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
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OF THE
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(INCLUDING THE VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY, MENTAL, MORAL,
AND METAPHYSICAL, BY WILLIAM FLEMING, D. D., PROF. OF
MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW,
FROM THE SECOND EDITION, 1860: AND THE THIRD,
1876, EDITED BY HENRY CALDERWOOD, LL. D.)

BY

CHARLES P. KRAUTH, S. T. D., LL. D.,
VICE-PROVOST OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA.

NEW YORK:
SHELDON & COMPANY.
1878.

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“Ἀρχὴ τῆς παιδείας ἡ τῶν ἀνοήτων ἐπιστήμη.”—*Epictetus*.

“Nomina et needs, perit et cognitio rerum.”

“He has been at a great feast of languages, and stolen the scraps.
O! they have lived long in the alms-basket of words.”

Love's Labour's Lost, Act v., Sc. 1.

“If we knew the original of all the words we meet with, we should thereby be very much helped to know the ideas they were first applied to, and made to stand for.”—*Locke*.

“In a language like ours, so many words of which are derived from other languages, there are few modes of instruction more useful or more amusing than that of accustoming young people to seek the etymology or primary meaning of the words they use. There are cases in which more knowledge, of more value, may be conveyed by the history of a word than by the history of a campaign.”—*Coleridge's Aids to Reflection*, Aphor. 12.

“In words contemplated singly, there are boundless stores of moral and historic truth.”—*French on Study of Words*, 12mo., Lond., 1853.

“Jock Ashler, the stane-mason that ca's himsel' an arkitekt—there's nae living for new words in this new world neither, and that's anither vex to auld folks such as me.”—*Quoth Meg Dods (St. Roman's Well*, chap. 2).

“A good dictionary is the best metaphysical treatise.”

“Etymology, in a moderate degree, is not only useful, as assisting the memory, but highly instructive and pleasing. But if pushed so far as to refer all words to a few primary elements, it loses all its value. It is like pursuing heraldry up to the first pair of mankind.”—*Coppleston's Remains*, p. 101.

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P R E F A C E.

I. IN this volume the reader has **TWO WORKS** by two writers. These works are closely related, yet are distinct. Together, they form a unit of plan. To Dr. Fleming belongs *The Vocabulary of Philosophy*, which, with the posthumous additions from his pen, and the definitions by Dr. Calderwood in the edition of 1876, is given *entire* in this new American edition, and in this alone. The last English edition omits much valuable matter of the second edition, probably to keep the size of the book within certain limits. This edition of Fleming is therefore the only complete exhibition of his labors. All the **ADDITIONS** made by the American editor to the former editions of Fleming are retained in this edition, but in a greatly improved form.

II. The "Vocabulary of the Philosophical Sciences" has, in general, with respect to the work it accompanies, two characteristics:

i. It is **SUPPLEMENTAL** to Fleming, and to the American editor's edition of Fleming.

1. **ADDITIONS** have been made to the **CHRONOLOGY**, bringing it down to June, 1877, the latest chronology of events and literature being far more full than the earlier, as information in regard to what is latest is least accessible.

2. The **SYNTHETICAL TABLE** is greatly enlarged, so as to cover completely the Philosophical Sciences, in their classification, terminology, and history. It now presents a methodological survey of all the most important terms, and of the great

schools and great names in the entire philosophical world, from the beginning to the present.

3. Other additions have been brought into their **PROPER PLACE**, so that the arrangement of the new volume, even after its great enlargement, is more simple and convenient than that of the old.

a. The Synthetical Table is placed at the **END** of the book.

b. The "German Philosophers of the most recent Era" is put in its proper place in the Synthetical Table.

c. The Vocabulary of German Terms, from Morell's *Tennessmann*, is presented in alphabetical order in the new Vocabulary.

d. The Index of Terms is put in its alphabetical places in the new Vocabulary. Every term which Fleming has, is marked with a star (*).

What is found under five heads, in five places, in the old, is drawn together under three in the new, so that the reader knows more easily *where* to find what he wants, and has fewer places to turn to for it.

4. An endeavor has been made to *remedy defects* in Fleming's plan and execution. New terms have been introduced, and new citations have been made. In this Fleming himself and Calderwood have borne part. Calderwood has introduced new terms, and has given definitions to them, and to a number of the old terms. Fleming's manuscripts have been drawn on for new matter. All the new matter in the Third London edition is incorporated in this.

ii. The "Vocabulary of the Philosophical Sciences" is, however, in important respects, **INDEPENDENT** of Fleming. The plan is greatly enlarged. There are entirely new departments in it; and others, in which Fleming has little, are presented with fulness.

1. The reader is not left to **INFER** the meaning of a term from a mass of discursive citation, but **DEFINITIONS ARE GIVEN**.

The CITATIONS are such as either directly define, or illustrate the definition.

2. The number of the more ELEMENTARY TERMS has been increased, with a view to the difficulties encountered by the learner.

3. The illustrations of the ANCIENT Philosophy, the basis of all real thinking, have been multiplied; additions have been made to the terms of the MEDIEVAL Philosophy, which still lives in the thinking and phrase of all the Occidental systems, and forms the very staple of some of the most widely received of them. The GREEK and LATIN terminology is presented both in its alphabetical place, where it is still retained in common use, and in its parallelism with English words.

The FRENCH, with its terminology, the BRITISH and AMERICAN philosophical literature have been more largely drawn on. The most important terms of the ORIENTAL systems have also been introduced.

4. HISTORICAL MATERIALS, illustrative of the rise, growth, and fluctuations of meaning are furnished in the case of terms which need such a treatment.

5. The more important PHRASES and COMBINATIONS of terms, and the GENERIC TERMS which mark the particular systems, are given.

6. The most noticeable weakness of Prof. Fleming's work is in GERMAN PHILOSOPHY, that philosophy which at this hour is exciting beyond any other the attention of the thinking world. In the "Vocabulary of the Philosophical Sciences," the most important distinctive terms of German philosophy are given in German at their alphabetical place. Its peculiarities in connection with these and with the common terms are illustrated in translations from the greatest German philosophers, especially from the time of Kant to the later and latest dates. The views of a number of writers of great distinction are introduced, in this volume, to the English reader for the first time. The

citations are carefully selected with reference to their direct value in **DEFINING** words and things, and winnowed from what is irrelevant to that aim.

7. Nothing in the same compass is of more service than carefully arranged **TABULAR VIEWS**. In these, this work will be found very rich. In the same line of usefulness are **OUTLINES** of the great epoch-making works, and of these there is a number. The various parts of the philosophical sciences and of their literature are **CLASSIFIED**.

8. The **BIBLIOGRAPHICAL** references are copious. The work is an **INDEX** — in some cases almost a **CONCORDANCE** — of much of the most important philosophical literature.

9. The whole character of the work is **OBJECTIVE**. It is designed to furnish impartial information in regard to all schools of thought. It is not meant, except as simple statements of truth may tend either way, for the defence of any system, however good, or the exposure of any system, however bad; but for the definition of the terms, general and particular, of all systems.

10. Its aim, in brief, is to furnish an **INDISPENSABLE** to the learner, a **CONVENIENCE** to the scholar.

III. The **NECESSARY LIMITATIONS** involved in the plan of the work must not be forgotten by the reader.

1. It is a **VOCABULARY, NOT AN ENCYCLOPÆDIA**. Its object is to define terms. This indeed often involves the history of terms and illustrations of their use. The definition of the word cannot be separated from the definition of the thing. A great deal, therefore, of the most important **MATTER** of Philosophy is involved in the plan, but only as it is connected with **DEFINITION**.

2. It is essential to facility in use, and to moderateness in price, that its **BULK** should not be excessive. The author has endeavored to keep the book from undue dimensions, not by omitting anything which he thought should be in it, but by careful avoid-

ance of superfluous matter; by economizing in space; by selecting a smaller type, where it could be employed with advantage; and by using the initial of the word defined where it recurs in the article.

IV. THE ACKNOWLEDGMENTS of the Author are due to Professor Robert Ellis Thompson, the Librarian of the University of Pennsylvania: first, for the judicious selection of philosophical works made by him for the Library; and secondly, for the facilities rendered by him in the use of that Library, and of his own, as well as for varied information derived from his large and thoughtful reading. The Author's thanks are also due to the Philadelphia Library, and to its courteous and intelligent librarians. For letters of sympathy with his work, and of friendly and useful suggestion, he is indebted to Professors Thos. G. Apple, P. E. Chase, T. S. Doolittle, and E. V. Gerhart; to Presidents J. W. Nevin, S. S. Sprecher, and M. Valentine; to Hon. W. T. Harris, editor of the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, and to Hon. Furman Sheppard, who, known to the world as one of our most distinguished jurists, is also one of our ripest philosophical scholars and thinkers.

V. THE SOURCES AND AIDS which have been employed by the writer will be found fully indicated at the particular articles. Having a working acquaintance with the languages which are the main repositories of philosophical thought, he hopes that the book will bring with it evidence that the rich stores within his reach have not been regarded ungratefully nor used carelessly.

CHARLES P. KRAUTH.

PHILADELPHIA, June 23, 1877.

INTRODUCTION

BY THE EDITOR.

It will, we think, be conceded by all who are familiar with philosophical writings, that there has never been gathered in our language in that department a fund of thought and of information which within as small a compass presents more that is valuable than we find in the *Vocabulary of Philosophy* by Professor Fleming. Jean Paul tells us that he never took up a book, the title of which excited extraordinary anticipation, without finding that he was destined to disappointment. It may safely be affirmed, on the other hand, that where the modesty of a title is unfeigned, the book, if it disappoint us at all, disappoints us agreeably. Of this class is the *Vocabulary of Philosophy*. It is much more than the title promises, for it illustrates the matter of philosophy as well as its terms. It gives incidentally a great deal of the history of philosophy, and notices its literature on the leading subjects. It is to a large extent made up of the very words of the most distinguished philosophical writers, and thus becomes a guide to their opinions and to the most important portions of their works. Professor Fleming has not laboured single-handed, but has in this way drawn into his service, as co-workers, many of the greatest

minds of all lands and of all time. It is true everywhere, and especially in the philosophical sciences, that the knowledge of words is, to a large extent, the knowledge of things. To grasp the full meaning of a term, we must oftentimes not only have a definition of it, but we must trace its history — and to know its history, we must know the views of the men who employed it, and the circumstances under which those views were formed and expressed; for the history of words is the history of the world. A Vocabulary with this large aim would be in fact a dictionary or Cyclopædia of subjects and of authors. A Vocabulary, on the other hand, in the strictest sense, would simply give us terms and a definition of them. Professor Fleming's book is midway between these classes. It rises as far above the second class, as from its compactness and the nature of its design it necessarily comes short of the first. In the Preface to the Second Edition, however, a conditional promise is given that he may attempt such a work as the first would be. We hope that the author may be encouraged to carry out his purpose, and that in conjunction with the best philosophical thinkers in our language, he may give us what is so much needed — a Cyclopædial Dictionary of the Philosophical Sciences, and of their literature and history.

The Editor, at the request of the Publishers, consented to make the effort to render the Vocabulary of Philosophy still more useful, so far as the very brief time of the passage of the work through the press would allow him. To have made additions to the text of a living author he would have considered an unwarranted liberty; and, apart from this consideration, such additions are really not needed, nor would they be consistent with the plan and purpose of the book, to both which compactness is indispensable. To have made the book a large

and expensive one would have destroyed one of its distinctive aims.

He directed his main efforts, therefore, to what he considers the proper functions of an editor, to the bringing more completely within the reach of the reader the treasures offered by the author. He has aimed at the accomplishment of this end in the present case in the following way :

I. He has thrown into the margin, where the eye readily catches them, when they are needed, the citations which, in the English edition, encumber and disfigure the text.

II. He has added a Vocabulary of some of the principal terms used by German philosophers.

III. He has given, from Tennemann's Manual, a Chronological Table of the History of Philosophy, enlarged somewhat in its closing part, and brought down to the year 1860; and with this has been connected a classification, by schools, of the latest German philosophers.

It is in matters connected with German philosophy that Professor Fleming seems least at home. He is evidently dependent upon translators and critics for his knowledge of them; and of translations from the German, especially in this department, we may use the reply which Canova made when Napoleon, as an inducement to the artist to reside in the French Capital, proposed to transfer the works of Art from Rome to Paris: "When you remove all that can be removed, there will remain infinitely more than all you have taken away."

IV. The largest measure of labour has been bestowed upon the Bibliographical Index. Though this is so arranged as to form an Index to the Vocabulary, it has nevertheless an independent value. It gives every name quoted or alluded to in the Vocabulary, and these embrace all the names of the most im-

portance in Philosophy. In the Index, as a general thing, the names of the authors are given in full, the dates of their birth and death, or of the period in which they flourished are added, together with the titles of their works, not only of those cited in the Vocabulary, but in many cases of others that are most important, with the dates either of their composition or of the best editions, and in many cases the dates of both. The reference is not by the page but by the subject under which they are quoted, so that the Index shows the topics of the works catalogued, and thus presents a special vocabulary of the terms of the leading authors. By turning, for instance, to the articles Aristotle, Plato, Hamilton, or Leibnitz, the reader will find himself able to examine consecutively the views of those great leaders in the World of Philosophical Science. Some of the most important philosophical works are destitute of an Index. Hamilton's Reid, for example, has none. The Vocabulary, with its Bibliographical additions, becomes to some extent an Index to such works. In preparing this Index with its Bibliographical feature, which, with all its imperfections, is, so far as the Editor knows, the only one of its kind, he has sometimes found all the sources within his reach, inadequate. It is based first of all upon an actual inspection of the works, where this was practicable. The facilities for this have been furnished by his own library, by the Philadelphia Library, and by the bookstores of the city. In this department he found the stock of his Publishers rich and well selected, and he acknowledges the facilities which they kindly gave to his labours by the unrestricted use of the whole. There still remained, however, a large number of works, for an ability to notice which he is indebted to various valuable books of reference. Among these might be mentioned. First, the works in which the Bibliography of Philosophy is

treated as a part of general Bibliography. The best English, American, French, and German CYCLOPEDIAS present more or less largely such materials. The works in BIBLIOGRAPHY, and in LITERARY HISTORY, Watt, Brunet, Ebert, Græsser, Darling, also furnish valuable matter. The best general BIOGRAPHIES are also necessarily bibliographical, and special attention has been given to this department in the admirable work edited by Hoefer, and now in process of publication by the Didots.¹

In ENGLISH and AMERICAN Bibliography, the Editor has had the best works of reference at hand, including the various Catalogues to the latest dates. Although all of them have been in various degrees necessary in the preparation of the Index, yet in a large proportion of cases the work of Mr. Allibone, as far as it is completed, is, for English and American authors, *instar omnium*, and sometimes much more, for it largely embodies matter not before in print. On many names it will always remain the primary source of information. Though the minute testing, letter by letter, most of all in a specialty like that of Philosophy, is one which very few works of a general character will at all endure, we have found, to a surprising extent, in this comprehensive work, what we searched it for, and we could not but feel a grateful regret in parting company with it in the very middle of the vast forest of the noblest Literature of the modern World.

For the French and German Literature he has also had access to the best sources.²

¹ Nouvelle Biographie Générale depuis les temps les plus reculés jusqu'à nos Jours. 1857. Thirty-one vols. have appeared.

² For the French, among others, La France Littéraire, with its continuation under the title La Littérature Française Contemporaine. 16 vols. 1827—1857. Bossange. Bibliographie de la France. 1850—1860. Reinwald, Catalogue Annuel, 1859—60. For the German, Georgi, Heinsius, Kayser, and the semi-annual Catalogues

The works in which the Bibliography of Philosophy is a SPECIALTY are comparatively few. Among them may be enumerated the best DICTIONARIES of Philosophy; Walch, Krug, the Dictionnaire des Sciences Philosophiques, and Furtmaier:¹ and the HISTORIES of Philosophy, which give its literature, among which, as valuable in this aspect, and easy of access, may be mentioned Tennemann's Manual and Blakey's History of the Philosophy of Mind. The books devoted EXCLUSIVELY to the Bibliography of Philosophy are of course very few. The Editor would mention those only which he has on his own shelves. These are — the Psychological Library of GRAESSE,² in which he presents in alphabetical order the titles of the most important works of ancient and of modern times relating to the soul, and to the doctrine of immortality; the Bibliographical Manual of German Philosophical Literature from the middle of the XVIIIth Century to the present day, by ERSCH³ and GEISSLER; the Philosophical Literature of Germany, from A. D. 1400 to the present time, by GUMPOSCH⁴; and the Philosophical Library of LADRANGE,⁵ which is a useful list of the best works of this class in French, original and translated.

V. The final labours of the Editor have been devoted to the preparation of the SYNTHETICAL TABLES which follow this Introduction. The utility of these tables will, we think, at once strike the reader. The First Part forms a skeleton of the Philosophical Sciences; the Second Part presents an outline of their history. It will be perceived that all these additions, which have increased the size of the book by 110 pages, have

¹ Philosophisches Real-Lexicon. 4 vols. 8vo. 1853–1855.

² Bibliotheca Psychologica. Leipzig. 1845.

³ Bibliographisches Handbuch. Dritte Auflage. Leipz. 1850.

⁴ Die Philosoph. Literatur der Deutschen. Regensburg, 1851.

⁵ Librairie Philosophique. Paris, 1856.

a certain internal unity, and are designed to co-operate in producing a common result. Very far more than in the ratio in which they have enlarged the work, the Editor believes, they have added to its value as a Manual. The student will find such bibliographical aid as he needs in beginning to form an acquaintance with philosophical literature. The Vocabulary, without undergoing a change in what its author has done, has to some extent become a Compendious Dictionary of Philosophy. Its leading articles, as indeed those of any work which arranges philosophical matter alphabetically, can, by the aid of the first part of the Synthetical Tables, be read in the order of nature. The general character and succession of the philosophical schools of all times are briefly presented in the second part. The Chronology of the History of Philosophy used in conjunction with the Bibliographical Index will enable the student, to some extent, to trace, by the aid of the Vocabulary, the theories and views of philosophers in the order of time. The work might indeed, in its present shape, be used advantageously, not merely as an indispensable aid in easily reaching the meaning of other works, but as a text-book for the systematic study of the Elements of Philosophy. It is a thread for the hand of the student who is entering that labyrinth which, beyond all the structures of man, proves the majesty of the mind, and the invincible character of some of its limitations.

PHILADELPHIA, August 10, 1860.

P R E F A C E
TO
THE FIRST EDITION.

THE aim of the following work, as its title indicates, is humble. It is not proposed to attempt an adequate illustration of the difficult and important topics denoted or suggested by the several vocables which are successively explained. All that is intended is, to assist the student towards a right understanding of the language of philosophy, and a right apprehension of the questions in discussing which that language has been employed. Instead of affixing a positive or precise signification to the vocables and phrases, it has been thought better to furnish the student with the means of doing so for himself—by showing whence they are derived, or of what they are compounded, and how they have been employed. In like manner, the quotations and references have not been selected with the view of supporting any particular system of philosophy, but rather with the view of leading to free inquiry, extended reading, and careful reflection, as the surest means of arriving at true and sound conclusions.

In our Scottish Universities, the study of philosophy is entered upon by those who, in respect of maturity of years and intellect, and in respect of previous preparation and attain-

ment, differ widely from one another. To many, a help like the present may not be necessary. To others, the Author has reason to think it may be useful. Indeed, it was the felt want of some such help, in the discharge of professional duty, which prompted the attempt to supply it. The labor has been greater than the result can indicate or measure. But, should THE VOCABULARY assist the young student by directing him what to read, and how to understand what he reads, in philosophy, the labourer shall have received the hire for which he wrought.

THE COLLEGE, GLASGOW,

November, 1856.

PREFACE

TO

THE SECOND EDITION.

THE VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY was originally prepared for the use of a Class of students who give attendance on a lengthened course of Lectures on Moral Philosophy. The words and phrases selected for explanation, were chiefly such as were actually employed in the Lectures, or such as the students were likely to meet with in the course of their reading. Of the words and phrases of the German Philosophy, only such were introduced as had found their way into common use.

THE VOCABULARY having been found useful, beyond the limits for which it was originally intended, a Second Edition has speedily been called for. Useful suggestions have spontaneously been made to the Author by persons with whom he was previously unacquainted; and, among others, by Mr. Haywood, the Translator of the *Criticism of the Pure Reason*. Mr. Morell, who was formerly a student at this University, and who is now so well known by his valuable contributions to Philosophy, had the kindness to go over the contents of THE VOCABULARY, and to furnish a list of such additional words and phrases as might be introduced with advantage. The like

good office was rendered by Dr. M'Cosh, the distinguished Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in Queen's College, Belfast; and the Author has done what he could to make this Edition more complete and useful. The quotations have, in some instances, been shortened; and, without much increasing the size of the work, many additional words and phrases, from the different departments of Philosophy, have been introduced.

It still retains the name and form of a VOCABULARY, in the hope that it may prove useful in our higher Academies and Colleges. But, should suitable encouragement and co-operation be obtained, it is in contemplation, by extending the plan and enlarging the articles, to claim for the work a higher title, by trying to make it instrumental in rendering to Philosophy among ourselves, a service similar to what has been rendered to Philosophy in France, by the publication of the *Dictionnaire des Sciences Philosophiques*.

THE COLLEGE, GLASGOW,

February, 1858.

PREFATORY NOTE BY THE EDITOR

(TO THE THIRD LONDON EDITION).

THE fact that the *Vocabulary of Philosophy* by the late Professor Fleming soon passed through two editions, shows that it has supplied a want felt by those entering upon philosophic study. Recognizing this, I have willingly responded to the request to edit a new issue of the work.

My purpose has been to retain the book as nearly as possible in the form in which it came from the hands of Professor Fleming. Occasionally I have withdrawn some quotations, when their number seemed too large. Additional manuscript, left by Professor Fleming, has been carefully examined, and some part of the new matter has been introduced. Vocables have been inserted, the absence of which left a blank in a *Vocabulary of Philosophy*.

In only one thing have I thought it needful to depart from Professor Fleming's plan. I have ventured to introduce definitions of the leading vocables. These definitions constitute the new feature in the edition now published, and are enclosed within brackets, to indicate the portions for which I must be held responsible.

H. CALDERWOOD.

UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH,
11th September, 1876.

ABBREVIATIONS.

- B. W.** *Baumeister*: *Philosophia Definitiva. Definitiones Philosophicæ ex Systemate Wolfi.* (Ed. Septima) 1746.
- C. (Ch.)** *Chauvini Stephani*: *Lexicon Philosophicum* (2d ed.), 1713.
- C. D. A. (D. A. C.)** *Complément du Dictionnaire de l'Académie Française*, 1847.
- C. F. V.** *Culderwood, Henry*: *Fleming's Vocabulary*, Third ed., 1876.
- Ch.** *Chauvin*. See **C.**
- D. A. G.** See **C. D. A.**
- D. P. S.** *Dictionnaire des Sciences Philosophiques . . .* sous la direction de M. Ad. Franck, 2d ed., 1875.
- Fu.** *Furtmair, Max*: *Philosophisches Real-Lexikon*, 4 vols., 1853-1855.
- F. V. 3.** Additions to the *Third* edition of *Fleming's Vocabulary*, from his manuscript.
- K.** *Krug, Wilhelm Traugott*: *Allgemeines Handwörterbuch der Philosophischen Wissenschaften*, 2d ed., 5 vols., 1832-1838.
- L.** *Lossius, Johann Christian*: *Neues Philosophisches Real-Lexikon*, 4 vols., 1803-1805.
- L. J.** *Latham, Robert Gordon*: *Dictionary of the English Language*, founded on that of *Dr. Samuel Johnson*, as edited by *Dr. H. J. Todd*, 1866-1870.
- L. S. L.** *Liddell, Henry George*: and *Scott, Robert*: *A Greek-English Lexicon*, 6th ed., 1869.
- M. T. M.** *Morell's Tennemann's Manual* (Kantian and other metaphysical terms), 1852.
- S. S. D.** *Smith, C. J.*: *Synonyms Discriminated*, 1871.
- W.** *Wolf, Christian*. See **B. W.**
- * indicates that there is an article on the word in *Fleming*.

THE VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY.

ABDUCTION (*abductio*, ἀπαγωγή, a leading away) is a kind of syllogism in which it is plain that the major extreme is contained in the middle; but it is not apparent that the middle is included in the minor extreme, although this is equally credible or more so than the conclusion. From this, therefore, that its major proposition is plain, it approaches to demonstration; but it is not yet demonstration, since its assumption or minor proposition is not evident. But the assumption is not evident because it is not immediate, but requires proof to make the demonstration complete. For example—All whom God absolves are free from sin. But God absolves all who are in Christ. Therefore all who are in Christ are free from sin. In this apagogic syllogism the major proposition is self-evident; but the assumption is not plain till another proposition proving it is introduced, namely, God condemns sin in them by the mission of his Son. This mode of reasoning is called *abduction*, because it withdraws us from the conclusion to the proof of a proposition concealed or not expressed. It is described by Aristotle.¹

ABILITY and INABILITY — (NATURAL and MORAL).

Ability (Nat.) is power to do certain acts, in consequence of being possessed of the requisite means, and being unrestrained in their exercise; thus we say ability to walk, the power of seeing, &c.

Inability (Nat.) is the opposite of this; as when we say of a blind man, he is unable to see; or when an object is too distant, we say we are unable to see it.

¹ *Prior. Analyt.*, lib. II., cap. 26.

ABILITY —

Ability (Mor.) is the disposition to use rightly the powers and opportunities which God has given; as when it is written, "It is a joy to the just to do judgment."

Inability (Mor.) is the want of a right disposition; as in those of whom it is written, "They have eyes full of adultery, and cannot cease from sin." "If there is anything besides want of inclination which prevents a man from performing a particular act, he is said to be *naturally* unable to do it. If unwillingness is the only obstacle in the way, he is said to be *morally* unable. That which prevents a man from doing *as he will*, is *natural inability*. That which prevents him from doing *as he ought*, is *moral inability*."¹

ABSCISSIO INFINITI is a phrase applied by some logical writers to a series of arguments used in any inquiry in which we go on *excluding*, one by one, certain suppositions, or certain classes of things, from that whose real nature we are seeking to ascertain. Thus, certain symptoms, suppose, exclude "*small-pox*;" that is, prove this *not* to be the patient's disorder; other symptoms, suppose, exclude "*scarlatina*" &c., and so one may proceed by gradually narrowing the range of possible suppositions."²

ABSOLUTE (*absolutum*, from *ab* and *solvere*, to free or loose from) signifies what is free from restriction or limit.

"We must know what is to be meant by *absolute* or *absolute-ness*; whereof I find two main significations. First, *absolute* signifieth *perfect*, and *absoluteness*, *perfection*; hence we have in Latin this expression—*Perfectum est omnibus numeris absolutum*. And in our vulgar language we say a thing is *absolutely* good when it is *perfectly* good. Next, *absolute* signifieth *free from tie or bond*, which in Greek is ἀπολευμένην."³

1. As meaning what is complete or perfect in itself, as a man, a tree, it is opposed to what is relative.

2. As meaning what is free from restriction, it is opposed to what exists *secundum quid*. The *soul* of man is *immortal absolutely*; man is *immortal only* as to his soul.

¹ Day, *On the Will*, pp. 96, 97.

² Whately, *Log.* b. ii., ch. iii., s. 4, and ch. v., s. 1, sub. 7.
Knox, *Hist. of Reform.*, Pref.

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3. As meaning what is underived, it denotes self-existence, and is predicable only of the First Cause.

4. It signifies not only what is free from external cause, but also free from *condition*.

Absolute, Unconditioned, Infinite.—"The *Absolute*, taking its etymological sense, may be explained as that which is *free* from all necessary relation; which exists in and by itself, and does not require the prior or simultaneous existence of anything else. The *Unconditioned*, in like manner, is that which is subject to no law or condition of being; which exists, therefore, in and by itself, and does not imply the prior or simultaneous existence of anything else. The *Absolute* and *Unconditioned* are also identical with the *Real*; for relation is but a phenomenon, implying and depending on the prior existence of things related; while the true *Real* is unrelated. Such a science as metaphysics, which has in all ages been proclaimed as the science of the *Absolute*, the *Unconditioned*, and the *Real*, according to Kant, must be unattainable by man; for all knowledge is consciousness, and all consciousness implies a relation between the subject or person conscious, and the object or thing of which he is conscious. An object of consciousness cannot be *Absolute*; for consciousness depends on the laws of the conscious mind, its existence as such implies an act of consciousness, and consciousness is a relation. It cannot be the *Unconditioned*; for consciousness depends on the laws of the conscious mind, and these are conditions. It cannot be the *Real*; for the laws of our consciousness can only give us things as they appear to us, and do not tell us what they are in themselves."¹

"Mr. Calderwood defines the *Absolute*, which he rightly identifies with the *Infinite*, as 'that which is free from all necessary relation:' 'it may exist in relation, provided that relation be not a necessary condition of its existence. Hence he holds that the *Absolute* may exist in the relation of consciousness, and in that relation be apprehended, though imperfectly, by man. On this theory we have two *absolutes*: the *Absolute* as it exists out of consciousness, and the *Absolute* as it is known in consciousness. Mr. Calderwood rests his theory on the

¹ Mansel, *Lecture on Philosophy of Kant*, p. 26.

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assumption that these two are one. How is this identity to be ascertained? How do I know that *the* absolute is *my* absolute? I cannot compare them; for comparison is a relation, and the first *Absolute* exists out of relation. Again, to compare them, I must be in and out of consciousness at the same time; for the first *Absolute* is never in consciousness, and the second is never out of it. Again, the *Absolute* as known is an object of consciousness; and an object of consciousness as such, cannot exist, save in relation. But the true *Absolute*, by its definition, can exist out of relation; therefore the *Absolute* as known is not the true *Absolute*. Mr. Calderwood's *Absolute* in consciousness is only the *Relative* under a false name."¹

According to Sir William Hamilton,² "The *Unconditioned* denotes the genus of which the *Infinite* and the *Absolute* are the species."

As to our knowledge or conception of the *Absolute*, there are different opinions.

1. According to Sir William Hamilton, "The mind can conceive, and consequently can know, only the limited, and the *conditionally* limited. The *unconditionally unlimited*, or the *Infinite*, the *unconditionally limited*, or the *Absolute*, cannot positively be construed to the mind; they can be conceived at all only by thinking away, or abstraction of those very conditions under which thought itself is realized; consequently the notion of the *Unconditioned* is only negative—negative of the conceivable itself."

2. According to Kant, the *Absolute* or *Unconditioned* is not an object of knowledge; but its notion as a regulative principle of the mind itself, is more than a mere negation of the conditioned.

3. According to Schelling, it is cognizable, but not conceivable; it can be known by a sinking back into identity with the *Absolute*, but is incomprehensible by consciousness and reflection, which are only of the *Relative* and the *Different*.

4. According to Cousin, it is cognizable and conceivable by consciousness and reflection, under relation, difference, and plurality.

Instead of saying that God is *Absolute* and *Infinite*,

¹ Mansel, *Lecture on Philosophy of Kant*, p. 36.

² *Discussions*, p. 12.

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Krause, and his admirer, Tiberghien, ascribe to him *Seîté* (*selbheit*) and Totality. Totality or the Infinite manifests itself everywhere in nature. *Nature* is made up of wholes, and all these constitute one whole. In *spirit* everything manifests itself under the character of spontaneity or *seîté*. *Spirit* always is what it is by its own individual efforts.

All philosophy aims at a knowledge of the *Absolute* under different phases. In psychology, the fundamental question is, have we ideas that are *à priori* and *absolute*?—in logic, is human knowledge *absolute*?—in ethics, is the moral law *absolute* rectitude?—and in metaphysics, what is the ultimate ground of all existence or *absolute* being?¹—V. INFINITE, UNCONDITIONED, REAL.

ABSTINENCE (*abs teneo*, to hold from or off)—“is whereby a man refraineth from anything which he may lawfully take.”²

Abstinence is voluntarily refraining from things which nature, and especially physical nature, needs or delights in, for a moral or religious end. It corresponds to the *Ἀνίσχου* of the precept of Epictetus, *Ἀνίσχου καὶ ἀνίσχου*; *Sustine et abstine*. The Stoics inculcated abstinence in order to make the soul more independent of the body and the things belonging to the body.—Christian abstinence is founded in humility and self-mortification.—V. ASCETICISM.

ABSTRACT, ABSTRACTION (*abstractio*, from *abs traho*, to draw away from. It is also called *separatio* and *resolutio*).

Dobrisch observes that the term *abstraction* is used sometimes in a psychological, sometimes in a logical sense. In the former we are said to abstract the attention from certain distinctive features of objects presented (*abstrahere [mentem] a differentiis*). In the latter, we are said to abstract certain portions of a given concept from the remainder (*abstrahere differentias*).³

Abstraction (Psychological), says Mr. Stewart,⁴ “is the power of considering certain qualities or attributes of an object apart

¹ *Essai des Connaissances Humaines*, pp. 738, 745.

² See *Edinburgh Review* for October, 1829; Sir William Hamilton (*Discussions*) Tiberghien (*Essai des Connaissances Humaines*).

³ Elyot, *Governour*, b. iii., a. 18.

⁴ Mansel, *Prolegom. Log.*, note, p. 26

⁵ *Elements of the Philosophy of Human Mind*, chap. iv.

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from the rest; or, as I would rather choose to define it, the power which the understanding has of separating the combinations which are presented to it." Perhaps it may be more correctly regarded as a *process* rather than a *power*—as a *function* rather than a *faculty*. Dr. Reid has called it "an *operation* of the understanding. It consists in the resolving or analyzing a subject (object) into its known attributes, and giving a name to each attribute, which shall signify that attribute and nothing more." Attributes are not presented to us singly in nature, but in the *concrete*, or growing together, and it is by *abstraction* that we consider them separately. In looking at a tree we may perceive simultaneously its trunk, and its branches, and its leaves, and its fruit; or we may contemplate any one of these to the exclusion of all the rest; and when we do so it is by the operation of mind which has been called *abstraction*. It implies an exercise of will as well as of understanding; for there must be the determination and effort to fix the energy of the mind on the attribute specially contemplated.

The chemist really separates into their elements those bodies which are submitted to his analysis. The psychologist does the same thing mentally. Hence *abstraction* has been distinguished as *real* and *mental*. But as the object presented to the psychologist may be an object of sense or an object of thought, the process of *abstraction* may be either *real* or *mental*. He may pluck off a branch from a tree, or a leaf from a branch, in order to consider the sensation or perception which is occasioned in him. And in contemplating mind, he may think of its capacity of feeling without thinking of its power of activity, or of the faculty of memory apart from any or all of the other faculties with which it is allied.

Abstraction (Logical), "As we have described it," says Mr. Thomson,² "would include three separate acts; first, an act of *comparison*, which brings several intuitions together; next, one of *reflection*, which seeks for some marks which they all possess, and by which they may be combined into one group; and last, one of *generalization*, which forms the new general

¹ *Intellect. Powers*, essay v., chap. 3.

² *Outline of the Laws of Thought*, p. 107.

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notion or conception. Kant, however, confines the name of *abstraction* to the last of the three; others apply it to the second. It is not of much consequence whether we enlarge or narrow the meaning of the word, so long as we see the various steps of the process. The word means a drawing away of the common marks from all the distinctive marks which the single objects have."

"The process," says Dr. Whately,¹ "by which the mind arrives at the notions expressed by 'common' (or in popular language, 'general') terms is properly called 'generalization,' though it is usually (and truly) said to be the business of *abstraction*; for generalization is one of the purposes to which *abstraction* is applied. When we draw off and *contemplate separately* any part of an object presented to the mind, disregarding the rest of it, we are said to *abstract* that part of it. Thus, a person might, when a rose was before his eye or his mind, make the scent a distinct object of attention, laying aside all thought of the colour, form, &c.; and thus, even though it were the *only* rose he had ever met with, he would be employing the faculty of *abstraction*; but if, in contemplating several objects, and finding that they agree in certain points, we abstract the circumstances of agreement, disregarding the differences, and give to all and each of these objects a name applicable to them in respect of this agreement,—i. e., a *common* name, as 'rose;' or, again, if we give a name to some attribute wherein they agree, as 'fragrance,' or 'redness,' we are then said to 'generalize.' *Abstraction*, therefore, does not necessarily imply *generalization*, though *generalization* implies *abstraction*." In opposition to this, see Thomson.²

"A person who had never seen but one rose," says Mr. Stewart,³ "might yet have been able to consider its *colour* apart from its other qualities; and, therefore, there may be such a thing as an idea which is at once *abstract* and *particular*. After having perceived this quality as belonging to a variety of individuals, we can consider it without reference to any of them, and thus form the notion of redness or whiteness

¹ *Log.*, book 1., sect. 6.

² *Outline of the Laws of Thought*, part 1., sect. 24.

³ Addenda to vol. 1., *Phil. of Hum. Mind*.

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in general, which may be called a general abstract idea. The words *abstract* and *general*, therefore, when applied to ideas, are as completely distinct from each other as any two words to be found in the language. It is indeed true, that the formation of every general notion presupposes *abstraction*, but it is surely improper, on this account, to call a *general term* an *abstract term*, or a *general idea* an *abstract idea*."

Mr. John S. Mill also censures severely¹ the practice of applying the expression "abstract name" to all names which are the result of *abstraction* or *generalization*, and consequently to all general names, instead of confining it to the names of attributes. He uses the term *abstract* as opposed to *concrete*. By an abstract name he means the name of an attribute—by a concrete name the name of an object. The sea is a concrete name. Saltness is an abstract name. Some abstract names are general names, such as colour; but rose-colour, a name obtained by abstraction, is not a general name.

"By *abstract terms*, which should be carefully distinguished from *general names*, I mean those which do not designate any object or event, or any class of objects or events, but an attribute or quality belonging to them; and which are capable of standing grammatically detached, without being joined to other terms: such as, the words roundness, swiftness, length, innocence, equity, health, whiteness."²

"When the notion derived from the view taken of any object," says Dr. Whately,³ "is expressed with a reference to, or as in conjunction with, the object that furnished the notion, it is expressed by a *concrete term*, as 'foolish' or 'fool:' when without any such reference, by an *abstract term*, as 'folly.'" And he adds in a note, "It is unfortunate that some writers have introduced the fashion of calling all *common terms abstract terms*."—*V. TERM.*

A French philosopher has expressed himself on this point to the following effect:—"In every class, genus, or species, there are two things which may be conceived distinctly, the objects united in the class, and the characters which serve to unite them.

¹ *Log.*, vol. 1., 2d edition, p. 86.

² S. Bailey, *Letters on Phil. Human Mind*, p. 196.

³ *Log.*, book ii., chap. 5, sect. 1.

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Hence it follows, that under every term which represents that ideal whole which we call *genus*, under the term 'bird,' for example, there are two different ideas,—the idea of the number of the objects united, and the idea of the common characters; this is what is called the *extension* and the *comprehension* of general terms. Sometimes there is a word to denote the *extension*, and another word to denote the *comprehension*; as 'mortals' and 'mortality.' And this has led some philosophers to say that there are general ideas which are *concrete* and general ideas which are *abstract*—the latter referring only to the qualities which are common, and the former to the qualities and to the objects which possess them."

"The mind," says Mr. Locke,¹ "makes particular ideas received from particular objects to become general, which is done by considering them as they are in the mind such appearances, separate from all other existences, and the circumstances of real existence, as time, place, or any other concomitant ideas. This is called *abstraction*, whereby ideas taken from particular beings, become general representatives of all of the same kind; and their names *general* names, applicable to whatever exists conformable to such *abstract* ideas."²

In reference to this, Bishop Berkeley has said,³ "I own myself able to *abstract* ideas, in one sense, as when I consider some particular parts or qualities separated from others, with which, though they are united in some object, yet it is possible they may really exist without them. But I deny that I can *abstract* one from another, or conceive separately those qualities which it is impossible should exist separately; or that I can frame a general notion by *abstracting* from particulars, as aforesaid, which two last are the proper acceptation of *abstraction*."

"It seems to me," says Mr. Hume,⁴ "not impossible to avoid these absurdities and contradictions,⁵ if it be admitted that there are no such things as abstract in general ideas, properly speaking, but that all general ideas are in reality

¹ *Essay on Hum. Under.*, book II., chap. 11, sect. 2.

² See also book IV., chap. 7, sect. 2.

³ *Principles of Hum. Know.*, Introd., sect. 10.

⁴ *Essays*, p. 371, n. c. edit., 1768.

⁵ See his *Essay on Skeptical Philosophy*.

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particular ones attached to a general term which recalls, upon occasion, other particular ones that resemble in certain circumstances the idea present to the mind. Thus, when the term 'horse' is pronounced, we immediately figure to ourselves the idea of a black or white animal of a particular size or figure; but as that term is also used to be applied to animals of other colours, figures, and sizes, their ideas, though not actually present to the imagination, are easily recalled, and our reasoning and conclusion proceed in the same way as if they were actually present."

In reference to the views of Berkeley and Hume which are supported by S. Bailey in *Letters on Phil. Hum. Mind*, see Dr. Reid.¹

The Rev. Sidney Smith² mentions an essay on *Abstraction* by Dumarsais, and calls it an admirable abridgment of Locke's *Essay*. — V. COMMON, CONCRETE, GENERALIZATION.

ABSTRACTIVE (KNOWLEDGE) and INTUITIVE.

The knowledge of the Deity has been distinguished into *abstractive* and *intuitive*, or knowledge of simple *intelligence* and knowledge of *vision*, or immediate beholding. By the former mode of knowing, God knows all things possible, whether they are actually to happen or not. By the latter He knows things future as if they were actually beheld or envisaged by him.³

ABSURD (*ab surdo*, a reply from a deaf man who has not heard what he replies to, or, according to Vossius, that which should be heard with deaf ears) properly means that which is logically contradictory; as, a triangle with four sides. What is contrary to experience merely cannot be called *absurd*, for experience extends only to facts and laws which we know; but there may be facts and laws which we have not observed and do not know, and facts and laws not actually manifested may yet be possible. — V. ARGUMENT (INDIRECT).

ACADEMICS. — "There are some philosophers who have made denying their profession, and who have even established on that foundation the whole of their philosophy; and amongst these philosophers, some are satisfied with denying certainty, admit-

¹ *Intell. Powers*, essay v., chap. 6.

² *Lectures on Mor. Phil.*, lect. III.

³ *Baronius, Metaphys.*, sect. 12, disput. II.

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ting at the same time probability, and these are the *New Academics*; the others, who are the *Pyrrhonists*, have denied even this probability, and have maintained that all things are equally certain and uncertain."¹

The *Academic* school embraces a period of four ages, from Plato to Antiochus. Some admit three Academies—first, that of Plato, 388 B.C.; middle, that of Arcesilas, 244 B.C.; new, that of Carneades and Clitomachus, 160 B.C. To these some add a fourth, that of Philon and Charmides, and a fifth, that of Antiochus. But Plato, and his true disciples, Speusippus and Xenocrates, should not be classed with these semi-sceptics, whose characteristic doctrine was τὸ πιθανόν, or the probable.²

ACADEMY.—Academus or Hecademus left to the inhabitants of Athens a piece of ground for a promenade, Hipparchus, son of Piristratus enclosed it with walls, Cimon, son of Miltiades, planted it with trees. Plato assembled his disciples in it, hence they were called *Academics*.³

ACATALEPSY (α, privative; and *κατάληψις*, *comprehensio*, incomprehensibility) is the term employed by Bacon⁴ to denote the doctrine held by the ancient academics and sceptics that human knowledge never amounts to certainty, but only to probability. "Their chief error," says Bacon, "lay in this, that they falsely charged the perceptions of the senses; by doing which they tore up the sciences by the root. But the senses, though they may often either deceive or fail us, yet can afford a sufficient basis for real science." Hence he says,⁵ "We do not meditate or propose *acatalepsy*, but *euacatalepsy*, for we do not derogate from sense, but help it, and we do not despise the understanding, but direct it." Arcesilas, chief of the second Academy, taught that we know nothing with certainty, in opposition to the dogmatism of the Stoics, who taught *κατάληψις*, or the possibility of seizing the truth. All Sceptics and Pyrrhonians were called *Acataleptics*. — *V. ACADEMICS.*

ACCIDENT (*accido*, to happen) is a modification or quality which

¹ *Port. Roy. Log.*, part iv., chap. 1.

² See Foucher (*Dissertatio de Phil. Academ.*, 12, Paris, 1692); Gerlach (*Commentatio de Probabilitate Disputationes*, 4to, Goett.)

³ *Biograph. Universa.*

⁴ *Adv. of Learning*, Moffet's trans., p. 140.

⁵ *Novum Organum*, b. 1., aphor. 128.

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does not essentially belong to a thing, nor form one of its constituent and invariable attributes; as motion in relation to matter, or heat to iron. The scholastic definition of it is *ens entis*, or *ens in alio*, while substance was defined to be *ens per se*.

"*Accident*, in its widest technical sense (equivalent to *attribute*), is anything that is attributed to another, and can only be conceived as belonging to some substance (in which sense it is opposed to *substance*); in its narrower and more properly logical sense, it is a predicable which may be present or absent, the essence of the species remaining the same; as for a man to be 'walking,' or 'a native of Paris.' Of these two examples, the former is what logicians call a *separable accident*, because it may be separated from the *individual* (e. g., he may sit down); the latter is an *inseparable accident*, being not separable from the individual (i. e., he who is a native of Paris can never be otherwise); *from the individual*, I say, because *every accident* must be separable from the *species*, else it would be a property."¹ — V. SUBSTANCE, PHENOMENON.

ACCIDENTAL. — Aristotle² says, "Suppose that in digging a trench to plant a tree you found a treasure, that is *accident*, for the one is neither the effect nor the consequent of the other; and it is not ordinarily that in planting a tree you find a treasure. If, then, a thing happen to any being, even with the circumstances of place and time, but which has no cause to determine its being, either actually, or in such a place, that thing is an *accident*. An *accident*, then, has no cause determinate, but only fortuitous; but a fortuitous cause is undetermined. *Accident* is also that which exists in an object without being one of the characters distinctive of its essence; such is the property of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles. Such *accidents* may be eternal; *accidents* properly so called are not."

A *phenomenon* may be constant, inherent in the nature of things, and in that sense essential, as the sparkling of the diamond in light, or the sinking of a stone in the water; but an *accident*, according to Aristotle, is that which neither occurs necessarily nor ordinarily. — V. CHANCE.

¹ Whately, *Log.*, book II., chap. 8 sect. 4, and index.

² *Metaphys.*, lib. IV., cap. 20.

ACOSMIST (α, priv., and κόσμος, world).—"Spinoza did not deny the existence of God; he denied the existence of the world; he was consequently an *acosmist*, and not an atheist."¹

"It has of late been a favourite criticism of Spinoza to say with Hegel, that his system is not atheism but *acosmism*; and this is true in a speculative point of view. But if I allow of no God distinct from the aggregate of the universe, myself included, what object have I of worship? Or if, according to the later manifestations of Pantheism, the Divine mind is but the sum total of every finite consciousness, my own included, what religious relation between God and man, is compatible with the theory? And, accordingly, the Pantheism of Hegel has found its natural development in the atheism of Feuerbach."²

ACROAMATICAL (from ἀκροαμαί, to hear).—"Aristotle was wont to divide his lectures and readings into *Acroamatical* and *Exoterical*; some of them contained only choice matter, and they were read privately to a select auditory; others contained but ordinary stuff, and were promiscuously, and in public, exposed to the hearing of all that would."³—V. **EXOTERIC**.

"In the life of Aristotle, by Mr. Blakesley,⁴ it has been shown, we think most satisfactorily, that the *acroamatic* treatises of Aristotle differed from the *exoteric*, not in the abstruseness or mysteriousness of their subject-matter, but in this, that the one formed part of a course or system, while the other were casual discussions or lectures on a particular thesis."⁵

Some of the early Fathers adopted a similar distinction, in giving instructions to the Catechumens, beginners (παρ' ἡχοῦ, according to sound—*viva voce* instruction), and the Teleioi (finished, or thoroughly instructed, from τέλος, an end).

This corresponds to the difference between the written law and the traditions of the elders.

Plutarch⁶ and Aulus Gellius⁷ maintain that the *acroamatic* works had natural philosophy and logic for their subject

¹ *Lewes, Biograph. Hist. of Philosoph.*, p. 1.

² *Mansel, Prolegom. Log.*, p. 279, note.

³ *Hales, Golden Remains* (on John xviii. 36).

⁴ Published in the *Encyclop. Metrop.*

⁵ *Mor. and Met. Phil.*, by Maurice, note, p. 166.

⁶ In *Alexand.*

⁷ *L. xx., c. 4.*

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whereas the *exoteric* treated of rhetoric, ethics, and politics. Strabo,¹ Cicero,² and Ammonius Herm.³ maintain that they were distinguished, not by difference of subject, but of form: the *acroamatic* being discourses, the *exoteric* dialogues. Simplicius⁴ thus characterizes the *acroamatic* in contradistinction to the *exoteric* works, "distinguished by pregnant brevity, closeness of thought, and quickness of transitions," from his more expanded, more perspicuous, and more popular productions.⁵

ACT, in Metaphysics and in Logic, is opposed to *power*. *Power* is simply a faculty or property of anything, as gravity of bodies. *Act* is the exercise or manifestation of a power or property, the realization of a fact, as the falling of a heavy body. We cannot conclude from *power* to *act*; a *posse ad actum*; but from *act* to *power* the conclusion is good. *Ab actu ad posse valet illatio*.

An act is *Immanent* or *Transient*. An *immanent* act has no effect on anything out of the agent. Sensation is an *immanent* act of the senses, cognition of the intellect. A *transient* act produces an operation or result out of and beyond the agent. The *act* of writing and of building are *transient* acts—they begin with the agent, but produce results which may affect others.

An act of the will is *Elicit* or *Imperate*. An *elicit* act of will is an act produced immediately by the will, and contained within it, as *velle* and *nolle*, to determine to do or not to do. An *elicit* act of will is either *volition*, which has reference to an end or ultimate object, or *election*, which has reference to means. — V. VOLITION, ELECTION.

An *imperate* act of will is a movement of body or mind following on a determination of will, as running after or running away, attending or not attending. Also an act done by others, when we order or forbid them to do, encourage or dissuade, assist or prevent.

ACTION.—"The word *action* is properly applied to those exertions

¹ L. 13, p. 608.

² *Ad Categ.* Aristot.

³ Buhle has a *Commentatio de Libris Arist., Exot. et Acroam.*, in his edit. of the works of Aristotle, 5 vols., 8vo., Deux Ponts, 1791, pp. 142, 143.

⁴ *Ad Atticum*, 13, 19.

⁵ *Ad Categ.* in *Proem.*

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which are consequent on volition, whether the exertion be made on external objects, or be confined to our mental operations. Thus we say the mind is active when engaged in study."¹

It is by the presence of will and intention that an action is distinguished from an event. The intention is one thing; the effect is another; the two together constitute the *action*.

ACTION and **ACT** are not synonymous. 1. *Act* does not necessarily imply an external result, *action* does. We may speak of repentance as an *act*, we could not call it an *action*. 2. An *act* must be *individual*; we may speak of a *course of action*. Lastly, *act*, when qualified, is oftener, though not universally coupled with another substantive: *action* always by an adjective preceding it. We say a *kind action*, not an *act of kindness*. A *kind act* might be admissible, though not usual, but an *action of kindness* is not used, though an *action of great kindness* might be. *Deed* is synonymous with *act*.

"*Act (actum)* is a thing done; *action (actio)* is doing: *act*, therefore, is an incident; an *action*, a process or habit; a virtuous *act*; a course of virtuous *action*."²

Actions, in **Morals**, are distinguished, according to the manner of their being called forth, into spontaneous or instinctive, voluntary or reflective, and free or deliberate; according to the faculty from which they proceed, into physical, intellectual, and moral; and according to the nature of the action and character of the agent, into right and wrong, virtuous or vicious, praiseworthy or blameworthy.

An action is said to be *materially right*, when, without regard to the end or the intention of the agent, the action is in conformity with some moral law or rule. An action is said to be *formally right*, when the end or the intention of the agent is *right*, and the action is not *materially wrong*. For a man to give his goods to feed the poor is *materially right*, even though he should not have charity or brotherly love, but when he has charity or brotherly love, and throws even a mite into the treasury of the poor, the action is *formally right*, although, in effect, it may fall short of that which is only *materially right*.

¹ Stewart, *Outlines*, No. 111.

² Taylor, *Synonyms*.

ACTIVE.—That which causes change is *active*; that which is changed is *passive*.¹

ACTIVITY.—*V. WILL.*

ACTUAL (*quod est in actu*) is opposed to *potential*. Before a thing is, it has a capacity of becoming. A rough stone is a statue *potentially*; when chiselled, *actually*.

"The relation of the *potential* to the *actual* Aristotle exhibits by the relation of the unfinished to the finished work; of the unemployed carpenter to the one at work upon his building; of the individual asleep to him awake. *Potentially* the seed-corn is the tree, but the grown-up tree is it *actually*; the potential philosopher is he who is not at this moment philosophizing; even before the battle the better general is the potential conqueror; in fact everything is potentially which possesses a principle of motion, of development, or of change; and which, if unhindered by anything external, will be of itself. *Actuality* or *entelechy*, on the other hand, indicates the perfect art, the end as gained, the completely actual (the grown-up tree, *e. g.*, is the *entelechy* of the seed-corn), that activity in which the act and the completeness of the act fall together, *e. g.*, to see, to think where he sees and he has seen, he thinks and he has thought (the acting and the completeness of the act), are one and the same, while in these activities which involve a becoming, *e. g.*, to learn, to go, to become well, the two are separated."²

Actual is also opposed to *virtual*. The oak is shut up in the acorn *virtually*.

Actual is also opposed to *real*. My will, though really existing as a faculty, only begins to have an *actual* existence from the time that I will anything.—*V. REAL, VIRTUAL.*

ACTUS PRIMUS (in scholastic philosophy)—*est rei esse*, or *actus quidditativus*.

ACTUS SECUNDUS—*est rei operari*, or *actus entitativus*.

ADAGE (*ad agendum aptum*)—a practical saying, fit for use, a rule of action. "From the Latin *adagium*, a saying handed down from antiquity, comes the English *adage*, which denotes an antique proverb."³ On the disagreement and similitude between *adagies*, *apophthegms*, and moral Γνώμας, see Erasmus.

¹ Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

² Taylor, *Synonyms*.

³ Schwegler, *Hist. of Phil.*, p. 123.

⁴ In the Prolegomena to his *Adagia*.

ADJURATION (from *ad-juro*, to put upon oath).—"Our Saviour, when the high priest *adjured* him by the living God, made no scruple of replying upon that *adjuration*."¹

ADMIRATION.—"We shall find that *admiration* is as superior to surprise and wonder, simply considered, as knowledge is superior to ignorance; for its appropriate signification is that act of the mind by which we discover, approve, and enjoy some unusual species of excellence."²

ADORATION.—To adore (from the Latin *ad oro*), signifies, to carry to the mouth; as in order to kiss one's hand, the hand is carried to the mouth; but it also includes in this action a sense of veneration or worship. "If I beheld the sun when it shined, or the moon walking in brightness, and *my mouth had kissed my hand*, this also were iniquity."³ As an act of worship, adoration is due only to God. But the form of kissing the hand to mortals was also used in the East. Pharaoh speaking to Joseph says, "According to thy word shall all my people *kiss*"—that is, in token of veneration to your order.⁴

ADSCITITIOUS (from *ad-scisco*, to seek after), that which is added or assumed. "You apply to your hypothesis of an *adscititious spirit*, what he (Philo) says concerning this *πνεῦμα θεῖον*, divine spirit or soul, infused into man by God's breathing."⁵

ÆSTHETICS (*αἰσθητικὴ*, perception or feeling).—"That science which refers the first principles in the arts to sensation and sentiment, as distinguished from mere instruction and utility."

The science of the beautiful and the philosophy of the fine arts. Various theories have been entertained as to the idea of the beautiful, by Plato, Plotinus, and Augustine. In modern times, the term *æsthetics* was first used in a scientific sense by A. Baumgarten, a disciple of Christian Wolf. In his *Æsthetica*,⁶ he considered the idea of the beautiful as an indistinct perception or feeling accompanying the moral ideas. Mendelssohn and others identified the idea of the beautiful with the idea of the good. Shaftesbury and Hutche-

¹ Clarke, *Works*, vol. II., ser. 125.

² Job xxxi. 26, 27.

³ Clarke, *Letter to Dodwell*.

⁴ Cogan, *On the Passions*, part 1., c. 2.

⁵ Gen. xli. 40, margin.

⁶ 2 vols., 8vo, Frankf., 1750-3.

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son regarded the two ideas as intimately connected. At the close of the eighteenth century, *æsthetics* was scientifically developed in Germany by Kant, and has been zealously prosecuted by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel.¹—*V. BEAUTY, IDEAL (BEAU).*

ÆTIOLOGY (*αἰτία*, cause; *λόγος*, discourse), is coming into use, by Dr. Whewell and others, to denote that department of Philosophy which inquires into causes.

AFFECTION.—"There are various principles of action in man which have *persons* for their immediate object, and imply, in their very nature, our being well or ill affected to some *person*, or at least to some animated being. Such principles I shall call by the general name of *affections*, whether they dispose us to do good or hurt to others."²

They are usually distinguished into *benevolent*, as esteem, gratitude, friendship; and *malevolent*, as hatred, envy, jealousy, revenge.

This term is applied to all the modes of the sensibility, or to all states of mind in which we are purely passive. By Descartes³ it is employed to denote some degree of love.—*V. LOVE, SENSIBILITY.*

AFFINITY is a relation contracted by, or resulting from, marriage; in contradistinction to *consanguinity*, or relation by blood.—*V. CONSANGUINITY.*

AFFIRMATION (*παράστασις*) is the attributing of one thing to another, or the admitting simply that something exists. A mental affirmation is a judgment; when expressed it becomes a proposition.—*V. JUDGMENT, PROPOSITION.*

In Law, *affirmation* is opposed to *oath*. There are certain separatists, who, from having scruples as to the lawfulness of oath-taking, are allowed to make a solemn *affirmation* that what they say is true; and if they make a false *affirmation* they are liable to the penalties of perjury.

¹ Besides the writings of these philosophers, consult *Cours d'Esthétique* par Ph. De miron, 8vo, Paris, 1842; *The Philosophy of the Beautiful*, by John G. MacVicar, D.D. Edin., 1855; Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay viii., ch. 4.

² Reid, *Act. Pow.*, essay iii., part ii., chap. 3-6.

³ *Traité des Passions*, art. 53.

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"To *affirm* is a solitary, to *confirm* is an assisted asseveration. A man *affirms* what he declares solemnly; he *confirms* what he aids another to prove."¹

A FORTIORI.—V. ARGUMENT (INDIRECT).

AGENT (*ago*, to act), one who, that which, *acts*. "Nor can I think that anybody has such an idea of chance as to make it an *agent*, or really existing and *acting* cause of anything, and much less sure of all things."²

AGNOIOLOGY (λόγος τῆς ἀγνοίας, the theory of true ignorance), is a section of Philosophy intermediate between Epistemology and Ontology. "Absolute Being may be that which we are ignorant of. We must, therefore, examine and fix what ignorance is, what we are, and can be ignorant of."³

ALCHEMY or **ALCHYMY** (*al*, the article, and *χημα*, what is poured, according to Vossius), is that branch of chemistry which proposed to transmute metals into gold, to find the panacea or universal remedy, &c.⁴—V. HERMETIC PHILOSOPHY, ROSICRUCIAN.

ALLEGORY (ἄλλο ὁνομαζέτω, to say another thing), says Quintilian, exhibits one thing in words and another in meaning.

"An *Allegory* is a continued metaphor. It consists in representing one subject (object) by another analogous to it; the subject thus represented is not formally mentioned, but we are left to discover it by reflection; and this furnishes a very pleasant exercise to our faculties. A metaphor explains itself by the words which are connected with it in their proper and natural meaning. When I say, 'Wallace was a thunderbolt of war,' 'In peace Fingal was the gale of spring,' the thunderbolt of war and the gale of spring are sufficiently explained by the mention of Wallace and Fingal. But an *allegory* may be allowed to stand more unconnected with the literal meaning; the interpretation is not so directly pointed out, but is left to our own discovery.

"When the Jewish nation is represented under the notion of a vine or a vineyard, as is done in the Psalms and the Pro-

¹ Taylor, *Synonyms*.

² Wollaston, *Relig. of Nat.*, 8, 5.

³ Ferrier, *Inst. of Metaphys.*, p. 48.

⁴ Louis Figuier, *L'Alchimie et Les Alchimistes*, Paris, 1860

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phets, you have a fine example of an *Allegory*." ¹—*V. METAPHOR, MYTH.*

AMBITION (from *ambio*, to go about seeking place or power), is the desire of power, which is regarded as one of the primary or original desires of human nature.²

AMPHIBOLOGY (*ἀμφιβολία*, ambiguity), is to use a proposition which presents not an obscure, but a doubtful or double sense. It is enumerated among the sophisms by Aristotle, who distinguishes it from *equivocatio*, *ἀνισχυμία*, by which he understands ambiguity in terms taken separately.—*V. FALLACY.*

AMPHIBOLY is applied by Kant to that kind of amphibology which is natural, and consists in confounding pure notions of the understanding with objects of experience, and attributing to the one characters and qualities which belong to the other; as when we make *identity*, which is a notion *a priori*, a real quality of phenomena, or objects which experience makes known to us.—*V. ANTINOMY, PROPOSITION.*

ANALOGUE (*ἀνάλογος*, proportionate).—"By an *Analogue* is meant an organ in one animal having the same function as a different organ in a different animal. The difference between *Homologue* and *Analogue* may be illustrated by the wing of a bird and that of a butterfly; as the two totally differ in anatomical structure, they cannot be said to be *homologous*, but they are *analogous* in function, since they both serve for flight."³

In Logic a term is *analogous* whose single signification applies with equal propriety to more than one object—as the *leg* of the table, the *leg* of the animal.⁴

ANALOGY (*ἀναλογία*, proportion), has been defined, "The similarity of ratios or relations." "But in popular language we extend the word to resemblances of things as well as relations. Employed as an argument, *analogy* depends upon the canon, the same attributes may be assigned to distinct, but similar things, provided they can be shown to accompany the

¹ Irving, *English Composition*, p. 289.

² See Reid, *Act. Pow.*, essay III., part 2, chap. 2; Stewart, *Act. Pow.*, book I., chap. 2, sect. 4.

³ McCosh, *Typical Forms*, p. 26.

⁴ Whately, *Log.*, b. III., § 10.

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points of resemblance in the things, and not the points of difference.”¹

“Analogy does not mean the similarity of two *things*, but the similarity, or sameness of two *relations*. There must be more than two *things* to give rise to two *relations*; there must be at least *three*, and in most cases there are *four*. Thus A may be *like* B, but there is no *analogy* between A and B: it is an abuse of the word to speak so, and it leads to much confusion of thought. If A has the same relation to B which C has to D, then there is an *analogy*. If the first relation be well known, it may serve to explain the second, which is less known; and the transfer of name from one of the terms in the relation best known to its corresponding term in the other, causes no confusion, but on the contrary tends to remind us of the similarity that exists in these relations, and so assists the mind instead of misleading it.”²

“*Analogy* implies a difference in sort, and not merely in degree; and it is the sameness of the end with the difference of the means which constitutes *analogy*. No one could say the lungs of a man were *analogous* to the lungs of a monkey, but any one might say that the gills of a fish and the spiracula of insects are *analogous* to lungs.”³

Between one man and another, as belonging to the same genus, there is *identity*. Between a flint and a flower, as belonging to different genera, there is *diversity*. Between the seasons of the year and the periods of human life, or between the repose of an animal and the sleep of a plant, when we think wherein they agree, without forgetting wherein they differ, there is *analogy*.

“When some course of events seems to follow the same order with another, so that we may imagine them to be influenced by similar causes, we say there is an *analogy* between them. And when we infer that a certain event will take place in some other case of a similar nature, we are said to reason from *analogy*; as when we suppose that the stars, like the sun, are surrounded with planets, which derive from them

¹ Thomson, *Outlines of Laws of Thought*, p. 363, 1st. edit.

² Copplestone, *Four Discourses*, p. 122, 8vo, London, 1821.

³ Coleridge, *Physiology of Life*, p. 64.

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light and heat. The word *analogy* is employed with strict propriety only in those cases where there is supposed to be a *sameness* in the causes of similar effects. When there is a mere similarity in effects or appearances, the word *resemblance* should be used. Resemblances may be well adduced in *illustration* of an argument; but then they should be proposed merely as similes, or metaphors, not as *analogies*.¹

“The meaning of *analogy* is resemblance (?), and hence all reasoning from one case to others resembling it might be termed *analogical*; but the word is usually confined to cases where the resemblance is of a slight or indirect kind. We do not say that a man reasons from *analogy* when he infers that a stone projected into the air will fall to the ground. The circumstances are so essentially similar to those which have been experienced a thousand times, that we call the cases *identical*, not *analogical*. But when Sir Isaac Newton, reflecting on the tendency of bodies at the surface of the earth to the centre, inferred that the moon had the same tendency, his reasoning, in the first instance, was *analogical*.

“By some writers the term has been restricted to the resemblance of relations; thus knowledge is said to bear the same relation to the mind as light to the eye—to enlighten it. But although the term is very properly applied to this class of resemblances, I think it is not generally confined to them; it is commonly used with more latitude, except, indeed, in mathematics, when it is employed to designate the identity of ratios.”²

“As *analogy* is the resemblance of ratios (or relations), two things may be connected by *analogy*, though they have in *themselves* no *resemblance*; thus as a sweet taste gratifies the palate, so does a sweet sound gratify the ear, and hence the same word, ‘sweet,’ is applied to both, though no flavour can resemble a sound in itself. To bear this in mind would serve to guard us against two very common errors in the interpretation of the analogical language of Scripture:—1. The error of supposing the things themselves to be similar, from their bearing similar relation to other things; 2. The still more

¹ Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

² Sam. Bailey, *Discourses*, p. 181, 8vo, London, 1852.

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common error of supposing the *analogy* to extend farther than it does, or to be more complete than it really is, from not considering in *what* the analogy in each case consists."¹

"*Analogy* is a Greek word used by mathematicians to signify a similitude of proportions. For instance, when we observe that two is to six as three is to nine, this similitude or equality of proportion is termed *analogy*. And although proportion strictly signifies the habitude or relation of one quantity to another, yet, in a looser and translated sense, it hath been applied to signify every other habitude, and consequently the term *analogy*, all similitude of relations or habitudes whatsoever. Hence the schoolmen tell us there is *analogy* between intellect and sight; forasmuch as intellect is to the mind what sight is to the body: and that he who governs the state is analogous to him who steers a ship. Hence a prince is analogically styled a pilot, being to the state as a pilot is to his vessel.² For the further clearing of this point, it is to be observed, that a twofold *analogy* is distinguished by the schoolmen, *metaphorical* and *proper*. Of the first kind there are frequent instances in Holy Scripture, attributing human parts and passions to God. When He is represented as having a finger, an eye, or an ear; when He is said to repent, to be angry, or grieved, every one sees the *analogy* is merely *metaphorical*; because these parts and passions, taken in the proper signification, must in every degree necessarily, and from the formal nature of the thing, include imperfection. When, therefore, it is said the finger of God appears in this or that event, men of common sense mean no more, but that it is as truly ascribed to God, as the works wrought by human fingers are to man; and so of the rest. But the case is different when wisdom and knowledge are attributed to God. Passions and senses, as such, imply defect; but in knowledge simply, or as such, there is no defect. Knowledge, therefore, in the proper formal meaning of the word, may be attributed to God proportionally, that is, preserving a proportion to the infinite nature of God. We may say, therefore, that as God is infinitely above man, so is the knowledge of God infinitely

¹ Whately.

² Vide Cajetan, de Nom. *Analogy*, c. III.

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above the knowledge of man, and this is what Cajetan calls *analogia proprie facta*.—And after the same *analogy* we must understand all those attributes to belong to the Deity, which in themselves simply, and as such, denote perfection.”¹

Analogy and Metaphor.—*Metaphor*, in general, is a substitution of the idea or conception of one thing with the term belonging to it, to stand for another thing, on account of an appearing similitude only, without any real resemblance and true correspondency between the things compared; as when the Psalmist describes the verdure and fruitfulness of valleys by laughing and singing. *Analogy*, in general, is the substituting the idea or conception of one thing to stand for and represent another, on account of a true resemblance and correspondent reality in the very nature of the things compared. It is defined by Aristotle *ἰσότης τοῦ λόγῳ*, an equality or parity of reason, though, in strictness and truth, the parity of reasoning is rather built on the similitude, and analogy, and consequent to them, than the same thing with them.

“The ground and foundation of *Metaphor* consists only in an appearing or imaginary resemblance and correspondency; as when God is said to have hands, and eyes, and ears. But the foundation of analogy is an actual similitude and a real correspondency in the very nature of things; which lays a foundation for a parity of reason even between things different in nature and kind; as when God is said to have knowledge, power, and goodness.

“*Metaphor* is altogether arbitrary, and the result merely of imagination, it is rather a figure of speech than a real similitude and comparison of things; and, therefore, is properly of consideration in rhetoric and poetry. But *analogy* being built on the very nature of things themselves, is a necessary and useful method of conception and reasoning; and, therefore, of consideration in Physics and Metaphysics.”²

“I am not of the mind of those speculators who seem assured that all states have the same period of infancy, manhood, and decrepitude that are found in individuals. Parallels

¹ Berkeley, *Min. Philosoph.*, Dialog. 4.

² Brown, *Divine Analogy*, p. 2.

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of this sort rather furnish *similitudes* to illustrate or to adorn, than supply *analogies* from whence to reason. The objects which are attempted to be forced into an *analogy* are not found in the same classes of existence. Individuals are physical beings—commonwealths are not physical, but moral essences.”¹

Many fallacies become current through false metaphorical *analogies*. See an example of false *analogy*² in the supposed likeness between the decay of vegetables and of living creatures.

Analogy and Example.—*Analogy* is not unfrequently used to mean mere similarity. But its specific meaning is *similarity of relations*, and in this consists the difference between the argument by *example* and that by *analogy*,—that in the one we argue from mere *similarity*, from *similarity of relations* in the other. In the one we argue from Pisistratus to Dionysius, who resembles him; in the other, from the *relation of induction to demonstration*, to the corresponding *relation* of the *example* to the *enthymeme*.³

Analogy and Experience.—“*Experience* is not the mere collection of observations; it is the methodical reduction of them to their principles. . . . *Analogy* supposes this, but it goes a step farther. *Experience* is mere analysis. *Analogy* involves also a synthesis. It is applied to cases in which some difference of circumstances is supposed; as, for instance, in arguing from the formation of particular parts of one class of animals to the correspondence in another, the different nature, habits, circumstances, of the one class, are considered and allowed for, in extending the given observation.”⁴

In the *Schools*, what was termed the *analogy* of faith,⁵ was showing that the truth of one scripture is not repugnant to the truth of another, or of the whole. “*Analogia vero est, cum veritas unius scripturæ ostenditur veritati alterius non repugnare.*”⁶

In *Logic*, three modes of reasoning are called analogical.

¹ Burke, *Letters on Regicide Peace*, b. iv.

² Butler, *Analogy*, part i., chap. 7.

³ Kernalake, *Aids to Log.*, vol. ii., p. 74.

⁴ Hampden, *Introd. Mor. Phil.*, lect. v.

⁵ See Rom. xii. 6.

⁶ Thom. Aquinas, *Summa Theolog.*, pars prima, quæst. i., art. 10.

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1. From effect to cause, or from cause to effect. 2. From means to ends, or from ends to means. 3. From mere resemblance or concomitance. Condillac¹ has shown how these modes of reasoning all concur to prove that the human beings around us, who are formed like ourselves (*analogy of resemblance*), who act as we act (*analogy of cause*), who have the same organs (*analogy of means*), should be in all respects like ourselves, and have the same faculties.

Analogy and Induction. — “There are two requisites in order to every analogical argument: 1. That the two or several particulars concerned in the argument should be known to agree in some one point; for otherwise they could not be referable to any one class, and there would consequently be no basis to the subsequent inference drawn in the conclusion. 2. That the conclusion must be modified by a reference to the circumstances of the particular to which we argue. For herein consists the essential distinction between an analogical and an inductive argument.”²

ANALYSIS and SYNTHESIS (ἀνά λύω, σύν, τίθημι, *resolutio, compositio*), or decomposition and recombination. Objects of sense and of thought are presented to us in a complex state, but we can only, or at least best, understand what is simple. Among the varied objects of a landscape, I behold a tree, I separate it from the other objects, I examine separately its different parts—trunk, branches, leaves, &c., and then reuniting them into one whole I form a notion of the tree. The first part of this process is *analysis*, the second is *synthesis*. If this must be done with an individual, it is more necessary with the infinitude of objects which surround us, to evolve the one out of many, to recall the multitude to unity. We compare objects with one another to see wherein they agree; we next, by a synthetical process, infer a general law, or generalize the coincident qualities, and perform an act of induction which is purely a synthetical process, though commonly called analytical. Thus, from our experience that bodies attract within certain limits,

¹ *Art. de Raisonner.*

² Hampden, *Essay on Phil. Evid. of Christianity*, pp. 60–64. See Locke, *On Hum. Understand.*, book iv., chap. 16, sect. 12; Beattie's *Essay on Truth*, part I., chap. 2, sect. 7; Stewart's *Elements*, vol. II., chap. 4, sect. 4; Stewart's *Essays*, v., c. 3.

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we infer that all bodies gravitate towards each other. The antecedent here only says that certain bodies gravitate, the consequent says all bodies gravitate. They are brought together by the mental insertion of a third proposition, which is, "that nature is uniform." This is not the product of induction, but antecedent to all induction. The statement fully expressed is, this and that body, which we know, gravitate, but nature is uniform; this and that body represent all bodies — all bodies gravitate. It is the mind which connects these things, and the process is synthetical. This is the one universal *method* in all philosophy, and different schools have differed only in the way of employing it. *Method* is the following of one thing *through* another. *Order* is the following of one thing *after* another. *Analysis* is *real*, as when a chemist separates two substances. *Logical*, as when we consider the properties of the sides and angles of a triangle separately, though we cannot think of a triangle without sides and angles.

For an explanation of the processes of *analysis* and *synthesis*, see Stewart.¹

The instruments of *analysis* are *observation* and *experiment*; of *synthesis*, *definition* and *classification*.

Take down a watch, *analysis*; put it up, *synthesis*.²

"*Hac analysi licebit, ex rebus compositis ratiocinatione colligere simplices; ex motibus, vires moventes; et in universum, ex effectis causas; ex causisque particularibus generales; donec ad generalissimas tandem sit deventum.*"³

Analysis is decomposing what is compound to detect its elements. Objects may be compound, as consisting of several distinct parts united, or of several properties equally distinct. In the former view, *analysis* will divide the object into its parts, and present them to us successively, and then the relations by which they are united. In the second case, *analysis* will separate the distinct properties, and show the relations of every kind which may be between them.⁴

Analysis is the resolving into its constituent elements of a

¹ *Elements*, part II, chap. 4.

² Lord Brougham, *Prelimin. Discourse*, part I, sect. 7.

³ Newton, *Optics*, 2d edit., p. 418.

⁴ Jardaiillac, *Etudes Element*, tom. I., pp. 8, 9.

ANALYSIS—

compound heterogeneous substance. Thus, water can be analyzed into oxygen and hydrogen, atmospheric air into these and azote.¹

Abstraction is *analysis*, since it is decomposition, but what distinguishes it is that it is exercised upon qualities which by themselves have no real existence. *Classification* is *synthesis*. *Induction* rests upon *analysis*. *Deduction* is a *synthetical process*. *Demonstration* includes both.

ANALYTICS (Τὰ Ἀναλυτικά) is the title which in the second century was given, and which has since continued to be applied, to a portion of the *Organon* or *Logic* of Aristotle. This portion consists of two distinct parts; the *First Analytics*, which teaches how to reduce the syllogism to its diverse figures and most simple elements, and the *Posterior Analytics*, which lays down the rules and conditions of demonstration in general. It was in imitation of this title that Kant gave the name of *Transcendental Analytic* to that part of the *Criticism of Pure Reason* which reduces the faculty of knowing to its elements.

ANGELOLOGY (ἄγγελος, a messenger; λόγος, discourse), is the doctrine of Angels. — V. PNEUMATOLOGY.

ANIMA MUNDI (soul of the world.)—*Animism* is the doctrine of the *anima mundi* as held by Stahl. The hypothesis of a force, immaterial, but inseparable from matter, and giving to matter its form and movement, is coeval with the birth of philosophy. Pythagoras obscurely acknowledged such a force, but held that there was an infinitely perfect being above it. From Pythagoras it passed into the system of Plato, who could not conceive how pure spirit, the seat of eternal ideas, could act directly upon matter. He thought also that the world would be more perfect if endowed with life. The soul of the world was the source of all life, sensibility, and movement. The school of Alexandria adhered to the views of Plato, and recognized intelligence and Deity as above the *anima mundi*, which in the system of the Stoics usurped the place of God, and even His name; while Straton of Lampsacus called it *nature*. The hypothesis of the *anima mundi* was not entertained by the

¹ Pezmann, *Introd. ad Philosoph.*, p. 75, 12mo, Lovan., 1840.

ANIMA MUNDI—

scholastic philosophers. But it reappeared under the name of *Archæus*, in the systems of Cornelius Agrippa, Paracelsus, and Van Helmont; while Henry More recognized a *principium hylarchicum*, and Cudworth a *plastic nature*, as the universal agent of physical phenomena, the cause of all forms of organization, and the spring of all the movements of matter. About the same time, some German divines, as Amos Comenius, and John Bayer, attempted to rest a similar opinion on Genesis i. 2, and maintained that the spirit which moved on the face of the waters still gives life to all nature.¹

The doctrine of the *anima mundi*, as held by the Stoics and Stratonicians, is closely allied to pantheism; while according to others this soul of the universe is altogether intermediate between the Creator and His works.²

ANTECEDENT (*antecedo*, to go before).—"And the *antecedent* shall you fynde as true when you rede over my letter as himself can not say nay, but that the *consecusyon* is formal."³

In a relation, whether logical or metaphysical, the first term is the *antecedent*, the second the *consequent*. Thus in the relation of causality—the cause is the *antecedent*, and the effect the *consequent*.

In Logic, *antecedent* is the former of two propositions, in a species of reasoning, which, without the intervention of any middle proposition, leads directly to a fair conclusion; and this conclusion is termed the *consequent*. Thus, I reflect, therefore I exist. I reflect, is the *antecedent*—therefore I exist, is the *consequent*.⁴

Antecedent is that part of a conditional proposition on which the other depends.⁵

In Grammar the word to which the relative refers is called the *antecedent*; as, "God whom we worship,"—where *God* is the *antecedent*, to which *whom* the relative refers.

ANTHROPOLOGY (*ἀνθρωπος*, and *λόγος*, the science of man).—

Among naturalists it means the natural history of the human

¹ Buddeus, *Elem. Phil.*, pars 3, cap. 6, sect. 11, 12, et seq.

² See Plato, *Timæus*, 29 D.—30 C. Schelling, *De l'Âme du Monde*, 8vo, Hamb., 1808

³ Sir T. More's *Works*, p. 1115.

⁴ Euler, *Letters to a German Princess*.

⁵ Whately, *Log.*, b. II., chap. 4, § 6.

ANTHROPOLOGY—

species. According to Dr. Latham,¹ *anthropology* determines the relations of man to the other mammalia; *ethnology*, the relations of the different varieties of mankind to each other, p. 559. The German philosophers since the time of Kant have used it to designate all the sciences which in any point of view relate to man—soul and body—individual and species—facts of history and phenomena of consciousness—the absolute rules of morality as well as interests material, and changing; so that works under the general title of *anthropology* treat of very different topics.

"*Anthropology* is the science of man in all his natural variations. It deals with the mental peculiarities which belong specifically to different races, ages, sexes, and temperaments, together with the results which follow immediately from them in their application to human life. Under *psychology*, on the other hand, we include nothing but what is common to all mankind, and forms an essential part of human nature. The one, accordingly, may be termed the science of mental variables; the other, the science of mental constants."²

In an anonymous work entitled *Anthropologie Abstracted*,³ *Anthropology* is divided into Psychology and Anatomy.

ANTHROPOMORPHISM (*ἄνθρωπος*, man; *μορφή*, form).—"It was the opinion of the *Anthropomorphites* that God had all the parts of a man, and that we are, in this sense, made according to his image."⁴

Melito, of Sardis, was the first Christian writer who ascribed body to Deity. The ascribing of bodily parts or members to Deity is too gross a delusion to call for refutation. It is wittily exposed by Cicero.⁵ But there is a spiritual *anthropomorphism*, sometimes also called *anthropopathy*, which ascribes to him the acts, passions, sentiments, and proceedings of human nature.

"We ought not to imagine that God is clothed with a human body, as the *Anthropomorphites* asserted, under colour that that figure was the most perfect of any."⁶

¹ *Nat. Hist. of Varieties of Man*, Lond., 1830.

² Morell, *Psychology*, pp. 1, 2.

³ 8vo, Lond., 1655.

⁴ More, *Def. of Cabbala*, c. 1.

⁵ *De Nat. Deor.*, lib. 1., cap. 27.

⁶ Malebranche, *Search after Truth*, book III., chap. 2.

ANTHROPOMORPHISM —

Hume applies the name to those who think the mind of God is like the mind of man.

"When it is asked, what cause produces order in the ideas of the Supreme Being, can any other reason be assigned by you *Anthropomorphites*, than that it is a *rational* faculty, and that such is the nature of Deity."¹

ANTICIPATION (*anticipatio*, πρόληψις), is a term which was first used by Epicurus to denote a general notion which enables us to conceive beforehand of an object which had not yet come under the cognizance of the senses. But these general notions being formed by abstraction from a multitude of particular notions, were all originally owing to sensation, or mere generalizations *à posteriori*. Buhle² gives the following account: — "The impressions which objects make on the senses, leave in the mind traces which enable us to recognize these objects when they present themselves anew, or to compare them with others, or to distinguish them. When we see an animal for the first time, the impression made on the senses leaves a trace which serves as a type. If we afterwards see the same animal, we refer the impression to the type already existing in the mind. This type and the relation of the new impression to it, constituted what Epicurus called the *anticipation of an idea*. It was by this *anticipation* that we could determine the identity, the resemblance or the difference of objects actually before us, and those formerly observed."

The language of Cicero³ seems to indicate that by Epicurus the term πρόληψις was extended to what is supersensual, and included what is now called knowledge *à priori*. "*Quæ est enim gens, aut quod genus hominum, quod non habeat, sine doctrina, anticipationem quandam Deorum? quam appellat πρόληψιν Epicurus, id est, anteceptam animo rei quandam informationem, sine qua nec intelligi quidquam, nec quæri, nec disputari potest.*" And according to Diogenes Laertius,⁴ the Stoics defined πρόληψις to mean "a natural concept on of the universal." It would appear, however, that this definition was

¹ *Dialogues on Nat. Relig.*, parts iv, v.

² *Hist. de la Phil. Mod.*, tom. i., pp. 87, 88.

³ *De Nat. Deor.*, lib. i., cap. 16.

⁴ *Ibid.* vii., sect. 61, 63, 64.

ANTICIPATION —

not adopted by all. And Sir William Hamilton has said:¹ — “It is not to be supposed that the *κωναι βρωται, φυσικαι προληψεις*, of the Stoics, far less of the Epicureans, were more than generalizations *a posteriori*. Yet this is a mistake, into which, among many others, Lipsius and Leibnitz have fallen in regard to the former.”²

Anticipation of Nature is a phrase employed by Lord Bacon³ to denote a hasty and illicit generalization, as opposed to a due and gradual generalization, which he called an *Interpretation of Nature*.”

ANTINOMY (*ἀντί*, against; *νόμος*, law), the opposition of one law or rule to another law or rule.

“If He once willed adultery should be sinful, all his omnipotence will not allow Him to will the allowance that His holiest people might, as it were, by His own *antinomy* or counter statute, live unreprieved in the same fact as He Himself esteemed it, according to our common explainers.”⁴

According to Kant, it means that natural contradiction which results from the law of reason, when, passing the limits of experience, we seek to know the absolute. Then, we do not attain the idea of the absolute, or we overstep the limits of our faculties, which reach only to phenomena.

If the world be regarded not as a phenomenon or sum of phenomena, but as an *absolute thing* in itself, the following *Antinomies* or counter-statements, equally capable of being supported by arguments, arise: —

Thesis.

I.

Antithesis.

The world has an origin in time, and is quoad space shut up in boundaries. The world has no beginning and no bounds.

II.

Every compound substance in the world consists of simple parts; and there is nothing but the simple, or that which is compounded from it. No composite consists of simple parts; and there exists nowhat simple in the world.

¹ *Reid's Works*, note A, p. 774.

² See *Manuductio ad Stoicam Phil.*, lib. ii., dissert. 11; and Leibnitz, *Nouvemeus Es* sais, Pref. See also Kernius, *Dissert. in Epicuri πρόληψιν*, &c., Goett., 1736.

³ Pref. to *Nov. Organ.*

⁴ Milton, *Doct. and Disc. of Div.*, b. ii., c. 2.

ANTINOMY—

III.

*Thesis.**Antithesis.*

It is requisite to assume a *Free* causality to explain the phenomena of the world. There is no Freedom. Everything in the world happens according to the laws of nature.

IV.

To the world there belongs some-what which, either as its part or its cause, is an absolutely necessary being. There exists no absolutely necessary Being, neither in the world nor out of the world, as its cause.

At the bottom of the two first *antinomies* lies the absurdity of transferring to the world in itself predicates which can be applied only to a world of phenomena. We get rid of the difficulty by declaring that both thesis and antithesis are false. With regard to the third, an act may be in respect of the causality of reason a first beginning, while yet, in respect of the sequences of phenomena, it is no more than a subordinate commencement, and so be, in the first respect, free; but in the second, as mere phenomenon, fettered by the law of the causal nexus. The fourth *antinomy* is explained in the same manner; for when the cause *qua* phenomenon is contradistinguished from the cause of phenomena, so far forth as this last may be a thing in itself, then both propositions may consist together.¹

Others think that when the principles are carefully inducted and expressed, the contradiction disappears.²

ANTIPATHY (*ἀντί παθος*, feeling against). — “There are many ancient and received traditions and observations touching the sympathy and *antipathy* of plants; for that some will thrive best growing near others, which they impute to sympathy, and some worse, which they impute to *antipathy*.”³

According to Sylvester Rattray, M. D.,⁴ there is antipathy and sympathy not only between plants, but also between minerals and animals.

¹ Semple, *Introd. to Metaphysic of Ethics*, p. 96.

² McCosh, *Meth. of Div. Govern.*, p. 530, 5th edit.

³ Bacon, *Nat. Hist.*, sect. 479.

⁴ *Aditus Novus ad Occultas Sympathias et Antipathias causas inventandas*. 12mo Glasg., 1668.

ANTIPATHY—

A blind and instinctive movement, which, without any appreciable reason, makes us averse to the company or character of some persons at first sight. An involuntary dislike or aversion entertained by an animate being to some sensible object. A man may have an antipathy to particular smells or tastes, a turkey cock or bull to the colour red, a horse to the smell of raw flesh. Some are natural, others are acquired, as a surfeit of any food gives antipathy. Some are founded on sensation, others on sentiment.—*V. SYMPATHY.*

A PARTE ANTE, and A PARTE POST.—These two expressions, borrowed from the scholastic philosophy, refer to eternity; of which man can only conceive as consisting of two parts; the one without limits in the past, *a parte ante*; and the other without limits in the future, *a parte post*. Both are predicable of Deity; only the latter of the human soul.—*V. ETERNITY.*

APATHY (α, privative; and πάθος, passion).—The absence of passion. “What is called by the Stoics *apathy*, or dispassion; by the Sceptics indisturbance, *ἀραπαΐα*; by the Molinists, quietism; by common men, peace of conscience: seem all to mean but great tranquillity of mind.”¹

As the passions are the springs of most of our actions, a state of *apathy* has come to signify a sort of moral inertia—the absence of all activity or energy. According to the Stoics, *apathy* meant the extinction of the passions by the ascendancy of reason.

“By the perfect *apathy* which that philosophy (the Stoical) prescribes to us, by endeavouring not merely to moderate but to eradicate, all our private, partial, and selfish affections, by suffering us to feel for whatever can befall our selves, our friends, our country, not even the sympathetic and reduced passions of the impartial spectator,—it endeavours to render us altogether indifferent and unconcerned in the success or miscarriage of everything which nature has prescribed to us as the proper business and occupation of our lives.”

¹ Locke, *On Hum. Understand.*, book ii., chap. 33, sect. 7, 8.

² Sir W. Temple, *Of Gardening*.

³ Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, part vii., sect. 2.

APATHY—

"In general, experience will show, that as the wants of natural appetite to food supposes and proceeds from some natural disease; so the *apathy* the Stoics talk of, as much supposes or is accompanied with something amiss in the moral character, in that which is the health of the mind."¹

In lazy *apathy* let Stoics boast
Their virtue fix'd; 'tis fix'd as in a frost;
Contracted all, retiring to the breast;
But strength of mind is exercise, not rest."—POPE.²

APHORISM, determinate position, from ἀφορισμός, to be nd, or limit; whence our *horizon*. "In order to get the full sense of a word, we should first present to our minds the visual image that forms its primary meaning. Draw lines of different colours round the different counties of England, and then cut out each separately, as in the common play-map³ that children take to pieces and put together, so that each district can be contemplated apart from the rest, as a whole in itself. This twofold act of circumscribing and detaching, when it is exerted by the mind on subjects of reflection and reason, is to aphorise, and the result an *aphorism*."⁴

A precise, sententious saying; e. g., "It is always safe to learn from our enemies, seldom safe to instruct even our friends."

Like Hippocrates, Boerhaave has written a book entitled *Aphorisms*, containing medical maxims, not treated argumentatively, but laid down as certain truths. In civil law *aphorisms* are also used.

The three ancient commentators upon Hippocrates, viz., Theophilus, Meletius, and Stephanus, have given the same definition of an *aphorism*, i. e., "a succinct saying, comprehending a complete statement," or a saying poor in expres-

¹ Butler, Sermon v.

² Wicanderus (Joh. Barth.), *Dissert. de Stoicorum Apathia*, &c. 4to, Holmst, 1679.

Beccius, *Diapp.*, lib. 2, *Apathia Sapientia Stoici*. 4to, Copenhag., 1693.

Flecherus (John Hen.), *Diss. de Stoicis ἀπαθείαις falso suspectis*. 4to, Lelz, 1716.

Quadius *Disputatio tribum illud Stoicorum paradoxon περί τῆς ἀπαθείας expensens* sto, Sedini, 1720.

Meiners, *Mélanges*, tom. II., p. 130.

³ Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*, vol. I., p. 16, edit. 1848.

APHORISM —

sion, but rich in sentiment. The first *aphorism* of Hippocrates is, "Life is short, and the art is long; the occasion fleeting; experience fallacious, and judgment difficult. The physician must not only be prepared to do what is right himself, but also to make the patient, the attendants, and externals, co-operate."

"The first and most ancient inquirers into truth were wont to throw their knowledge into *aphorisms*, or short, scattered, unmethodical sentences."¹

Heraclitus is known by his *aphorisms*, which are among the most brilliant of those

"Jewels, five words long,
That on the stretched fore-finger of all time,
Sparkle for ever."

Among the most famous are,—War is father of all things, *i. e.*, all things are evolved by antagonistic force. No man can bathe twice in the same stream, *i. e.*, all things are in perpetual flux.

APODEICTIC, APODEICTICAL (*ἀποδείκνυμι*, to show).—

"The argumentation is from a similitude, therefore not *apodictic*, or of evident demonstration."²

This term was borrowed by Kant from Aristotle.³ He made a distinction between propositions which admitted of contradiction or dialectic discussion, and such as were the basis or result of demonstration. Kant wished to introduce an analogous distinction between our judgments, and to give the name of *apodeictic* to such as were above all contradiction.

APOLOGUE (*ἀπόλογος*, *fabula*), "a novel story, contrived to teach some moral truth." — Johnson.

"It would be a high relief to hear an *apologue* or fable well told, and with such humour as to need no sententious moral at the end to make the application."⁴ It is essential to an *apologue* that the circumstances told in it should be fictitious.

¹ *Nov. Organ.*, book 1., sect. 86. And the *Novum Organum* itself is written in *spharisms*.

² Robinson, *Budosa*, p. 23.

³ *Analyt. Prior.*, lib. i., cap. 1.

⁴ Shaftesbury, vol. iii., *Miscell.* 4, a. 1.

APOLOGUE—

The difference between a *parable* and an *apologue* is, that the former being drawn from human life requires probability in the narration; whereas the *apologue* being taken from inanimate things or the inferior animals, is not confined strictly to probability. The fables of *Æsop* are *apologues*.

For an admirable instance of the *λόγος* or *apologue*, see Coleridge's *Friend*, where the case of the seizure of the Danish fleet by the English is represented in this form.

APOLOGY (*ἀπολογία*, a defence made in a court of justice).—

We have a work of Xenophon, entitled the *Apology of Socrates*, and another with the same title by Plato. The term was adopted by the Christian fathers, and applied to their writings in defence of Christianity, and in answer to its opponents. About the year 125, Quadratus and Aristides presented *Apologies* to the Emperor Hadrian when on a visit to Athens. Tertullian addressed his *Apologetic* to the magistrates of Rome, the Emperor Severus being then absent.

APOPHTHEGM (*ἀποφθίγματος*, to speak out plainly).—A short and pithy speech or saying of some celebrated man; as that of Augustus, *Festina lente*.

"In a numerous collection of our Saviour's *apophthegms*, there is not to be found one example of sophistry."¹

The Lacedæmonians used much this mode of speaking. Plutarch has a collection entitled the *Apophthegms of Kings and Generals*, many of which are anecdotes; and also another entitled *Iaconica*. Drusius (Joan. Prof. Heb. Lugd. Bat.) published in 1612, a collection of Hebrew and Arabic *Apophthegms*. Erasmus has a collection of *Apophthegms*.²

"Of Blackmore's (Sir Richard) attainments in the ancient tongues, it may be sufficient to say that in his prose, he has confounded an *aphorism* with an *apophthegm*."³

In *Guesses at Truth*,⁴ the saying of Demosthenes, "that action was the first, second, and third essential of eloquence" is called an *apophthegm*.

¹ Paley, *Evidences*, part II., c. 2.

² 12mo, Basil, 1658.

³ Macaulay, *On Addison*, p. 11.

⁴ 2d series, 1848.

APPERCEPTION (Self-consciousness). — “By *apperception* he (Leibnitz) understands that degree of perception which reflects as it were upon itself; by which we are conscious of our own existence, and conscious of our perceptions, by which we can reflect upon the operation of our own minds, and can comprehend abstract truths.”¹

“By *apperception* the Leibnitzio-Wolfians meant the act by which the mind is conscious immediately of the representative object, and through it, mediately of the remote object represented.”²

Apperception according to Kant is consciousness of one's self, or the simple representation of the I. If a subject capable of representations possesses such, it, besides, always connects with these representations that it (the subject) has them. This second representation, that I, the representing subject, has these representations, is called the consciousness of myself, or the *apperception*. This representation is simple, and is an effect of the understanding, which thereby connects all the diversity of a representation in a single representation, or, according to Kant's mode of expression, produces a synthesis.”³

“The term *consciousness* denotes a *state*, *apperception* an *act* of the *ego*; and from this alone the superiority of the latter is apparent.”⁴

“Cousin maintains that the soul possesses a mode of spontaneous thought, into which volition and reflection, and therefore personality, do not enter, and which gives her an intuition of the absolute. For this he has appropriated the name *apperception*, explaining it also as a true inspiration, and holding therefore, that inspirations come to man, not by the special volitions of God, as commonly believed, but fall to reason in its own right, thus constituting a scientific organ of discovery”⁵

APPETITE. — “The word *appetitus*, from which that of appetite is derived, is applied by the Romans and the Latinists to desires in general, whether they primarily relate to the body or not, and with obvious propriety; for the primitive signification

¹ Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay II., c. 15.

² Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note D*, sect. 1.

³ Haywood, *Critick of Pure Reason*, p. 592.

⁴ Meiklejohn, *Criticism of Pure Reason*, note, p. 81.

⁵ MacVicar, *Enquiry into Human Nature*, 8vo, Edin., 1853, p. 216.

APPETITE—

is the seeking after whatever may conduce either to gratification or happiness. Thus Cicero observes, '*Motus animorum duplices sunt; alteri, cogitationis; alteri, appetitus. Cogitatio in vero exquirendo maxime versatur; appetitus impellit ad agendum.*' By two powers of action being thus placed in contrast with each other, and the one applied to thought simply, it is obvious that the other comprehends every species of desire, whether of a mental or corporeal nature. Metaphysicians also, who have written in the Latin language, use the word *appetitus* in the same latitude."¹

In modern use, *appetites* refer to corporeal wants, each of which creates its correspondent desire. But desire proper refers to mental objects.

"The word *appetite*, in common language, often means hunger, and sometimes figuratively any strong desire."²

As our perceptions are *external*, which are common to us with the brutes; and *internal*, which are proper to us as rational beings—so *appetite* is *sensitive* and *rational*. The sensitive appetite was distinguished into the irascible and the concupiscible.³

Appetite and Instinct.—"Appetites have been called instinctive, because they seek their own gratification without the aid of reason, and often in spite of it. They are common to man with the brute; but they differ at least in one important respect from those instincts of the lower animals which are usually contrasted with human reason. The objects towards which they are directed are prized for their own sake; they are sought as *ends*, while *instinct* teaches brutes to do many things which are needed only as *means* for the attainment of some ulterior purpose. Thus *instinct* enables a spider to entrap his prey, while *appetite* only leads him to devour it when in his possession.

"*Instinct* is an impulse conceived without instruction, and prior to all experience, to perform certain acts, which are not needed for the immediate gratification of the agent, which, in fact, are often opposed to it, and are useful only as means for

¹ Ogan, *On the Passions*, vol. 1., p. 15.

² Beattie, *Mor. Science*, part 1., c. 1.

³ Reid, *Act. Pow.*, essay iii.; Stewart, *Act. Pow.*, vol. 1., p. 14.

APPETITE—

the accomplishment of some ulterior object; and this object is usually one of pre-eminent utility or necessity, either for the preservation of the animal's own life, or for the continuance of its species. The former quality separates it from intelligence, properly so called, which proceeds only by experience or instruction; and the latter is its peculiar trait as distinguished from *appetite*, which in strictness uses no means at all, but looks only to ends."¹

APPREHENSION (*apprehendo*, to lay hold of).—"By the *apprehensive* power, we perceive the species of sensible things, present or absent, and retain them as wax doth the print of a seal."²

Here it includes not only conception or imagination, but also memory or retention.

"How can he but be moved willingly to serve God, who hath an *apprehension* of God's merciful design to save him!"³

"It may be true, perhaps, that the generality of the negro slaves are extremely dull of *apprehension* and slow of understanding."⁴

Apprehension in Logic, is that act or condition of the mind in which it receives a notion of any object; and which is analogous to the perception of the senses. *Incomplex apprehension* regards one object, or several, without any relation being perceived between them, as a man, a card, &c. *Complex apprehension* regards several objects with such a relation, as a man on horseback, a pack of cards, &c.⁵

"*Apprehension* is the Kantian word for perception, in the largest sense in which we employ that term. It is the genus which includes under it, as species, perception proper and sensation proper."⁶

Apprehend and Comprehend.—"We *apprehend* many truths which we do not *comprehend*. The great mysteries of our faith, the doctrine, for instance, of the Holy Trinity—we lay hold upon it (*adprehendo*), we hang upon it, our souls live by it; but we do not take it all in, we do not *comprehend* it; for

¹ Bowen, *Lowell Lect.*, 1849, p. 228.

² Burton, *Anat. of Melancholy*, p. 21.

³ Barrow, *Serm.* xlii.

⁴ Whately, *Log.*, b. ii., ch. 1, § 1.

⁵ Meiklejohn, *Criticism of Pure Reason*, note, p. 127.

⁶ Porteus, *On Civilization of Slaves*

APPREHENSION —

it is a necessary attribute of God that He is incomprehensible; if He were not so He would not be God, or the being that comprehended Him would be God also. But it also belongs to the idea of God that He may be '*apprehended*,' though not '*comprehended*' by His reasonable creatures; He has made them to know Him, though not to know Him all, to '*apprehend*' though not to '*comprehend*' Him."¹

APPROBATION (Moral) includes a judgment of an action as *right*, and a feeling favourable to the agent. The judgment precedes and the feeling follows. But in some cases the feeling predominates; and in others the judgment is more prominent. Hence some have resolved an exercise of the moral faculty into an act of the reason; while others would refer it altogether to the sensibility. But both the judgment and the feeling should be taken into account.²

A PRIORI and A POSTERIORI.—"There are two general ways of *reasoning*, termed arguments *à priori* and *à posteriori*, or according to what is usually styled the *synthetic* and *analytic* method; the one lays down some previous, self-evident principles; and in the next place, descends to the several consequences that may be deduced from them; the other begins with a view of the phenomena themselves, traces them to their original, and by developing the properties of these phenomena, arrives at the knowledge of the cause."³

By an *à priori* argument a conclusion is drawn from an antecedent fact, whether the consequence be in the order of time or in the necessary relation of cause and effect. By the argument *à posteriori* we reason from what is consequent in the order of time to what is antecedent, or from effect to cause. An individual may fall under suspicion of murder for two reasons: he may have coveted the deceased's property, or he may be found with it in his possession; the former is an *à priori*, the latter an *à posteriori* argument against him.

"Of demonstrations there are two sorts; demonstrations *à priori*, when we argue from the cause to the effect; and *à*

¹ Trench, *On Study of Words*, p. 110, 12mo, Lond., 1861.

² See *Manual of Mor. Phil.*, p. 102, Reid, *Act. Pow.*, essay v., ch. 7.

³ King, *Essay on Evils*, Pref., p. 9

A PRIORI—

posteriori, when we argue from the effect to the cause. Thus when we argue from the ideas we have of immensity, eternity, necessary existence, and the like, that such perfections can reside but in *one* being, and thence conclude that there can be but one supreme God, who is the cause and author of all things, and that therefore it is contradictory to this to suppose that there can be two necessary independent principles, the one the cause of all the good, and the other the cause of all the evil that is in the world; this is an argument *a priori*. Again, when the Manicheans and Paulicians, from what they observe in things and facts, from the many natural evils which they see in the world, and the many moral wickednesses which are committed by men, conclude that there must be two different causes or principles from whence each of these proceed; this is arguing *a posteriori*.¹

"The term *a priori*, by the influence of Kant and his school, is now very generally employed to characterize those elements of knowledge which are not obtained *a posteriori*—are not evolved out of factitious generalizations; but which as native to, are potentially in, the mind antecedent to the act of experience, on occasion of which (as constituting its subjective condition) they are first actually elicited into consciousness. Previously to Kant the terms *a priori* and *a posteriori* were, in a sense which descended from Aristotle, properly and usually employed—the former to denote a reasoning from cause to effect—the latter a reasoning from effect to cause. The term *a priori* came, however, in modern times, to be extended to any abstract reasoning from a given notion to the conditions which such a notion involved; hence, for example, the title *a priori* bestowed on the ontological and cosmological arguments for the existence of the Deity. The latter of these, in fact, starts from experience—from the observed contingency of the world, in order to construct the supposed notion on which it founds. Clarke's cosmological demonstration called *a priori*, is therefore, so far, properly an argument *a posteriori*."²

"By knowledge *a priori*," says Kant,³ "we shall in the

¹ Dr. John Clark, *Enquiry into Evil*, pp. 31-2.

Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 762.

² *Criticism of Pure Reason*, Introd., § 1.

A PRIORI—

sequel understand, not such as is independent of this or that kind of experience, but such as is absolutely so of *all* experience. Opposed to this is empirical knowledge, or that which is possible only *à posteriori*, that is, through experience. Knowledge *à priori* is either pure or impure. Pure knowledge *à priori* is that with which no empirical element is mixed up. For example, the proposition, 'Every change has a cause,' is a proposition *à priori*, but impure because change is a conception which can only be derived from experience."

"We have ordinarily more consideration for the demonstration called *propter quid* or *à priori*, than for that which we call *quia* or *à posteriori*; because the former proceeds from universals to particulars, from causes to effects, while the latter proceeds in a manner wholly contrary. We must nevertheless see whether we have a right to do this; since no demonstration *à priori* can have credence, or be received, without supposing the demonstration *à posteriori*, by which it must be proved. For how is it, for example, that having to prove that *man feels*, from this proposition, every animal feels—how, I say, will you establish the truth of this position, should some one hesitate to grant it, except by making induction of the individual animals, of whom there is not one that does not feel?"¹

"If there are any *truths* which the mind possesses, whether consciously or unconsciously, before and independent of experience, they may be called *à priori* truths, as belonging to it *prior* to all that it acquires from the world around. On the other hand, truths which are acquired by observation and experience, are called *à posteriori* truths, because they come to the mind *after* it has become acquainted with external facts. How far *à priori* truths or ideas are possible, is the great *campus philosophorum*, the great controverted question of mental philosophy."²—V. DEMONSTRATION.

ARBOR PORPHYRIANA.—In the third century Porphyry wrote *Εἰσαγωγή*, or an *Introduction to Logic*. He represented the five predicables under the form of a tree with its trunk

¹ Bernier, *Abridgment of Gassendi's "De l'Entendement,"* vol. vi., pp. 340-1.

² Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*, 2d edit., pp. 66-2.

ARBOR PORPHYRIANA—

and branches, and hence the name. By the Greek logicians it was called the ladder (*καίμαξ*) of Porphyry. A delineation of the *Arbor Porphyriana* is given by Aquinas.¹

ARCHÆUS is the name given by Paracelsus to the vital principle which presides over the growth and continuation of living beings. He called it body; but an *astral body*, that is an emanation from the substance of the stars, which defends us against the external agents of destruction till the inevitable term of life arrives. The hypothesis was extended by Van Helmont to the active principle which presides not only over every body, but over every particle of organized body, to which it gives its proper form.

The word is used by More² as synonymous with *form*.

ARCHELOGY (*λόγος περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν*) treats of principles, and should not be confounded with *Archæology* (*λόγος περὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων*), which treats of antiquities or things old.³—V. PRINCIPLE.

ARCHETYPE (*ἀρχή*, first or chief; and *τύπος*, form), a model or first form.—“There were other objects of the mind, universal, eternal, immutable, which they called intelligible ideas, all originally contained in one *archetypal* mind or understanding, and from thence participated by inferior minds or souls.”⁴

“The first mind is, according to this hypothesis, an *archetypal* world which contains intelligibly all that is contained sensibly in our world.”⁵

Cornelius Agrippa gave the name of *Archetype* to God, considered as the absolute model of all being.

In the philosophy of Locke, the *archetypes* of our ideas are the things really existing out of us. “By real ideas, I mean such as have a foundation in nature; such as have a conformity with the real being and existence of things, or with their *archetypes*.”⁶

¹ *Opusc.* xlviii., tract. ii., cap. 3.

² *Antidote to Atheism*, pt. i., c. 11.

³ See Alstedius (J. H.), *Scientiarum Omnium Encyclopædia*.

⁴ Cudworth, *Intell. Syst.*, p. 387.

⁵ Bolingbroke, *Essay* iv., sect. 28.

⁶ *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, b. ii., c. 39.

ARCHETYPE—

"There is truth as well as poetry in the Platonic idea of things being formed after original *archetypes*. But we hold that these *archetypes* are not uncreated, as Plato seems to suppose; we maintain that they have no necessary or independent existence, but that they are the product of Divine wisdom; and that we can discover a final cause for their prevalence, not, indeed, in the mere convenience and comfort of the animal, but in the aid furnished to those created intelligences who are expected to contemplate and admire their pre-determined forms."¹

"Apelles paints a head of Jupiter. The statue of Phidias was his *archetype*, if he paints after it from memory, from idea. It was his *model*, if he paints after it in presence of the statue. He paints a *likeness*, if the resemblance is striking. If he makes a second painting in imitation of the first, he takes a *copy*."²

ARCHITECTONICK.—"I understand by an *Architectonick* the art of systems. As the systematic unity is what first of all forms the usual cognition into science, that is, from a mere aggregate of it forms a system, so is *Architectonick* the doctrine of the Scientific in our cognition in general, and belongs therefore necessarily to the doctrine of Method."³

ARGUMENT (*arguo*, from ἀργός, clear, manifest—to show, reason, or prove), is an explanation of that which is doubtful, by that which is known.

Reasoning (or *discourse*) expressed in words, is *Argument*. Every *argument* consists of two parts; that which is *proved*; and that *by means of which* it is proved. The former is called, *before* it is proved, the *question*; *when proved* the *conclusion* (or *inference*); that which is used to prove it, if stated last (as is often done in *common discourse*), is called the *reason*, and is introduced by "*because*," or some other causal conjunction; *e. g.*, "Cæsar deserved death *because* he was a tyrant, and all tyrants deserve death." If the conclusion be stated *last* (which is the strict logical form, to which all reasoning may be reduced), then, that which is employed to prove it is called

¹ McCosh, *Meth. of Div. Govern.*, b. II., ch. 1, § 4.

² Taylor, *Synonyms*.

³ Kant, *Critick of Pure Reason*, by Haywood, p. 624.

ARGUMENT—

the *premises*, and the conclusion is then introduced by some *illative* conjunction, as *therefore*; e. g.,

"All tyrants deserve death:

Cæsar was a tyrant;

Therefore he deserved death."¹

The term *argument* in ordinary discourse, has several meanings.—1. It is used for the premises in contradistinction to the conclusion, e. g., "the conclusion which this *argument* is intended to establish is," &c. 2. It denotes what is a *course* or *series* of *arguments*, as when it is applied to an entire dissertation. 3. Sometimes a *disputation* or *two trains of arguments* opposed to each other. 4. Lastly, the *various forms of stating* an *argument* are sometimes spoken of as different kinds of *argument*, as if the same *argument* were not capable of being stated in various ways.*

"In technical propriety *argument* cannot be used for *argumentation*, as Dr. Whately thinks, but exclusively for its middle term. In this meaning, the word (though not with uniform consistency) was employed by Cicero, Quintilian, Boethius, &c.; it was thus subsequently used by the Latin Aristotelians, from whom it passed even to the Ramists; and this is the meaning which the expression always first and most naturally suggests to a logician."²

In this sense, the *discovery* of *arguments* means the discovery of middle terms.

Argument (The Indirect).—It is opposed to the Ostensive or Direct. Of *Indirect arguments* several kinds are enumerated by logicians.

Argumentum ad hominem, an appeal to the principles of an opponent.

Argumentum ex concessio, a proof derived from some truth already admitted.

Argumentum a fortiori, the proof of a conclusion deduced from that of a less probable supposition that depends upon it.—Matthew vi. 30, vii. 11.

Argumentum ad iudicium, an appeal to the common sense of mankind.

¹ Whately, *Log.*, b. II., ch. 3, § 2.

² *Ibid.*, Appendix I.

³ Sir W. Hamilton, *Discussions*, p. 147.

Argumentum ad verecundiam, an appeal to our reverence for some respected authority.

Argumentum ad populum, an appeal to the passions and prejudices of the multitude.

Argumentum ad ignorantiam, an argument founded on the ignorance of an adversary.

Reductio ad absurdum is the proof of a conclusion derived from the absurdity of a contrary supposition. These arguments are called *Indirect*, because the conclusion that is established is not the absolute and general one in question, but some other relative and particular conclusion, which the person is bound to admit in order to maintain his consistency. The *Reductio ad absurdum* is the form of argument which more particularly comes under this denomination. In geometry this mode of reasoning is much employed, by which, instead of demonstrating what is asserted, everything which contradicts that assertion is shown to be absurd. For, if everything which contradicts a proposition is absurd, or unthinkable, the proposition itself must be accepted as true. In other sciences, however, which do not depend upon definition, nor proceed by demonstration, the supposable and the false find a place between what is true and what is absurd.

ARGUMENTATION is opposed to intuition and consciousness, and used as synonymous with deduction by Dr. Price.¹

Argumentation or reasoning is that operation of mind whereby we infer one proposition from two or more propositions premised.²

Argumentation must not be confounded with *reasoning*. *Reasoning* may be natural or artificial; *argumentation* is always artificial. An advocate *reasons* and *argues*; a Hottentot *reasons*, but does not *argue*. *Reasoning* is occupied with ideas and their relations, legitimate or illegitimate; *argumentation* has to do with forms and their regularity or irregularity. One *reasons* often with one's self; you cannot *argue* but with two. A thesis is set down—you attack, I defend it; you insist, I reply; you deny, I approve; you distinguish, I destroy your distinction; your objections and my replies balance or over-

¹ *Review*, chap. 6.

² Watts, *Log.*, Introd.

ARGUMENTATION —

turn one another. Such is *argumentation*. It supposes that there are two sides, and that both agree to the same rules.¹

"*Argumentationis nomine tota disputatio ipsa comprehenditur, constans ex argumento et argumenti confutatione.*"²

ART (Latin *ars*, from Greek ἀρτή, strength or skill; or from ἄρω, to fit, join, or make agree).

*Ars est ratio recta aliquorum operum faciendorum.*³

*Ars est habitus cum recta ratione effectivus; quia per precepta sua dirigit effectiorem seu productionem operis externi sensibilis. Differt autem a natura, quod natura operatur in eo in quo est; ars vero nunquam operatur in eo in quo est; nisi per accidens, puta cum medicus seipsum sanat.*⁴

Ars est methodus aliquid juxta regulas determinatas operandi.

*Ars est recta ratio factibilium, atque in eo differt a prudentia, quæ est recta ratio agibilium.*⁵

Docti rationem artis intelligunt, indocti voluptatem. — Quint. This is the difference, in the fine arts especially, between acquired knowledge and natural taste.

"We speak of *art* as distinguished from *nature*; but *art* itself is natural to man. . . . If we admit that man is susceptible of improvement, and has in himself a principle of progression and a desire of perfection, it appears improper to say that he has quitted the state of his *nature*, when he has begun to proceed; or that he finds a station for which he was not intended, while, like other animals, he only follows the disposition and employs the powers that *nature* has given. The latest efforts of human invention are but a continuation of certain devices which were practised in the earliest ages of the world, and in the rudest state of mankind."⁷

Art is defined by Lord Bacon to be "a proper disposal of the things of nature by human thought and experience, so as to make them answer the designs and uses of mankind." It may be defined more concisely to be the adjustment of *means* to accomplish a desired *end*.⁸

¹ *Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*

² Cicero.

³ Thomas Aquinas.

⁴ Diderot, *Phys.*, p. 21.

⁵ Bouvier.

⁶ Peckham, *Introd. ad Philosoph.*, p. 81.

⁷ Ferguson, *Essay on Hist. of Civ. Soc.*, pp. 10-13.

⁸ Stewart, *Works*, vol. II., p. 36, last edition.

ART—

"*Art* has in general preceded science. There were bleaching, and dyeing, and tanning, and artificers in copper and iron, before there was chemistry to explain the processes used. Men made wine before there was any theory of fermentation; and glass and porcelain were manufactured before the nature of alkalies and earths had been determined. The pyramids of Nubia and Egypt, the palaces and sculptured slabs of Nineveh, the Cyclopean walls of Italy and Greece, the obelisks and temples of India, the cromlechs and druidical circles of countries formerly Celtic, all preceded the sciences of mechanics and architecture. There was music before there was a science of acoustics; and painting while as yet there was no theory of colours and perspective."¹

On the other hand Cicero has said,² "*Nihil est enim, quod ad artem redigi possit, nisi ille prius qui illa tenet, quorum artem instituere vult, habeat illam scientiam, ut ex iis rebus, quarum ars nondum sit, artem efficere possit.*"

And Mr. Harris³ has argued—"If there were no theorems of science to guide the operations of *art*, there would be no *art*; but if there were no operations of *art*, there might still be theorems of science. Therefore science is prior to *art*."

"The principles which *art* involves, science evolves. The truths on which *art* depends lurk in the artist's mind undeveloped, guiding his hand, stimulating his invention, balancing his judgment, but not appearing in the form of enunciated propositions. *Art* in its earlier stages is anterior to science—it may afterwards borrow aid from it."⁴

If the knowledge used be merely accumulated experience, the *art* is called *empirical*; but if it be experience reasoned upon and brought under general principles, it assumes a higher character and becomes a *scientific art*.

The difference between *art* and *science* is regarded as merely verbal by Sir William Hamilton.⁵

"The distinction between *science* and *art* is, that a *science* is

¹ M'Cosh, *On Div. Govern.*, p. 161.

² *De Oratore*, I., 41.

³ *Phil. Arrangements*, chap. 15.

⁴ Whewell, *Phil. of Induct. Sciences*, vol. II., pp. 111-2, new edit.

⁵ In *Edin. Rev.*, No. 115. On the other side, see Preface of St. Hilaire's translation of the *Organon*, p. 12; Whewell, *Phil. of Induct. Sciences*, part II., book II., chap. 8.

ART—

a body of principles and deductions, to explain the nature of some object matter. An *art* is a body of precepts with practical skill for the completion of some work. A *science* teaches us to know, an *art* to do; the former declares that something exists, with the laws and causes which belong to its existence; the latter teaches how something may be produced."¹

"The object of *science* is knowledge; the objects of *art* are works. In *art*, truth is a means to an end; in *science* it is the only end. Hence the practical arts are not to be classed among the sciences."²

"*Science* gives principles, *art* gives rules. *Science* is fixed, and its object is intellectual; *art* is contingent, and its object sensible."³

ASCETICISM (*ἀσκησις*, exercise).—The exercise of severe virtue among the Pythagoreans and Stoics was so called. It consisted in chastity, poverty, watching, fasting, and retirement.

"The *ascetics* renounced the business and the pleasures of the age; abjured the use of wine, of flesh, and of marriage, chastised the body, mortified their affections, and embraced a life of misery, as the price of eternal happiness."⁴

This name may be applied to every system which teaches man not to govern his wants by subordinating them to reason and the law of duty, but to stifle them entirely, or at least to resist them as much as we can; and these are not only the wants of the body, but still more those of the heart, the imagination, and the mind; for society, the family, most of the sciences and arts of civilization, are proscribed sometimes as rigorously as physical pleasures. The care of the soul and the contemplation of the Deity are the only employments. *Asceticism* may be distinguished as *religious*, which is founded on the doctrine of expiation, and seeks to appease the Divine wrath by voluntary sufferings, and *philosophical*, which aims at accomplishing the destiny of the soul, developing its faculties, and freeing it from the servitude of sense.⁵

¹ Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*, p. 16, 2d edit.

² Whewell, *Phil. of Induct. Sciences*, aph. 26.

³ Harris, *Dialogue on Art*.

⁴ Gibbon, *Hist.*, c. 37.

⁵ *Dict. des Sciences Phil.*

ASCETICISM—

The *principle of asceticism* is described by Bentham,¹ as “that principle which approves of actions in proportion as they tend to *diminish* human happiness, and conversely disapproves of them as they tend to augment it.” But this is not a fair representation of *asceticism* in any of its forms. The only true and rational *asceticism* is temperance or moderation in all things.

ASSENT (*ad sentio*)—to think the same—to be of the same mind or opinion).—“Subscription to articles of religion, though no more than a declaration of the subscriber’s *assent*, may properly enough be considered in connection with the subject of oaths, because it is governed by the same rule of interpretation.”²

Assent is that act of the mind by which we accept as true a proposition, a perception, or an idea. It is a necessary part of judgment; for if you take away from judgment affirmation or denial, nothing remains but a simple conception without logical value, or a proposition which must be examined before it can be admitted. It is also implied in perception, which would otherwise be a mere phenomenon which the mind had not accepted as true. *Assent* is *free* when it is not the unavoidable result of evidence, *necessary* when I cannot withhold it without contradicting myself. The Stoics, while they admitted that most of our ideas came from without, thought that images purely sensible could not be converted into real cognitions without a spontaneous act of the mind, which is just *assent*, or belief, *συγκατάθεσις*.³—V. BELIEF, CONSENT.

“*Assent* of the mind to truth is, in all cases, the work not of the *understanding*, but of the *reason*. Men are not convinced by syllogisms; but when they believe a principle, or wish to believe, then syllogisms are brought in to prove it.”⁴

ASSERTION (*ad sero*, to join to, to declare), in Logic is the affirmation or denial of something.⁵

ASSERTORY.—“But whether each of them be according to the

¹ *Intro. to Prin. of Mor. and Legislation*, ch. 2.

² *Paley, Mor. Phil.*, b. III., c. 22.

³ *Sewall, Christ. Mor.*, chap. 21.

⁴ *Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*

⁵ *Whately, Log.*, b. II., ch. 2, §

ASSERTORY —

kinds of *oaths* divided by the schoolmen, one *assertory*, the other *promissory*, to which some add a third, *comminatory*, is to me unknown."¹

Judgments have also been distinguished into the *problematic*, the *assertory*, and the *apodeictic*. — V. JUDGMENT, OATH.

ASSOCIATION (*associo*, to accompany). — "Ideas that in themselves are not all of kin, come to be so united in some men's minds, that it is very hard to separate them; they always keep company, and the one no sooner at any time comes into the understanding but its *associate* appears with it."² — V. SUGGESTION, TRAIN OF THOUGHT.

"If several thoughts, or ideas, or feelings, have been in the mind at the same time, afterwards, if one of these thoughts return to the mind, some, or all of the others, will frequently return with it; this is called the *association of ideas*."³

"By the *law of continuity*, the mind, when the chord has once been struck, *continues*, as Hume describes it, to repeat of itself the same note again and again, till it finally dies away. By *association* it falls naturally into the same train of consecutive ideas to which it has been before accustomed. Imagine a glass so constructed that when the face placed before it was withdrawn, the image should still continue reflected on it for a certain time, becoming fainter and fainter until it finally disappeared. This would represent the *law of continuity*. Imagine that when a book and a man had been once placed before it together, it should be able, when the book was next brought alone, to recall the image of the man also. This would be the *law of association*. On these two laws depends the spontaneous activity of the mind."⁴ — Sewell.⁵

"The law of *association* is this, — That empirical ideas which often follow each other, create a habit in the mind, whenever the one is produced, for the other always to follow."⁶

"I employ the word *association* to express the effect

¹ Fuller, *Worthies*, Cornwall.

² Locke, *On Hum. Understand.*, b. II., c. 33, sect. 5.

³ Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

⁴ See the use which Butler has made of these in his *Analogy*, ch. 1 and ch. 5.

⁵ *Christ. Mor.*, ch. 14.

⁶ Kant, *Anthropology*, p. 182.

ASSOCIATION—

which an object derives from ideas, or from feelings which it does not necessarily suggest, but which it uniformly recalls to the mind, in consequence of early and long continued habits.”¹

“*Intelligitur per associationem idearum non quævis naturalis et necessaria earundem conjunctio, sed quæ fortuita est, aut per consuetudinem vel affectum producitur, quæ ideæ, quæ nullum naturalem inter se habent nexum, ita copulantur, ut recurrente una, tota earum catena se conspiciendum intellectui præbeat.*”²

“The influence of *association* upon morals opens an ample field of inquiry. It is from this principle that we explain the reformation from theft and drunkenness in servants which we sometimes see produced by a draught of spirits in which tartar emetic had been secretly dissolved. The recollection of the pain and sickness excited by the emetic, naturally associates itself with the spirits, so as to render them both equally the objects of aversion. It is by calling in this principle only that we can account for the conduct of Moses in grinding the golden calf into a powder, and afterwards dissolving it (probably by means of *hepar sulphuris*) in water, and compelling the children of Israel to drink of it as a punishment for their idolatry. This mixture is bitter and nauseous in the highest degree. An inclination to idolatry, therefore, could not be felt without being associated with the remembrance of this disagreeable mixture, and of course being rejected with equal abhorrence.”³—V. COMBINATION.

ASSUMPTION (*assumo*, to take for granted).—“The unities of time and place arise evidently from false *assumptions*.”⁴

Of enunciations or premises, that which is taken universally is called the *proposition*, that which is less universal and comes into the mind secondarily is called the *assumption*.⁵

¹ Stewart, *Works*, vol. II., p. 449.

² Bruckerus, *De Ideis*. Locke, *Essay*, book II., chap. 23; Hume, *Essays*, essay III. Hartley, *Observ. on Man*; Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay IV.; Stewart, *Elements*, vol. II., ch. 8; Brown, *Lectures*, lect. xxxiii.

³ Dr. Rush, *Medical Enquiries*, vol. II., 8vo, Philadelphia, 1793, p. 42.

⁴ Johnson, *Proposals for*, &c., *Shakspeare*.

⁵ Trendelenburg, *Notæ in Arist.*

ASSUMPTION—

The Assumption is the minor or second proposition in a categorical syllogism.

ATHEISM (α, priv.; and Θεός, God).—The doctrine that there is no God.

"We shall now make diligent search and inquiry, to see if we can find any other philosophers who *atheized* before Democritus and Leucippus, as also what form of *atheism* they entertained."¹

The name *Atheist* is said to have been first applied to Diagoras of Melos (or Delos), a follower of Democritus, who explained all things by motion and matter, or the movement of material atoms. The other form of *athgism* in ancient times was that of Thales, Anaximenes, and Heraclitus, who accounted for all things by the different transformations of the one element of water. Straton of Lampsacus rejected the purely mechanical system of Democritus, and ascribed to matter a power of organization which gave to all beings their forms and faculties. Epicurus was the contemporary of Straton, but the follower of Democritus, on whose system he grafted the morality which is suited to it. And the materialism of Hobbes and others in modern times has, in like manner, led to *atheism*.

It is a fine observation of Plato in his *Laws*—that *atheism* is a disease of the soul before it becomes an error of the understanding.²

"To believe nothing of a designing principle or mind, nor any cause, measure, or rule of things but chance, so that in nature neither the interest of the *whole*, nor of any *particulars*, can be said to be in the least designed, pursued, or aimed at, is to be a perfect *atheist*."³

*Hi soli sunt athei, qui mundum rectoris sapientis consilio negant in initio constitutum fuisse atque in omni tempore administrari.*⁴

Atheists are confounded with *Pantheists*; such as Xenophanes among the ancients, or Spinoza and Schelling among

¹ Cudworth, *Intell. Syst.*, p. 111.

² Lerlerc, *Hist. des Systemes des Ancien Athées*. In *Bibliothèque Choisie*.

³ Shaftesbury, *Inquiry Concerning Virtue*, book 1., part 1., sect. 2.

⁴ Hutcheson, *Metaphys.*, pars 3, c. 1.

ATHEISM—

the moderns, who, instead of denying God, absorb everything into Him, and are rather *Acosmists*.

Atheism has been distinguished from *Antitheism*; and the former has been supposed to imply merely the non-recognition of God, while the latter asserts His non-existence. This distinction is founded on the difference between *unbelief* and *disbelief*,¹ and its validity is admitted in so far as it discriminates merely between sceptical and dogmatic *atheism*.²

"The verdict of the *atheist* on the doctrine of a God, is only that it is not proven. It is not that it is disproven. He is but an *atheist*. He is not an *antitheist*."³

ATOM, ATOMISM (*a*, priv. ; and *τέμνω*, to cut, that which cannot be cut or divided is an atom).

"Now, I say, as Ecphantus and Archelaus asserted the corporeal world to be made of *atoms*, yet notwithstanding, held an incorporeal deity, distinct from the same as the first principle of activity in it, so in like manner did all other ancient *atomists* generally before Democritus join theology and incorporealism with their atomical physiology."⁴

Leucippus considered the basis of all bodies to consist of extremely fine particles, differing in form and nature, which he supposed to be dispersed throughout space, and to which the followers of Epicurus first gave the name of *atoms*. To these *atoms* he attributed a rectilinear motion, in consequence of which, such as are homogeneous united, whilst the lighter were dispersed throughout space.

The doctrine of *atomism* did not take its rise in Greece, but in the East. It is found in the Indian philosophy. Kanada, the author of the system, admitted an infinite intelligence distinct from the world. But he could not believe matter to be infinitely divisible, as in this case a grain of sand would be equal to a mountain, both being infinite. Matter consists, then, of ultimate indivisible *atoms*, which are indestructible and eternal. Empedocles and Anaxagoras did not exclude mind or spirit from the universe. Leucippus and Democritus did. Epicurus added nothing to their doctrine. Lucretius gave to it the graces of poetry.

¹ Chalmers, *Nat. Theol.*, 1., 53.

Chalmers, *at supra*.

² Buchanan, *Faith in God*, vol. 1., p. 296

⁴ Cudworth, *Intell. Syst.*, p. 26.

ATOM —

In all its forms, explaining the universe by chance or necessity, it tends to materialism or atheism, although Gassendi has attempted to reconcile it with a belief in God.¹ — *V. MOLECULE.*

ATTENTION (*attendo*, to stretch towards).

"When we see, hear, or think of anything, and feel a desire to know more of it, we keep the mind fixed upon the object; this effort of the mind, produced by the desire of knowledge, is called *attention*."²

Attention is the voluntary directing of the energy of the mind towards an object or an act. It has been said by Sir H. Holland,³ that "The phrase of *direction of consciousness* might often be advantageously substituted for it." It implies Will as distinct from Intelligence and Sensibility. It is the voluntary direction of the intelligence and activity. Condillac confounded it with a sensation of which we were passively conscious, all other sensations being as if they were not. Larmiguiere regarded it as a faculty, and as the primary faculty of the understanding, which gives birth to all the rest. But we may do an act with *attention* as well as contemplate an object with *attention*. And we may attend to a feeling as well as to a cognition. According to De Tracy,⁴ it is a state of mind rather than a faculty. It is to be acquired and improved by habit. We may learn to be attentive as we learn to walk and to write.

According to Dr. Reid,⁵ "*Attention* is a voluntary act; it requires an active exertion to begin and to continue it; and it may be continued as long as we will; but consciousness is involuntary, and of no continuance, changing with every thought."

Attention to external things is *observation*. *Attention* to the subjects of our own consciousness is *reflection*.

Attention and *abstraction* are the same process, it has been said, viewed in different relations. They are the positive and negative poles of the same act. The one evolves the other. *Attention* is the *abstraction* of the mind from all things else, and fixing it upon one object; and *abstraction* is the fixing the mind upon one object to the exclusion of others.

¹ Stewart, *Act. Pow.*, vol. ii., last edit., 369.

² *Mental Physiol.*, p. 14.

³ *Ideologic*, c. 11.

⁴ Taylor, *Elements of Thought*

⁵ *Intell. Pow.*, essay i., ch. 6.

ATTENTION —

Attention and Thought.—"By *thought* is here meant the voluntary reproduction in our minds of those states of consciousness, to which, as to his best and most authentic documents, the teacher of moral or religious truth refers us. In *attention*, we keep the mind passive; in *thought*, we rouse it into activity. In the former, we submit to an impression—we keep the mind steady, in order to receive the stamp. In the latter, we seek to imitate the artist, while we ourselves make a copy or duplicate of his work. We may learn arithmetic or the elements of geometry, by continued *attention* alone; but self-knowledge, or an insight into the laws and constitution of the human mind, and the grounds of religion and true morality, in addition to the effort of *attention*, requires the energy of *thought*."¹

ATTRIBUTE (*attribuo*, to apportion, to ascribe), is anything that can be predicated of another.

"Heaven delights

To pardon erring man; sweet mercy seems

Its darling *attribute*, which limits justice."

Dryden, *All for Love*.

"*Attributes* are usually distributed under the three heads of quality, quantity, and relation."²

In the Schools, the definition, the genus, the proprium, and the accident, were called dialectic *attributes*; because, according to Aristotle,³ these were the four points of view in which any subject of philosophical discussion should be viewed.

"A predicate, the exact limits of which are not determined, cannot be used to define and determine a subject. It may be called an *attribute*, and conveys not the whole nature of the subject, but some one quality belonging to it. 'Metals are heavy,' 'some snakes are venomous,' are judgments in which this kind of predicable occurs."⁴

Attributes (real or metaphysical) are always real qualities, essential and inherent, not only in the nature, but even in the substance of things. "By this word *attribute*," said Descartes (in his letter to Regius), "is meant something which is

¹ Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*, vol. I., p. 4.

² Mill, *Log.*, 2d edit., vol. I., p. 83.

³ *Topic*, lib. I., c. 6.

⁴ Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*, 2d edit., p. 161.

ATTRIBUTE—

immovable and inseparable from the essence of its subject, as that which constitutes it, and which is thus opposed to *mode*." Thus unity, identity, and activity, are *attributes* of the soul; for I cannot deny them, without, at the same time, denying the existence of the soul itself. Sensibility, liberty, and intelligence, are but *faculties*. In God there is nothing but *attributes*, because in God everything is absolute, involved in the substance and unity of the necessary being. *In Deo non proprie modos aut qualitates, sed attributa tantum dicimus esse.*¹

In man the essential *mark* is reason—*attribute*, capacity of learning—*mode*, actual learning—*quality*, relatively to another more or less learned.²—*V. QUALITY, MODE.*

AUTHENTIC.—“A *genuine* book is that which was written by the person whose name it bears, as the author of it. An *authentic* book is that which relates matters of fact as they really happened. A book may be *genuine* without being *authentic*; and a book may be *authentic* without being *genuine*. The books written by Richardson and Fielding are *genuine* books, though the histories of Clarissa and Tom Jones are fables. . . . Anson's voyage may be considered as an *authentic* book, it probably containing a true narrative of the principal events recorded in it; but it is not a *genuine* book, having not been written by Walters, to whom it is ascribed, but by Robins.”³

In jurisprudence, those laws or acts are called *authentic* which are promulgated by the proper public officer, and accompanied with the conditions requisite to give them faith and force.

AUTHORITY (The principle of).—“The principle of adopting the belief of others, on a matter of opinion, without reference to the particular grounds on which the belief may rest.”⁴—*V. CONSENT.*

Authority (The argument from).—It is an argument for the truth of an opinion that it has been embraced by all men. *is*

¹ Descartes, *Princip. Philosoph.*, I., p. 87.

² Peemans, *Introd. ad Philosoph.*, p. 6.

³ Bp. Watson, *Apology for the Bible*, p. 38.

⁴ Sir G. C. Lewis, *On Authority in Matters of Opinion*, p. 8.

AUTHORITY—

all ages, and in all nations. *Quod semper, ubique, et ab omnibus*, are the marks of universality, according to Vincentius Lirinensis. "This word is sometimes employed in its primary sense, when we refer to any one's example, testimony, or judgment; as when, *e.g.*, we speak of correcting a reading in some book on the *authority* of an ancient MS., or giving a statement of some fact on the *authority* of such and such historians, &c. In this sense the word answers pretty nearly to the Latin *auctoritas*. It is a claim to *deference*.

"Sometimes, again, it is employed as equivalent to *potestas*, power, as when we speak of the *authority* of a magistrate. This is a claim to *obedience*."¹

*Una in re consentio omnium gentium lex naturæ putanda est.*²

*Multum dare solemus præsumptioni omnium hominum: Apud nos veritatis argumentum est, aliquid omnibus videri.*³

AUTOCRASY (αὐτοκράτης, self; and κρατία, to have power).—"The Divine will is absolute, it is its own reason, it is both the producer and the ground of all its acts. It moves not by the external impulse or inclination of objects, but determines itself by an absolute *autocracy*."⁴

"God extends his dominion even to man's will, that great seat of freedom, that with a kind of *autocracy* and supremacy within itself, commands its own actions, laughs at all compulsion, scorns restraint, and defies the bondage of human laws or external obligations."⁵—V. AUTONOMY.

AUTOMATON (αὐτόματος, that which moves of itself.)

Automatic.—"The difference between an animal and an *automatic* statue consists in this, that in the animal we trace the mechanism to a certain point, and then we are stopped, either the mechanism becoming too subtle for our discernment, or something else beside the known laws of mechanism taking place; whereas, in the *automaton*, for the comparatively few motions of which it is capable, we trace the mechanism throughout."⁶

Automatic motions are those muscular actions which are

¹ Whately, *Log.* Appendix 1.

² Seneca, *Epist.* cxvii.

³ South, vol. i., ser. vii.

⁴ Cicero, i., *Tuscul.*

⁵ South, vol. vii., ser. x.

⁶ Paley, *Nat. Theol.*, c. 2.

AUTOMATON—

not dependent on the mind, and which are either persistent, or take place periodically with a regular rhythm, and are dependent on *normal* causes seated in the nerves or central organs of the nervous system. "Movements influenced simply by sensation, and not at all by the will, are *automatic*, such as winking."¹

Leibnitz² has said, "*anima humana est spirituale quoddam automaton.*" In a note on this passage, Bilfinger is quoted as saying that *automaton* is derived from *αὐτός* and *μαίω* or *μῶτο*, to seek or desire. The soul is a being desiring of itself, whose changes are desired by itself; whereas the common interpretation of the word is self-moving. The soul, in strict propriety, may be called self-desiring, or desiring changes of itself, as having the principle of change in itself; whereas machines are improperly called self-moving, or self-desiring, or willing.

"By the compound word *αὐτόματον* (*ὅταν αὐτὸ μᾶλλον γένηται*) Aristotle expresses nature effecting either more or less than the specific ends or purposes to which her respective operations invariably tend."³ Nature operating *κατὰ συμβεβηχός*, and producing effects not in her intention, is called *αὐτόματον* or chance, and art operating *κατὰ συμβεβηχός*, and producing effects not in her intention, is called *τύχη*, fortune. Thus, chance or fortune cannot have any existence independently of intention or design.

Automatism is one of the theories as to the activity of matter.⁴

AUTONOMY (*αὐτός νόμος*, a law itself).—In the philosophy of Kant, *autonomy* is ascribed to the reason in all matters of morality. The meaning is, that reason is sovereign, and the laws which it imposes on the will are universal and absolute. Man, as possessed of reason, is his own lawgiver. In this, according to Kant, consists the true character and the only possible proof of liberty. The term *heteronomy* is applied by him to those laws which are imposed upon us by nature, or the violence done to us by our passions and our wants or desires.—**V. AUTOCRASY.**

¹ Morell, *Psychology*, p. 99.

² Tom. I., p. 166.

³ *Nat. Ausrult.*, lib. II., cap. 6; Gillies, *Analysis of Aristotle's Works*, chap. 2, note.

⁴ See Stewart, *Art. Pow.*, vol. II., pp. 378, 379

AUTOTHEISTS (αὐτός θεός). — *Autotheistæ qui nulla alia entia præter se agnoscunt.*¹

AXIOM (ἀξίωμα, from ἀξιόω, to think worthy), a position of worthy or authority. In science, that which is assumed as the basis of demonstration. In mathematics, a self-evident proposition.

Diogenes Laertius,² explains an *axiom*, according to Chrysippus, as meaning a proposition asserting or denying something. "It has received the name of *axiom*, ἀξίωμα, because it is either maintained, ἀξιοῦρας, or repudiated."

"There are a sort of propositions, which, under the name of maxims and *axioms*, have passed for principles of science."³

"Philosophers give the name of *axioms* only to self-evident truths that are necessary, and are not limited to time and place, but must be true at all times and in all places."⁴

Mr. Stewart⁵ contends that *axioms* are elemental truths necessary in reasoning, but not truths from which anything can be deduced.

That all *axioms* are *intuitive* and *self-evident* truths, is, according to Mr. Tatham,⁶ a fundamental mistake into which Mr. Locke,⁷ and others,⁸ have been betrayed, to the great injury of science. All *axioms* though not *intuitive* may, however, be properly said to be *self-evident*; because, in their formation, reason judges by single comparisons without the help of a third idea or middle term; so that they are not indebted to any *other* for their evidence, but have it in themselves; and though inductively framed, they cannot be syllogistically proved.⁹

This term was first applied by mathematicians to a certain number of propositions which are self-evident, and serve as the basis of all their demonstrations. Aristotle¹⁰ applied it to all self-evident principles, which are the grounds of all science. According to him they were all subordinate to the

¹ Lacoudre, *Instit. Philosoph.*, tom. II., p. 120.

² *Life of Zeno*, ch. 48.

³ Locke, *On Hum. Understand.*, book IV., ch. 7.

⁴ Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay II., chap. 20; see also Sir William Hamilton's edition of Reid, note A, sect. 5.

⁵ *Elements*, part II., ch. 1.

⁶ *Chart and Scale of Truth*, chap. 4.

⁷ *Essay*, b. IV., chap. 7, § 1.

⁸ *Ancient Metaphysics*, vol. I., b. V., chap. 3, p. 380, and vol. II., p. 335.

⁹ *Ibid.*, chap. 7, sect. 1.

¹⁰ *Analyt. Post.*, lib. I., chap. 2.

AXIOM —

supreme condition of all demonstration, the principle of identity and contradiction. The Stoics, under the name of *axioms*, included every kind of general proposition, whether of necessary or contingent truth. In this sense the term is employed by Bacon,¹ who, not satisfied with submitting *axioms* to the test of experience, has distinguished several kinds of *axioms*, some more general than others. The Cartesians, who wished to apply the methods of geometry to philosophy, have retained the Aristotelian use of the term. Kant has consecrated it to denote those principles which are the grounds of mathematical science, and which, according to him, are judgments absolutely independent of experience, of immediate evidence, and which have their origin in the pure intuition of time and space.

BEAUTY. — “All the objects we call beautiful agree in two things, which seem to concur in our sense of *beauty*. First, When they are perceived, or even imagined, they produce a certain agreeable emotion or feeling in the mind; and, secondly, This agreeable emotion is accompanied with an opinion or belief of their having some perfection or excellence belonging to them.”²

Beauty is *absolute*, *real*, and *ideal*. The *absolutely* beautiful belongs to Deity. The *really* beautiful is presented to us in the objects of nature and the actions of human life. The *ideally* beautiful is aimed at by art. Plato identified the *beautiful* with the *good*, τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν. But, although the ideas of the beautiful, of the good, and of the true are related to each other, they are distinct. There may be truth and propriety or proportion in *beauty* — and there is a *beauty* in what is good or right, and also in what is true. But still these ideas are distinct.

Dr. Hutcheson³ distinguishes *beauty* into “*absolute*; or that

¹ *Novum Organum*, lib. 1., aphor. 13, 17, 18, &c.

² *Bald, Intel. Pow.*, essay viii., chap. 4.

³ *Inquiry Concerning Beauty*, &c.

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beauty which we perceive in objects without comparison to anything external, of which the object is supposed an imitation or picture; such as that *beauty*, perceived from the works of nature; and *comparative* or relative *beauty*, which we perceive in objects, commonly considered as imitations or resemblances of something else." According to Hutcheson,¹ the general foundation or occasion of the ideas of *beauty* is "*uniformity amidst variety*."

Berkeley, in his *Alciphron*, and Hume, in many parts of his works, make utility the foundation of *beauty*. But objects which are useful are not always beautiful, and objects which are beautiful are not always useful. That which is useful is useful for some end; that which is beautiful is beautiful in itself, and independent of the pleasure which it gives, or the end it may serve.

On the question whether mental or material objects first give us feelings of *beauty*, see Stewart,² Smith,³ and Alison.⁴

Dr. Price⁵ has some remarks on natural *beauty*. See also the article "Beauty" in the *Encyclop. Brit.*, by Lord Jeffrey; Kames, *Elements of Criticism*;⁶ Burke *On the Sublime and Beautiful*; Knight's *Enquiry into Principles of Taste*; Sir Uvedale Price *On the Picturesque*, with Preface by Sir T. D. Lauder, 8vo, Edin., 1842; Stewart's *Essays*;⁷ Crousaz, *Traité de Beau*; André, *Essai sur le Beau*. — V. **ÆSTHETICS, IDEAL.**

BEING (τὸ ὄντως ὄν, that which is, existence).

"First, thou madest things which should have *being* without life; then those which should have life and *being*; lastly, those which have *being*, life, and reason."⁸

"This (*being*), applies to everything which exists in any way whether as *substance* or *accident*, whether *actually* or *potentially*, whether in the nature of things, or only in our notions; for, even what we call *entia rationis*, or fictions of our minds, such as *hippo-centaur*, or *mountain of gold*, have a

¹ *Inquiry*, sect. 2.² *Theory of Mor. Sci.*, part iv., chap. 1.³ In his *Review of Principal Questions in Morals*, sect. 2.⁴ Vol. I., chap. 3.⁵ Bishop Hall, *Contempl.*, "The Creation."⁶ *Act. Pow.*, vol. i., p. 279.⁷ *Essay on Taste*.⁸ Part II.

BEING—

being; even *negation* or *privation* have an existence; nay, according to Aristotle,¹ we can say that *nothing* has a *being*. In short, whenever we can use the substantive verb *is*, there must be some kind of *being*.²

According to some,³ we can have no idea of *nothing*; according to others,⁴ the knowledge of contraries being one, if we know what *being* is, we know what *not being* is.

Being is either *substance* or *accident*.

Substance is either *matter* or *mind*.

Accident is divided by the other categories. — V. ONTOLOGY.

BELIEF (that which we live by, or according to, or *lief*, in German *belieben*, from *lubet*, that which pleases).

"The first great instrument of changing our whole nature, is a firm *belief*, and a perfect assent to, and hearty entertainment of the promises of the gospel."⁵

"*Belief*, assent, conviction, are words which I do not think admit of logical definition, because the operation of mind signified by them is perfectly simple, and of its own kind. *Belief* must have an object. For he who believes must believe something, and that which he believes is the object of his *belief*. *Belief* is always expressed in language by a proposition wherein something is affirmed or denied. *Belief* admits of all degrees, from the slightest suspicion to the fullest assurance. There are many operations of mind of which it is an essential ingredient, as consciousness, perception, remembrance. We give the name of evidence to whatever is a ground of *belief*. What this evidence is, is more easily felt than described. The common occasions of life lead us to distinguish evidence into different kinds; such as the evidence of sense, of memory, of consciousness, of testimony, of axioms, and of reasoning. I am not able to find any common nature to which they may all be reduced. They seem to me to agree only in this, that they are all fitted by nature to produce *belief* in the human mind, some of them in the highest degree,

¹ *Metaphys.*, lib. iv., c. 2.

² Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, book 1., chap. 4.

³ *Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*, art. "Être."

⁴ Smart, *Man. of Log.*, 1849, p. 130.

⁵ Bp. Taylor, vol. 1., Ser. xi.

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which we call certainty, others in various degrees according to circumstances."¹

"St. Austin accurately says, 'We *know* what rests upon reason; we *believe* what rests upon authority.' But reason itself must rest at last upon authority; for the original data of reason do not rest upon reason, but are necessarily accepted by reason on the authority of what is beyond itself. These data are, therefore, in rigid propriety, *beliefs* or *trusts*. Thus it is, that in the last resort, we must, perforce, philosophically admit, that *belief* is the primary condition of reason, and not reason the ultimate ground of *belief*. We are compelled to surrender the proud *Intellige ut credas* of Abelard, to content ourselves with the humble *Crede ut intelligas* of Anselm."²—
V. FEELING, KNOWLEDGE, OPINION.

See Guizot, *Meditations, &c.* *Quel est le vrai sens du mot Foi*, p. 135, 8vo, Paris, 1852.

To *believe* is to admit a thing as true, on grounds sufficient, *subjectively*; insufficient, *objectively*.³

"The word *believing* has been variously and loosely employed. It is frequently used to denote states of consciousness which have already their separate and appropriate appellations. Thus it is sometimes said, 'I believe in my own existence and the existence of an external world, I believe in the facts of nature, the axioms of geometry, the affections of my own mind,' as well as 'I believe in the testimony of witnesses, or in the evidence of historical documents.'"

"Setting aside this loose application of the term, I propose to confine it, *First*, to the effect on the mind of the premises in what is termed probable reasoning, or what I have named contingent reasoning—in a word, the premises of all reasoning, but that which is demonstrative; and, *Secondly*, to the state of *holding true* when that state, far from being the effect of any premises discerned by the mind, is dissociated from all evidence."⁴

"I propose to restrict the term *belief* to the assent to propositions, and demarcate it from those inferences which are

¹ Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay II., chap. 20, and *Inquiry*, chap. 20, sect. 5.

² Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note A, sect. 5.

³ Kant, *Crit. de la Rais. Prat.*, p. 11.

⁴ Bailey, *Lectures on Philosophy of Hum. Mind*, 8vo, 1851, p. 75.

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made in the presence of objects and have reference to them. I would say, we *believe* in the proposition 'Fire burns,' but *know* the fact that the paper about to be thrust into the flame will ignite."¹

BENEVOLENCE (*benevolentia*, well-wishing).—"When our love or desire of good goes forth to others, it is termed good-will or *benevolence*."²

Bishop Butler has said,³ that "there are as real and the same kind of indications in human nature, that we were made for society and to do good to our fellow-creatures, as that we were intended to take care of our own life, and health, and private good." These principles in our nature by which we are prompted to seek and to secure our own good are comprehended under the name of self-love, and those which lead us to seek the good of others are comprehended under the name of *benevolence*. The term corresponding to this among the Greeks was *φιλανθρωπία*, among the writers of the New Testament *ἀγάπη*, and among the Romans *humanitas*. Under these terms are comprehended all those feelings and affections which lead us to increase the happiness and alleviate the sufferings of others, while the term self-love includes all those principles of our nature which prompt us to seek our own good. According to some philosophers, our own good is the ultimate and only proper end of human actions, and when we do good to others it is done with a view to our own good. This is what is called the selfish philosophy, which in modern times has been maintained by Hobbes, Mandeville, Rochefoucault, and others. The other view, which is stated above in the words of Butler, has been strenuously defended by Cumberland, Hutcheson, Adam Smith, and Reid.

BLASPHEMY (*βλάπτω*, to hurt).—"Βλασφημία properly denotes *calumny, detraction, reproachful or abusive language*, against whomsoever it be vented."⁴

As commonly used, it means the wanton and irreverent use of language in reference to the Divine Being or to His worship

¹ *Lewis, Biograph. Hist. of Philosophy*, p. 492.

² *Cogan, On the Passions*, part 1., chap. 2.

³ *Sermon I., On Human Nature*.

⁴ *Campbell, On the Gospels*, Prelim. Dissert. ix., part II.

BLASPHEMY—

and service.¹ This is an offence against the light of nature, and was severely condemned by ancient ethical writers. Among the Jews, *blasphemy* was punished by death (Levit. xxiv. 14, 16). And by the laws of many Christian nations it has been prohibited under heavy penalties. So late as the end of the seventeenth century, a man suffered death at Edinburgh for *blasphemy*.²

Blasphemy differs from sacrilege, in that the former consists in using language, the latter in some overt act.

BODY.—"The primary ideas we have peculiar to *body*, as contradistinguished to *spirit*, are the cohesion of solid and consequently separable parts, and a power of communicating motion by impulse."³

"*Body* is the external cause to which we ascribe our sensations."⁴

Monboddo⁵ distinguishes between *matter* and *body*, and calls *body* matter sensible, that is, with those qualities which make it perceptible to our senses. This leaves room for understanding what is meant by a *spiritual body*, σώμα πνευματικόν, of which we read 1 Cor. xv. 44. He also calls *body*, "matter with form," in contradistinction to "first matter," which is matter without form.

Body is distinguished as *physical*, *mathematical*, and *metaphysical*. *Physical body* is *incomplete* or *complete*. *Incomplete* as in the *material part* of a living being; thus man is said to consist of *body* and *mind*, and *life* is something different from the *bodily frame* in animals and vegetables. *Complete*, when composed of matter and form, as all natural bodies are. *Mathematical body* is the threefold dimensions of length, breadth, and thickness. *Metaphysical body* is *body* as included under the predicament of *substance*, which it divides with *spirit*.—
V. MATTER, MIND, SPIRIT.

BONUM, when given as one of the transcendental properties of being, means that God hath made all things in the best pos-

¹ Augustine said, — *Jam vulgo blasphemia non accipitur nisi mala verba de Deo fieri.*

² See Arnot, *Orim. Trials*.

³ Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book II., chap. 23.

⁴ Mill, *Logic*, 2d edit., vol. I., p. 74.

⁵ *Ancient Metaphys.*, book II., chap. 1.

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sible manner to answer the wisest ends, or that no thing is destitute of its essential properties, which metaphysicians call perfections. Perfections are distinguished into absolute and relative, the former making the nature to which they belong happy, and excluding all imperfection; the latter belonging to inferior natures, and not excluding imperfection, but affording help and relief under its effects.¹

Bonum Morale, or what is good, relatively to man, was distinguished into *bonum jucundum*, or what is calculated to give pleasure, as music; *bonum utile*, or what is advantageous, as wealth; and *bonum honestum*, or what is right, as temperance. These may be separate or conjoined in human actions.

Bonum Summum—the chief good.—This phrase was employed by ancient ethical philosophers to denote that in the prosecution and attainment of which the progress, perfection, and happiness of human beings consist. The principal opinions concerning it are stated by Cicero in his treatise *De Finibus*. See also Augustin, *De Summo Bono*.

Tucker, *Light of Nature*, has a chapter,² entitled "Ultimate Good," which he says is the right translation of *summum bonum*.

According to Kant, "virtue is not the entire complete good as an object of desire to reasonable finite beings; for, to have this character it should be accompanied by happiness, not as it appears to the interested eyes of our personality, which we conceive as an end of itself, but according to the impartial judgment of reason, which considers virtue in general, in the world, as an end in itself. Happiness and virtue, then, 'together constitute the possession of the sovereign good in an individual, but with this condition, that the happiness should be exactly *proportioned* to the morality (this constituting the value of the individual, and rendering him worthy of happiness). The sovereign good, consisting of these two elements, represents the entire or complete good, but virtue must be considered as the supreme good, because there can be no condition higher than virtue; whilst happiness, which is unquestionably always agreeable to its possessor, is not of

¹ Hutcheson, *Metaphys.*, pars 1, cap. 2.

² 7, of vol. I.

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itself absolutely good, but supposes as a condition, a morally good conduct."

BROCARD. — "I make use of all the *brocardics*, or rules of interpreters; that is, not only what is established regularly, in law, but what is concluded wise and reasonable by the best interpreters."¹

"To the Stoice and not to the Stagyrite, are we to refer the first announcement of the *brocard*—*In intellectu nihil est, quod non prius fuerit in sensu.*"²

CÆNESTHESIS. — V. SENSATION, SENSUS COMMUNIS.
CAPACITY. —

"Is it for that such outward ornament
 Was lavished on their sex, that inward gifts
 Were left for haste unfinish'd, judgment scant,
 Capacity not rais'd to apprehend,
 Or value, what is best
 In choice, but oftent to affect the wrong."

Milton, *Samson Agonistes*.

"The original power which the mind possesses of being taught, we call *natural capacity*; and this in some degree is common to all men. The superior facility of being taught, which some possess above the rest, we call *genius*. The first transition or advances from natural power, we call *proficiency*; and the end or completion of proficiency we call *habit*. If such habit be conversant about matter purely speculative, it is then called *science*; if it descend from speculation to practice, it is then called *art*; and if such practice be conversant in regulating the passions and affections, it is then called *moral virtue*."³

"From habit, necessarily results power or *capacity* (in Greek *δύναμις*), which Aristotle has distinguished into two kinds. The first is the *mere capacity of becoming anything*. The second is the *power or faculty of energizing*, according to the habit when it is formed and acquired; or, in other words,

¹ Jeremy Taylor, Preface to *Ductor Dubitantium*.

² Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note A, p. 772.

³ Harris, *Philosoph. Arrang.*, chap. 8.

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after the thing is *become* and actually exists, which at first was only in the *capacity of existing*. This, Aristotle illustrates by the example of a child, who is then only a general in power (*ἐν δυνάμει*), that is, has the power of becoming a general, but when he has grown up and has become a general, then he has the power of the second kind, that is, the power of performing the office of a general."¹

"There are powers which are acquired by use, exercise, or study, which are called *habits*. There must be something in the constitution of the mind necessary to our being able to acquire *habits*, and this is commonly called *capacity*."²

Dr. Reid did not recognize the distinction of power as active or passive. But *capacity* is a passive power, or natural receptivity. A faculty is a power which we are conscious we can direct towards an end. A *capacity* is rather a disposition or aptitude to receive certain modifications of our consciousness, in receiving which we are passive. But an original *capacity*, though at first passive, may be brought under the influence of will and attention, and when so exercised it corresponds to a mental power, and is no longer a pure receptivity. In sensation, we are in the first instance passive, but our *capacity* of receiving sensations may be employed in various ways under the direction of will and attention, or personal activity.

CARDINAL (The) Virtues, prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice, were so called from *cardo*, a hinge; because they were the hinges on which other virtues turned. Each one of them was a *fons et principium*, from which other virtues took their rise.

The four *cardinal* virtues are rather the necessary and essential conditions of virtue, than each individually a virtue. For no one can by itself be manifested as a virtue, without the other three.³

This division of the virtues is as old as moral philosophy. It is found in the teaching of Socrates as recorded by Xenophon, with this difference, that *εὐσεβεία* or regard to the Deity holds the place of prudence or knowledge, which, united to virtue,

¹ Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, b. I., chap. 4.

² Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay I., chap. 1.

³ Thurot, *De l'Entendement*, tom. I., p. 162.

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forms true wisdom. Plato notices temperance, fortitude, and prudence, and in connection with or arising out of these, justice, which he considered not as the single virtue of giving all their due, but as the perfection of human nature and of human society. The term justice had been employed in the same large sense by Pythagoras, and the corresponding term righteousness, is used in Scripture to signify not one virtue, but all the virtues. The four *cardinal* virtues are alluded to in the Apocrypha, *Wisdom*, viii. 7.

The theological virtues are faith, hope, and charity; which being added to the *cardinal*, make the number seven.

"Justice, temperance, fortitude, and prudence, the old heads of the family of virtues, give us a division which fails altogether; since the parts are not distinct, and the whole is not complete. The portions of morality so laid out, both overlap one another, or are undistinguishable; and also leave parts of the subject which do not appear in the distribution at all."¹

Clodius, *De Virtutibus quas Cardinales Appellant*, 4to, Leips., 1815. Plethon, *De Quatuor Virtutibus Cardinalibus*, 8vo, Basl., 1552.

The *cardinal* or principal points of the compass are the North, South, East, and West.

The *cardinal* numbers are one, two, three, &c., in opposition to the *ordinal*, as first, second, third, &c.

CASUISTRY is a department of ethics—"the great object of which is to lay down rules or canons for directing us *how* to act wherever there is any room for doubt or hesitation."²

To *casuistry*, as ethical or moral, belongs the decision of what are called cases of conscience—that is, cases in which we are under obligation, but which, from the special circumstances attending, give rise to doubt whether or how far the obligation may be relaxed or dissolved—such as the obligation to keep a promise obtained by fraud, or extorted by force.

"All that philosophy of right and wrong which has become famous or infamous under the name of *Casuistry*, had

¹ Whewell, *Systemat. Mor.*, lect. iv.

² Stewart, *Act. Pw.*, b. iv., chap. 5, sect. 4

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its origin in the distinction between Mortal¹ and Venial Sin.”²

CATALEPSY (*κατάληψις*, catalepsy).—“The speculations of Berkeley and Boscovich on the non-existence of matter, and of Kant and others on the arbitrariness of all our notions, are interested in, for they appear to be confuted by, the intuitions of *cataleptics*. The *cataleptic* apprehends or perceives directly the objects around her; but they are the same as, when realized through her senses. She notices no difference; size, form, colour, distance, are elements as real to her now as before. In respect again to the future, she sees it, but not in the sense of the annihilation of time; she foresees it; it is the future present to her; time she measures, present and future, with strange precision—strange, yet an approximation, instead of this certainty, would have been more puzzling.

“So that it appears that our notions of matter, force, and the like, and of the conditions of space and time, apart from which we can conceive nothing, are not figments to suit our human and temporary being, but elements of eternal truth.”³

How far is the argument in the foregoing passage affected by the fact, that in sleep and in dreams we have sensations and perceptions in reference to objects which are not within the reach of the senses?

The paradox of Berkeley may be confuted in two ways:—First, by a *reductio ad absurdum*; second, no single existence can effect any change or event, and a change or event of some kind there must be, in order to create those sensations or states of mind in which consciousness consists. There must, therefore, be something in existence foreign to ourselves, for no change, in other words, nothing which stands in the relation of cause and effect, is conceivable, but what is the result of two existences acting upon each other.⁴

CATEGOREMATIC (*κατηγορηματικόν*, to predicate).—“A word is so called which may by itself be employed as a Term. Adverb,

¹ This subject is fully and clearly discussed by Mr. Jowett.—*Epistles of St. Paul*, vol. II., pp. 351, 352.

² *Cambridge Essays*, 1856, p. 6.

³ Mayo, *On Popular Superstitions*, p. 125, 8vo, 3d edit., Edin., 1861.

⁴ See Sir Gilbert Blane on *Muscular Motion*, p. 258, note.

CATEGOREMATIC —

Propositions, &c., and also Nouns in any other case besides the Nominative, are *Synecategorematic*, i. e., can only form part of a Term."¹

CATEGORICAL. — V. PROPOSITION.**CATEGORY** (*κατηγορία*, to predicate).

"So again the distribution of things into certain tribes, which we call *categories* or *predicaments*, are but cautions against the confusion of definitions and divisions."²

The *categories* are the highest classes to which all the objects of knowledge can be reduced, and in which they can be arranged in subordination and system. Philosophy seeks to know all things. But it is impossible to know all things individually. They are, therefore, arranged in classes, according to properties which are common to them. And when we know the definition of a class, we attain to a formal knowledge of all the individual objects of knowledge contained in that class. Every individual man we cannot know; but if we know the definition of man, we know the nature of man, of which every individual of the species participates; and in this sense we may be said to know all men. This attempt to render knowledge in some sense universal, has been made in all ages of philosophy, and has given rise to the *categories* which have appeared in various forms. They are to be found in the philosophy of Eastern nations, as a classification of things and of ideas. The *categories* of the followers of Pythagoras have been preserved by Aristotle in the first book of his *Metaphysics*. Those ascribed to Archytas are now regarded as apocryphal, and as having been fabricated about the beginning of the Christian era, to lower the reputation of Aristotle, whose *categories* are well known. They are ten in number, viz., — *οὐσία*, substance; *πόσος*, quantity; *ποιόν*, quality; *πρός τί*, relation; *πού*, place; *πότε*, time; *πῶς*, situation; *ἔχειν*, possession, or manner of holding; *ποιεῖν*, action; and *πάσχειν*, suffering. The Mnemonic verses which contain them, are: —

Arbor sex servos ardore refrigerat ustos
Cras rure stabo, sed tunicatus ero.³

¹ Whately, *Log.*, b. ii., ch. 1, § 3.

² Bacon, *Adv. of Learning*, b. ii.

³ A humorous illustration of the categories is given by Cornelius to his pupil Marcus Scribnerus. Calling up the coachman, he asked him what he had seen at the

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The *categories* of Aristotle are both logical and metaphysical, and apply to things as well as to words. Regarded logically, they are reducible to two, *substance* and *attribute*. Regarded metaphysically, they are reducible to *being* and *accident*. The Stoics reduced them to four, viz., substance, quality, manner of being, and relation. Plotinus attempted a new system. But the *categories* of Aristotle were acquiesced in till the time of Bacon, who recommended observation rather than classification. Descartes arranged all things under two great *categories*, the absolute and the relative. In the *Port Royal Logic*, seven *categories* are established. In more modern times the *categories* of Kant are well known. They are quantity, quality, relation, and modality. But they are purely subjective, and give merely a classification of the conceptions or judgments of the understanding. In the history of philosophy, the *categories* have been successively a classification universal of things, of words, of ideas, or of forms of thought. And a complete theory of classification, or a complete system of *categories*, is still a desideratum.¹—V. PREDICAMENT, UNIVERSAL.

Sir William Hamilton,² gives a deduction and simplification of the *categories* of Aristotle.³

Mr. Mill⁴ gives the following classification of all nameable things:—

1. Feelings or state of consciousness.
2. The minds which experience these feelings.
3. The bodies or external objects which excite certain of these feelings, together with the power or properties whereby they excite them.
4. The successions and co-existences, the likenesses and unlikenesses, between feelings or states of consciousness.

bear-garden? The man answered that he had seen two men fight for a prize; one was a fair man, a sergeant in the Guards; the other black, a butcher; the sergeant had red breeches, the butcher blue; they fought upon a stage about four o'clock, and the sergeant wounded the butcher in the leg. Mark (quoth Cornelius) how the fellow runs through the predicaments—men (*substantia*)—two (*quantitas*)—fair and black (*qualitas*)—sergeant and butcher (*relatio*)—wounded the other (*actio et passio*)—fighting (*modus*)—stage (*ubi*)—four o'clock (*quando*)—blue and red breeches (*habitus*).

¹ Monboddo, *Origin of Lang.*, vol. I., p. 520, and *Ancient Metaphys.*, b. III., chap. I.

² Reid's *Works*, p. 687.

³ See also *Discussions*, pp. 26, 27, 2d edit.

⁴ *Log.*, I. iii., ult.

CAUSALITY, CAUSATION, CAUSE.

CAUSE.—

"He knew the cause of every maladie,
Were it of cold, or hot, or moist, or drie."

Chaucer, *Prologue*, v. 421.

"The general idea of *cause* is, that without which another thing called the *effect*, cannot be; and it is divided by Aristotle,¹ into four kinds, known by the name of the *material*, the *formal*, the *efficient*, and the *final*. The first is that of which anything is made. Thus brass or marble are the *material* causes of a statue; earth, air, fire, and water, of all natural bodies. The *formal cause* is the form, idea, archetype, or pattern of a thing; for all these words Aristotle uses to express it. Thus the idea of the artist is the *formal cause* of the statue; and of all natural substances, if we do not suppose them the work of chance, the *formal cause* are the ideas of the Divine mind; and this form concurring with the matter, produces every work, whether of nature or art. The *efficient cause* is the principle of change or motion which produces the thing. In this sense the statuary is the *cause* of the statue, and the God of nature the *cause* of all the works of nature. And lastly, the *final cause* is that for the sake of which anything is done. Thus the statuary makes the statue for pleasure or for profit; and the works of nature are all for some good end."²

Aristotle³ says we may distinguish four kinds of causes. The *first* is the *form* proper to each thing. Τὸ εἶ ἢ εἶδος. This is the *quidditas* of the schoolmen, the *causa formalis*. The *second* is the matter and the subject. Ἡ ὕλη καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον, *causa materialis*. The *third* is the principle of movement which produced the thing. Ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως, *causa efficiens*. The *fourth* is the reason and good of all things; for the end of all phenomena and of all movement is good. Τὸ ὅ ἐστι καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, *causa finalis*. The sufficient reason of Leibnitz, which he, like Aristotle, thought to be essentially good.

Aristotle⁴ says, "It is possible that one object may combine all the kinds of causes. Thus, in a house, the *principle of*

¹ *Metaphys.*, lib. v., cap. 2.

² Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, b. I., chap. 4.

³ In *Metaphys.*, lib. I., cap. 3.

⁴ *Ibid.*, lib. III., cap. 2.

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movement is the art and the workmen, the *final cause* is the work, the *matter* the earth and stones, and the plan is the *form*.”¹

In addition to these four causes, Dr. Gillies² says, “The *model* or *exemplar* was considered as a *cause* by the Pythagoreans and Platonists; the former of whom maintained that all perceptible things were imitations of *numbers*; and the latter, that they owed their existence to the participation of *ideas*; but wherein either this imitation or this participation consisted, these philosophers, Aristotle observes, omitted to show.”

Seneca,³ explains the common and Platonic divisions of causes; and arraigns both, because he conceived that space, time, and motion, ought to be included.

Sir W. Hamilton⁴ says, “The *exemplary cause* was introduced by Plato; and was not adopted by the schoolmen as a fifth *cause* in addition to Aristotle’s four.” It is noticed by Suarez and others.

According to Derodon,⁵ material and formal *causes* are *internal*, and constitute the essence of a thing; efficient, final, and exemplary *causes* are *external*, that is, out from or of the essence of a thing. The material *cause* is that, *ex quo*, anything is, or becomes. The formal *cause* is that, *per quod*. The efficient *cause* is that, *a quo*. The final *cause* is that, *propter quod*. And the exemplary *cause* is that, *ad cuius imitationem res fit*.

When the word *cause* is used without an adjective, it commonly means, active power, that which produces change, or *efficient cause*.

Suarez, Rivius, and others, define a *cause* thus: — *Causam esse principium per se influens esse in aliud*.

Ens quod in se continet rationem, cur alterum existat, dicitur hujus causa. — Wolfius.

“A *cause* is that which, of itself, makes anything begin to be.”⁶

We conceive of a *cause* as existing and operating before the effect which is produced. But, to the production of an effect,

¹ See also *Nat. Auscult.* lib. ii., cap. 3, quoted by Harris, Concerning Art, p. 24.

² *Analysis of Aristotle’s Works*, chap. 2, note, p. 100.

³ *Epist.* 66 and 67.

⁴ *De Prædicatione*, p. 114.

⁵ *Reid’s Works*, p. 690, note.

⁶ *Irons, Final Causes*, p. 74.

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more causes than one may be necessary. Hence it has been said by Mr. Karslake,¹ "The *cause* of a thing is that antecedent (or aggregate of antecedents), which is seen to have an intimate connection with the effect, viewed, if it be not itself a self-determining agent, in reference to self-acting power, whose agency it exhibits." And some, instead of the word *cause*, would prefer in many cases to use the word *concauses*.

"Though the antecedent is most strictly the *cause of a thing being*, as, e. g., the passage of the moon between the earth and the sun is the *cause* of an eclipse, yet the effect is that which commonly presents itself to us as the *cause* of our *knowing it to be*. Hence, by what seems to us a strange inversion of *cause* and effect, *effect was said to be a cause*, a *causa cognoscendi*, as distinguished from a *causa essendi*, the strict *cause*."²—V. OCCASION.

CAUSALITY and CAUSATION.

"Now, if there be no spirit, matter must of necessity move itself, where you cannot imagine any activity or *causality*, but the bare essence of the matter, from whence the motion comes."³

"Now, always God's word hath a *causation* with it. He said to him, Sit, that is, he made him sit, or as it is here expressed, he made him sit with a mighty power."⁴

Causality, in actu primo, is the energy or power in the *cause*⁵ by which it produces its effect; as heat in the fire. *Causality, in actu secundo*, is *causation* or the operation of the power by which the *cause* is actually producing its effect. It is *inflexus uile, a quo causa influit esse in effectum quæ dis-*

¹ *Aids to the Study of Logic*, vol. II., p. 43.

² *Ibid.*, vol. II., p. 38.

³ H. More, *Immortality of the Soul*, book I., chap. 6.

⁴ Goodwin, *Works*, vol. I., part I., p. 406.

⁵ The idea of the reason is not to be confounded with that of *causality*. It is a more elevated idea, because it applies to all orders of things, while *causality* extends only to things in time. It is true we speak sometimes of the eternal cause; but thus the idea of cause is synonymous with that of the reason. This idea of the reason expresses the relation of a being or thing to what is contained within it; in other words, the reason expresses the *rapport du contenant au contenu*, or the reason is that whose essence encloses the essence and existence of another thing. We thus arrive at the conception of all being contained in God, who is the supreme reason. — Ahrens, *Cours de Psychol.*, tom. II. — V. REASON.

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tingitur a parte rei, tam a principio, quam a termino, sive ad effectum ad quem tendit. "The changes of which I am conscious in the state of my own mind, and those which I perceive in the external universe, impress me with a conviction that some *cause* must have operated to produce them. There is an intuitive judgment involving the simple idea of *causation*."¹

From the explanation of these terms, it appears that a cause is something which not only *precedes*, but has power to *produce* the effect. And when the effect has been produced, we say it is in consequence of the power in the cause having operated. The belief that every exchange implies a cause, or that every change is produced by the operation of some power, is regarded by some as a primitive belief, and has been denominated by the phrase, the² *principle of causality*. Hume, and others, however, have contended that we have no proper idea of cause as implying power to produce, nor of any necessary connection between the operation of this power and the production of the effect. All that we see or know is mere succession, antecedent and consequent; but having seen things in this relation, we associate them together, and imagining that there is some *vinculum* or connection between them, we call the one the cause, and the other the effect. Dr. Thomas Brown adopts this view with the modification that it is in cases where the antecedence and consequence is *invariable*³ that we attain to the idea of cause. Experience, however, can only testify that the succession of one thing to

¹ Stewart, *Philosoph. Essays*, I., chap. 3.

² Lord Bacon (*Nov. Organ.*, book II., sect. 14), says, "There are some things ultimate and incausable."

³ "A cause, in the fullest definition which it philosophically admits, may be said to be that which immediately precedes any change, and which, existing at any time in similar circumstances, has been always, and will be always, immediately followed by a similar change."—Brown, *Inquiry*, p. 18.

"Antecedency and subsequence are immaterial to the proper definition of cause and effect; on the contrary, although an object, in order to act as a cause, must be in being antecedently to such action; yet when it acts as a cause, its effects are synchronous with that action and are included in it, which a close inspection into the nature of cause will prove. For effects are no more than the new qualities of newly formed objects. Each conjunction of bodies (now separately in existence, and of certain defined qualities), produces upon their union these new natures, whose qualities must necessarily be in and with them in the very moment of their formation."—*Essay on Cause and Effect*, 8vo, Lond., 1824, p. 50.

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another has, in so far as it has been observed, been *unvaried*, not that in the nature of things it is *invariable*. Mr. Locke¹ ascribes the origin of our idea of cause to our experience of the sensible changes which one body produces on another, as fire upon wax. Our belief in an external world rests partly on the principle of *causality*. Our sensations are referred to external objects as their causes. Yet, the idea of *power* which is involved in that of cause, he traces to the consciousness of our possessing power in ourselves. This is the view taken of the origin of our idea of cause by Dr. Reid.² "In the strict philosophical sense, I take a cause to be that which has the relation to the effect which I have to my voluntary and deliberate actions; for I take this notion of a cause to be derived from the power I feel in myself to produce certain effects. In this sense we say that the Deity is the cause of the universe." And at p. 81 he has said, "I see not how mankind could ever have acquired the conception of a cause, or of any relation beyond a mere conjunction in time and place between it and its effects, if they were not conscious of active exertions in themselves, by which effects are produced. This seems to me to be the origin of the idea, or conception of production."

By origin, however, Dr. Reid must have meant occasion. At least he held that the principle of *casuality*, or the belief that every change implies the operation of a cause, is a natural judgment, or *a priori* conviction, necessary and universal. But if the idea of a cause be empirical and grounded on experience, it may be difficult to show how a higher origin can be claimed for the principle of *causality*. Mr. Stewart has expressed himself in language equivalent to that of Dr. Reid. And Maine de Biran³ thinks that the true origin of our idea of cause is to be found in the activity of the will, or in the consciousness that we are causes, or have in ourselves the power of producing change. Having found the idea of power within the sphere of consciousness, we, by a process

¹ *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book II., chaps. 21 and 26.

² *Correspondence of Dr. Reid*, p. 77.

³ *Nouvelles Considérat. sur le Rapport du Physique et du Moral de l'Homme*, 2^e ed., Paris, 1834, pp. 274, 290, 363, 402.

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which he calls natural induction, project this idea into the external world, and ascribe power to that which we call *cause*. According to Kant we have the idea of cause, and also the belief that every commencing phenomenon implies the operation of a cause. But these are merely forms of our understanding, subjective conditions of human thought. In conformity with a pre-existing law of our intelligence, we arrange phenomena according to the relation of cause and effect. But we know not whether, independently of our form of thought, there be any reality corresponding to our idea of cause, or of productive power. The view that the idea of cause is furnished by the fact of our being conscious of possessing power, meets the idealism of Kant, for what greater reality can be conceived than a fact of consciousness? But if experience of external phenomena can be accepted as the origin (or rather as the occasion) of our notion of change, and if consciousness of internal phenomena can be accepted as the origin (or rather as the occasion) of our notion of power to produce change, the idea of a necessary and universal connection between change and the power which produces it, in other words, a belief in the principle of *causality*, can only be referred to the reason, the faculty which apprehends, not what is contingent and passing, but what is permanent and absolute.

"Cousin's theory concerning the origin of idea of *causality* is, that the mind, when it perceives that the agent and the change vary in cases of personal agency (though here he is not very explicit), several times repeated; while the relation between them, viz., the strict idea of personal causation, never varies, but is necessary; that the mind abstracts the invariable and necessary element from the variable and contingent elements of the fact, and thus arrives at the idea of *causality*."¹

"CAUSATION is not an object of sense. The only experience we can have of it is in the consciousness we have of exerting some power in ordering our thoughts and actions. But this experience is surely too narrow a foundation for a general conclusion, that all things that have had or shall have a

¹ *Essay on Causality*, By an Undergraduate, 1854, p. 3.

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beginning must have a cause. This is to be admitted as a first or self-evident principle."¹

But Locke has said,² "The idea of the beginning of motion we have only from reflection on what passes in ourselves, where we find by experience, *that barely by willing it, barely by a thought of the mind, we can move the parts of our bodies which were before at rest.*"

See Cousin.³ See also on the various theories as to the origin of our judgment of cause and effect, Sir Will. Hamilton.⁴

CAUSES (Final, Doctrine of).—When we see means independent of each other conspiring to accomplish certain ends, we naturally conclude that the ends have been contemplated, and the means arranged by an intelligent agent; and, from the nature of the ends and of the means, we infer the character or design of the agent. Thus, from the ends answered in creation being wise and good, we infer not only the existence of an Intelligent Creator, but also that He is a Being of infinite wisdom and goodness. This is commonly called the argument from design or from *final causes*. It was used by Socrates,⁵ and found a place in the scholastic philosophy. But Lord Bacon has said,⁶ that the inquiry into *final causes* is sterile. And Descartes maintained that we cannot know the designs of God in creating the universe, unless he reveal them to us. But Leibnitz, in maintaining the principle of sufficient reason, upheld the doctrine of *final causes*, and thought it equally applicable in physics and in metaphysics. It is true that in physical science we should prosecute our inquiries without any preconceived opinion as to the ends to be answered, and observe the phenomena as they occur, without forcing them into the service of an hypothesis. And it is against this error that the language of Bacon was directed. But when our contemplations of nature reveal to us innumerable adjustments and arrangements working out ends that are wise and good, it is natural to conclude that they have been designed by a *cause* sovereignly wise and good. Notwithstand

¹ Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay vi., chap. 6.

² *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., chap. 21, § 4.

³ *Cours. Prem. Scr.*, tom. I., cours 1817, and *Hist. de Philosoph. Mod.*, par 39.

⁴ *Discussions*, App. 1.

⁵ See Xenophon, *Memorabiles*.

⁶ *De Aug. Scient.*, lib. III., cap. 5.

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ing the doubts as to the logical validity of this argument, which have been started by Kant, Coleridge, and others, it continues to be regarded as the most popular and impressive mode of proving the being and perfections of God. And the validity of it is implied in the universally admitted axiom of modern physiology, that there is no organ without its function. We say of some things in nature that they are useless. All we can truly say is, that we have not yet discovered their use. Everything has an end, to the attainment or accomplishment of which it continually tends. This is the form in which the doctrine of *final causes* was advocated by Aristotle. With him it was not so much an argument from design, as an argument against chance. But if things do not attain their ends by chance it must be by design. Aristotle, it is true, was satisfied that ends were answered by tendencies in nature. But whence or why these tendencies in nature, but from an Intelligent Author of nature?

“If we are to judge from the explanations of the principle given by Aristotle, the notion of a *final cause*, as originally conceived, did not necessarily imply design. The theological sense to which it is now commonly restricted, has been derived from the place assigned to it in the scholastic philosophy; though, indeed, the principle had been long before beautifully applied by Socrates and by the Stoics to establish the truth of a Divine Providence. Whenever, indeed, we observe the adjustment of means to an end, we seem irresistibly impelled to conclude that the whole is the effect of design. The present acceptation, therefore, of the *doctrine of final causes*, is undoubtedly a natural one. Still it is not a necessary construction of the *doctrine*. With Aristotle, accordingly, it is simply an inquiry into tendencies—an investigation of any object or phenomenon, from considering the *ἑκτα τοῦ*, the reason of it, in something else which follows it, and to which it naturally leads.

“His theory of *final causes* is immediately opposed to a doctrine of chance, or spontaneous coincidence; and must be regarded as the denial of that, rather than as a positive assertion of design. He expressly distinguishes, indeed, between thought and nature. He ascribes to nature the same working

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in order to ends, which is commonly regarded as the attribute of thought alone. He insisted that there is no reason to suppose deliberation necessary in these workings of nature, since it is 'as if the art of shipbuilding were in the timber, or just as if a person should act as his own physician.'"¹

"The argument from *final causes*," says Dr. Reid,² "when reduced to a syllogism, has these two premises:—First, that design and intelligence in the *cause* may, with certainty, be inferred from marks or signs of it in the effect. This we may call the major proposition of the argument. The second, which we call the minor proposition, is, that there are in fact the clearest marks of design and wisdom in the works of nature; and the conclusion is, that the works of nature are the effects of a wise and intelligent *cause*. One must either assent to the conclusion, or deny one or other of the premises."

Hampden, *Introd. to Mor. Phil.*;* Irons, *Doctrine of Final Causes*, 8vo, Lond., 1856. The argument from design is prosecuted by Paley, in *Nat. Theol.*; in *Bridgewater Treatises*; *Burnett Prize Essays*, &c.

CAUSES (Occasional, Doctrine of).—This phrase has been employed by the Cartesians to explain the commerce or mode of communicating between mind and matter. The soul being a thinking substance, and extension being the essence of body, no intercourse can take place between them without the intervention of the First Cause. It is Deity himself, therefore, who, on the *occasion* of certain modifications in our minds, excites the corresponding movements of body; and, on the *occasion* of certain changes in our body, awakens the corresponding feelings in the mind. This theory, which is involved in the philosophy of Descartes, was fully developed by Malebranche, Regis, and Geulinx. Laforge limited the theory to involuntary movements, and thus reconciled it in some degree to experience and common sense. Malebranche's *doctrine* is commonly called the "vision of all things in God"—who is the "light of all our seeing."

According to this theory, the admirable structure of the

* Hampden, *Introd. to Mor. Phil.*, lect. iv., p. 118.

† *Intell. Pow.*, essay vi., chap. 6.

‡ Pp. 110–112.

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body and its organs is useless; as a dull mass would have answered the purpose equally well.

CERTAINTY, CERTITUDE (*Certum* (from *cerno*), *propre idem sit, quod decretum ac proinde firmum.* Vossius).

"This way of *certainty* by the knowledge of our own ideas, goes a little farther than bare imagination; and I believe it will appear that all the *certainty* of general truths a man has, lies in nothing else."¹

"*Certain*, in its primary sense, is applied (according to its etymology, from *cerno*), to the state of a person's mind; denoting any one's full and complete conviction; and *generally*, though not always, implying that there is sufficient *ground* for such conviction. It was thence easily transferred metonymically to the *truths* or *events*, respecting which this conviction is rationally entertained. And *uncertain* (as well as the substantives and adverbs derived from these adjectives) follows the same rule. Thus we say, 'It is *certain*,' &c., meaning that we are sure; whereas the fact may be *uncertain* and *certain* to different individuals. From not attending to this, the words *uncertain* and *contingent* have been considered as denoting some quality in the things themselves—and *chance* has been regarded as a real agent."²

"*Certainty* is truth brought methodically to the human intellect, that is, conducted from principle to principle, to a point which is evident in itself. It is the relation of truth to knowledge, of God to man, of ontology to psychology."³

"In accurate reasoning, the word *certain* ought never to be used as merely synonymous with *necessary*. Physical events we call *necessary*, because of their depending on *fixed causes*, not on *known causes*; when they depend also on *known causes*, they may be called *certain*. The variations of the weather arise from *necessary* and *fixed causes*, but they are proverbially *uncertain*."⁴

When we affirm, without any doubt, the existence or non-existence of a being or phenomenon, the truth or falsity of a proposition, the state in which our mind is we call *certainty*—

¹ Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book III., chap. 4.

² Whately, *Log.*, Appendix I.

³ Tiberghien, *Essai des Connait. Hum.*, p. 25.

⁴ Coplestone, *Remains*, 8vo, Lond., 1854, p. 96.

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and we say of the object of knowledge that it is evident or certain. According to the mode in which it is attained, *certainty* is *immediate* by sense and intuition, and *mediate* by reasoning and demonstration. According to the grounds on which it rests, it is called *metaphysical*, when we firmly adhere to truth which cannot be otherwise; such as the first principles of natural law, or the difference between right and wrong. *Physical*, when we adhere to truth which cannot be otherwise, according to the laws of nature, but which may be by miracle; as, fire will *certainly* burn—although it did not burn the Hebrew youths (Dan., chap. iii.) *Moral*, when we adhere to truth which is in accordance with the common order of things, and the common judgment of men—although it may be otherwise without a miracle.

Moral *certainty* may amount to the highest degree of *probability*, and to all practical purposes may be as influential as *certainty*. For it should be observed that *probability* and *certainty* are two states of mind, and not two modes of the reality. The reality is one and the same, but our knowledge of it may be probable or certain. *Probability* has more or less of doubt, and admits of degrees. *Certainty* excludes doubt, and admits neither of increase nor diminution.

Certainty supposes an object to be known, a mind to know, and the result of a communication or relation being established between them which is knowledge; and certain knowledge or *certainty* is the confidence with which the mind reposes in the information of its faculties. Self-consciousness reveals with *certainty* the different states and operations of our own minds. The operations of memory may give us *certainty* as to the past. We cannot doubt the reality of what our senses clearly testify. Reason reveals to us first truths with intuitive *certainty*. And by demonstration we ascend with *certainty* from one truth to another. For to use the words of Thomas Aquinas,¹ "*Tunc conclusiones pro certo sciuntur, quando resolvuntur in principia, et ideo, quod aliquod per certitudinem sciatur, est ex lumine rationis divinitus interius indito, quo in nobis loquitur Deus, non autem ab homine exterius docente, nisi quatenus con-*

¹ *De Veritate.*

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clusiones in principia resolvit, nos docens, ex quo tamen nos certitudinem non acciperemus, nisi in nobis esset certitudo principiorum in quæ conclusiones resolvuntur."

"The criterion of true knowledge is not to be looked for anywhere abroad without our own minds, neither in the height above, nor in the depth beneath, but only in our knowledge and conceptions themselves. For the entity of all theoretical truth is nothing else but clear intelligibility, and whatever is clearly conceived, is an entity and a truth; but that which is false, Divine power itself cannot make it to be clearly and distinctly understood, because falsehood is a non-entity, and a clear conception is an entity; and Omnipotence itself cannot make a non-entity to be an entity."¹

"The theories of *certitude* may be reduced to three classes. The *first* places the ground of *certitude* in *reason*; the *second* in *authority*; the *third* in *evidence*; including, under that term, both the external manifestations of truth, and the internal principles or laws of thought by which we are determined in forming our judgments in regard to them."²

*"De veritatis criterio frustra laborantur quidam: quum non alia reperienda sit præter ipsam rationis facultatem, aut menti congenitam intelligendi vim."*³

Protagoras and Epicurus in ancient times, and Hobbes and the modern sensationalists, have made sense the measure and ground of *certainty*. Descartes and his followers founded it on self-consciousness, *Cogito ergo sum*; while others have received as certain only what is homologated by human reason in general. But *certainty* is not the peculiar characteristic of knowledge furnished by any one faculty, but is the common inheritance of any or all of our intellectual faculties when legitimately exercised within their respective spheres. When so exercised we cannot but accept the result as true and certain.

But if we are thus naturally and necessarily determined to accept the knowledge furnished by our faculties, that knowledge, according to Kant, cannot be proved to be absolute,

¹ Oudworth, *Eternal and Immutable Mor.*, book iv., chap. 5.

² Buchanan, *Truth in God*, vol. II., p. 304.

³ Hutcheson, *Metaphys.*, part II., cap. 2.

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or a knowledge of things in themselves, and as they must appear to all intelligent beings, but is merely relative, or a knowledge of things as they appear to us. Now, it is true that we cannot, as Kant has expressed it, *objectify the subjective*. Without rising out of human nature to the possession of a higher, we cannot sit in judgment on the faculties of that nature. But in admitting that our knowledge is *relative*, we are merely saying it is human. It is according to the measure of a man. It is attained by human faculties, and must be relative, or bear proportion to the faculties by which it is attained. In like manner, the knowledge of angels may be called angelic, but this is not to call it uncertain. We may not know all that can be known of the objects of our knowledge, but still, what we do know, we may know with *certainty*. Human knowledge may admit of increase without being liable to be contradicted or overturned. We come to it by degrees, but the higher degree of knowledge to which we may ultimately attain, does not invalidate the lower degree of knowledge. It rests upon it and rises out of it, and the ground and encouragement of all inquiry is, that there is a truth and reality in things, which our faculties are fitted to apprehend. Their testimony we rejoice to believe. Faith in their trustworthiness is spontaneous. Doubt concerning it is an afterthought. And scepticism as a creed is self-destructive. He who doubts is *certain* that he doubts. *Omnis qui utrum sit veritas dubitat, in se ipso habet verum, unde non dubitet.*¹

Etiam qui negat veritatem esse; concedit veritatem esse; si enim veritas non est, verum est, veritatem non esse. Thomas Aquin., *Sum. Theol.*; Savary, *Sur la Certitude*, 8vo, Paris, 1847. — V. EVIDENCE, CRITERION, KNOWLEDGE.

CHANCE. — Aristotle² says, "According to some, *chance* is a cause not manifest to human reasoning." Δοκεί μὲν αἰτία ἡ τύχη, ἀθροὺν δὲ ἀθροικόμεναι διακαί.

"Many things happen, besides what man intends or purposes; and also some things happen different from what is aimed at by nature. We cannot call them natural things, or from nature, neither can we say that they are from human

¹ Augustin, *de vera Religione*

² Phys., II., 4.

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intention. They are what we call fortuitous events, and the cause which produces them is called *chance*. But they have all respect to some end intended by nature or by man. So that nothing can be more true than what Aristotle¹ says, that if there were no end intended, there could be no *chance*.

"A man digs a piece of ground, to sow or plant it; but, in digging, he finds a treasure. This is beside his intention, and therefore it is said to be by *chance*.

"When a hanging wall falls upon a passenger and crushes him, the destination of nature was only, that the stones of the wall being no longer kept together by the cement, should fall to the ground, according to their natural movement; so that the crushing of the man was something beside the purpose of nature, or *κατὰ φύσιν*."²

As to Aristotle's views of *fortune* and *chance*, see Piccolomineus.³

Chance is opposed to law in this sense, viz., that what happens according to law may be predicted, and counted on. But everything has its own law and its proper cause; and *chance* merely denotes that we know not the proper cause, nor the law according to which a phenomenon occurs.

An event or series of events which seems to be the result neither of a necessity inherent in the nature of things, nor of a plan conceived by intelligence, is said to happen by *chance*.

"It is not, I say, merely in a pious manner of expression, that the Scripture ascribes every event to the providence of God; but it is strictly and philosophically true in nature and reason, that there is no such thing as *chance* or accident; it being evident that these words do not signify anything that is truly an agent or the cause of any event; but they signify merely men's ignorance of the real and immediate cause."⁴

"If a die be thrown, we say it depends upon *chance* what side may turn up; and, if we draw a prize in a lottery, we ascribe our success to *chance*. We do not, however, mean that

¹ *Phys.*, lib. II.

² Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, book II., chap. 20.

³ *Philosoph. de Moribus*, 1583, p. 713.

⁴ Clarke, vol. I., Sermon xcviil.

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these effects were produced by no cause but only that we are ignorant of the cause that produced them.”¹

In what sense we may say there is such a thing as *chance*, and in what sense not, see M'Cosh,² and Mill, *Log.*³

CHANCES (Theory of).—“The theory of *chances* consists in reducing all events of the same kind to a certain number of cases equally possible, that is, such that we are *equally undecided* as to their existence; and in determining the number of these cases which are favourable to the event of which the probability is sought. The ratio of that number to the number of all the possible cases, is the measure of the probability; which is thus a fraction, having for its numerator the number of cases favourable to the event, and for its denominator the number of all the cases which are possible.”⁴

CHARITY (*ἀγάπη*), as one of the theological virtues, is a principle of prevailing love to God, prompting to seek his glory and the good of our fellow-men.

Sometimes it is used as synonymous with brotherly love, or that principle of benevolence which leads us to promote, in all possible ways, the happiness of others.

In a more restricted sense it means almsgiving, or relieving the wants of others by communication of our means and substance.

CHASTITY is the duty of restraining and governing the appetite of sex. It includes purity of thought, speech, and behaviour. Lascivious imaginings, and obscene conversation, as well as incontinent conduct, are contrary to the duty of *chastity*.

CHOICE.

“The necessity of continually *choosing* one of the two, either to act or to forbear acting, is not inconsistent with or an argument against liberty, but is itself the very essence of liberty.”⁵

“For the principle of deliberate *choice*, Aristotle thought that the rational and irrational should concur, producing “orectic intellect,” or “dianoetic appetite,” of which he emphatically says,—“And this principle is man.”⁶

Mr. Locke says, “The will signifies nothing but a power of

¹ Arthur, *Discourses*, p. 17.

² *Typical Forms*, p. 40.

³ B. III., chap. 17.

⁴ Laplace, *Essai Phil. sur les Probabilités*, 5th edit., p. 7.

⁵ Clarke, *Demonstration*, prop. 10.

⁶ *Catholic Philosophy*, p. 46.

CHOICE—

ability to *prefer* or *choose*." And in another passage he says, "The word *preferring* seems best to express the act of volition; yet it does not precisely, for though a man would *prefer* flying to walking, yet who can say he ever *wills* it?"—By Jonathan Edwards,¹ *choice* and *volition* are completely identified: But, in popular language, *choosing* or *preferring* may mean—1. A conclusion of the understanding; as when I say—I prefer or choose peaches rather than plums; *i. e.*, I reckon them a better and safer fruit.

2. A state of inclination or sensibility; as, I prefer or choose plums rather than pears; that is, I like them better; or—

3. A determination of will; as, I prefer or choose pears, meaning that, with the offer of other fruits, I take this.

It is only in the latter sense that *choice* and *volition* are the same.²

"*Choice* or *preference*, in the proper sense, is an act of the understanding; but sometimes it is improperly put for volition, or the determination of the will in things where there is no judgment or preference; thus, a man who owes me a shilling, lays down three or four equally good, and bids me take which I choose. I take one without any judgment or belief that there is any ground of preference; this is merely an act of will, that is, a volition."³

"To prefer is an act of the judgment; and to choose is an act of the will. The one describes intellectual, and the other practical decision."⁴

CHREMATISTICS (*χρημα*, goods), is the science of wealth, or as it is more commonly called, Political Economy, or that department of social science which treats of the resources of a country, and of the best means of increasing them, and of diffusing them most beneficially among the inhabitants, regarded as individuals, or as constituting a community.

CIVILITY or COURTEOUSNESS belongs to what have been called the lesser moralities. It springs from benevolence or brotherly love, and manifests itself by kindness and consideration in manner and conversation towards others. It is distin

¹ *Essay on Freedom of Will*, sect. 1.

² See Tappan, *Appeal to Omnipotence*, ch. 3, sect. 4, 5.

³ *Correspondence of Dr. Reid*, p. 79.

⁴ Taylor, *Synonyma*.

CIVILITY—

guished into *natural* and *conventional*. It is opposed to *rudeness*. Dr. Ferguson says *civility* avoids giving offence by our conversation or manner. *Politeness* seeks to please.¹

CLASSIFICATION (κλῆσις, *classis*, from καλέω, to call, a multitude called together).

"Montesquieu observed very justly, that in their *classification* of the citizens, the great legislators of antiquity made the greatest display of their powers, and even soared above themselves."²

"A *class* consists of several things coming under a common description."³

"The sorting of a multitude of things into parcels, for the sake of knowing them better, and remembering them more easily, is *classification*. When we attempt to classify a multitude of things, we first observe some respects in which they differ from each other; for we could not classify things that are entirely alike; as, for instance, a bushel of peas; we then separate things that are not alike, and bring together things that are similar."⁴

"In every act of *classification*, two steps must be taken; certain marks are to be selected, the possession of which is to be the title to admission into the class, and then all the objects that possess them are to be ascertained. When the marks selected are really important and connected closely with the nature and functions of the thing, the *classification* is said to be *natural*; where they are such as do not affect the nature of the objects materially, and belong in common to things the most different in their main properties, it is *artificial*."⁵

The condition common to both modes of *classification*, is to comprehend everything and to suppose nothing. But the rules for a natural *classification* are more strict than for an artificial

¹ Knox, *Essays*, No. 95.

² Burke, *On the French Revolution*.

³ Whately, *Log.*, b. I., § 3.

⁴ Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

⁵ *Abstraction, generalization, and definition, precede classification*; for if we wish to reduce to regularity the observations we have made, we must compare them, in order to unite them by their essential resemblances, and express their essence with all possible precision. We might classify a library by dividing the books into *history* and *philosophy*. *History* into *ancient* and *modern*; *ancient*, according to the people to whom it referred, and *modern* into *general*, *particular*, and *individual*, or *memoirs*. These divisions and subdivisions might be called a *classification*.

⁶ Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*, 2d edit., p. 377

CLASSIFICATION—

or arbitrary one. We may classify objects arbitrarily in any point of view in which we are pleased to regard them. But a natural *classification* can only proceed according to the real nature and qualities of the objects. The advantages of *classification* are to give a convenient form to our acquirements, and to enlarge our knowledge of the relations in which different objects stand to one another. A good *classification* should—1st, Rest on one principle or analogous principles. 2d, The principle or principles should be of a constant and permanent character. 3d, It should be natural, that is, even when artificial, it should not be violent or forced. 4th, It should clearly and easily apply to all the objects classified.

The principles on which *classification* rests are these:—1st, of *Generalization*; 2d, of *Specification*; and 3d, of *Continuity*,—q. v.

Classification proceeds upon observed resemblances. *Generalization* rests upon the principle, that the same or similar causes will produce similar effects.¹

COGNITION (*cognosco*, to know).—According to Kant, cognition (*Erkenntniss*) is the determined reference of certain representations to an object, that is, that object in the conception whereof the diverse of a given intuition is united. *Erkenntniss vermögen* is the cognition faculty, or the faculty of cognition. To cognize, is to refer a perception to an object by means of a conception. For cognizing, understanding is required. A dog *knows* his master, but he does not *cognize* him.

Representing something to one's self (*vorstellen*) is the first degree of *cognition*; representing to one's self with consciousness (*wahrnehmen*), or perceiving, is the second; knowing (*kennen*) something, or representing to one's self something in comparison with other things, as well in respect of identity as difference, is the third; cognizing (*erkennen*) or knowing something with consciousness, the fourth; understanding (*verstanden*) cognizing through the understanding by means of the conceptions, or conceiving something, the fifth; cognizing something through reason or perspecting (*einsehen*), the sixth; and comprehending something (*begreifen*), that is, cognizing it through reason &

¹ Mill, *Log.*, b. I., chap. 7, § 4; M'Cosh, *Typical Forms*, b. III., chap. 1.

COGNITION —

priori in a degree sufficient for our purpose, the seventh. For all our comprehending is only *relative*, that is, sufficient for a certain purpose; *absolutely* we do not comprehend anything.¹

COLLIGATION OF FACTS in Induction, is a phrase employed by Dr. Whewell to denote the binding together groups of *facts* by means of some suitable conception. The conception must be capable of explanation or definition, not indeed of *adequate* definition, since we shall have to alter our description of it from time to time with the advance of knowledge, but still capable of a precise and clear explanation. Conceptions not wholly correct may serve for a time for the *colligation of facts*, and may guide us in researches which shall end in a more exact *colligation*. As soon as *facts* occur which a conception is inadequate to explain, we unite it or replace it by a new one.²

COMBINATION and CONNECTION of IDEAS are phrases to be found in *Locke's Essay*,³ in which he treats of what is more commonly called *Association of Ideas*, — q. v.

COMBINATION OF IDEAS.—The phrase *Association of Ideas* seems to have been introduced by Locke. It stands as the title to one of the chapters in his *Essay on the Human Understanding*. But in the body of the chapter he uses the phrase *combination of ideas*. These two phrases have reference to the two views which may be taken of the *train of thought* in the mind. In both, under *ideas* are comprehended all the various modes of consciousness. In treating of the association of ideas, the inquiry is as to the laws which regulate the succession or order according to which one thought follows another. But, it has been observed, that the various modes of consciousness not only succeed in some kind of order, but that they incorporate themselves with one another so as to form permanent and almost indissoluble *combinations*.

"When many impressions or ideas are operating in the mind together, there sometimes takes place a process, of a similar kind to chemical combination. When impressions have been so often experienced in conjunction, that each

¹ Haywood, *Orig. of Pure Reason*, p. 363, 2d edit.

² Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*, 2d edit., p. 368.

³ In book II, chap. 33.

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of them calls up readily and instantaneously the ideas of the whole group, these ideas sometimes melt and coalesce into one another, and appear not several ideas, but one in the same manner as when the seven prismatic colours are presented to the eye in rapid succession, the sensation produced is that of white. But, as in this last case, it is correct to say, that the seven colours, when they rapidly follow one another, *generate* white, but not that they actually *are* white; so it appears to me that the Complex Idea, formed by the blending together of several simple ones, should, when it really appears simple (that is, when the separate elements are not consciously distinguishable in it), be said to *result from*, or to be *generated by*, the simple ideas, not to *consist* of them. Our idea of an orange really *consists* of the simple ideas of a certain colour, a certain form, a certain taste, and smell, &c., because we can by interrogating our consciousness, perceive all these elements in the idea. But we cannot conceive, in so apparently simple a feeling as our perception of the shape of an object by the eye, all that multitude of ideas derived from other senses, without which, it is well ascertained, that no such visual perception would ever have had existence; nor in our idea of extension can we discover these elementary ideas of resistance derived from our muscular frame, in which Dr. Brown has shown it to be highly probable that the idea originates. These, therefore, are cases of mental chemistry, in which it is proper to say that the simple ideas generate, rather than that they compose the complex ones.”¹

Suppose, that, in eating an apple we had made use of a fruit knife; a connection comes to be established in our minds between an apple and a fruit knife; so that when the idea of the one is present, the idea of the other also will appear; and these two ideas are said to be associated in the way of *combination*.

Or, the same kind of connection may be established between two feelings, or between a cognition and a feeling, or between a feeling and a volition, — between any two or more mental movements.

¹ Mill, *Log.*, b. vi., ch. 4, § 4.

COMBINATION —

In cutting an apple, we may have wounded our finger; and, afterwards, the sight of an apple will raise a sense or feeling of the wound. Having eaten of honey, we have afterwards suffered pain; and, when honey is again presented, there will be a feeling of dislike, and a purpose to abstain from it.

The *association*, which thus takes place between different mental movements, is more than mere juxtaposition of separate things. It amounts to a perfect *combination* or fusion. And, as in matter, compounds have properties which are not manifested by any of the component parts, in their separate state, so it is in mind; the result of various thoughts and feelings being fused into one whole, may be to produce a new principle, with properties differing from the separate influence of each individual thought and feeling. In this way, many *secondary* and *factitious* principles of action are formed.

COMMON SENSE is a phrase employed to denote that degree of intelligence, sagacity, and prudence, which is common to all men.

"There is a certain degree of *sense* which is necessary to our being subjects of law and government, capable of managing our own affairs and answerable for our conduct to others. This is called *common sense*, because it is common to all men with whom we can transact business.

"The same degree of understanding which makes a man capable of acting with common prudence in life, makes him capable of discerning what is true and what is false in matters that are self-evident, and which he distinctly apprehends."¹

"It is by the help of an innate power of distinction that we recognize the differences of things, as it is by a contrary power of composition that we recognize their identities. These powers, in some degree, are common to all minds; and as they are the basis of our whole knowledge (which is, of necessity, either affirmative or negative), they may be said to constitute what we call *common sense*."²

COMMON SENSE (The Philosophy of) is that philosophy which accepts the testimony of our faculties as trustworthy within

¹ Reid, *Intel. Pow.*, essay vi., ch. 2.

² Harris, *Philosoph. Arrange.*, chap. 9.

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their respective spheres, and rests all human knowledge on certain first truths or primitive beliefs, which are the constitutive elements or fundamental forms of our rational nature, and the regulating principles of our conduct.

"As every ear not absolutely depraved is able to make some general distinctions of sound; and, in like manner, every eye, with respect to objects of vision; and as this general use of these faculties, by being diffused through all individuals, may be called common hearing and common vision, as opposed to those more accurate energies, peculiar only to artists; so fares it with respect to the intellect. There are truths or universals of so obvious a kind, that every mind or intellect not absolutely depraved, without the least help of art, can hardly fail to recognize them. The recognition of these, or at least the ability to recognize them, is called *σοῦς κοινός*, *common sense*, as being a sense common to all except lunatics and idiots.

"Further, as this power is called *κοινός σοῦς*, so the several propositions which are its proper objects, are called *προκαταλήψεις*, or pre-conceptions, as being previous to all other conceptions. It is easy to gather from what has been said that those *προκαταλήψεις* must be general, as being formed by induction; as also natural, by being common to all men, and previous to all instruction—hence, therefore, their definition. A pre-conception is the natural apprehension of what is general or universal."¹

A fundamental maxim of the Stoics was, that there is nothing in the intellect which has not first been in the sense. They admitted, however, natural notions, which they called *anticipations*, and artificial notions formed in us by the understanding. They also recognized notions which all men equally receive and understand. These cannot be opposed to one another; they form what is called *common sense*.²

"A power of the mind which perceives truth, not by progressive argumentation, but by an instinctive and instantaneous impulse; derived neither from education nor from habit, but from nature; acting independently upon our will, whenever

¹ Harris, *On Happiness*, p. 46.

² Bouvier, *Hist. de la Philosophie*, tom. 1, p. 149, 8vo, Paris, 1844.

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the object is presented, according to an established law; and, therefore, not improperly called a *sense*, and acting in the same manner upon all mankind; and, therefore, properly called *common sense*, the ultimate judge of truth."

"*Common sense*," says Mons. Jaques,² "is the unanimous sentiment of the whole human race, upon facts and questions which all may know and resolve—or, more precisely, it is the *ensemble* (complement) of notions and opinions common to all men of all times and places, learned or ignorant, barbarous or civilized. Spontaneity, impersonality, and universality, are the characteristics of truths of *common sense*; and hence their truth and certainty. The moral law, human liberty, the existence of God, and immortality of the soul, are truths of *common sense*."

On the nature and validity of the *common sense* philosophy, see *Reid's Works* by Sir W. Hamilton;³ Oswald, *Appeal to Common Sense*; Beattie, *Essay on Truth*, &c.

COMMON.—V. TERM.

COMPACT (*compingo*, to bind close), is that by which or to which men bind or oblige themselves. It is a mutual agreement between two or more persons to do or to refrain from doing something.—V. PACT, CONTRACT.

COMPARISON is the act of carrying the mind from one object to another, in order to discover some relation subsisting between them. It is a voluntary operation of the mind, and thus differs from the perception or intuition of relations, which does not always depend upon the will. The result of *comparison* is knowledge, which the intellect apprehends, but the act is an exercise of attention voluntarily directing the energy of the mind to a class of objects or ideas. The theorems of mathematics are a series of judgments arrived at by comparison, or viewing different quantities and numbers in their relations. The result of *comparison* is a judgment.

COMPASSION.—V. SYMPATHY.

COMPLEX.—"That which consists of several *different* things, so put together as to form a whole, is called *complex*. *Complex*

² Beattie, *Essay on Truth*, pp. 38-42.

³ *Mém. de l'Acad. Roy. des Sciences Mor. et Pol.*, tom. I., p. 349, Paris, 1841.

⁴ Appendix, note A.

COMPLEX —

things are the subjects of analysis. The analysis of *complex* notions is one of the first and most important exercises of the understanding."¹

COMPREHENSION means the act of comprehending or fully understanding any object or idea. — *V. APPREHENSION*. For the sense in which it is used by the logicians, *V. EXTENSION*.

COMPUNCTION (*compungo*, to prick or sting), is the pricking or uneasy feeling of the conscience on account of something wrong being done. "All men are subject more or less to *compunctions* of conscience." — Blair.

"Stop up th' access and passage to remorse;
That no *compunctious* visitings of nature
Shake my fell purpose." — *Macbeth*.

CONCEIVING and APPREHENDING, or UNDERSTANDING. — Dr. Reid begins his essay on Conception by saying,

"*Conceiving, imagining, apprehending, and understanding, having a notion of a thing*, are common words used to express that operation of the understanding which the logicians call *simple apprehension*."

In reference to this it has been remarked by Mr. Mansel, that "*conception* must be distinguished as well from mere *imagination*, as from a mere *understanding* of the meaning of words.² Combinations of attributes logically impossible, may be expressed in language perfectly intelligible. There is no difficulty in understanding the meaning of the phrase *bilinear figure*, or *iron-gold*. The language is intelligible, though the object is inconceivable. On the other hand, though all conception implies imagination, yet all imagination does not imply conception. To have a conception of a horse, I must not only know the meaning of the several attributes constituting the definition of the animal, but I must also be able to combine these attributes in a *representative image*, that is, to *individualize them*. This, however, is not mere imagination, it is imagination relatively to a concept. I not only see, as it were, the image with the mind's eye, but I also think of it *as a horse*, as possessing the attributes of a given

¹ Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

² Prolegom. Log., p. 24.

³ These have been confounded by Aldrich, and Reid, and others.

CONCEIVING —

concept, and called by the name expressive of them. But mere imagination is possible without any such relation. My mind may recall a sensible impression on whose constituent features I have never reflected, and relatively to which I have never formed a concept or applied a name. Imagination would be possible in a being without any power of distinguishing or comparing his presentations; it is compatible with our ignorance or forgetfulness of the existence of any presentations, save the one represented by the image. Conception, in its lowest degree, implies at least a comparison and distinction of *this* from *that*. Conception proper thus holds an intermediate place between the *intuitive* and *symbolical* knowledge of Leibnitz, being a verification of the latter by reference to the former."

"The words *conception*, *concept*, *notion*, should be limited to the thought of what cannot be represented in the imagination, as the thought suggested by a general term. The Leibnitzians call this *symbolical*, in contrast to *intuitive* knowledge. This is the sense in which *conceptio* and *conceptus* have been usually and correctly employed."¹ — V. KNOWLEDGE.

CONCEPT, A, "is a collection of attributes, united by a sign, and representing a possible object of intuition."²

It was used, or *conceit* as synonymous with it, by the older English writers.³

Kant and his followers, while they reserve the word *idea* to denote the absolute products of the reason, and *intuition* to denote the particular notions which we derive from the senses, have applied the word *concept* (*begriff*) to notions which are general without being absolute. They say they are of three kinds, — 1. *Pure concepts*, which borrow nothing from experience; as the notions of cause, time, and space. 2. *Empirical concepts*, which are altogether derived from experience; as the notion of colour or pleasure. 3. *Mixed concepts*, composed of elements furnished partly by experience, and partly by the pure understanding.⁴

¹ Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 260, note.

² Mansel, *Prolegom. Log.*, p. 60

³ See Baynes, *Essay on Analytic of Log. Forms*, 8vo, Edin., 1850, pp. 5, 6; Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 332.

⁴ See Schmid, *Dictionnaire pour servir aux écrits de Kant*, 12mo, Jena, 1798.

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A *concept* is *clear*, when its object, as a whole, can be distinguished from any other; it is *distinct*, when its several constituent parts can be distinguished from each other. The merit of first pointing out these characteristics of the logical perfection of thought is ascribed to Leibnitz.¹

CONCEPT, CONCEPTION (*conceptus, conceptio* = to *notio* or notion).—"Conception consists in a conscious act of the understanding, bringing any given object or impression into the same class with any number of other objects or impressions, by means of some character or characters common to them all. *Concipimus, id est, capimus hoc cum illo* — we take hold of both at once, we *comprehend* a thing, when we have learnt to comprise it in a known class."²

"Conception is the forming or bringing an image or idea into the mind by an effort of the will. It is distinguished from *sensation* and *perception*, produced by an object present to the senses; and from *imagination*, which is the joining together of ideas in new ways; it is distinguished from *memory*, by not having the feeling of past time connected with the idea."³

According to Mr. Stewart,⁴ *conception* is "that faculty, the business of which is to present us with an exact transcript of what we have felt or perceived," or that faculty, whose province it is "to enable us to form a notion of our past sensations or of the objects of sense which we have formerly perceived." But what Mr. Stewart would thus assign to the faculty of *conception* belongs to *imagination* in its reproductive function. Hence Sir Will. Hamilton has said,⁵ "Mr. Stewart has bestowed on the reproductive imagination the term *conception*, happily, we do not think; as, both in grammatical propriety and by the older and correcter usage of philosophers this term (or rather the product of this operation, *concept*) is convertible with *general notion*, or more correctly, *notion* simply, and in this sense

¹ See *Meditationes de Cognitione, Veritate et Ideis*

² Coleridge, *Church and State*, Prelim. Rem., p. 4.

³ Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

⁴ *Elements*, vol. 1., chap. 3.

⁵ *Discussions*, p. 276.

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is admirably rendered by the *begriff* (which is, *grasped up*) of the Germans."

According to Kant, cognition by conception (*begriff*) is a mode of cognizing an object, when I have not the same *immediately* before me. If I see a tree before me, its immediate representation strikes upon the senses, and I have an intuition of it; but if I represent to myself the tree by means of certain characteristics, which I seek for in the intuition of it, as, for example, the trunk, branches, and leaves, these characteristics are termed signs, and the complex of them is termed the content of the *conception*, and affords a *mediate* representation of the tree. The difference between pure and empirical *conceptions* does not concern the origin of either in time, or the mode whereby we come to the consciousness thereof, but the origin of the same, from the source and content. Hence an empirical *conception* is that which does not only arise by occasion of experience, but to which experience also furnishes the matter. A pure *conception* is that with which no sensation is mixed up. The *conception* of cause is a pure conception of this kind, since I have no sensible object which I would term Cause.¹

CONCEPTION and IMAGINATION.—"Properly and strictly to *conceive* is an act more purely intellectual than *imagining*, proceeding from a faculty superior to those of sense and fancy, or imagination, which are limited to corporeal things, and those *determined*, as all particulars must be, to this or that, place, time, manner, &c. When as that higher power in man, which we may call the *mind*, can form apprehensions of what is *not material* (viz., of spirits and the affections of bodies which fall not under sense), and also can frame *general* ideas or notions, or consider of things in a general way without attending to their particular limited circumstances, as when we think of length in a road, without observing its determinate measure."²

"It is one thing to *imagine* and another thing to *conceive*. For do we *conceive* anything more clearly than our thought

¹ Haywood, *Orig. of Pure Reason*, p. 204; Raynes, *Essay on Analyt. of Log. Forms* pp. 5, 6.

² Oldfield, *Essay on Reason*, p. 11.

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when we think? And yet it is impossible to *imagine* a thought, or to paint any image of it in the brain.”¹

“The distinction between *conception* and *imagination* is real, though it be too often overlooked and the words taken to be synonymous. I can *conceive* a thing that is impossible, but I cannot distinctly *imagine* a thing that is impossible. I can *conceive* a proposition or a demonstration, but I cannot *imagine* either. I can *conceive* understanding and will, virtue and vice, and other attributes of mind, but I cannot *imagine* them. In like manner, I can distinctly *conceive* universals, but I cannot *imagine* them.”²

Imagination has to do only with objects of sense, *conception* with objects of thought. The things which we *imagine* are represented to the mind as individuals, as some particular man, or some particular horse. The things of which we *conceive* are such as may be denoted by general terms, as man, horse.

“The notions” (or *conceptions*) which the “mind forms from things offered to it, are either of single objects, as of ‘this pain, that man, Westminster Abbey;’ or of many objects taken together, as ‘pain, man, abbey.’” Notions of single objects are called *intuitions*, as being such as the mind receives when it simply attends to or inspects (*intuetur*) the object. Notions formed from several objects are called *conceptions*, as being formed by the power which the mind has of taking things together (*concipere*, i. e., *capere hoc cum illo*).

“On inspecting two or more objects of the same class, we begin to compare them with one another, and with those which are already repositied in our memory; and we discover that they have some points of resemblance. All the houses, for example, which come in our way, however they may differ in height, length, position, convenience, duration, have some common points; they are all covered buildings, and fit for the habitation of men. By attending to these points only, and abstracting them from all the rest, we arrive at a general notion of a house, that it is a covered building fit for human habitation; and to this notion we attach a particular name

¹ *Port Roy. Log.*, part i., chap. 1.

² Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay iv.

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house, to remind us of the process we have gone through, and to record its results for use. The general notion so formed we call a *conception*; the common points we observed in the various objects are called *marks* or *notes*; and the process of observing them and forming one entire notion from them is termed *abstraction*.”¹

CONCEPTION and IDEA.—“By *conception* is meant the simple view we have of the objects which are presented to our mind; as when, for instance, we think of the *sun*, the *earth*, a *tree*, a *circle*, a *square*, *thought*, *being*, without forming any determinate judgment concerning them; and the form through which we consider these things is called an *idea*.” — *Port. Roy. Log.*

“The *having an idea of a thing* is, in common language, used in the same sense (as *conceiving*), chiefly, I think,” says Dr. Reid, “since Mr. Locke’s time.”

“A *conception* is something derived from observation; not so *ideas*, which meet with nothing exactly answering to them within the range of our experience. Thus *ideas* are *à priori*, *conceptions* are *à posteriori*; and it is only by means of the former that the latter are really possible. For the bare fact, taken by itself, falls short of the *conception* which may be described as the synthesis of the fact and the *idea*. Thus we have an *idea* of the universe, under which its different phenomena fall into place, and from which they take their meaning; we have an *idea* of God as creator, from which we derive the power of conceiving that the impressions produced upon our minds, through the senses, result from really existing things; we have an *idea* of the soul, which enables us to realize our own personal identity, by suggesting that a feeling, conceiving, thinking subject, exists as a substratum of every sensation, *conception*, thought.”²

“Every *conception*,” says Coleridge,³ “has its sole reality in its being referable to a thing or class of things, of which, or of the common characters of which, it is a reflection. An *idea* is a power, δύναμις, νοερά, which constitutes its own reality,

¹ Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*, p. 105, *Principles of Necessary and Contingent Truth*, p. 141.

² Chrestien, *Essay on Log. Meth.*, p. 137.

³ *Notes on English Divines*, 12mo, 1853, vol. 1, p. 27.

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and is, in order of thought, necessarily antecedent to the things in which it is more or less adequately realized, while a *conception* is as necessarily posterior."

Conception is used to signify — 1. The *power* or *faculty* of conceiving, as when Mr. Stewart says, "Under the article of *conception* I shall confine myself to that faculty whose province it is to enable us to form a notion of our past sensations, or of the objects of sense that we have formerly perceived."

2. The *act* or *operation* of this power or faculty. "*Conception*," says Sir John Stoddart,¹ "which is derived from *con* and *cipio*, expresses the *action* by which I *take up together* a portion of our sensations, as it were water, in some vessel adapted to contain a certain quantity."

"*Conception* is the *act* by which we comprehend by means of a general notion, as distinguished both from the *perception* of a *present*, and the imagination of an *absent individual*."²

3. The *result* of the operation of this power or faculty; as when Dr. Whewell says,³ "our *conceptions* are *that*, in the mind, which we denote by our general terms, as a triangle, a square number, a force."

This last signification, however, is more correctly and conveniently given by the word *concept*, i. e., *conceptum*, or *id quod conceptum est*.

CONCEPTUALISM is a doctrine in some sense intermediate between *realism* and *nominalism*, *q. v.* Have genera and species a real independent existence? The *Realist* answers that they exist independently; that besides individual objects and the general notion from them in the mind, there exist certain *ideas*, the pattern after which the single objects are fashioned; and that the general notion in our mind is the counterpart of the idea without it. The *Nominalist* says that nothing exists but things, and names of things; and that universals are mere names, *flatus venti*. The *Conceptualists* assign to universals an existence which may be called logical or psychological, that is, independent of single objects, but dependent upon the mind of the thinking subject, in which they are as notions or conceptions.

¹ *Univ. Gram.*, in *Encyclop. Metropol.*

² *North Brit. Rev.*, No. 27, p. 45.

³ Pref. to the *Philosoph. of the Induct. Sciences*, p. 12.

Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*, 2d edit., p. 112.

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Dr. Brown, while his views approach those of the *Conceptualists*, would prefer to call himself a *Relationist*.¹

CONCLUSION.—When something is simply affirmed to be true, it is called a *proposition*; after it has been found to be true, by several reasons or arguments, it is called a *conclusion*. "Sloth and prodigality will bring a man to want," this is a proposition; after all the arguments have been mentioned which prove this to be true, we say, "*therefore* sloth and prodigality will bring a man to want;" this is now the *conclusion*.²

That proposition which is inferred from the premises of an argument is called the *conclusion*.³

CONCRETE (*concreresco*, to grow together), is opposed to *abstract*.

A *concrete* notion is the notion of an object as it exists in nature, invested with all its qualities. An *abstract* notion, on the contrary, is the notion of some quality or attribute separated from the object to which it belongs, and deprived of all the specialities with which experience invests it; or it may be the notion of a substance stripped of all its qualities. In this way *concrete* comes to be synonymous with *particular*, and *abstract* with *general*.

The names of classes are *abstract*, those of individuals *concrete*; and from *concrete* adjectives are made *abstract* substantives. — V. ABSTRACT, TERM.

CONDIGNITY. — V. MERIT.

CONDITION — (*Conditio fere sumitur pro qualitate qua quid conditum est fieri.* — Vossius. Or it may be from *condo*, to give along with, i. e., something given or going along with a cause).

A *condition* is that which is pre-requisite in order that something may be, and especially in order that a cause may operate. A *condition* does not operate but by removing some impediment, as opening the eyes to see; or by applying one's strength in conjunction with another, when two men are re-

¹ See *Physiol. of Hum. Mind*, p. 295. Cousin, *Introduct. aux Oeuvres Inédites d'Abelard*, 4to, Par., 1836, p. 181; Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay v., chap. 6, with Sir W. Hamilton's note, p. 412.

Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

² Whately, *Log.*, b. II., ch. 3, § 1.

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quired to lift or carry a weight, it being a condition of their doing so that their strength be exerted at the same time. A *condition* is prior to the production of an effect; but it does not produce it. It is fire that burns; but, before it burns, it is a *condition* that there be an approximation of the fire to the fuel, or the matter that is burned. Where there is no wood the fire goeth out. The cause of burning is the element of fire, fuel is a con-cause, and the *condition* is the approximation of the one to the other. The impression on the wax is the *effect*—the seal is the *cause*; the pressure of the one substance upon the other, and the softness or fluidity of the wax are *conditions*.

"By a *condition*," says Mr. Karslake,¹ "is meant something more negative, whereas a *cause* is regarded as something more positive. We seem to think of a *condition* rather as that whose absence would have prevented a thing from taking place; of a *cause*, rather as that whose presence produced it. Thus we apply, perhaps, the word *cause* rather to that between which and the result we can see a more immediate connection. If so, then in this way, also, every *cause* will be a *condition*, or antecedent, but not every antecedent will be a cause. The fact of a city being built of wood will be a *condition* of its being burnt down: some inflammable matter having caught fire will be the cause." — V. OCCASION.

Condition and Conditioned (*Bedingung* and *Bedingies*) are correlative conceptions. The *condition* is the ground which must be presupposed; and what presupposes a *condition* is the *conditioned*, *conditionate*, or *conditional*.

CONDITIONAL. — V. PROPOSITION, SYLLOGISM.

CONGRUITY (from *congruo*, to come together as cranes do, who feed and fly in companies), means the fitness or agreement of one thing to another. *Congruity* to the relations of the agent is given by some philosophers as the characteristic of all right actions. Thus there is a *congruity* or fitness in a creature worshipping his Creator, in a son honouring his father. In this use of the word it belongs to the theory which places virtue in the nature, reason, and fitness of things. — V. MERIT

¹ *Aids to Log.*, vol. II., p. 43.

CONJUGATE.— Words of the same stock or kindred, as *wise*, *to be wise*, *wisely*, are called *conjugate* or *paronymous* words.

CONNOTATIVE, A, or attributive term is one which, when applied to some object, is such as to imply in its signification some attribute belonging to that object. It *connotes*, i. e., notes along with the object (or implies), something considered as inherent therein; as “The capital of France,” “The founder of Rome.” The founding of Rome is, by that appellation, *attributed* to the person to whom it is applied.

A term which merely *denotes* an object, without implying any attribute of that object, is called absolute or non-connotative; as Paris, Romulus. The latter terms *denote* respectively the same objects as the former, but do not, like them, *connote* (*imply* in their signification) any attribute of those individuals.¹

CONSANGUINITY (*con sanguis*, of the same blood), is defined to be, *vinculum personarum ab eodem stipite descenditum*, the relation of persons descended from the same stock or common ancestor. It is either *lineal* or *collateral*. *Lineal consanguinity* is that which subsists between persons of whom one is descended in a direct line from the other; as son, grandson, great grandson, &c. *Collateral* relations agree with the *lineal* in this, that they descend from the same stock or ancestor; but differ in this, that they do not descend the one from the other. John has two sons, who have each a numerous issue; both these issues are *lineally* descended from John, or their common ancestor; and they are *collateral* kinsmen to each other, because all descended from this common ancestor, and all have a portion of his blood in their veins, which denominates them *consanguineous*. — V. AFFINITY.

CONSCIENCE (*conscientia*, joint or double knowledge), means knowledge of conduct in reference to the law of right and wrong.

“Conscience is the reason, employed about questions of right and wrong, and accompanied with the sentiments of approbation and condemnation, which, by the nature of man, cling inextricably to his apprehension of right and wrong.”²

¹ Whately, *Log.*, b. II., ch. 5, § 1; Mill, *Log.*, b. I., ch. 2, sect. 5.

² Whewell, *Syst. Mor.*, lect. vi.

CONSCIENCE—

According to some, *conscience* takes cognizance merely of our own conduct. Thus Bishop Butler has said:¹ "The principle in man by which he approves or disapproves of his heart, temper, and actions, is *conscience*—for this is the strict sense of the word, though it is sometimes used so as to take in more."

Locke defined conscience to be "our own judgment of the rectitude and pravity of our own actions."

Dr. Rush² has said: "The moral faculty exercises itself upon the actions of others. It approves, even in books, of the virtues of a Trajan, and disapproves of the vices of a Marius, while *conscience* confines its operations to our own actions."

"The word '*conscience*' does not immediately denote any moral faculty by which we approve or disapprove. *Conscience* supposes, indeed, the existence of some such faculty, and properly signifies our consciousness of having acted agreeably or contrary to its directions."³

"*Conscience* coincides exactly with the moral faculty, with this difference only, that the former refers to our own conduct alone, whereas the latter is meant to express also the power by which we approve or disapprove of the conduct of others."⁴

By these writers *conscience* is represented as being the function of the moral faculty in reference to our own conduct, and as giving us a consciousness of self-approbation or of self-condemnation.

By a further limitation of the term, *conscience* has been regarded by some as merely retrospective in its exercise; and by a still further limitation as only, or chiefly, punitive in its exercise, and implying the consciousness of our having acted wrong.

But of late years, and by the best writers, the term *conscience*, and the phrases moral faculty, moral judgment, faculty of moral perception, moral sense, susceptibility of moral emo-

¹ Sermon 1., *On Hum. Nature*.

² *Inquiry into the Influence of Physical Causes upon the Moral Faculty*, p. 8.

³ Smith, *Theory of Mor. Sent.*, pt. vii., sect. 3.

⁴ Stewart, *Axi. Pro.*, pt. 1., ch. 2. See also Payne, *Elements of Mor. Science*, 1948, p. 203.

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tion, have all been applied to that faculty, or combination of faculties, by which we have ideas of right and wrong in reference to actions, and correspondent feelings of approbation and disapprobation. This faculty, or combination of faculties, is called into exercise not merely in reference to our own conduct, but also in reference to the conduct of others. It is not only *reflective* but *prospective* in its operations. It is *antecedent* as well as *subsequent* to action in its exercise; and is occupied *de faciendo* as well as *de facto*.¹

In short, *conscience* constitutes itself a witness of the past and of the future, and judges of actions reported as if present when they were actually done. It takes cognizance not merely of the individual man, but of human nature, and pronounces concerning actions as right or wrong, not merely in reference to one person, or one time, or one place, but absolutely and universally.

With reference to their views as to the nature of *conscience* and the constitution of the moral faculty, modern philosophers may be arranged in two great schools or sects. The difference between them rests on the prominence and precedence which they assign to reason and to feeling in the exercise of the moral faculty; and their respective theories may be distinctively designated the *intellectual* theory and the *sentimental* theory. A brief view of the principal arguments in support of each may be found in Hume.²

CONSCIOUSNESS (*conscientia*, joint knowledge, a knowledge of one thing in connection or relation with another).

Sir William Hamilton³ has remarked that "the Greek has no word for *consciousness*," and that "Tertullian is the only *ancient* who uses the word *conscientia* in a psychological sense, corresponding with our *consciousness*."⁴

The meaning of a word is sometimes best attained by means of the word opposed to it. *Unconsciousness*, that is, the want or absence of *consciousness*, denotes the suspension of all our faculties. *Consciousness*, then, is the state in which we are when all or any of our faculties are in exer-

¹ See Reid, *Act. Pow.*, essay III., pt. III., ch. 8.

² *Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, sect. 5.

³ *Discussions*, p. 110, note.

⁴ Reid's *Works*, p. 778.

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cise. It is the condition or accompaniment of every mental operation.

The scholastic definition was, *perceptio qua mens de presenti suo statu admonetur*.

"*Consciousness* is the necessary knowledge which the mind has of its own operations. In knowing, it knows that it knows. In experiencing emotions and passions, it knows that it experiences them. In willing, or exercising acts of causality, it knows that it wills or exercises such acts. This is the common, universal, and spontaneous *consciousness*." . . . "By *consciousness* more nicely and accurately defined, we mean the power and act of self-recognition: not if you please, the mind knowing its knowledges, emotions, and volitions; but the mind knowing itself in these."¹

Mr. Locke has said,² "It is altogether as intelligible to say that a body is extended without parts, as that anything thinks without being conscious of it, or perceiving that it does so. They who talk in this way, may, with as much reason, say that a man is always hungry, but that he does not always feel it; whereas hunger consists in that very sensation, as thinking consists in being conscious that one thinks!"

"We not only *feel*, but we *know* that we *feel*; we not only *act*, but we *know* that we *act*; we not only *think*, but we *know* that we *think*; to think, without knowing that we think, is as if we should not think; and the peculiar quality, the fundamental attribute of thought, is to have a *consciousness* of itself. *Consciousness* is this interior light which illuminates everything that takes place in the soul; *consciousness* is the accompaniment of all our faculties; and is, so to speak, their echo."³

On *consciousness* as the necessary form of thought, see lecture v. of the same volume.

That *consciousness* is not a particular faculty of the mind, but the universal condition of intelligence, the fundamental form of all the modes of our thinking activity, and not a special mode of that activity, is strenuously maintained by

¹ Tappan, *Doctrine of the Will by an Appeal to Consciousness*, chap. 2, sect. 1.

² *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., ch. 1.

³ Cousin, *Hist. of Mod. Philosophy*, vol. 1., pp. 274-5

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Amadee Jacques,¹ and also by two American writers, Mr. Bowen² and Mr. Tappan. This view is in accordance with the saying of Aristotle, *οτι ἵστις αἰσθησις αἰσθησεως*—there is not a feeling of a feeling; and that of the schoolmen—"Non sentimus, nisi sentiamus nos sentire—non intelligimus, nisi intelligamus nos intelligere." "No man," said Dr. Reid, "can perceive an object without being conscious that he perceives it. No man can think, without being conscious that he thinks." And as on the one hand we cannot think or feel without being conscious, so on the other hand we cannot be conscious without thinking or feeling. This would be, if possible, to be conscious of nothing, to have a *consciousness* which was no *consciousness*, or *consciousness* without an object. "Annihilate the object of any mental operation and you annihilate the operation; annihilate the *consciousness* of the object, and you annihilate the operation."

This view of *consciousness*, as the common condition under which all our faculties are brought into operation, or of considering these faculties and their operations as so many modifications of *consciousness*, has of late been generally adopted; so much so, that psychology, or the science of mind, has been denominated an inquiry into the facts of *consciousness*. All that we can truly learn of mind must be learned by attending to the various ways in which it becomes conscious. None of the phenomena of *consciousness* can be called in question. They may be more or less clear—more or less complete; but they either are or are not.

In the *Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*,³ it is maintained that *consciousness* is a separate faculty, having *self*, or the *ego*, for its object.

Instead of regarding *consciousness* as the common condition or accompaniment of every mental operation, Royer Collard and Adolphe Garnier among the French, and Reid and Stewart among the Scotch philosophers, have been represented as holding the opinion that *consciousness* is a separate faculty, having for its objects the operations of our other faculties. "*Consciousness*," says Dr. Reid,⁴ "is a word used by philoso-

¹ In the *Manuel de Philosophie, Partie Psychologique*.

² In his *Critical Essays*, p. 131.

³ Art. "Conscience."

⁴ *Intell. Pro.*, essay I., chap. 1; see also essay vi., chap. 5.

CONSCIOUSNESS—

phers to signify that immediate knowledge which we have of our present thoughts and purposes, and in general, of all the present operations of our minds. Whence we may observe that *consciousness* is only of things present. To apply *consciousness* to things past, which sometimes is done, in popular discourse, is to confound *consciousness* with memory; and all such confusion of words ought to be avoided in philosophical discourse. It is likewise to be observed that *consciousness* is only of things in the mind, and not of external things. It is improper to say, 'I am *conscious* of the table which is before me.' I perceive it, I see it, but do not say I am *conscious* of it. As that *consciousness* by which we have a knowledge of the operations of our own minds, is a different power from that by which we perceive external objects; and as these different powers have different names in our language, and, I believe, in all languages, a philosopher ought carefully to preserve this distinction and never confound things so different in their nature." In this passage Dr. Reid speaks of *consciousness* properly so called as that *consciousness* which is distinct from the *consciousness* by which we perceive external objects—as if perception was another kind or mode of *consciousness*. Whether all his language be quite consistent with the opinion that all our faculties are just so many different modes of our becoming conscious, may be doubted. But there is no doubt that by *consciousness* he meant especially attention to the operations of our own minds, or *reflection*; while by *observation* he meant attention to external things. This language has been interpreted as favourable to the opinion that *consciousness* is a separate faculty. Yet he has not distinctly separated it from reflection except by saying that *consciousness* accompanies all the operations of mind. Now reflection does not. It is a voluntary act—an energetic attention to the facts of *consciousness*. But *consciousness* may be either spontaneous or reflective.

"This word denotes the immediate knowledge which the mind has of its sensations and thoughts, and, in general, of all its present operations."¹

¹ *Outlines of Mor. Philosoph.*, part 1., sect. 1.

CONSCIOUSNESS —

Mr. Stewart¹ has enumerated *consciousness* as one of our intellectual powers, co-ordinate with perception, memory, judgment, &c. But *consciousness* is not confined to the operation of the intellectual powers. It accompanies the development of the feelings and the determinations of the will. And the opinion that *consciousness* is a separate faculty, is not only founded on a false analysis, but is an opinion, which if prosecuted to its results would overturn the doctrine of immediate knowledge in perception—a doctrine which Stewart and Reid upheld as the true and only barrier against the scepticism of Hume. “Once admit that, after I have perceived an object, I need another power termed *consciousness*, by which I become cognizant of the perception, and by the medium of which the knowledge involved in perception is made clear to the thinking self, and the plea of common sense against scepticism is cut off. . . . I am conscious of *self* and of *notself*; my knowledge of both in the act of perception is equally direct and immediate. On the other hand, to make *consciousness* a peculiar faculty, by which we are simply cognizant of our own mental operations, is virtually to deny the immediacy of our knowledge of an external world.”²

“We may give *consciousness* a separate name and place, without meaning to degrade it to the level of the other faculties. In some respects it is superior to them all, having in it more of the essence of the soul, and being exercised whenever the soul is intelligently exercised.”³

CONSCIOUSNESS and FEELING. — “Feeling and sensation are equivalent terms, the one being merely the translation of the other; but feeling and *consciousness* are not equivalent, for we are conscious that we feel, but we do not feel that we are conscious. *Consciousness* is involved in all mental operations, active or passive; but these are not therefore kinds or parts of consciousness. Life is involved in every operation, voluntary or involuntary, of our bodily system; but movement or action are not, therefore, a species of life. *Consciousness* is mental life.”⁴

¹ In his *Outlines*.

² Morell, *Hist. of Spec. Philosoph.*, vol. II., p. 18.

³ McCosh, *Method of Div. Govern.*, p. 533, fifth edition. See Fearn, *Essay on Consciousness*.

⁴ *Agonistes*; or, *Philosophical Strictures*, p. 336.

CONSENT. — "Believing in the prophets and evangelists with a calm and settled faith, with that *consent* of the will, and heart, and understanding, which constitutes religious belief, I find in them the clear annunciation of the kingdom of God upon earth."¹

Assent is the consequence of a conviction of the understanding. *Consent* arises from the state of the disposition and the will. The one accepts what is *true*; the other embraces it as *true and good*, and worthy of all acceptance. — *V. ASSENT.*

CONSENT (Argument from Universal). — *V. AUTHORITY.*

Reid² applies this argument to establish first principles. He³ uses it against the views of Berkeley and Hume.

Cicero⁴ says, *Major enim pars eo fere deferri solet quo a natura deducitur.* It is used to prove the existence of the gods. *De quo autem omnium natura consentit, id verum esse necesse est. Esse igitur deos, confitendum est.*⁵ Cotta⁶ argues against it. The argument it also used, where we read, *Omni autem in re, consensio omnium gentium lex naturæ putanda est.*⁷

Bacon is against this argument.⁸

"These things are to be regarded as *first truths*, the credit of which is not derived from other truths, but is inherent in themselves. As for *probable truths*, they are such as are admitted by *all men*, or by the *generality* of men, or by *wise men*; and among these last, either by all the wise, or by the generality of the wise, or by such of the wise as are of the highest authority."⁹

*Multum dare solemus præsumptioni omnium hominum. Apud nos veritatis argumentum est aliquid omnibus videri.*¹⁰

CONSEQUENT. — *V. ANTECEDENT, NECESSITY.*

CONSILIENCE of INDUCTIONS takes place when an induction obtained from one class of facts coincides with an induction obtained from a different class. This *consilience* is the test of the truth of the theory in which it occurs.¹¹

¹ Southey, *Progress of Society*, colloquy 2.

² Essay II., chap. 19.

³ *De Nat. Deorum*, lib. I., cap. 17.

⁴ *De Nat. Deorum*, lib. II., 2; and *Tuscul. Quest.*, lib. I., 13.

⁵ In the preface to his *Instauratio Magna*, in aphorism 77, and in *Cogitata et Visa*.

⁶ Aristotle, *Topic.*, I., 1.

⁷ Whewell, *Philosoph. Induct. Sciences*, aphorism 14.

⁸ *Intell. Prow.*, essay I., chap. 2.

⁹ *De Officiis*, lib. I., cap. 41.

¹⁰ Cap. 23.

¹¹ Seneca, *Epist.*, cvii., cviii.

CONSILIENCE—

Paley's *Horæ Paulinæ*, which consists of gathering together undesigned coincidences, is an example of the *consilience* of inductions.

"The law of gravitation may be proved by a *consilience* of inductions."¹

CONSTITUTIVE (in German, *constitutiv*), means objectively determining, or legislating. It is a predicate which expresses that something *a priori* determines how something else must be, or is to be. That which is *constitutive* is opposed to that which is *regulative*—q. v.

CONTEMPLATION (*contemplor*), means originally to gaze on a shire of the heavens marked out by the augur.² "The next faculty of the mind (*i. e.*, to perception), whereby it makes a further progress towards knowledge, is that which I call *retention*, or the keeping of these simple ideas which from sensation or reflection it hath received. This is done two ways; first, by keeping the idea which is brought into it for some time actually in view, which is called *contemplation*."³

When an object of sense or thought has attracted our admiration or love we dwell upon it; not so much to know it better, as to enjoy it more and longer. This is *contemplation*, and differs from reflection. The latter seeks knowledge, and our intellect is active. In the former, we think we have found the knowledge which reflection seeks, and luxuriate in the enjoyment of it. Mystics have exaggerated the benefits of *contemplation*, and have directed it exclusively to God, and to the cherishing of love to Him.

CONTINENCE (*contineo*, to restrain), is the virtue which consists in governing the appetite of sex. It is most usually applied to men, as *chastity* is to women. *Chastity* may be the result of natural disposition or temperament—*continence* carries with it the idea of struggle and victory.

CONTINGENT (*contingo*, to touch). — "Perhaps the beauty of the world requireth that some agents should work without deliberation (which his lordship calls *necessary* agents), and some agents with deliberation (and those both he and I call

¹ *Quarterly Rev.*, vol. xlviii., p. 233.

² Taylor, *Synonyms*.

³ Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., chap. 10.

CONTINGENT—

free agents), and that some agents should work, and we know not how (and their effects we call *contingents*)."¹

"When any event takes place which seems to us to have no cause, why it should happen in one way, rather than another, it is called a *contingent* event; as, for example, the falling of a leaf on a *certain spot*, or the turning up of any particular number when the dice are thrown."²

The *contingent* is that which does not exist necessarily, and which we can think as non-existing without contradiction. Everything which had a beginning, or will have an end, or which changes, is *contingent*. The *necessary*, on the contrary, is that which we cannot conceive as non-existing—that which has always been, which will always be, and which does not change its manner of being.

"*Contingent* is that which does not happen constantly and regularly. Of this kind ancient philosophy has distinguished three different opinions; for either the event happens more frequently one way than another, and then it is said to be *ἐνι τὸ κοινόν*; of this kind are the regular productions of nature, and the ordinary actions of men. Or it happens more rarely, such as the birth of monsters, or other extraordinary productions of nature, and many accidents that happen to man. Or, lastly, it is betwixt the two, and happens as often the same way as the other; or, as they express it in Greek, *ἀπὸ τῆς ἐτυχῆς*. Of this kind are some things in nature, such as the birth of a male or female child; a good or bad day in some climates of the earth; and many things among men, such as good or bad luck at play. All these last-mentioned events are in reality as necessary as the falling of heavy bodies, &c. But as they do not happen constantly and uniformly, and as we cannot account for their happening sometimes one way and sometimes another, we say they are *contingent*."³

The *contingent* is known empirically—the *necessary* by the reason. There are but two modes of being, the *necessary* and the *contingent*. But the *contingent* has degrees: 1. Simple

¹ Hobbes, *Liberty and Necessity*.

² Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

³ Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, vol. i., p. 296.

CONTINGENT—

facts which appear and disappear, or, in the language of the Schools, accidents. 2. Qualities or properties inherent in a substance, which constitute its specific character. 3. The substance itself considered as a particular and finite existence.

A thing may be *contingent* in three ways:—

1. *Æqualiter*, when the thing or its opposite may equally be, from the determination of a free will.

2. *Ut plurimum*, as when a man is born with five digits though sometimes with more or less.

3. *Raro*, as when it happens seldom; *by a necessary agent*, as when a tile falls on a man's head; or *by a free agent*, as when a man cleaving wood wounds the bystander.¹

An event, the opposite of which is *possible*, is *contingent*.

An event, the opposite of which is *impossible*, is *necessary*.

An event is *impossible* when the opposite of it is *necessary*.

An event is *possible* when the opposite of it is *contingent*.

CONTINUITY (Law of).—“The supposition of bodies *perfectly* hard, having been shown to be inconsistent with two of the leading doctrines of Leibnitz, *that* of the constant maintenance of the same quantity of force in the universe, and *that* of the proportionality of forces to the squares of the velocities—he found himself reduced to the necessity of maintaining that all changes are produced by insensible gradations, so as to render it impossible for a body to have its state changed from motion to rest, or from rest to motion, without passing through all the intermediate states of velocity. From this assumption he argued with much ingenuity, that the existence of atoms, or of perfectly hard bodies, is impossible; because, if two of them should meet with equal and opposite motions, they would necessarily stop at once, in violation of the *law of continuity*.”²

“I speak,” said John Bernouilli,³ “of that immovable and perpetual order established since the creation of the universe, which may be called the *law of continuity*, in virtue of which everything that is done, is done by degrees infinitely small. It seems to be the dictate of good sense that no change is made *per saltum*; *natura non operatur per saltum*; and nothing

¹ See Chauvin, *Lexicon Philosoph.*

² Stewart, *Dissert.*, part II., p. 276.

³ *Discours on Motion*, 772.

CONTINUITY—

can pass from one extreme to another without passing through all the intermediate degrees."

The *law of continuity*, though originally applied to *continuity of motion*, was extended by Charles Bonnet to *continuity of being*. He held that all the various beings which compose the universe, form a scale descending downwards without any chasm or *saltus*, from the Deity to the simplest forms of unorganized matter. A similar view had been held by Locke and others.¹ The researches of Cuvier have shown that it can only be held with limitations and exceptions, even when confined to the comparative anatomy of animals.—V. ASSOCIATION.

CONTRACT (*contraho*, to draw together).—A *contract* is an agreement or pact in which one party comes under obligation to do one thing, and the other party to do some other thing. Paley calls it a mutual promise. *Contracts* originate in the insufficiency of man to supply all his needs. One wants what another has abundance of and to spare; while the other may want something which his neighbour has. Men are drawn more closely together by their individual insufficiency, and they enter into an agreement each to give what the other needs or desires.

Contracts being so necessary and important for the welfare of society, the framing and fulfilling of them have in all countries been made the object of positive law. Viewed ethically, the obligation to fulfil them is the same with that to fulfil a promise. The consideration of *contracts*, and of the various kinds and conditions of them belongs to Jurisprudence.

While all *contracts* are *pacts*, all *pacts* are not *contracts*. In the Roman law, a distinction was taken between pacts or agreements entered into without any cause or consideration antecedent, present or future, and pacts which were entered into for a cause or consideration, that is, containing a *causa*, or bargain, or as it may be popularly expressed, a *quid pro quo*—in which one party came under obligation to give or do something, on account of something being done or given by the other party. Agreements of the latter kind were properly

¹ *Spectator*, No. 519.

CONTRACT—

contracts, while those of the former were called *bare pacts*. A *pactum nudum*, or *bare pact*, was so called because it was not clothed with the circumstances of mutual advantage, and was not a valid agreement in the eye of the Roman law. *Nuda pactio obligationem non facit*. It is the same in the English law, in which a *contract* is defined: "An agreement of two or more persons, upon *sufficient consideration*, to do or not to do a particular thing,"—and the consideration is necessary to the validity of the *contract*.

CONTRADICTION, Principle of (*contradico*, to speak against).

—It is usually expressed thus: A thing cannot be and not be at the same time, or a thing must either be or not be, or the same attribute cannot at the same time be affirmed and denied of the same subject.¹—V. IDENTITY.

Aristotle laid down this principle as the basis of all Logic and of all Metaphysic.

Leibnitz thought it insufficient as the basis of all truth and reasoning, and added the principle of the *sufficient reason*—q. v.

Kant thought this principle good only for those judgments of which the attribute is the consequence of the subject, or, as he called them, analytic judgments; as when we say, all body has extension. The idea of extension being enclosed in that of body, it is a sufficient warrant of the truth of such a judgment, that it implies no *contradiction*. But in synthetic judgments, we rest either on a belief of the reason or the testimony of experience, according as they are *a priori* or *a posteriori*.²

"The law of *contradiction* vindicates itself. It cannot be denied without being assented to, for the person who denies it must assume that he is denying it, in other words, he must assume that he is saying what he is saying, and he must admit that the contrary supposition—to wit, that he is saying what he is *not* saying—involves a contradiction. Thus the law is established."³

It has also been called the law of *non-contradiction*. It is one and indivisible, but develops itself in three specific forms,

¹ Pierson and Zevort, *Introd. à la Métaphys. d'Aristote*, 2 tom., Paris, 1840.

² Aristot., *Métaphys.*, lib. iii., cap. 3; lib. ix., cap. 7; lib. x., cap. 8.

³ Herlier, *Ess. de Métaphys.*, p. 21.

CONTRADICTION —

which have been called the *Three Logical Axioms*. *First*, "A is A." *Second*, "A is not Not-A." *Third*, "Everything is either A or Not-A." This last is sometimes called the *Law of Excluded Middle* — q. v.

The principle of *contradiction* is the same with the *Dictum de omni et nullo* — q. v.¹

CONTRARIES. — Aristotle² says — "There seems to be one and the same error, and one and the same science, with respect to things contrary." This, by Themistius, in his *Paraphrase*, is thus illustrated:—"Of things contrary there is one science and one ignorance. For thus, he who knows good to be something beneficial, knows evil at the same time to be something pernicious; and he who is deceived with respect to one of these, is deceived also with respect to the other."

"There is an essential difference between *opposite* and *contrary*. Opposite powers are always of the same kind, and tend to union either by equipoise or by a common product. Thus the + and the — poles of the magnet, thus positive and negative electricity, are opposites. *Sweet* and *sour* are *opposites*; *sweet* and *bitter* are *contraries*. The *feminine* character is *opposed* to the *masculine*; but the *effeminate* is its *contrary*."³

We should say *opposite* sides of the street, not *contrary*.

Aristotle defines *contrary*, "that which in the same genus differs most;" as in colour, white and black; in sensation, pleasure and pain; in morals, good and evil. *Contraries* never co-exist, but they may succeed in the same subject. They are of two kinds, one admitting a middle term, participating at once in the nature of the things opposed. Thus, between absolute being and nonentity, there may be contingent being. In others no middle term is possible. There are *contraries* of which the one belongs necessarily to a subject, or is a simple privation, as health and sickness; light and darkness; sight and blindness. *Contraries* which admit of no middle term are *contradictories*; and form, when united, a *contradiction*. On this rests all logic. Aristotle wished to make virtue a middle term, between two extremes.⁴

¹ See Forster, *Posterior Analyt.*, Appendix A.

² Coleridge, *Church and State*, note, p. 18.

³ *De Anima*, lib. iii., cap. 2.

⁴ *Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*

CONVERSION, in Logic, is the transposition of the subject of a proposition into the place of the predicate, and of the predicate into the place of the subject. The proposition to be *converted* is called the *convertend* or *exposita*, and that into which it is converted the *converse*. Logical conversion is *illative*, that is, the truth of the *convertend* necessitates the truth of the *converse*. It can only take place when no term is distributed in the *converse* which was undistributed in the *convertend*. It is of three kinds, viz., *simple conversion*, *conversion per accidens*, and *conversion by negation or contraposition*.¹

COPULA (The) is that part of a proposition which indicates that the predicate is affirmed or denied of the subject. This is sometimes done by *inflection*; as when we say, Fire burns; the change from *burn* to *burns* showing that we mean to affirm the predicate burn of the subject fire. But this function is more commonly fulfilled by the word *is*, when an affirmation is intended — *is not*, when a negation; or by some other part of the verb *to be*. Sometimes this verb is both copula and predicate, e. g., "One of Jacob's sons is not." But the copula, merely as such, does not imply real existence, e. g., "A faultless man is a being feigned by the Stoics."²

COSMOGONY (κόσμος, world; γίγνομαι, to come into being). — "It was a most ancient, and, in a manner, universally received tradition among the Pagans, that the *cosmogonia*, or generation of the world, took its first beginning from a chaos (the divine *cosmogonists* agreeing therein with the atheistic ones): this tradition having been delivered down from Orpheus and Linus (among the Greeks) by Hesiod and Homer, and others."³

The different theories as to the origin of the world may be comprehended under three classes: —

1. Those which represent the world, in its present form, as having existed from eternity. — Aristotle.

2. Those which represent the *matter* but not the *form* of the world to be from eternity. — Leucippus, Democritus, Epicurus.

3. Those which assign both the matter and form of the world to the direct agency of a spiritual cause.

¹ Whately, *Log.*, b. II., ch. 2, § 4.

² Ibid., b. II., ch. 1, § 8. Mill, *Log.*, b. I., ch. 4, § 1.

³ Cadworth, *Intell. Syst.*, p. 248.

COSMOGONY—

"*Cosmogony* treats of the birth, *cosmography* of the description, and *cosmology* of the theory of the world."¹

COSMOLOGY, Rational.—*V. METAPHYSICS.*

CRANIOLOGY.—*V. PHRENOLOGY.*

CRANIOSCOPY.—*V. PHRENOLOGY, ORGAN, ORGANOLOGY.*

CREATION is the act by which God produced out of nothing all things that now exist. Unless we deny altogether the existence of God, we must either believe in *creation* or accept one or other of the two hypotheses, which may be called *theological dualism* and *pantheism*. According to the former, there are two necessary and eternal beings, God and matter. According to the latter, all beings are but modes or manifestations of one eternal and necessary being. A belief in *creation* admits only the existence of one necessary and eternal being, who is at once substance and cause, intelligence and power, absolutely free and infinitely good. God and the universe are essentially distinct. God has self-consciousness, the universe has not and cannot have.²

CREDULITY, or a disposition to believe what others tell us, is set down by Dr. Reid as an original principle implanted in us by the Supreme Being. And as the counterpart of this he reckons *veracity* or a propensity to speak truth and to use language so as to convey our real sentiments, to be also an original principle of human nature.³

CRITERION (*κρίριον*, from the Greek verb *κρίνω*, to judge), denotes in general, all means proper to judge. It has been distinguished into the *criterion a quo, per quod*, and *secundum quod*—or the *being* who judges, as man; the *organ* or faculty by which he judges, and the *rule* according to which he judges. Unless utter scepticism be maintained, man must be admitted capable of knowing what is true.

"With regard to the *criterion*,⁴ or organ of truth among the ancient philosophers, some advocated a simple and others

¹ Taylor, *Synonyms*.

² *Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*

³ Reid, *Inquiry*, chap. 6, § 24; and also *Act. Pow.*, essay III., pt. 1, chap. 2; Stewart, *Act. Pow.*, vol. II., p. 344; Priestley, *Exam.*, p. 86; Brown, *Lect.* lxxxiv.

⁴ Says Edw. Poste, M. A., *Introd.*, p. 14, to trans. of *Poster. Analyt. of Aristotle*.

CRITERION —

a mixed *criterion*. The advocates of the former were divided into Sensationalists or Rationalists, as they advocated sense or reason; the advocates of the latter advocated both sense and reason. Democritus and Leucippus were Sensationalists; Parmenides and the Pythagoreans were Rationalists; Plato and Aristotle belonged to the mixed school. Among those who advocated reason as a *criterion*, there was an important difference: some advocating the common reason, as Heraclitus and Anaxagoras; others, the scientific reason, or the reason as cultivated and developed by education, as Parmenides, the Pythagoreans, Plato, and Aristotle. In the *Republic*,¹ Plato prescribes a training calculated to prepare the reason for the perception of the higher truths. Aristotle requires education for the moral reason. The older Greeks used the word *measure*, instead of *criterion*; and Protagoras had said, that man was the measure of all truth. This Aristotle² interprets to mean that sense and reason are the organs of truth, and he accepts the doctrine, if limited to these faculties in a healthy and perfect condition. These names, then, cannot properly be ranked among the *common sense* philosophers, where they are placed by Sir William Hamilton.

"When reason is said to be an organ of truth, we must include, besides the intuitive, the syllogistic faculty. This is the instrument of the mediate or indirect apprehension of truth, as the other of immediate. The examination of these instruments, in order to discover their capabilities and right use, is *Logic*. This appears to be the reason why Aristotle gave the title of *Organon* to his *Logic*. So Epicurus called his the *Canon* or *Criterion*." The controversy on the *Criterion* is to be found at length in Sextus Empiricus.³

Criterion is now used chiefly to denote the character which distinguishes truth from falsity. In this sense it corresponds with the ground of certitude. — *V. CERTITUDE.*

CRITICK, CRITICISM, CRITIQUE (German, *critik*), is the examination of the pure reason, and is called in Germany simply the *critick* or *critik*, κατ' ἐξοχήν. It is the science of

¹ 7, sect. 9.

² *Metaphys.*, x. 2; xi. 6.

³ *Pyrron.*, lib. II., cap. 5-7.

CRITICK —

the pure faculty of reason, or the investigation of that which reason is able to know or effect, independently of experience, and is opposed to dogmatism. Sir J. Mackintosh terms the critical philosophy a self-reviewing philosophy.

CUMULATIVE (The Argument).—“The proof of a Divine agency is not a conclusion which lies at the end of a chain of reasoning, of which chain each instance of contrivance is only a link, and of which, if one link fail, the whole falls; but it is an *argument* separately supplied by every separate example. An error in stating an example affects only that example. The argument is *cumulative* in the fullest sense of that term. The eye proves it without the ear, the ear without the eye. The proof in each example is complete; for when the design of the part, and the conduciveness of its structure to that design is shown, the mind may set itself at rest; no future consideration can detract anything from the force of the example.”¹

CUSTOM.—“Let *custom*,” says Locke,² “from the very childhood, have joined figure and shape to the idea of God, and what absurdities will that mind be liable to about the Deity.”

Custom is the queen of the world.

“Such precedents are numberless; we draw
Our right from *custom*; *custom* is a law
As high as heaven, as wide as seas or land.”

Lansdown, *Beauty and Law*.

A *custom* is not necessarily a *usage*. A *custom* is merely that which is often repeated; a *usage* must be often repeated and of long standing. Hence we may speak of a “new *custom*,” but not of a “new *usage*.” *Custom* had probably the same origin as “accost,” to come near, and thence to be habitual. The root is the Latin *costa*, the side or rib.³

“An aggregate of habits, either successive or contemporaneous, in different individuals, is denoted by the words *custom*,

¹ Paley, *Nat. Theol.*, chap. 6.

² *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book II., chap. 33, 17; and book I., chap. 4, 16.

³ See Kames, *Elements of Criticism*, chap. 14; Sir G. C. Lewis, *On Politics*, chap. 20, sect. 2.

CUSTOM —

usage, or *practice*. When many persons — either a class of society, or the inhabitants of a district, or an entire nation — agree in a certain habit, they are said to have a *custom* or usage to that effect.

"*Customs* may be of two kinds:—*First*, There may be voluntary *customs*—*customs* which are adopted spontaneously by the people, and originate from their independent choice, such as the modes of salutation, dress, eating, travelling, &c., prevalent in any country, and most of the items which constitute the manners of a people. — *Secondly*, There are the *customs* which are the result of laws—*customs* which have grown up in consequence of the action of the government upon the people. Thus, when successive judges in a court of justice have laid down certain rules of procedure, and the advocates pleading before the court have observed these rules, such is called the established *practice* of the court. The sum of the habits of the successive judges and practitioners constitute the *practice* of the court. The same may be said of a deliberative assembly or any other body, renewed by a perpetual succession of its members. In churches the equivalent name is *rites* and *ceremonies*." — V. HABIT.

Custom is a frequent repetition of the same act; *habit* is the effect of such repetition: *fashion* is the *custom* of numbers; *usage* is the *habit* of numbers. It is a good *custom* to rise early; this will produce a *habit* of so doing; and the example of a distinguished family may do much toward reviving the *fashion*, if not re-establishing the *usage*.^a

Usage has relation to space, and *custom* to time; *usage* is more universal, and *custom* more ancient; *usage* is what many people practise, and *custom* is what people have practised long. A vulgar *usage*; an old *custom*.^b

CYNIC.—After the death of Socrates, some of his disciples, under Antisthenes, were accustomed to meet in the Cynosarges, one of the gymnasia of Athens, — and hence they were called *Cynics*. According to others, the designation comes from *κύνων*,

^a A similar distinction between *mos* and *consuetudo* is made by Macrobius, *Satura. III.*, 8, commenting on Virgil, *Æneid*, 6, 601. He quotes Varro as stating that *mos* is the unit, and *consuetudo* the resulting aggregate.

^b Taylor, *Synonyma*.

^c *Ibid.*

CYNIC—

a dog, because like the dog they were destitute of all modesty. Antisthenes, Diogenes, and Crates were the first heads of the sect. Zeno, by checking and moderating their doctrines, gave birth to the sect of Stoics.¹

DÆMONIST. — “To believe the governing mind, or minds, not absolutely and necessarily good, nor confined to what is best, but capable of acting according to mere will or fancy, is to be a *Dæmonist*.”²

DATA (the plural of *datum* — given or granted). — “Those facts from which an inference is drawn, are called *data*; for example, it has always been found that the inhabitants of temperate climates have excelled those of very hot or very cold climates in stature, strength, and intelligence: these facts are the *data*, from which it is inferred that excellence of body and mind depend, in some measure, upon the temperature of the climate.”³

DEDUCTION (from *deduco*, to draw from, to cause to come out of), is the mental operation which consists in drawing a particular truth from a general principle antecedently known. It is opposed to *induction*, which consists in rising from particular truths to the determination of a general principle. Let it be proposed to prove that Peter is mortal; I know that Peter is a man, and this enables me to say that all men are mortal; from which affirmation I *deduce* that Peter is mortal.

The syllogism is the form of *deduction*. Aristotle⁴ has defined it to be “an enunciation in which certain assertions being made, by their being true, it follows necessarily, that another assertion different from the first is true also.”

Before we can *deduce* a particular truth we must be in pos-

¹ Richterus, *Dissertatio de Cynicis*. Lipsæ, 1701; Diogenes Laertius, lib. vi., c. 108.

² Shaftesbury, *Inquiry concerning Virtue*, book i., pt. 1, sect. 2.

³ Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

⁴ *Prior. Analyt.*, lib. i., cap. 1.

DEDUCTION—

session of the general truth. This may be acquired *intuitively*, as every change implies a cause; or *inductively* as the volume of gas is in the inverse ratio of the pressure.

Deduction, when it uses the former kind of truths, is demonstration or science. Truths drawn from the latter kind are contingent and relative, and admit of correction by increasing knowledge.

The principle of *deduction* is, that things which agree with the same thing agree with one another. The principle of *induction* is, that in the same circumstances, and in the same substances, from the same causes the same effects will follow.

The mathematical and metaphysical sciences are founded on *deduction*, the physical sciences rest on *induction*.¹

DE FACTO and DE JURE.—In some instances the penalty attaches to the offender at the instant when the fact is committed; in others, not until he is convicted by law. In the former case he is guilty *de facto*, in the latter *de jure*.

De facto is commonly used in the sense of *actually* or *really*, and *de jure* in the sense of *rightfully* or *legally*; as when it is said George II. was king of Great Britain *de facto*; but Charles Stuart was king *de jure*.

DEFINITION (*definitio*, to mark out limits).—*Est definitio, earum rerum, quæ sunt ejus rei propriæ, quam definire volumus, brevis et circumscripta quædam explicatio.*²

“The simplest and most correct notion of a *definition* is, a proposition declaratory of the meaning of a word.”³

Definition signifies “laying down a boundary;” and is used in Logic to signify “an expression which explains any term so as to *separate* it from everything else, as a boundary separates fields. Logicians distinguish *definitions* into *Nominal* and *Real*.

“Definitions are called *nominal*, which explain merely the *meaning of the term*; and *real*, which explain the nature of the

¹ For the different views of *deduction* and *induction*, see Whewell, *Philosoph. of Induct. Sciences*, book I., chap. 6; Mill, *Log.*, book II., chap. 5; *Quarterly Rev.*, vol. lxviii., art. on “Whewell.”

² Cicero, *De Orat.*, lib. I., c. 42.

³ Mill, *Log.*, 2d edit., vol. I., p. 182.

DEFINITION—

thing signified by that term. Logic is concerned with *nomina*. definitions alone.”¹

“By a *real*, in contrast to a *verbal* or *nominal* definition, the logicians do not intend ‘the giving an adequate conception of the nature and essence of a thing;’ that is, of a thing considered in itself, and apart from the conceptions of it already possessed. By *verbal* definition is meant the more accurate determination of the signification of a *word*; by *real* the more accurate determination of the contents of a *notion*. The one clears up the relation of *words* to *notions*; the other of *notions* to *things*. The substitution of *notional* for *real* would, perhaps, remove the ambiguity. But if we retain the term *real*, the aim of a *verbal* definition being to specify the *thought* denoted by the *word*, such definition ought to be called *notional*, on the principle on which the definition of a *notion* is called *real*; for this definition is the exposition of what things are comprehended in a thought.”²

“In the sense in which *nominal* and *real* definitions were distinguished by the scholastic logicians, logic is concerned with *real*, i. e., *notional* definitions only; to explain the meaning of words belongs to dictionaries or grammars.”³

“There is a real distinction between definitions of names and what are erroneously called definitions of things; but it is that the latter, along with the meaning of a name, covertly asserts a matter of fact. This covert assertion is not a *definition*, but a postulate. The *definition* is a mere identical proposition, which gives information only about the use of language, and from which no conclusions respecting matters of fact can possibly be drawn. The accompanying postulate, on the other hand, affirms a fact which may lead to consequences of every degree of importance. It affirms the real existence of things, possessing the combination of attributes set forth in the definition, and this, if true, may be foundation sufficient to build a whole fabric of scientific truth.”⁴

Real definitions are divided into *essential* and *accidental*

¹ Whately, *Log.*, b. II., ch. 2, § 6.

² Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 661, note.

³ Mansel, *Prolegom. Log.*, p. 189.

⁴ Mill, *Log.*, p. 197.

DEFINITION—

An *essential* definition states what are regarded as the constituent parts of the essence of that which is to be defined; and an *accidental definition* (or description) lays down what are regarded as circumstances belonging to it, viz., properties or accidents, such as causes, effects, &c.

"*Essential definition* is divided into *physical* (natural), and *logical* (metaphysical); the *physical definition* being made by an enumeration of such parts as are *actually* separable; such as are the hull, masts, &c., of a 'ship;' the root, trunk, branches, bark, &c., of a 'tree.' The *logical definition* consists of the genus and difference, which are called by some the *metaphysical* (ideal) parts; as being not two real parts into which an *individual* object can (as in the former case), be actually divided, but only different views taken (notions formed) of a *class* of objects, by one mind. Thus a magnet would be defined *logically*, 'an iron ore having attraction for iron.'"¹

Accidental or descriptive definition may be—1. *Causal*; as when man is defined as made after the image of God, and for his glory. 2. *Accidental*; as when he is defined to be *animal, bipes implume*. 3. *Genetic*; as when the means by which it is made are indicated; as, if a straight line fixed at one end be drawn round by the other end so as to return to itself, a circle will be described. Or, 4. *Per oppositum*; as, when virtue is said to be flying from vice.

The rules of a good definition are:—1. That it be adequate. If it be too narrow, you explain a *part* instead of a *whole*; if too extensive, a *whole* instead of a *part*. 2. That it be clearer (i. e., consist of ideas less complex) than the thing defined. 3. That it be in just a sufficient number of proper words. Metaphorical words are excluded because they are indefinite.²

¹ Whately, *Log.*, b. II., ch. 5, § 6.

² Mansel's *Aldrich*, p. 35. Aristotle, *Poster. Analyt.*, lib. II.; *Topic.*, lib. VI. *Port Royal Log.*, part I., chap. 12, 13, 14; part II., chap. 16; Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book III., c. 3 and 4; Leibnitz, *Nouveaux Essais*, liv. III., cap. 3 et 4; Reid, *Account of Aristotle's Logic*, chap. 2, sect. 4; Tappan, *Appeal to Consciousness*, chap. 2, § 1.

DEIST (*Deus*, God).—There are different kinds of *deists* noticed by Dr. Sam. Clarke.¹

1. Those who believe in an Eternal and Intelligent Being, but deny a Providence, either conserving or governing.

2. Those who believe in God and in Providence, but deny moral distinctions and moral government.

3. Those who believe in God and His moral perfections, but deny a future state.

4. Those who believe in God and His moral government, here and hereafter, in so far as the light of nature goes; but doubt or deny the doctrines of revelation.

Kant has distinguished between a *theist* and a *deist*—the former acknowledging a God, free and intelligent, the creator and preserver of all things; the latter believing that the first principle of all things is an Infinite Force, which is inherent in matter, and the blind cause of all the phenomena of nature. *Deism*, in this sense, is mere materialism. But *deism* is generally employed to denote a belief in God, without implying a belief in revelation.

“That modern species of infidelity, called *deism*, or *natural religion*, as contradistinguished from *revealed*.”²

“Tindal appears to have been the first who assumed for himself, and bestowed on his coadjutors, the denomination of *Christian deists*, though it implied no less than an absolute contradiction in terms.”³—V. THEIST.

DEMIURGE (*δημιουργός*, workman, architect).—Socrates and Plato represented God as the architect of the universe. Plotinus confounded the *демиург* with the soul of the world, and represented it as inferior to the supreme intelligence. The Gnostics represented it as an emanation from the supreme divinity, and having a separate existence. The difficulty of reconciling our idea of an infinite cause to the variable and contingent effects observable in the universe, has given rise to the hypotheses of a *демиург*, and of a plastic nature; but they do not alleviate the difficulty. This term is applied to God, Heb. xi. 10.

¹ Works, vol. ii., p. 12.

² Van Mildert, *Bampton Lect.*, sermon ix.

³ Ibid., sermon x. See Leland, *View of Deistical Writers*.

DEMON (*δαίμων*).—"The *demon kind* is of an intermediate nature between the divine and human. What is the power and virtue, said I, of this intermediate kind of being? To transmit and to interpret to the gods, what comes from men; and to men, in like manner, what comes from the gods; from men their petitions and their sacrifices; from the gods, in return, the revelation of their will."¹

Socrates declared that he had a friendly spirit, or *Demon*, who restrained him from imprudence, and revealed to him what was true. Plutarch has a Dialogue on the *Demon* of Socrates, and Apuleius also wrote *De Deo Socratis*. In modern times we have Lélut, *Du Demon de Socrate*.² He thinks Socrates was subject to hallucinations of sight and hearing.

DEMONSTRATION (*demonstro*, to point out, to cause to see).—

In old English writers this word was used to signify the *pointing out* the connection between a conclusion and its premises, or that of a phenomenon with its asserted cause. It now denotes a necessary consequence, and is synonymous with *proof* from first principles. To draw out a particular truth from a general truth in which it is enclosed, is *deduction*; from a necessary and universal truth to draw consequences which necessarily follow, is *demonstration*. To connect a truth with a first principle, to show that it is this principle applied or realized in a particular case, is to demonstrate. The result is science, knowledge, certainty. Those general truths arrived at by induction in the sciences of observation, are certain knowledge. But it is knowledge which is not definite or complete. It may admit of increase or modification by new discoveries; but the knowledge which *demonstration* gives is fixed and unalterable.

A *demonstration* is a reasoning consisting of one or more arguments, by which some proposition brought into question is evidently shown to be contained in some other proposition assumed, whose truth and certainty being evident and acknowledged, the proposition in question must also be admitted as certain.

Demonstration is *direct* or *indirect*. *Direct demonstration* is

¹ Sydenham, *Plato, The Banquet*.

² Paris, 1836, 1856.

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descending—when starting from a general truth we come to a particular conclusion, which we must affirm or deny; or *ascending*—when starting from the subject and its attributes, we arrive by degrees at a general principle, with which we connect the proposition in question. Both these are deductive, because they connect a particular truth with a general principle. *Indirect demonstration* is when we admit hypothetically a proposition contradictory of that which we wish to demonstrate, and show that this admission leads to absurdity; that is, an impossibility or a contradiction. This is, *demonstratio per impossibile*, or *reductio ad absurdum*. It should only be employed when *direct demonstration* is unattainable.

"*Demonstration* was divided by ancient writers into two kinds: one kind they called *demonstration êti*; the other *demonstration diôti*.

"The *demonstration diôti*, or argument from cause to effect, is most commonly employed in anticipating future events. When, *e. g.*, we argue that at a certain time the tides will be unusually high, because of its being the day following the new or the full moon, it is because we know that that condition of the moon is in some way connected as a cause with an unusually high rising of the tides as its effect, and can argue, therefore, that it will produce what is called *spring tide*.

"On the other hand, the *demonstration êti*, or argument from effect to cause, is more applicable, naturally, to past events, and to the explanation of the phenomena which they exhibit as effects. Thus the presence of poison in the bodies of those whose death has been unaccountably sudden, is frequently proved in this way by the phenomena which such bodies present, and which involve the presence of poison as their cause."¹

The theory of *demonstration* is to be found in the *Organon* of Aristotle, "since whose time," said Kant, "Logic, as to its foundation, has gained nothing."

DENOMINATION, External. — V. MODE.

DEONTOLOGY (τὸ δέον, what is due, or binding; λόγος, discourse).

¹ Karslake *Aids to Logic*, vol. II., p. 46.

DEONTOLOGY—

"*Deontology*, or that which is proper, has been chosen as a fitter term than any other which could be found, to represent, in the field of morals, the principle of *utilitarianism*, or that which is useful."¹

"The term *deontology* expresses moral science, and expresses it well, precisely because it signifies the science of duty, and contains no reference to utility."²

Deontology involves the being bound or being under obligation; the very idea which it was selected to avoid, and which utility does not give.

"The ancient Pythagoreans defined virtue to be *ἔθος τοῦ δέοντος* (that is, the habit of duty, or of doing what is binding), the oldest definition of virtue of which we have any account and one of the most unexceptionable which is yet to be found in any system of philosophy."³

And Sir W. Hamilton⁴ has observed that ethics are well denominated *deontology*.

DESIGN (*designo*, to mark out). — "The atomic atheists further allege, that though there be many things in the world which serve well for uses, yet it does not at all follow that therefore they were made intentionally and *designedly* for those uses."⁵

"What is done, neither by accident, nor simply for its own sake, but with a view to some effect that is to follow, is said to be the result of *design*. None but intelligent beings act with *design*; because it requires knowledge of the connection of causes and effects, and the power of comparing ideas, to conceive of some end or object to be produced, and to devise the means proper to produce the effect. Therefore, whenever we see a thing which not only may be applied to some use, but which is evidently made for the sake of the effect which it produces, we feel sure that it is the work of a being capable of thought."⁶

"When we find in nature the adaptation of means to an end, we infer *design* and a designer; because the only circum-

¹ Bentham, *Deontology; or, the Science of Morality*, vol. i., p. 34.

² Whewell, *Preface to Macintosh's Prelim. Dissert.*, p. 20.

³ Stewart, *Act. and Mor. Powers*, vol. ii., p. 446.

⁴ Reid's *Works*, p. 540, note.

⁵ Oudworth, *Intell. Syst.*, p. 670.

⁶ Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

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stances in which we can trace the origination of adaptation, are those in which human mind is implicated."¹

On the argument for the being of God from the evidences of *design*, or the adaptation of means to ends in the universe, see Xenophon, *Memorabilia of Socrates*,² Buffier, *Treatise on First Truths*,³ Reid,⁴ Stewart,⁵ Paley,⁶ *Bridgewater Treatises*; *Burnett Prize Essays*. — V. CAUSE (Final).

DESIRE. — "*Desire* may be defined that uneasy sensation excited in the mind by the view or by the contemplation of any desirable good which is not in our possession, which we are solicitous to obtain, and of which the attainment appears at least possible."⁷

According to Dr. Hutcheson,⁸ "*desires* arise in our mind from the frame of our nature, upon apprehension of good or evil in objects, actions, or events, to obtain for ourselves or others the agreeable sensation when the object or event is good; or to prevent the uneasy sensation when it is evil."

But, while *desires* imply intelligence, they are not the mere efflux, or product of that intelligence; and, while the objects of our *desires* are known, it is not, solely, in consequence of knowing them, that we desire them; but, rather, because we have a capacity of *desiring*. There is a tendency, on our part, towards certain ends or objects, and there is a fitness in them to give us pleasure, when they are attained. Our *desires* of such ends or objects are *natural* and *primary*. *Natural*, but not *instinctive*, for they imply intelligence; *primary*, and not *factitious*, for they result from the constitution of things, and the constitution of the human mind, antecedent to experience and education.

It has been maintained, however, that there are no original principles in our nature, carrying us towards particular objects, but that, in the course of experience, we learn what gives us pleasure or pain—what does us good or ill—that we flee from the one class of objects, and follow after the other; that in this way, likings and dislikings—inclination and aversion,

¹ Dove, *Theory of Hum. Progression*, p. 482.

² Part II., chap. 16.

³ *Act. and Mor. Pow.*, book III., chap. II.

⁴ Cogan, *On Passions*, part I., chap. 2, sect. 3.

⁵ Book., chap. 4.

⁶ *Act. Pow.*, essay VI., chap. 6.

⁷ *Nat. Theol.*

⁸ *Essay on the Passions*, sect. 1.

DESIRE—

spring up within us; and that all the various passions and pursuits of human life are produced and prompted by sensibility to pleasure and pain, and a knowledge of what affects that sensibility; and thus, all our *desires* may be resolved into one general *desire* of happiness or well-being.

There is room for difference of opinion as to the number of those *desires* which are original; but there is little room for doubting, that there are some which may be so designated. Every being has a nature. Everything is what it is, by having such a nature. Man has a nature, and his nature has an end. This end is indicated by certain tendencies. He feels inclination or *desire* towards certain objects, which are suited to his faculties and fitted to improve them. The attainment of these objects gives pleasure, the absence of them is a source of uneasiness. Man seeks them by a natural and spontaneous effort. In seeking them, he comes to know them better and *desire* them more eagerly. But the intelligence which is gradually developed, and the development which it may give to the *desires*, should not lead us to overlook the fact, that the *desires* primarily existed, as inherent tendencies in our nature, aiming at their correspondent objects; spontaneously, it may be, in the first instance, but gradually gaining clearness and strength, by the aid and concurrence of our intellectual and rational powers.

DESTINY (*destinatum*, fixed), is the necessary and unalterable connection of events; of which the heathens made a divine power, superior to all their deities. The idea of an irresistible *destiny*, against which man strives in vain, pervades the whole of Greek tragedy.—V. FATALISM.

DETERMINISM.—This name is applied by Sir W. Hamilton¹ to the doctrine of Hobbes, as contradistinguished from the ancient doctrine of *fatalism*. The principle of the *sufficient reason* is likewise called by Leibnitz the principle of the *determining reason*. In the *Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*, nothing is given under *determinism*, but a reference made to *fatalism*.² And fatalism is explained as the doctrine

¹ Reid's Works, p. 601, note.

² But in the article "Liberté," *determinism* is applied to the doctrine that motives *invariably determine* the will, and is opposed to liberty of indifference, which is described as the doctrine that man can determine himself without motives.

DETERMINISM—

which denies liberty to man.—*V. NECESSITY, FATALISM, LIBERTY.*

DIALECTIC (*dialektik*) is the logic of appearance as distinguished from universal Logic, or it may be that which teaches us to excite appearance or illusion. As logical or formal it treats of the sources of error and illusion, and the mode of destroying them; as transcendental, it is the exposure of the natural and unavoidable illusion that arises from human reason itself, which is ever inclined to look upon phenomena as things in themselves, and cognitions *à priori*, as properties adhering to these things, and in such way to form the super-sensible, according to this assumed cognition of things in themselves."¹

"How to divide and subdivide, and dissect, and analyze a topic, so as to be directed to the various roads of argument by which it may be approached, investigated, defended, or attacked, is the province of *dialectic*. How to criticise those arguments, so as to reject the sophistical, and to allow their exact weight to the solid, is the province of Logic. The dialectician is praised in proportion as his method is *exhaustive*; that is, in proportion as it supplies every possible form of argument applicable to the matter under discussion. The logician is praised in proportion as his method is *demonstrative*; that is, in proportion as it determines unanswerably the value of every argument applied to the matter under discussion. *Dialectic* provides, and Logic appreciates argumentation; *dialectic* exercises the invention, and Logic the judgment."²

DIALECTICS (*διαλεκτική τέχνη*).—"The Greek verb *διαλέγεσθαι*, in its widest signification,—1. Includes the use both of reason and speech as proper to man. Hence *dialectics* may mean Logic, as including the right use of reason and language. 2. It is also used as synonymous with the Latin word *disserere*, to discuss or dispute; hence, *dialectics* has been used to denote the Logic of probabilities, as opposed to the doctrine of demonstration and scientific induction. 3. It is also used in popular language to denote Logic properly so called. But *dialectics*, like science, is not Logic, but the subject matter of Logic

¹ Haywood, *Transl. of Kant*, p. 696.

² Taylor, *Synonyms*.

DIALECTICS—

Dialectics is handled, anatomized, and its conditions determined by Logic; but, for all that, it is not Logic, any more than the animal kingdom is Zoology, or the vegetable kingdom is Botany."¹

"Xenophon² tells us, that Socrates said, 'That *dialectics* (τὸ διαλέγεσθαι) was so called because it is an inquiry pursued by persons who take counsel together, separating the subjects considered according to their kinds (διαλέγουρας). He held accordingly that men should try to be well prepared for such a process, and should pursue it with diligence. By this means he thought they would become good men, fitted for responsible offices of command, and truly *dialectical*' (διαλεκτικώτατους). And this is, I conceive, the answer to Mr. Grote's interrogatory exclamation.³ 'Surely the etymology here given by Xenophon or Socrates of the word (διαλέγεσθαι), cannot be considered as satisfactory.' The two notions, of investigatory dialogue and distribution of notions according to their kinds, which are thus asserted to be connected in etymology, were, among the followers of Socrates, connected in fact; the *dialectic* dialogue was supposed to involve of course the *dialectic* division of the subject."⁴

DIANOIOLOGY—V. NOOLOGY.

DICHOTOMY (διχοτομία, cutting in two, division into two parts, logically), is a bimembral division.—"Our Saviour said to Pilate, 'Sayest thou this thing of thyself, or did others tell thee?' And all things reported are reducible to this *dichotomie*,—1. The fountain of invention. 2. The channel of relation."⁵

"The divisions of Peter Ramus always consisted of two members, one of which was contradictory of the other, as if one should divide England into Middlesex." In a note on this passage, Sir William Hamilton says, "There is nothing new in Ramus' Dichotomy by contradiction. It was, in particular, a favourite with Plato."⁶

"Every division, however complex, is reducible at each of

¹ Poste, *Introd. to Poster. Analyt.*, p. 16. 12mo, London, 1850.

² *Mex.*, iv. 5, 11.

³ Vol. viii., p. 577.

⁴ Dr. Whewell, *On Plato's Notion of Dialectic*, *Trans. of Camb. Philosoph. Soc.*, vol. x., part 4.

⁵ Fuller, *Worthies*, vol. i., c. 23

⁶ Reid's *Works*, p. 689

DICHOTOMY—

its steps to a *Dichotomy*; that is, to the division of a class into two sub-classes, opposed to each other by contradiction. The term X, if divisible positively by several terms, of which Y is one, is divisible also by the terms Y and not Y."¹

DICTION DE OMNI ET NULO may be explained to mean "whatever is predicated (i. e., affirmed, or denied) universally of any class of things, may be predicated in like manner (viz., affirmed, or denied) of anything comprehended in that class."
—V. CONTRADICTION.

DICTION SIMPLICITER.—When a term or proposition is to be understood in its plain and unlimited sense, it is used *simpliciter*; when with limitation or reference, it is said to be used *secundum quid* — q. v.

DIFFERENCE (διαφορά, *differentia*).—When two objects are compared they may have qualities which are common to both, or the one may have qualities which the other has not. The first constitutes their *resemblance*, the second their *difference*. If the qualities constituting their resemblance be *essential* qualities, and the qualities constituting their difference be merely *accidental*, the objects are only said to be *distinct*; but if the qualities constituting their difference be *essential* qualities, then the objects are *different*.² One man is *distinct* from another man, or one piece of silver from another; but a man is *different* from a horse, and gold is *different* from silver. Those accidental differences which distinguish objects whose essence is common, belong only to individuals, and are called *individual* or *numerical differences*. Those *differences* which cause objects to have a different nature, constitute species, and are called *specific differences*. The former are passing and variable; but the latter are permanent and form the objects of science, and furnish the grounds of all *classification, division, and definition* — q. v.

"*Difference* or *differentia*, in Logic, means the formal or distinguishing part of the essence of a species." When I say that the *differentia* of a magnet is "its attracting iron," and that its *property* is "polarity," these are called respectively, a

¹ Spalding, *Logic*, p. 146.

² Deroodon, *De Universaliibus*, seems to use *differentia* and *distinctio* indiscriminately

DIFFERENCE—

specific difference and *property*; because magnet is (I have supposed) an *infima species* (i. e., only a species). When I say that the *differentia* of iron ore is "its containing iron," and its *property* "being attracted by the magnet," these are called respectively, a *generic difference* and *property*, because "iron ore" is a subaltern species or genus; being both the genus of magnet, and the species of mineral."¹

The English word *divers* expresses *difference* only, but *diverse* expresses *difference with opposition*. The Evangelists narrate the same events in "divers manners," but not in "*diverse manners*."²—V. DISTINCTION.

DILEMMA is a syllogism with a conditional premiss, in which either the antecedent or consequent is disjunctive. When an affirmative is proved, the *Dilemma* is said to be in the *modus ponens*, and the argument is called *constructive*; when a negative is proved, the *Dilemma* is said to be in the *modus tollens*, and the argument is called *destructive*. Of the *constructive* dilemma there are two sorts—the *simple*, which concludes categorically, and the *complex*, which has a disjunctive conclusion. There is but one sort of the true *destructive* dilemma.

The *dilemma* is used to prove the absurdity or falsehood of some assertion. A conditional proposition is assumed, the antecedent of which is the assertion to be disproved, while the consequent is a disjunctive proposition enumerating the suppositions on which the assertion can be true. Should the supposition be rejected, the assertion also must be rejected. If A is B, either C is D or E is F. But neither C is D nor E is F; therefore, A is not B.

This syllogism was called the *Syllogismus Cornutus*, the two members of the consequent being the horns of the *dilemma*, on which the adversary is caught between (*διαλαμβάνεται*) two difficulties. And it was called *dilemma*, quasi δις λαμβάνω; according to others it was so called from δις, twice, and λήμμα, an assumption, because in the major premiss there

¹ Whately, *Log.*, book II., chap. 5, § 4

² See Porphyry, *Introd. to Categ.*; Arist., *Top.*, lib. vii., c. 1, 2.

DILEMMA—

are generally two antecedents, which in the minor become two assumptions.

The hypothetico-disjunctive syllogism, or *dilemma*, must not be confounded with the sophism called *dilemma*, in which, by a fallacy, two contradictories seem to be proved.

DISCOVERY.—V. INVENTION.

DISCURSUS.—"If the mind do not perceive intuitively the connection betwixt the prædicate and subject, as in the case of axioms, or self-evident propositions, it can do so no otherwise than by the intervention of other ideas, or by the use of middle terms, as they are called, in the language of Aristotle. And this application of the middle term, first to one of the terms of a proposition, and then to the other, is performed by that exercise of the intellect which is very properly called in Greek *διάνοια*, because the intellect in this operation goes betwixt the two terms, as it were, and passes from the one to the other. In Latin, as there is not the same facility of composition, it is expressed by two words, *discursus mentis*, *mens* being the same thing in Latin as *Νοῦς* in Greek; and the Latin expression is rendered into English by *discourse of reasoning*, or as it is commonly called, reasoning."¹

"Reasoning (or *discourse*) is the act of proceeding from certain judgments to another *founded* on them (or the result of them.)"²

DISJUNCTIVE.—V. PROPOSITION, SYLLOGISM.

DISPOSITION (*διάθεσις*, *dispositio*), according to Aristotle,³ is the arrangement of that which has parts, either according to place, or to potentiality, or according to species; for it is necessary that there be a certain position, as also the name *disposition* makes manifest."

As applied to mind, it supposes the relation of its powers and principles to one another, and means the resultant bias, or tendency to be moved by some of them rather than by others.

Mind is essentially one. But we speak of it as having a constitution and as containing certain primary elements; and, according as these elements are combined and balanced there

¹ Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, book v., ch. 4.

² Whately, *Log.*, book II., ch. 1, § 2.

³ *Metaphys.*, lib. iv., cap. 19.

DISPOSITION —

may be differences in the constitution of individual minds, just as there are differences of bodily *temperaments*; and these differences may give rise to a *disposition* or bias, in the one case, more directly in the other. According as intellect, or sensitivity, or will, prevails in any individual mind, there will be a correspondent bias resulting.

But it is in reference to original differences in the *primary desires*, that differences of *disposition* are most observable. Any *desire*, when powerful, draws over the other tendencies of the mind to its side; gives a colour to the whole character of the man, and manifests its influence throughout all his temper and conduct. His thoughts run in a particular channel, without his being sensible that they do so, except by the result. There is an under-current of feeling, flowing continually within him, which only manifests itself by the direction in which it carries him. This constitutes his temper.¹ *Disposition* is the sum of a man's desires and feelings.

DISTINCTION (*διαίρεσις*) is wider in signification than *difference*; for all things that are *different* are also *distinct*; but all things that are *distinct* are not also *different*. One drop of water does not *specifically differ* from another; but they are *individually distinct*.

Distinction is a kind of *alietas* or otherness. Those things are said to be distinct of which one is not the other. Thus *Peter*, precisely because he is not *Paul*, is said to be distinct from *Paul*. *Union* is not opposed to *distinction*; for things may be so united that the one shall not be confounded with the other. Thus the soul is united to the body. Indeed *union* implies *distinction*; it is when two things which are mutually *distinct* become, as it were, *one*.

Distinction is *real* and *mental*, *a parte rei* and *per intellectum*. *Real distinction* is founded in the nature of the thing, and amounts to *difference*. It is threefold:—1. Object from object—as God from man. 2. Mode from mode—as blue from black. 3. Mode from thing—as body from motion. *Mental distinction* is made by the mind—as when we distinguish between light

¹ "The balance of our animal principles, I think, constitutes what we call a man's natural temper."—*Roid, Act. Proo.*, essay III., part II., ch. 8.

DISTINCTION —

and heat, which are naturally united, or between the length and breadth of a body. It amounts to *abstraction*.¹

"Separation by the touch (*dis* and *tango*) makes a *distinction*; by turning apart (*dis* and *verto*) makes a *diversity*; by carrying asunder (*dis* and *fero*) makes a *difference*; by affixing a mark (*dis* and *crimen*) makes a *discrimination*. *Distinction*, therefore, is applied to delicate variations; *diversity* to glaring contrasts; *difference* to hostile unlikenesses; and *discrimination* to formal criticism."²

DISTRIBUTION—"is the placing particular things in the places or compartments which have already been prepared to receive them."³

"In Logic, a term is said to be *distributed* when it is employed in its full extent, so as to comprehend all its significates—everything to which it is applicable."⁴

"A term is said to be '*distributed*,' when an assertion is made or implied respecting *every member* of the class which the term denotes. Of every universal proposition, therefore, the subject is *distributed*; e. g., all *men* are mortal; No *rational being* is responsible; Whatsoever things were written *aforetime* were written for our learning. When an assertion is made or applied respecting some member or members of a class, but not necessarily respecting all, the term is said to be '*undistributed*;' as, for example, the subjects of the following propositions:—Some *men* are benevolent; There are some *standing here* that shall not die; Not every one *that invokes the sacred name* shall enter into the heavenly kingdom."⁵

"When the whole of either term (in a proposition) is compared with the other, it is said to be *distributed*; when a part only is so compared, it is said to be *undistributed*. In the proposition '*All, A is B*,' the term A is distributed; but in the proposition '*Some, A is B*,' it is undistributed."⁶

The rules for *distribution* are:—

1. All universal propositions, and no particular, distribute the *subject*.

¹ Bossuet, *Log.*, liv. I., c. 26; Reid, *Account of Aristotle's Logic*, ch. 2, sect. 3.

² Taylor, *Synonyms*.

³ Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

⁴ Whately, *Logic*, b. II., ch. 3, § 2.

⁵ Kidd, *Principles of Reasoning*, ch. 4, sect. 3, p. 179.

⁶ Booley, *Syll. of Log.*, p. 47.

DISTRIBUTION —

2. All negative, and no affirmative, the predicate.¹

"A singular term can never denote anything less than the object of which it is a name. A common term may be understood as denoting *all*, or fewer than all, of the objects of the class. When it denotes *all*, it is said to be taken universally, or to be *distributed*; that is, to be spread over the whole class, or to be applied to all the objects distributively — not collectively — to each, not to all together. When it denotes fewer than all the objects of the class, it is said to be taken particularly, or to be *undistributed*."²

DITHEISM. — "As for that fore-mentioned *ditheism*, or opinion of two gods — a good and an evil one, it is evident that its original sprung from nothing else, but from a firm persuasion of the essential goodness of Deity, &c."³ — V. DUALISM.

DIVISION — "is the separating things of the *same kind* into parcels; *analysis* is the separating of things that are of *different kinds*; we divide a stick by cutting it into two, or into twenty pieces; we analyze it by separating the bark, the wood, and the pith — a *division* may be made at pleasure, an *analysis* must be made according to the nature of the object."⁴

Division is either *division proper* or *partition*. *Partition* is the distribution of some *substance* into its parts; as of the globe into Europe, Asia, Africa, and America. *Division proper* is the distribution of *genus* and *species* into what is under them; as when *substance* is divided into *spiritual* and *material*. The members which arise from *division* retain the name of their whole; but not those from *partition*.

"*Division* is the separation of a whole into its parts.

"But as there are *two kinds of wholes*, there are also two kinds of *division*. There is a *whole* composed of parts really distinct, called in Latin, *totum*, and whose parts are called *integral parts*. The division of this *whole* is called properly *partition*; as when we divide a *house* into its apartments, a *town* into its wards, a *kingdom* or *state* into its provinces, *man* into *body* and *soul*, the *body* into its *members*. The sole rule

¹ Wesley, *Guide to Syllogism*, p. 10.

² Spalding, *Log.*, p. 51.

³ Cudworth, *Intell. System*, p. 213.

⁴ Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

DIVISION—

of their division is, to make the enumeration of particulars very exact, and that there be nothing wanting to them.

"The other *whole* is called, in Latin, *omne*, and its parts *subjected* or *inferior parts*, inasmuch as the whole is a *common term*, and its parts are the terms comprising its extension. The word *animal* is a whole of this nature, of which the inferiors, as man and beast, which are comprehended under its extension, are subjected parts. This division obtains properly the name of *division*, and there are four kinds of division which may be noticed.

"The *first* is, when we divide the *genus by its species*; every substance is body or mind, every animal is man or beast. The *second* is, when we divide the *genus by its differences*; every animal is rational or irrational, every number is even or uneven. The *third* is, when we divide a *common subject* into the *opposite accidents* of which it is susceptible, these being according to its different inferiors, or in relation to different times; as, every star is luminous by itself, or by reflection only; every body is in motion or at rest, &c. The *fourth* is, that of an *accident* into its *different subjects*, as division of *goods* into those of mind and body."¹

"*Division* (Logical) is the distinct enumeration of several things signified by one common name. It is so called from its being analogous to the real division of a whole into its parts."²

The rules of a good *division* are:—

1. Each of the parts, or any, short of all, must contain less (*i. e.*, have a narrower signification) than the thing divided. "Weapon" could not be a division of the term "sword."
2. All the parts taken together must be exactly equal to the thing divided. In dividing the term "weapon" into "sword," "pike," "gun," &c., we must not omit anything of which "weapon" can be predicated, nor introduce anything of which it cannot.
3. The parts, or members, must be *opposed*, *i. e.*, must not be contained in one another. "Book" must not be divided into "Quarto," "French;" for a French book may be a quarto, and a quarto French. It may be added, that a divi

¹ Port Roy. *Log.*, part II., chap. 16.

² Whately, *Log.*, book II., ch. 5, § 6.

DIVISION—

sion should proceed throughout upon the same principle—Books may be divided according to *size, language, matter, &c.*, all these being so many cross-divisions.

Aristotle,¹ Reid,²—V. WHOLE, FALLACY.

DIVORCE (*diverto*, to separate), is a separation, especially of husband and wife. It is used to signify,—1. Separation of a married pair without any right of re-marriage. 2. The like separation with that right; and 3. The declaratory sentence, pronouncing a marriage to have been void *ab initio*—that is, never to have existed in law.—Paley³ understands by *divorce*, “the dissolution of the marriage contract by the act and at the will of the husband.”⁴

DOGMATISM (*δόγμα*, from *δοκέω*, to think).—“Philosophers,” said Lord Bacon, “may be divided into two classes, the *empirics* and the *dogmatists*. The empiric, like the ant, is content to amass, and then consume his provisions. The *dogmatist*, like the spider, spins webs of which the materials are extracted from his own substance, admirable for the delicacy of their workmanship, but without solidity or use. The bee keeps a middle course—she draws her matter from flowers and gardens; then, by art peculiar to her, she labours and digests it. True philosophy does something like this.”

“He who is certain, or presumes to say he *knows*, is, whether he be mistaken or in the right, a *dogmatist*.”⁵

Kant defined *dogmatism*, “the presumption that we are able to attain a pure knowledge based on ideas, according to principles which the reason has long had in use, without any inquiry into the *manner* or into the *right* by which it has attained them.”⁶

“By *dogmatism* we understand, in general, both all propounding and all receiving of tenets merely from habit, without thought or examination, or, in other words, upon the authority of others; in short, the very opposite of critical investigation. All assertion for which no proof is offered is *dogmatical*.”⁷

¹ *Poster. Analyt.*, lib. II., c. 13.

² *Mor. Phil.*, b. III., pt. III., c. 7.

³ Shaftesbury, *Miscell. Reflect.*, Miscell. II., c. 2.

⁴ Morell, *Elements of Psychology*, p. 236, note.

⁵ Chalybeus, *Specul. Philosoph.*, p. 6.

⁶ *Account of Aristotle's Logic*, chap. II., sect. 2.

⁷ *Quarterly Rev.*, No. 203, p. 256.

DOGMATISM—

To maintain that man cannot attain to knowledge of the truth, is *scepticism*. To maintain that he can do so only by renouncing his reason, which is naturally defective, and surrendering himself to an internal inspiration or superior intuition, by which he is absorbed into God, and loses all personal existence, is *mysticism*. *Dogmatism* is to maintain that knowledge may be attained by the right use of our faculties, each within its proper sphere, and employed in a right method. This is the natural creed of the human race. Scepticism and mysticism are after thoughts.

Dogmatism, or faith in the results of the due exercise of our faculties, is to be commended. But *dogmatism* in the method of prosecuting our inquiries is to be condemned. Instead of laying down *dogmatically* truths which are not proven, we should proceed rather by observation and doubt. The scholastic philosophers did much harm by their *dogmatic method*. It is not to be mistaken for the *synthetic method*. There can be no *synthesis* without a preceding *analysis*. But they started from positions which had not been proved, and deduced consequences which were of no value.¹

There is wisdom as well as wit in the saying that, *Dogmatism* is *Puppyism* come to maturity.

DOUBT (*dubito*, to go two ways).—Man knows some things and is ignorant of many things, while he is in *doubt* as to other things. *Doubt* is that state of mind in which we hesitate as to two contradictory conclusions—having no preponderance of evidence in favour of either. Philosophical *doubt* has been distinguished as *provisional* or *definitive*. *Definitive doubt* is *scepticism*. *Provisional*, or *methodical doubt* is a voluntary suspending of our judgment for a time, in order to come to a more clear and sure conclusion. This was first given as a rule in philosophical method by Descartes, who tells us that he began by doubting everything, discharging his mind of all preconceived ideas, and admitting none as clear and true till he had subjected them to a rigorous examination.

"*Doubt* is some degree of belief, along with the consciousness of ignorance, in regard to a proposition. Absolute *dis-*

¹ *Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*

DOUBT—

belief implies knowledge: it is the knowledge that such or such a thing is not true. If the mind admits a proposition without any desire for knowledge concerning it, this is *credulity*. If it is open to receive the proposition, but feels ignorance concerning it, this is *doubt*. In proportion as knowledge increases, *doubt* diminishes, and belief or disbelief strengthens."¹—V. CERTAINTY, SCEPTICISM.

DREAMING.—The phenomena of sleep and *dreaming*, are treated by almost all writers on psychology. *Dreams* very often take their rise and character from something in the preceding state of body or mind. "Through the multitude of business cometh a *dream*," said Solomon; and Aristotle regarded dreams as the vibrations of our waking feelings.²

According to these views, *dreams*, instead of being prospective or prophetic, are retrospective and resultant. The former opinion, however, has prevailed in all ages and among all nations; and hence, *oneiromancy* or prophesying by *dreams*, that is, interpreting them as presages of coming events.

DUALISM, DUALITY.—"Pythagoras talked, it is said, of an immaterial unity, and a material *duality*, by which he pretended to signify, perhaps, the first principles of all things, the efficient and material causes."³

Dualism is the doctrine that the universe was created and is preserved by the concurrence of two principles, equally necessary, eternal, and independent.

Mythological dualism was held by Zoroaster and the Magi, who maintained the existence of a good principle and an evil principle; and thus explained the mixed state of things which prevails. It would appear, however, according to Zoroaster, that both Ormuzd and Ahrimanes were subordinate to Akerenes, or the Supreme Deity; and that it was only a sect of the Magi who held the doctrine of *dualism* in its naked form. Their views were revived in the second century by the Gnostics, and in the third century were supported by Manes, whose followers were called Manicheans.

Many of the ancient philosophers regarded the universe as constituted by two principles, the one active, the other pas-

¹ Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

² *Ethic*, lib. 1., cap. 12.

³ Bolingbroke, *Hum. Reason*, essay II.

DUALISM—

sive, the one mind, the other matter—the one soul, the other body. But the supposition of two infinities, or of two first causes, is self-contradictory, and is now abandoned.

The term *dualism* also finds a place in the theory of *perception*—*q. v.*

DURATION.—“After some thought has entirely disappeared from the mind it will often return, joined with the belief that it has been in the mind before; this is called *memory*. Memory and the consciousness of succession give us the notion signified by the word *duration*.”¹

According to Kant, *duration* or time, and also space, are necessary forms of the human mind, which cannot think of bodies but as existing in space, nor of events but as occurring in time.—*V. TIME.*

DUTY.—That which we *ought* to do—that which we are under *obligation* to do. In seeing a thing to be right, we see at the same time that it is our *duty* to do it. There is a complete synthesis between *rectitude* and *obligation*. Price has used *oughtness* as synonymous with *rightness*.—*V. OBLIGATION.*

Duty and *right* are relative terms. If it be the *duty* of one party to do some thing, it is the *right* of some other party to expect or exact the doing of it.²—*V. RIGHT, RECTITUDE.*

DYNAMISM, the doctrine of Leibnitz, that all substance involves *force*.—*V. MATTER.*

ECLECTICISM (*ἐκλέγω*, to select, to choose out).—The Alexandrian philosophers, or Neo-Platonicians, who arose at Alexandria about the time of Pertinax and Severus, and continued to flourish to the end of the reign of Justinian, professed to gather and unite into one body, what was true in all systems of philosophy. To their method of philosophizing, the name *eclecticism* was first applied. Clemens Alexandrinus³ said, “By philosophy I mean neither the Stoic, nor the Platonic, nor the Epicurean, nor the Aristotelian; but whatever

¹ Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book II., chap. 18.

² See Wordsworth, *Ode to Duty*.

³ Stromm., lib. I., p. 228.

ECLECTICISM —

things have been properly said by each of these sects, inculcating justice and devout knowledge,—*this whole selection I call philosophy.*" Diogenes Laertes¹ tell us, that Potamos of Alexandria introduced *ἐκλεκτικὴν αἵρεσιν*. But the method had been adopted by Plato and Aristotle before, and has been followed by many in all ages of philosophy. Leibnitz said that truth was more widely diffused than was commonly thought; but it was often burdened and weakened, mutilated and corrupted by additions which spoiled it and made it less useful. In the philosophy of the ancients, or those who had gone before, he thought there was *perennis quædam philosophia*—if it could only be disintricated from error and disinterred from the rubbish which overwhelmed it. In modern times the great advocate of *eclecticism* is Mons. Cousin. But its legitimacy as a mode of philosophizing has been challenged.

"The sense in which this term is used by Clemens" (of Alexandria) says Mr. Maurice,² "is obvious enough. He did not care for Plato, Aristotle, Pythagoras, as such; far less did he care for the opinions and conflicts of the schools which bore their names; he found in each hints of precious truths of which he desired to avail himself; he would gather the flowers without asking in what garden they grew, the prickles he would leave for those who had a fancy for them. *Eclecticism*, in this sense, seemed only like another name for catholic wisdom. A man, conscious that everything in nature and in art was given for his learning, had a right to suck honey wherever it was to be found; he would find sweetness in it if it was hanging wild on trees and shrubs, he could admire the elaborate architecture of the cells in which it was stored. The Author of all good to man had scattered the gifts, had imparted the skill; to receive them thankfully was an act of homage to Him. But once lose the feeling of *devotion* and *gratitude*, which belonged so remarkably to Clemens—once let it be fancied that the philosopher was not a mere receiver of treasures which had been provided for him, but an ingenious chemist and compounder of various naturally unsociable ingredients, and the eclectic doctrine would lead to more self

¹ 1, sect. 21.² *Mor. and Metaphys. Phil.*, p. 52.

ECLECTICISM—

conceit, would be more unreal and heartless than any one of the sectarian elements out of which it was fashioned. It would want the belief and conviction which dwell, with whatever unsuitable companions, even in the narrowest theory. Many of the most vital characteristics of the original dogmas would be effaced under pretence of taking off their rough edges and fitting them into each other. In general the superficialities and formality of each creed would be preserved in the new system; its original and essential characteristics sacrificed."

"In philosophy Cicero was never more than an *eclectic*, that is, in point of fact, no philosopher at all. For the very essence of the philosophical mind lies in this, that it is constrained by an irresistible impulse to ascend to primary, necessary principles, and cannot halt until it reaches the living, streaming sources of truth; whereas the *eclectic* will stop short where he likes, at any maxim to which he chooses to ascribe the authority of a principle. The philosophical mind must be systematic, ever seeking to behold all things in their connection, as parts or members of a great organic whole, and impregnating them all with the electric spirit of order; while the *eclectic* is content if he can string together a number of generalizations. A philosopher incorporates and animates; an *eclectic* heaps and ties up. The philosopher combines multiplicity into unity; the *eclectic* leaves unity straggling about in multiplicity. The former opens the arteries of truth, the latter its veins. Cicero's legal habits peer out from under his philosophical cloak, in his constant appeal to precedent, his ready deference to authority. For in law, as in other things, the practitioner does not go beyond maxims, that is, secondary or tertiary principles, taking his stand upon the mounds which his predecessors have erected."¹

See Cousin,² Jouffroy,³ and Damiron.⁴

ECONOMICS (*oikos*, a house; *nomos*, a law).—Treatises under this title were written by Xenophon, Aristotle, and Cicero.

¹ Second Series of *Guesses at Truth*, edition 1848, p. 238.

² *Fragmens Philosophiques*, 8vo, Paris, 1826.

³ *Melanges Philosophiques*, 8vo, Paris, 1838.

⁴ *Essai sur l'Histoire de la Philosophie au dix-neuvième siècle*, 2 tom., 8vo, Paris, 1894.

ECONOMICS—

They seem to have treated of the best means of managing and increasing the comforts and resources of a household. Only fragments of them remain. But in modern times justice or social duty has been distinguished by Henry More into *ethical*, *economical*, and *political*. And *economics* has been employed to denote those duties which spring from the relations which exist in a family or household. These are the duties—

1. Of husband and wife.
2. Of parent and child.
3. Of master and servant.

ECSTASY (*Exorasy*, standing out), a transport of the soul by which it seems as if out of the body.

“Whether that which we call *ecstasy* be not dreaming with the eyes open, I leave to be examined.”¹

This word does not occur in philosophy before the time of Philo and the Alexandrians. Plotinus and Porphyry pretended to have *ecstasies* in which they were united to God. Among Christian writers, Bonaventura (*Itinerarium Mentis in Deum*), Gerson (*Theologia Mystica*), and Francis de Sales, recommend those contemplations which may lead to *ecstasy*. But there is danger of their leading to delusion, and to confound the visions of a heated imagination with higher and nearer views of spiritual things.²

EDUCATION (*educō*, to lead out), means the development of the bodily and mental powers. The human being is born and lives amidst scenes and circumstances which have a tendency to call forth and strengthen his powers of body and mind. And this may be called the *education* of nature. But by *education* is generally meant the using those means of development which one man or one generation of men may employ in favour of another. These means are chiefly *instruction*, or the communication of knowledge to enlighten and strengthen the mind; and *discipline*, or the formation of manners and habits. Instruction and discipline may be physical or moral, that is, may refer to the body or to the mind. Both, when employed in all their extent, go to make up *education*, which

¹ Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book II., chap. 12.

² Boeder, *Traité sur l'Ecstasy*, 1817.

EDUCATION —

is the aid given to assist the development, and advance the progress of the human being, as an individual, and as a member of a family, of a community, and a race.

"The business of *education* is to *educer* or bring out that which is within, not merely or mainly to *instruct* or impose a form from without. Only we are not framed to be self-sufficient, but to derive our nourishment, intellectual and spiritual, as well as bodily, from without, through the ministration of others; and hence *instruction* must ever be a chief element of *education*. Hence too we obtain a criterion to determine what sort of *instruction* is right and beneficial — that which ministers to *education*, which tends to bring out, to nourish and cultivate the faculties of the mind, not that which merely piles a mass of information upon them. Moreover, since nature, if left to herself, is ever prone to run wild, and since there are hurtful and pernicious elements around us, as well as nourishing and salutary, pruning and sheltering, correcting and protecting are also among the principal offices of *education*."¹

Milton,² Locke,³ Guizot,⁴ *Conseils d'un Père sur l'Éducation*.

EFFECT. — That which is produced by the operation of a cause.

— V. CAUSE.

EGO (I). — "Supposing it proved that my thoughts and my consciousness must have a *subject*, and consequently that I exist, how do I know that all that train and succession of thoughts which I remember belong to one subject, and that the *I* of this moment is the very individual *I* of yesterday, and of time past?"⁵

Sir William Hamilton's note upon this passage is as follows: — "In English, we cannot say the *I* and the *not I*, so happily as the French *le moi* and *le non-moi*, or even the German *das Ich* and *das nicht Ich*. The ambiguity arising from identity of sound between the *I* and the *eye*, would itself preclude the ordinary employment of the former. The *ego* and the *non-ego* are the best terms we can use; and as the expressions are scientific, it is perhaps no loss that their technical precision is guarded by their *non-ternacularity*."

¹ Second Series, *Guesses at Truth*, 1848, p. 145.
On *Education*.

² On *Education*.

³ *Méditations*, 8vo, Paris, 1863.

⁴ *Beld, Inquiry*, Introd., sect. 3.

EGO—

In another note¹ he has added:—"The *ego* as the subject of thought and knowledge, is now commonly styled by philosophers the *subject*; and *subjective* is a familiar expression for what pertains to the mind or thinking principle. In contrast and correlation to these, the terms *object* and *objective* are, in like manner, now in general use to denote the *non-ego*, its affections and properties, and in general, the *really existent* as opposed to the *ideally known*."

EGOISM, EGOIST.—"Those Cartesians who in the progress of their doubts ended in absolute *egoism*."

"A few bold thinkers, distinguished by the name of *egoists*, had pushed their scepticism to such a length as to doubt of everything but their own existence. According to *these*, the proposition, *Cogito ergo sum*, is the only truth which can be regarded as absolutely certain."

Dr. Reid² says, that some of Descartes' disciples who doubted of everything but their own existence, and the existence of the operations and ideas of their own mind, remained at this stage of his system and got the name of *egoists*. But Sir William Hamilton, in a note on the passage, says, "He is doubtful about the existence of this supposed sect of *egoists*."

The first sense and aspect of *egoism* may seem to be selfishness. But this is contradicted by the following epitaph:—

In the churchyard of Homersfield (St. Mary, Southelmham), Suffolk, was the gravestone of Robert Crytoft, who died Nov. 17, 1810, aged ninety, bearing the following epitaph:—

"MYSELF.

"As I walk'd by myself, I talk'd to myself,
And thus myself said to me,
Look to thyself, and take care of thyself,
For nobody cares for thee.

"So I turned to myself and I answered myself,
In the self-same reverie,
Look to myself, or look not to myself,
The self-same thing will it be."

ELECTION (*eligo*, to choose), is an elicit act of will, by which, after deliberation of several means to an end proposed by the

¹ *Reid's Works*, note 2, sect. 1, p. 806.

² *Stewart, Dissert.*, part II., v. 161, and p. 175.

³ *Intell. Pow.*, essay II., chap. 2.

ELECTION —

understanding, the will elects one rather than any other. *Volition* has reference to the end, *election* is of the means. According to others, no distinction should be taken between *election* and *volition*; as to will an end is the same act as to choose the means. But an end may be accomplished by different means — of one or other of which there is *election*.

Aristotle¹ says, "moral preference, *προαίρεσις*, then, relates to those things only which may be accomplished by our own exertions; it is appetite or affection, combined with and modified by reason; and conversant not about *ends*, but about the best *means* by which they may be attained. *Volition*, on the contrary, is conversant only about *ends*; which consist, according to some, in real, and according to others, in seeming good."

ELEMENT (*στοιχεῖον*). — The Stoic definition of an element is, "that out of which, as their first principle, things generated are made, and into which, as their last remains, they are resolved."²

"We call that elementary which in a composition cannot be divided into heterogeneous parts — thus the *elements* of sound constitute sound, and the last parts into which you divide it — parts which you cannot divide into other sounds of a different kind. The last parts into which bodies can be divided — parts which cannot be divided into parts of a different kind, are the *elements* of bodies. The *elements* of every being are its constitutive principle."³

"*Elements* are τὰ ἐννέαρχα αἴτια — the inherent or inexistent causes, such as matter and form. There are other causes, such as the tribe of *efficient causes*, which cannot be called *elements*, because they make no part of the substances which they generate or produce. Thus the statuary is no part of his statue; the painter of his picture. Hence it appears that all *elements* are causes, but not all causes *elements*."⁴ And in the chap. he says, "In form and matter we place the *elements* of natural substance."

Materia prima, or matter without form — *ἄλη*, was an *element* ready to receive form. This seems to be the use of the word

¹ *Ethics*, book iii., chap. 3, 4.

² *Arist.*, *Metaphys.*, lib. iv., c. 3.

³ *Diog. Laert.*, vii., 176.

⁴ *Harris*, *Philosoph. Arrang.*, chap. 5, note.

ELEMENT —

as retained in the communion service. Bread and wine are *elements* ready to receive the form of the body and blood of Christ. "Like the *elements* of the material world, the bases of the sacred natures into which they were transformed."¹— See Doublado's *Letters*.

"The *elementes* be those originall thynges unmyxt and un-compounde, of whose temperance and myxture all other thynges having corporal substance be compact; of them be foure, that is to say, earth, water, ayre, and fyre."²

Element is applied analogically to many things; as to letters, the *elements* of words; to words the *elements* of speech; and in general to the principles or first truths or rules of any science or art.

ELEMENTOLOGY.—V. METHODOLOGY.

ELICIT (*elicio*, to draw out), is applied to acts of will which are produced directly by the will itself, and are contained within it; as *velle aut nolle*. An *elicit* act of will is either election or volition—the latter having reference to ends, and the former to means.

ELIMINATION (*elimino*, to throw out), in Mathematics, is the process of causing a function to disappear from an equation, the solution of which would be embarrassed by its presence there. In other writings the correct signification is, "the extrusion of that which is superfluous or irrelevant." Thus, Sir W. Hamilton³ says:—"The preparatory step of the discussion was, therefore, an *elimination* of those less precise and appropriate significations, which, as they would at best only afford a remote genus and difference, were wholly incompetent for the purpose of a definition."

It is frequently used in the sense of eliciting, but incorrectly.

EMANATION (*emano*, to flow from).—According to several systems of philosophy and religion which have prevailed in the East, all the beings of which the universe is composed, whether body or spirit, have proceeded from, and are parts of, the Divine Being or substance. This doctrine of *emanation* is

¹ Hampden, *On Scholastic Philosophy*, lect. vii.

² Sir T. Elyot, *Castel of Health*, l. i.

³ In *Edin. Rev.*, April, 1833.

EMANATION—

to be found in the systems of Zoroaster, the Gnostics, an Neo-Platonicians. It differs little, if at all, from Pantheism.

EMINENTLY.—V. VIRTUAL.

EMOTION (*emoveo*, to move out), is often used as synonymous with feeling. Strictly taken, it means "a state of feeling which, while it does not spring directly from an affection of body, manifests its existence and character by some sensible effect upon the body."

An *emotion* differs from a *sensation*, by its not originating in a state of body; and from a *cognition*, by its being pleasurable or painful.

Emotions, like other states of feeling, imply knowledge. Something beautiful or deformed, sublime or ridiculous, is known and contemplated; and on the contemplation, springs up the appropriate feeling, followed by the characteristic expression of countenance, or attitude, or manner.

In themselves considered, *emotions*¹ can scarcely be called springs of action. They tend rather, while they last, to fix attention on the objects or occurrences which have excited them. In many instances, however, *emotions* are succeeded by desires to obtain possession of the objects which awaken them, or to remove ourselves from the presence of such objects. When an *emotion* is thus succeeded by some degree of desire, it forms, according to Lord Kames, a *passion*, and becomes, according to its nature, a powerful and permanent spring of action.

Emotions, then, are awakened through the medium of the intellect, and are varied and modified by the conception we form of the objects to which they refer.

Emotions manifest their existence and character by sensible effects upon the body.

Emotions, in themselves, and by themselves, lead to quiescence and contemplation, rather than activity. But they combine with springs of action, and give to them a character and

¹ "The feelings of beauty, grandeur, and whatever else is comprehended under the name of taste, do not lead to action, but terminate in delightful contemplation, which constitutes the essential distinction between them and the moral sentiments, to which, in some points of view, they may doubtless be likened."—Mackintosh, *Dissert.* p. 238.

EMOTION —

a colouring. What is said to be done from surprise or shame, has its proper spring — the surprise or shame being concomitant.¹

EMPIRIC, EMPIRICISM.—Among the Greek physicians those who founded their practice on experience called themselves *empirics* (*ἐμπειρικοί*); those who relied on theory, *methodists* (*μεθοδικοί*); and those who held a middle course, *dogmatists* (*δωγματικοί*). The term *empiricism* became naturalized in England when the writings of Galen and other opponents of the *empirics* were in repute, and hence it was applied generally to any ignorant pretender to knowledge. It is now used to denote that kind of knowledge which is the result of experience. Aristotle applies the terms *historical* and *empirical* in the same sense. *Historical* knowledge is the knowledge that a thing is. *Philosophical* knowledge is the knowledge of its cause, or why it is. The Germans laugh at our phrase *philosophical transactions*, and say, "Socrates brought down philosophy from the clouds — but the English have brought her down to the dunghill."

Empiricism allows nothing to be true nor certain but what is given by experience, and rejects all knowledge *à priori*.

In antiquity the Ionian school may be said to have been sensualist or *empirical*. The saying of Heraclitus that nothing is, but that all things are beginning to be, or are in a continual flux, amounts to a denial of the persistence of substance. Democritus and the atomists, if they admitted the substance of atoms, denied the fundamental laws of the human mind. And the teaching of Protagoras, that sense is knowledge, and man the measure of all things, made all science individual and relative. The influence of Plato and Aristotle re-established the foundation of true philosophy, and *empiricism* was regarded as scepticism.

In the middle ages *empiricism* was found only among the physicians and alchemists, and was not the badge of any school of philosophy.

Empiricism, as applied to the philosophy of Locke, means that he traces all knowledge to experience, *ἐμπειρία*. Expe-

¹ See Dr. Thalmers, *Sketches of Ment. and Mor. Phil.*, p. 88.

EMPIRIC—

rience, according to him, included sensation and reflection. The French philosophers, Condillac and others, rejected reflection as a distinct source of knowledge; and their doctrine, to distinguish it from that of Locke, is called *sensualism*. *Ideology* gives nothing to the mind but sensations remembered or generalized, which it calls ideas. But Reid and the common sense philosophers, as well as Cousin and the rationalist philosophers, hold that the mind has primary beliefs, or universal and necessary ideas, which are the ground of all experience and knowledge. — *V. EXPERIENCE.*

Empirical or *experimental* "is an epithet used by Madame de Staël and other writers on German philosophy, to distinguish what they call the philosophy of sensation, from that of Plato and of Leibnitz. It is, accordingly, generally, if not always, employed by them in an unfavourable sense. In this country, on the contrary, the *experimental* or *inductive* philosophy of the human mind denotes those speculations concerning mind, which, rejecting all hypothetical theories, rest solely on phenomena for which we have the evidence of consciousness. It is applied to the philosophy of Reid, and to all that is truly valuable in the metaphysical works of Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume."¹

EMULATION (*æmulus*, striving; from *ἀμύλλω*, a strife), is the desire of superiority. It is one of those primitive desires which manifest themselves in very early years. It prompts, when properly directed and regulated, to the most strenuous and persevering exertion. Its influence in the carrying forward of education is most important.

ENDS. — *Ends* are of two kinds, according to Aristotle,² *ἐντέλεια*, operations; *ἔργα*, productions. An *ἐντέλεια* is the *end*, when the object of a man's acting is the pleasure or advantage in being so employed, as in music, dancing, contemplation, &c., which produce nothing, generally speaking, beyond the pleasure which the act affords. An *ἔργον* is something which is produced beyond the operation or energy; thus, the shoe is the *ἔργον* produced by the *ἐντέλεια* of shoe-making.³

This corresponds to Adam Smith's distinction of labour as

¹ Stewart, *Dissert.*, pt. II., p. 146, note.

² *EA.*, lib. I., cap. 1.

³ Paul, *Analysis of Arist.*, p. 2.

ENDS—

productive or unproductive, according as it gives or does not give a material product.

An *end* is that for the sake of which an action is done. Hence it has been said to be, *principium in intentione et terminus in executione*.

When one *end* has been gained, it may be the means of gaining some other *end*. Hence it is that *ends* have been distinguished, as *supreme* and *ultimate*, or *subordinate* and *intermediate*. That which is sought for its own sake, is the *supreme* and *ultimate end* of those actions which are done with a view to it. That which is sought for the sake of some other end, is a *subordinate* and *intermediate end*.

Ends as ultimate, are distinguished into the *end simpliciter ultimus*, and *ends* which are ultimate *secundum quid*. An *end* which is the last that is successively aimed at, in a series of actions, is called ultimate *secundum quid*. But that which is aimed at, exclusively for its own sake, and is never regarded as a means to any other *end*, is an ultimate end, simply and absolutely.

See Edwards,¹ Cicero.²

ENS is either *ens reale* or *ens rationis*.

Ens Rationis.—That which has no existence but in the idea which the mind forms of it; as a golden mountain.

Ens Reale, in philosophical language, is taken *late et stricte*, and is distinguished as *ens potentiale*, or that which may exist, and *ens actuale*, or that which does exist. It is sometimes taken as the concrete of *essentia*, and signifies what has essence and may exist—as a rose in winter. Sometimes as the participle of *esse*, and then it signifies what actually exists. *Ens* without intellect is *res*, a thing.

ENTELECHY (*entelecheia*, from *enteles*, perfect; *chein*, to have; and *telos*, an end; in Latin *perfectihabia*).—"In one of the books of the Pythagoreans, viz., *Ocellus Lucanus*, *Περὶ τοῦ παντός*, the word *συτελής* is used in the same sense. Hence it has been thought that this was borrowed from the Pythagoreans."³

¹ *Dissertation concerning the End for which God created the World.*

² *De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum.*

³ Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, b. 1., ch. 3, p. 16, note.

ENTELECHY—

Cicero¹ interprets it to mean *quandam quasi continuatam motionem et perennem*.

Melancthon² gives two interpretations of *Endelechy*, as he writes it. He says that *ἐνδελέχεια* signifies *continuus*, and *ἐνδελέχεια* *continuitas*. According to him, Aristotle used it as synonymous with *ἐνέργεια*. Hence Cicero translated it by continuous movement or agitation. Argyropolus blames Cicero for this, and explains it as meaning "interior perfection," as if it were *τὸ ἐντὸς τελειοῦν*. But Melancthon thinks Cicero's explanation in accordance with the philosophy of Aristotle.

According to others, *ἐνδελέχεια* means *continuance*, and is a totally different word from *ἐντελέχεια*, which means *actuality*.³

According to Leibnitz, *entelecheia* is derived apparently from the Greek word which signifies *perfect*, and therefore the celebrated Hermolaüs Barbarus expressed it in Latin, word for word, by *perfecti habia*, for act is the accomplishment of power; and he needed not to have consulted the devil, as he did, they say, to tell him this much.⁴

"You may give the name of *entelechie* to all simple substances or created monads, for they have in them a certain perfection (*ἔχουσι τὸ ἐντελές*), they have a sufficiency (*αὐτάρκεια*) which makes them the source of their internal actions, and so to say incorporeal automata." He calls a monad an autarchic automaton, or first *entelechie*—having life and force in itself.

"*Entelechy* is the opposite to *potentiality*, yet would be ill translated by that which we often oppose to potentiality, *actuality*. *ἔδος* expresses the substance of each thing viewed in repose—its form or constitution; *ἐνέργεια* its substance, considered as active and generative; *ἐντελέχεια* seems to be the synthesis or harmony of these two ideas. The *effectio* of Cicero, therefore, represents the most important side of it, but not the whole."⁵

¹ *Tuscul. Quæst.*, lib. 1., quæst. 1.

² *Opera*, tom. xiii., pp. 12-14, edit. 1846.

³ *Arist. Metaphys.*, Bohn's Libr., pp. 63, 301; Donaldson 1, *New Cratylus*, pp. 339-344.

⁴ Leibnitz, *Theodicæ*, partie 1., sect. 87.

⁵ *Monadologie*, sect. 18.

⁶ Maurice, *Mor. and Metaphys. Phil.*, note, p. 191.

ENTELECHY—

Ἐντελέχεια ce qui a en soi sa fin, qui par conséquent ne relève que de soi même, et constitue une unité indivisible.¹

"L'*Entelechie* est opposée à la simple puissance, comme la forme à la matière, l'être au possible. C'est elle qui, par la vertu de la fin, constitue l'essence même des choses, et imprime le mouvement à la matière aveugle; et c'est en ce sens qu' Aristote a pu donner de l'âme cette célèbre définition, qu'elle est l'entelechie ou forme première de tout corps naturel qui possède la vie en puissance."²

Aristotle defines the soul of man to be an *entelechy*; a definition of which Dr. Reid said he could make no sense. — V. SOUL, ACTUAL.

ENTHUSIASM (ὁ θεὸς ἐν ἡμῖν) — "is almost a synonym of genius; the moral life in the intellectual light, the will in the reason; and without it, says Seneca, nothing truly great was ever achieved."³

The word occurs both in Plato and Aristotle. According to its composition it should signify "divine inspiration." But it is applied in general to any extraordinary excitement or exaltation of mind. The raptures of the poet, the deep meditations of the philosopher, the heroism of the warrior, the devotedness of the martyr, and the ardour of the patriot, are so many different phases of *enthusiasm*. "According to Plutarch, there be five kinds of *Enthusiasm*: — *Divinatory*, *Bacchical* (or corybantic), *Poetical* (under which he comprehends musical also), *Martial* and *Erotical*, or *Amatoric*."⁴

ENTHYME (ἐνθύμημα, in the mind), is an irregular syllogism in which one of the premisses is not expressed, but kept in mind; as "every animal is a substance, therefore, every man is a substance;" in which the premiss, "man is an animal," is suppressed. "This is the vulgar opinion regarding Aristotle's *Enthymeme*, but, as I have shown, not the correct."⁵

¹ Cousin, note to *Transl. of Aristotle's Metaphysics*, book xii., p. 212.

² *Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*

³ Coleridge, *Notes on Eng. Div.*, vol. I., p. 338.

⁴ A *Treatise concerning Enthusiasm* by Meric Cassaubon, D. D., chap. 1. Shaftesbury, *Of Enthusiasm*. See also *Natural Hist. of Enthusiasm*, by Isaac Taylor; Madame de Staël, *Germany*; Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book iv., chap. 19; Moro, *Enthusiasmus Triumphatus*.

⁵ See *Edin. Rev.*, vol. lvii., p. 221; Sir William Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 704, note

ENTHYMEME—

Aristotle's *Syllogism* was an inference in matter necessary, his *Enthymeme* was an inference in matter probable.¹ The famous expression of Descartes, *Cogito ergo sum*, is, as to form, an *enthymeme*. It was not put, however, as a proof of existence, but as meaning that the fact of existing is enclosed in the consciousness of thinking.

ENTITY (*entitas*), in the scholastic philosophy was synonymous with essence or form.

To all individuals of a species there is something in common—a nature which transiently invests all, but belongs exclusively to none. This essence, taken by itself and viewed apart from any individual, was what the scholastics called an *entity*. Animals had their *entity*, which was called *animality*. Men had their *entity*, which was called *humanity*. It denoted the common nature of the individuals of a species or genus. It was the idea or model according to which we conceived of them. The question whether there was a reality corresponding to this idea, divided philosophers into *Nominalists* and *Realists*—*q. v.*

It is used to denote anything that exists, as an object of sense or of thought.—*V. Ens.*

ENUNCIATION, in Logic, includes the doctrine of *propositions*—*q. v.*

EPICHEIREMA (*ἐπιχειρημα*, to put one's hand to a thing), an attempted proof—is a syllogism having the major or minor premiss, or both, confirmed by an incidental proposition called a *Prosyllogism*. This proposition, with the premiss it is attached to, forms an enthymeme. The *incidental* proposition is the *expressed premiss* of the enthymeme, and the premiss it is attached to is the *conclusion*: *c. g.*,—

All sin is dangerous.

Covetousness is sin (for it is a transgression of the law), therefore,

It is dangerous.

The minor premiss is an enthymeme. "Covetousness is a transgression of the law; therefore, it is sin."

¹ Bachman, p. 200.

EPICUREAN.—A follower of Epicurus, a philosopher, who was born 341, B. C.

"The system of Epicurus agreed with those of Plato, Aristotle, and Zeno, in making virtue consist in acting in the most suitable manner to obtain primary objects of natural desire. It differed from all of them in two other respects;—1st, in the account which it gave of these primary objects of natural desire; and, 2dly, in the account which it gave of the excellence of virtue, or the reason why that quality ought to be esteemed."¹

EPISTEMOLOGY (λόγος τῆς ἐπιστήμης, the science of true knowing) — "the doctrine or theory of knowing, just as Ontology is the doctrine or theory of being."²

EPISYLLOGISM.—In a chain of reasoning one of the premisses of the main argument may be the conclusion of another argument, in that case called a *Prosyllogism*; or the conclusion of the main argument may be a premiss to a supplementary one, which is called an *episyllogism*. The question is, "Has A. B. been poisoned?" and the *syllogism* is, "A man who has taken a large quantity of arsenic has been poisoned, and A. B. is found to have done so, therefore, he has been poisoned." With the addition of a *prosyllogism* and an *episyllogism* the meaning would run—"A man who has taken arsenic has been poisoned; and A. B. has taken arsenic, for tests discover it (*Prosyl.*), therefore, A. B. has been poisoned, and, therefore, there cannot be a verdict of death from natural causes (*Episyll.*)."

EQUANIMITY.—V. MAGNANIMITY.

EQUITY (ἐπιείκεια, or τὸ ἴσον, as distinguished from τὸ νομιμον), is described by Aristotle³ as that kind of justice which corrects the irregularities or rigours of strict legal justice. All written laws must necessarily speak in general terms, and must leave particular cases to the discretion of the parties. An *equitable* man will not press the letter of the law in his own favour, when, by doing so, he may do injustice to his neighbour. The ancients, in measuring rusticated building,

¹ Smith, *Theory of Mor. Sent.*, part vii., sect. 2. See Gassendi, *De Vita Moribus et Doctrina, Epicuri*, 4to, Lyons, 1647.

² Ferrier, *Inst of Metaphys.*, p. 46.

³ *Ethics*, book v chap. 10.

EQUITY—

in which the stones alternately projected and receded, used a leaden rule. *Equity*, like this leaden rule, bends to the specialities of every case, when the iron rule of legal justice cannot do so.

"*Equity* contemplates the mass of rights growing out of the law of nature; and justice contemplates the mass of rights growing out of the law of society. *Equity* treats of our dues as equals; justice treats of our dues as fellow-subjects. The purpose of *equity* is respect for humanity; the purpose of justice is respect for property. *Equity* withstands oppression; justice withstands injury."—V. JUSTICE.

"In the most general sense we are accustomed to call that *equity* which, in human transactions, is founded in natural justice, in honesty and right, and which properly arises *ex æquo et bono*. In this sense it answers precisely to the definition of justice or natural law, as given by Justinian in his *Pandects*, '*Justitia est constans et perpetua voluntas jus suum cuique tribuendi*.' And the word *jus* is used in the same sense in the Roman law, when it is declared that *jus est ars boni et æqui*, where it means that we are accustomed to call jurisprudence." This is natural jurisprudence. In this sense *equity* is coincident with it. But Wolfius says, "*Justum appellatur quicquid fit secundum jus perfectum alterius; æquum vero quod secundum imperfectum.*"¹

EQUIVOCAL or HOMONYMOUS words have different significations, as *bull*, the animal, the Pope's letter, a blunder. *Gallus*, in Latin, a cock, or a Frenchman. *Canis*, a dog, or the dog-star. They originate in the multiplicity of things and the poverty of language.

Words signifying different things may be used,—

First, By accident; or, second, With intention. 1st, It has happened, that *Sandwich* is the name of a peer—of a town—of a cluster of Islands, and of a slice of bread and meat. 2d, There are four ways in which a word may come to be used equivocally with knowledge or intention:—

1. On account of the resemblance of the things signified, as when a statue or a picture is called a man.

¹ Taylor, *Synonyms*.

² Story, *Comment. on Equity Jurisp.*, pp. 1-2.

EQUIVOCAL —

2. On account of proportion, as when a point is called a principle in respect to a line, and unity a principle in respect to number.

3. On account of common derivation—thus, a *medical* man, a *medical* book, a *medical* instrument, are all derived from *medicine*.

4. On account of common reduction or reference—thus, a *healthful* medicine, *healthful* pulse, *healthful* herb, all referring to human *health*.

Some of these are intermediate between *equivocal* and *analogous* terms, particularly No. 4.

An *Equivocal* noun, in Logic, has more than one signification, each of its significations being *equally* applicable to several objects, as pen, post. "Strictly speaking, there is hardly a word in any language which may not be regarded as in this sense *equivocal*; but the title is usually applied only in any case when a word is *employed equivocally*; e. g., when the middle term is used in different senses in the two premises, or where a proposition is liable to be understood in different senses, according to the various meaning of one of its terms."¹

EQUIVOCATION (*æque, voco*, to use one word in different senses).—"How absolute the knave is! We must speak by the card, or *equivocation* will undo us."—*Hamlet*, act v., scene 1.

In morals, to *equivocate* is to offend against the truth by using language of double meaning, in one sense, with the intention of its being understood in another—or in either sense according to circumstances. The ancient oracles gave responses of ambiguous meaning. *Aio, te, Æacide, Romanos vincere posse*—may mean either; "I say that thou, O descendant of Æacus, canst conquer the Romans;" or, "I say that the Romans can conquer thee, O descendant of Æacus." *Latronem Petrum occidisse*, may mean, "a robber slew Peter:" or, "Peter slew a robber."

Edwardum occidere nolite timere bonum est. The message penned by Adam Orleton, Bishop of Hereford, and sent by

¹ Whately, *Log.*, b. iii., § 10.

EQUIVOCATION —

Q. Isabella to the gaolers of her husband, Edw. II. Being written without punctuation, the words might be read two ways; with a comma after *timere*, they would mean, "Edward, to kill fear not, the deed is good;" but with it after *nolite*, the meaning would be, "Edward kill not, to fear the deed is good."

Henry Garnet, who was tried for his participation in the Gunpowder Plot, thus expressed himself in a paper dated 20th March, 1605-6: — "Concerning *equivocation*, this is my opinion; in moral affairs, and in the common intercourse of life, when the truth is asked among friends, it is not lawful to use *equivocation*, for that would cause great mischief in society — wherefore, in such cases, there is no place for *equivocation*. But in cases where it becomes necessary to an individual for his defence, or for avoiding any injustice or loss, or for obtaining any important advantage, without danger or mischief to any other person, then equivocation is lawful."¹

Dr. Johnson would not allow his servant to say he was not at home when he really was. "A servant's strict regard for truth," said he, "must be weakened by such a practice. A philosopher may know that it is merely a form of denial, but few servants are such nice distinguishers. If I accustom a servant to tell a lie for *me*, have I not reason to apprehend that he will tell many lies for *himself*?"²

There may be *equivocation* in sound as well as in sense. It is told that the queen of George III. asked one of the dignitaries of the church, if ladies might *knot* on Sunday? His reply was, Ladies may *not*; which, in so far as sound goes, is *equivocal*. — V. RESERVATION.

ERROR. — Knowledge being to be had only of visible certain truth, *error* is not a fault of our knowledge, but a mistake of our judgment, giving assent to that which is not true.³

"The true," said Bossuet, after Augustine, "is that which is, the false is that which is not." To *err* is to fail of attaining

¹ Jardine, *Gunpowder Plot*, p. 223.

² Boswell, *Letters*, p. 32.

³ Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, b. iv., c. 20.

ERROR —

to the true, which we do when we think that to be which is not—or think that not to be which is. *Error* is not in things themselves, but in the mind of him who *errs*, or judges not according to the truth.

Our faculties, when employed within their proper sphere, are fitted to give us the knowledge of truth. We *err* by a wrong use of them. The causes of *error* are partly in the objects of knowledge, and partly in ourselves. As it is only the true and real which exists, it is only the true and real which can reveal itself. But it may not reveal itself fully—and man, mistaking a part for the whole, or partial evidence for complete evidence, falls into *error*. Hence it is, that in all *error* there is some truth. To discover the relation which this partial truth bears to the whole truth, is to discover the origin of the *error*.

The causes in ourselves which lead to *error*, arise from wrong views of our faculties, and of the conditions under which they operate. Indolence, precipitation, passion, custom, authority, and education, may also contribute to lead us into *error*.¹—*V. FALSITY.*

ESOTERIC and EXOTERIC (*ἑσώτερος*, within; *ἑξώ*, without).

—"The philosophy of the Pythagoreans, like that of the other sects, was divided into the *exoteric* and the *esoteric*; the open, taught to all; and the secret, taught to a select number."²

According to Origen, Aulus Gellius, Porphyry, and Jamblichus, the distinction of *esoteric* and *exoteric* among the Pythagoreans was applied to the disciples—according to the degree of initiation to which they had attained, being fully admitted into the society, or being merely postulants.³

Plato is said to have had doctrines which he taught publicly to all—and other doctrines which he taught only to a few, in secret. There is no allusion to such a distinc-

¹ Bacon, *Novum Organum*, lib. i.; Malebranche, *Recherche de la Vérité*; Descartes, *On Method*; Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, b. vi., c. 20.

² Warburton, *Div. Leg.*, book ii., note 22.

³ Ritter, *Hist. de Philosophie*, tom. i., p. 298, of French translation.

ESOTERIC—

tion of doctrines in the writings of Plato. Aristotle¹ speaks of opinions of Plato which were not written. But it does not follow that these were secret—'Ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις ἀγγράφαις δόγμασιν. They may have been oral.

Aristotle himself frequently speaks of some of his writings as *exoteric*; and others as *acroamatic*, or *esoteric*. The former treat of the same subjects as the latter, but in a popular and elementary way; while the *esoteric* are more scientific in their form and matter.²—V. ACROAMATICAL.

ESSENCE (*essentia*, from *essens*, the old participle of *esse*, to be—introduced into the Latin tongue by Cicero).

"*Sicut ab eo quod est sapere, vocatur sapientia; sic ab eo quod est esse, vocatur essentia.*"—Augustine.³

"*Totum illud per quod res est, et est id quod est.*"—Chauvin.⁴

"*Essence may be taken for the very being of anything, whereby it is what it is.*"⁵

Mr. Locke distinguishes the *real* and the *nominal essence*. The nominal essence depends upon the real essence; thus the *nominal* essence of gold, is that complex idea which the word "gold" represents; viz., "a body yellow, heavy, malleable, fusible, and fixed;" but its *real* essence is the constitution of its insensible parts, on which these qualities and all its other properties depend, which is wholly unknown to us.

"The *essence* of things is made up of that common nature wherein it is founded, and of that distinctive nature by which it is formed. This latter is commonly understood when we speak of the formality or *formalis ratio* (the formal consideration) of things; and it is looked upon as being more peculiarly the *essence* of things, though 'tis certain that a triangle is as truly made up in part of figure, its common nature, as of the three lines and angles, which are distinctive and peculiar to it.

¹ *Phys.*, lib. iv., c. 2.

² Ravaisson, *Essai sur la Métaphysique d'Aristote*, tom. i., c. 1; Tucker, *Light of Nature*, vol. ii., chap. 2.

³ *De Civ.*, lib. xii., c. 11.

⁴ *Lexicon Philosoph.*

⁵ Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book iii., chap. 3, sect. 15.

ESSENCE—

"The *essence* of a thing most properly and strictly is, what does first and fundamentally constitute that thing, and that only is strictly essential which is either the whole or some part of the constituent *essence*; as, in man to be a living creature, or to be capable of religion; his being capable of celestial happiness, may be called essential in the way of consequence, or consecutively, not constitutively."¹

"Whatever makes a thing to be what it is, is properly called its *essence*. Self-consciousness, therefore, is the *essence* of the mind, because it is in virtue of self-consciousness that the mind is the mind—that a man is himself."²

"All those properties or qualities, without which a thing could not exist, or without which it would be entirely altered, make up what is called the *essence* of a thing. Three lines joining are the *essence* of a triangle; if one is removed, what remains is no longer a triangle."³

The essential attributes, *faciunt esse entia*, cause things to be what they are.

The Greeks had but one word for *essence* and substance, viz., *οὐσία*. The word *ὑπόστασις* was latterly introduced. By Aristotle *οὐσία* was applied—1. To the *form*, or those qualities which constitute the specific nature of every being. 2. To the *matter*, in which those qualities manifest themselves to us—the substratum or subject (*ὑποκείμενον*). 3. To the concrete or individual being (*σύνολον*), constituted by the union of the two preceding.

In the scholastic philosophy a distinction began to be established between *essence* and *substance*. *Substance* was applied to the abstract notion of matter—the undetermined subject or substratum of all possible forms, *τὸ ὑποκείμενον*; *Essence* to the qualities expressed in the definition of a thing, or those ideas which represent the genus and species. Descartes⁴ defined *substance* as "that which exists so that it needs nothing but itself to exist"—a definition applicable to deity only. *Essence* he stripped of its logical signification, and made it

¹ Oldfield, *Essay on Reason*, p. 184.

² Ferrier, *Inst. of Metaphys.*, p. 246.

³ Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

⁴ *Princip. Philosoph.*, pars. 4, sect. 1.

ESSENCE—

the foundation of all those qualities and modes which we perceive in matter. Among the attributes of every substance there is one only which deserves the name of *essence*, and on which the others depend as modifications—as extension, in matter, and thought, in mind. He thus identified *essence* and *substance*. But extension supposes something extended, and thought something that thinks. With Leibnitz *essence* and *substance* were the same, viz., force or power.

Essence is analogically applied to things having no real existence, and then it retains its logical sense and expresses the qualities or ideas which should enter into the definition; as when we speak of the essence of an equilateral triangle being three equal sides and three equal angles. This is the only sense in which Kant recognizes the word. In popular language *essence* is used to denote the nature of a thing.

ETERNITY is a negative idea expressed by a positive term. It supposes a present existence, and denies a beginning or an end of that existence. Hence the schoolmen spoke of *eternity*, *a parte ante*, and *a parte post*. The *Scotists* maintained that *eternity* is made up of successive parts, which drop, so to speak, one from another. The *Thomists* held that it is simple duration, excluding the past and the future. Plato said, time is the moving shadow of *eternity*. The common symbol of *eternity* is a circle. It may be doubted how far it is competent to the human mind to compass in thought the idea of absolute beginning, or the idea of absolute ending.

On man's conception of *eternity*, see an *Examination of Mr. Maurice's Theory of a Fixed State out of Time*. By Mr. Mansel.

"What is *eternity*? can aught
Paint its duration to the thought?
Tell all the sand the ocean laves,
Tell all its changes, all its waves,
Or, tell with more laborious pains,
The drops its mighty mass contains
Be this astonishing account
Augmented with the full amount
Of all the drops that clouds have shed,
Where'er their wat'ry fleeces spread,
Through all time's long protracted tour,
From Adam to the present hour;—

ETERNITY—

Still short the sum, nor can it vie
 With the more numerous years that lie
 Embosomed in *eternity*.
 Attend, O man, with awe divine,
 For this *eternity* is thine." — Gibbons.

ETERNITY (OF GOD). — *Deus non est duratio vel spatium, sed durat et adest.* This scholium of Sir Isaac Newton contains the germ of Dr. Clarke's *Demonstration of the Being of God*. Time and space are qualities, and imply a substance. The ideas of time and space necessarily force themselves upon our minds. We cannot think of them as not existing. And as we think of them as infinite, they are the infinite qualities of an infinite substance, that is, of God, necessarily existing.

ETHICS "extend to the investigation of those principles by which moral men are governed; they explore the nature and excellence of virtue, the nature of moral obligation, on what it is founded, and what are the proper motives of practice; *moral-ity* in the more common acceptation, though not exclusively, relates to the practical and obligatory part of *ethics*. *Ethics* principally regard the theory of morals."¹

Aristotle² says that *ἠθικός*, which signifies moral virtue, is derived from *ἔθος*, custom; since it is by repeated acts that virtue, which is a moral habit, is acquired. Cicero³ says, *Quia pertinet ad mores, quod ἠθικός illi vocant, nos eam partem philosophiæ, De moribus, appellare solemus: sed decet augentem linguam Latinam nominare Moralem.* *Ethics* is thus made synonymous with *morals* or *moral philosophy* — *q. v.*

Ethics taken in its widest signification, as including the moral sciences or natural jurisprudence, may be divided into—

1. Moral Philosophy, or the science of the relations, rights, and duties, by which men are under obligation towards God, themselves, and their fellow-creatures.
2. The Law of Nations, or the science of those laws by which all nations, as constituting the universal society of the human race, are bound in their mutual relations to one another.
3. Public or Political Law, or the science of the relations between the different ranks in society.

¹ Cogan, *Ethic. Treat. on Passions*, Introd.

² *Eth.*, lib. 2.

De Fato, cap. 1.

ETHICS —

4. Civil Law, or the science of those laws, rights, and duties, by which individuals in civil society are bound,—as commercial, criminal, judicial, Roman, or modern.

5. History, Profane, Civil, and Political.'

ETHNOGRAPHY (ἔθνος and γράφειν), and **ETHNOLOGY** bear the same relation almost to one another as *geology* and *geography*. While *ethnography* contents herself with the mere description and classification of the races of man, *ethnology*, or the science of races, "investigates the mental and physical differences of mankind, and the organic laws upon which they depend; seeks to deduce from these investigations principles of human guidance, in all the important relations of social and national existence."

"*Ethnology* treats of the different races into which the human family is subdivided, and indicates the bonds which bind them all together."²

ETHOLOGY (ἦθος, or ἔθος, and λόγος), is a word coming to be used in philosophy. Sir William Hamilton has said that Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is the best *ethology* extant, meaning that it contains the best account of the passions and feelings of the human heart, and of the means of awakening and interesting them so as to produce persuasion or action. Mr. Mill³ calls *ethology* the science of the formation of character.

EUDEMONISM (εὐδαιμονία, happiness), is a term applied by German philosophers to that system of morality which places the foundation of virtue in the production of happiness.⁴

This name, or rather *Hedonism*, may be applied to the system of Chrysippus and Epicurus.

EURETIC or **EURISTIC**.—V. OSTENSIVE.

EVIDENCE (*e* and *video*, to see, to make see).—"Evidence signifies that which demonstrates, makes clear, or ascertains the truth of the very fact or point in issue, either on the one side or the other."⁵

¹ Peemans, *Introd. ad Philosoph.*, p. 96.

² Donaldson, *New Cratylus*, p. 12. *Ethnological Journal*, June 1, 1843; *Edin. Rev.*, Oct., 1844.

³ *Log.*, book vi., chap. 5.

⁴ Whewell, *Pref. to Mackintosh's Dissert.*, p. 20.

⁵ Blackstone, *Comment.*, b. iii., c. 23.

EVIDENCE—

Evidence is the ground or reason of knowledge. It is the light by which the mind apprehends things presented to it. *Fulgor quidam mentis assensum rapiens.*

In an act of knowledge there is the object or thing known, and the subject or person knowing. Between the faculties of the person knowing and the qualities of the thing known, there is some proportion or relation. The qualities manifest themselves to the faculties, and the result is knowledge; or the thing is made evident—that is, it not only exists, but is revealed as existing.

There are as many kinds of evidence as there are powers or faculties by which we attain to truth. But according as truth may be attained, more or less directly, *evidence* is distinguished into *intuitive* and *deductive*.

Intuitive evidence comprehends all *first truths*, or *principles of common sense*, as, “every change implies the operation of a cause”—*axioms*, in science, as, “things equal to the same thing are equal to one another”—and the evidence of *consciousness*, whether by sense, or memory, or thought, as when we touch, or remember, or know, or feel anything. *Evidence* of this kind arises directly from the presence or contemplation of the object, and gives knowledge without any effort upon our parts.

Deductive evidence is distinguished as *demonstrative* and *probable*.

Demonstrative evidence rests upon *axioms*, or *first truths*, and from which, by *ratiocination*, we attain to other truths. It is scientific, and leads to certainty. It admits not of degrees; and it is impossible to conceive the contrary of the truth which it establishes.

Probable evidence has reference, not to necessary, but contingent truth. It admits of degrees, and is derived from various sources; the principal are the following, viz.:—*Experience*, *Analogy*, and *Testimony*—q. v.¹

¹ Glanville, *Essay on Principles of Evidence*, 8vo, Edin., 1820; Campbell, *Philosophy of Rhetoric*, book I.; Gambler, *On Moral Evidence*, 8vo, Lond., 1824; Smedley, *Moral Evidence*, 8vo, Lond., 1860; Butler, *Analogy*, Intro.; Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understanding*, book iv., chap. 15.

EVIL is the negation or contrary of good.—“That which hath in it a fitness to promote its own preservation or well-being, is called good. And, on the contrary, that which is apt to hinder it, is called *evil*.”¹

“Every man calleth that which *pleaseth*, and is delightful to himself, good; and that *evil* which *displeaseth* him.”²

Pleasure is *fit* for, or *agreeable* to, the nature of a sensible being, or a *natural good*; pain is *unfit*, or is a *natural evil*.

“The voluntary *application* of this natural good and *evil* to any *rational* being, or the production of it by a rational being, is *moral good and evil*.”³

“*Metaphysical evil* consists simply in imperfection, *physical evil* in suffering, and *moral evil* in sin.”⁴

“*Evil* does not proceed from a *principle of evil*. Cold does not proceed from a *principle of coldness*, nor darkness from a *principle of darkness*. *Evil* is mere privation.”⁵

Evil is not a generation, but a degeneration; and as Augustine often expresses it, it has not an efficient, but only a deficient cause.⁶

Metaphysical evil is the absence or defect of powers and capacities, and the consequent want of the higher enjoyment which might have flowed from the full and perfect possession of them. It arises from the necessarily limited nature of all created beings.

Physical evil consists in pain and suffering. It seems to be necessary as the contrast and heightener of pleasure or enjoyment, and is in many ways productive of good.

Moral evil originates in the will of man, who could not have been capable of moral good without being liable to moral evil, a power to do right being, *ex necessitate rei*, a power to do wrong.

The question concerning the *origin of evil* has been answered by—1. The doctrine of pre-existence, or that the *evils* we are here suffering are the punishments or expiations of moral delinquencies in a former state of existence. 2. The doctrine of the Manicheans which supposes two co-eternal and inde-

Wilkins, *Nat. Relig.*, book 1.

² Hobbes, *Hum. Nat.*, chap. 7.

King, *Essay on Origin of Evil*, translated by Law, chap. 1, sect. 3, notes, p. 38, fifth

ed.

Leibnitz, *On Goodness of God*, part 1, sect. 31.

³ Part 2, sect. 153.

De Civ. Dei, l. 17, c. 7.

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pendent agencies, the one the author of good, and the other of *evil*. 3. The doctrine of optimism, or, that *evil* is part of a system conducted by Almighty power, under the direction of infinite wisdom and goodness.¹

On the origin of *evil*, its nature, extent, uses, &c., see Plato, Cicero, and Seneca, Malebranche and Fenelon, Clarke and Leibnitz, Bledsoe, *Theodicy*; Young, *Mystery*; King, J. Müller.

EXAMPLE. — V. ANALOGY.

EXCLUDED MIDDLE. — *Principium exclusi medii inter duo contradictorius.* — “By the principle of ‘Contradiction’ we are forbidden to think that two contradictory attributes can both be present in the same object; by the principle of ‘Excluded Middle’ we are forbidden to think that both can be absent. The first tells us that both differentiæ must be compatible with the genus: I cannot, for example, divide animal into animate and inanimate. The second tells us that one or the other must be found in every member of the genus; but in what manner this is actually carried out, whether by every existing member possessing one of the differentiæ and none of the other, or by some possessing one and some the other, experience alone can determine.”²

The formula of this principle is — “Everything is either A or not A: everything is either a given thing, or something which is not that given thing.” That there is no mean between two contradictory propositions is proved by Aristotle.³ “So that if we think a judgment true, we must abandon its contradictory; if false, the contradictory must be accepted.”⁴

EXISTENCE (*exsisto*, to stand out). — “The metaphysicians look upon *existence* as the formal and actual part of a being.”⁵

It has been called the *actus entitativus*, or that by which anything has its essence actually constituted in the nature of things.

Essence pertains to the question, *Quid est?*

Existence pertains to the question, *An est?*

¹ Stewart, *Act. and Mor. Pow.*, b. III, c. 3, sect. 1.

² Mansel, *Prolegom.*, *Log.*, p. 193.

³ *Metaphys.*, book III, ch. 7.

⁴ Thomson, *Laws of Thought*, p. 205.

⁵ H. More, *Antid. agt. Atheism*, app. s. 44.

EXISTENCE—

Essence *formal*, combined with essence *substantial*, gives *existence*; for *existence* is essence clothed with form.¹

Existence is the actuality of essence. It is the act by which the essences of things are actually in *rerum natura*—beyond their causes. Before things are produced by their causes, they are said to be in the objective power of their causes; but when produced they are beyond their causes, and are actually in *rerum natura*—as maggots before they are warmed into life by heat of the sun.

Existencia est unio realis, sive actualis conjunctio partium sive attributorum quibus ens constat. . . . Existencia dicitur quasi rei extra causas et nihilum sistencia."²

Existence and Essence.—*Incaute sibi finxerunt quidam, "Essentias quasdam easque eternas, fuisse sine existentia;" si quando autem subnascatur Res istiusmodi ideæ similis, tunc censent existentiam essentiæ supervenientem, veram rem efficere, sive ens reale. Atque hinc, essentiam et existentiam dixerunt essendi principia, sive entis constitutiva. Quicquid vero essentiam habet veram, eodem tempore habet existentiam, eodem sensu quo habet essentiam, aut quo est ens, aut aliquid.*"³

"*Essence*, in relation to God, must involve a *necessary existence*; for we cannot in any measure duly conceive *what he is*, without conceiving *that he is*, and, indeed, *cannot but be*. The name he takes to himself is *I am* (or, *I will be*). This is the contraction of that larger name, *I am what I am* (or, *I will be what I will be*), which may seem closely to conjoin God's unquestionable *necessary existence* with his unsearchable, boundless *essence*."⁴

EXOTERIC.—*V. ESOTERIC.*

EXPEDIENCY (Doctrine of).—Paley has said, "Whatever is expedient is right."—*V. UTILITY (Doctrine of).*

EXPERIENCE (*ἐμπειρία, experientia*).—According to Aristotle,⁵ from sense comes memory, but from repeated remembrance of the same thing we get *experience*.

¹ Tilberghien, *Essai des Omniais. Hum.*, p. 739, note.

² Peemans, *Introd. ad Philosoph.*, 12mo, Lovan, 1846. p. 45.

³ Hutcheson, *Metaphys.*, p. 4.

⁴ Oldfield, *Essay on Reason*, p. 48. See art. "Existence," in *French Encyclopédie*, by Mons. Turgot.

⁵ *Analyt. Poster.*, II., 19.

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Wolf¹ used *experience* as co-extensive with the contents of consciousness, to include all of which the mind is conscious, as agent or patient, all that it does from within, as well as all that it suffers from without. "*Experiri dicimur, quicquid ad perceptiones nostras attentim cognoscimus. Solem lucere, cognoscimus ad ea attentim, quæ visu percipimus. Unde experientia constare dicitur, quod sol luceat. Similiter ad nosmet ipsos attentim cognoscimus, nos non posse assensum præbere contradictoriis, v. g. non posse sumere tanquam verum, quod simul pluit et non pluit.*"

"*Experience*, in its strict sense, applies to what has occurred within a person's own knowledge. *Experience*, in this sense of course, relates to the *past* alone. Thus it is that a man knows by *experience* what sufferings he has undergone in some disease; or what height the tide reached at a certain time and place. More frequently the word is used to denote that judgment which is derived from *experience in the primary sense*, by reasoning from that in combination with other data. Thus a man may assert, on the ground of *experience*, that he was cured of a disorder by such a medicine—that that medicine is generally beneficial in that disorder; that the tide may always be expected, under such circumstances, to rise to such a height. Strictly speaking, none of these can be known *by experience*, but are conclusions *from experience*. It is in this sense only that *experience* can be applied to the *future*, or, which comes to the same thing, to any *general fact*; as, *e. g.*, when it is said that we know *by experience* that water exposed to a certain temperature will freeze."

Mr. Locke² has assigned *experience* as the only and universal source of human knowledge. "Whence hath the mind all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from *experience*; in that, all our knowledge is founded, and from that ultimately derives itself. Our observation, employed either about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds, perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understanding with all the materials of thinking. These are the

¹ *Philosoph. Rat.*, sect. 664.

² *Wlately, Log.*, app. I.

³ *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., chap. .

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fountains of knowledge from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring—that is, sensation and reflection.”

In opposition to this view, according to which all human knowledge is *à posteriori*, or the result of *experience*, it is contended that man has knowledge *à priori*—knowledge which *experience* neither does nor can give, and knowledge without which there could be no *experience*—inasmuch as all the generalizations of *experience* proceed and rest upon it.

“*No accumulation of experiments whatever can bring a general law home to the mind of man; because if we rest upon experiments, our conclusion can never logically pass beyond the bounds of our premises; we can never infer more than we have proved; and all the past, which we have not seen, and the future, which we cannot see, is still left open, in which new experiences may arise to overturn the present theory. And yet the child will believe at once upon a single¹ experiment. Why? Because a hand divine has implanted in him the tendency to generalize thus rapidly. Because he does it by an instinct, of which he can give no account, except that he is so formed by his Maker.*”²

“We may have seen one circle, and investigated its properties, but why, when our individual *experience* is so circumscribed, do we assume the same relations of all? Simply because the understanding has the conviction intuitively that similar objects will have similar properties; it does not acquire this idea by sensation or custom; the mind develops it by its own intrinsic force—it is a law of our faculties, ultimate and universal, from which all reasoning proceeds.”³

Experience, more especially in physical philosophy, is either active or passive, that is, it is constituted by observation and experiment.

“*Observationes fiunt spectando id quod natura per seipsam sponte exhibet. Experimenta fiunt ponendo naturam in eas circumstantias, in quibus debeat agere, et nobis ostendere id quod quærimus.*”⁴

¹ As having been once burnt by fire.

² Sewell, *Christ. Mor.*, chap. 24.

³ Dr. Mill, *Essays*, p. 337.

⁴ Boecoviah, Note to Stay's Poem, *De Systematice*.

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These are more fully explained and characterized in the following passage from Sir John Herschel.¹

"The great, and indeed the only ultimate source of our knowledge of nature and its laws is *experience*; by which we mean not the *experience* of one man only, or of one generation, but the accumulated *experience* of all mankind in all ages, registered in books, or recorded by tradition. But *experience* may be acquired in two ways: either, first, by noticing facts as they occur, without any attempt to influence the frequency of their occurrence, or to vary the circumstances under which they occur; this is *observation*: or, secondly, by putting in action causes and agents over which we have control, and purposely varying their combinations, and noticing what effects take place; this is *experiment*. To these two sources we must look as the fountains of all natural science. It is not intended, however, by thus distinguishing *observation* from *experiment*, to place them in any kind of contrast. Essentially they are much alike, and differ rather in degree than in kind; so that, perhaps, the terms *passive* and *active observation* might better express their distinction; but it is, nevertheless, highly important to mark the different states of mind in inquiries carried on by their respective aids, as well as their different effects in promoting the progress of science. In the former, we sit still and listen to a tale, told us, perhaps obscurely, piecemeal, and at long intervals of time, with our attention more or less awake. It is only by after rumination that we gather its full import; and often, when the opportunity is gone by, we have to regret that our attention was not more particularly directed to some point which, at the time, appeared of little moment, but of which we at length appreciate the importance. In the latter, on the other hand, we cross-examine our witness, and by comparing one part of his evidence with the other, while he is yet before us, and reasoning upon it in his presence, are enabled to put pointed and searching questions, the answer to which may at once enable us to make up our minds. Accordingly it has been found invariably, that in those departments of physics where the phenomena are beyond our control, or

¹ *On the Study of Nat. Phil., Lardner's Cyclop., No. xiv., p. 61.*

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into which experimental inquiry, from other causes, has not been carried, the progress of knowledge has been slow, uncertain, and irregular; while in such as admit of experiment, and in which mankind have agreed to its adoption, it has been rapid, sure, and steady." — *V. ANALOGY.*

EXPERIMENT. — V. OBSERVATION.

EXPERIMENTUM CRUCIS. — A crucial or decisive experiment in attempting to interpret the laws of nature; so called, by Bacon, from the crosses or way-posts used to point out roads, because they determine at once between two or more possible conclusions.

Bacon¹ says, "Crucial instances are of this kind; when in inquiry into any nature the intellect is put into a sort of equilibrium, so that it is uncertain to which of two, or sometimes more natures, the cause of the nature inquired into ought to be attributed or assigned, on account of the frequent and ordinary concurrence of more natures than one; the *instances of the cross* show that the union of the one nature with the nature sought for is faithful and indissoluble; while that of the other is varied and separable; whence the question is limited, and that first nature received as the cause, and the other sent off and rejected."

Sir G. Blane² notices that in chemistry a single experiment is conclusive, and the epithet *experimentum crucis* applied; because the crucible derives its name from the figure of the cross being stamped upon it.

A and B, two different causes, may produce a certain number of similar effects; find some effect which the one produces and the other does not, and this will point out, as the direction-post (*crux*), at a point where two highways meet, which of these causes may have been in operation in any particular instance. Thus, many of the symptoms of the Oriental plague are common to other diseases; but when the observer discovers the peculiar bubo or boil of the complaint, he has an *instantia crucis* which directs him immediately to its discovery.

"If all that the senses present to the mind is sensations, Berkeley must be right; but Berkeley assumed this premise

¹ *Nov. Org.*, book II., sect. 36.

² *Med. Log.*, p. 30.

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without any foundation or any proof of it. The size and shape of things are presented to us by our senses, yet every one knows that size and shape are not sensations.

"This I would therefore humbly propose as an *experimentum crucis*, by which the ideal system must stand or fall; and it brings the matter to a short issue. Extension, figure, and motion, may—any one or all of them—be taken for the subject of this experiment. Either they are ideas of sensation, or they are not. If any one of them can be shown to be an idea of sensation, or to have the least resemblance to any sensation, I lay my hand upon my mouth, and give up all pretence to reconcile reason to common sense in this matter, and must suffer the ideal scepticism to triumph."¹

"If, in a variety of cases presenting a general resemblance, whenever a certain circumstance is present, a certain effect follows, there is a strong probability that one is dependent on the other; but if you can also find a case where the circumstance is absent from the combination, and the effect also disappears, your conclusion has all the evidence in its favour of which it is susceptible. When a decisive trial can be made by leaving out, in this manner, the cause of which we wish to trace the effect, or by insulating any substances so as to exclude all agents but those we wish to operate, or in any other way, such a decisive trial receives the title of *experimentum crucis*. One of the most interesting on record is that of Dr. Franklin, by which he established the identity of lightning and the electricity of our common machines."²

EXTENSION (*extendo*, to stretch from).—"The notions acquired by the sense of touch, and by the movement of the body, compared with what is learnt by the eye, make up the idea expressed by the word *extension*."³

Extension is that property of matter by which it occupies space; it relates to the qualities of length, breadth, and thickness, without which no substance can exist; but has no respect to the size or shape of a body. Solidity is an essential quality of matter as well as *extension*. And it is from the

¹ Reid, *Inquiry into Hum. Mind*, ch. 5, sec. 7.

² S. Bailey, *Discourses*, Lond., 1852, p. 169.

³ Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

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resistance of a solid body, as the occasion, that we get the idea of *externality* — q. v.

According to the Cartesians, *extension* was the essence of matter. "*Sola igitur extensio corporis naturam constituit, quum illa omni solum semperque conveniat, adeo ut nihil in corpore prius percipere possumus.*"¹

Hobbes's views are given, *Phil. Prima.*²

Locke's views are given, in *Essay on Hum. Understand.*³

Extension (Logical), when predicated as belonging to a general term, means the number of objects included under it, and *comprehension* means the common characters belonging to such objects.

"I call the *comprehension* of an idea, those attributes which it involves in itself, and which cannot be taken away from it without destroying it; as the *comprehension* of the idea triangle includes extension, figure, three lines, three angles, and the equality of these three angles to two right angles, &c.

"I call the *extension* of an idea those subjects to which that idea applies, which are also called the inferiors of a general term, which, in relation to them, is called superior, as the idea of triangle in general extends to all the different sorts of triangles."⁴

We cannot detach any properties from a notion without extending the list of objects to which it is applied. Thus, if we abstract from a rose its essential qualities, attending only to those which it connotes as a plant, we *extend* its application, before limited to flowers with red petals, to the oak, fir, &c. But as we narrow the sphere of a notion, the qualities which it *comprehends* proportionally increase. If we restrict the term body to animal, we include life and sensation—if to man, it *comprehends* reason.

Thus emerges the law of the inverse ratio between the extension of common terms and their comprehension, viz., the greater the *extension* the less the *comprehension*, and *vice versa*.

¹ Le Grand, *Inst. Philosoph.*, pars iv., p. 152.

² Pars ii., c. 8, sect. 1.

³ B. II., chap. 13, see also chap. 15; Reid, *Inquiry*, c. 5, sect. 5, 6; *Intellect. Pow.*, *running* H., c. 19.

⁴ *Port. Roy. Logic*, part i. chap. 6.

EXTERNALITY or OUTNESS. -- "Pressure or resistance necessarily supposes *externality* in the thing which presses or resists."¹

"Distance or *outness* is neither immediately of itself perceived by sight, nor yet apprehended or judged of by lines and angles, but is only *suggested* to our thoughts," &c.²—*V. PERCEPTION.*

FABLE. -- "The word *fable* is at present generally limited to those fictions in which the resemblance to the matter in question is not direct but analogical."³

Fable and *Myth* were at one time synonyms. "*Fables of Æsop and other eminent mythologists,*" by Sir R. L'Estrange.⁴ — *V. APOLOGUE.*

FACT. -- "Whatever really exists, whether necessarily or relatively, may be called a *fact*. A statement concerning a number of *facts*, is called a doctrine (when it is considered *absolutely* as a truth), and a law (when it is considered *relatively* to an intelligence ordaining or receiving it)."⁵

By a *matter of fact*, in ordinary usage, is meant something which might, *conceivably*, be submitted to the *senses*; and about which it is supposed there could be no disagreement among persons who should be *present*, and to whose senses it should be submitted; and by a *matter of opinion* is understood anything respecting which an exercise of *judgment* would be called for on the part of those who should have certain objects before them, and who might conceivably disagree in their judgment thereupon."⁶ — *V. OPINION.*

"By a *matter of fact*, I understand anything of which we obtain a conviction from our internal consciousness, or any individual event or phenomenon which is the object of sensation."⁷

It is thus opposed to *matter of inference*. Thus, the destruc-

¹ Adam Smith, *On the Senses*.

² Berkeley, *Principles of Knowledge*, part I., sect. 43.

³ Whately, *Rhet.*, part I., ch. 2, § 8.

⁴ Fol., Lond., 1704.

⁵ Irons, *On Final Causes*, p. 48.

⁶ Whately, *Rhet.*, pt. I., ch. 2, § 4

⁷ Sir G. O. Lewis, *Essay on Influence of Authority*, pp. 1-4.

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tiveness of cholera is *matter of fact*, the mode of its propagation is *matter of inference*. *Matter of fact* also denotes what is certain, as opposed to *matter of doubt*. The existence of God is *matter of fact*, though ascertained by reasoning.

"The distinction of *fact* and *theory* is only relative. Events and phenomena considered as particulars which may be colligated by induction, are *facts*; considered as generalities already obtained by colligation of other *facts*, they are *theories*. The same event or phenomenon is a *fact* or a *theory*, according as it is considered as standing on one side or the other of the inductive bracket."¹

"Theories which are true, are *facts*."²—V. OPINION.

FACTITIOUS (*factito*, to practise), is applied to what is the result of use or art, in distinction to what is the product of nature. Mineral waters made in imitation of the natural springs are called *factitious*.

*Cupiditas aliorum existimationis non est factitia sed nobis congenita; deprehenditur enim et in infantibus qui, etiam ante reflectionis usum, molestia afficiuntur, quum parvi a ceteris penduntur.*³

"It is enough that we have moral ideas, however obtained; whether by original constitution of our nature, or *factitiously*, makes no difference."⁴

"To Mr. Locke, the writings of Hobbes suggested much of the sophistry displayed in the first book of his essay on the *factitious* nature of our moral principles."⁵

FACULTY.—*Facultates sunt aut quibus facilius fit, aut sine quibus omnino confici non potest.*⁶

*Facultas est quælibet vis activa, seu virtus, seu potestas. Solet etiam vocari potentia, verum tunc intelligenda est potentia activa, seu habilitas ad agendum.*⁷

"The word *faculty* is most properly applied to those powers of the mind which are original and natural, and which make part of the constitution of the mind."⁸

¹ Whewell, *Philosoph. Induct. Sciences*, aphorism 23.

² Ibid., *On Induction*, p. 23.

³ N. Lacoudre, *Inst. Philosoph.*, tom. III., p. 21

⁴ Hampden, *Introd. to Mor. Philosoph.*, p. 13.

⁵ Stewart, *Prelim. Dissert.*, p. 64

⁶ Cicero, *De Invent.*, lib. II., 40

⁷ Chauvin, *Lexicon Philosoph.*

⁸ Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay 1, chap. 1.

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A *faculty* is the natural power by which phenomena are produced by a person that is an agent, who can direct and concentrate the power which he possesses.¹

Bodies have the *property* of being put in motion, or of being melted. The magnet has an attractive *power*. Plants have a medical *virtue*. But instead of blind and fatal activity, let the being who has power be conscious of it, and be able to exercise and regulate it; this is what is meant by *faculty*. It implies intelligence and freedom. It is personality which gives the character of *faculties* to those natural powers which belong to us.²

"The *faculties* of the mind and its *powers*," says Dr. Reid, "are often used as synonymous expressions. But," continues he, "as most synonyms have some minute distinction that deserves notice, I apprehend that the word *faculty* is most properly applied to those powers of the mind which are original and natural, and which make part of the constitution of the mind. There are other powers which are acquired by use, exercise, or study, which are not called *faculties*, but *habits*. There must be something in the constitution of the mind necessary to our being able to acquire *habits*, and this is commonly called *capacity*."

Such are the distinct meanings which Dr. Reid would assign to these words, and these meanings are in accordance both with their philosophical and more familiar use. The distinction between *power* and *faculty* is, that *faculty* is more properly applied to what is natural and original, in opposition or contrast to what is acquired. We say the *faculty* of judging, but the *power* of habit. But, as all our faculties are powers, we can apply the latter term equally to what is original and to what is acquired. And we can say, with equal propriety, the *power* of judging and the *power* of habit. The acquiring of habits is peculiar to man: at least the inferior animals do so to a very limited extent. There must, therefore, be something in the constitution of the human mind upon which the acquiring of habits depends. This, says Dr. Reid, is called a *capacity*. The capacity is natural, the habit is acquired. Dr. Reid did

Jouffroy, *Mélanges*, Bruxell, 1834, p. 249.

² *Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*

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not recognize the distinction between active and passive power. But a capacity is a passive power. The term is applied to those manifestations of mind in which it is generally regarded as passive, or as affected or acted on by something external to itself. Thus, we say a man is *capable* of gratitude, or love, or grief, or joy. We speak also of the *capacity* of acquiring knowledge. Now, in these forms of expression, the mind is considered as the passive recipient of certain affections or impressions coming upon it. Taking into account the distinction of powers as active and passive, "these terms," says Sir Wm. Hamilton,¹ "stand in the following relations. *Powers* are *active* and *passive*, *natural* and *acquired*. Powers natural and active are called *faculties*. Powers natural and passive, *capacities* or *receptivities*. Powers acquired are *habits*, and habit is used both in an active and passive sense. The power, again, of acquiring a habit is called a disposition." This is quite in accordance with the explanations of Dr. Reid, only that instead of disposition he employs the term capacity, to denote that on which the acquiring of habits is founded. Disposition is employed by Dr. Reid to denote one of the active principles of our nature.

One great end and aim of philosophy is to reduce facts and phenomena to general heads and laws. The philosophy of mind, therefore, endeavours to arrange and classify the operations of mind according to the general circumstances under which they are observed. Thus we find that the mind frequently exerts itself in acquiring a knowledge of the objects around it by means of the bodily senses. These operations vary according to the sense employed, and according to the object presented. But in smelling, tasting, and touching, and in all its operations by means of the senses, the mind comes to the knowledge of some object different from itself. This general fact is denoted by the term perception; and we say that the mind, as manifested in these operations, has the *power* or *faculty* of perception. The knowledge which the mind thus acquires can be recalled or reproduced, and this is an operation which the mind delights to perform, both from the pleasure which it feels in reviving objects of former knowledge and the

¹ *Reid's Works*, p. 221.

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benefit which results from reflecting upon them. But the recalling or reproducing objects of former knowledge is an act altogether different from the act of originally obtaining it. It implies the possession of a peculiar power to perform it. And hence we ascribe to the mind a power of recollection or a *faculty* of memory. A perception is quite distinct from a recollection. In the one we acquire knowledge which is new to us—in the other we reproduce knowledge which we already possess.

In the operations of recollection or memory it is often necessary that the mind exert itself to exclude some objects which present themselves, and to introduce others which do not at first appear. In such cases the mind does so by an act of resolving or determining, by a volition. Now, a volition is altogether different from a cognition. To know is one thing, to will is quite another thing. Hence it is that we assign these different acts to different powers, and say that the mind has a power of understanding, and also a power of willing. The power of understanding may exert itself in different ways, and although the end and result of all its operations be knowledge, the different ways in which knowledge is acquired or improved may be assigned, as we have seen they are, to different powers or *faculties*—but these are all considered as powers of understanding. In like manner the power of willing or determining may be exerted under different conditions, and, for the sake of distinctness, these may be denoted by different terms; but still they are included in one class, and called powers of the will.

Before the will is exerted we are in a state of pleasure or pain, and the act of will has for its end to continue that state or to terminate it. The pleasures and the pains of which we are susceptible are numerous and varied, but the power or capacity of being affected by them is denoted by the term sensibility or feeling. And we are said not only to have powers of understanding and will, but powers of sensibility.

When we speak, therefore, of a power or *faculty* of the mind, we mean that certain operations of mind have been observed, and classified according to the conditions and circumstances under which they manifest themselves, and that distinct names have been given to these classes of phenomena, to mark what

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is peculiar in the act or operation, and consequently in the power or *faculty* to which they are referred. But when we thus classify the operations of the mind, and assign them to different powers, we are not to suppose that we divide the mind into different compartments, of which each has a different energy. The energy is the same in one and all of the operations. It is the same mind acting according to different conditions and laws. The energy is one and indivisible. It is only the manifestations of it that we arrange and classify.

This is well put by the famous Alcuin, who was the friend and adviser of Charlemagne, in the following passage, which is translated from his work *De Ratione Animæ*:—"The soul bears divers names according to the nature of its operations; inasmuch as it lives and makes live, it is the soul (*anima*); inasmuch as it contemplates, it is the spirit (*spiritus*); inasmuch as it feels, it is sentiment (*sensus*); since it reflects, it is thought (*animus*); as it comprehends, intelligence (*mens*); inasmuch as it discerns, reason (*ratio*); as it consents, will (*voluntas*); as it recollects, memory (*memoria*). But these things are not divided in substance as in name, for all this is the soul, and one soul only."

Faculties of the Mind (Classification of).—The faculties of the human mind were formerly distinguished as gnostic or cognitive, and orectic or appetent. They have also been regarded as belonging to the understanding or to the will, and have been designated as intellectual or active. A threefold classification of them is now generally adopted, and they are reduced to the heads of intellect or cognition, of sensitivity or feeling, and of activity or will. Under each of these heads, again, it is common to speak of several subordinate *faculties*.

"This way of speaking of *faculties* has misled many into a confused notion of so many distinct agents in us, which had their several provinces and authorities, and did command, obey, and perform several actions, as so many distinct beings: which has been no small occasion of wrangling, obscurity, and uncertainty, in questions relating to them."¹

Dr. Brown,² instead of ascribing so many distinct *faculties* to

¹ Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book II., chap. 21, § 17, 20.

² Lecture xvi.

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the mind, which is one, would speak of it as in different *states*, or under different *affections*.—V. OPERATIONS OF THE MIND.

“Les divers facultés que l’on considère dans l’âme, ne sont point des choses distinctes réellement, mais le même être différemment considéré.”¹

“Quoique nous donnions à ces facultés des noms différents, par rapport à leur diverses opérations, cela ne nous oblige pas à les regarder comme des choses différentes, car l’entendement n’est autre chose que l’âme, en tant qu’elle retient et se ressouvient; la volonté n’est autre chose que l’âme, en tant qu’elle veut et qu’elle choisit. . . . De sorte qu’on peut entendre que toutes ces facultés ne sont, au fond, que le même âme, qui, reçoit divers noms, à cause de ses différentes opérations.”²

“*Man is sometimes in a predominant state of intelligence, sometimes in a predominant state of feeling, and sometimes in a predominant state of action and determination. To call these, however, separate faculties, is altogether beside the mark. No act of intelligence can be performed without the will, no act of determination without the intellect, and no act either of the one or the other without some amount of feeling being mingled in the process. Thus, whilst they each have their own distinctive characteristics, yet there is a perfect unity at the root.*”³

“I feel that there is no more reason for believing my mind to be made up of distinct entities, or attributes, or *faculties*, than that my foot is made up of walking and running. My mind, I firmly believe, thinks, and wills, and remembers, just as simply as my body walks, and runs, and rests.”⁴

“It would be well if, instead of speaking of ‘the powers (or *faculties*) of the mind’ (which causes misunderstanding), we adhered to the designation of the several ‘operations of one mind;’ which most psychologists recommend, but in the sequel forget.”⁵

¹ Armand, *Des Vrais et des Fauxes Idées*, ch. 27.

² Bossuet, *Connaissances de Dieu*, ch. 2, art. 20.

³ Morell, *Psychology*, p. 61.

⁴ Irons, *Final Causes*, p. 98.

⁵ Feuchtersleben, *Medical Psychol.*, 8vo, 1847, p. 120.

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"The judgment is often spoken of as if it were a distinct power or *faculty* of the soul, differing from the imagination, the memory, &c., as the heart differs from the lungs, or the brain from the stomach. All that ought to be understood by these modes of expression is, that the mind sometimes compares objects or notions; sometimes joins together images; sometimes has the feeling of past time with an idea now present, &c."¹

"Notwithstanding we divide the soul into several powers and *faculties*, there is no such division in the soul itself, since it is the whole soul that remembers, understands, wills, or imagines. Our manner of considering the memory, understanding, will, imagination, and the like *faculties*, is for the better enabling us to express ourselves in such abstracted subjects of speculation, not that there is any such division in the soul itself."²

"The expression, 'man perceives, and remembers, and imagines, and reasons,' denotes all that is conveyed by the longer phrase, 'the mind of man has the *faculties* of perception, and memory, and imagination, and reasoning.'³

"Herbart rejects the whole theory of mental inherent *faculties* as chimerical, and has, in consequence, aimed some severe blows at the psychology of Kant. But, in fact, it is only the rational psychology which Kant exploded, which is open to this attack. It may be that in mental, as in physical mechanics, we know force only from its effects; but the consciousness of distinct effects will thus form the real basis of psychology. The *faculties* may then be retained as a convenient method of classification, provided the language is properly explained, and no more is attributed to them than is warranted by consciousness. The same consciousness which tells me that seeing is distinct from hearing, tells me also that volition is distinct from both; and to speak of the faculty of will does not necessarily imply more than the consciousness of a distinct class of mental phenomena."⁴

FAITH.—V. BELIEF.

¹ Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

² S. Bailey, *Lectures on Philosoph. Hum. Mind*, p. 13.

³ Mansel, *Prolegom. Log.*, p. 34, note.

⁴ *Spectator*, No. 600.

FALLACY (A) is an argument, or apparent argument, professing to decide the matter at issue, while it really does not. Fallacies have been arranged as *logical*, *semi-logical*, and *non-logical*. By Aristotle they were arranged in two classes—according as the *fallacy* lay in the *form*, in *dictione*; or in the *matter*, *extra dictionem*. The *fallacies*, in form or expression, are the following:—

Fallacia Æquivocationis, arising from the use of an equivocal word; as, the dog is an animal; Sirius is the dog; therefore, Sirius is an animal.

Fallacia Amphiboliæ, arising from doubtful construction; *quod tangitur a Socrate illud sentit; columna tangitur a Socrate; ergo columna sentit*. In the major proposition *sentit* means "Socrates feels." In the conclusion, it means "feels Socrates."

Fallacia Compositionis, when what is proposed, in a *divided* sense, is afterwards taken collectively; as, two and three are even and odd; five is two and three; therefore five is even and odd.

Fallacia Divisionis, when what is proposed in a *collective*, is afterwards taken in a divided sense; as, the planets are seven; Mercury and Venus are planets; therefore Mercury and Venus are seven.

Fallacia Accentus, when the same thing is predicated of different terms, if they be only written or pronounced in the same way; as, *Equus est quadrupes; Aristides est æquus; ergo Aristides est quadrupes*.

Fallacia Figuræ Dictionis, when, from any similitude between two words, what is granted of one is, by a forced application, predicated of another; as, projectors are unfit to be trusted; this man has formed a project; therefore, this man is unfit to be trusted.

Fallacies in the matter, or *extra dictionem*, according to some, are the only fallacies strictly logical; while, according to the formal school of logicians, they are beyond the province of logic altogether.

Fallacia Accidentis, when what is *accidental* is confounded with what is *essential*; as, we are forbidden to kill; using capital punishment is killing; we are forbidden to use capital punishment.

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Fallacia a Dicto Secundum quid ad Dictum Simpliciter, when a term is used, in one premiss, in a limited, and in the other in an unlimited sense; as, the Ethiopian is *white as to his teeth*; therefore he is *white*.

Fallacia Ignorationis Elenchi, an argument in which the point in dispute is intentionally or ignorantly overlooked, and the conclusion is irrelevant; as if any one, to show the inutility of the art of logic, should prove that men unacquainted with it have reasoned well.

Fallacia a non Causa pro Causa, is divided into *fallacia a non vera pro vera*, and *fallacia a non tali pro tali*; as, "a comet has appeared, therefore, there will be war." "What intoxicates should be prohibited. Wine intoxicates." Excess of it does.

Fallacia Consequentis, when that is inferred which does not logically follow; as, "he is an animal; therefore he is a man."

Fallacia Petitionis Principii (begging the question), when that is assumed for granted, which ought to have been proved; as, when a thing is proved *by itself* (called *petitio statim*), "he is a man, therefore, he is a man; or by a *synonym*; as, "a sabre is sharp, therefore a scimitar is;" or by *anything equally unknown*; as, Paradise was in Armenia, therefore, Gihon is an Asiatic river; or by *anything more unknown*; as, "this square is twice the size of this triangle, because equal to this circle;" or by *reasoning in a circle*, i. e., when the disputant tries to prove reciprocally conclusion from premises, and premises from conclusion; as, "fire is hot, therefore it burns;" and afterwards, "fire burns, therefore it is hot;" "the stars twinkle, therefore they are distant;" "the stars are distant, therefore they twinkle."

Fallacia Plurium Interrogationum, when two or more questions, requiring each a separate answer, are proposed as one, so that if *one* answer be given, it must be inapplicable to *one* of the particulars asked; as, "was Pisistratus the usurper and scourge of Athens?" The answer "no" would be false of the former particular, and "yes" would be false of the latter. The *fallacy* is overthrown by giving to each particular a *separate* reply.

FALSE, FALSITY.—The *false*, in one sense, applies to things; and there is *falsity* either when things really are not, or when it is impossible they can be; as when it is said that the proportion of the diagonal to the side of a square is commensurable, or that you sit—the one is absolutely *false*, the other accidentally—for in the one case and the other the fact affirmed is not.

The *false* is also predicated of things which really exist, but which appear other than they are, or what they are not; a portrait, or a dream. They have a kind of reality, but they really are not what they represent. Thus, we say that things are *false*, either because they do not absolutely exist, or because they are but appearances and not realities.

Falsity is opposed to verity or *truth*—*q. v.*

To transcendental truth, or *truth of being*, the opposite is *nonentity* rather than *falsity*. A thing that really is, is what it is. A thing that is not is a *nonentity*. *Falsity*, then, is two-fold—*objective* and *formal*. *Objective falsity* is when a thing resembles a thing which it really is not, or when a sign or proposition seems to represent or enunciate what it does not. *Formal falsity* belongs to the intellect when it fails to discover objectively *falsity*, and judges according to appearances rather than the reality and truth of things. *Formal falsity* is error; which is opposed to logical truth. To moral truth, the opposite is falsehood or lying.

FANCY (*φαντασία*).—“Imagination or *phantasy*, in its most extensive meaning, is the faculty *representative* of the phenomena both of the internal and external worlds.”¹

“In the soul
Are many lesser faculties, that serve
Reason as chief; among them *fancy* next
Her office holds; of all external things
Which the five watchful senses represent
She forms imaginations, airy shapes.”

Milton, *Paradise Lost*, book v.

“Where *fantasy*, near handmaid to the mind,
Sits and beholds, and doth discern them all;
Compounds in one things different in their kind,
Compares the black and white, the great and small.”

Sir John Davies, *Immortality*.

¹ Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note 2, sect. 1.

"When nature rests,
 Oft in her absence mimic *fancy* wakes
 To imitate her, but, misjoining shapes,
 Wild work produces oft, but most in dreams."

"Tell me where is *fancy* bred,
 Or in the heart, or in the head?
 How begot, how nourished?"

Merch. of Venice, act III., scene 2.

"Break, *Phantisie*, from thy cave of cloud,
 And wave thy purple wings,
 Now all thy figures are allowed,
 And various shapes of things.
 Create of airy forms a stream;
 It must have blood and nought of phlegm;
 And though it be a waking dream,
 Yet let it like an odour rise
 To all the senses here,
 And fall like sleep upon their eyes,
 Or music on their ear."—Ben Jonson.

"How various soever the pictures of *fancy*, the materials, according to some, are all derived from sense; so that the maxim—*Nihil est in intellectu nisi prius fuerit in sensu*—though not true of the intellect, holds with regard to the *phantasy*."¹

Addison² said that he used the words *imagination* and *fancy* indiscriminately.

Mr. Stewart³ said, "It is obvious that a creative imagination, when a person possesses it so habitually that it may be regarded as forming one characteristic of his genius, implies a power of summoning up at pleasure a particular class of ideas; and of ideas related to each other in a particular manner; which power can be the result only of certain habits of association, which the individual has acquired. It is to this power of the mind, which is evidently a particular turn of thought, and not one of the common principles of our nature," that Mr. Stewart would appropriate the name *fancy*. "The office of this power is to collect materials for the imagination; and therefore, the latter power presupposes the former, while the former does not necessarily suppose the latter. A man whose habits of association present to him, for illustrating or embellishing a subject, a number of resembling or

¹ Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, b. II., ch. 7.

² *Spectator*, No. 411.

³ *Elements*, chap. 5.

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analogous ideas, we call a man of *fancy*; but for an effort of imagination, various other powers are necessary, particularly the powers of taste and judgment; without which we can hope to produce nothing that will be a source of pleasure to others. It is the power of *fancy* which supplies the poet with metaphorical language, and with all the analogies which are the foundation of his allusions: but it is the power of imagination that creates the complex scenes he describes, and the fictitious characters he delineates. To *fancy* we apply the epithets of rich or luxuriant; to imagination, those of beautiful or sublime."

Fancy was called by Coleridge "the aggregative and associative power." But Wordsworth says, "To aggregate and to associate, to evoke and to combine, belong as well to *imagination* as to *fancy*. But *fancy* does not require that the materials which she makes use of should be susceptible of change in their constitution from her touch; and, where they admit of modification, it is enough for her purpose if it be slight, limited, and evanescent. Directly the reverse of these are the desires and demands of the *imagination*. She recoils from everything but the plastic, the pliant, and the indefinite."

—Wordsworth.¹—V. IMAGINATION.

FATALISM, FATE.—"Fatum is derived from *fari*; that is, to pronounce, to decree; and in its right sense, it signifies the decree of Providence."—Leibnitz.² "*Fate*, derived from the Latin *fari*, to speak, must denote the word spoken by some intelligent being who has power to make his words good."—Tucker.³

Among all nations it has been common to speak of *fate* or destiny as a power superior to gods and men—swaying all things irresistibly. This may be called the *fate* of poets and mythologists. Philosophical *fate* is the sum of the laws of the universe, the product of eternal intelligence, and the blind properties of matter. Theological *fate* represents Deity as above the laws of nature, and ordaining all things according to his will—the expression of that will being the law.

¹ Preface to *Works*, vol. 1., 12mo, Lond., 1836.

² *Fifth Paper to Dr. Clarke*.

³ *Light of Nature*, vol. 11., part 11., chap. 26.

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Leibnitz¹ says:—"There is a *Fatum Mahometanum*, a *Fatum Stoicum*, and a *Fatum Christianum*. The Turkish *fate* will have an effect to happen, even though its cause should be avoided; as if there was an *absolute necessity*. The Stoical *fate* will have a man to be quiet, because he must have patience whether he will or not, since 'tis impossible to resist the course of things. But 'tis agreed that there is *Fatum Christianum*, a *certain destiny* of everything, regulated by the fore-knowledge and providence of God."

"Fatalists that hold the necessity of all human actions and events, may be reduced to these three heads—*First*, such as asserting the Deity, suppose it irrespectively to decree and determine all things, and thereby make all actions necessary to us; which kind of *fate*, though philosophers and other ancient writers have not been altogether silent of it, yet it has been principally maintained by some neoteric Christians, contrary to the sense of the ancient church. *Secondly*, such as suppose a Deity that, acting wisely, but necessarily, did contrive the general frame of things in the world; from whence, by a series of causes, doth unavoidably result whatsoever is so done in it: which *fate* is a concatenation of causes, all in themselves necessary, and is that which was asserted by the ancient Stoics, Zeno, and Chrysippus, whom the Jewish Essenes seemed to follow. And, *lastly*, such as hold the material necessity of all things without a Deity; which *fate* Epicurus calls *τῆς φύσεως ἀναγκὴν*, the *fate* of the naturalists, that is, indeed, the atheists, the assertors whereof may be called also the Democritical fatalists."²

Cicero, *De Fato*; Plutarchus, *De Fato*; Grotius, *Philosophorum Sententia De Fato*.

FEAR is one of the passions. It arises on the conception or contemplation of something evil coming upon us.

FEELING.—"This word has two meanings. *First*, it signifies the perceptions we have of external objects, by the sense of touch. When we speak of *feeling* a body to be hard or soft, or rough or smooth, hot or cold, to *feel* these things is to perceive

¹ Fifth Paper to Dr. Samuel Clarke.

² Gudworth, *Intell. Syst.*, book 1, chap. 1.

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them by touch. They are external things, and that act of the mind by which we *feel* them is easily distinguished from the objects felt. *Secondly*, the word *feeling* is used to signify the same thing as *sensation*; and in this sense, it has no object; the *feeling* and the thing felt are one and the same.

"Perhaps betwixt *feeling*, taken in this last sense, and *sensation*, there may be this small difference, that *sensation* is most commonly used to signify those *feelings* which we have by our external senses and bodily appetites, and all our bodily pains and pleasures. But there are *feelings* of a nobler nature accompanying our affections, our moral judgments, and our determinations in matters of taste, to which the word *sensation* is less properly applied."¹ — Reid.²

"*Feeling*, beside denoting one of the external senses, is a general term, signifying that internal act by which we are made conscious of our pleasures and our pains; for it is not limited, as sensation is, to any one sort. Thus, *feeling* being the genus of which sensation is a species, their meaning is the same when applied to pleasure and pain felt at the organ of sense; and accordingly we say indifferently, 'I feel pleasure from heat, and pain from cold;' or, 'I have a sensation of pleasure from heat and of pain from cold.' But the meaning of *feeling*, as it is said, is much more extensive. It is proper to say, I feel pleasure in a sumptuous building, in love, in friendship; and pain in losing a child, in revenge, in envy; sensation is not properly applied to any of these.

"The term *feeling* is frequently used in a less proper sense, to signify what we feel or are conscious of; and in that sense it is a general term for all our passions and emotions, and for all our other pleasures and pains."³

All sensations are *feelings*; but all *feelings* are not sensations. Sensations are those *feelings* which arise immediately and solely from a state or affection of the bodily organism. But we have *feelings* which are connected not with our animal,

¹ The French use of *sensation* — as when we say such an occurrence excited a great *sensation*, that is, *feeling* of surprise, or indignation, or satisfaction, is becoming more common.

² *Intell. Pow.*, essay I., chap. 1.

³ *Kames, Elements of Criticism*, Appendix.

FEELING —

but with our intellectual, and rational, and moral nature; such as *feelings* of the sublime and beautiful, of esteem and gratitude, of approbation and disapprobation. Those higher *feelings* it has been proposed to call *Sentiments* — q. v.

From its most restricted sense of the perceiving by the sense of touch, *feeling* has been extended to signify immediate perceiving or knowing in general. It is applied in this sense to the immediate knowledge which we have of first truths or the principles of common sense. "By external or internal perception, I apprehend a phenomenon of mind or matter as existing; I therefore affirm it to be. Now, if asked how I know, or am assured, that what I apprehend as a mode of mind, may not, in reality, be a mode of mind; I can only say, using the simplest language, 'I know it to be true, because I *feel*, and cannot but *feel*,' or 'because I *believe*, and cannot but *believe*,' it so to be. And if further interrogated how I know, or am assured that I thus *feel* or thus *believe*, I can make no better answer than, in the one case, 'because I *believe* that I *feel*;' in the other, 'because I *feel* that I *believe*.' It thus appears, that when pushed to our last resort, we must retire either upon *feeling* or *belief*, or upon both indifferently. And, accordingly, among philosophers, we find that a great many employ one or other of these terms by which to indicate the nature of the ultimate ground to which our cognitions are reducible; while some employ both, even though they may award a preference to one. . . . In this application of it we must discharge that signification of the word by which we denote the phenomena of pain and pleasure."¹—V. BELIEF.

FETTERISM is supposed to have been the first form of the theological philosophy; and is described as consisting in the ascription of life and intelligence essentially analogous to our own, to every existing object, of whatever kind, whether organic or inorganic, natural or artificial.² The Portuguese call the objects worshipped by the negroes of Africa *fetisso*—bewitched or possessed by fairies. Such are the *grisgris* of Africa, the *manitous* and the *ockis* of America, and the *barb*

¹ Sir William Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note A, sect. 8.

² Comte, *Philosoph. Positive*, 1, 8.

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hans of Siberia—good and evil genii inhabiting the objects of nature which they worship. The priests of this worship are called *griots* in Africa, *jongleurs* or *jugglers* in America, and *chamanes* in Central Asia.

Mr. Grote,¹ in reference to Xerxes scourging the Hellespont which had destroyed his bridge, remarks, that the absurdity and childishness of the proceeding is no reason for rejecting it as having actually taken place. "To transfer," continues he, "to inanimate objects the sensitive as well as the willing and designing attributes of human beings, is among the early and wide-spread instincts of mankind, and one of the primitive forms of religion; and although the enlargement of reason and experience gradually displaces this elementary *fetichism*, and banishes it from the region of reality into those of conventional fictions, yet the force of momentary passion will often suffice to supersede the acquired habit, and even an *intelligent man may be impelled in a moment of agonising pain to kick or beat the lifeless object from which he has suffered.*"

Dr. Reid was of opinion that children naturally believed all things around them to be alive—a belief which is encouraged by the education of the nursery. And when under the smarting of pain we kick or strike the inanimate object which is the occasion of it, we do so, he thought, by a momentary relapse into the creed of infancy and childhood.

FIGURE.—V. SYLLOGISM.

FITNESS and UNFITNESS "most frequently denote the congruity or incongruity, aptitude or inaptitude, of any means to accomplish an end. But when applied to actions, they generally signify the same with *right* and *wrong*; nor is it often hard to determine in which of these senses these words are to be understood. It is worth observing that *fitness* in the former sense is equally undefinable with *fitness* in the latter; or, that it is as impossible to express in any other than synonymous words, what we mean when we say of certain objects, 'that they have a *fitness* to one another; or are *fit* to answer certain purposes,' as when we say, 'reverencing the Deity is *fit*, or

¹ *Hist. of Greece*, vol. v., p. 22.

FITNESS—

beneficence is *fit* to be practised.' In the first of these instances, none can avoid owning the absurdity of making an arbitrary sense the source of the idea of *fitness*, and of concluding that it signifies nothing real in objects, and that no one thing can be properly the *means* of another. In both cases the term *fit* signifies a simple perception of the understanding."¹

According to Dr. Samuel Clarke, virtue consists in acting in conformity to the nature and *fitness* of things. In this theory the term *fitness* does not mean the adaptation of an action, as a means towards some end designed by the agent; but a congruity, proportion, or suitableness between an action and the relations, in which, as a moral being, the agent stands. Dr. Clarke has been misunderstood on this point by Dr. Brown² and others.³

"Our perception of vice and its desert arises from, and is the result of, a comparison of actions with the nature and capacities of the agent. And hence arises a proper application of the epithets incongruous, unsuitable, disproportionate, *unfit*, to actions which our moral faculty determines to be vicious."⁴

In like manner, when our moral faculty determines actions to be virtuous, there is a propriety in the application of the epithets congruous, suitable, proportionate, *fit*.

FORCE is an energy or power which has a tendency to move a body at rest, or to affect or stop the progress of a body already in motion. This is sometimes termed *active force*, in contradistinction to that which merely resists or retards the motion of a body, but is itself apparently *inactive*. But according to Leibnitz, by whom the term *force* was introduced into modern philosophy, no substance is altogether passive. *Force*, or a continual tendency to activity, was originally communicated by the Creator to all substances, whether material or spiritual. Every *force* is a *substance*, and every *substance* is a *force*. The two notions are inseparable; for you cannot think of action without a being, nor of a being without activity. A substance entirely passive is a contradictory idea.⁵—V. MONAD.

¹ Price, *Review*, ch. 6.

² Lect. lxxvi.

³ See Wardlaw, *Christ. Ethics*, note 2.

⁴ Butler, *Dissertation on Virtue*.

⁵ See Leibnitz, *De primæ Philosophiæ emendatione, et de notionibus substantiæ*.

FORCE—

In like manner Boscovich¹ maintained that the ultimate particles of matter are indivisible and unextended points, endowed with the *forces* of attraction and repulsion.

According to the dynamic theory of Kant, and the atomic theory of Leucippus, the phenomena of matter were explained by attraction and repulsion.

"*La force proprement dite, c'est ce qui régit les actes, sans régler les volontés.*" If this definition of *force*, which is given by Mons. Comte, be adopted, it would make a distinction between *force* and *power*. Power extends to *volitions* as well as to *operations*, to mind as well as matter. But we also speak of *force* as physical, vital, and mental.

FORM "is that of which matter is the receptacle," says Lord Monboddo.² A trumpet may be said to consist of two parts; the *matter* or brass of which it is made, and the *form* which the maker gives to it. The latter is essential, but not the former; since although the matter were silver, it would still be a trumpet; but without the *form* it would not. Now, although there can be no *form* without matter, yet as it is the *form* which makes the thing what it is, the word *form* came to signify essence or nature. "*Form* is the essence of the thing, from which result not only its figure and shape, but all its other qualities."

Matter void of *form*, but ready to receive it, was called, in metaphysics, *materia prima*, or elementary; in allusion to which Butler has made Hudibras say, that he

Professed

He had first matter seen undressed,
And found it naked and alone,
Before one rag of *form* was on.

Forme was defined by Aristotle λόγος τῆς οὐσίας, and as οὐσία signifies, equally, substance and essence; hence came the question whether *form* should be called substantial or essential; the Peripatetics espousing the former epithet, and the Cartesians the latter.

¹ *Dissertationes duæ de viribus vivis*, 4to, 1745. See also Stewart, *Philosophical Essays*, essay II., chap. 1.

² *Ancient Metaphys.*, book II., chap. 2.

FORM —

According to the Peripatetics, in any natural composite body, there were — 1. The matter. 2. Quantity, which followed the matter. 3. The substantial *form*. 4. The qualities which followed the *form*. According to others, there were only — 1. Matter. 2. Essential *form*; as *quantity* is identified with *matter*, and *qualities* with *matter* or *form*, or the compound of them.

According to the Peripatetics, *form* was a subtle substance, penetrating *matter*, and the cause of all acts of the compound; in conformity with the saying, *formæ est agere, materiæ vero pati*. According to others, *form* is the union of material parts, as atoms, or elements, &c., to which some added a certain motion and position of the parts.¹

He who gives *form* to matter, must, before he do so, have in his mind some idea of the particular *form* which he is about to give. And hence the word *form* is used to signify an idea.

Idea and Law are the same thing, seen from opposite points. "That which contemplated *objectively* (that is, as existing externally to the mind), we call a law; the same contemplated *subjectively* (that is, as existing in a subject or mind), is an idea. Hence Plato often names ideas laws; and Lord Bacon, the British Plato (?), describes the laws of the material universe as ideas in nature. *Quod in natura naturata lex, in natura naturante idea dicitur.*"² Bacon³ says, "When we speak of *forms*, we understand nothing more than the *laws* and *modes* of action which regulate and constitute any simple nature, such as heat, light, weight, in all kinds of matter susceptible of them; so that the *form* of heat, or the *form* of light, and the *law* of heat, and the *law* of light, are the same thing." Again he says,⁴ "Since the *form* of a thing is the very thing itself, and the thing no otherwise differs from the *form*, than as the apparent differs from the existent, the outward from the inward, or that which is considered in relation to man from that which is considered in relation to the universe it follows clearly that no nature can be taken for the

¹ Derodon, *Phys.*, pars prima, pp. 11, 12.

² Coleridge, *Church and State*, p. 12.

³ In *Noe. Org.*, II., 17.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 2, 12.

FORM—

true *form*, unless it ever decreases when the nature itself decreases, and in like manner is always increased when the nature is increased."

As the word *form* denotes the *law*, so it may also denote the class of cases brought together and united by the law. "Thus to speak of the *form* of animals might mean, first, the law or definition of animal in general; second, the part of any given animal by which it comes under the law, and is what it is; and last, the class of animals in general formed by the law."¹

"The sense attached at the present day to the words *form* and *matter*, is somewhat different from, though closely related to, these. The *form* is what the mind impresses upon its perceptions of objects, which are the *matter*; *form* therefore means *mode of viewing* objects that are presented to the mind. When the attention is directed to any object, we do not see the object itself, but contemplate it in the light of our own prior conceptions. A rich man, for example, is regarded by the poor and ignorant under the *form* of a very fortunate person, able to purchase luxuries which are above their own reach; by the religious mind under the *form* of a person with more than ordinary temptations to contend with; by the political economist, under that of an example of the unequal distribution of wealth; by the tradesman, under that of one whose patronage is valuable. Now, the object is really the same to all these observers; the same rich man has been represented under all these different *forms*. And the reason that the observers are able to find many in one, is that they connect him severally with their own prior conceptions. The *form*, then, in this view, is *mode of knowing*; and the *matter* is the *perception*, or *object*, we have to know."²

Sir W. Hamilton³ calls the theory of *substantial forms*, "the theory of qualities viewed as entities conjoined with, and not as mere dispositions or modifications of matter."

¹ Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*, p. 33, 2d edit.

² *Ibid.*, p. 34.

³ *Reid's Works* p. 327.

FORM —

Aristotle,¹ Michelet,² Ravaisson.³ — *V. LAW, MATTER.*

FORMALLY. — *V. REAL, VIRTUAL, ACTION.*

FORTITUDE is one of the virtues called *cardinal*. It may display itself *actively* by *resolution* or *constancy*, which consists in adhering to duty in the face of danger and difficulty which cannot be avoided, or by *intrepidity* or *courage*, which consists in maintaining firmness and presence of mind in the midst of perils from which there may be escape. The displays of *fortitude passively* considered may be comprehended under the term *patience*, including humility, meekness, submission, resignation, &c.

FREE WILL. — *V. LIBERTY, NECESSITY, WILL.*

FRIENDSHIP is the mutual affection cherished by two persons of congenial minds. It springs from the social nature of man, and rests on the esteem which each entertains for the good qualities of the other. The resemblance in disposition and character between friends may sometimes be the occasion of their contracting friendship; but it may also be the effect of imitation and frequent and familiar intercourse. And the interchange of kind offices which takes place between friends is not the cause of their friendship, but its natural result. Familiarities founded on views of interest or pleasure are not to be dignified by the name of friendship.

Dr. Brown⁴ has classified the duties of *friendship* as they regard the *commencement* of it, the *continuance* of it, and its *close*.

See the various questions connected with *friendship* treated by Aristotle,⁵ and by Cicero.⁶

FUNCTION (*fungor*, to perform). — "The pre-constituted forms or elements under which the reason forms cognitions and assigns laws, are called ideas. The capacities of the reason to know in different modes and relations, we shall call its *functions*."⁷

"The *function* of conception is essential to thought." The first intention of every word is its real meaning; the second inten-

¹ *Metaphys.*, lib. 7 et 8.

² *Examen Critique de la Métaphysique d'Aristote*, 8vo, Paris, 1836; p. 164 et p. 287.

³ *Essai sur la Métaphysique d'Aristote*, 8vo, Paris, 1837, tom. i., p. 149.

⁴ *Lect.* lxxxix.

⁵ In his treatise *De Amicitia*.

⁶ In *Ethics*, books viii. and ix.

⁷ Tappan, *Log*, p. 119.

FUNCTION —

tion, its logical value, according to the *function* of thought to which it belongs."¹

"The *function* of names is that of enabling us to *remember* and to *communicate* our thoughts."²

GENERAL TERM. — V. TERM.

GENERALIZATION "is the act of comprehending, under a common name, several objects agreeing in some point which we abstract from each of them, and which that common name serves to indicate."

"When we are contemplating several individuals which *resemble* each other in some *part* of their nature, we can (by attending to *that part alone*, and not to those points wherein they differ) assign them *one common name*, which will express or stand for them merely as far as they all *agree*; and which, of course, will be applicable to all or any of them (which process is called *generalization*); and each of these names is called a *common term*, from its belonging to them *all alike*; or a *predicable*, because it may be predicated affirmatively of them or any of them."³

Generalization is of two kinds—*classification* and *generalization* properly so called.

When we observe facts accompanied by diverse circumstances, and reduce these circumstances to such as are essential and common, we obtain a law.

When we observe individual objects and arrange them according to their common characters, we obtain a class. When the characters selected are such as belong essentially to the nature of the objects, the class corresponds with the law. When the character selected is not natural the *classification* is artificial. If we were to class animals into white and red, we would have a *classification* which had no reference to the laws of their nature. But if we classify them as vertebrate or invertebrate, we have a *classification* founded on their organization. Artificial *classification* is of no value in science,

¹ Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*, pp. 25 and 40, 2d edit.

² Mill, *Log.*, b. ii., ch. 2, § 2.

³ Whately, *Log.*, b. ii., ch. 5, § 2.

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it is a mere aid to the memory. Natural *classification* is the foundation of all science. This is sometimes called *generalization*. It is more properly *classification*.—*V. CLASSIFICATION.*

The law of gravitation is exemplified in the fall of a single stone to the ground. But many stones and other heavy bodies must have been observed to fall before the fact was generalized, and the law stated. And in this process of *generalizing* there is involved a principle which experience does not furnish. Experience, how extensive soever it may be, can only give the particular, yet from the particular we rise to the general, and affirm not only that all heavy bodies which have been observed, but that all heavy bodies whether they have been observed or not, gravitate. In this is implied a belief that there is order in nature, that under the same circumstances the same substances will present the same phenomena. This is a principle furnished by reason, the process founded on it embodies elements furnished by experience.—*V. INDUCTION.*

The results of *generalization* are general notions expressed by general terms. Objects are classed according to certain properties which they have in common, into genera and species. Hence arose the question which caused centuries of acrimonious discussion. Have genera and species a real, independent existence, or are they only to be found in the mind?—*V. REALISM, NOMINALISM, CONCEPTUALISM.*¹

The principle of *generalization* is, that beings howsoever different agree or are homogeneous in some respect.

GENIUS (from *geno*, the old form of the verb *gigno*, to produce).

This word was in ancient times applied to the tutelary god or spirit appointed to watch over every individual from his birth to his death. As the character and capacities of men were supposed to vary according to the higher or lower nature of their *genius*, the word came to signify the natural powers and abilities of men, and more particularly their natural inclination or disposition. But the peculiar and restricted use of the term is to denote that high degree of mental power which produces or invents. "*Genius*," says Dr. Blair,² "always imports something inventive or creative." "It produces,"

¹ Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay v., chap. 6; Stewart, *Elements*, chap. 4.

² *Lectures on Rhetoric*, lect. iii.

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says another, "what has never been accomplished, and which all in all ages are constrained to admire. Its chief elements are the reason and the imagination, which are alone inventive and productive. According as one or other predominates, *genius* becomes scientific or artistic. In the former case, it seizes at once those hidden affinities which otherwise do not reveal themselves, except to the most patient and vigorous application; and as it were intuitively recognizing in phenomena the unalterable and eternal, it produces truth. In the latter, seeking to exhibit its own ideas in due and appropriate forms, it realizes the infinite under finite types, and so creates the beautiful."

"To possess the powers of common sense in a more eminent degree, so as to be able to perceive identity in things widely different, and diversity in things nearly the same; this it is that constitutes what we call *genius*, that power divine, which through every sort of discipline renders the difference so conspicuous between one learner and another."¹

"Nature gives men a bias to their respective pursuits, and that strong propensity, I suppose, is what we mean by *genius*."

Dryden has said, —

"What the child admired,
The youth endeavoured, and the man acquired."

He read Polybius, with a notion of his historic exactness, before he was ten years old. Pope, at twelve, feasted his eyes in the picture galleries of Spenser. Murillo filled the margin of his schoolbooks with drawings. Le Brun, in the beginning of childhood, drew with a piece of charcoal on the walls of the house.²

"In its distinctive and appropriate sense, the term *genius* is applied to mind only when under the direction of its individual tendencies, and when those are so strong or clear as to concentrate all its powers upon the production of new, or at least independent results; and that whether manifested in the regions of art or science. Bacon, Descartes, and Newton, were no less men of *genius*, than Michael Angelo, Raphael, Shæke

¹ Harris, *Philosoph. Arrange.*, chap. 9.

² *Super.*

³ *Pleasures, &c., of Literature*, 12mo, Lond., 1851, pp. 27, 28.

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speare, and Scott, although the work they performed and the means they employed were different."¹

Sharp, *Dissertation on Genius*;² Duff, *Essays on Original Genius*;³ Gerard, *Essay on Genius*;⁴ Lælius and Hortensia; or, *Thoughts on the Nature and Objects of Taste and Genius*;⁵ Beattie, *Dissertations, Of Imagination*.⁶

Genius and Talent. — "Genius is that mode of intellectual power which moves in alliance with the *genial* nature; i. e., with the capacities of pleasure and pain; whereas *talent* has no vestige of such an alliance, and is perfectly independent of all human sensibilities. Consequently, *genius* is a voice or breathing that represents the *total* nature of man, and therefore, his enjoying and suffering nature, as well as his knowing and distinguishing nature; whilst, on the contrary, *talent* represents only a single function of that nature. *Genius* is the language which interprets the synthesis of the human spirit with the human intellect, each acting through the other; whilst *talent* speaks only of insulated intellect. And hence also it is that, besides its relation to suffering and enjoyment, *genius* always implies a deeper relation to virtue and vice; whereas *talent* has no shadow of a relation to moral qualities any more than it has to vital sensibilities. A man of the highest *talent* is often obtuse and below the ordinary standard of men in his feelings; but no man of *genius* can unyoke himself from the society of moral perceptions that are brighter, and sensibilities that are more tremulous, than those of men in general."⁷

GENUINE. — V. AUTHENTIC.

GENUS is "a predicable which is considered as the material part of the species of which it is affirmed."⁸ It is either *summum* or *subalternum*, that is, having no *genus* above it, as *being*, or having another *genus* above it, as *quadruped*; *proximum* or *remotum*, when nothing intervenes between it and the species, as *animal* in respect of man, or when something intervenes, as *animal* in respect of a crow, for between it and crow,

¹ Moffat, *Study of Aesthetics*, p. 203, Cincinnati, 1363.

² Lond., 1755.

³ Lond., 1767.

⁴ Lond., 1774.

⁵ Edin., 1782.

⁶ Chap. 3, 4to, Lond., 1788

⁷ De Quincy, *Sketches, Crit. and Biograph.*, p. 275

⁸ Whately, *Log.*, b. II., ch. 5 § 2.

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brute and *bird* intervene. A *genus physicum* is part of the species, as *animal* in respect of man, who has an animal body and a rational soul. A *genus metaphysicum* is identified adequately with the species and distinguished from it extrinsically, as *animal* in respect of brute, *colour* in respect of blackness in ink. Logically the *genus* contains the species; whereas metaphysically the species contains the *genus*; e. g., we divide logically the *genus man* into European, Asiatic, &c., but each of the species, European, &c., contains the idea of man, together with the characteristic difference.

In modern classification, *genus* signifies "a distinct but subordinate group, which gives its name as a prefix to that of all the species of which it is composed.

GNOME (γνῶμη) a weighty or memorable saying.—The saying in the parable (Matt. xx. 1-16), "Many that are first shall be last, and the last shall be first," is called by Trench¹ a *gnome*.
—V. ADAGE.

GOD, in Anglo-Saxon, means good.

One of the names of the Supreme Being. The corresponding terms in Latin (*Deus*) and in Greek (Θεός) were applied to natures superior to the human nature. With us, *God* always refers to the Supreme Being.

That department of knowledge which treats of the being, perfections, and government of *God*, is *Theology*—q. v.

"The true and genuine idea of *God* in general, is this—a perfect conscious understanding being (or mind), existing of itself from eternity, and the cause of all other things."²

"The true and proper idea of *God*, in its most contracted form, is this—a being absolutely perfect; for this is that alone to which necessary existence is essential, and of which it is demonstrable."³

"I define *God* thus—an essence or being, fully and absolutely perfect. I say fully and absolutely perfect, in contradistinction to such perfection as is not full and absolute, but the perfection of this or that species or kind of finite beings, suppose a lion, horse, or tree. But to be fully and absolutely perfect, is to be,

¹ On the Parables, pp. 164, 165.

² Cudworth, *Intell. Syst.*, b. 1., ch. 4, sect. 4.

³ *Ibid.*, sect. 3.

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at least, as perfect as the apprehension of a man can conceive without a contradiction."¹

GOOD (The Chief).—An inquiry into the chief good, or the *summum bonum*, is an inquiry into what constitutes the perfection of human nature and the happiness of the human condition. This has been the aim of all religion and philosophy. The answers given to the question have been many. Varro enumerated 288.² But they may easily be reduced to a few. The ends aimed at by human action, how various soever they may seem, may all be reduced to three, viz., pleasure, interest and duty. What conduces to these ends we call *good*, and seek after; what is contrary to these ends we call *evil*, and shun. But the highest of these ends is duty, and *the chief good* of man lies in the discharge of duty. By doing so he perfects his nature, and may at the same time enjoy the highest happiness.

"Semita certe

Tranquilla per virtutem patet unica vitæ."

Juvenal, lib. iv., sat. 10.

Cicero, *De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum*; L'Abbe Anselme, *Sur le Souverain bien des anciens*, *Mem. d. l'Acad. des Inscript., et Belles Lettres*.³—Jouffroy, *Miscell.*—V. **BONUM** (Summum).

GRAMMAR (Universal).—This word *grammar* comes to us from the Greeks, who included under *εἰς τὴν γραμματικὴν* the art of writing and reading letters. But "*grammar*," says B. Jonson,⁴ "is the art of true and well speaking a language; the writing is but an accident." Language is the expression of thought—thought is the operation of mind, and hence language may be studied as a help to psychology.⁵

Thought assumes the form of ideas or of judgments, that is, the object of thought is either simply apprehended or conceived of, or something is affirmed concerning it. Ideas are expressed in words, judgments by propositions; so that as ideas are the elements of judgments, words are the elements of propositions.

Every judgment involves the idea of a *substance*, of which

¹ H. More, *Antidote against Atheism*, ch. 2.

² August., *De Civit.*, lib. 19, cap. 1.

³ 1 ser., tom. v.

⁵ Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay 1., chap. 5.

⁴ *English Grammar*, c. 1

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some *quality* is affirmed or denied—so that language must have the *substantive* or noun, the adjective or *quality*, and the *verb* connecting or disconnecting.

If the objects of our thoughts existed or were contemplated singly, these parts of speech would be sufficient. But the relations between objects and the connection between propositions, render other parts of speech necessary.

It is because we have ideas that are general, and ideas that are individual, that we have also *nouns common* and *proper*; and it is because we have ideas of unity and plurality, that we have *numbers, singular, dual, and plural. Tenses and moods* arise from dividing duration, and viewing things as conditional or positive. Even the order or construction of language is to be traced to the calm or impassioned state of mind from which it proceeds.

In confirmation of the connection thus indicated between *grammar* and psychology, it may be noticed that those who have done much for the one have also improved the other. Plato has given his views of language in the *Cratylus*, and Aristotle, in his *Interpretation* and *Analytics*, has laid the foundations of general *grammar*. And so in later times the most successful cultivators of mental philosophy have also been attentive to the theory of language.

In Greek, the same word (*λόγος*) means reason and language. And in Latin, reasoning is called *discursus*—a meaning which is made English by our great poet, when he speaks of “large discourse of reason.” In all this the connection between the powers of the mind and language is recognized.

Montémont,¹ Beattie,² Monboddo.³

GRANDEUR. — “The emotion raised by *grand* objects is awful, solemn, and serious.”

“Of all objects of contemplation, the Supreme Being is the most grand. . . . The emotion which this grandest of all objects raises in the mind is what we call devotion—a serious *recollected* temper, which inspires magnanimity, and disposes to the most heroic acts of virtue.

¹ *Grammaire General ou Philosophie des Langues*, 2 tom., 8vo, Paris, 1746.

² *Dissertations, Theory of Language*, part II., 4to, Lond., 1783.

³ *On the Origin and Progress of Language*, 3 vols.

GRANDEUR—

"The emotion produced by other objects which may be called *grand*, though in an inferior degree, is, in its nature and in its effects, similar to that of devotion. It disposes to seriousness, elevates the mind above its usual state to a kind of enthusiasm, and inspires magnanimity, and a contempt of what is mean. . . .

"To me *grandeur* in objects seems nothing else but such a degree of excellence, in one kind or another, as merits our admiration."¹—V. SUBLIMITY, BEAUTY, ÆSTHETICS.

GRATITUDE is one of the affections which have been designated benevolent. It implies a sense of kindness done or intended, and a desire to return it. It is sometimes also characterized as a moral affection, because the party cherishing it has the idea that he who did or intended kindness to him has done right and deserves a return; just as the party who has received an injury has not merely a sense or feeling of the wrong done, but a sense of injustice in the doing of it, and the feeling or conviction that he who did it deserves punishment.

See Chalmers,² Shaftesbury.³

GYMNOSOPHIST (*γυμνός*, naked; *σοφός*, wise).—"Among the Indians, be certain philosophers, whom they call *gymnosophists*, who from sun rising to the setting thereof are able to endure all the day long, looking full against the sun, without winking or once moving their eyes."⁴

The Brahmins, although their religion and philosophy were but little known to the ancients, are alluded to by Cicero.⁵ Arrian.⁶

Colebrooke and others in modern times have explained the Indian philosophy.

HABIT (*ἔξῃς*, *habitus*).—"Habit, or state, is a constitution, frame, or disposition of parts, by which everything is fitted to act or

¹ Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay viii., chap. 8.

² *Sketches of Mental and Moral Philosophy*, chap. 8.

³ *Moralists*, pt. iii., sect. 2.

⁴ *Tuscul.*, lib. v., c. 27.

⁵ Holland, *Pliny*, b. vii., c. 2.

⁶ *Exped. Alexana.*, lib. vii., c. 2.

HABIT—

suffer in a certain way.”¹ By Aristotle² *ἥξις* is defined to be in one sense, the same with *διάθεσις*, or disposition. His commentators make a distinction, and say *ἥξις* is more permanent. A similar distinction has been taken in English between *habit* and *disposition*.

Habits have been distinguished into natural and super natural, or acquired and infused. Natural *habits* are those acquired by custom or repetition. Supernatural *habits* are such as are infused at once. They correspond to gifts or graces, and the consideration of them belongs to theology.

Acquired *habits* are distinguished into intellectual and moral. From *habit* results power or virtue, and the intellectual *habits* or virtues are intellect, wisdom, prudence, science, and art. “These may be subservient to quite contrary purposes, and those who have them may exercise them spontaneously and agreeably in producing directly contrary effects. But the moral virtues, like the different *habits* of the body, are determined by their nature to one specific operation. Thus, a man in health acts and moves in a manner conformable to his healthy state of body, and never otherwise, when his motions are natural and voluntary; and in the same manner the habits of justice or temperance uniformly determine those adorned by them to act justly and temperately.”³

Habits have been distinguished as active or passive. The determinations of the will, efforts of attention, and the use of our bodily organs, give birth to active *habits*; the acts of the memory and the affections of the sensibility, to passive *habits*.

Aristotle⁴ proves that our habits are voluntary, as being created by a series of voluntary actions. “But it may be asked, does it depend merely on our own will to correct and reform our bad *habits*? It certainly does not; neither does it depend on the will of a patient, who has despised the advice of a physician, to recover that health which has been lost by profligacy. When we have thrown a stone we cannot restrain its flight; but it depended entirely on ourselves whether we should throw it or not.”

¹ Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, chap. 4.

² *Metaphys.*, lib. iv., cap. 20.

³ Arist., *Ethic.*, lib. v., cap. 1.

⁴ *Ibid.*, lib. iii.

HABIT—

Actions, according to Aristotle, are voluntary throughout; *habits* only as to their beginnings.

Thurot¹ calls "*habît* the memory of the organs, or that which gives memory to the organs."

Several precepts can be given for the wise regulation of the exercises of the mind as well as of the body. We shall enumerate a few of them.

"The first is, that we should, from the very commencement, be on our guard against tasks of too difficult or too easy a nature; for, if too great a burden be imposed, in the diffident temper you will check the buoyancy of hope, in the self-confident temper you will excite an opinion whereby it will promise itself more than it can accomplish, the consequence of which will be sloth. But in both dispositions it will happen that the trial will not answer the expectation, a circumstance which always depresses and confounds the mind. But if the task be of too trivial a kind, there will be a serious loss on the total progress.

"The second is, that in order to the exercise of any faculty for the acquirement of *habît*, two particular times should be carefully observed: the one when the mind is best disposed, the other, when worst disposed to the matter; so that, by the former, we may make most progress on our way; by the latter, we may, by laborious effort, wear out the knots and obstructions of the mind, by which means the intermediate times shall pass on easily and smoothly.

"The third precept is that of which Aristotle makes incidental mention:—'That we should, with all our strength (yet not running into a faulty excess), struggle to the opposite of that to which we are by nature the most inclined;' as when we row against the current, or bend into an opposite direction a crooked staff, in order to straighten it.

"The fourth precept depends on a general law, of undoubted truth, namely, that the mind is led on to anything more successfully and agreeably, if that at which we aim be not the chief object in the agent's design, but is accomplished, as it were, by doing something else; since the bias of our nature is such, that

¹ *De l'Entendement*, tom. I., p. 128.

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it usually dislikes constraint and rigorous authority. There are several other rules which may be given with advantage on the government of *habit*; for *habit*, if wisely and skilfully formed, becomes truly a second nature (as the common saying is); but unskilfully and unmethodically directed, it will be, as it were, the ape of nature, which imitates nothing to the life, but only clumsily and awkwardly."

Bacon,¹ Maine de Biran,² Dutrochet,³ M. F. Ravaisson,⁴ Butler,⁵ Reid.⁶—*V. Custom.*

HAPPINESS "is not, I think, the most appropriate term for a state, the perfection of which consists in the exclusion of all hap, that is, chance.

"Felicity, in its proper sense, is but another word for fortunateness, or happiness; and I can see no advantage in the improper use of words, when proper terms are to be found, but on the contrary, much mischief."

The Greeks called the sum total of the pleasure which is allotted or happens to a man *eudaimonia*, that is, good hap; or, more religiously, *εὐδαιμονία*, that is, favourable providence.⁷

To live well and to act well is synonymous with being happy.⁸

Happiness is never desired but for its own sake only. Honour, pleasure, intelligence, and every virtue are desirable on their own account, but they are also desirable as means towards *happiness*. But *happiness* is never desirable as a means, because it is complete and all-sufficient in itself.

"*Happiness* is the object of human action in its most general form, as including all other objects, and approved by reason. As pleasure is the aim of mere desire, and interest the aim of prudence, so *happiness* is the aim of wisdom. *Happiness* is conceived as necessarily an *ultimate* object of action. To be happy, includes or supersedes all other gratifications. If we are happy, we do not miss that which we have not; if we are

¹ *On Advancement of Learning*, book vii.

² *L'Influence de l'Habitude*.

³ *Théorie de l'Habitude*.

⁴ *De l'Habitude*.

⁵ *Analogy*, pt. 1, ch. 5.

⁶ *Act. Pow.*, essay iii., pt. 1, ch. 3; *Intell. Pow.*, essay iv., ch. 4.

⁷ Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*, vol. 1, pp. 81-2.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ Aristotle, *Ethic.*, lib. 1, c. 4.

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not happy, we want something more, whatever we have. The desire of *happiness* is the supreme desire. All other desires of pleasure, wealth, power, fame, are included in this, and are subordinate to it. We may make other objects our ultimate objects; but we can do so only by identifying them with this. *Happiness* is our being's end and aim.

"Since *happiness* is necessarily the supreme object of our desires, and duty the supreme rule of our actions, there can be no harmony in our being, except our *happiness* coincide with our duty. That which we contemplate as the ultimate and universal object of desire, must be identical with that which we contemplate as the ultimate and supreme guide of our intentions. As moral beings, our *happiness* must be found in our moral progress, and in the consequences of our moral progress we must be happy by being virtuous."¹

See Aristotle,² Harris.³—V. Good (Chief).

HARMONY (Pre-established).—When an impression is made on a bodily organ by an external object, the mind becomes percipient. When a volition is framed by the will, the bodily organs are ready to execute it. How is this brought about? The doctrine of a *pre-established harmony* has reference to this question, and may be thus stated.

Before creating the mind and the body of man, God had a perfect knowledge of all possible minds and of all possible bodies. Among this infinite variety of minds and bodies, it was impossible but that there should come together a mind the sequence of whose ideas and volitions should correspond with the movements of some body: for, in an infinite number of possible minds and possible bodies, every combination or union was possible. Let us, then, suppose a mind, the order and succession of whose modifications corresponded with the series of movements to take place in some body, God would unite the two and make of them a living soul, a man. Here, then, is the most perfect harmony between the two parts of which man is composed. There is no commerce nor communication, no action and reaction. The mind is an independent force

¹ Whewell, *Morality*, Nos. 544, 545.

² *Dialogues on Happiness*.

³ *Ethic.*, lib. I.

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which passes from one volition or perception to another, in conformity with its own nature; and would have done so although the body had not existed. The body, in like manner, by virtue of its own inherent force, and by the single impression of external objects, goes through a series of movements; and would have done so although it had not been united to a rational soul. But the movements of the body and the modifications of the mind correspond to each other. In short, the mind is a spiritual automaton, and the body is a material automaton. Like two pieces of clockwork, they are so regulated as to mark the same time; but the spring which moves the one is not the spring which moves the other; yet they go exactly together. The harmony between them existed before the mind was united to the body. Hence this is called the doctrine of *pre-established harmony*.

It may be called *correspondence* or *parallelism*, but not *harmony* between mind and body—for there is no unity superior to both, and containing both, which is the cause of their mutual penetration. In decomposing human personality into two substances,¹ from eternity abandoned each to its proper impulse, which acknowledges no superior law in man to direct and control them, liberty is destroyed.²

The doctrine of *pre-established harmony* differs from that of occasional causes “only in this respect, that by the former the accordance of the mental and the bodily phenomena was supposed to be pre-arranged, once for all, by the Divine Power, while by the latter their *harmony* was supposed to be brought about by His constant interposition.”³—V. CAUSES (Occasional).

This doctrine was first advocated by Leibnitz in his *Theodicée* and *Monadologie*.

Bilfinger, *De Harmonia Præstabilita*.⁴

HARMONY (of the Spheres).—The ancient philosophers supposed that the regular movements of the heavenly bodies throughout space formed a kind of *harmony*, which they called the *harmony of the spheres*.

¹ Soul and body, however, constitute one *suppositum* or person.

² Tiberghien, *Essai des Connaiss. Hum.*, p. 394.

³ Ferrier, *Inst. of Metaphys.*, p. 478.

⁴ 4to, Tubing., 1740.

HARMONY—

"Look how the floor of heaven
Is thick inlaid with patines of bright gold;
There's not the smallest orb which thou behold'st
But in his motion like an angel sings,
Still quiring to the young-ey'd cherubim:
Such harmony is in immortal souls;
But, whilst this muddy vesture of decay
Doth grossly close it in, we cannot hear it."

Merchant of Venice, Act v., sc. 1.

HATRED.—*V. LOVE.*

HEDONISM (*ἡδονή*, pleasure), is the doctrine that the chief good of man lies in the pursuit of pleasure. This was the doctrine of Aristippus and the Cyrenaic school.

HERMETIC BOOKS.—A collection of treatises ascribed to the Egyptian Thoth or Taaut, and also to the Hermes or Mercury of the Greeks. Different opinions have been entertained as to their origin and author. Marsilius Ficinus has collected the quotations made from the *Hermetic books* scattered throughout the writings of the Platonicians and early Christians; of which he published a Latin translation in 1471. They are a miscellany of theosophy, astrology, and alchemy—partly Egyptian, partly Greek, and partly Jewish and Christian.¹

HEURISTIC.—*V. OSTENSIVE.*

HOLINESS suggests the idea, not of perfect virtue, but of that peculiar affection wherewith a being of perfect virtue regards moral evil; and so much indeed is this the precise and characteristic import of the term, that, had there been no evil either actual or conceivable in the universe, there would have been no *holiness*. There would have been perfect truth and perfect righteousness, yet not *holiness*; for this is a word which denotes neither any one of the virtues in particular, nor the assemblage of them all put together, but the recoil or the repulsion of these towards the opposite vices—a recoil that never would have been felt, if vice had been so far a nonentity as to be neither an object of real existence nor an object of thought."²

HOMOLOGUE (*ὁμός*, same; *λόγος*).—"A *homologue* is defined as the same organ in different animals, under every variety of

¹ Lenglet du Fresnoy, *Hist. de la Philosoph. Hermetique*, 3 tom., 12mo, Paris, 1742.

² Chalmers, *Nat. Theol.*, vol. II., p. 380.

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form and function. Thus, the arms and feet of man, the fore and hind feet of quadrupeds, the wings and feet of birds, and the fins of fishes, are said to be *homologous*.¹

"The corresponding parts in different animals are called *homologues*, a term first applied to anatomy by the philosophers of Germany: and this term Mr. Owen adopts to the exclusion of terms more loosely denoting identity or similarity."²

See Owen, *On the Archetype and Homologies of the Vertebrate Skeleton*, 1848.—*V. ANALOGUE.*

HOMONYMOUS.—V. EQUIVOCAL.

HOMOTYPE (ὁμός, same; τύπος, type).—"The corresponding or serially repeated parts in the same animal are called *homotypes*. Thus, the fingers and toes of man, indeed the fore and hind limbs of vertebrate animals generally, are said to be *homotypal*."³

HUMOUR (*humor*, moisture).—As the state of the mind is influenced by the state of the fluids of the body, *humour* has come to be used as synonymous with *temper* and *disposition*. But *temper* and *disposition* denote a more settled frame of mind than that denoted by the word *humour*. It is a variable mood of the *temper* or *disposition*. A man who is naturally of a good temper or kind disposition may occasionally be in bad *humour*.
—*V. WIT.*

HYLOZOISM (ὑλη, matter; and ζωή, life).—The doctrine that life and matter are inseparable. This doctrine has been held under different forms. Straton of Lampsacus held that the ultimate particles of matter were each and all of them possessed of life. The Stoics, on the other hand, while they did not accord activity or life to every distinct particle of matter, held that the universe, as a whole, was a being animated by a principle which gave to it motion, form, and life. This doctrine appeared among the followers of Plotinus, who held that the soul of the universe animated the least particle of matter. Spinoza asserted that all things were alive in different degrees. *Omnia quavis diversis gradibus animata tamen sunt.*

Under all these forms of the doctrine there is a confounding

¹ M'Coah, *Typical Forms*, p. 26.

² Whewell, *Supplem. Vol.*, p. 142.

³ M'Coah, *Typical Forms*, p. 26.

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of life with force. Matter, according to Leibnitz and Bosovich, and others, is always endowed with force. Even the *vis inertiae* ascribed to it is a force. Attraction and repulsion, and chemical affinity, all indicate activity in matter; but life is a force always connected with organization, which much of matter wants. Spontaneous motion, growth, nutrition, separation of parts, generation, are phenomena which indicate the presence of life; which is obviously not co-extensive with matter.

HYPOSTASIS.—V. SUBSISTENTIA.

HYPOTHESIS (*ὑπόθεσις*, *suppositio*, supposition).—In Logic Aristotle gave the name *θέσις* to every proposition which, without being an axiom, served as the basis of demonstration, and did not require to be demonstrated itself. He distinguished two kinds of thesis, the one which expressed the essence of a thing, and the other which expressed its existence or non-existence. The first is the *ἀπομύσις* or definition—the second, the *ὑπόθεσις*.

When a phenomenon that is new to us cannot be explained by any known cause, we are uneasy and try to reconcile it to unity by assigning it *ad interim* to some cause which may appear to explain it. Before framing an *hypothesis*, we must see *first* that the phenomenon really exists. Prove ghosts before explaining them. Put the question *an sit?* before *cur sit?* *Second*, that the phenomenon cannot be explained by any known cause. When the necessity of an *hypothesis* has been admitted, a good *hypothesis*—*First*, should contain nothing contradictory between its own constituent parts or other established truths. The Wernerians suppose water once to have held in solution bodies which it cannot now dissolve. The Huttonians ascribe no effect to fire but what it can now produce. *Second*, it should fully explain the phenomenon. The Copernican system is more satisfactory than that of Tycho Brahe. *Third*, it should simply explain the phenomenon, that is, should not depend on any other *hypothesis* to help it out. The Copernican system is more simple. It needs only gravitation to carry it out—that of Tycho Brahe depends on several things.

By *hypothesis* is now understood the supposing of something, the existence of which is not proved, as a cause to explain

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phenomena which have been observed. It thus differs in signification from theory, which explains phenomena by causes which are known to exist and to operate. "*Hypothesis*," says Dr. Gregory,¹ "is commonly confounded with *theory*; but a *hypothesis* properly means the supposition of a principle, of whose existence there is no proof from experience, but which may be rendered more or less probable by facts which are neither numerous enough nor adequate to infer its existence."

"In some instances," says Boscovich,² "observations and experiments at once reveal to us all we know. In other cases, we avail ourselves of the aid of *hypothesis*; by which word, however, is to be understood, not fictions altogether arbitrary, but suppositions conformable to experience or analogy." "This," says Dr. Brown, "is the right use of *hypothesis*—not to supersede, but to direct investigation—not as telling us what we are to believe, but as pointing out to us what we are to ascertain." And it has been said,³ that "the history of all discoveries that have been arrived at, by what can with any propriety be called philosophical investigation and induction, attests the necessity of the experimenter proceeding in the institution and management of his experiments upon a previous idea of the truth to be evolved. This previous idea is what is properly called an *hypothesis*, which means something placed under as a foundation or platform on which to institute and carry on the process of investigation."

Different opinions have been held as to the use of *hypotheses* in philosophy. The sum of the matter seems to be, that *hypotheses* are admissible and may be useful as a means of stimulating, extending, and directing inquiry. But they ought not to be hastily framed, nor fondly upheld in the absence of support from facts. They are not to be set up as barriers or stopping places in the path of knowledge, but as way-posts to guide us in the road of observation, and to cheer us with the prospect of speedily arriving at a resting place—at another stage in our journey towards truth. They are to be given

¹ *Lectures on Duties and Qualifications of a Physician.*

² *De Solis ac Lunæ Defectibus*, Lond., 1776, pp. 211, 212.

Pursuit of Knowledge, vol. II, p. 255, weekly vol., No. 31.

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only as provisional explanations of the phenomena, and are to be cheerfully abandoned the moment that a more full and satisfactory explanation presents itself.¹ — *V. THEORY.*

HYPOTHETICAL. — *V. PROPOSITION, SYLLOGISM.*

I. — V. EGO, SUBJECT.

IDEA (*idea, εἶδος, forma, species, image*). — “Plato agreed with the rest of the ancient philosophers in this — that all things consist of matter and form; and that the matter of which all things were made, existed from eternity, without form; but he likewise believed that there are eternal forms of all possible things which exist, without matter; and to those eternal and immaterial forms he gave the name of ideas.

“In the Platonic sense, then, *ideas* were the patterns according to which the Deity fashioned the phenomenal or ectypal world.”²

The word is used in this sense by Milton when he says: —

“God saw his works were good,
Answering his fair *idea*.”

And Spenser gives its meaning in the following passage: —

“What time this world's great workmaister did cast,
To make all things such as we now behold,
It seems that he before his eyes had plast
A goodly patterne, to whose perfect mould
He fashioned them as comely as he could,
That now so fair and seemly they appear,
As nought may be amended anywhere.
That wondrous patterne, wheresoe'er it be,
Whether in earth, laid up in secret store,
Or else in heaven, that no man may it see
With sinful eyes, for fear it to defile,
Is perfect beauty.”

We are accustomed to say that an artificer contemplating the *idea* of anything, as of a chair or bed, makes a chair or bed. But he does not make the *idea* of them. “These forms of things,” said Cicero,³ “Plato called *ideas*, and denied that

¹ Reid, *Intell. Prov.*, essay 1, chap. 2.

² Sir William Hamilton.

³ *Orat.*, c. 2.

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they were born, but were always contained in reason and intelligence."¹

"*Idea* is a bodiless substance, which of itself hath no subsistence, but giveth form and figure to shapeless matter, and becometh the cause that bringeth them into show and evidence. Socrates and Plato supposed that there be substances separate and distinct from matter, howbeit subsisting in the thoughts and imagination of God, that is to say, of mind and understanding. Aristotle admitted verily these forms and *ideas*, howbeit not separate from matter, as being patterns of all that God hath made. The Stoics, such at least as were of the school of Zeno, have delivered that our thoughts and conceits are the *ideas*."²

"*Ideæ sunt principales formæ quædam, vel rationes rerum stabiles, atque incommutabiles, quæ ipsæ formatæ non sunt, ac per hoc æternæ ac semper eodem modo sese habentes, quæ in divina intelligentia continentur: et cum ipsæ neque oriuntur, neque intereant; secundum eas tamen formari dicitur, quicquid oriri et interire potest, et omne quod oritur et interit.*"³

"Tu cuncta superno

Ducts ab exemplo, pulchrum pulcherimus ipse

Mundum mente gerens, similique imagine formens."⁴

Tiberghien⁵ has said, — "Seneca considered *ideas*, according to Plato, as the *eternal exemplars* of things, Cicero as their *form*, Diogenes Laertius as their *cause* and *principle*, Aristotle as *substances*; and in the middle ages and in our day they are *general notions*, in opposition to particular or individual notions. The *ideas* of Plato embrace all these meanings. The terms which he employs are *ἰδέα* and *εἶδος*; to designate the Divine image, the ideal model or type (*τύπος*) of all things and beings. He also calls them *παράδειγματα*, *αἰτίαι ἀρχαί*, to denote that these eternal exemplars are the principle and cause of the existence and development of all that is in nature. They are also the thoughts of God (*νοήματα*), who has pro-

¹ Heusde, *Init. Philosoph. Platon.*, tom. ii., part. 3.

² Plutarch. *Opinions of Philosophers*, ch. 10, fol. 666 of the translation by Holland.

³ Augustine, lib. lxxxiii., 99, 43.

⁴ Boeth., *De Consol.*, 3.

⁵ *Essai des Connaiss. Hum.*, p. 207.

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duced all things according to the type of these *ideas*. And the terms *ἐνάδες*, *μυάδες*, indicate the affinity between the theory of Plato and the numbers of Pythagoras."

In another passage¹ the same author has said, that, "according to the Platonic sense, adopted by Kant and Cousin, *ideas* are as it were the essence and matter of our intelligence. They are not as such, a product or result of intelligence, they are its primitive elements, and at the same time the immediate object of its activity. . . . They are the primary anticipations which the mind brings to all its cognitions, the principles and laws by reason of which it conceives of beings and things. The mind does not create *ideas*, it creates by means of *ideas*. . . . There are two great classes of *ideas* — 1. Those which are related in some sense to experience; as the principles of mathematics, notions of figure, magnitude, extension, number, time, and space. 2. Those which are completely independent of all sensible representation, as the *ideas* of good and evil, just and unjust, true or false, fair or deformed." — p. 208. — *V. NOTION.*

According to Plato, *ideas* were the only objects of science or true knowledge. Things created being in a state of continual flux, there can be no real knowledge with respect to them. But the divine *ideas* being eternal and unchangeable, are objects of science properly so called. According to Aristotle and the Peripatetics, knowledge, instead of originating or consisting in the contemplation of the eternal *ideas*, types, or forms, according to which all things were created, originated, and consisted in the contemplation of the things created, and in the thoughts and the operations of mind to which that contemplation gives rise. But as external things cannot themselves be in the mind, they are made known to it by means of *species*, *images*, or *phantasms* (*q. v.*); so that, in perception, we are not directly cognizant of the object, but only of a representation of it. In like manner, in imagination, memory, and the operations of intellect, what is directly present to the mind is not the real object of thought, but a representation of it.

¹ *Essai des Connaiss. Hum.*, pp. 33, 34.

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Instead of employing the various terms *image*, *species*, *phantasm*, &c., of the Peripatetic philosophy, Descartes adopted the term *idea*, which till his time had been all but exclusively employed in its Platonic sense.

By Descartes and subsequent philosophers the term *idea* was employed to signify all our mental representations, all the notions which the mind frames of things. And this, in contradistinction to the Platonic, may be called the modern use of the word. Mr. Locke, for example, who uses the word *idea* so frequently as to think it necessary to make an apology for doing so, says—"It is the term which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding, when a man thinks: I have used it to express whatever is meant by *phantasm*, *notion*, *species*, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking."

Against this modern use of the word *idea*, more especially in reference to the doctrine of *perception* (*q. v.*), Dr. Reid most vehemently protested.—"Modern philosophers," said he, "as well as the Peripatetics and Epicureans of old, have conceived that external objects cannot be the immediate objects of our thoughts; that there must be some image of them in the mind itself, in which, as in a mirror, they are seen. And the name *idea*, in the philosophical sense of it, is given to those internal and immediate objects of our thoughts. The external thing is the remote or immediate object; but the *idea*, or image of that object in the mind, is the immediate object, without which we would have no perception, no remembrance, no conception of the mediate object.

"When, therefore, in common language, we speak of *having an idea* of anything, we mean no more by that expression than thinking of it. The vulgar allow that this expression implies a mind that thinks, an act of that mind which we call thinking, and an object about which we think. But besides these three, the philosopher conceives that there is a fourth; to wit, the *idea* which is the immediate object. The *idea* is in the mind itself, and can have no existence but in a mind that thinks; but the remote or mediate object may be something external, as the sun or moon; it may be something past or

¹ *Intell. Pow.*, essay 1, chap. 1

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future; it may be something which never existed. This is the philosophical meaning of the word *idea*; and we may observe that this meaning of the word is built upon a philosophical opinion; for if philosophers had not believed that there are such immediate objects of all our thoughts in the mind, they would never have used the word *idea* to express them.

"I shall only add that, although I may have occasion to use the word *idea* in this philosophical sense in explaining the opinions of others, I shall have no occasion to use it in expressing my own, because I believe *ideas*, taken in this sense, to be a mere fiction of philosophers. And in the popular meaning of the word, there is the less occasion to use it, because the English words *thought*, *notion*, *apprehension*, answer the purpose as well as the Greek word *idea*; with this advantage, that they are less ambiguous."

Now it may be doubted whether in this passage Dr. Reid has correctly understood and explained the meaning of the word *idea* as employed by all modern philosophers, from the time of Descartes.

Dr. Reid takes *idea* to mean something interposed between the mind and the object of its thought—a *tertium quid*, or a *quartum quid*, an independent entity different from the mind and from the object thought of. Now this has been the opinion both of ancient and modern philosophers; but it is not the opinion of all. There are many, especially among modern philosophers, who, by the *idea of a thing*, mean the thing itself in the mind as an object of thought. Even when the object thought of is represented to the mind, the representation is a modification of the mind itself, and the act of representing and the act of knowing the object thought of, are one and the same; the representation and cognition are indivisible. But Dr. Reid does not admit that any of our knowledge is representative. He had such a horror of the doctrine of *ideas* as meaning something interposed between the mind and the objects of its knowledge, that he calls all our knowledge immediate. Thus he speaks of an immediate knowledge of things past, and of an immediate knowledge of things future. Now all knowledge is present knowledge, that is, it is only know-

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ledge when we have it. But all knowledge is not immediate knowledge. Things that are past are not actually present to the mind when we remember them. Things that are future are not actually present when we anticipate them, for they have as yet no actual existence. But the mind frames to itself a representation of these things as they have been, or as they will be, and in thus representing them has knowledge of them. This knowledge, however, cannot be called immediate. In memory there is the faculty, and there is the object of the faculty or the thing remembered. But the object or the thing remembered is not actually present to the faculty. It is reproduced or represented, and in representing the object to the faculty we have knowledge of it as a past reality. Memory, therefore, may be called a representative faculty. Now, in perception, where the object of the faculty is also present, it may not be necessary for the mind to frame to itself any representation or image of the external reality. The faculty and its object are in direct contact, and the knowledge or perception is the immediate result. This is the doctrine of Dr. Reid, and if he had acknowledged the distinction, he might have called perception a presentative faculty, as memory is a representative faculty.¹ According to other philosophers, however, there is a representation even in perception. The external reality is not in the mind. The mind merely frames to itself a representation or image of what the external reality is, and in this way has knowledge of it. But this representation or image is not something interposed or different from the mind and the external object. It is a modification of the mind itself. It is the external object in the mind as an object of thought. It is the *idea* of the external reality. This is a theory of perception which Dr. Reid did not clearly distinguish; but it is at variance with his own, and, if he had distinctly apprehended it, he would have condemned it. In like manner he would have condemned the use of the word *idea* to denote a representative image, even although that representation was held to be

¹ See *Reid's Works*, edited by Sir William Hamilton; Note B, Of Presentative and Representative Knowledge; and Note C, Of the Various Theories of External Perception.

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merely a modification of mind. But this is the sense in which the term *idea* is used by Descartes, and other philosophers, in reference to the doctrine of perception. In a general sense it means anything present to the mind, whether really or representatively, as an object of thought.¹

Ideas, regarded according to the nature and diversity of their objects, are *sensible*, *intellectual*, or *moral*; according to the essential characters of these objects, they are *necessary* and *absolute*, or *contingent* and *relative*; according to the aspect in which they represent things, they are *simple* or *compound*, *abstract* or *concrete*, *individual* or *general*, *partitive* or *collective*; according to their origin or formation, they are *adventitious*, *factitious*, or *innate*; according to their quality or fidelity, they are *true* or *false*, *real* or *imaginary*, *clear* or *obscure*, *distinct* or *confused*, *complete* or *incomplete*, *adequate* or *inadequate*.²

As to the origin of our *ideas*, the opinions of metaphysicians may be divided into three classes. 1. Those who deny the senses to be anything more than instruments conveying objects to the mind, perception being active (Plato and others). 2. Those who attribute all our *ideas* to sense (Hobbes, Gassendi, Condillias, the ancient Sophists). 3. Those who admit that the earliest notions proceed from the senses, yet maintain that they are not adequate to produce the whole knowledge possessed by the human understanding (Aristotle, Locke).³—V. INNATE.

See Trendlenburg, *De Ideis Platonis*; Richter, *De Ideis Platonis*; Sir William Hamilton, *Discussions on Philosophy*; Reid's *Works*; Dugald Stewart, *Philosoph. Essays*; ⁴ Adam Smith, *Essays on Philosoph. Subjects*.⁵

IDEAL. — "Though ideas are widely separated from sensible reality, there is something, if possible, still more widely separated, and that is the *ideal*. A few examples will enable you to comprehend the difference between *ideas* and the *ideal*:

¹ Dr. Currie once, upon being bored by a foolish blue, to tell her the precise meaning of the word *idea* (which she said she had been reading about in some metaphysical work, but could not understand), answered, at last, angrily, "*Idea*, madam, is the feminine of *idiot*, and means a female fool." — Moore, *Diary*, vol. iv., p. 38.

² Leibnitz, *Nouveaux Essais*, b. ii., ch. 22.

⁴ Appendix ii.

³ Dr. Mill, *Essays*, 314, 321.

⁵ P. 119, note.

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Perfection is an *idea*; humanity in all its perfection is an *ideal*; human virtue and wisdom in all their purity are *ideas*; the wisdom of the Stoics is an *ideal*. The *ideal*, then, is the intellectual existence of a thing which has no other characters than those determined by the *idea* itself. The *idea*, thus individualized, so to speak, serves as the rule of our actions: it is a model, which we may approach in a greater or lesser degree, but from which we are nevertheless infinitely distant. We compare, for example, our conduct with the dictates of the monitor, that exists within us. We all judge and correct ourselves with reference to this *ideal*, without the power of ever attaining to its perfection. These ideas, though destitute of any objective reality, cannot be regarded as purely chimerical. They furnish a unit of measure to the reason, which requires a conception of what is perfect in each kind, in order to appreciate and measure the various degrees of imperfection. But would you realize the *ideal* in experience as the hero of a romance? It is impossible, and is, besides, a senseless and useless enterprise; for the imperfection of our nature, which ever belies the perfection of the idea, renders all illusion impossible, and makes the good itself, as contemplated in the idea, resemble a fiction."¹

"By *ideal* I understand the idea, not in *concreto* but in *individuo*, as an individual thing, *determinable* or *determined* by the idea alone. What I have termed an *ideal*, was in Plato's philosophy an *idea of the Divine mind*—an individual object present to its pure intuition, the most perfect of every kind of possible beings, and the archetype of all phenomenal existences."²

"We call attention," says Cousin,³ "to two words which continually recur in this discussion—they are, on the one hand, *nature* or *experience*; on the other, *ideal*. Experience is individual or collective; but the collective is resolved into the individual; the *ideal* is opposed to the individual and to collectiveness: it appears as an original conception of the mind. Nature or experience gives me the occasion for con-

¹ Henderson, *The Philosophy of Kant*, p. 119.

² Meiklejohn, *Translation of Kant's Crit. of Pure Reason*, p. 351.

³ *On the Beautiful*.

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ceiving the *ideal*, but the *ideal* is something entirely different from experience or nature; so that, if we apply it to natural, or even to artificial figures, they cannot fill up the condition of the *ideal* conception, and we are obliged to *imagine* them exact. The word *ideal* corresponds to an absolute and independent idea, and not to a collective one."

"L'idéal, voilà l'échelle mystérieuse qui fait monter l'âme du fini, à l'infini."¹

When the word *ideal* is used as a noun and qualified by the adjective *beau*, its sense is critical or æsthetic, and has reference to the fine arts, especially to statuary and painting. "The common notion of the *ideal* as exemplified more especially in the painting of the last century, degrades it into a mere abstraction. It was assumed that to raise an object into an *ideal*, you must get rid of everything individual about it. Whereas the true *ideal* is the individual freed from everything that is not individual in it, with all its parts pervaded, and animated, and harmonized by the spirit of life which flows from the centre."²

The *ideal* is to be attained by selecting and assembling in one whole the beauties and perfections which are usually seen in different individuals, excluding everything defective or unseemly, so as to form a type or model of the species. Thus, the Apollo Belvedere is the *ideal* of the beauty and proportion of the human frame; the Farnese Hercules is the type of manly strength. The *ideal* can only be attained by following nature. There must be no elements nor combinations but such as nature exhibits; but the elements of beauty and perfection must be disengaged from individuals, and embodied in one faultless whole. This is the empirical account of the *ideal*.

According to Cicero,³ there is nothing of any kind so fair that there may not be a fairer conceived by the mind. "We can conceive of statues more perfect than those of Phidias. Nor did the artist, when he made the statue of Jupiter or Minerva, contemplate any one individual from which to take a likeness; but there was in his mind a form of beauty, gazing

¹ Cousin, *Du Vrai, du Beau, et du Bien*, 9me. leçon, p. 179.

² *Glosses at Truth*, second series, p. 218.

³ *Orator*, c. 2, 2.

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on which, he guided his hand and skill in imitation of it.² In the philosophy of Plato this form was called *παράδειγμα*. Seneca¹ takes the distinction between *ἰδέα* and *εἶδος*, thus:—when a painter paints a likeness, the original is his *ἰδέα*—the likeness is the *εἶδος*, or image. The *εἶδος* is in the work—the *ἰδέα* is out of the work and before the work. This distinction is commended by Heusde.³ And he refers to Cicero,⁴ who states that Zeuxis had five of the most beautiful women of Crotona, as models, from which to make up his picture of a perfect beauty, as illustrating the Platonic sense of *παράδειγμα* or the *ideal*. According to this view, the *beau idéal* is a type of hypothetical perfection contemplated by the mind, but which may never have been realized, how nearly soever it may have been approached in the shape of an actual specimen.

IDEALISM is the doctrine that in external perceptions the objects immediately known are ideas. It has been held under various forms.—See Sir W. Hamilton;⁵ Berkeley, *Works*; Sir W. Drummond, *Academic Questions*; Reid, *Inquiry*.

Some of the phases of modern *idealism* among the Germans, may be seen in the following passage from Lewes:—"I see a tree. The common psychologists tell me that there are three things implied in this one fact of vision, viz.: a tree, an image of that tree, and a mind which apprehends that image. Fichte tells me that it is I alone who exist. The tree and the image of it are one thing, and that is a modification of my mind. This is *subjective idealism*. Schelling tells me that both the tree and my *ego* (or self), are existences equally real or ideal; but they are nothing less than manifestations of the absolute, the infinite, or unconditioned. This is *objective idealism*. But Hegel tells me that all these explanations are false. The only thing really existing (in this one fact of vision) is the idea, the relation. The *ego* and the tree are but two terms of the relation, and owe their reality to it. This is *absolute idealism*. According to this there is neither mind nor matter, heaven nor earth, God nor man.—V. **NIHILISM**. The only

¹ *Epist.*, lviii., sect. 15-18.

² *Init. Phil. Plat.*, vol. II., pars 3, p. 106.

³ *De Invent.*, II., 1.

⁴ *Reid's Works*, note c.

⁵ *Biograph. Hist. of Phil.*, vol. IV., p. 209.

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real existences are certain ideas or relations. Everything else that has name or being derives its name and being from its constituting one or other of the two related terms, subject and object; but the only thing that is true or real is the identity of their contradiction, that is, the relation itself."

The doctrine opposed to *idealism* is *realism*—q. v. See also PERCEPTION.

IDEALIST. — "In England, the word *idealist* is most commonly restricted to such as (with Berkeley) reject the existence of a material world. Of late its meaning has been sometimes extended (particularly since the publication of Reid) to all those who retain the theory of Descartes and Locke, concerning the immediate objects of our perceptions and thoughts, whether they admit or reject the consequences deduced from this theory by the Berkeleian. In the present state of the science, it would contribute much to the distinctness of our reasonings were it to be used in this last sense exclusively."

IDEATION and IDEATIONAL. — "The term *sensation* has a double meaning. It signifies not only an individual sensation, as, when I say, I smell this rose, or I look at my hand; but it also signifies the general faculty of sensation; that is, the complex notion of all the phenomena together, as a part of our nature."

"The word *idea* has only the meaning which corresponds to the first of these significations; it denotes an individual idea; and we have not a name for that complex notion which embraces, as one whole, all the different phenomena to which the term *idea* relates. As we say *sensation*, we might also say *ideation*; it would be a very useful word; and there is no objection to it, except the pedantic habit of decrying a new term. *Sensation* would, in that case, be the general name for one part of our constitution; *ideation* for another."

Quoting this from Mr. James Mill as his authority, Dr. Carpenter² has introduced the adjective *ideational* to express a state of consciousness which is excited by a sensation through the instrumentality of the sensorium.

Stewart, *Dissert.*, part II, 166, note.

² *Princip. of Hum. Phys.*, p. 446.

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"The basement convolutions of the cerebrum are the central organs of the perceptive consciousness, the portals to intellectual action, where sensory impressions, the intuitions of the special senses, whether sights, sounds, tastes, smells, or feelings become *idealized and registered*; that is, *perceived, remembered, and associated*; and where, too, the *ideation* of outward individualities is effected. . . . *Ideation* is the first step in the intellectual progress of man. *Ideas* are the *pabula* of thought, and form equally a constituent element in the *composite nature* of our animal propensities, and of our emotional and moral feelings. *Ideation* is as essential to the very existence of memory, as memory is to the operation of thought. For what, in reality, is memory but the fact of *retained idealized impressions* in the mind? And without these retained idealizations, embodied in the memory as *representative ideas*, where are the materials of thought? and how are the processes of thought to be effected?"¹

IDENTICAL PROPOSITION.—"It is Locke, I believe, who introduced, or at least gave currency to the expression *identical proposition*, in philosophic language. It signifies a judgment, a proposition, in which an idea is affirmed by itself, or in which we affirm of a thing what we already know of it."²

We must distinguish between *analytic* and *tautologous* judgments. Whilst the *analytic* display the meaning of the subject, and put the same matter in a new form, the *tautologous* only repeat the subject, and give us the same matter, in the same form, as, "Whatever is, is."³

A proposition is called *identical* whenever the attribute is contained in the subject, so that the subject cannot be conceived as not containing the attribute. Thus, when you say a body is solid, I say that you make an *identical proposition*, because it is impossible to have the idea of body without that of solidity.

IDENTISM or IDENTITY (*idem*, the same), or the doctrine

¹ *Journal of Psychol. Med.*, Jan., 1857, pp. 139, 144.

² Cousin, *Hist. of Mod. Philosophy*, lect. xxiv.; Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.* book iv., chap. 3, sect. 3.

³ Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*, p. 196.

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of absolute *identity*, teaches that the two elements of thought, objective and subjective, are absolutely one; that matter and mind are opposite poles of the same infinite substance; and that creation and the Creator are one. This is the philosophy of Schelling. It coincides ultimately with *Pantheism* — *q. v.*

“If the doctrine of *identity* means anything, it means that thought and being are essentially one; that the process of *thinking* is virtually the same as the process of *creating*; that in constructing the universe by logical deduction, we do virtually the same thing as Deity accomplished in developing himself in all the forms and regions of creation; that every man’s reason, therefore, is really God; in fine, that Deity is the whole sum of consciousness immanent in the world.”¹

IDENTITY means sameness. *Unity* is opposed to division, *identity* to distinction. A thing is *one* when it is not divided into others. A thing is the *same* when it is not distinguishable from others, whether it be divided from them or not. *Unity* denies the divisibleness of a thing in itself. *Identity* denies the divisibleness of a thing from itself, or from that with which it is said to be the same. It is unity with persistence and continuity; unity perceived even in plurality; in multiplicity and succession, in diversity and change. It is the essential characteristic of all substance or being, that it is one and endures.

Unorganized matter may be said to have *identity* in the persistence of the parts or molecules of which it consists. Organized bodies have *identity* so long as organization and life remain. An oak, which from a small plant becomes a great tree, is still the same tree.²

IDENTITY (Personal). — “What is called *personal identity*, is our being the same persons from the commencement to the end of life; while the matter of the body, the dispositions, habits, and thoughts of the mind, are continually changing. We feel and know that we are the same. This notion of persuasion of *personal identity* results from memory. If *e*

¹ Morell, *Hist. of Phil.*, vol. II., p. 127.

² Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ‘I., chap. 27, sect. 2.

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man loses all recollection of his early life, he continues, nevertheless, actually the same person."¹

Dr. Brown² changes the phrase *personal identity* into *mental identity*. Locke³ says—"To find wherein *personal identity* consists we must consider what person stands for; which, I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places."

This looks like confining *personal identity* to the mind. But Leibnitz⁴ called it a "metaphysical communication by which soul and body make up one *suppositum*, which we call a person." In a *Review of the Doctrine of Personal Identity*,⁵ it has been proposed to define it as "the continuation of the same organization of animal life in a human creature possessing an intelligent mind, that is, one endowed with the ordinary faculties of reason and memory, without reference to the original formation or constitution of that mind, whether it be material or immaterial, or whether it survives or perishes with the body. Or, more shortly, it may be said *personal identity* consists in the same thinking intelligent substance united to the same human body. By the same human body, however, is not meant the same particles of matter, but of the same human structure and form."—V. PERSONALITY.

Locke⁶ makes *personal identity* consist in consciousness. "Consciousness is inseparable from thinking; and since it is so, and is *that* which makes every one to be what he calls *self*, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking beings, in *this alone consists personal identity*, i. e., the sameness of a rational being. And as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the *identity* of that person."

But it has been remarked that "Consciousness, without any regard to a sameness of the thinking intelligent substance, cannot constitute *personal identity*. For, then, a disordered

¹ Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

² *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book II., ch. 27.

³ *Theodice*, p. 172.

⁴ P. 73, 8vo, London, 1827.

⁵ *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book II., ch. 27.

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imagination might make *one man* become *two*, or even *twenty persons*, whose actions he should imagine himself to have performed. And if a man forgets and loses all consciousness of having done certain actions, he will then not be the same person who did them.”¹

Consciousness merely ascertains or indicates *personal identity*, but does not constitute it. Consciousness presupposes *personal identity* as knowledge presupposes truth.

See Butler, *Dissertation on Personal Identity*; Reid, *Intell. Pow.*; ² Stewart, *Elements*.³

IDENTITY (Principle of).—It is usually expressed thus—a thing is what it is, and not another. So that it amounts to the same as the principle of *contradiction*—*q. v.* In Logic it is expressed thus—conceptions which agree can be in thought united, or affirmed of the same subject at the same time.

IDEOLOGY or IDEALOGY.—The analysis of the human mind by Destutt de Tracy, published about the end of last century, was entitled “*Elémens d’Idéologie*,” and the word has come to be applied to the philosophy of the sensational school, or the followers of Condillac—as Cabanis, Garat, and Volney. Of this school, De Tracy is the metaphysician; Cabanis⁴ is the physiologist; and Volney⁵ is the moralist. The followers of this school were leading members of the *Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques*, and also took an active share in political assemblies. Their doctrines and movements were contrary to the views of Napoleon, who showed his dislike by suppressing the *Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques*. But the members of the school kept up their doctrines and their meetings, and it was on the motion of De Tracy that the Senate decreed the abdication of the emperor in 1814.⁶

“For Locke and his whole school, the study of the understanding is the study of ideas; hence the recent and celebrated expression *ideology*, to designate the science of the human understanding. The source of this expression is in the *Essays*

¹ Whitehead, *On Materialism*, p. 79.

² Ercay III., ch. 6, with note.

³ Part II., ch. 1, sect. 2.

⁴ *Rapports du Physique et de Moral de l’Homme*.

⁵ *Catechism du Citoyen Français*.

⁶ Damiron, *Hist. de Philosoph. en France au 19 siècle*.

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on the Hum. Understanding, and the ideological school is the natural offspring of Locke."¹

"By a double blunder in philosophy and Greek, *ideologie* (for *ideologia*), a word which could only *properly* suggest an *a priori* scheme; deducing our knowledge from the intellect, has in France become the name peculiarly distinctive of that philosophy of mind which exclusively derives our knowledge from sensation."²

"Destutt de Tracy has distinguished Condillac by the title of *the father of ideology*."³

IDIOSYNCRASY (*ἰδιος*, *proprius*; *ὅν*, *con*, and *συνέσις*, *mixtio*), means a peculiar temperament of mind or of body. "The soul in its first and pure nature hath no *idiosyncrasies*, that is, hath no *proper natural inclinations*, which are not competent to others of the same kind and condition."⁴ It is seen, however, that different persons "of the same kind and condition" may soon manifest different inclinations—which if not natural are partly so, and are traced to some peculiarity in their *temperament*, as well as to the effect of circumstances.

Sir Thomas Browne⁵ asks, "Whether quails from any *idiosyncrasy* or peculiarity of constitution do invariably feed upon hellebore, or rather sometimes but medically use the same?" In like manner some men are violently affected by honey and coffee, which have no such effects on others. This is bodily *idiosyncrasy*. *Sympathy* and *antipathy*—*q. v.*, when peculiar, may be traced to *idiosyncrasy*.

Mr. Stewart in the conclusion of part second of his *Elements*, says he uses temperament as synonymous with *idiosyncrasy*.—
V. TEMPERAMENT.

IDOL (*εἰδωλον*, from *εἶδος*, an image).—Something set up in place of the true and the real. Hence Lord Bacon⁶ calls those false appearances by which men are led into error, *idols*. "I do find, therefore, in this enchanted glass four *idols*, or false appearances, of several distinct sorts, every sort comprehending many subdivisions: the first sort I call *idols* of the nation

¹ Comte, *Hist. of Mod. Philosoph.*, lect. 16.

² Sir W. Hamilton, *Edin. Rev.*, Oct., 1830, p. 112.

³ Stewart, *Philosoph. Essays*, essay III.

⁴ *Vulgar Errors*, book III., chap. 28.

⁵ Gianvili, *Pre-existence of Souls*, c. 10.

⁶ *De Augment. Scient.*, lib. IV., cap. 6.

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or tribe; the second, *idols* of the den or cave; the third, *idols* of the forum; and the fourth, *idols* of the theatre."—*V. PREJUDICE.*

IGNORANCE, in morals and jurisprudence, may respect the law or the action, and is distinguished into *ignorantia juris*, and *ignorantia facti*.

Ignorantia facti excusat. Ignorance of what is done excuses, as, when a contract is signed under a wrong impression as to the meaning of the terms, such contract is voidable.

Ignorantia juris quod quisque tenetur scire neminem excusat. Every man is supposed to know the laws of the land in which he lives; and if he transgress any of them, although in ignorance, he is not excused. A merchant continuing to deal in goods which have been declared contraband is liable to the penalty, though he did not know the law.

In respect of an action, *ignorance* is called *efficacious* or *concomitant*, according as the removal¹ of it would, or would not, prevent the action from being done. In respect of the agent, *ignorance* is said to be *vincible* or *invincible*, according as it can, or cannot, be removed by the use of accessible means of knowledge.

Vincible ignorance is distinguished into *affected* or *wilful*, by which the means of knowing are perversely rejected; and *supine* or *crass*, by which the means of knowing are indolently or stupidly neglected.

Ignorance is said to be *invincible* in two ways—in *itself*, and also *in its cause*, as when a man knows not what he does, through disease of body or of mind; *in itself, but not in its cause*, as when a man knows not what he does, through intoxication or passion.

ILLATION (*illatum*, from *infero*, to bring in), or "*inference*" consists in nothing but the perception of the connection there is between the *ideas* in each step of the deduction, whereby the mind comes to see either the certain agreement or disagreement of any two *ideas*, as in demonstration, in which it arrives

¹ *De Interpretatione Naturæ*, sect. 39; Reid, *Intell. Pro.*, essay iv., chap. 8.

² Aristotle (*Ethic.*, lib. iii., cap. 1) takes a difference between an action done through ignorance (*διδ ἄγνοιας*), and an action done ignorantly (*ἀγνοῦν*). In the former case the ignorance is the direct cause of the action, in the latter case it is an accident or concomitant.

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at knowledge; or their probable connection on which it withholds its assent, as in opinion."¹ — *V. INFERENCE, INDUCTION*

ILLUMINATI (*illumino*, to enlighten). — The name given to a secret society said to exist in Germany and other countries of Europe, towards the close of the last century. They professed the purest principles of virtue; but their real design was to subvert all religion and all government. Doubts have been entertained as to the extent and influence of any such society; and some have even denied its existence.²

IMAGINATION. — "Nihil aliud est *imaginari* quam rei corporeæ figuram seu imaginem contemplari."³

Mr. Addison⁴ says, "The pleasures of *imagination* are such as arise from visible objects, since it is the sense of sight that furnishes the *imagination* with its ideas." Dr. Reid says, "*Imagination*, in its proper sense, signifies a lively conception of objects of sight. It is distinguished from conception, as a part from a whole." But a much wider signification has been given to the word by others.

"By *imagination* we mean, in a comprehensive sense, that operation of the mind by which it — (1) *receives*, (2) *retains*, (3) *recalls*, and (4) *combines*, according to higher laws the ideal *images* furnished to it by the cœnesthesis and by the senses; for all these acts are manifestly links of one chain. At the first step, we usually call this operation⁵ the faculty of conception; at the second, memory; at the third, reproductive fancy; and at the fourth, productive fancy."⁶

"In the language of modern philosophy, the word *imagination* seems to denote—first, the power of apprehending or conceiving ideas, simply as they are in themselves, without any view to their reality; secondly, the power of combining into new forms or assemblages, those thoughts, ideas, or notions, which we have derived from experience or from information.

¹ Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, b. iv., c. 17.

² Robinson, *Proofs of a Conspiracy*, &c.

³ Descartes, *Medit. Secunda*

⁴ *Spectator*, No. 411.

⁵ It would be well, if instead of speaking of the *powers of the mind* (which causes a misunderstanding), we adhere to the designation of the several *operations of the mind*; which most psychologists recommend, but in the sequel forget."

⁶ Feuchtersleben, *Med. Psychol.*, p. 120. 8vo, 1847.

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These two powers, though distinguishable, are not essentially different."¹

"*Imagination as reproductive*, stores the mind with ideal images, constructed through the medium of attention and memory, out of our immediate perceptions. These images, when laid up in the mind, form *types* with which we can compare any new phenomena we meet with, and which help us to begin the important work of reducing our experience to some appreciable degree of unity.

"To understand the nature of *productive or creative imagination*, we must suppose the reproductive process to be already in full operation, that is, we must suppose a number of ideas to be already formed and stored up within the mind. . . . They may now be combined together so as to form new images, which, though composed of the elements given in the original representations, yet are *now* purely mental creations of our own. Thus, I may have an image of a rock in my mind, and another image of a diamond. I combine these two together and create the purely ideal representation of a diamond rock."²

IMAGINATION and FANCY.—"A man has *imagination* in proportion as he can distinctly copy in idea the impressions of sense; it is the faculty which *images* within the mind the phenomena of sensation. A man has *fancy* in proportion as he can call up, connect, or associate at pleasure, these internal images (*φανταζω*, is to cause to appear) so as to complete ideal representations of absent objects. *Imagination* is the power of depicting, and *fancy*, of evoking or combining. The *imagination* is formed by patient observation; the *fancy*, by a voluntary activity in shifting the scenery of the mind. The more accurate the *imagination*, the more safely may a painter, or a poet, undertake a delineation or description, without the presence of the objects to be characterized. The more versatile the *fancy*, the more original and striking will be the decorations produced."³

Wordsworth⁴ finds fault with the foregoing discrimination,

¹ Beattie, *Dissert., Of Imagination*, chap. 1.

² Morell, *Psychol.*, pp. 176, 176. 8vo, Lond., 1853.

³ Preface to his *Works*, vol. 1., 12mo, Lond., 1836.

⁴ Taylor, *Synonyms*.

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and says, "It is not easy to find how *imagination* thus explained, differs from distinct remembrance of images; or *fancy*, from quick and vivid recollection of them; each is nothing more than a mode of memory." According to Wordsworth, "*imagination*, in the sense of the poet, has no reference to images that are merely a faithful copy, existing in the mind, of absent external objects; but is a word of higher import, denoting operations of the mind upon these objects, and processes of creation or composition governed by fixed laws."

"It is the divine attribute of the *imagination*, that it is irrepressible, unconfined; that when the real world is shut out, it can create a world for itself, and with a necromantic power, can conjure up glorious shapes and forms, and brilliant visions to make solitude populous, and irradiate the gloom of the dungeon." — W. Irving.¹

"And as *imagination* bodies forth
The form of things unknown, the poet's pen
Turns them to shapes, and gives to nothing
A local habitation and a name."

To *imagine* in this high and true sense of the word, is to realize the ideal, to make intelligible truths descend into the forms of sensible nature, to represent the invisible by the visible, the infinite by the finite. In this view of it, *imagination* may be regarded as the *differentia* of man—the distinctive mark which separates him *a grege mutorum*. That the inferior animals have memory, and what has been called *passive imagination*, is proved by the fact that they dream—and that in this state the sensuous impressions made on them during their waking hours, are reproduced. But they show no trace of that higher faculty or function which transcends the sphere of sense, and which out of elements supplied by things seen and temporal, can create new objects, the contemplation of which lifts us to the infinite and the unseen, and gives us thoughts which wander through eternity. High art is highly metaphysical, and whether it be in poetry or music, in painting or in sculpture, the triumph of the artist lies not in presenting us with an exact transcript of things that may be seen, or heard, or handled in the world around us, but in carrying us across the gulf which separates the phenomenal from the real, and

¹ *Sketch Book*.

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placing us in the presence of the truly *beautiful*, and surrounding us with an atmosphere more pure than that which the sun enlightens.

IMAGINATION and CONCEPTION. — “The business of *conception*,” says Mr. Stewart,¹ “is to present us with an exact transcript of what we have felt or perceived. But we have, moreover, a power of modifying our *conceptions*, by combining the parts of different ones together, so as to form new wholes of our own creation. I shall employ the word *imagination* to express this power, and I apprehend that this is the proper sense of the word; if *imagination* be the power which gives birth to the productions of the poet and the painter. This is not a simple faculty of the mind. It presupposes abstraction to separate from each other qualities and circumstances which have been perceived in conjunction; and also judgment and taste to direct us in forming the combinations.” And he adds,² “The operations of *imagination* are by no means confined to the materials which *conception* furnishes, but may be equally employed about all the subjects of our knowledge.” —
V. CONCEPTION, FANCY.

IMAGINATION and MEMORY. — “*Memory* retains and recalls the past in the form which it assumed when it was previously before the mind. *Imagination* brings up the past in new shapes and combinations. Both of them are reflective of objects; but the one may be compared to the mirror which reflects whatever has been before it, in its proper form and colour; the other may be likened to the kaleidoscope which reflects what is before it in an infinite variety of new forms and dispositions.”³

“Music when soft voices die
Vibrates in the memory;
Odours, when sweet violets sicken,
Live within the sense they quicken.” — Shelley.

See Hunt, *Imagination and Fancy*; Wordsworth, Preface to *Lyrical Ballads*; Edin. Review for April, 1842, article on Moore's *Poems*; Akenside, *Pleasures of Imagination*.

IMITATION (*imitor, quasi mimitor*, from *μιμῶμαι*. Vossius.) —

¹ *Elements*, chap. 3.

² Chap. 6.

³ M'Cosh, *Typical Forms*, p. 450.

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"is a facultie to expresse livelie and perfitelie that example, which ye go about to follow."¹

As a social and improvable being, man has been endowed with a propensity to do as he sees others do. This propensity manifests itself in the first instance spontaneously or instinctively. Children try to follow the gestures and movements of others, before their muscles are ready to obey, and to *imitate* sounds which they hear, before their voice is able to do so. Mr. Stewart² has made a distinction between the *propensity* and the *power* of *imitation*. Both are peculiarly strong and lively in children, and answer the most important purposes. But the propensity to imitate what others do, and the manner of doing it, continues throughout life, and requires to be carefully watched and properly directed.

Man not only imitates his fellow-creatures, but tries to copy nature in all her departments. In the fine arts he imitates the forms which strike and please him. And the germ of some of the highest discoveries in science has been found in attempts to copy the movements and processes of nature.³

IMMANENCE implies the unity of the intelligent principle in creation, in the creation itself, and of course includes in it every genuine form of pantheism. *Transcendence* implies the existence of a separate divine intelligence, and of another and spiritual state of being, intended to perfectionate our own."⁴

IMMANENT (*immaneo*, to remain in), means that which does not pass out of a certain subject or certain limits. "Logicians distinguish two kinds of operations of the mind; the first kind produces no effect without the mind, the last does. The first they call *immanent* acts; the second *transitive*. All intellectual operations belong to the first class; they produce no effect upon any external object."⁵

"Even some voluntary acts, as attention, deliberation, purpose, are also *immanent*."⁶

"Conceiving, as well as projecting or resolving, are what

¹ Ascham, *The Scholemaster*, b. II.

² *Elements*, vol. III., chap. 2.

³ Reid, *Act. Powers*, essay III., part I., chap. 2.

⁴ J. D. Morell, *Manchester Papers*, No. 2, pp. 108-9.

⁵ Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay II., chap. 14.

⁶ *Correspondence of Dr. Reid*, p. 81.

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the schoolmen called *immanent* acts of the mind, which produce nothing beyond themselves. But painting is a *transitive* act, which produces an effect distinct from the operation, and this effect is the picture."¹

The logical sense assigned to this word by Kant, is somewhat different. According to him we make an *immanent* and valid use of the forms of the understanding, and conceive of the matter, furnished by the senses, according to our notions, of time and space. But when we try to lift ourselves above experience and phenomena, and to conceive of things as they are in themselves, we are making a *transcendent* and illegitimate use of our faculties.

Theologians say, God the Father generated the Son by an *immanent* act, but he created the world by a *transient* act.

The doctrine of Spinoza² is, *Deus est omnium rerum causa immanens, non vero transiens*, — that is, all that exists, exists in God; and there is no difference in substance between the universe and God.

"We are deceived, when, judging the infinite essence by our narrow selves, we ascribe *intellections, volitions, decrees, purposes*, and such like *immanent actions* to that nature which hath nothing in common with us, as being infinitely above us."³

IMMATERIALISM is the doctrine of Bishop Berkeley, that there is no material substance, and that all being may be reduced to mind, and ideas in a mind.

Swift, in a letter to Lord Carteret, of date 3d September, 1724, speaking of Berkeley, says, "Going to England very young, about thirteen years ago, he became founder of a sect there, called the *immaterialists*, by the force of a very curious book upon that subject."

"In the early part of his own life, he (Dr. Reid) informs us that he was actually a convert to the scheme of *immaterialism*; a scheme which he probably considered as of a perfectly inoffensive tendency, so long as he conceived the existence of the material world to be the only point in dispute."⁴

A work published a few years ago in defence of Berkeley's

¹ Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay IV., chap. 1.

² *Ibid.*, para 1. pref. 18.

³ Glanvill, *Vanity of Dogmatizing*, edit 1681 p. 101.

⁴ Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay II., chap. 10.

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doctrine, was entitled *Immaterialism*; and a prize offered to any one who would refute the reasoning of it.

IMMATERIALITY is predicated of mind, to denote that as a substance it is different from *matter*. *Spirituality* is the positive expression of the same idea. Simplicity is also used in the same sense. Matter is made up of parts into which it can be resolved. Mind is simple and has no parts, and so cannot be dissolved. The materiality of the soul was maintained by Tertullian, Arnobius, and others, during the three first centuries. At the end of the fourth, the *immateriality* of the soul was professed by Augustin, Nemesius, and Mamertus Claudianus.¹

IMMORTALITY (OF THE SOUL) is one of the doctrines of natural religion. At death the body dies, and is dissolved into its elements. The soul being distinct from the body, is not affected by the dissolution of the body. How long, or in what state it may survive after the death of the body, is not intimated by the term *immortality*. But the arguments to prove that the soul survives the body, all go to favour the belief that it will live for ever.

See Plato, *Phædon*; Porteus, *Sermons*; Sherlock, *On the Immortality of the Soul*; Watson, *Intimations of a Future State*; Bakewell, *Evidence of a Future State*; Autenrieth, *On Man, and his Hope of Immortality*, Tübingen, 1815.

IMMUTABILITY is the absence or impossibility of change. It is applied to the Supreme Being to denote that there can be no inconstancy in his character or government. It was argued for by the heathens. See Bishop Wilkins, *Natural Religion*.

IMPENETRABILITY is one of the primary qualities of matter, in virtue of which the same portion of space cannot at the same time be occupied by more than one portion of matter. It is extension, or the quality of occupying space. A nail driven into a board does not *penetrate* the wood; it merely separates and displaces the particles. Things are *penetrable*, when two or more can exist in the same space—as two angels; *impenetrable*, when not—as two stones.

IMPERATE.—V. ELICIT, ACT.

IMPERATIVE (*imperativ*), that which contains a *should* or *ought*

¹ Guizot, *Hist. of Civilis.*, vol. I., p. 304.

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(*sollen*). It is the formula of the commandment (*gebot*) of reason.

IMPERATIVE (CATEGORICAL, THE), is the phrase employed by Kant, to denote that the moral law is absolute and obligatory. The practical reason speaks to us in the *categorical imperative*, that is, in seeing an action to be right, we see, at the same time, that we ought to do it. And this sense of obligation springs from no view of the consequences of the action, as likely to be beneficial, but is a primitive and absolute idea of the reason; involving, according to Kant, the power to obey, or not to obey. We are under obligation, therefore we are free. Moral obligation implies freedom.

IMPOSSIBLE (THE), or that which cannot be, has been distinguished as the *metaphysically* or absolutely *impossible*, or that which implies a contradiction, as to make a square circle, or two straight lines to enclose a space; the *physically impossible*, the miraculous, or that which cannot be brought about by merely physical causes, or in accordance with the laws of nature, as the death of the soul; and the *ethically impossible*, or that which cannot be done without going against the dictates of right reason, or the enactments of law, or the feelings of propriety. That which is *morally impossible*, is that against the occurrence of which there is the highest probable evidence, as that the dice should turn up the same number a hundred successive times.¹

“It may be as *really impossible* for a person in his senses, and without any motive urging him to it, to drink poison, as it is for him to prevent the effects of it after drinking it; but who sees not these impossibilities to be totally different in their foundation and meaning? or what good reason can there be against calling the one a *moral* and the other a *natural* impossibility?”²

IMPRESSION (*imprimo*, to press in, or on), is the term employed to denote the change on the nervous system arising from a communication between an external object and a bodily organ. It is obviously borrowed from the effect which one piece of matter which is hard has, if pressed upon another piece of matter which is softer; as the seal leaving its impression or

¹ Whately, *Log.*, Append. L.

² Price, *Review*, chap. 70, p. 431.

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configuration upon the wax. It is not intended, however, to convey any affirmation as to the nature of the change which is effected in the nervous system, or as to the nature of sensation; and still less to confound this preliminary change with the sensation itself. The term *impression* is also applied to the effects produced upon the higher sensibility, or our sentiments. Thus, we speak of moral *impressions*, religious *impressions*, *impressions* of sublimity and beauty.

Hume divided all modifications of mind into *impressions* and *ideas*. Ideas were *impressions* when first received; and became *ideas* when remembered and reflected on.¹

“Mr. Stewart² seems to think that the word *impression* was first introduced as a *technical* term, into the philosophy of mind, by Hume. This is not altogether correct; for, besides the instances which Mr. Stewart himself adduces, of the illustration attempted, of the phenomena of memory from the analogy of an *impress* and a *trace*, words corresponding to *impression* were among the ancients familiarly applied to the processes of external perception, imagination, &c., in the Atomistic, the Platonic, the Aristotelian, and the Stoical philosophies; while among modern psychologists (as Descartes and Gassendi), the term was likewise in common use.”³

Dr. Reid⁴ distinguishes the *impressions* made on the organs of sense into *mediate* and *immediate*. The *impressions* made on the sense of touch are *immediate*, the external body and the organ being in contact. The *impressions* made on the ear by sounding bodies are *mediate*, requiring the air and the vibrations of the air to give the sensation of hearing. It may be questioned whether this distinction is well or deeply founded.⁵

IMPULSE and IMPULSIVE (*impello*, to drive on), are used in contradistinction to *reason* and *rational*, to denote the influence of appetite and passion as differing from the authority of reason and conscience. “It may happen, that when appe

¹ See Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay i., chap. 1.

² *Elements*, vol. iii., Addenda to vol. i., p. 43.

³ Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 294. note.

⁴ *Intell. Pow.*, essay ii.

⁵ See Dr. Young, *Intell. Philosoph.*, p. 71; Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 104.

IMPULSE—

tite draws one way, it may be opposed, not by any appetite or passion, but by some cool principle of action, which has authority without any *impulsive* force.¹

"Passion often gives a violent *impulse* to the will, and makes a man do what he knows he shall repent as long as he lives."²

IMPUTATION (*imputo*, to ascribe, to charge), is a judgment by which a person is considered the author of an action. In all moral action there is the presence of knowledge and intention on the part of the agent. In such cases he is held to be responsible, and the action is *imputed* to him or set down to his account.

INCLINATION (*inclino*, to lean towards), is a form or degree of natural desire. It is synonymous with propensity or with the *penchant* of the French. It is more allied to affection than to appetite. "It does not appear that in things so intimately connected with the happiness of life, as marriage and the choice of an employment, parents have any right to force the *inclinations* of their children."³—*V. DISPOSITION, TENDENCY.*

INDEFINITE (*in* and *definitum*, that which is not limited), means that, the limits of which are not determined, or at least not so determined as to be apprehended by us. The *definite* is that of which the form and limits are determined and apprehended by us. That of which we know not the limits, comes to be regarded as having none; and hence *indefinite* has been confounded with the *infinite*. But they ought to be carefully distinguished. The *infinite* is absolute; it is that of which we not only know not the limits, but which has and can have no limit. The *indefinite* is that of which there is no limit fixed. You can suppose it enlarged or diminished, but still it is *finite*.⁴—*V. INFINITE.*

INDIFFERENCE (*Liberty of*) is that state of mind in which the will is not influenced or moved to choose or to refuse an

¹ Reid, *Act. Pow.*, essay iii., pt. ii., chap. 1.

² *Ibid.*, chap. 6.

³ Beattie, *Mor. Science*, vol. ii., part ii.

⁴ Leibnitz, *Discours de la Conformité de la Foi et de la Raison*, sect. 70; Descartes, *Princip. Philosoph.*, -ars 1, c. 26, et 27.

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object, but is equally ready to do either. It is also called liberty of contrariety. It should rather be called liberty of indetermination, or that state in which the mind is when it has not determined to do one of two or more things. — *V. LIBERTY, WILL.*

INDIFFERENT. — An action in morals is said to be *indifferent*, that is, neither right nor wrong, when, *considered in itself*, or *in specie*, it is neither contrary nor conformable to any moral law or rule; as, to bow the head. Such an action becomes right or wrong, when the end for which it is done, or the circumstances in which it is done are considered. It is then regarded in *individuo*; as, to bow the head, in token of respect, or in a temple, in token of adoration.

INDIFFERENTISM or IDENTISM — *q. v.*, is sometimes employed to denote the philosophy of Schelling, according to which there is no difference between the real and the ideal, or the idea and the reality, or rather that the idea is the reality.

Indifferentism is also used to signify the want of religious earnestness. "In the *indifferentism* of the Lutheran Church, we see a marked descent towards the rationalism which has overspread the states of Germany."¹

INDISCERNIBLES (Identity of). — It is a doctrine of the philosophy of Leibnitz, that no two things can be exactly alike. The difference between them is always more than a numerical difference. We may not always be able to discern it, but still there is a difference. Two things radically indiscernible the one from the other, that is, having the same qualities, and of the same quantity, would not be two things, but one. For the qualities of a thing being its essence, perfect similitude would be identity. But Kant objected that two things perfectly alike, if they did not exist in the same place at the same time, would, by this numerical difference, be constituted different individuals.²

"There is no such thing as two individuals *indiscernible* from each other. An ingenious gentleman of my acquaintance, discoursing with me, in the presence of Her Electoral Highness the Princess Sophia, in the garden of Herenhause,

¹ Dr. Vaughan, *Essays*, vol. II., p. 255.

² Leibnitz, *Nouveaux Essais, Avant-Propos.*

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thought he could find two leaves perfectly alike. The Princess defied him to do it, and he ran all over the garden a long time to look for some, but it was to no purpose. Two drops of water, or milk, viewed through a microscope, will appear distinguishable from each other. This is an argument against *atoms*; which are confuted, as well as a *vacuum*, by the principles of true metaphysics.

"To suppose two things *indiscernible*, is to suppose the *same thing* under two names."¹

"From the principle of the *sufficient reason* I infer that there cannot be in nature two real beings absolutely *indiscernible*; because if there were, God and nature would act without reason, in treating the one differently from the other; and thus God does not produce two portions of matter perfectly equal and alike."²

INDIVIDUAL, INDIVIDUALISM, INDIVIDUALITY, INDIVIDUATION (from *in* and *divido*, to divide).

Individual was defined by Porphyry—*Id cuius proprietates alteri simul convenire non possunt*.

"An object which is, in the strict and primary sense, one, and cannot be logically divided, is called *individual*."³

An *individual* is not absolutely indivisible, but that which cannot be divided without losing its name and distinctive qualities, that which cannot be parted into several other things of the same nature, is an *individual* whole. A stone or a piece of metal may be separated into parts, each of which shall continue to have the same qualities as the whole. But a plant or an animal when separated into parts loses its *individuality*; which is not retained by any of the parts. We do not ascribe *individuality* to brute matter. But what is that which distinguishes one organized being, or one living being, or one thinking being from all others? This is the question so much agitated by the schoolmen, concerning the principle of *individuation*. In their barbarous Latin it was called *Hæccietas*, that is, that in virtue of which they say *this* and not *that*; or *Ecceietas*, that of which we say, lo! here, and not anywhere

¹ Leibnitz, *Fourth Paper to Clarke*, p. 95.

² Ibid., *Fifth Paper to Clarke*.

³ Whately, *Log.*, b. ii., ch. 5, § 3.

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else. Peter, as an *individual*, possesses many properties which are *quiddative*, or common to him with others, such as *substantialitas*, *corporeietas*, *animalitas*, *Humanitas*. But he has also a reality, which may be called *Petreietas* or *Peterness*, which marks all the others with a difference, and constitutes him Peter. It is the *Hæcceietas* which constitutes the principle of *individuation*. It was divided into the *extrinsic* and *intrinsic*.

The number of properties which constituted an *individuum extrinsecum*, are enumerated in the following versicle:—

*Forma, figura, locus, tempus, cum nomine, sanguis,
Patria, sunt septem, quas non habet unum et alter.*

You may call Socrates a philosopher, bald, big-bellied, the son of Sophroniscus, an Athenian, the husband of Xantippe, &c., any one of which properties might belong to another man; but the congeries of all these is not to be found but in Socrates.

The *intrinsic* principle of *individuation*, is the ultimate reality of the being—*ipsa rei entitas*. In physical substances, the *intrinsic* principle of *individuation* is *ipsa materia et forma cum unione*.

Hutcheson¹ has said, “*Si quærat de causa cur res sit una, aut de Individuationis principio in re ipsa; non aliud assignandum, quam ipsa rei natura existens. Quæcunque enim causa rem quamlibet fecerat aut creaverat, eam unam etiam fecerat, aut individuum, quo sensu volunt Metaphysici.*”

Leibnitz has a dissertation, *De principio Individuationis*, which has been thought to favour nominalism. Yet he maintained that *individual* substances have a real positive existence, independent of any thinking subject.

Individuality, like personal identity, belongs properly to intelligent and responsible beings. Consciousness reveals it to us that no being can be put in our place, nor confounded with us, nor we with others. We are one and indivisible.

“*Individuality* is scarcely to be found among the inferior animals. When it is, it has been acquired or taught. *Individuality* is not *individualism*. The latter refers everything to

¹ *Metaphys.*, pars 1, chap. 2.

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self, and sees nothing but self in all things. *Individuality* consists only in willing to be self, in order to be something."¹

But in the *Elements of Individualism*,² the word *individualism* is used in the sense assigned above to *individuality*.

INDUCTION (Method or Process of) (*ἰνὰγωγῆς*, *inductio*).—"It has been said that Aristotle attributed the *discovery* of *induction* to Socrates, deriving the word *ἰνὰγωγῆς* from the Socratic accumulation of instances, serving as antecedents to establish the requisite conclusion."³

*"Inductio est argumentum quo ex plurium singularium recensione aliquid universale concluditur."*⁴

*Inductio est argumentum quo probatur quid verum esse de quopiam generali, ex eo quod verum sit de particularibus omnibus, saltem de tot ut sit credible.*⁵

Induction is a kind of argument which infers, respecting a whole class, what has been ascertained respecting one or more individuals of that class.⁶

"*Induction* is that operation of mind by which we infer that what we know to be true in a particular case or cases, will be true in all cases which resemble the former in certain assignable respects. In other words, *induction* is the process by which we conclude that what is true of certain individuals of a class, is true of the whole class, or that what is true at certain times will be true under similar circumstances at all times."⁷

"*Induction* is usually defined to be the process of drawing a general rule from a sufficient number of particular cases; *deduction* is the converse process of proving that some property belongs to the particular case from the consideration that it belongs to the whole class in which the case is found. That all bodies tend to fall towards the earth is a truth which we have obtained from examining a number of bodies coming under our notice, by *induction*; if from this general principle we argue that the stone we throw from our hand will show the same tendency, we adopt the *deductive* method. . . .

¹ Vinet, *Essais de Philosophie*, Mor., Paris, 1847, p. 142.

² By William Maccall. 8vo, Lond., 1847.

³ Le Grand, *Inst. Philosophie*, p. 57, edit. 1675.

⁴ Wallis, *Inst. Log.*, p. 198, 4th edit.

⁵ Whately, *Log.*, book II., chap. 5, § 5.

⁶ Devey, *Log.*, p. 161, note.

⁷ Mill, *Log.*, B. III., ch. 2, § 1.

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More exactly, we may define the *inductive* method as the process of discovering laws and rules from facts, and causes from effects; and the *deductive*, as the method of deriving facts from laws and effects from their causes."¹

According to Sir William Hamilton,² "*Induction* has been employed to designate three very different operations—1. The objective process of investigating particular facts, as preparatory to *induction*, which is not a process of reasoning of any kind. 2. A material illation of the universal from the singular, as warranted either by the general analogy of nature, or the special presumptions afforded by the object-matter of any real science. 3. A formal illation of the universal from the individual, as legitimated solely by the laws of thought, and abstract from the conditions of this or that 'particular matter.' The second of these is the *inductive* method of Bacon, which proceeds by way of rejections and conclusions, so as to arrive at those axioms or general laws from which we infer by way of synthesis other particulars unknown to us, and perhaps placed beyond reach of direct examination. Aristotle's definition coincides with the third, and '*induction* is an inference drawn from all the particulars.'³ The second and third have been confounded. But the second is not a logical process at all, since the conclusion is not necessarily inferrible from the premiss, for the *some* of the antecedent does not necessarily legitimate the *all* of the conclusion, notwithstanding that the procedure may be warranted by the material problem of the science or the fundamental principles of the human understanding. The third alone is properly an *induction* of Logic; for Logic does not consider things, but the general forms of thought under which the mind conceives them; and the logical inference is not determined by any relation of casuality between the premiss and the conclusion, but by the subjective relation of reason and consequence as involved in the thought."

"The Baconian or Material *Induction* proceeds on the assumption of general laws in the relations of physical phenomena, and endeavours, by select observations and experi

¹ Thomson, *Outline of the Laws of Thought*, 2d edit., pp. 321, 323.

² *Discussions*, p. 156.

³ *Prior Analyt.*, II., c. 23.

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ments, to detect the law in any particular case. This, whatever be its value as a general method of physical investigation, has no place in Formal Logic. The Aristotelian or Formal *Induction* proceeds on the assumption of general laws of thought, and inquires into the instances in which, by such laws, we are necessitated to reason from an accumulation of particular instances to an universal rule."¹

On the difference between *induction* as known and practised by Aristotle, and as recommended by Lord Bacon, see Stewart.²

INDUCTION (Principle of).—By the principle of *induction* is meant the ground or warrant on which we conclude that what has happened in certain cases, which have been observed, will also happen in other cases, which have not been observed. This principle is involved in the words of the wise man,³ "The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be: and that which is done is that which shall be done." In nature there is nothing insulated. All things exist in consequence of a sufficient reason, all events occur according to the efficacy of proper causes. In the language of Newton, *Effectuum naturalium ejusdem generis eadem sunt causæ*. The same causes produce the same effects. The principle of *induction* is an application of the principle of causality. Phenomena have their proper causes, and these causes operate according to a fixed law. This law has been expressed by saying, substance is persistent. Our belief in the established order of nature is a primitive judgment, according to Dr. Reid and others, and the ground of all the knowledge we derive from experience. According to others this belief is a result or inference derived from experience. On the different views as to this point compare Mill's *Log.*,⁴ with Whewell's *Philosophy of Inductive Sciences*.⁵ Also, the *Quarterly Review*.⁶

On the subject of *induction* in general, see Reid, *Intell. Pow.*;⁷ *Inquiry*;⁸ Stewart, *Elements*;⁹ *Philosoph. Essays*;¹⁰ Royer Collard, *Œuvres de Reid*, par Mons. Jouffroy.¹¹

¹ Manuel, *Prolegom. Log.*, p. 209.

² *Elements*, part d., chap. 4, sect. 2.

³ Eccles. i. 9.

⁴ B. iii., ch. 3.

⁵ Book i., ch. 6.

⁶ Vol. lxviii.

⁷ Essay vi., ch. 5.

⁸ Ch. vi., sect. 24.

⁹ Vol. i., ch. 4, sect. 5.

¹⁰ P. 74.

¹¹ Tom. iv., p. 277.

INERTIA. — That property of matter by which it would always continue in the same state of rest or motion in which it was put, unless changed by some external force. Resistance to change of state. The quantity of matter in a body is determined by its quantity of *inertia*; and this is estimated by the quantity of force required to put it in motion at a given rate. Kepler conceiving the disposition of a body to maintain its state of motion as indicating an exertion of power, prefixed the word *vis* to *inertia*. Leibnitz maintained that matter manifests force in maintaining its state of rest.

"The *vis insita*, or innate force of matter, is a power of resisting by which every body, as much as in it lies, endeavours to persevere in its present state, whether it be of rest or of moving uniformly forward in a straight line. This force is ever proportional to the body whose force it is; and differs nothing from the inactivity of the mass but in our manner of conceiving it. A body, from the inactivity of matter, is not without difficulty put out of its state of rest or motion. Upon which account this *vis insita* may, by a most significant name, be called *vis inertiae*, or force of inactivity."¹

IN ESSE; IN POSSE.—Things that are not, but which may be, are said to be *in posse*; things actually existing are said to be *in esse*.

INFERENCE (*infero*, to bear, or bring in), is of the same derivation as *illation* and *induction* — *q. v.*

"To infer is nothing but by virtue of one proposition laid down as true, to *draw in* another as true; *i. e.*, to see, or suppose such a connection of the two ideas of the *inferred* proposition."²

"An *inference* is a proposition which is perceived to be true, because of its connection with some known fact. There are many things and events which are always found together; or which constantly follow each other: therefore, when we observe one of these things or events, we *infer* that the other also exists, or has existed, or will soon take place. If we see the prints of human feet on the sands of an unknown coast, we *infer* that the country is inhabited; if these prints appear to be fresh, and also below the level of high water, we *infer*

¹ Newton, *Princip.*, defin. 3.

² Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book iv., ch. 17.

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that the inhabitants are at no great distance ; if the prints are those of naked feet, we *infer* that these inhabitants are savages ; or if they are the prints of shoes, we *infer* that they are, in some degree, civilized.”¹

“ We ought to comprehend, within the sphere of *inference*, all processes wherein a truth, involved in a thought or thoughts given as antecedent, is evolved in a thought which is found as consequent.”²

“ We *infer immediately*, either by contraposition, by subalternation, by opposition (proper), or by conversion.”³

Mediate inference is the syllogistic.

INFERENCE and PROOF.—“ Reasoning comprehends *inferring* and *proving* ; which are not two different things, but the same thing regarded in *two different points of view* ; like the road from London to York, and the road from York to London. He who *infers*, *proves* ; and he who *proves*, *infers* ; but the word *infer* fixes the mind *first* on the *premiss* and then on the *conclusion* ; the word *prove*, on the contrary, leads the mind *from* the conclusion to the premiss. Hence, the substantives derived from these words respectively, are often used to express that which, on each occasion, is *last* in the mind ; *inference* being often used to signify the *conclusion* (i. e., proposition *inferred*), and *proof*, the *premiss*. To *infer*, is the business of the *philosopher* ; to *prove*, of the *advocate*.”⁴

Proving is the assigning a reason (or argument) for the support of a *given* proposition ; *inferring* is the deduction of a conclusion from *given* premisses.”⁵

“ When the grounds for believing anything are slight, we term the mental act or state induced a *conjecture* ; when they are strong, we term it an *inference* or *conclusion*. Increase the evidence for a conjecture, it becomes a conclusion ; diminish the evidence for a conclusion, it passes into a conjecture.”⁶—
V. FACT.

INFINITE (*in* and *finitum*, unlimited or rather limitless).—

In geometry, *infinite* is applied to quantity which is greater

¹ Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

² Spalding, *Log.*, p. 1.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 160

⁴ Whately, *Log.*, b. iv., ch. 3, § 1.

⁵ Whately, *ibid.*

⁶ B. Bailey, *Theory of Reasoning*, pp. 31, 32, 8vo, Lond., 1851

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than any assignable magnitude. But strictly speaking it means that which is not only without determinate bounds, but which cannot possibly admit of bound or limit.

"The *infinite* expresses the entire absence of all limitation, and is applicable to the one *infinite* Being in all his attributes. The *absolute* expresses perfect independence, both in being and in action. The *unconditioned* indicates entire freedom from every necessary relation. The whole three unite in expressing the entire absence of all restriction. But let this be particularly observed, they do not imply that the one *infinite* Being cannot exist in *relation*, they only imply that He cannot exist in a *necessary relation*, that is, if He exist in relation, that relation cannot be a necessary condition of his existence."¹ — V. ABSOLUTE, UNCONDITIONED.

As to our idea of the *infinite* there are two opposite opinions.

According to some, the idea is purely negative, and springs up when we contemplate the ocean or the sky, or some object of vast extent to which we can assign no limits. Or, if the idea has anything positive in it, that is furnished by the imagination, which goes on enlarging the finite without limit.

On the other hand it is said that the enlarging of the finite can never furnish the idea of the *infinite*, but only of the indefinite. The indefinite is merely the confused apprehension of what may or may not exist. But the idea of the *infinite* is the idea of an objective reality, and is implied as a necessary condition of every other idea. We cannot think of body but as existing in space, nor of an event but as occurring in time; and space and duration are necessarily thought of as *infinite*.

But have we or can we have knowledge of the *infinite*? Boethius² is quoted as saying, "*Infinitorum nulla cognitio est; infinita namque animo comprehendere nequeunt; quod autem ratione mentis circumdari non potest, nullius scientiæ fine concluditur; quare infinitorum scientia nulla est.*"

On the other hand, Cudworth³ has said,—"Since *infinite* is

¹ Calderwood, *Philosophy of the Infinite*, p. 37.

² *In Prov.*, p. 112, edit. Bas.

³ *Intell. System*, p. 446.

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the same with *absolutely perfect*, we having a notion or idea of the latter must needs have of the former."

But, while we cannot *comprehend* the *infinite*, we may *apprehend* it in contrast or relation with the finite. And this is what the common sense of men leads them to rest satisfied with, and, without attempting the metaphysical difficulty of reconciling the existence of the *infinite* with that of the *finite*, to admit the existence of both.

"Truth is bigger than our minds, and we are not the same with it, but have a lower participation only of the intellectual nature, and are rather *apprehenders* than *comprehenders* thereof. This is indeed one badge of our creaturely state, that we have not a perfectly comprehensive knowledge, or such as is adequate and commensurate to the essence of things."—Cudworth.

Ancillon, *Essai sur l'Idée et le Sentiment de l'Infini*; Cousin, *Cours de Philosoph.*, et *Hist. de la Philosoph.*; Sir W. Hamilton, *Discussions on Philosophy*, &c.; L. Velthuyssen, *Dissertatio de Finito et Infinito*; Descartes, *Meditations*.

"The *infinite* and the *indefinite* may be thus distinguished: the former implies an actual conceiving the absence of limits; the latter is a not conceiving the presence of limits—processes as different as searching through a house and discovering that a certain person is not there, as from shutting our eyes and not seeing that he is there. *Infinity* belongs to the object of thought; *indefiniteness* to the manner of thinking of it."¹

INFLUX (Physical) (*influo*, to flow in), is one of the theories as to our perception of external objects.—"The advocates of this scheme maintained that real things are the efficient causes of our perceptions, the word *efficient* being employed to signify that the things by means of some positive power or inherent virtue which they possess, were competent to transmit to the mind a knowledge of themselves. . . . External objects were supposed to operate on the nervous system by the transmission of some kind of influence, the nervous system was supposed to carry on the process by the transmission of certain images or representations, and thus our knowledge of external

¹ Mansel, *Lect. on Philosoph. of Kant*, p. 29.

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things was supposed to be brought about. The representations alone came before the mind; the things by which they were caused remained occult and unknown.”¹—*V. CAUSES (OCCASIONAL).*

INJURY (*injuria*, from *in* and *jus*, neglect or violation of right), in morals and jurisprudence is the intentional doing of wrong. We may bring *harm* or *evil* upon others without intending it. But *injury* implies intention, and awakens a sense of injustice and indignation, when it is done. It is on this difference in the meaning of *harm* and *injury* that Bishop Butler founds the distinction of resentment into *sudden* and *deliberate*.²

INNATE IDEAS.—Ideas, as to their origin, have been distinguished into *adventitious*, or such as we receive from the objects of external nature, as the idea or notion of a mountain, or a tree; *factitious*, or such as we frame out of ideas already acquired, as of a golden mountain, or of a tree with golden fruit; and *innate*, or such as are inborn and belong to the mind from its birth, as the idea of God or of immortality. Cicero, in various passages of his treatise *De Natura Deorum*, speaks of the idea of God and of immortality as being *inserted*, or *engraven*, or *inborn* in the mind. “*Intelligi necesse est, esse deos, quoniam insitas eorum, vel potius innatas cognitiones habemus.*”³ In like manner, Origen⁴ has said, “That men would not be guilty if they did not carry in their mind common notions of morality, *innate* and written in divine letters.” It was in this form that Locke⁵ attacked the doctrine of *innate ideas*. It has been questioned, however, whether the doctrine, as represented by Locke, was really held by the ancient philosophers. And Dr. Hutcheson⁶ has the following passage:—“*Omnes autem ideas, apprehensiones, et judicia, quæ de rebus, duce natura, formamus, quocunque demum tempore hoc fiat, sive quæ naturæ nostræ viribus quibuscunque, necessario fere, atque universaliter recipiuntur, innata quantum memini, dixerunt*

¹ Ferrier, *Inst. of Metaphys.*, p. 474.

² Lib. I., sect. 17.

³ *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book I.

⁴ *Oratio Inauguralis, De Naturali hominum Societate.*

⁵ We have here, in 1730, the two marks of *necessity* and *universality* which subsequently were so much insisted on by Kant and others as characterizing all our *a priori* cognitions.

⁶ Butler, *Sermons*, viii. and 9.

⁷ *Adv. Celsum*, lib I., cap. 4.

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antiqui." Among modern philosophers it would be difficult to name any who held the doctrine in the form in which it has been attacked by Locke. In calling some of our ideas *innate* they seem merely to have used this word as synonymous with *natural*, and applied it, as Hutcheson thinks the ancients did, to certain ideas which men, as human or rational beings, necessarily and universally entertain. — See *NATURAL* as distinguished from *INNATE*.

"There are three senses in which an idea may be supposed to be *innate*; one, if it be something originally superadded to our mental constitution, either as an idea in the first instance fully developed; or as one undeveloped, but having the power of self-development: another, if the idea is a subjective condition of any other ideas, which we receive independently of the previous acquisition of this idea, and is thus proved to be in some way embodied in, or interwoven with, the powers by which the mind receives those ideas: a third, if, without being a subjective condition of other ideas, there be any faculty or faculties of mind, the exercise of which would suffice, independently of any knowledge acquired from without, spontaneously to produce the idea. In the first case, the idea is given us at our first creation, without its bearing any special relation to our other faculties; in the second case, it is given us as a form, either of thought generally or of some particular species of thought, and is therefore embodied in mental powers by which we are enabled to receive the thought; in the third case, it is, as in the second, interwoven in the original constitution of some mental power or powers; not, however, as in the preceding case, simply as a pre-requisite to their exercise, but by their being so formed as by exercise spontaneously to produce the idea."¹

The first of these three is the form in which the doctrine of innate ideas is commonly understood. This doctrine was at one time thought essential to support the principles of natural religion and morality. But Locke saw that these principles were safe from the attacks of the sceptic, although a belief in God and immortality, and a sense of the difference between

¹ Dr. Alliot, *Psychology and Theology*, p. 93, 12mo, Lond., 1855

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right and wrong were not implanted or inserted in the mind; if it could be shown that men *necessarily* and *universally* came to them by the ordinary use of their faculties. He took a distinction between an *innate law*, and a *law of nature*;¹ and while he did not admit that there was a law "imprinted on our minds in their very original," contended "that there is a law knowable by the light of nature." In like manner, Bishow Law² said, "It will really come to the same thing with regard to the usual attributes of God, and the nature of virtue and vice, whether the Deity has *implanted* these instincts and affections in us, or has framed and disposed us in such a manner—has given us such powers and placed us in such circumstances, that we must *necessarily* acquire them." *V. NATURE (Law of).*

"Though it appears not that we have any *innate* ideas or formed notions or principles laid in by nature, antecedently to the exercise of our senses and understandings; yet it must be granted that we were born with the natural faculty, whereby we actually discern the agreement or disagreement of some notions, so soon as we have the notions themselves; as, that we can or do think, that therefore we ourselves are; that one and two make three, that gold is not silver, nor ice formally water; that the whole is greater than its part, &c., and if we should set ourselves to do it, we cannot deliberately and seriously doubt of its being so. This we may call intuitive knowledge, or natural certainty wrought into our very make and constitution."³

"Some writers have imagined, that no conclusions can be drawn from the state of the passions for or against the Divine Benevolence, because they are not *innate* but acquired. This is frivolous. If we are so framed and placed in such circumstances, that all these various passions must be acquired; it is just the same thing as if they had been planted in us originally."⁴

"Ni nos idées, ni nos sentiments, ne sont *innés*, mais ils sont *naturels*, fondés sur la constitution de notre esprit et de

¹ *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book 1., ch. 3.

² King's *Essay on Origin of Evil*, p. 79, note.

³ Oldfield, *Essay on Reason*, p. 5, 8vo, Lond., 1707.

⁴ Balguy, *Divine Benevolence*, p. 100, note.

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notre ame, et sur nos rapports avec tout ce qui nous environne.” — Turgot,¹ quoted by Cousin.²

“We are prepared to defend the following propositions in regard to *innate ideas*, or constitutional principles of the mind. *First*,—Negatively, that there are no innate ideas in the mind (1.) as images or mental representations; nor (2.) as abstract or general notions; nor (3.) as principles of thought, belief, or action before the mind as principles. But, *Second*,—Positively (1.) that there are constitutional principles operating in the mind, though not before the consciousness as principles; (2.) that these come forth into consciousness as individual (not general) cognitions or judgments; and (3.) that these individual exercises, when carefully inducted, but only when so, give us primitive or philosophic truths. It follows that, while these native principles operate in the mind spontaneously, we are entitled to use them reflexly in philosophic or theologic speculations only after having determined their nature and rule by abstraction and generalization.”³

“Though man does not receive from his Maker either speculative or moral maxims, as rules of judgment and of conduct, like so many perfect *innate* propositions enforcing assent in his very infancy; yet he has received that constitution of mind which enables him to form to himself the general rules or first principles on which religion and science must be built, when he allows himself these advantages of cultivation and exercise, which every talent he possesses absolutely requires. And this is all that is pleaded for; and it is sufficient for the end. Nor is there anything either mystical, or unphilosophical, or unscriptural in the notion. For if the proposition be not strictly innate, it arises from an innate power, which, in a sound mind, cannot form a proposition in any other way that will harmonize with enlightened reason and purified moral sentiment than in that to which the natural bias of the mind leads.”⁴

The doctrine of *innate ideas* is handled by Locke in his *Essay on Hum. Understand.*,⁵ and by most authors who treat

¹ *Œuvres*, tom. iv., p. 308.

² *Œuvres*, 1^{re} série, tom. iv., p. 202.

³ M'Cosh, *Meth. of Div. Govern.*, p. 508, 5th edit.

⁴ Hancock, *On Instinct*, p. 414.

⁵ Book I.

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of intellectual philosophy.—See also Ellis, *Knowledge of Divine Things*;¹ Sherlock, *On the Immortality of the Soul*.²

INSTINCT (*ἰνστίς* or *ἰνστικός*; and *ενιςτω*, *intus pingo*), signifies an internal stimulus.

In its widest signification it has been applied to plants as well as to animals; and may be defined to be "the power or energy by which all organized forms are preserved in the individual, or continued in the species." It is more common, however, to consider *instinct* as belonging to animals. And in this view of it, Dr. Reid³ has said:—"By *instinct* I mean a natural blind impulse to certain actions without having any end in view, without deliberation, and very often without any conception of what we do." An *instinct*, says Paley,⁴ "is a propensity prior to experience and independent of instruction."

"An instinct," says Dr. Whately,⁵ "is a blind tendency to some mode of action independent of any consideration on the part of the agent, of the end to which the action leads."

There are two classes of actions, which, in the inferior animals, have been referred to *instinct* as their spring. 1. Those which have reference to the preservation of individuals—as the seeking and discerning the food which is convenient for them, and the using their natural organs of locomotion, and their natural means of defence and attack. 2. Those which have reference to the continuation of the species—as the bringing forth and bringing up of their young.

The theories which have been proposed to explain the *instinctive* operations of the inferior animals may be arranged in three classes.

I. According to the *physical* theories, the operations of *instinct* are all provided for in the structure and organization of the inferior animals, and do not imply any mind or soul. The principle of life may be developed —

1. By the *mechanical play of bodily organs*. See Descartes, *Epistles*; Polignac, *Anti-Lucretius*; ⁶ Norris, *Essay towards the Theory of an Ideal World*.⁷

¹ Pp. 50-56.

² *Act. Pow.*, essay III., part 1, chap. 2.

³ *Nat. Theol.*, chap. 18.

⁴ Book vi.

⁵ Chap. 2.

⁶ *Tract on Instinct*, p. 21.

⁷ Part 2, ch. 2.

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2. By *Irritability*: Badham, *Insect Life*; Mason Good, *Book of Nature*;¹ Virey, *De la Physiologie dans ses rapports, avec la Philosophie*.²

3. By *Sensation*: Bushnan, *Philosophy of Instinct and Reason*;³ Barlow, *Connection between Physiology and Intellectual Philosophy*; Kirby, *Bridgewater Treatise*.⁴

II. According to the *psychical* theories, the instinctive actions of the inferior animals are the results of mental powers or faculties possessed by them, analogous to those of understanding in man.

1. Mr. Coleridge⁵ calls *instinct* "the power of selecting and adapting means to a proximate end." But he thinks "that when *instinct* adapts itself, as it sometimes does, to *varying* circumstances, there is manifested by the inferior animals, an instinctive intelligence, which is not different in kind from understanding, or the faculty which judges according to sense in man."—Green, *Vital Dynamics*,⁶ or Coleridge's *Works*.⁷

2. Dr. Darwin⁸ contends, that what have been called the instinctive actions of the inferior animals are to be referred to experience and reasoning, as well as those of our own species; "though their reasoning is from fewer ideas, is busied about fewer objects, and is exerted with less energy."

3. Mr. Smellie,⁹ instead of regarding the instinctive actions of the inferior animals as the results of reasoning, regards the power of reasoning as itself an *instinct*. He holds¹⁰ that "all animals are, in some measure, rational beings; and that the dignity and superiority of the human intellect are necessary results of the great variety of *instincts* which nature has been pleased to confer on the species."

III. According to the theories which may be called *hyper-psychical*, the phenomena of *instinct* are the results of an intelligence, different from the human, which emanates upon the inferior animals from the supreme spirit or some subordinate spirit.

This doctrine is wrapped up in the ancient fable, that the

¹ Vol. II., p. 182.

² P. 394.

³ P. 178.

⁴ Vol. II., p. 285.

⁵ *Aids to Reflection*, vol. I., p. 193, 6th edit.

⁶ App. F., p. 88.

⁷ Vol. II., App. B, 5.

⁸ *Zoonomia*, vol. I., 4to, p. 256-7.

⁹ *Philosophy of Nat. Hist.*, vol. I., 4to, p. 155

¹⁰ P. 158.

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gods, when pursued by the Titans, fled into Egypt, and took refuge under the form of animals of different kinds.

Father Bougeant, in a work entitled, *A Philosophical Amusement on the Language of Beasts*, contends that the bodies of the inferior animals are inhabited by fallen and reprobate spirits.

Mr. French¹ holds that the actions of the inferior animals are produced by good and evil spirits; the former being the cause of the *benevolent*, and the latter of the *ferocious* instincts.

Others have referred the operations of *instinct* to the direct agency of the Creator on the inferior animals.—See Newton, *Optics*; ² *Spectator*; ³ Hancock, *Essay on Instinct*.

Dr. Reid⁴ has maintained, that in the human being many actions, such as sucking and swallowing, are done by *instinct*; while Dr. Priestley⁵ regards them as automatic or acquired. And the interpretation of natural signs and other acts which Dr. Reid considers to be instinctive, Dr. Priestley refers to association and experience.—V. APPETITE.

INTELLECT (*intelligo*, to choose between, to perceive a difference).—*Intellect*, *sensitivity*, and *will*, are the three heads under which the powers and capacities of the human mind are now generally arranged. In this use of it, the term *intellect* includes all those powers by which we acquire, retain, and extend our knowledge, as perception, memory, imagination, judgment, &c. "It is by those powers and faculties which compose that part of his nature commonly called his *intellect* or *understanding* that man acquires his knowledge of external objects; that he investigates truth in the sciences; that he combines means in order to attain the ends he has in view; and that he imparts to his fellow-creatures the acquisitions he has made."⁶

The *intellectual* powers are commonly distinguished from the *moral* powers; inasmuch as it is admitted that the

¹ *Zoological Journal*, No. 1.

² Book iii., xx., query subjoined.

³ *Act. Pow.*, essay iii., pt. i., chap. 2.

⁴ *Examina. of Reid*, &c., p. 70.

⁵ Stewart, *Active and Moral Powers*, Introd.

⁶ No. 120.

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moral powers partake partly of the *intellect* and partly of the *sensitivity*, and imply not only *knowledge* but *feeling*.

And when the moral powers are designated active, it is not meant to assert that in exercising the intellectual powers the mind is altogether passive, but only to intimate that while the function of the intellectual powers is to give knowledge, the function of the active and moral powers is to prompt and regulate actions.

Lord Monboddo¹ reduces the gnostic powers to two, viz.—*sense* and *intellect*. Under *sense* he includes the phantasy and also the comparing faculty, and that by which we apprehend ideas, either single or in combination. This he considers to be partly rational, and shared by us with the brutes. But *intellect* or *νοῦς*, he considers peculiar to man—it is the faculty by which we generalize and have ideas altogether independent of sense. He quotes Hierocles² on the golden verses of Pythagoras, as representing the λόγος or ψυχὴ λογικὴ, as holding a middle place betwixt the irrational or lowest part of our nature and intellect, which is the highest.

“The term *intellect* is derived from a verb (*intelligere*), which signifies to *understand*: but the term itself is usually so applied as to imply a faculty which recognizes principles explicitly as well as implicitly; and abstract as well as applied; and therefore agrees with the reason rather than the understanding; and the same extent of signification belongs to the adjective intellectual.”³

“*Understanding* is Saxon and *intellect* is Latin for nearly the same idea: perhaps *understanding* describes rather the power of inference, a quickness at perceiving that which *stands under* the object of contemplation: perhaps *intellect* describes rather the power of judgment, a quickness at *choosing between* (*inter* and *legere*) the objects of contemplation.”⁴

Intellect and Intellection.—“The mind of man is, by its native faculty, able to discern universal propositions, in the same manner as the sense does particular ones—that is, as the truth

¹ *Ancient Metaphysics*, book II., chap. 7.

² P. 160, edit. Needham.

³ Whewell, *Elements of Morality*, introd. 12.

⁴ Taylor, *Synonyms*.

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of these propositions — Socrates exists, An eagle flies, Bucephalus runs, is immediately perceived and judged of by the sense; so these contradictory propositions cannot be both true; What begins to exist has its rise from another; Action argues that a thing exists (or, as it is vulgarly expressed, a thing that is not, acts not), and such-like propositions, which the mind directly contemplates and finds to be true by its native force, without any previous notion or applied reasoning; which method of attaining truth is by a peculiar name styled *intellection*, and the faculty of attaining it the *intellect*.”¹

Intellect and Intelligence. — “By Aristotle, *νοῦς* is used to denote —

“1. Our higher faculties of thought and knowledge.

“2. The faculty, habit, or place of principles, that is, of self-evident and self-evidencing notions and judgments.

“The schoolmen, following Boethius, translated it by *intellectus* and *intelligentia*; and some of them appropriated the former of these terms to its first or general signification, the latter to its second or special.”²

Intellect and *intelligence* are commonly used as synonymous. But Trusler has said, “It seems to me that *intellectus* ought to describe *art* or *power*, and *intelligentia* ought to describe *use* or *habit* of the understanding; such being the tendency of the inflections in which the words terminate. In this case *intellect* or understanding power is a gift of nature; and *intelligence*, or understanding habit, an accumulation of time. So discriminated, *intellect* is inspired, *intelligence* is acquired. The Supreme *Intellect*, when we are speaking of the Wisdom, the Supreme *Intelligence* when we are speaking of the Knowledge of God. Every man is endowed with understanding; but it requires reading to become a man of *intelligence*.” — V. REASON, UNDERSTANDING.

Intellectus Patiens. and Intellectus Agens. — Aristotle³ distinguished between the *intellectus patiens* and *intellectus agens*. The former, perishing with the body, by means of the senses, imagination, and memory, furnished the matter of knowledge;

¹ Barrow, *Mathem. Lectures*, 1734, p. 72.

² Sir William Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note 4, sect. 5.

³ *De Anima*, cap. 5.

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the latter, separable from the body, and eternal, gave that knowledge form. Under the impressions of the senses the mind is passive; but while external things rapidly pass, imagination does not allow them altogether to escape, but the knowledge of them is retained by the memory. But this knowledge, being the knowledge of singulars, cannot give universal notions, but merely generalized ones. The *intellectus agens*, however, proceeding upon the information furnished by the senses, actually evolves the idea which the *intellectus patiens* potentially possessed. His illustration is, — as light makes colours existing potentially, actually to be, so the *intellectus agens* converts into actuality, and brings, as it were, to a new life, whatever was discovered or collected by the *intellectus patiens*. As the senses receive the forms of things expressed in matter, the *intellect* comprehends the universal form, which, free from the changes of matter, is really prior to it and underlies the production of it as cause. The common illustration of Aristotle is that the senses perceive the form of a thing, as it is τό αἶψόν or a height; the *intellect* has knowledge of it as resembling τὴ κοίτη, a hollow, out of which the height was produced.

Aristotle has often been said to reduce all knowledge to experience. But although he maintained that we could not shut our eyes and frame laws and causes for all things, yet he maintained, while he appealed to experience, that the *intellect* was the ultimate judge of what is true.¹

According to Thomas Aquinas,² "*Intellectus noster nihil intelligit sine phantasmate.*" But he distinguished between the *intellect passive* and the *intellect active*; the one receiving impressions from the senses, and the other reasoning on them. Sense knows the individual, *intellect* the universal. You see a triangle, but you rise to the idea of triangularity. It is this power of generalizing which specializes man and makes him what he is, *intelligent*.

INTENT or INTENTION (*in-tendo*, to tend to), in morals and in law, means that act of the mind by which we contemplate

¹ See Hermann Rassow, *Aristotelis de Notionis Definitione Doctrina*, Berol., 1842.

² *Adv. Gentis*, lib. iii., cap. 41.

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and design the accomplishment of some end. It is followed by the adoption and use of suitable means. But this is more directly indicated by the word *purpose*. "He had long harboured the *intention* of taking away the life of his enemy, and for this *purpose* he provided himself with weapons." *Purpose* is a step nearer action than *intention*. But both in law and in morals, *intention*, according as it is right or wrong, good or bad, affects the nature or character of the action following. According to the doctrine of the Church of Rome, *intention* may altogether change the nature of an action. Killing may be no murder, if done with the *intention* of freeing the church from a persecutor, and society from a tyrant. And if a priest administers any of the sacraments without the *intention* of exercising his priestly functions, these sacraments may be rendered void. — V. ELECTION.

INTENTION (Logical).

Quoth he, whatever others deem ye,
I understand your metonymy,¹
Your words of second-hand *intention*,
When things by wrongful names you mention.

Butler, *Hudibras*.

Intention, with logicians, has the same meaning as *notion*; as it is by *notions* the mind tends towards or attends to objects. — V. NOTION.

Intention (First and Second).

"Nouns of the *first intention* are those which are imposed upon things as such, that conception alone intervening, by which the mind is carried immediately to the thing itself. Such are *man* and *stone*. But nouns of the *second intention* are those which are imposed upon things not in virtue of what they are in themselves, but in virtue of their being subject to the *intention* which the mind makes concerning them; as, when we say that *man* is a *species*, and *animal* a *genus*."²

Raoul le Breton, *Super Lib. Poster. Analyt.* He was a Thomist.

¹ "The transference of words from the primary to a secondary meaning, is what grammarians call metonymy. Thus a *door* signifies both an opening in the wall (more strictly called the doorway) and a board which closes it; which are things neither similar nor analogous." — Whately, *Log.*, b. III., § 10.

² Part II., canto 3, l. 887.

³ Aquinas, *Opuscula*, xlii., art. 12, ad init.

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See *Tractatio de Secundis Intentionibus secundum doctrinam Scoti*. By Sarnanus, 4to, Ursellis, 1622.

A *first intention* may be defined "a conception of a thing or things formed by the mind from materials existing without itself."

A *second intention* is "a conception of another conception or conceptions formed by the mind from materials existing in itself." Thus the conceptions "*man, animal, whiteness,*" &c., are framed from marks presented by natural objects. "The conceptions, *genus, species, accident,* &c., are formed from the *first intentions* themselves viewed in certain relations to each other."¹

INTERPRETATION OF NATURE.—"There are," says Bacon,² "two ways, and can be only two, of seeking and finding truth. One springs at once from the sense, and from particulars, to the most general axioms; and from principles thus obtained, and their truth assumed as a fixed point, judges and invents intermediate axioms. This is the way now in use. The other obtains its axioms (that is, its truths) also from the sense and from particulars, by a connected and gradual progress, so as to arrive, in the last place, at the most general truths. This is the true way, as yet untried. The former set of doctrines we call," he says,³ "for the sake of clearness, '*Anticipation of Nature,*' the latter the '*Interpretation of Nature.*'"

INTUITION (from *intueor*, to behold).—"Sometimes the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately by themselves, without the intervention of any other; and this, I think, we may call *intuitive* knowledge. For in this the mind is at no pains of proving or examining, but perceives the truth as the eye doth the light, only by being directed towards it. Thus, the mind perceives that white is not black, that a circle is not a triangle, that three are more than two, and equal to one and two."⁴

"What we know or comprehend as soon as we perceive or

¹ Mansel, *Note to Aldrich*, 1849, pp. 16, 17. See *Review of Whately's Logic*, No. cxv *Edin. Review*.

² *Nov. Org.*, i., Aph. 19.

³ Aph. 24.

⁴ Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, b. iv., ch. 2.

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attend to it, we are said to know by *intuition*: things which we know by *intuition*, cannot be made more certain by arguments, than they are at first. We know by *intuition* that all the parts of a thing together are equal to the whole of it. Axioms are propositions known by *intuition*.”¹

“*Intuition* has been applied by Dr. Beattie and others, not only to the power by which we perceive the truth of the axioms of geometry, but to that by which we recognize the authority of the fundamental laws of belief, when we hear them enunciated in language. My only objection to this use of the word is, that it is a departure from common practice; according to which, if I be not mistaken, the proper objects of *intuition* are propositions analogous to the axioms prefixed to Euclid’s *Elements*. In some other respects this innovation might perhaps be regarded as an improvement on the very limited and imperfect vocabulary of which we are able to avail ourselves in our present discussions.”²

“*Intuition* is properly attributed and should be carefully restricted, to those instinctive faculties and impulses, external and internal, which act instantaneously and irresistibly, which were given by nature as the first inlets of all knowledge, and which we have called the *Primary Principles*, whilst self-evidence may be justly and properly attributed to axioms, or the *Secondary Principles* of truth.”³

On the difference between knowledge as *intuitive*, *immediate*, or *presentative*, and as *mediate*, or *representative*, see Sir W. Hamilton.⁴

Intuition is used in the extent of the German *Anschauung*, to include all the products of the perceptive (external or internal) and imaginative faculties; every act of consciousness, in short, of which the immediate object is an *individual* thing, state, or act of mind, presented under the condition of distinct existence in space or time.”⁵

“Besides its original and proper meaning (as a visual perception), it has been employed to denote a kind of *appro-*

¹ Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

² Stewart, *Elements*, part II., chap. 1, sect. 2.

³ Tatham, *Chart and Scale of Truth*, ch. 7, lect. 1.

⁴ Reid’s *Works*; note 2.

⁵ Mansel, *Prolegom. Log.* p. 9.

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hension and a kind of *judgment*. Under the former head it has been used to denote, 1. A perception of the actual and present, in opposition to the *abstractive* knowledge which we have of the possible in imagination, and of the past in memory. 2. An immediate apprehension of a thing in itself, in contrast to a representative, vicarious or mediate, apprehension of it, in or through something else. (Hence by Fichte, Schelling, and others, *intuition* is employed to designate the *cognition* as opposed to the *conception* of the absolute.) 3. The knowledge, which we can adequately represent in imagination, in contradistinction to the 'symbolical' knowledge which we cannot image, but only think or conceive, through and under a sign or word. (Hence, probably, Kant's application of the term to the forms of the sensibility, the imaginations of Time and Space, in contrast to the forms or categories of the Understanding). 4. Perception proper (the objective), in contrast to sensation proper (the subjective), in our sensitive consciousness. 5. The simple apprehension of a notion, in contradistinction to the complex apprehension of the terms of a proposition.

"Under the latter head it has only a single signification, viz. :—To denote the immediate affirmation by the intellect, the predicate does or does not pertain to the subject, in what are called self-evident propositions."¹

INTUITION and CONCEPTION.—"The perceptions of sense are immediate, those of the understanding mediate only; sense refers its perceptions directly and immediately to an object. Hence the perception is singular, incomplex, and immediate, *i. e.*, is *intuition*. When I see a star, or hear the tones of a harp, the perceptions are immediate, incomplex, and intuitive. This is the good old logical meaning of the word *intuition*. In our philosophic writings, however, *intuitive* and *intuition* have come to be applied solely to propositions; it is here extended to the first elements of perception, whence such propositions spring. Again, *intuition*, in English, is restricted to perceptions *a priori*; but the established logical use and wont applies the word to every incomplex representation whatever; and

¹ Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note A, sect. 5, p. 759.

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it is left for further and mere deep inquiry to ascertain what *intuitions* are founded on observation and experience, and what arise from *à priori* sources."¹

INVENTION (*invenio*, to come in, or to come at) is the creation or construction of something which has not before existed. Discovery is the making manifest something which hitherto has been unknown. We *discover* or uncover what is hidden. We *come at* new objects. Galileo *invented* the telescope. Harvey *discovered* the circulation of the blood.

"We speak of the *invention* of printing, the *discovery* of America. Shift these words, and speak, for instance, of the *invention* of America, you feel at once how unsuitable the language is. And why? Because Columbus did not make that to be which before him had not been. America was there before he revealed it to European eyes; but that which before was, he showed to be; he withdrew the veil which hitherto had concealed it, he *discovered* it."²

Newton *discovered* the law of gravitation, but Watt *invented* the steam engine. We speak with a true distinction, of the *inventions* of Art, the *discoveries* of Science.

In Locke and his contemporaries, to say nothing of the older writers, to *invent* is currently used for to *discover*. Thus Bacon³ says, "Logic does not pretend to *invent* science, or the axioms of sciences, but passes it over with a *cuique in sua arte credendum*."

IRONY (*εἰρωνεία*, dissimulation), is an ignorance purposely affected to provoke or confound an antagonist. It was very much employed by Socrates against the Sophists. In modern times it was adopted by Burke in his *Defence of Natural Society*, in which, assuming the person of Bolingbroke, he proves, according to the principles of that author, that the arguments he brought against ecclesiastical, would equally lie against civil, institutions. Sir William Drummond, in his *Œdipus Judaicus*, maintained that the history of the twelve patriarchs is a mythical representation of the signs of the Zodiac. Dr. Townsend, in his *Œdipus Romanus*, attempts to show that upon the same principles the twelve patriarchs

¹ Semple, *Introd. to Metaphys. of Ethics*, p. 34.

² Trench, *On Words*.

³ *Adv. of Learning*.

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were prophecies of the twelve Cæsars. Dr. Whately, in a pamphlet entitled *Historic Doubts*, attempted to show that objections similar to those against the Scripture-history, and much more plausible, might be urged against all the received accounts of Napoleon Bonaparte.

JUDGMENT. — “A judgment is a combination of two concepts, related to one or more common objects of possible intuition.”¹

Our judgments, according to Aristotle, are either *problematical*, *assertive*, or *demonstrable*; or, in other words, the results of *opinion*, of *belief*, or of *science*.

“The *problematical judgment* is neither subjectively nor objectively true, that is, it is neither held with entire certainty by the thinking subject, nor can we show that it truly represents the object about which we judge. It is a mere opinion. It may, however, be the expression of our presentiment of certainty; and what was held as mere opinion before proof, may afterwards be proved to demonstration. Great discoveries are problems at first, and the examination of them leads to a conviction of their truth, as it has done to the abandonment of many false opinions. In other subjects, we cannot, from the nature of the case, advance beyond mere opinion. Whenever we judge about variable things, as the future actions of men, the best course of conduct for ourselves under doubtful circumstances, historical facts about which there is conflicting testimony, we can but form a *problematical judgment*, and must admit the possibility of error at the moment of making our decision.

“The *assertive judgment* is one of which we are fully persuaded ourselves, but cannot give grounds for our belief that shall compel men in general to coincide with us. It is therefore *subjectively*, but not *objectively*, certain. It commends itself to our moral nature, and in so far as other men are of the same disposition, they will accept it likewise.

“The *demonstrative judgment* is both *subjectively* and *objectively* true. It may either be certain in itself, as a mathematical

¹ Mansel, *Prolegom. Log.*, p. 60.

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axiom is, or capable of proof by means of other judgments, as the theories of mathematics and the laws of physical science."¹

Port Royal definition:—"Judgment is that operation of the mind through which, joining different ideas together, it affirms or denies the one or the other; as when, for instance, having the ideas of the earth and roundness, it affirms or denies that the earth is round."

When expressed in words a *judgment* is called a proposition. According to Mr. Locke, *judgment* implies the comparison of two or more ideas. But Dr. Reid² says he applies the word *judgment* to every determination of the mind concerning what is true or false, and shows that many of these determinations are simple and primitive beliefs (not the result of comparing two or more ideas), accompanying the exercise of all our faculties, *judgments* of nature, the spontaneous product of intelligence.

"One of the most important distinctions of our *judgments* is, that some of them are intuitive, others grounded on argument."

In his *Inquiry*,³ he shows that *judgment* and belief, so far from arising from the comparison of ideas, in some cases precede even simple apprehension.

The same view has been taken by Adolphe Garnier, in his *Traité des Facultés de l'ame*.⁴

Judgments, Analytic, Synthetic, and Tautologous.—"Some *judgments* are merely explanatory of their subject, having for their predicate a conception which it fairly implies, to all who know and can define its nature. They are called *analytic judgments* because they *unfold* the meaning of the subject, without determining anything new concerning it. If we say that 'all triangles have three sides,' the *judgment* is *analytic*; because having three sides is always implied in a right notion of a triangle. Such *judgments*, as declaring the nature or essence of the subject, have been called 'essential propositions.'

"*Judgments* of another class attribute to the subject something not directly implied in it, and thus increase our know

¹ Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*, pp. 304-6.

² *Intel. Pow.*, essay vi., chap. 1. Chap. 4.

³ Chap. 2, sect. 4.

⁴ 3 tom., 8vo, Paris, 1862.

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ledge. They are called *synthetic*, from *placing together* two notions not hitherto associated. 'All bodies possess power of attraction' is a *synthetic judgment*, because we can think of bodies without thinking of attraction as one of their immediate primary attributes.

"We must distinguish between *analytic* and *tautologous judgments*. Whilst the *analytic* display the meaning of the subject, and put the same *matter* in a new *form*, the *tautologous* only repeat the subject, and give us the same matter in the same form, as 'whatever is, is.' 'A spirit is a spirit.'

"It is a misnomer to call *analytic judgments* identical propositions.¹ 'Every man is a living creature' would not be an identical proposition unless 'living creature' denoted the same as 'man;' whereas it is far more extensive. Locke² understands by identical propositions only such as are tautologous. — Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*.³

JURISPRUDENCE (*jurisprudentia*, the science of rights).—Some refer the Latin word *jus* to *jussum*, the supine of the verb *jubeo*, to order or enact. Others refer it to *justum*, that which is just and right. But as right is, or ought to be, the foundation of positive law, a thing is *jussum*, *quia justum est*—made law because it was antecedently just and right.

Jurisprudence is the science of rights in accordance with positive law. It is distinguished into universal and particular. "The former relates to the science of law in general, and investigates the principles which are common to all positive systems of law, apart from the local, partial, and accidental circumstances and peculiarities by which these systems respectively are distinguished from one another. Particular *jurisprudence* treats of the laws of particular states; which laws are, or at least profess to be, the rules and principles of universal *jurisprudence* itself, specifically developed and applied."

There is a close connection between *jurisprudence* and *morality*, so close that it is difficult to determine precisely the respective limits of each. Both rest upon the great law of right and wrong as made known by the light of nature. But while *morality* enjoins obedience to that law in all its extent, *jurisprudence* exacts obedience to it only in so far as the law

¹ Mill, *Log.*, b. I., chap. 6² B. IV., ch. 8, 2.³ Pp. 194, 195.

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of nature has been recognized in the law of nations or the positive institutions of society. *Morality* is, therefore, more extensive than *jurisprudence*. *Morality* has equal reference to the whole of human duty. *Jurisprudence* has special reference to social duty. All social duty as enjoined by the light of nature—whether included under justice or benevolence—belongs to *morality*. *Jurisprudence* treats chiefly or almost exclusively of duties of justice, which have been made the subject of positive law; which duties of benevolence cannot well be. The rules of *morality* as such, are enforced merely by the law within; but in so far as they have been adopted by *jurisprudence*, they can be enforced by external law. The *moralist* appeals to our sense of duty, the *jurist* to a sense of authority or law. "As the sense of duty is the sense of moral necessity simply, and excluding the sense of physical (or external) compulsion, so the sense of law is the sense of the same necessity, in combination with the notion of physical (or external) compulsion in aid of its requirements."¹

The difference between *morality* and *jurisprudence* as to extent of range, may be illustrated by the difference of signification between the word *right*, when used as an adjective, and when used as a substantive. *Morality* contemplates all that is *right* in action and disposition. *Jurisprudence* contemplates only that which one man has a *right* to from another. "The adjective *right*," says Dr. Whewell,² "has a much wider signification than the substantive *right*. Everything is *right* which is conformable to the supreme rule of human action; but that only is a *right* which, being conformable to the supreme rule, is realized in society and vested in a particular person. Hence the two words may often be properly opposed. We may say, that a poor man has *no right* to relief; but it is *right* he should have it. A rich man has a *right* to destroy the harvest of his fields; but to do so would not be *right*." So that the sphere of *morality* is wider than that of *jurisprudence*, the former embracing all that is *right*, the latter only particular *rights* realized or vested in particular persons.

¹ Foster, *Elements of Jurisprudence*, p. 39.

² *Elements of Morality*, No. 84.

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Morality and *jurisprudence* differ also in the immediate ground of obligation. *Morality* enjoins us to do what is *right*, because it is *right*. *Jurisprudence* enjoins us to give to others their *right*, with ultimate reference, no doubt, to the truth made known to us by the light of nature, that we are morally bound to do so; but, appealing more directly to the fact, that our doing so can be demanded by our neighbour, and that his demand will be enforced by the authority of positive law. And this difference between the immediate ground of obligation in matters of *morality* and matters of *jurisprudence*, gives rise to a difference of meaning in the use of some words which are generally employed as synonymous. For example, if regard be had to the difference between *morality* and *jurisprudence*, *duty* is a word of wider signification than *obligation*: just as *right*, the adjective, is of wider signification than *right*, the substantive. It is my *duty* to do what is *right*. I am under *obligation* to give another man his *right*. A similar shade of difference in meaning may be noticed in reference to the words *ought* and *obliged*. I *ought* to do my duty; I am *obliged* to give a man his *right*. I am not *obliged* to relieve a distressed person, but I *ought* to do so.

These distinctions are sometimes explained by saying, that what is enjoined by *jurisprudence* is of *perfect obligation*, and what is enjoined only by *morality* is of *imperfect obligation*,—that is, that we may or may not do what our conscience dictates, but that we can be compelled to do what positive law demands. But these phrases of *perfect* and *imperfect obligation* are objectionable, in so far as they tend to represent the obligations of *morality* as inferior to those of *jurisprudence*—the dictates of conscience as of less authority than the enactments of law—whereas the latter rest upon the former, and the law of nations derives its binding force from the law of nature.

Grotius, *De Jure Belli et Pacis*; Puffendorff, *De Officio Hominis et Civis*; Leibnitz, *Jurisprudentia*; Montesquieu, *Spirit of Laws*; Burlamaqui, *Principles of Natural Law*; Rutherford, *Institutes of Natural Law*; Mackintosh, *Discourse of the Law of Nature and of Nations*; Lermnier, *Sur le Droit*.

JUSTICE (*δικαιοσύνη, justitia*), is one of the four cardinal virtues. It consists, according to Cicero,¹ *in suo cuique tribuendo*, in according to every one his right. By the Pythagoreans, and also by Plato, it was regarded as including all human virtue or duty. The word righteousness is used in our translation of the Scripture in a like extensive signification. As opposed to equity, *justice* (*τὸ νομιζόν*) means doing merely what positive law requires, while equity (*τὸ ἴσον*) means doing what is fair and right in the circumstances of every particular case. *Justice* is not founded in law, as Hobbes and others hold, but in our idea of what is right. And laws are just or unjust in so far as they do or do not conform to that idea.

"To say that there is nothing just nor unjust but what is commanded or prohibited by positive laws," remarks Montesquieu,² "is like saying that the radii of a circle were not equal till you had drawn the circumference."

Justice may be distinguished as ethical, economical, and political. The first consists in doing *justice* between man and man as men; the second, in doing *justice* between the members of a family or household; and the third, in doing *justice* between the members of a community or commonwealth. These distinctions are taken by More in his *Enchiridion Ethicum*, and are adopted by Grove in his *Moral Philosophy*.

Plato's *Republic* contains a delineation of *justice*.—Aristotle, *Ethic.*;³ Cicero, *De Finibus*.

Horace⁴ gives the idea of a just or good man. — V. RIGHT, DUTY, EQUITY.

KABALA.—In Hebrew *kabal* signifies "to receive;" *masora* "to hand down." "The Kabalists believe that God has expressly committed his mysteries to certain chosen persons, and that they themselves have received those mysteries in trust, still further to hand them down to worthy recipients."⁵

The origin of the *kabala* has been carried back to Moses,

¹ *De Finibus*, lib. v., cap. 23.

² *Spirit of Laws*, book I., chap. 1.

³ Lib. v.

⁴ *Ethieridge, Heb. Liter.*, p. 293.

⁵ *Eptid.*, lib. I., 16, 40.

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and even to Adam. The numerous allusions to it in the Mishna and Gemara, show, that under the Tanaim, a certain philosophy, or religious metaphysic, was secretly taught, and that this system of esoteric teaching related especially to the Creation and the Godhead. So early as A. D. 189, the time of the Mishna redaction, it was recognized as an established theosophy, the privilege of select disciples. Two works of the Mishnaic period are still extant in authentic and complete form, viz., *Sepher Tetsira* and the *Zohar*. The *kabala*, considered as a constructed science, is theoretical and practical. The practical department comprises a symbolical apparatus, and rules for the use of it. The theoretical consists of two parts—the *cosmogonic*, relating to the visible universe, and the *theogonic* and *pneumatological*, relating to the spiritual world and the perfections of the Divine nature. Pantheism is the foundation of both. The universe is a revelation of the Infinite—an immanent effect of His ever active power and presence. Towards the end of the fifteenth century the *kabala* was adopted by several Christian mystics. Raymond Lully, Reuchlin, Henry More, and others paid much attention to it.

Reuchlin, *De Arte Cabalistica*; ¹ *De Verbo Mirifico*; ² Athanasius Kircher, *Œdipus Œgyptiacus*; ³ Henry More, *Cabbala*; ⁴ Ad. Franck, *La Kabbale*; ⁵ Etheridge, *Hebrew Literature*; ⁶ Picus (J. Paris.), *Cabalistarum Selectiora Obscurioraque Dogmata*.⁷

KNOWLEDGE (*γνῶσις*, *cognitio*).

. . . . "Learning dwells
In heads replete with thoughts of other men,
Knowledge in minds attentive to their own."

"*Knowledges* (or cognitions), in common use with Bacon and our English philosophers, till after the time of Locke, ought not to be discarded. It is, however, unnoticed by any English lexicographer."¹

"*Knowledge* is the perception of the connection and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas

¹ Fol., Hagen, 1617.

² Fol., Basil, 1494.

³ Fol., Rom., 1661.

⁴ Fol., Lond., 1662.

⁵ 8vo, Paris, 1843.

⁶ 8vo, Lond., 1866.

⁷ 12mo, Venet., 1669.

⁸ Sir William Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note A, sect. 5, p. 763.

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Where this perception is, there is *knowledge*; and where it is not, then, though we may fancy, guess, or believe, yet we always come short of *knowledge*."—Locke.¹ And in chap. 14, he says, "The mind has two faculties conversant about truth and falsehood. *First, knowledge*, whereby it certainly perceives, and is undoubtedly satisfied of the agreement or disagreement of any ideas. *Secondly, judgment*, which is the putting ideas together, or separating them from one another in the mind, when their certain agreement or disagreement is not perceived, but presumed to be so." *Knowledge* is here opposed to opinion. But judgment is the faculty by which we attain to certainty, as well as to opinion. "And," says Dr. Reid,² "I know no authority, besides that of Mr. Locke, for calling *knowledge* a faculty, any more than for calling opinion a faculty."

"*Knowledge* implies three things, — 1st, *Firm Belief*; 2d, of what is *true*; 3d, On sufficient *grounds*. If any one, *e. g.*, is in *doubt* respecting one of Euclid's demonstrations, he cannot be said to *know* the proposition proved by it; if, again, he is fully *convinced* of anything that is not *true*, he is mistaken in supposing himself to know it; lastly, if two persons are each *fully confident*, one, that the moon is inhabited, and the other, that it is not (though one of these opinions must be true), neither of them could properly be said to *know* the truth, since he cannot have sufficient *proof* of it."³

Knowledge supposes three terms: a *being* who knows, an *object* known, and a *relation* determined between the knowing being and the known object. This relation properly constitutes *knowledge*.

But this relation may not be exact, in conformity with the nature of things; *knowledge* is not *truth*. *Knowledge* is a subjective conception — a relative state of the human mind; it resides in the relation, essentially ideal, of our thought and its object. *Truth*, on the contrary, is the reality itself, the reality ontological and absolute, considered in their absolute relations with intelligence, and independent of our personal

¹ *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book iv., chap. 1.

² *Intell. Pow.*, essay iv., chap. 3.

³ Whately, *Log.*, book iv., chap. 2, § 2, nota.

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conceptions. Truth has its source in God; *knowledge* proceeds from man. *Knowledge* is true and perfect from the moment that our conception is really conformable to that which is— from the moment that our thought has seized the reality. And, in this view, truth may be defined to be the conformity of our thought with the nature of its object.

But truth is not yet *certitude*. It may exist in itself without being acquired by the human mind, without existing actually for us. It does not become certain to us till we have acquired it by the employment of method. *Certitude* is thus truth brought methodically to the human intelligence,—that is, conducted from principle to principle, to a point which is evident of itself. If such a point exist, it is plain that we can attain to all the truths which attach themselves to it directly or indirectly; and that we may have of these truths, howsoever remote, a *certainty* as complete as that of the point of departure.

Certitude, then, in its last analysis, is *the relation of truth to knowledge*, the relation of man to God, of ontology to psychology. When the human intelligence, making its spring, has seized divine truth, in identifying itself with the reality, it ought then, in order to finish its work, to return upon itself, to individualize the truth in us; and from this individualization results the *certitude* which becomes, in some sort, personal, as *knowledge*; all the while preserving the impersonal nature of *truth*.

Certitude then reposes upon two points of support, the one *subjective*—man or the human consciousness; the other *objective* and absolute—the Supreme Being. God and consciousness are the two arbiters of *certitude*.¹

"The schoolmen divided all human knowledge into two species, *cognitio intuitiva*, and *cognitio abstractiva*. By intuitive knowledge they signified that which we gain by an immediate presentation of the *real individual object*; by abstractive, that which we gain and hold through the medium of a general term; the one being, in modern language, a *perception*, the other a *concept*."²—V. ABSTRACTIVE.

¹ Tiberghien, *Essai des Connaiss. Hum.*, p. 34.

² Morell, *Psychology*, p. 158.

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Leibnitz took a distinction between *knowledge as intuitive or symbolical*. When I behold a triangle actually delineated, and think of it as a figure with three sides and three angles, &c., according to the idea of it in my mind, my *knowledge is intuitive*. But when I use the word triangle, and know what it means without explicating all that is contained in the idea of it, my *knowledge is blind or symbolical*.¹

**Knowledge as Immediate and Presentative or Intuitive—
and as Mediate and Representative or Remote.**

"A thing is known *immediately or proximately*, when we cognize it *in itself*; *mediately or remotely*, when we cognize it *in or through something numerically different from itself*. Immediate cognition, thus the knowledge of a thing in itself, involves the *fact* of its existence; mediate cognition, thus the knowledge of a thing in or through something not itself, involves only the *possibility* of its existence.

"An immediate cognition, inasmuch as the thing known is *itself presented* to observation, may be called a *presentative*; and inasmuch as the thing presented is, as it were, *viewed by the mind face to face*, may be called an *intuitive* cognition. A mediate cognition, inasmuch as the thing known is *held up or mirrored to the mind in a vicarious representation*, may be called a *representative* cognition.

"A thing known is an *object* of knowledge.

"In a *presentative* or immediate cognition there is *one sole object*; the thing (immediately) known and the thing existing being one and the same. In a *representative* or mediate cognition there may be discriminated *two objects*; the thing (immediately) known and the thing existing being numerically different.

"A thing known *in itself* is the (sole) *presentative* or *intuitive object* of knowledge, or the (sole) object of a *presentative* or *intuitive knowledge*. A thing known *in and through something else* is the *primary, mediate, remote, real, existent* or *represented object* of (mediate) knowledge—*objectum quod*; and a thing *through which something else is known* is the *secondary, immediate, proximate, ideal, vicarious, or representative object*

¹ Leibnitz, *De Cognitione*, &c.; Wolf, *Psychol. Empir.*, sect. 296, 299.

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of (mediate) knowledge—*objectum quo* or *per quod*. The former may likewise be styled—*objectum entitativum*.”¹

Knowledge, in respect of the mode in which it is obtained, is *intuitive* or *discursive*—*intuitive* when things are seen in themselves by the mind, or when objects are so clearly exhibited that there is no need of reasoning to perceive them—as, a whole is greater than any of its parts—*discursive* when objects are perceived by means of reasoning, as, the sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles. In respect of its strength, *knowledge* is *certain* or *probable*. If we attend to the degrees or ends of knowledge, it is either *science*, or *art*, or *experience*, or *opinion*, or *belief*—*q. v.*

“*Knowledge* is not a couch whereon to rest a searching and reckless spirit, or a terrace for a wandering and variable mind to walk up and down with a fair prospect, or a tower of state for a proud mind to raise itself upon, or a fort or commanding ground for strife and contention, or a shop for profit or sale; but a rich storehouse for the glory of the Creator, and the relief of man’s estate.”²—*V. CERTAINTY, TRUTH, WISDOM.*

LANGUAGE.—“The ends of language in our discourse with others are chiefly these three: first, to make known one man’s thoughts or ideas to another; secondly, to do it with as much ease and quickness as is possible; and thirdly, thereby to convey knowledge of things.”³

Language has been thus divided by Mons. Duval-Jouve:⁴

Languages are	Natural	Absolute— <i>Oris and Gestures.</i>
		Conventional— <i>Speech.</i>
	Artificial	Absolute— <i>Painting, Sculpture.</i>
		Conventional— <i>Emblems, Telegraphic Signs, Hieroglyphics, Writing.</i>

Reid, *Inquiry*.⁵—*V. SIGNS.*

LAUGHTER is the act of expressing our sense of the ridiculous. This act, or rather the sense of the ridiculous which prompts

¹ Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid’s Works*, note a, sect. 1.

² Bacon.

³ Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book iii., ch. 10.

⁴ *Logic*, p. 201.

⁵ Chap. ii., sect. 2.

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it, has been thought peculiar to man, as that which distinguishes him from the inferior animals.¹—Hutcheson, *Essay on Laughter*; Beattie, *Essay on Laughter and Ludicrous Composition*; Akenside, *Pleasures of Imagin.*; ² *Spectator*.³

LAW comes from the Anglo-Saxon verb signifying “to lay down.”

“All things that are have some operation not violent or casual. That which doth assign unto each thing the kind, that which doth moderate the force and power, that which doth appoint the form and measure of working, the same we term a *law*.”⁴

“*Laws* in their most extended signification are the necessary relations arising from the nature of things; and, in this sense, all beings have their laws, the Deity has his laws, the material world has its laws, superior intelligences have their laws, the beasts have their laws, and man has his laws.”⁵

Thus understood, the word comprehends the *laws* of the physical, metaphysical, and moral universe. Its primary signification was that of a command or a prohibition, addressed by one having authority to those who had power to do or not to do. There are in this sense *laws* of society, *laws* of morality, and *laws* of religion—each resting upon their proper authority. But the word has been transferred into the whole philosophy of being and knowing. And when a fact frequently observed recurs invariably under the same circumstances, we compare it to an act which has been prescribed, to an order which has been established, and say it recurs according to a *law*. On the analogy between political *laws* or *laws* proper, and those which are called metaphorically *laws* of nature, see Lindley, *Introduction to Jurisprudence*.⁶

Austin, *Provinces of Jurisprudence Determined*, p. 186.

Law and Cause.

The word *law* expresses the constant and regular order according to which an energy or agent operates. It may thus

¹ The ludicrous pranks of the puppy and the kitten make this doubtful; and Montaigne said he was not sure whether his favourite cat might not sometimes be laughing as much at him as with him.

² Book III.

³ Hooker, *Eccles. Pol.*, book I., sect. 2.

⁴ Montesquieu, *Spirit of Laws*, book I., ch. 1.

⁵ Nos. 47 and 248.

⁶ App., p. 1.

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be distinguished from *cause*—the latter denoting *efficiency*, the former denoting the mode according to which efficiency is developed. "It is a perversion of language," says Paley,¹ "to assign any *law*, as the efficient, operative cause of anything. A *law* presupposes an agent; this is only the mode, according to which an agent proceeds; it implies a power; for it is the order according to which that power acts. Without this agent, without this power, which are both distinct from itself, the *law* does nothing, is nothing." To the same purpose Dr. Reid has said, "The *laws* of nature are the rules according to which effects are produced; but there must be a *cause* which operates according to these rules. The rules of navigation never steered a ship, nor the *law* of gravity never moved a planet."

"Those who go about to attribute the origination of mankind (or any other effect) to a bare order or *law* of nature, as the primitive effector thereof, speak that which is perfectly irrational and unintelligible; for although a *law* or rule is the method and order by which an intelligent being may act, yet a *law*, or rule, or order, is a dead, unactive, uneffective, thing of itself, without an agent that useth it, and exerciseth it as his rule and method of action. What would a *law* signify in a kingdom or state, unless there were some person or society of men that did exercise and execute, and judge, and determine, and act by it, or according to it?"²

To maintain that the world is governed by *laws*, without ascending to the superior reason of these *laws*—not to recognize that every *law* implies a legislator and executor, an agent to put it in force, is to stop half-way; it is to hypostatize these *laws*, to make beings of them, and to imagine fabulous divinities in ignoring the only God who is the source of all *laws*; and who governs by them all that lives in the universe.³

"A *law* supposes an agent and a power; for it is the mode, according to which the agent proceeds, the order according to which the power acts. Without the presence of such an agent, of such a power, conscious of the relations on which the *law*

¹ *Nat. Theol.*, ch. 1.

² Hale, *Prim. Origin.* chap. 7, sect. 4.

³ See Tiberghien, *Essai des Connaiss. Hum.*, p. 743.

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depends, producing the effects which the *law* prescribes, the *law* can have no efficacy, no existence. Hence we infer, that the intelligence by which the *law* is ordained, the power by which it is put into action, must be present at all times and in all places, where the effects of the *law* occur; that thus the knowledge and the agency of the Divine Being pervade every portion of the universe, producing all action and passion, all permanence and change. The *laws* of matter are the *laws* which he, in his wisdom, prescribes to his own acts; his universal presence is the necessary condition of any course of events; his universal agency, the only organ of any efficient force."¹

Law, Physical, Mental, Moral, Political.

Laws may acquire different names from the difference in the agents or energies which operate according to them. A stone when thrown up into the air rises to a height proportional to the force with which it is thrown, and then falls to the ground by its own gravity. This takes place according to *physical laws*, or what are commonly called *laws of nature*.²

"Those principles and faculties are the general *laws* of our constitution, and hold the same place in the philosophy of mind that the general *laws* we investigate in physics hold in that branch of science."³ When an impression has been made upon a bodily organ a state of sensation follows in the mind. And when a state of sensation has been long continued or often repeated it comes to be less sensibly felt. These are *mental laws*. We have a faculty of memory by which the objects of former consciousness are recalled; and this faculty operates according to the *laws* of association.

Moral laws are derived from the nature and will of God, and the character and condition of man, and may be understood and adopted by man, as a being endowed with intelligence and will, to be the rules by which to regulate his actions. It is right to speak the truth. Gratitude should be cherished. These things are in accordance with the nature and condition

¹ Whewell, *Astronomy*, p. 361.

² See McCosh, *Meth. of Div. Govern.*, b. II., chap. 1

³ Stewart, *Elements*, part I., Introd.

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of man, and with the will of God—that is, they are in accordance with the *moral law* of conscience and of revelation.

Political laws are prohibitions or injunctions promulgated by those having authority to do so, and may be obeyed or disobeyed; but the disobedience of them implies punishment.

“The *intent* or *purpose* of a law is wholly different from the *motives* or *grounds* of the law. The former is its practical end or effect; the latter, the pre-existing circumstances which suggested and caused its enactment.¹ For example, the existence of a famine in a country may tend to the enactment of a poor law. In this case the famine is the motive or ground of the *law*; and the relief of the poor its intent or purpose. The one is its positive cause, the latter its desired effect.”²

In reference to the *moral law*, Hobbes and his followers have overlooked the difference between a *law* and the *principle* of the *law*. An action is not right merely in consequence of a *law* declaring it to be so. But the declaration of the *law* proceeds upon the antecedent rightness of the action.

Law and Form, “though correlative terms, must not, in strict accuracy, be used as synonymous. The former is used properly with reference to an operation; the latter with reference to its product. *Conceiving, judging, reasoning*, are subject to certain *laws*; *concepts, judgments, syllogisms*, exhibit certain *forms*.”³

LAW (Empirical).—“Scientific inquirers give the name of *empirical laws* to those uniformities which observation or experiment has shown to exist, but on which they hesitate to rely in cases varying much from those which have been actually observed, for want of seeing any reason *why* such a law should

¹ Suarez (*De Legibus*, III., 20, sect. 2) says, “Sine dubio in animo legislatoris hæc duo distincta sunt, scilicet voluntas seu intentio ejus, secundum quam vult præcipere, et ratio, ob quam movetur.”

The *ratio legis* and the *mens legis* are distinguished by Grotius (*J. B. et P.*, II., 16, sect. 8) with Barbeyrac’s notes; and by Puffendorf (*v.*, 12, sect. 10). The *purpose* of a law and its *motive* have often been confounded under the general term *ratio legis*.—See Savigny, *System des Rechts*, vol. I., pp. 216–224.

² Sir G. C. Lewis, *Method of Observ. in Politics*, ch. 12, sect. 6.

³ Mansel, *Prolegom. Log.*, p. 240.

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exist. It is implied, therefore, in the notion of an *empirical law*, that it is not an ultimate law; that if true at all, its truth is capable of being, and requires to be, accounted for. It is a derivative law, the derivation of which is not yet known. To state the explanation, the *why* of the *empirical law*, would be to state the laws from which it is derived; the ultimate causes on which it is contingent. And if we knew these, we should also know what are its limits; under what conditions it would cease to be fulfilled."¹

As instances of *empirical laws* he gives the local laws of the flux and reflux of the tides in different places; the succession of certain kinds of weather to certain appearances of the sky, &c. But these do not deserved to be called *laws*.

LEMMA (from λαμβάνω, to take for granted, to assume). — This term is used to denote a preliminary proposition, which, while it has no direct relation to the point to be proved, yet serves to pave the way for the proof. In Logic, a premiss taken for granted is sometimes called a *lemma*. To prove some proposition in mechanics, some of the propositions in geometry may be taken as *lemmata*.

LIBERTARIAN. — "I believe he (Dr. Crombie, that is) may claim the merit of adding the word *Libertarian* to the English language, as Priestley added that of *Necessarian*."²

Both words have reference to the questions concerning liberty and necessity, in moral agency.

LIBERTY of the WILL or LIBERTY of a MORAL AGENT.

"The idea of *liberty* is the idea of a power in any agent to do or forbear any particular action, according to the determination or thought of the mind, whereby either of them is preferred to the other."³

"By the *liberty* of a moral agent, I understand a power over the determinations of his own will. If, in any action, he had power to will what he did, or not to will it, in that action he is free. But if, in every voluntary action, the determination of his will be the necessary consequence of something involuntary in the state of his mind, or of something in his external

¹ Mill, *Log.*, b. III., chap. 16.

² *Correspondence of Dr. Reid*, p. 88.

³ Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, b. II., ch. 21, sect. 2.

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circumstances, he is not free; he has not what I call the *liberty* of a moral agent, but is subject to necessity."¹

It has been common to distinguish *liberty* into *freedom from co-action*, and *freedom from necessity*.

Freedom from co-action implies, on the one hand, the absence of all impediment or restraint, and, on the other hand, the absence of all compulsion or violence. If we are prevented from doing what is in our power, when we desire and will to do it, or, if we are compelled to do it, when we desire and will not to do it, we are not free from *co-action*. This general explanation of freedom agrees equally with *bodily freedom*, *mental freedom*, and *moral freedom*. Indeed, although it is common to make a distinction between these, there is no difference, except what is denoted by the different epithets introduced. We have *bodily freedom*, when our body is not subjected to restraint or compulsion—*mental freedom*, when no impediment or violence prevents us from duly exercising our powers of mind—and *moral freedom*, when our moral principles and feelings are allowed to operate within the sphere which has been assigned to them. Now it is with freedom regarded as moral that we have here to do—it is with freedom as the attribute of a being who possesses a moral nature, and who exerts the active power which belongs to him, in the light of reason, and under a sense of responsibility. Liberty of this kind is called *freedom from necessity*.

Freedom from necessity is also called *liberty of election*, or power to choose, and implies freedom from anything invincibly determining a moral agent. It has been distinguished into *liberty of contrariety*, or the power of determining to do either of two actions which are contrary, as right or wrong, good or evil; and *liberty of contradiction*, or the power of determining to do either of two actions which are contradictory, as to walk or to sit still, to walk in one direction or in another.

Freedom from necessity is sometimes also called *liberty of indifference*, because, before he makes his election, the agent has not determined in favour of one action more than another. *Liberty of indifference*, however, does not mean, as some would have it, liberty of equilibrium, or that the agent has no more

¹ Reid, *Act. Pow.*, essay IV., ch. 1.

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inclination towards one action or one mode of action than towards another; for although he may have motives prompting more urgently to one action or course of action, he still has *liberty of election*, if he has the power of determining in favour of another action or another course of action. Still less can the phrase *liberty of indifference* be understood as denoting a power to determine in opposition to all motives, or in absence of any motive. A being with *liberty of indifference* in the former of these senses would not be a reasonable being; and an action done without a motive is an action done without an end in view, that is, without intention or design, and, in that respect, could not be called a moral action, though done by a moral agent.

Liberty of will may be viewed, 1st, in respect to the *object*, and 2d, in respect of the *action*. In both respects it may be *liberty of*, 1st, *contrariety*, or 2d, of *contradiction*.

Liberty of contrariety in respect of the object is when the will is indifferent to any object and to its opposite or contrary—as when a man is free, for the sake of health, to take hot water or cold water. *Liberty of contradiction* is when the will is indifferent to any object, and to its opposite or contradictory—as walking and not walking.

In respect of the act of will, there is *liberty of contrariety*, when the will is indifferent as to contrary actions concerning the same particular object,—as to choose or reject some particular good. There is *liberty of contradiction*, when the will is free not to contrary action, but to act or not to act, that is, to will or not to will, to exercise or suspend volition.

Liberty has also been distinguished into, 1st, *liberty of specification*, and 2d, *liberty of exercise*. The former may be said to coincide with *liberty of contrariety*, and the latter with *liberty of contradiction*.¹

LIFE belongs to organized bodies, that is, animals and vegetables. Birth and development, decay and death, are peculiar to living bodies. Is there a vital principle, distinct on the one hand from matter and its forces, and on the other, from mind and its energies? According to Descartes, Borelli, Boerhaave, and others, the phenomena of living bodies may be explained by

¹ Baroniſius, *Metaphys.*, p. 96.

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the mechanical and chemical forces belonging to matter. According to Bichat, there is nothing in common—but rather an antagonism—between the forces of dead matter and the phenomena of life, which he defines to be “the sum of functions which resist death.” Bichat and his followers are called *Organicists*. Barthez and others hold that there is a vital principle distinct from the organization of living bodies, which directs all their acts and functions which are only vital, that is, without feeling or thought. Their doctrine is *Vitalism*. The older doctrine of Stahl was called *Animism*, according to which the soul, or *anima mundi*, presides not only over the functions of the sensibility and thought but over all the functions and actions of the living economy.

Are *life* and *sensibility* two things essentially distinct, or two things essentially united?

Irritability and *Excitability* are terms applied to the sensibility which vegetables manifest to external influences, such as light, heat, &c. Bichat ascribed the functions of absorption, secretion, circulation, &c., which are not accompanied with feeling, to what he called *organic sensibility*.

The characteristics of the several kingdoms of nature given by Linnæus are the following:—*Lapides cresunt*; *vegetabilia cresunt et vivunt*; *animalia cresunt vivunt et sentiunt*.

The theories of life and its connection with the phenomena of mind are thus classified by Morell.¹

“1. The *chemical* theory. This was represented by Sylvius in the seventeenth century, who reduced all the phenomena of vital action and organization to *chemical processes*. 2. The *mechanical* theory. This falls to the time when Harvey discovered the circulation of the blood, and Boerhaave represented the human frame as one great hydraulic machine. 3. The *dynamical* theory. Here we have the phenomena of mind and of life drawn closely together. The writings of Stahl especially show this point of view. He regarded the whole man as being the product of certain *organic powers*, which evolve all the various manifestations of human life, from the lowest physical processes to the highest intellectual. 4. The theory of *irritation*. This we find more especially amongst the

¹ *Psychology*, p. 77, note.

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French physiologists, such as Bichat, Majendie, and others, who regard life as being the product of a mere organism, acted on by physical stimuli from the world without. 5. The theory of *evolution*. Schultz and others of the German writers of the same school, regard life as a regular *evolution*, created by opposing powers in the universe of existence, from the lowest forms of the vital functions to the highest spheres of thought and activity. To these speculators nature is not a fixed reality, but a *relation*. It is perpetual movement, an unceasing *becoming*, a passing from death to life, and from life to death. And just as physical life consists in the tension of the lower powers of nature, so does mental life consist in that of its higher powers. 6. The theory of the *Divine ideal*. Here, Carus, prompted by Schelling's philosophy, has seized the *ideal* side of nature, as well as the *real*, and united them together in his theory of the genesis of the soul, and thus connected the whole dynamics of nature with their *Divine original*."

Plato, *Timæus*; Aristotle, *De Anima*; ¹ Descartes, *Œuvres*, par Cousin; ² Barthez, Bichat, Cabanis, and Berard; Coleridge, *Posthumous Essay: Hints towards the Formation of a more Comprehensive Theory of Life*.

LOGIC (λογική, λόγος, reason, reasoning, language).—The word *logica* was early used in Latin; while ἡ λογική and τὸ λογικόν were late in coming into use in Greek. Aristotle did not use either of them. His writings which treat of the syllogism and of demonstration were entitled *Analytics* (q. v.) The name *organon* was not given to the collected series of his writings upon *logic* till after the invention of printing. The reason of the name is, that *logic* was regarded as not so much a science in itself as the *instrument* of all science. The Epicureans called it κανονική, the rule by which true and false are to be tried. Plato in the *Phædrus*, has called it a *part* (μέρος), and in the *Parmenides* the organ (ὄργανον) of philosophy.³ An old division of philosophy was into *logic*, *ethics*, and *physics*. But excluding physics, philosophy may

¹ Lib. II., cap. 10.

² Tom. iv.

³ See Trendelenburg, *Elementa Log. Arist.*, 8vo, Basil, 1842, pp. 48, 49.

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be regarded as consisting of four parts—viz., *psychology*, *logic*, *ethics*, and *metaphysics* properly so called.

"*Logic* is derived from the word (*λόγος*), which signifies communication of thought usually by speech. It is the name which is generally given to the branch of inquiry (be it called science or art) in which the act of the mind in reasoning is considered, particularly with reference to the connection of thought and language."¹

"We divide logicians into three schools, according as they hold words, things, or conceptions, to be the subject of logic; and entitle them respectively, the *verbal*, the *phenomenal*, and the *conceptional*."²

"When we attend to the procedure of the human intellect we soon perceive that it is subject to certain supreme laws which are independent of the variable matter of our ideas, and which posited in their abstract generality, express the absolute and fixed rules not only of the human intellect, but of all thought, whatever be the subject which frames it or the object which it concerns. To determine those universal laws of thought in general, in order that the human mind in particular may find in all its researches a means of control, and an infallible criterion of the legitimacy of its procedure, is the object of *logic*. At the beginning of the *prior analytics*, Aristotle has laid it down that 'the object of *logic* is demonstration.'

"*Logic* is the science of the laws of thought as thought—that is, of the necessary conditions to which thought, considered in itself, is subject."³

"'*Logic* is the science of the laws of thought.' It is a science rather than an art. As the science of the necessary laws of thought it is pure. It only gives those principles which constitute thought; and pre-supposes the operation of those principles by which we gain the materials for thinking. And it is the science of the *form* or *formal laws* of thinking, and not of the *matter*."⁴—V. INTENTION, NOTION.

Others define *logic* to be the science of the laws of reason—

¹ De Morgan, *Formal Logic*, ch. 2.

² Chretien, *Logical Method*, §. 95.

³ Sir W. Hamilton. *Reid's Works*, p. 698, note.

⁴ Thomson, *Outline of the Laws of Thought*.

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ing. Dr. Whately has said, "*Logic* in its most extensive application, is the science as well as the art of reasoning. So far as it institutes an analysis of the process of the mind in reasoning, it is strictly a *science*; while so far as it investigates the principles on which argumentation is conducted, and furnishes rules to secure the mind from error in its deductions, it may be called the *art* of reasoning."

Kirwan¹ has said, "*Logic* is both a science and an art; it is a *science* inasmuch as, by analyzing the elements, principles, and structure of arguments, it teaches us how to discover their truth or detect their fallacies, and point out the sources of such errors. It is an *art*, inasmuch as it teaches us how to arrange arguments in such manner that their truth may be most readily perceived or their falsehood detected." Sir William Hamilton² thinks that Dr. Whately had this passage in view when he constructed his own definition; but he adds, "Not a single reason has been alleged to induce us to waver in our belief, that the *laws of thought*, and not the *laws of reasoning*, constitute the adequate object of the science."

According to the significations attached to the terms art and science, and according to the point of view in which it is regarded, *logic* may be called a science or an art, or both, that is, a scientific art.

Thought may manifest itself in framing concepts, or judgments, or reasonings; and *logic* treats of these under three corresponding heads. Method, which is the scientific arrangement of thoughts, is frequently added as a fourth head. But to some it appears that method belongs more properly to psychology than to *logic*. Barthelemy St. Hilaire,³ who takes this view, has said, "In *logic* considered as a science there are necessarily four essential parts, which proceed from the simple to the compound, and in the following order, which cannot be changed: 1, A theory of the elements of a proposition; 2, A theory of propositions; 3, A general theory of reasoning formed of propositions connected with one another according to certain laws; and, lastly, a theory of that special and supreme kind of reasoning which is called demonstration, and

¹ *Logic*, vol. I., p. 1.

² *Discussions*, pp. 181-4.

³ *Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*, art. *Logique*."

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gives assurance to the mind of man of the forms of truth, if it be not truth itself."

LOVE and **HATRED** are the two genetic or mother passions or affections of mind, from which all the others take their rise. The former is awakened by the contemplation of something which is regarded as good; and the latter by the contemplation of something which is regarded as evil. Hence springs a desire to seek the one, and a desire to shun the other; and desire, under its various forms and modifications, may be found as an element in all the manifestations of the sensitivity.

MACROCOSM and **MICROCOSM** (*μακρός*, large; *μικρός*, small; *κόσμος*, world).

"As for Paracelsus, certainly he is injurious to man, if (as some eminent chemists expound him) he calls a man a *microcosm*, because his body is really made up of all the several kinds of creatures the *macrocosm* or greater world consists of, and so is but a model or epitome of the universe."¹

Many ancient philosophers regarded the world as an animal, consisting like man of a soul and a body. This opinion, exaggerated by the mystics, became the theory of the *macrocosm* and the *microcosm*, according to which man was an epitome of creation, and the universe was a man on a grand scale. The same principles and powers which were perceived in the one were attributed to the other, and while man was believed to have a supernatural power over the laws of the universe, the phenomena of the universe had an influence on the actions and destiny of man. Hence arose Alchemy and Astrology, which were united in the Hermetic medicine. Such views are fundamentally pantheistic, leading to the belief that there is only one substance, manifesting itself in the universe by an infinite variety, and concentrated in man as in an epitome. Van Helmont, Paracelsus, Robert Fludd, and others held some of these views.

¹ Boyle, *Works*, vol. II., p. 54.

MACROCOSM —

Dr. Reid¹ has said, "Man has not, without reason, been called an epitome of the universe. His body, by which his mind is greatly affected, being a part of the material system, is subject to all the laws of inanimate matter. During some part of his existence, his state is very like that of a vegetable. He rises, by imperceptible degrees, to the animal, and, at last, to the rational life, and has the principles that belong to all."

"Man is not only a *microcosm*, in the structure of his body, but in the system, too, of his impulses, including all of them within him, from the basest to the most sublime."²

"Man is a living synthesis of the universe."³

Cousin⁴ has given an analysis of a MS. work by Bernard de Chartres, entitled *Megacosmus et Microcosmus*.

MAGIC (*μαγία*, from *μάγος*, a Magian). — "It is confessed by all of understanding that a *magician* (according to the Persian word) is no other than a studious observer and expounder of divine things."⁵

But while *magic* was used primarily to denote the study of the more sublime parts of knowledge, it came at length to signify a science of which the cultivators, by the help of demons or departed souls, could perform things miraculous.

"*Natural magic* is no other than the absolute perfection of natural philosophy."⁶ Baptista Porta has a treatise on it, which was published in 1589 and 1591. It is characterized by Bacon⁷ as full of credulous and superstitious observations and traditions on the sympathies and antipathies and the occult and specific qualities of things. Sir D. Brewster has a treatise under the same title, but of very different character and contents, and answering to the definition of Raleigh. Campanella, *De Sensu Rerum et Magia*;⁸ Longinus, *Trinon Magicum*.⁹

MAGNANIMITY and EQUANIMITY (*magnus*, great; *aequus*, even; *animus*, mind), are two words which were much used by Cicero and other ancient ethical writers.

¹ *Active Pow.*, essay III., part I., chap. I.

² Harris, *Philosoph. Arrange.*, cap. 17.

³ *Introd. aux Œuvres Inédites d'Abelard*, p. 127.

⁴ Raleigh, *Hist. of the World*, b. I., c. 11, s. 2.

⁵ *Ibid.*, *Hist. of the World*, b. I., c. 11, s. 2.

⁶ *Ibid.*, *Par.*, 1687.

⁷ Tiberghien.

⁸ *De Augm.*, lib. III.

⁹ 12mo, Franc., 1616.

MAGNANIMITY —

Magnanimity was described as lifting us above the good and evil of this life—so that while the former was not necessary to our happiness, the latter could not make us miserable. The favourite example of *magnanimity*, among the Romans, was Fabius Maximus, who, amidst the provocation of the enemy and the impatience of his countrymen, delayed to give battle till he saw how he could do so successfully.

Equanimity supposes change of state or fortune, and means the preservation of an even mind in the midst of vicissitude—neither elated unduly by prosperity nor depressed unduly by adversity. *Equanimity* springs from *Magnanimity*. Indeed both these words denote frames or states of mind from which special acts of virtue spring—rather than any particular virtue. They correspond to the active and passive *fortitude* of modern moralists.

"Aequam memento rebus in arduis
Servare mentem, non secus in bonis
A insolenti temperatam
Lætitiæ, moriture Delli."—Hor.

. "Est hic,
Est ubi vis, animus si te non deficit æquus."—Hor.

"True happiness is to no spot confined;
If you preserve a firm and equal mind,
'Tis here, 'tis there, 'tis everywhere."

MANICHEISM (so called from Manes, a Persian philosopher, who flourished about the beginning of the third century), is the doctrine that there are two eternal principles or powers, the one good and the other evil, to which the happiness and misery of all beings may be traced. It has been questioned whether this doctrine was ever maintained to the extent of denying the Divine unity, or that the system of things had not an ultimate tendency to good. It is said that the Persians, before Manes, maintained dualism so as to give the supremacy to the good principle; and that Manes maintained both to be equally eternal and absolute.

The doctrine of *manicheism* was ingrafted upon Christianity about the middle of the third century. The Cathari or Albigenses who appeared in the twelfth century are said also to have held the doctrine of *dualism* or *ditheism*—q. v.

MANICHEISM —

To refute it we have only to say that if the two opposing principles were equal, they would neutralize each other — if they were unequal, the stronger would prevail, so that there would be nothing but evil, or nothing but good in the world; which is contrary to fact.

Matter, *Hist. Critiq. du Gnosticism*;¹ Beausobre, *Hist. du Manichéisme*.

MATERIALISM.—"The *materialists* maintain that man consists of one uniform substance, the object of the senses; and that perception, with its modes, is the result, necessary or otherwise, of the organization of the brain."² The doctrine opposed to this is *spiritualism*, or the doctrine that there is a spirit in man, and that he has a soul as well as a body. In like manner he who maintains that there is but one substance (*unsubstancisme*), and that that substance is matter, is a *materialist*. And he who holds that above and beyond the material frame of the universe there is a spirit sustaining and directing it, is a *spiritualist*. The philosopher who admits that there is a spirit in man, and a spirit in the universe, is a perfect *spiritualist*. He who denies spirit in man or in the universe, is a perfect *materialist*. But some have been inconsistent enough to admit a spirit in man and deny the existence of God, while others have admitted the existence of God and denied the soul of man to be spiritual. — **V. IMMATERIALITY.**

Baxter and Drew have both written on the immateriality of the soul. Belsham and Priestly have defended *materialism* without denying the existence of God.

Priestley, *Disquisitions on Matter and Spirit; Three Dissertations on the Doctrine of Materialism and Philosophical Necessity*; Price, *Letters on Materialism and Philosophical Necessity*.

MATHEMATICS (μαθηματική [sc. ἐπιστήμη] τὰ μαθήματα), according to Descartes,³ treat of order and measures. "*Illa omnia tantum, in quibus ordo vel mensura examinatur, ad mathesim referri, nec interesse utrum in numeris vel figuris, vel astris, vel sonis, aliove quovis objecto talis mensura quaerenda est.*"

¹ 8 tom., Paris, 1843.

² Belsham, *Moral Philosophy*, chap. xi, sect. 1

³ Reg. ad Direct. Ingeniū, Reg. 4.

MATHEMATICS—

Mathematics are either *Pure* or *Mixed*. Arithmetic, Geometry, Algebra, and the Differential and Integral Calculus belong to *Pure Mathematics*. *Mixed Mathematics* is the application of Pure Mathematics to physical science in its various departments: *Mechanics, Hydrodynamics, Optics, Astronomy, Acoustics, Electricity, Magnetism, &c.*, are physico-mathematical sciences. Among philosophers, Anaximander of Miletus, and Pythagoras are called mathematicians.

MATTER, as opposed to *mind* or *spirit* (*q. v.*), is that which occupies space, and with which we become acquainted by means of our bodily senses or organs. Everything of which we have any knowledge is either *matter* or *mind*, *i. e.*, *spirit*. *Mind* is that which knows and thinks. *Matter* is that which makes itself known by means of the bodily senses.

"The first form which *matter* assumes is extension, or length, breadth, and thickness—it then becomes *body*. If body were infinite there could be no *figure*, which is body bounded. But body is not physical body, unless it partake of or is constituted of one or more of the elements, fire, air, earth, or water."¹

According to Descartes the essence of *mind* is *thought*, and the essence of *matter* is *extension*. He said, Give me extension and motion, and I shall make the world. Leibnitz said the essence of all being, whether *mind* or *matter*, is *force*. *Matter* is an assemblage of simple forces or monads. His system of physics may be called *dynamical*, in opposition to that of Newton, which may be called *mechanical*; because Leibnitz held that the monads possessed a vital or living energy. We may explain the phenomena of *matter* by the movements of ether, by gravity and electricity; but the ultimate reason of all movement is a force primitively communicated at creation, a force which is everywhere, but which while it is present in all bodies is differently limited; and this force, this virtue or power of action is inherent in all substances material and spiritual. Created substances received from the creative substance not only the faculty to act, but also to exercise their activity each after its own manner. See Leibnitz. *De Prima Philosophiæ Emendatione et de Notione Substantiæ*, or *Newton*

¹ Monbodo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, b. ii., c. 2.

MATTER—

Système de la Nature et de la Communication des Substances, in the *Journal des Savans*, 1695. On the various hypotheses to explain the activity of *matter*, see Stewart.¹

The properties which have been predicated as essential to *matter* are impenetrability, extension, divisibility, inertia, weight. To the senses it manifests colour, sound, smell, taste, heat, and motion; and by observation it is discovered to possess elasticity, electricity, magnetism, &c.

Metaphysicians have distinguished the qualities of *matter* into primary and secondary, and have said that our knowledge of the former, as of impenetrability and extension, is clear and absolute—while our knowledge of the latter, as of sound and smell, is obscure and relative. This distinction taken by Descartes, adopted by Locke and also by Reid and Stewart, was rejected by Kant, according to whom, indeed, all our knowledge is relative. And others who do not doubt the objective reality of *matter*, hold that our knowledge of all its qualities is the same in kind. See the distinctions precisely stated and strenuously upheld by Sir William Hamilton;² and ingeniously controverted by Mons. Emilie Saisset.³

Matter and Form.

Matter as opposed to *form* (*q. v.*) is that elementary constituent in composite substances, which appertains in common to them all without distinguishing them from one another. Everything generated or made, whether by nature or art, is generated or made out of something else; and this something else is called its *subject* or *matter*. Such is iron to the boat, such is timber to the boat. *Matter* void of *form* was called *ἄνυστον*, or, *prima materia*—(*ἄν*, means wood.—*V. HYLOZISM*). *Form* when united to *matter* makes it determinate and constitutes *body*—*q. v.*

"The term *matter* is usually applied to whatever is given to the artist, and consequently, as given, does not come within the province of the art itself to supply. The *form* is that which is given in and through the proper operation of the art. In sculpture, the *matter* is the marble in its rough state as given

¹ *Outlines*, part II., ch. 2, sect. 1, and *Act. and Mor. Pow.*, last edit., vol. II., note A.

² *Reid's Works*, note D.

³ In *Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*, art. "Matière."

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to the sculptor; the *form* is that which the sculptor in the exercise of his art communicates to it. The distinction between *matter* and *form* in any mental operation is analogous to this. The former includes all that is given *to*, the latter all that is given *by*, the operation. In the division of notions, for example, the generic notion is that given to be divided; the addition of the difference in the art of division constitutes the species. And accordingly, Genus is frequently designated by logicians the *material*, Difference, the *formal* part of the species."¹

Harris, *Philosoph. Arrange.*;² Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*;³ Reid, *Intell. Pow.*⁴ — V. ACTION, PROPOSITION.

MAXIM (*maxima propositio*, a proposition of the greatest weight), is used by Boethius as synonymous with *axiom*, or a self-evident truth.⁵ It is used in the same way by Locke.⁶ "There are a sort of propositions, which, under the name of *maxims* and *axioms*, have passed for principles of science." "By Kant, *maxim* was employed to designate a subjective principle, theoretical or practical, i. e., one not of objective validity, being exclusively relative to some interest of the subject. *Maxim* and *regulative principle* are, in the critical philosophy, opposed to *law* and *constitutive principle*."

In Morals, we have Rochefoucauld's *Maxims*.

In Theology, Fenelon wrote *Maxims of the Saints*, and Rollin made a collection of *Maxims* drawn from holy writ.

MEMORY (from *memini*, preterite of the obsolete from *meneo* or *meno*, from the Greek μένω, *manere*, to stay or remain. From the contracted form μένω comes μνήμη, the memory in which things remain. Lennep). — "The great Keeper, or Master of the Rolls of the soul, a power that can make amends for the speed of time, in causing him to leave behind him those things which else he would so carry away as if they had not been."⁷

Consciousness testifies that when a thought has once been present to the mind, it may again become present to it, with

¹ Mansel, *Prolegom. Log.*, p. 226.

² Book ii., chap. 1.

³ Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note A, sect. 6.

⁴ *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, b. iv., chap. 7.

⁵ Bishop Hall, *Eighteous Mammon*.

⁶ Chap. iv.

⁷ Essay ii., chap. 12.

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the additional consciousness that it has formerly been present to it. When this takes place we are said to *remember*, and the faculty of which *remembrance* is the act is *memory*.

Memory implies,—1. A mode of consciousness experienced. 2. The retaining or remaining of that mode of consciousness so that it may subsequently be revived without the presence of its object. 3. The actual revival of that mode of consciousness; and 4. The recognizing that mode of consciousness as having formerly been experienced.

“The word *memory* is not employed uniformly in the same precise sense; but it always expresses some modification of that faculty, which enables us to treasure up, and preserve for future use, the knowledge we acquire; a faculty which is obviously the great foundation of all intellectual improvement, and without which no advantage could be derived from the most enlarged experience. This faculty implies two things; a capacity of retaining knowledge, and a power of recalling it to our thoughts when we have occasion to apply it to use. The word *memory* is sometimes employed to express the capacity, and sometimes the power. When we speak of a *retentive memory*, we use it in the former sense; when of a *ready memory*, in the latter.”¹

Memory has, and must have, an object; for he that remembers must remember something, and that which he remembers is the object of memory. It is neither a decaying sense, as Hobbes would make it, nor a transformed sensation, as Condillac would have it to be; but a distinct and original faculty, the phenomena of which cannot be included under those of any other power. The objects of *memory* may be things external to us, or internal states and modes of consciousness; and we may remember what we have seen, touched, or tasted; or we may remember a feeling of joy or sorrow which we formerly experienced, or a resolution or purpose which we previously formed.

Hobbes would confine *memory* to objects of sense. He says,² “By the senses, which are numbered according to the organs to be five, we take notice of the objects without us,

Stewart, *Philosoph. of Hum. Mind*, chap. 6.
Hum. Nature, ch. 3, sect. 6.

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and that notice is our conception thereof: but we take notice also, some way or other, of our conception, for when the conception of the same thing cometh again, we take notice that it is again, that is to say, that we have had the same conception before, which is as much as to imagine a thing past, which is impossible to the sense which is only of things present; this, therefore, may be accounted a sixth sense, but internal; not external as the rest, and is commonly called *remembrance*."

Mr. Stewart holds that *memory* involves "a power of recognizing, as former objects of attention, the thoughts that from time to time occur to us: a power which is not implied in that law of our nature which is called the association of ideas." But the distinction thus taken between *memory* and *association* is not very consistent with a further distinction which he takes between the *memory of things* and the *memory of events*.¹ "In the former case, thoughts which have been previously in the mind, may recur to us without suggesting the idea of the past, or of any modification of time whatever; as when I repeat over a poem which I have got by heart, or when I think of the features of an absent friend. In this last instance, indeed, philosophers distinguish the act of the mind by the name of *conception*; but in ordinary discourse, and frequently, even in philosophical writing, it is considered as an exertion of *memory*. In these and similar cases, it is obvious that the operations of this faculty do not necessarily involve the idea of the past. The case is different with respect to the *memory of events*. When I think of these, I not only recall to the mind the former objects of its thoughts, but I refer the event to a particular point of time; so that, of every such act of *memory*, the idea of the past is a necessary concomitant." Mr. Stewart therefore supposes "that the remembrance of a past event is not a simple act of the mind; but that the mind first forms a conception of the event, and then judges from circumstances, of the period of time to which it is to be referred. But the remembrance of a *thing* is not a simple act of the mind, any more than the remembrance of an *event*. The truth seems to

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be that *things* and *events* recur to the mind equally unclothed or unconnected with the notion of pastness.¹ And it is not till they are recognized as objects of former consciousness that they can be said to be remembered. But the recognition is the act of the judging faculty. Thoughts which have formerly been present to the mind may again become present to it without being recognized. Nay, they may be entertained for a time as new thoughts, but it is not till they have been recognized as objects of former consciousness that they can be regarded as remembered thoughts,² so that an act of *memory*, whether of things or events, is by no means a simple act of the mind. Indeed, it may be doubted whether in any mental operation we can detect any single faculty acting independently of others. What we mean by calling them distinct faculties is, that each has a separate or peculiar function; not that that function is exercised independently of other faculties.—V. FACULTY.

Mr. Locke³ treats of *retention*. "The next faculty of the mind (after perception), whereby it makes a further progress towards knowledge, is that which I call *retention*, or the keeping of those simple ideas, which from sensation or reflection it hath received. This is done two ways: first, by keeping the idea which is brought into it for some time actually in view; which is called *contemplation*. The other way of *retention*, is the power to revive again in our minds those ideas which, after imprinting, have disappeared, or have been as it were laid aside out of sight; and thus we do, when we conceive heat or light, yellow or sweet,—the object being removed. This is *memory*, which is as it were the storehouse of our ideas."—V. RETENTION.

The circumstances which have a tendency to facilitate or insure the retention or the recurrence of anything by the *memory*, are chiefly—*Vividness*, *Repetition*, and *Attention*. When an object affects us in a pleasant or in a disagreeable

See Young, *Intellect. Philosoph.*, lect. xvi.

¹ Aristotle (*De Memoria et Reminiscencia*, cap. 1), has said that *memory* is always accompanied with the notion of time, and that only those animals that have the notion of time have *memory*.

² *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, b. II., c. 10.

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manner—when it is frequently or familiarly observed—or when it is examined with attention and interest, it is more easily and surely remembered.

"The things which are best preserved by the *memory*," said Lord Herbert,¹ "are the things which *please or terrify*—which are *great or new*—to which much *attention* has been paid—or which have been oft *repeated*,—which are *apt to the circumstances*—or which have many things *related to them*."

The qualities of a good *memory* are *susceptibility, retentiveness, and readiness*.

The common saying that *memory* and judgment are not often found in the same individual, in a high degree, must be received with qualification.

Memory in all its manifestations is very much influenced, and guided by what have been called the laws of *association*—*q. v.*

In its first manifestations, *memory* operates spontaneously, and thoughts are allowed to come and go through the mind without direction or control. But it comes subsequently to be exercised with intention and will; some thoughts being sought and invited, and others being shunned and as far as possible excluded. *Spontaneous memory* is *remembrance*. *Intentional memory* is *recollection* or *reminiscence*.

The former in Greek is *Μνήμη*, and the latter 'Ανάμνησις. In both forms, but especially in the latter, we are sensible of the influence which *association* has in regulating the exercise of this faculty.

By *memory*, we not only retain and recall former knowledge, but we also acquire new knowledge. It is by means of *memory* that we have the notion of continued existence or duration; and also the persuasion of our personal identity, amidst all the changes of our bodily frame, and all the alterations of our temper and habits.

Memory, in its spontaneous or passive manifestation, is common to man with the inferior animals. But Aristotle denies² that they are capable of *recollection* or *reminiscence*, which is a kind of reasoning by which we ascend from a present conscio-

¹ *De Veritate*, p. 156.

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ness to a former, and from that to a more remote, till the whole facts of some case are brought again back to us. And Dr. Reid has remarked that the inferior animals do not measure time nor possess any distinct knowledge of intervals of time. In man *memory* is the condition of all experience, and consequently of all progress.

Memory in its exercises is very dependent upon bodily organs, particularly the brain. In persons under fever, or in danger of drowning, the brain is preternaturally excited; and in such cases it has been observed that *memory* becomes more remote and far-reaching in its exercise than under ordinary and healthy circumstances. Several authentic cases of this kind are on record.¹ And hence the question has been suggested, whether thought be not absolutely imperishable, or whether every object of former consciousness may not, under peculiar circumstances, be liable to be recalled?²

MEMORIA TECHNICA, or MNEMONICS.—These terms are applied to artificial methods which have been devised to assist the memory. They all rest on the association of ideas. The relations by which ideas are most easily and firmly associated are those of contiguity in place and resemblance. On these two relations the principal methods of assisting the memory have been founded. The methods of *localization*, or local memory, associate the object which it is wished to remember with some place or building, all the parts of which are well known. The methods of *resemblance* or *symbolization*, establish some resemblance either between the things or the words which it is wished to remember, and some object more familiar to the mind. Rhythm and rhyme giving aid to the memory, technical verses have been framed for that purpose in various departments of study.

The topical or local memory has been traced back to Simónides, who lived in the sixth century, B. C. Cicero³ describes a local memory or gives a Topology. Quintilian⁴ and Pliny the naturalist⁵ also describe this art.

¹ See Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria*; De Quincey, *Confessions of an English Opium Eater*; and Sir John Barrow, *Autobiography*, p. 398.

² Aristotle, *De Memoria et Reminiscencia*; Beattie, *Dissertations*; Reid, *Intell. Powers* III.: Stewart, *Elements*, chap. 6.

³ *Dr Oratore*, li. 82.

⁴ xl., 2.

⁵ vii. 24.

MEMORIA TECHNICA—

In modern times may be mentioned, Gray¹ and Feinagle.²

MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.—The adjective *mental* comes to us from the Latin *mens*, or from the Greek *μῆνς*; or these may be referred to the German *meinen*, to mean, to mark. If the adjective *mental* be regarded as coming from the Latin *mens*, then *mental philosophy* will be the philosophy of the human mind, and will correspond with psychology. If the adjective *mental* be regarded as coming from the German *meinen*, to mean or to mark, then the phrase *mental philosophy* may be restricted to the philosophy of the mind in its intellectual energies, or those faculties by which it marks or *knows*, as distinguished from those faculties by which it *feels* or *wills*. It would appear that it is often used in this restricted signification to denote the philosophy of the intellect, or of the intellectual powers, as contradistinguished from the active powers, exclusive of the phenomena of the sensitivity and the will.³

MERIT (*meritum*, from *μῆρς*, a part or portion of labour or reward), means good desert; having done something worthy of praise or reward.

"Fear not the anger of the wise to raise;
Those best can bear reproof, who *merit* praise."
Pope, *Essay on Criticism*.

In seeing a thing to be right, we see at the same time that we ought to do it; and when we have done it we experience a feeling of conscious satisfaction or self-approbation. We thus come by the idea of *merit* or good desert. The approbation of our own mind is an indication that God approves of our conduct; and the religious sentiment strengthens the moral one. We have the same sentiments towards others. When we see another do what is right, we applaud him. When we see him do what is right in the midst of temptation and difficulty, we say he has much *merit*. Such conduct appears to be deserving of reward. Virtue and happiness ought to go together. We are satisfied that under the government of God they will do so.

¹ *Memoria Technica*, 1730.

² *New Art of Memory*, 1812.

³ See Chalmers, *Sketches of Moral and Mental Philosophy*, c. 1.

MERIT—

The idea of *merit* then is a primary and natural idea to the mind of man. It is not an after thought to praise the doing of what is right from seeing that it is beneficial, but a spontaneous sentiment indissolubly connected with our idea of what is right, a sentiment guaranteed as to its truthfulness by the structure of the human mind and the character of God.¹

The scholastic distinction between *merit of congruity* and *merit of condignity* is thus stated by Hobbes:²—“God Almighty having promised paradise to those that can walk through this world according to the limits and precepts prescribed by Him; they say, he that shall so walk, shall *merit* paradise *ex congruo*. But because no man can demand a right to it by his own righteousness, or any other power in himself, but by the free grace of God only; they say, no man can *merit* paradise *ex condigno*.”—V. VIRTUE.

METAPHOR (*μεταφορα*, to transfer).—“A *metaphor* is the transferring of a word from its usual meaning, to an analogous meaning, and then the employing it agreeably to such transfer.”³ For example: the usual meaning of evening is the conclusion of the day. But age too is a conclusion, the conclusion of human life. Now there being an analogy in all conclusions, we arrange in order the two we have alleged, and say, that “as evening is to the day, so is age to human life.” Hence by an easy permutation (which furnishes at once two *metaphors*) we say alternately, that “evening is the age of the day,” and that “age is the evening of life.”⁴

“Sweet is primarily and properly applied to tastes; secondarily and improperly (*i. e.*, by analogy) to sounds.

“When the secondary meaning of a word is founded on some *fanciful* analogy, and especially when it is introduced for ornament’s sake, we call this a *metaphor*, as when we speak of a ship’s *ploughing* the deep; the turning up of the surface being essential indeed to the plough, but accidental only to the ship.”⁵

METAPHOR and SIMILE.—“A *metaphor* differs from a *simile* in form only, not in substance. In a *simile*, the two

¹ See Price, *Review*, ch. 4.

² Arist., *Poet.*, cap. 21.

³ Whately, *Log.*, b. III., § 10.

⁴ *Of Man*, pt. I., ch. 14.

⁵ Harris, *Philosoph. Arrange.*, p. 441.

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subjects are kept distinct in the expression, as well as in the thought; in a *metaphor* they are kept distinct in the thought, but not in the expression. A hero resembles a lion; and upon that resemblance many *similies* have been founded by Homer and other poets. But let us invoke the aid of the imagination, and figure the hero to be a lion, instead of only resembling one; by that variation the *simile* is converted into a *metaphor*, which is supported by describing all the qualities of the lion that resemble those of the hero.¹ When I say of some great minister, that 'he upholds the state like a pillar which supports the weight of a whole edifice,' I evidently frame a comparison; but when I say of the same minister, that 'he is a pillar of the state,' this is not a comparison but a *metaphor*. The comparison between the minister and the pillar is instituted in the mind, but without the aid of words which denote comparison. The comparison is only insinuated, not expressed; the one object is supposed to be so like the other, that, without formally drawing the comparison, the name of the one may be substituted for that of the other."²—

V. ANALOGY, ALLEGORY.

METAPHYSICS.—This word is commonly said to have originated in the fact that Tyrannion or Andronicus, the collectors and conservers of the works of Aristotle, inscribed upon a portion of them the words *Tà μετὰ τὰ φυσικά*. But a late French critic, Mons. Ravaisson,³ says he has found earlier traces of this phrase, and thinks it probable that, although not employed by Aristotle himself, it was applied to this portion of his writings by some of his immediate disciples. Whether the phrase was intended merely to indicate that this portion should *stand*, or that it should be *studied*, after the physics, in the collected works of Aristotle, are the two views which have been taken. In point of fact, this portion does usually stand after the physics. But in the order of science or study, Aristotle said, that after physics should come mathematics. And Derridon⁴ has given reasons why *metaphysics* should be studied after logic, and before physics and other parts of philosophy. But the

¹ Arist., *Rhet.*, lib. iii., cap. 4.

² Irving, *English Composition*, p. 172.

³ *Essai sur la Métaphysique*, tom. 1, p. 40.

⁴ *Proem. Métaphys.*

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truth is that the preposition *μετά* means *along with* as well as *after*, and might even be translated *above*. In Latin *metaphysica* is synonymous with *supernaturalia*. And in English Shakspeare has used *metaphysical* as synonymous with *supernatural*.

. . . "Fate and *metaphysical* aid doth seem
To have thee crowned."

Macbeth, Act 1, scene 3.

Clemens Alexandrinus¹ considered *metaphysical* as equivalent to *supernatural*; and is supported by an anonymous Greek commentator, whom Patricius has translated into Latin, and styles Philoponus.

But if *μετά* be interpreted, as it may, to mean *along with*, then *metaphysics* or metaphysical philosophy will be that philosophy which we should take *along with* us into physics, and into every other philosophy—that knowledge of causes and principles which we should carry with us into every department of inquiry. Aristotle called it the governing philosophy, which gives laws to all, but receives laws from none.² Lord Bacon³ has limited its sphere, when he says, "The one part (of philosophy) which is *physics* enquireth and handleth the *material* and *efficient* causes; and the other which is *metaphysic* handleth the *formal* and *final* cause." But all causes are considered by Aristotle in his writings which have been entitled *metaphysics*. The inquiry into causes was called by him the first philosophy—science of truth, science of being. It has for its object—not those things which are seen and temporal—phenomenal and passing, but things not seen and eternal, things supersensuous and stable. It investigates the

¹ Strom. i.

² *Metaphys.*, lib. 1., cap. 2.

³ *Advancement of Learning*, book II. In another passage, however, Bacon admits the advantage, if not the validity, of a higher *metaphysic* than this. "Because the distributions and partitions of knowledge are not like several lines that meet in one angle, and so touch but in a point, but are like branches of a tree that meet in a stem, which hath a dimension and quantity of entireness and continuance, before it come to discontinue and break itself into arms and boughs; therefore, it is good to erect and constitute one universal science by the name of '*philosophia prima*,' primitive or summary philosophy, as the main and common way, before we come where the ways part and divide themselves; which science, whether I should report deficient or no, I stand doubtful." Except in so far as it proceeded by observation rather than by speculation *a priori*, even this science would have been but lightly esteemed by Bacon.

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first principles of nature and of thought, the ultimate causes of existence and of knowledge. It considers things in their essence, independently of the particular properties or determined modes which make a difference between one thing and another. In short, it is ontology or the science of being as being, that is, not the science of any particular being or beings, such as animals or vegetables, lines or numbers, but the science of being in its general and common attributes. There is a science of matter and there is a science of mind. But *metaphysics* is the science of being as common to both.

"The subject of *metaphysics* is the *whole* of things. This cannot be otherways known than in its principles and causes. Now these must necessarily be what is *most general* in nature; for it is from *generals* that *particulars* are derived, which cannot exist without the *generals*; whereas the *generals* may exist without the *particulars*. Thus, the species, *man*, cannot exist without the genus, *animal*; but *animal* may be without *man*. And this holds universally of all *genuses* and *specieses*. The subject therefore of *metaphysics*, is what is principal in nature, and first, if not in priority of time, in dignity and excellence, and in order likewise, as being the causes of everything in the universe. Leaving, therefore, particular subjects, and their several properties, to particular sciences, this universal science compares these subjects together; considers wherein they differ and wherein they agree: and that which they have in common, but belongs not, in particular, to any one science, is the proper object of *metaphysics*."¹

Metaphysics is the knowledge of the one and the real in opposition to the many and the apparent.² *Matter*, as perceived by the senses, is a combination of distinct and heterogeneous qualities, discernible, some by sight, some by smell, &c. What is the *thing itself*, the subject and owner of these several qualities, and yet not identical with any one of them? What is it by virtue of which those several attributes constitute or belong to one and the same thing? *Mind* presents to consciousness so many distinct states, and operations, and feelings. What is the nature of that one mind,

¹ Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, book III., chap. 4.

² Arist., *Metaphys.*, lib. III., c. 2.

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of which all these are so many modifications? The inquiry may be carried higher still, can we attain to any single conception of *being* in general, to which both *mind* and *matter* are subordinate, and from which the essence of both may be deduced?¹

“Aristotle said every science must have for investigation a determined province and separate form of being, but none of these sciences reaches the conception of being itself. Hence there is needed a science which should investigate that which the other sciences take up hypothetically, or through experience. This is done by the first philosophy, which has to do with being as such, while the other sciences relate only to determined and concrete being. The *metaphysics*, which is this science of being and its primitive grounds, is the *first philosophy*, since it is pre-supposed by every other discipline. Thus, says Aristotle, if there were only a physical substance, then would physics be the first and the only philosophy; but if there be an immaterial and unmoved essence which is the ground of all being, then must there be also an antecedent, and because it is antecedent, a universal philosophy. The first ground of all being is God, whence Aristotle occasionally gives to the first philosophy the name of theology.²

Metaphysics was formerly distinguished into *general* and *special*. The former was called *Ontology*—(q. v.), or the science of being in general, whether infinite or finite, spiritual or material; and explained therefore the most universal notions and attributes common to all beings—such as entity, non-entity, essence, existence, unity, identity, diversity, &c. This is *metaphysics* properly so called. *Special metaphysics* was sometimes called *Pneumatology*—(q. v.), and included—1. *Natural Theology*, or *Theodicy*; 2. *Rational Cosmology*, or the science of the origin and order of the world; and 3. *Rational Psychology*, which treated of the nature, faculties, and destiny of the human mind.

The three objects of *special metaphysics*, viz., God, the world, and the human mind, correspond to Kant's three ideas

¹ Wolf, *Philosoph. Ration. Disc. Prelim.*, sect. 73; Mansel, *Prolegom. Log.*, p. 277

² Schwegler, *Hist. of Philos.*, p. 112.

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of the pure reason. According to him, a systematic exposition of those notions and truths, the knowledge of which is altogether independent of experience, constitutes the *science of metaphysics*.

"Time was," says Kant,¹ "when *metaphysics* was the *queen* of all the sciences; and if we take the will for the deed, she certainly deserves, so far as regards the high importance of her object matter, this title of honour. Now, it is the fashion of the time to heap contempt and scorn upon her; and the matron mourns, forlorn and forsaken, like Hecuba—

'Modo, maxima rerum,
Tot genera, natisque potens,
Nunc trahor exul, inops.'"

According to D'Alembert,² the aim of *metaphysics* is to examine the generation of our ideas, and to show that they all come from *sensations*. This is the *ideology* of Condillac and De Tracy.

Mr. Stewart³ has said that "*Metaphysics* was a word formerly appropriated to the ontology and pneumatology of the schools, but now understood as equally applicable to all those inquiries which have for their object, to trace the various branches of human knowledge to their first principles in the constitution of the human mind." And⁴ he has said that by *metaphysics* he understands the "inductive philosophy of the human mind." In this sense the word is now popularly employed to denote, not the *rational psychology* of the schools, but *psychology*, or the philosophy of the human mind prosecuted according to the inductive method. In consequence of the subtle and insoluble questions prosecuted by the schoolmen, under the head of *metaphysics*, the word and the inquiries which it includes have been exposed to ridicule.⁵

¹ Preface to the first edition of the *Crit. of Pure Reason*.

² *Mélanges*, tom. iv., p. 143.

³ *Dissert.*, part ii., p. 475.

⁴ In the Preface to the *Dissert.*

⁵ The word *metaphysics* was handled by Rev. Sydney Smith (*Elementary Sketches of Moral Philosophy*, chap. 1, p. 3,) with as much caution as if had been a hand-grenade.

"There is a word," he exclaimed, when lecturing, with his deep, sonorous, warning voice, "of dire sound and horrible import, which I would fain have kept concealed if I possibly could, but as this is not feasible, I shall even meet the danger at once, and get

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But there is and must be a *science of being*, otherwise there is and can be no *science of knowing*.

"If by *metaphysics* we mean those truths of the pure reason which always transcend, and not seldom appear to contradict the understanding, or (in the words of the great apostle) spiritual verities which can only be spiritually discerned, and this is the true and legitimate meaning of *metaphysics*, *μετὰ τὰ φυσικά*, then I affirm, that this very controversy between the Arminians and the Calvinists (as to grace), in which both are partially right in what they affirm, and both wholly wrong in what they deny, is a proof that without *metaphysics* there can be no light of faith."¹

In French the word *metaphysique* is used as synonymous with *philosophie*, to denote the first principles, or an inquiry into the first principles of any science. *La Metaphysique du Droit*, *La Metaphysique du Moral*, &c. It is the same in German.

METEMPSYCHOSIS (*μετὰ*, beyond; *ἐμψύχω*, to animate), is the transmigration or passage of the soul from one body to another. "We read in Plato, that from the opinion of *metempsychosis*, or transmigration of the souls of men into the bodies of beasts most suitable unto their human condition, after his death, Orpheus the musician became a swan."²

This doctrine implies a belief in the pre-existence and immortality of the soul. And, according to Herodotus,³ the Egyptians were the first to espouse both doctrines. They believed that the soul at death entered into some animal

out of it as well as I can. The word to which I allude is that very tremendous one of '*metaphysics*,' which in a lecture on moral philosophy, seems likely to produce as much alarm as the cry of 'fire' in a crowded playhouse; when Belvidera is left to cry by herself, and every one saves himself in the best manner he can. I must beg of my audience, however, to sit quiet, and in the meantime to make use of the language which the manager would probably adopt on such an occasion: I can assure ladies and gentlemen there is not the smallest degree of danger."

The blacksmith of Glamsi's description of *metaphysics* was—"Twa folk disputin' theither; he that's listenin' disna ken what he that's speakin' means, and he that's speakin' disna ken what he means himsel'—that's *metaphysics*."

Another said—"God forbid that I should say a word against *metaphysics*, only, if a man should try to see down his own throat, with a lighted candle in his hand, let him take care lest he set his head on fire."

¹ Coleridge, *Notes on Eng. Div.*, vol. i., p. 340.

² Browne, *Vulgar Errors*, b. iii., c. 27.

³ Lib. ii., sect. 123.

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created at the moment; and that after having inhabited the forms of all animals on earth, in the water, or in the air, it returned at the end of three thousand years into a human body, to begin anew a similar course of transmigration. (Among the inhabitants of India the transmigration of the soul was more nearly allied to the doctrine of *emanation*—q. v.) The common opinion is, that the doctrine of transmigration passed from Egypt into Greece. But, before any communication between the two countries, it had a place in the Orphic mysteries. Pythagoras may have given more precision to the doctrine. It was adopted by Plato and his followers, and was secretly taught among the early Christians, according to one of St. Jerome's letters. The doctrine, when believed, should lead to abstaining from flesh, fish, or fowl, and this, accordingly, was one of the fundamental injunctions in the religion of Brahma, and in the philosophy of Pythagoras.

METHOD (*μῆθοδος*, *μετά* and *ὁδός*), means the way or path by which we proceed to the attainment of some object or aim. In its widest acceptance, it denotes the means employed to obtain some end. Every art and every handicraft has its *method*. Cicero¹ translates *μῆθοδος* by *via*, and couples it with *ars*.

Scientific or philosophical *method* is the march which the mind follows in ascertaining or communicating truth. It is the putting of our thoughts in a certain order with a view to improve our knowledge or to convey it to others.

Method may be called, in general, *the art of disposing well a series of many thoughts, either for the discovering truth when we are ignorant of it, or for proving it to others when it is already known*. Thus there are two kinds of *method*, one for discovering truth, which is called *analysis*, or the *method of resolution*, and which may also be called the *method of invention*; and the other for explaining it to others when we have found it, which is called *synthesis*, or the *method of composition*, and which may also be called the *method of doctrine*.²

"*Method*, which is usually described as the fourth part of *Logio*, is rather a complete practical *Logio*. It is rather a

¹ *Brutus*, c. 12. Compare *De Finibus*, II, 1, v. and also *De Orat.*, I, 19.

² *Port Roy. Logic*, part IV., ch. 2.

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power or spirit of the intellect, pervading all that it does, than its tangible product."¹

Every department of philosophy has its own proper *method*; but there is a universal *method* or science of *method*. This was called by Plato,² dialectic; and represented as leading to the true and the real. It has been said that the word *μῆθοδος*, as it occurs in Aristotle's *Ethics*, should be translated "systems," rather than "method."³ But the construction of a system implies *method*. And no one was more thoroughly aware of the importance of a right *method* than Aristotle. He has said,⁴ "that we ought to see well what demonstration (or proof) suits each particular subject; for it would be absurd to mix together the research of science and that of *method*; two things, the acquisition of which offers great difficulty." The deductive *method* of philosophy came at once finished from his hand. And the inductive *method* was more extensively and successfully followed out by him than has been generally thought.

James Acontius, or Concio, as he is sometimes called, was born at Trent, and came to England in 1567. He published a work, *De Methodo*, of which Mons. Degerando⁵ has given an analysis. According to him all knowledge deduced from a process of reasoning presupposes some primitive truths, founded in the nature of man, and admitted as soon as announced; and the great aim of *method* should be to bring these primitive truths to light, that by their light we may have more light. Truths obtained by the senses, and by repeated experience, become at length positive and certain knowledge.

Descartes has a discourse on *Method*. He has reduced it to four general rules.

I. To admit nothing as true of which we have not a clear and distinct idea. We have a clear and distinct idea of our own existence. And in proportion as our idea of anything else approaches to, or recedes from, the clearness of this idea, it ought to be received or rejected.

¹ Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*, sect. 119.

² Paul, *Analysis of Aristotle's Ethics*, p. 1.

³ *Hist. Compar. des Systemes de Philosophie*, part II., tom. II., p. 2.

⁴ *Repub.*, lib. vii.

⁵ *Metaphys.*, lib. II.

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II. To divide every object inquired into as much as possible into its parts. Nothing is more simple than the ego, or self-consciousness. In proportion as the object of inquiry is simplified, the evidence comes to be nearer that of self-consciousness,

III. To ascend from simple ideas or cognitions to those that are more complex. The real is often complex: and to arrive at the knowledge of it as a reality, we must by synthesis reunite the parts which were previously separated.

IV. By careful and repeated enumeration to see that all the parts are reunited. For the synthesis will be deceitful and incomplete if it do not reunite the whole, and thus give the reality.

This *method* begins with provisory doubt, proceeds by analysis and synthesis, and ends by accepting evidence in proportion as it resembles the evidence of self-consciousness.

These rules are useful in all departments of philosophy. But different sciences have different *methods* suited to their objects and to the end in view.

In prosecuting science with the view of extending our knowledge of it, or the limits of it, we are said to follow the *method* of investigation or inquiry, and our procedure will be chiefly in the way of *analysis*. But in communicating what is already known, we follow the *method* of exposition or doctrine, and our procedure will be chiefly in the way of *synthesis*.

In some sciences the principles or laws are given, and the object of the science is to discover the possible application of them. In these sciences the *method* is deductive, as in geometry. In other sciences, the facts or phenomena are given, and the object of the science is to discover the principles or laws. In these sciences the proper *method* is inductive, proceeding by observation or experiment, as in psychology and physics. The *method* opposed to this, and which was long followed, was the constructive *method*; which, instead of discovering causes by induction, imagined or assigned them *a priori*, or *ex hypothesi*, and afterwards tried to verify them. This *method* is seductive and bold but dangerous and insecure, and should be resorted to with great caution. — V. **HYPOTHESIS.**

METHOD—

The use of *method*, both in obtaining and applying knowledge for ourselves, and in conveying and communicating it to others, is great and obvious. "*Currenti extra viam, quo habilior sit et velocior, eo majorem contingere aberrationem.*"

"Une bonne methode donne a l'esprit une telle puissance qu'elle peut en quelque sorte remplacer le talent. C'est un levier qui donne a l'homme faible, qui l'emploie, une force que ne savait posséder l'homme le plus fort qui serait privé d'un semblable moyen."¹ La Place has said,—"*La connaissance de la methode qui a guidé l'homme de genie, n'est pas moins utile au progres de la science, et meme a sa propre gloire, que ses decouvertes.*"

"Marshal thy notions into a handsome *method*. One will carry twice as much weight, trussed and packed up in bundles, than when it lies untoward, flapping and hanging about his shoulders."²—*V. SYSTEM.*

METHODOLOGY (*Methodenlehre*) is the transcendental doctrine of *method*.³ The elementary doctrine has been called by some *Elementology*, or the science treating of the form of a metaphysical system.

METONOMY.—*V. INTENTION.*

MICROCOSM.—*V. MACROCOSM.*

MIND is that which moves, body is that which is moved.⁴

"By *mind* we mean something which, when it acts, knows what it is going to do; something stored with ideas of its intended works, agreeably to which ideas those works are fashioned."⁵

"*Mind*, that which perceives, feels, thinks, and wills."⁶

"Among metaphysicians, *mind* is becoming a generic, and *soul* an individual designation. *Mind* is opposed to matter; soul to body. *Mind* is soul without regard to per-

¹ *Nova Org.*, I., 61.

² Comte, *Traité de P'Legislation*, lib. 1., c. 1.

³ *Pleasures of Literature*, 12mo, Lond., 1861, p. 104. See Descartes, *On Method*; Coleridge, *On Method*, Intro. to *Encyclop. Metropol.*; Friend, vol. i. l.

⁴ See Kant, *Crit. of Pure Reason*, p. 641, Haywood's translation.

⁵ Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, book ii., chap. 3. See his remarks on the definition of Plato and Aristotle, chap. 4.

⁶ Harris, *Hermes*, p. 227.

⁷ Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

MIND—

sonality; soul is the appropriate *mind* of the being under notice. Etymologically, *mind* is the principle of volition, and *soul* the principle of animation. "I *mean* to go" was originally "I *mind* to go." *Soul*, at first identical with *self*, is from *sellah*, to say, the faculty of speech being its characteristic.

"Dumb, and without a soul, beside such beauty,
He has no *mind* to marry."¹

—V. SOUL.

MIRACLE (*miror*, to wonder). — "A *miracle* I take to be a sensible operation, which being above the comprehension of the spectator, and, in his opinion, contrary to the established course of nature, is taken by men to be divine."²

"A miracle," says Mr. Hume,³ "is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as complete as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined; and if so, it is an undeniable consequence, that it cannot be surmounted by any proof whatever derived from human testimony."

Mr. Hume says the first hint of that argument occurred to him in a conversation with a Jesuit in the College of La Flèche. It has been replied to by Dr. Adams,⁴ Dr. Campbell,⁵ Bp. Douglas.⁶

MNEMONICS.—V. MEMORIA TECHNICA.

MODALITY is the term employed to denote the most general points of view under which the different objects of thought present themselves to our mind. Now all that we think of we think of as *possible*, or *contingent*, or *impossible*, or *necessary*. The *possible* is that which may equally be or not be, which is not yet, but which may be; the *contingent* is that which already is, but which might not have been; the *necessary* is that which always is; and the *impossible* is that which never is. These are the *modalities* of being, which necessarily find a place in thought, and in the expression of it in

¹ Taylor, *Synonyms*.

² Locke, *A Discourse of Miracles*.

³ *Essay on Miracles*.

⁴ *Essay in Answer, &c.*

⁵ *Dissert on Miracles*.

⁶ *Criterion of Miracles*. See also Lemoine, *A Treatise on Miracles*, 8vo, Lond., 1767.

MODALITY —

judgments and in propositions. Hence arise the four *modal propositions* which Aristotle¹ has defined and opposed. He did not use the term *modality*, but it is to be found among his commentators and the scholastic philosophers. In the philosophy of Kant, our judgments are reduced under the four heads of quantity, quality, relation, and *modality*. In reference to *modality* they are either problematic, or assertory, or apodeictical. And hence the category of *modality* includes possibility and impossibility, existence and non-existence, necessity or contingency. But existence and non-existence should have no place; the contingent and the necessary are not different from being.²

MODE.—"The manner in which a thing exists is called a *mode* or affection; shape and colour are *modes* of matter, memory and joy are *modes* of mind."³

"*Modes*, I call such complex ideas, which, however compounded, contain not in them the supposition of subsisting by themselves, but are considered as dependencies on, or affections of, substances."⁴

"There are some *modes* which may be called *internal*, because they are conceived to be in the substance, as round, square; and others which may be called *external*, because they are taken from something which is not in the substance, as loved, seen, desired, which are names taken from the action of another; and this is what is called in the schools an *external denomination*."⁵

"*Modes* or *modifications* of mind, in the Cartesian school, mean merely what some recent philosophers express by *states of mind*; and include both the *active* and *passive* phenomena of the conscious subject. The terms were used by Descartes as well as by his disciples."⁶

Mode is the manner in which a substance exists; thus wax may be round or square, solid or fluid. *Modes* are secondary or subsidiary, as they could not be without substance, which

¹ Περὶ ἔμφυτας, c. 12-14.

² *Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*

³ Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

⁴ Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, b. II, chap. 12, sect. 4.

⁵ Port Roy. *Logic*, part I, chap. 2.

⁶ Sir William Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 296, note.

MODE—

exists by itself. Substances are not confined to any *mode*, but must exist in some. *Modes* are all variable conditions, and though some one is necessary to every substance, the particular ones are all accidental. *Modification* is properly the bringing of a thing into a *mode*, but is sometimes used to denote the *mode* of existence itself. *State* is a nearly synonymous but a more extended term than *mode*.

A *mode* is a variable and determinate affection of a substance, a quality which it may have or not, without affecting its essence or existence. A body may be at rest or in motion, a mind may affirm or deny, without ceasing to be. They are not *accidents*, because they arise directly from the nature of the substance which experiences them. Nor should they be called *phenomena*, which may have or not have their cause in the object which exhibits them. But *modes* arise from the nature of the substance affected by them. It is true that one substance *modifies* another, and in this view *modes* may sometimes be the effect of causes out of the substance in which they appear. They are then called *modifications*. Fire melts wax; the liquidity of wax in this view is a *modification*.

All beings which constitute the universe modify one another; but a soul endowed with liberty is the only being that modifies itself, or which can be altogether and in the same *mode*, cause and substance, active and passive.¹

"That quality which distinguishes one genus, one species, or even one individual, from another, is termed a *modification*; then the same particular that is termed a *property* or *quality*, when considered as belonging to an individual, or a class of individuals, is termed a *modification* when considered as distinguishing the individual or the class from another; a black skin and soft curled hair, are properties of a negro; the same circumstances considered as marks that distinguish a negro from a man of different species, are denominated *modifications*."

MOLECULE (*molecula*, a little mass), is the smallest portion of matter cognizable by any of our senses. It is something real, and thus differs from *atom*, which is not perceived but conceived

¹ *Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*

² *Kames, Elements of Criticism, App.*

MOLECULE—

It is the smallest portion of matter which we can reach by our means of dividing, while *atom* is the last possible term of all division. When *molecules* are of simple homogeneous elements, as of gold or silver, they are called *integral*; when they are of compound or heterogeneous elements, as salts and acids, they are called *constituent*.

MONAD, MONADOLOGY (μονάς, unity, one).—According to Leibnitz, the elementary particles of matter are vital forces not acting mechanically, but from an internal principle. They are incorporeal or spiritual atoms, inaccessible to all change from without, but subject to internal movement. This hypothesis he explains in a treatise entitled *Monadologie*. He thought inert matter insufficient to explain the phenomena of body, and had recourse to the *entelechies* of Aristotle, or the *substantial forms* of the scholastic philosophy, conceiving of them as primitive forces, constituting the substance of matter, atoms of substance but not of matter, real and absolute unities, metaphysical points, full of vitality, *exact* as mathematical points, and *real* as physical points. These substantial unities which constitute matter are of a nature inferior to spirit and soul, but they are imperishable, although they may undergo *transformation*.

“Leibnitz conceived the whole universe, bodies as well as minds, to be made up of *monads*, that is, simple substances, each of which is, by the Creator, in the beginning of its existence, endowed with certain active and perceptive powers. A *monad*, therefore, is an active substance, simple, without parts or figure, which has within itself the power to produce all the changes it undergoes from the beginning of its existence to eternity. The changes which the *monad* undergoes, of what kind soever, though they may seem to us the effect of causes operating from without, are only the gradual and successive evolutions of its own internal powers, which would have produced all the same changes and motions, although there had been no other being in the universe.”¹

Mr. Stewart² has said,—“After studying, with all possible diligence, what Leibnitz has said of his *monads* in different

¹ Reid, *Intell. Pro.*, essay II., ch. 15.

² *Dissert.*, part II., note 1, p. 219.

MONAD—

parts of his works, I find myself quite incompetent to annex any precise idea to the word as he has employed it." The most intelligible passage which he quotes is the following:—

"A *monad* is not a *material* but a *formal* atom, it being impossible for a thing to be at once material, and possessed of a real unity and indivisibility. It is necessary, therefore, to revive the obsolete doctrine of *substantial forms* (the essence of which consists in *force*), separating it, however, from the various abuses to which it is liable."

"*Monadology* rests upon this axiom—Every substance is at the same time a cause, and every substance being a cause, has therefore in itself the principle of its own development: such is the *monad*; it is a simple force. Each *monad* has relation to all others; it corresponds with the plan of the universe; it is the universe abridged; it is, as Leibnitz says, a living mirror which reflects the entire universe under its own point of view. But every *monad* being simple, there is no immediate action of one *monad* upon another; there is, however, a natural relation of their respective development, which makes their apparent communication; this natural relation, this harmony which has its reason in the wisdom of the supreme director, is *pre-established harmony*."²

MONOGAMY (*μόνος, γάμος*, one marriage), is the doctrine that one man should have only one wife, and a wife only one husband. It has also been interpreted to mean that a man or woman should not marry more than once.—*V.* POLYGAMY.

MONOTHEISM (*μόνος, θεός*, one God), is the belief in one God only.

"The general propensity to the worship of idols was totally subdued, and the Jews became *monotheists*, in the strictest sense of the term."³—*V.* THEISM, POLYTHEISM.

MOOD.—*V.* SYLLOGISM.

MORAL (*moralis*, from *mos*, manner), is used in several senses in philosophy.

In reasoning, the word *moral* is opposed to *demonstrative*,

¹ Tom. II., p. 50.

² Cousin, *Hist. Mod. Philosoph.*, vol. II., p. 86.

³ Cogan, *Discourse on Jewish Dispensation*, c. 2, s. 7.

MORAL—

and means *probable*. Sometimes it is opposed to *material*, and in this sense it means *mental*, or that the object to which it is applied belongs to *mind* and not to *matter*. Thus we speak of *moral science* as distinguished from *physical science*.

It is also opposed to *intellectual* and to *æsthetic*. Thus we distinguish between a *moral habit* and an *intellectual habit*, between that which is *morally* becoming and that which pleases the powers of *taste*.

Moral is opposed to *positive*. "*Moral precepts* are precepts, the reasons of which we see; *positive precepts* are precepts, the reasons of which we do not see. *Moral duties* arise out of the nature of the case itself, prior to external command; *positive duties* do not arise out of the nature of the case, but from external command; nor would they be duties at all, were it not for such command received from Him whose creatures and subjects we are."¹

"A *positive* precept concerns a thing that is right because commanded; a *moral* precept respects a thing commanded because it is right. A Jew, for instance, was bound both to honour his parents, and also to worship at Jerusalem; but the former was *commanded* because it was right, and the latter was right *because* it was commanded."²

MORAL FACULTY.—V. CONSCIENCE.

MORALITY.—"To lay down, in their universal form, the laws according to which the conduct of a free agent ought to be regulated, and to apply them to the different situations of human life, is the end of *morality*."

"A *body of moral truths, definitely expressed, and arranged according to their rational connection*," is the definition of a "*system of morality*" by Dr. Whewell.³

"The doctrine which treats of actions as right or wrong is *morality*."⁴

"There are in the world two classes of objects, persons and things. And these are mutually related to each other. There are relations between persons and persons, and between things and things. And the peculiar distinctions of *moral* actions,

¹ Butler, *Analogy*, part II., ch. 1.

² On *Systematic Morality*, lect. I.

³ Whately, *Lessons on Morals*.

⁴ Whewell, *Morality*, sect. 76.

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moral characters, *moral* principles, *moral* habits, as contrasted with the intellect and other parts of man's nature, lies in this, *that they always imply a relation between two persons, not between two things.*"¹

"*Morality* commences with, and begins in, the sacred distinction between thing and person. On this distinction all law, human and divine, is grounded."²

"What the duties of *morality* are, the apostle instructs the believer in full, comprising them under the two heads of negative and positive; negative, to keep himself pure from the world; and positive, beneficence from loving-kindness, that is, love of his fellow-men (his kind) as himself. Last and highest come the spiritual, comprising all the truths, acts, and duties, that have an especial reference to the timeless, the permanent, the eternal, to the sincere love of the true as truth, of the good as good, and of God as both in one. It comprehends the whole ascent from uprightness (*morality*, virtue, inward rectitude) to godlikeness, with all the acts, exercises, and disciplines of mind, will, and affections, that are requisite or conducive to the great design of our redemption from the form of the evil one, and of our second creation or birth in the divine image.

"It may be an additional aid to reflection, to distinguish the three kinds severally, according to the faculty to which each corresponds, the part of our human nature which is more particularly its organ. Thus, the prudential corresponds to the sense and the understanding; the moral to the heart and the conscience; the spiritual to the will and the reason, that is, to the finite will reduced to harmony with, and in subordination to, the reason, as a ray from that true light which is both reason and will, universal reason and will absolute."

How nearly this scriptural division coincides with the Platonic, see PRUDENCE.³

MORAL PHILOSOPHY is the science of human duty. The knowledge of human duty implies a knowledge of human nature. To understand what man ought to do, it is necessary

¹ Sewell, *Christ. Morals*, p. 339.

² Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*, vol. 1., p. 265.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. 1., pp. 22, 23

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to know what man is. Not that the moral philosopher, before entering upon those inquiries which peculiarly belong to him, must go over the science of human nature in all its extent. But it is necessary to examine those elements of human nature which have a direct bearing upon human conduct. A full course of *moral philosophy* should consist, therefore, of two parts—the first containing an analysis and illustration of those powers and principles by which man is prompted to act, and by the possession of which, he is capable of acting under a sense of duty; the second, containing an arrangement and exposition of the duties incumbent upon him as the possessor of an active and moral nature. As exhibiting the facts and phenomena presented by an examination of the active and moral nature of man, the first part may be characterized as *psychological*; and as laying down the duties arising from the various relations in which man, as a moral agent, has been placed, the second part may be designated as *deontological*.

"The moral philosopher has to investigate the principles according to which men act—the motives which influence them in fact—the objects at which they commonly aim—the passions, desires, characters, manners, tastes, which appear in the world around him, and in his own constitution. Further, as in all moral actions, the intellectual principles are implicated with the feelings, he must extend his inquiry to the phenomena of the mental powers, and know both what they are in themselves, and how they are combined in actions with the feelings."¹—V. ETHICS.

MORAL SENSE.—V. SENSES (Reflex).

MORPHOLOGY (μορφή, form; λόγος).—"The branch of *botanical science* which treats of the forms of plants is called *morphology*, and is now regarded as the fundamental department of botany."²

"The subject of *animal morphology* has recently been expanded into a form, strikingly comprehensive and systematic, by Mr. Owen."³ So that *morphology* treats of the forms of plants and animals, or organized beings.

¹ Hampden, *Intro. to Mor. Phil.*, lect. vi., p. 187.

² M'Cosh, *Typical Forms*, p. 23.

³ Whewell, *Supplem.* vol., p. 140.

MOTION (*κίνησις*) is the continued change of place of a body, or of any parts of a body; for in the cases of a globe turning on its axis, and of a wheel revolving on a pivot, the parts of these bodies change their places, while the bodies themselves remain stationary.

Motion is either *physical*, that is, obvious to the senses, or *not physical*, that is, knowable by the rational faculty.

Aristotle has noticed several kinds of *physical* motion. Change of place, as when a body moves from one place to another, remaining the same. Alteration or aliation, as when a body from being round, becomes square. Augmentation or diminution, as when a body becomes larger or smaller. All these are changes from one attribute to another, while the substance remains the same.

But body only moves because it is moved. And Aristotle traced all *motion* to impulses in the nature of things, rising from the spontaneous impulse of life, appetite, and desire, up to the intelligent contemplation of what is good.

As Heraclitus held that all things are continually changing, so Parmenides and Zeno denied the possibility of motion. The best reply to their subtle sophisms, was that given by Diogenes the Cynic, who walked into the presence of Zeno in refutation of them.

The notion of movement or *motion*, like that of extension, is acquired in connection with the exercise of the senses of sight and touch.

MOTIVE. — "The deliberate preference by which we are moved to act, and not the object for the sake of which we act, is the principle of action; and desire and reason, which is for the sake of something, is the origin of deliberate preference."¹

Kant distinguishes between the subjective principle of apperception which he calls the mobile or spring (*die Triebfeder*), and the objective principle of the will, which he calls motive or determining reason (*beweggrund*); hence the difference between *subjective ends* to which we are pushed by natural disposition, and *objective ends* which are common to us with all beings endowed with reason.²

¹ Aristotle, *Ethic.*, lib. vi., cap. 2.

² Willm, *Hist. de la Philosophie Allemande*, tom. i., p. 367.

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This seems to be the difference expressed in French between *mobile* and *motif*.

"A motive is an object so operating upon the mind as to produce either desire or aversion."

"By *motive*," said Edwards,¹ "I mean the whole of that which moves, excites, or invites the mind to volition, whether that be one thing singly, or many things conjunctly. Many particular things may concur and unite their strength to induce the mind; and when it is so, all together are, as it were, one complex *motive*. . . . Whatever is a *motive*, in this sense, must be something that is *extant in the view or apprehension of the understanding, or perceiving faculty*. Nothing can induce or invite the mind to will or act anything, any further than it is perceived, or is in some way or other in the mind's view; for what is wholly unperceived, and perfectly out of the mind's view, cannot affect the mind at all."

Hence it has been common to distinguish *motives* as *external* or *objective*, and as *internal* or *subjective*. Regarded *objectively*, *motives* are those external objects or circumstances, which, when contemplated, give rise to views or feelings which prompt or influence the will. Regarded *subjectively*, *motives* are those internal views or feelings which arise on the contemplation of external objects or circumstances. In common language, the term *motive* is applied indifferently to the external object, and to the state of mind, to which the apprehension or contemplation of it may give rise. The explanation of Edwards includes both. Dr. Reid² said, that he "understood a *motive*, when applied to a human being, to be that for the sake of which he acts, and therefore that what he never was conscious of, can no more be a *motive* to determine his will, than it can be an argument to determine his judgment."³

¹ Lord KAMM, *Essay on Liberty and Necessity*.

² *Inquiry*, part I, sect. 2.

³ *Correspondence prefixed to his Works*, p. 87.

⁴ "This is Aristotle's definition (*τὸ ἐκείνου αἰτία*) of end or final cause; and as a synonym for end or final cause the term *motive* had been long exclusively employed." — Sir WILLIAM HAMILTON.

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In his *Essays on the Active Powers*,¹ he said, "Everything that can be called a *motive* is addressed either to the animal or to the rational part of our nature." Here the word *motive* is applied *objectively* to those external things, which, when contemplated, affect our intelligence or our sensitivity. But, in the very next sentence, he has said, "*motives* of the former kind are common to us with the brutes." Here the word *motive* is applied *subjectively* to those internal principles of our nature, such as appetite, desire, passion, &c., which are excited by the contemplation of external objects, adapted and addressed to them.

But, in order to a more precise use of the term *motive*, let it be noted, that, in regard to it, there are three things clearly distinguishable, although it may not be common, nor easy, always to speak of them distinctively. These are, the external object, the internal principle, and the state or affection of mind resulting from the one being addressed to the other. For example, bread or food of any kind, is the external object, which is adapted to an internal principle which is called appetite, and hunger or the desire for food is the internal feeling, which is excited or allayed as the circumstances may be, by the presentment of the external object to the internal principle. In popular language, the term *motive* might be applied to any one of these three; and, it might be said, that the *motive* for such an action was *bread*, or *appetite*, or *hunger*. But, strictly speaking, the feeling of hunger was the *motive*; it was that, in the preceding state of mind, which disposed or inclined the agent to act in one way rather than in any other. The same may be said of *motives* of every kind. In every case there may be observed the external object, the internal principle, and the resultant state or affection of mind; and the term *motive* may be applied, separately and successively, to any one of them; but speaking strictly it should be applied to the terminating state or affection of mind which arises from a principle of human nature having been addressed by an object adapted to it; because, it is this state or affection of mind which prompts to action. The *motive* of an agent, in some particular action, may be said to have been *injury*, or *resent*

¹ Essay iv., chap. 4.

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ment, or *anger*—meaning by the first of these words, the wrongous behaviour of another; by the second, the principle in human nature affected by such behaviour; and by the third, the resultant state of mind in the agent. When it is said that a man acted *prudently*, it may intimate that his conduct was in accordance with the rules of propriety and prudence; or, that he adopted it, after careful consideration and forethought, or, from a sense of the benefit and advantage to be derived from it. In like manner, when it is said that a man acted *conscientiously*, it may mean, that the particular action was regarded not as a matter of interest, but of duty, or, that his moral faculty approved of it as right, or, that he felt himself under a sense of obligation to do it. In all these cases, the term *motive* is strictly applicable to the terminating state or affection of mind, which immediately precedes the volition or determination to act.

To the question, therefore, whether *motive* means something in the mind or out of it, it is replied, that what moves the will is something in the preceding state of mind. The state of mind may have reference to something out of the mind. But what is out of the mind must be apprehended or contemplated—must be brought within the view of the mind, before it can in any way affect it. It is only in a secondary or remote sense, therefore, that external objects or circumstances can be called *motives*, or be said to move the will. *Motives* are, strictly speaking, *subjective*—as they are internal states or affections of mind in the agent.

And *motives* may be called *subjective*, not only in contradistinction to the external objects and circumstances which may be the occasion of them, but also in regard to the different effect which the same objects and circumstances may have, not only upon different individuals, but even upon the same individuals, at different times.

A man of slow and narrow intellect is unable to perceive the value or importance of an object when presented to him, or the propriety and advantage of a course of conduct that may be pointed out to him, so clearly or so quickly as a man of large and vigorous intellect. The consequence will be, that with the same *motives* (*objectively* considered) presented to

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them, the one may remain indifferent and indolent in reference to the advantage held out, while the other will at once apprehend and pursue it. A man of cold and dull affections will contemplate a spectacle of pain or want, without feeling any desire or making any exertion to relieve it; while he whose sensibilities are more acute and lively, will instantly be moved to the most active and generous efforts. An injury done to one man will rouse him at once to a phrenzy of indignation, which will prompt him to the most extravagant measures of retaliation or revenge; while, in another man, it will only give rise to a moderate feeling of resentment. An action which will be contemplated with horror by a man of tender conscience, will be done without compunction by him whose moral sense has not been sufficiently exercised to discern between good and evil. In short, anything external to the mind will be modified in its effect, according to the constitution and training of the different minds within the view of which it may be brought.

And not only may the same objects differently affect different minds, but also the same minds, at different times, or under different circumstances. He who is suffering the pain of hunger may be tempted to steal in order to satisfy his hunger; but he who has bread enough and to spare, is under no such temptation. A sum of money which might be sufficient to bribe one man, would be no trial to the honesty of another. Under the impulse of any violent passion, considerations of prudence and propriety have not the same weight as in calmer moments. The young are not so cautious, in circumstances of danger and difficulty, as those who have attained to greater age and experience. Objects appear to us in very different colours, in health and in sickness, in prosperity and in adversity, in society and in solitude, in prospect and in possession.

It would thus appear that *motives* are in their nature *subjective*, in their influence *individual*, and in their issue *variable*.

MYSTICISM and **MYSTERY** have been derived from *μύς*, to shut up; hence *μύστης*, one who shuts up.

“The epithet sublime is strongly and happily descriptive

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of the feelings inspired by the genius of Plato, by the lofty *mysticism* of his philosophy, and even by the remote origin of the theological fables which are said to have descended to him from Orpheus."¹

Mysticism in philosophy is the belief that God may be known face to face, without anything intermediate. It is a yielding to the sentiment awakened by the idea of the infinite, and a running up of all knowledge and all duty to the contemplation and love of Him.²

Mysticism despairs of the regular process of science; it believes that we may attain directly, without the aid of the senses or reason, and by an immediate intuition, the real and absolute principle of all truth, God. It finds God either in nature, and hence a *physical* and *naturalistic mysticism*; or in the soul, and hence a *moral* and *metaphysical mysticism*. It has also its historical views; and in history it considers especially that which represents *mysticism* in full, and under its most regular form, that is religious; and it is not to the letter of religions, but to their spirit, that it clings; hence an *allegorical* and *symbolical mysticism*. Van Helmont, Ames, and Pordage, are *naturalistic mystics*; Poiret is *moral*, and Bourignon and Fenelon are *Divine mystics*. Swedenborg's *mysticism* includes them all.

"Whether in the Vedas, in the Platonists, or in the Hegelians, *mysticism* is neither more nor less than ascribing objective existence to the subjective creations of our own faculties, to ideas or feelings of the mind; and believing that by watching and contemplating these ideas of its own making, it can read in them what takes place in the world without."³

The Germans have two words for *mysticism*; *mystik* and *mysticismus*. The former they use in a favourable, the latter in an unfavourable sense. Just as we say *piety* and *pidism*, or *rationality* and *rationalism*; keeping the first of each pair for use, the second for abuse.⁴

¹ Stewart, *Philosoph. Essays*, ii., chap. 5.

² Cousin, *Hist. de la Philosoph. Mod.*, première série, tom. ii., leçon 9, 10.

³ Mill, *Log.*, b. v., chap. iii., § 5.

⁴ Vaughan, *Hours with the Mystics*, vol. i., p. 23.

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Cousin,¹ Schmidt (Car.).²

MYTH and MYTHOLOGY (*μῦθος*, a tale; *λόγος*).—"I use this term (*myth*) as synonymous with 'invention,' having no historical basis."³

The early history and the early religion of all nations are full of fables. Hence it is that *myths* have been divided into the *traditional* and the *theological*, or the *historical* and the *religious*.⁴

A *myth* is a narrative framed for the purpose of expressing some general truth, a law of nature, a moral phenomenon, or a religious idea, the different phases of which correspond to the turn of the narrative. An *allegory* agrees with it in expressing some general idea, but differs from it in this,—that in the *allegory* the *idea* was developed before the *form*, which was invented and adapted to it. The *allegory* is a reflective and artificial process, the *myth* springs up spontaneously and by a kind of inspiration. A *symbol* is a silent *myth*, which impresses the truths which it conveys not by successive stages, but at once (*ὅν, βάλλω*) throws together significant images of some truth.

Plato has introduced the *myth* into some of his writings in a subordinate way, as in the *Gorgias*, the *Republic*, and the *Timæus*.

Blackwell,⁵ Huttner,⁶ Bacon,⁷ Müller.⁸

On the philosophic value of *myths*, see Cousin,⁹ and the Argument of his translation of *Plato*.

Some good remarks on the difference between the *parable*, the *fable*, the *myth*, &c., will be found in Trench.¹⁰

¹ *Hist. of Mod. Philosoph.*, vol. II., pp. 94-7.

² *Essai sur les Mystiques du Quatorzième siècle*. Strasburg, 1836.

³ Pococke, *India in Greece*, p. 2, note.

⁴ Among the early nations, every truth a little remote from common apprehension was embodied in their religious creed; so that this second class would contain *myths* concerning Deity, morals, physics, astronomy, and metaphysics. These last are properly called *philosophemes*.

⁵ *Letters Concerning Mythology*, 8vo, Lond., 1748.

⁶ *De Mythis Platonicis*, 4to, Leipzig, 1788.

⁷ *On the Wisdom of the Ancients*.

⁸ *Mythology*: Translated by Leibniz, 1844.

⁹ *Cours*, 1828; 1 and 15 leçons.

¹⁰ *On the Parables*, Introd.

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On the different views taken of Greek *mythology*, see Creuzer and Godfrey Hermann.

See an *Essay on Comparative Mythology*,¹ Grote.²

NATURA. — V. NATURE.

NATURAL, as distinguished from **Supernatural** or **Miraculous**.

— “The only distinct meaning of the word *natural* is *stated, fixed, or settled*; since what is *natural* as much requires and presupposes an intelligent agent to render it so, that is, to affect it continually or at stated times, as what is supernatural or miraculous does to effect it for once.”³

Natural, as distinguished from **Innate** or **Instinctive**.

“There is a great deal of difference,” said Mr. Locke,⁴ “between an *innate law*, and a *law of nature*; between something imprinted on our minds in their very original, and something that we being ignorant of, may attain to the knowledge of by the use and application of our *natural* faculties. And I think they equally forsake the truth who, running into contrary extremes, either affirm an *innate law*, or deny that there is a law knowable by the *light of nature*, without the help of positive revelation.”

“Of the various powers and faculties we possess, there are some which nature seems both to have planted and reared, so as to have left nothing to human industry. Such are the powers which we have in common with the brutes, and which are necessary to the preservation of the individual, or to the continuance of the kind. There are other powers, of which nature hath only planted the seeds in our minds, but hath left the rearing of them to human culture.⁵ It is by the proper culture of these that we are capable of all those improvements in intellectuals, in tastes, and in morals, which exalt and dignify human nature; while, on the other hand, the neglect or perversion of them makes its degeneracy and corruption.”⁶

¹ In the *Oxford Essays* for 1854.

² *Hist. of Greece*, vol. I., p. 400.

³ Butler, *Analogy*, part I., chap. 1.

⁴ *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book I., ch. 2.

⁵ Yet Dr. Reid, when speaking of *natural* rights (*Act. Pow.*, essay v., ch. 5) uses the *term* as synonymous with *natural*.

⁶ Reid, *Inquiry*, ch. 1, sect. 2.

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"Whatever ideas, whatever principles we are *necessarily* led to acquire by the circumstances in which we are placed, and by the exercise of those faculties which are essential to our preservation, are to be considered as parts of human nature, no less than those which are implanted in the mind at its first formation."¹

"Acquired perceptions and sentiments may be termed *natural*, as much as those which are commonly so called, if they are as rarely found wanting."²

NATURALISM is the name given to those systems of the philosophy of *nature* which explain the phenomena by a blind force acting necessarily. This doctrine is to be found in Lucretius,³ and was held by Leucippus and Epicurus. The *Système de la Nature* of D'Holbach, the *Traité de la Nature* of Robinet, and the *Philosophie de la Nature* of Delisle de Sales, also contain it.

Naturalism in the fine arts is opposed to *idealism*. Of Albert Durer it is said that "he united to the brilliant delicacies of Flemish *naturalism* the most elevated and varied of Italian *idealism*."⁴

NATURE (*nāscor*, to be born). — According to its derivation, *nature* should mean that which is produced or born; but it also means that which produces or causes to be born. The word has been used with various shades of meaning, but they may all be brought under two heads, *Natura Naturans*, and *Natura Naturata*.

I. *Natura Naturans*. — a. The Author of *nature*, the uncreated Being who gave birth to everything that is. b. The plastic *nature* or energy subordinate to that of the Deity, by which all things are conserved and directed to their ends and uses. c. The course of *nature*, or the established order according to which the universe is regulated.

*Alii naturam censent esse vim quandam sine Ratione, cientem motus in corporibus necessarios; alii autem vim participem ordinis, tanquam via progredientem.*⁵

II. *Natura Naturata*. — a. 1. The works of *nature*, both mind

¹ Stewart, *Act. and Mor. Pow.*, vol. 1, p. 351.

² Mackintosh, *Prelimin. Dissert.*, p. 67.

³ Labarte, *Handbook of the Middle Ages*.

⁴ Cicero, *De Nat. Deorum*, lib. II.

⁵ *De Rerum Natura*.

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and matter. 3. The visible or material creation, as distinct from God and the soul, which is the object of *natural science*.

"The term *nature* is used sometimes in a wider, sometimes in a narrower extension. When employed in its most extensive meaning, it embraces the two worlds of mind and matter. When employed in its more restricted signification, it is a synonym for the latter only, and is then used in contradistinction to the former. In the Greek philosophy, the word φύσις was general in its meaning; and the great branch of philosophy, styled '*physical* or *physiological*,' included under it not only the sciences of matter, but also those of mind. With us, the term *nature* is more vaguely extensive than the terms *physics*, *physical*, *physiology*, *physiological*, or even than the adjective, *natural*; whereas, in the philosophy of Germany, *natur* and its correlatives, whether of Greek or Latin derivation, are, in general, expressive of the world of matter in contrast to the world of intelligence."¹

h. *Nature* as opposed to *art*, all physical causes, all the forces which belong to physical beings, organic or inorganic.
c. The *nature* or essence of any particular being or class of beings, that which makes it what it is.

"The word *nature* has been used in two senses,—viz., actively and passively; energetic (= *forma formans*), and material (= *forma formata*). In the first it signifies the inward principle of whatever is requisite for the reality of a thing as *existent*; while the *essence*, or essential property, signifies the inner principle of all that appertains to the *possibility* of a thing. Hence, in accurate language, we say the essence of a mathematical circle or geometrical figure, not the *nature*, because in the conception of forms, purely geometrical, there is no expression or implication of their real existence. In the second or material sense of the word *nature*, we mean by it the sum total of all things, as far as they are objects of our senses, and consequently of possible experience—the aggregate of phenomena, whether existing for our outer senses, or for our inner sense. The doctrine concerning *nature*, would therefore (the word *physiology* being both am-

¹ Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 216, note.

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biguous in itself, and already otherwise appropriated) be more properly entitled phenomenology, distinguished into its two grand divisions, somatology¹ and psychology."²

NATURE (Course or Power of).—"There is no such thing as what men commonly call the *course of nature*, or the *power of nature*. The *course of nature*, truly and properly speaking, is nothing else but the *will of God* producing certain effects in a continued, regular, constant, and uniform manner; which course or manner of acting, being in every movement perfectly *arbitrary*, is as easy to be *altered* at any time as to be *preserved*. And if (as seems most probable), this continual acting upon matter be performed by the subserviency of created intelligences appointed for that purpose by the Supreme Creator, then it is easy for any of them, and as much within their natural power (by the permission of God), to *alter* the course of *nature* at any time, or in any respect, as it is to *preserve* or continue it."³

"All things are artificial," said Sir Thomas Browne, "for *nature* is the *art* of God." The antithesis of *nature* and *art* is a celebrated doctrine in the peripatetic philosophy. Natural things are distinguished from artificial, inasmuch as they have, what the latter are without, an intrinsic principle of formation."⁴

"*Nature*," said Dr. Reid,⁵ "is the name we give to the efficient cause of innumerable effects which fall daily under observation. But if it be asked what *nature* is? whether the first universal cause⁶ or a subordinate one? whether one or many? whether intelligent or unintelligent?—upon these points we find various conjectures and theories, but no solid ground upon which we can rest. And I apprehend the wisest men are they who are sensible that they know nothing of the matter."

The Hon. Robert Boyle wrote an *Enquiry into the vulgarly*

¹ Both these are included in the title of a work which appeared more than thirty years ago. — viz., *Somatopsychologia*.

² Coleridge, *Friend*, p. 410.

³ Clarke, *Evidences of Nat. and Revealed Religion*, p. 300, 4th edit.

⁴ Arist., *De Gen., Anim.* ii., c. 1.

⁵ *Act. Pow.*, essay 1., ch. 5.

⁶ *Natura est principium et causas efficiens omnium rerum naturalium, quo sensu a veteribus philosophis cum Deo confundebatur.* — Cicero, *De Nat. Deor.*, lib. 1., c. 8, and lib. ii., c. 22, 32.

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received notion of Nature, in which he attempted to show the absurdity of interposing any subordinate energy between the Creator and His works.¹

Nature or Force (Plastic) (*κλάσσω*, to form), was the name given by ancient physiologists to a power to which they attributed the formation of the germs and tissues of organized and living beings. In opposition to the doctrine of Democritus, who explained all the phenomena of *nature* by means of matter and motion, and in opposition to the doctrine of Strato, who taught that matter was the only substance, but in itself a living and active force, Cudworth maintained that there is a *plastic nature*, a spiritual energy, intermediate between the Creator and His works, by which the phenomena of *nature* are produced. To ascribe these phenomena to the immediate agency of Deity would be, he thought, to make the course of *nature* miraculous; and he could not suppose the agency of the Deity to be exerted directly, and yet monstrosities and defects to be found in the works of *nature*. How far the facts warrant such an hypothesis, or how far such an hypothesis explains the facts, may be doubted. But the hypothesis is not much different from that of the *anima mundi*, or soul of matter, which had the countenance of Pythagoras and Plato, as well as of the school of Alexandria, and later philosophers.—
V. ANIMA MUNDI.

Nature (Philosophy of).—The philosophy of *nature* includes all the attempts which have been made to account for the origin and on-goings of the physical universe. Some of these have been noticed under *Matter*—q. v. And for an account of the various *Philosophies of nature*, see T. H. Martin,² J. B. Stallo, A. M.³

NATURE (Law of).—By the *law of Nature* is meant that law of justice and benevolence which is written on the heart of every man, and which teaches him to do to others as he would wish that they should do unto him. It was long called the *law of nature and of nations*, because it is natural to men of all nations.

¹ 12mo, Lond., 1785.

² *Philosophie Spiritualiste de la Nature*, 2 tom., Paris, 1849.

³ *General Principles of Philosoph. of Nature*, Lond., 1848.

⁴ *Quod naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit, id apud omnes populos peræque custoditur, vocaturque jus gentium; quasi uno jure omnes gentes utuntur.*—Gaius.

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But by the phrase *law of nations* is now meant international law, and by the *law of nature*, natural law. It is not meant by the phrase that there is a regular system or code of laws made known by the light of nature in which all men everywhere acquiesce, but that there are certain great principles universally acknowledged, and in accordance with which men feel themselves bound to regulate their conduct.

“Why seek the law or rule in the world? What would you answer when it is alleged to be within you, if you would only listen to it? You are like a dishonest debtor who asks for the bill against him when he has it himself. *Quod petis intus habes*. All the tables of the law, the two tables of Moses, the twelve tables of the Romans, and all the good laws in the world, are but copies and extracts, which will be produced in judgment against thee who hidest the original and pretendest not to know what it is, stifling as much as possible that light which shines within thee, but which would never have been without and humanly published but that that which was within, all celestial and divine, had been contemned and forgotten.”¹

According to Grotius, “*Jus naturale est dictatum rectæ rationis, indicans, actui alicui, ex ejus convenientia, vel inconvenientia cum ipsa natura rationali, inesse moralem turpitudinem, aut necessitatem moralem; et consequenter ab authore naturæ, ipso Deo, talem actum aut vetari aut præcipi.*”

“*Jus gentium* is used to denote, not international law, but positive or instituted law, so far as it is common to all nations. When the Romans spoke of international law, they termed it *Jus Feciale*, the law of heralds, or international envoys.”²

Selden,³ Grotius,⁴ Puffendorff,⁵ Sanderson,⁶ Tyrell,⁷ Culverwell.⁸

NATURE (of Things).—The following may be given as an outline of the views of those philosophers, Cudworth, Clarke, Price,

¹ Charron, *De la Sagesse*. liv. II., chap. 3, No. 4.

² Whewell, *Morality*, No. 1139.

³ *De Jure Naturali*, lib. I., c. 3.

⁴ *De Jure Belli et Pacis, Prolegom.*, sect. 5, lib. I., cap. 1, sect. 10.

⁵ *De Officiis Hominis et Civis*, lib. III., c. 3.

⁶ *De Oblig. Conscientia*, Prælect. Quarta, sect. 20-24.

⁷ *On Law of Nature*.

⁸ *Discourses of the Light of Nature*.

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and others, who place the foundation of virtue in the nature, reason, and fitness of things:—

“Everything is what it is, by having a nature. As all things have not the same nature, there must be different *relations, respects, or proportions*, of some things towards others, and a consequent *fitness or unfitness*, in the application of different things, or different relations, to one another. It is the same with *persons*. There is a *fitness, or suitableness* of certain circumstances to certain *persons*, and an *unsuitableness* of others. And from the different relations of *different persons to one another*, there necessarily arises a *fitness or unfitness* of certain *manners of behaviour* of some persons towards others, as well as in respect to the things and circumstances with which they are surrounded. Now, we stand in various relations to God, as our Creator, our Preserver, our Benefactor, our Governor, and our Judge. We cannot contemplate these relations, without seeing or feeling a Rectitude or Rightness in cherishing certain affections and discharging certain services towards Him, and a Wrongness in neglecting to do so, or in manifesting a different disposition, or following a different course of action. We stand, also, in various relations to our fellow-creatures; some of them inseparable from our nature and condition as human beings, such as the relations of parent and child, brother and friend; and others which may be voluntarily established, such as the relations of husband and wife, master and servant. And we cannot conceive of these relations without at the same time seeing a Rectitude or Rightness in cherishing suitable affections and following a suitable course of action. Not to do so we see and feel to be Wrong. We may even be said to stand in various relations to the objects around us in the world; and, when we contemplate our nature and condition, we cannot fail to see, in certain manners of behaviour, a *suitableness or unsuitableness* to the circumstances in which we have been placed. Now, Rectitude or conformity with those relations which arise from the nature and condition of man, is nothing arbitrary or fictitious. It is founded in the nature of things. God was under no necessity to create human beings. But, in calling them into existence, he must have given them a nature, and thus have constituted

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the relations in which they stand to Him and to other beings. There is a suitableness or congruity, between these relations and certain manners of behaviour. Reason, or the Moral Faculty, perceives and approves of this suitableness or congruity. The Divine mind must do the same, for the relations were constituted by God ; and conformity to them must be in accordance with His will. So that Conscience, when truly enlightened, is a ray from the Divine Reason ; and the moral law, which it reveals to us, is Eternal and Immutable as the nature of God and the nature of things.”¹

NATURE (Human).—As to the different senses in which *nature* may be understood, and the proper meaning of the maxim, Follow *nature*, — see Butler.²

NECESSITY (*ne* and *cesso*, that which cannot cease). — “ I have one thing to observe of the several kinds of *necessity*, that the idea of some sort of firm connection runs through them all :— and that is the proper general import of the name *necessity*. Connection of mental or verbal propositions, or of their respective parts, makes up the idea of *logical necessity*, — connection of end and means makes up the idea of *moral necessity*, — connection of causes and effects is *physical necessity*, — and connection of existence and essence is *metaphysical necessity*.”³

Logical necessity is that which, according to the terms of the proposition, cannot but be. Thus it is necessary that man be a rational animal, because these are the terms in which he is defined.

Moral necessity is that without which the effect cannot well be, although, absolutely speaking it may. A man who is lame is under a *moral necessity* to use some help, but absolutely he may not.

“ The phrase *moral necessity* is used variously ; sometimes it is used for *necessity* of moral obligation. So we say a man is under *necessity*, when he is under bonds of duty and conscience from which he cannot be discharged. Sometimes by *moral necessity* is meant that sure connection of things that is a

¹ *Manual of Mor. Phil.*, p. 124.

² *Three Sermons on Hum. Nature*.

³ *Waterland, Works*, vol. iv., p. 432.

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foundation for infallible certainty. In this sense *moral necessity* signifies much the same as that high degree of probability, which is ordinarily sufficient to satisfy mankind in their conduct and behaviour in the world. Sometimes by *moral necessity* is meant that *necessity* of connection and consequence which arises from such moral causes as the strength of inclination or motives, and the connection which there is in many cases between them, and such certain volitions and actions. It is in this sense that I use the phrase *moral necessity* in the following discourse.”¹

“By *natural* (or *physical*) *necessity*, as applied to men, I mean such *necessity* as men are under through the force of natural causes. Thus men placed in certain circumstances, are the subjects of particular sensations by *necessity*; they feel pain when their bodies are wounded; they see the objects placed before them in a clear light, when their eyes are opened: so they assent to the truths of certain propositions as soon as the terms are understood; as that two and two make four, that black is not white, that two parallel lines can never cross one another; so by a *natural* (a *physical*) *necessity* men’s bodies move downwards when there is nothing to support them.”²

Necessity is characteristic of *ideas* and of *actions*. A *necessary idea* is one the contrary of which cannot be entertained by the human mind; as every change implies a cause. *Necessity* and *universality* are the marks of certain ideas which are native to the human mind, and not derived from experience. A *necessary action* is one the contrary of which is impossible. *Necessity* is opposed to freedom, or to free-will. — V. LIBERTY.

NECESSITY (Doctrine of).

“There are two schemes of *necessity*,—the necessitation by *efficient*—the necessitation by *final* causes. The former is brute or blind fate; the latter rational determinism. Though their practical results be the same, they ought to be carefully distinguished.”³

Leibnitz⁴ distinguishes between—

1. *Hypothetical necessity*, as opposed to absolute *necessity*, as

¹ Edwards, *Works*, vol. 1., p. 116.

² *Ibid*, vol. 1., p. 146.

³ Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 87. note.

⁴ In his Fifth Paper to Dr. Clarke, p. 167.

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that which the supposition or the hypothesis of God's foresight and preordination lays upon future contingents.

2. *Logical, metaphysical, or mathematical necessity*, which takes place because the opposite implies a contradiction; and

3. *Moral necessity*, whereby a wise being chooses the best, and every mind follows the strongest inclination.

Dr. Clarke¹ replies, "*Necessity*, in philosophical questions, always signifies *absolute necessity*. *Hypothetical necessity* and *moral necessity* are only figurative ways of speaking, and in philosophical strictness of truth, are no *necessity* at all. The question is not, whether a thing *must* be, when it is *supposed* that it *is*, or that it is *to be* (which is *hypothetical necessity*). Neither is the question whether it be true, that a *good* being, continuing to be *good*, cannot do evil; or a *wise* being, continuing to be *wise*, cannot act unwisely; or a *veracious* person, continuing to be *veracious*, cannot tell a lie (which is *moral necessity*). But the true and only question in philosophy concerning liberty, is, whether the *immediate physical cause*, or *principle of action* be indeed in him whom we call the agent; or whether it be some other *reason*, which is the *real cause* by operating upon the agent, and making him to be not indeed an *agent*, but a mere *patient*."

NECESSITY (Logical).

"The scholastic philosophers have denominated one species of *necessity*—*necessitas consequentiæ*, and another—*necessitas consequentis*. The former is an *ideal* or *formal necessity*; the inevitable dependence of one *thought* upon another, by reason of our intelligent nature. The latter is a *real* or *material necessity*; the inevitable dependence of one *thing* upon another because of its own nature. The former is a *logical necessity*, common to all legitimate *consequence*, whatever be the material modality of its objects. The latter is an extra-logical *necessity*, over and above the syllogistic inference, and wholly dependent upon the modality of the *consequent*. This ancient distinction modern philosophers have not only overlooked but confounded. (See contrasted the doctrines of the Aphrodisian, and of Mr. Dugald Stewart.²)—Sir William Hamilton.³

¹ P. 287.

² In *Dissertations on Reid*, p. 701, note.

³ *Discussions*, p. 144.

NEGATION (*nego*, to deny), is the absence of that which does not naturally belong to the thing we are speaking of, or which has no right, obligation, or necessity to be present with it; as when we say—A stone is inanimate, or blind, or deaf, that is, has no life, nor sight, nor hearing; or when we say—A carpenter or fisherman is unlearned; these are mere *negations*.¹

According to Thomas Aquinas,² simple *negation* denies to a thing some certain realities which do not belong to the nature of the same. *Privation*, on the contrary, is deficiency in some reality which belongs to the notion of the being.—V. **PRIVATION.**

In simple apprehension there is no affirmation or denial, so that, strictly speaking, there are no negative ideas, notions, or conceptions. In truth, some that are so called represent the most positive realities; as infinity, immensity, immortality, &c. But in some ideas, as in that of blindness, deafness, insensibility, there is, as it were, a taking away of something from the object of which these ideas are entertained. But this is *privation* (*στέρησις*) rather than *negation* (*ἀνύστασις*). And in general it may be said that *negation* implies some anterior conception of the object of which the *negation* is made. Absolute *negation* is impossible. We have no idea of nothing. It is but a word.³

NIHILISM (*nihil*, *nihilum*, nothing), is scepticism carried to the denial of all existence.

"The sum total," says Fichte, "is this. There is absolutely nothing permanent either without me or within me, but only an unceasing change. I know absolutely nothing of any existence, not even of my own. I myself know nothing, and am nothing. Images (*Bilder*) there are; they constitute all that apparently exists, and what they know of themselves is after the manner of images; images that pass and vanish without there being ought to witness their transition; that consist in fact of the images of images, without significance and without an aim. I myself am one of these images; nay, I am not even thus much, but only a confused image of images. All reality is converted into a marvellous dream without a life to dream of

¹ Watts, *Log.*, part 1., chap. 2, sect. 6.

² *Summa*, p. 1., qu. 48, art. 5.

³ *Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*

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and without a mind to dream; into a dream made up only of a dream itself. Perception is a dream; thought, the source of all the existence and all the reality which I imagine to myself of *my* existence, of my power, of my destination—is the dream of that dream.”¹

In like manner, Mr. Hume resolved the phenomena of consciousness into impressions and ideas. And as according to Berkeley, sensitive impressions were no proof of external realities, so according to Hume, ideas do not prove the existence of mind—so that there is neither matter nor mind, for anything that we can prove.

NIHILUM or **NOTHING** “is that of which everything can truly be denied, and *nothing* can be truly affirmed. So that the idea of *nothing* (if I may so speak) is absolutely the negation of all ideas. The idea, therefore, either of a finite or infinite *nothing*, is a contradiction in terms.”²

Nothing, taken *positively*, is what does not but may exist, as a river of milk—taken *negatively*, it is that which does not and cannot exist, as a square circle, a mountain without a valley. Nothing positively is *ens potentiale*. Nothing negatively is *non ens*.

NOMINALISM (*nomen*, a name), is the doctrine that general notions, such as the notion of a tree, have no realities corresponding to them, and have no existence but as names or words. The doctrine directly opposed to it is *realism*. To the intermediate doctrine of *conceptualism*, *nominalism* is closely allied. It may be called the envelope of *conceptualism*, while *conceptualism* is the letter or substance of *nominalism*. “If *nominalism* sets out from *conceptualism*, *conceptualism* should terminate in *nominalism*,” says Mons. Cousin.³

Universalia ante rem, is the watchword of the *Realists*; *Universalia in re*, of the *Conceptualists*; *Universalia post rem*, of the *Nominalists*. The *Nominalists* were called *Terminists* about the time of the Reformation.⁴

“The *Terminists*, among whom I was, are so called be-

¹ Sir William Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 129, note.

² Clarke, *Answer to Seventh Letter*, note.

³ *Introd. aux ouvrages inédits d'Abailard*, 4to, Paris, 1836, p. 181.

⁴ Ballantyne, *Exam. of Hum. Mind*, chap. 3, sect. 4.

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cause they speak of a thing in its own proper words, and do not apply them after a strange sort. They are also called *Occamists*, from Ockham their founder. He was an able and a sensible man."¹

In asserting that universals existed, but only in the mind, Ockham agreed exactly with the modern *Conceptualists*. — *V. UNIVERSALS.*

NON SEQUITUR (it does not follow; the inference is not necessary.) — It is sometimes used as a substantive; and an inconclusive inference is called a *non sequitur*.

NOOGONIE (νοῦς, mind; γένος, birth, or generation). — "Leibnitz has intellectualized sensations, Locke has sensualized notions, in that system which I might call a *noogonie*, in place of admitting two different sources of our representations, which are objectively valid only in their connection."²

NOOLOGY (νοῦς, mind; λόγος), is a term proposed by Mons. Paffe,³ to denote the science of intellectual facts, or the facts of intellect; and *pathology* (*psychological*), to denote the science of the *phenomenes affectifs*, or feeling, or sensibility.

The use of the term is noticed by Sir W. Hamilton⁴ as the title given to Treatises on the doctrine of First Principles, by Calovius, in 1651; Mejerus, in 1662; Wagnerus, in 1670; and Zeidlerus, in 1680 — and he has said, "The correlatives *noetic* and *dianoetic* would afford the best philosophical designations, the former for an intuitive principle, or truth at first hand; the latter for a demonstrative proposition, or truth at second hand. *Noology* or *noological*, *dianoiology* and *dianoiological*, would be also technical terms of much convenience in various departments of philosophy."

Mons. Ampère proposed to designate the sciences which treat of the human mind *Les sciences Noologiques*.

"If, instead of considering the *objects* of our knowledge, we consider its *origin*, it may be said that it is either derived from experience alone, or from reason alone; hence empirical philosophers and those which Kant calls *noologists*: at their head

¹ Luther, *Table Talk*, p. 540-2.

² Kant, *Orig. de la Raison Pure*, pp. 326, 327.

³ *Sur la Sensibilité*, p. 30.

⁴ *Writings*, note A, sect. 5, p. 770.

NOOLOGY —

are Aristotle and Plato among the ancients, and Locke and Leibnitz among the moderns."¹

NORM (*norma*, from *γνώριμος*, a square or rule of builders), is used as synonymous with law. Anything not in accordance with the law is said to be *abnormal*.

"There is no uniformity, no *norma*, principle, or rule, perceivable in the distribution of the primeval natural agents through the universe."²

NOTION (*nosco*, to know). — Bolingbroke³ says, "I distinguish here between *ideas* and *notions*, for it seems to me, that, as we compound simple into complex ideas, so the composition we make of simple and complex ideas may be called, more properly, and with less confusion and ambiguity, *notions*."

Mr. Locke⁴ says, "The mind being once furnished with simple ideas, it can put them together in several compositions, and so make variety of complex *ideas*, without examining whether they exist so together in nature, and hence I think it is that these *ideas* are called *notions*, as they had their original and constant existence more in the thoughts of men than in the reality of things."

"The distinction of *ideas*, strictly so called, and *notions*, is one of the most common and important in the philosophy of mind. Nor do we owe it, as has been asserted, to Berkeley. It was virtually taken by Descartes and the Cartesians, in their discrimination of ideas of imagination, and ideas of intelligence; it was in terms vindicated against Locke, by Serjeant, Stillingfleet, Norris, Z. Mayne, Bishop Brown, and others. Bonnet signalized it; and under the contrast of *Anschauungen* and *Begriffe*, it has long been an established and classical discrimination with the philosophers of Germany. Nay, Reid himself suggests it in the distinction he requires between *imagination* and *conception*,—a distinction which he unfortunately did not carry out, and which Mr. Stewart still more unhappily perverted. The terms *notion* and *conception* (or more correctly *concept* in this sense), should be reserved to express what we comprehend but cannot picture in *imagination*, such as a rela

¹ Henderson, *Philosoph. of Kant*, p. 172.

² Mill, *Log.*, b. iii., ch. 16, § 3.

³ Essay 1., *On Human Knowledge*, sect. 2.

⁴ *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., ch. 22.

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tion, a general term, &c. The word *idea*, as one prostituted to all meanings, it were better to discard. As for the representations of imagination or phantasy, I would employ the term *image* or *phantasm*, it being distinctly understood that these terms are applied to denote the *representations* not of our visible perceptions merely, as the term taken literally would indicate, but of our sensible perceptions in general.¹

Notion is more general in its signification than *idea*. *Idea* is merely a *conception*, or at most a *necessary* and *universal* conception. *Notion* implies all this and more,—a judgment or series of judgments, and a certain degree of knowledge of the object. Thus we speak of having no *notion* or knowledge of a thing, and of having some *notion* or knowledge. It began to be used by Descartes,² and soon came into current use among French philosophers. It enables us to steer clear of the *ideas* of Plato, of the *species* of the scholastics, and of the *images* of the empirical school. Hence Dr. Reid tells us that he used it in preference.³

Des Maistre⁴ uses the French word *notion* as synonymous with pure idea, or innate idea, underived from sense.

Chalybæus, in a letter to Mr. Eddersheim (the translator of his work), says, "In English as in French, the word *idea*, *idée*, is applied, without distinction, to a representation, to a *notion*, in short to every mental conception; while in German, in scientific language, a very careful distinction is made between sensuous '*vorstellung*' (representation), abstract '*verstandes-begriff*' (intellectual notion); and '*ideen*' (ideas), of reason."

Notions or *concepts* are *clear* and *distinct*, or *obscure* and *indistinct*. "A concept is said to be *clear* when the degree of consciousness is such as enables us to distinguish it as a whole from others, and *obscure* when the degree of consciousness is insufficient to accomplish this. A concept is said to be *distinct* when the amount of consciousness is such as enables us to discriminate from each other the several characters or constituent parts of which the concept is the sum, and *indistinct* or *con-*

¹ Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 291, note.

² In his *Regula ad Directionem Ingenii*.

³ *Œuvres de St. Petersbourg*, p. 164.

⁴ *Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*

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fused when the amount of consciousness requisite for this is wanting." In the darkness of night there is no perception of objects, this is *obscurity*. As light dawns we begin to see objects, this is *indistinctness*. As morning advances we make a distinction between trees and houses, and fields and rivers, as wholes differing from one another, this is *clearness*. At length when day approaches noon, we see the parts which make up the wholes, and have a *distinct* view of everything before us.

We have a *clear notion* of colours, smells, and tastes; for we can discriminate red from white, bitter from sweet. But we have not a *distinct notion* of them, for we are not acquainted with the qualities which form the difference; neither can we describe them to such as cannot see, smell, and taste. We have a *clear notion* of a triangle when we discriminate it from other figures. We have a *distinct notion* of it when we think of it as a portion of space bounded by three straight lines, as a figure whose three angles taken together are equal to two right angles.

First Notions and Second Notions.

The distinction (which we owe to the Arabians) of *first* and *second notions* (*notiones, conceptus, intentiones, intellecta prima et secunda*) is a highly philosophical determination.¹ A *first notion* is the concept of a thing as it exists of itself, and independent of any operation of thought; as man, John, animal, &c. A *second notion* is the concept, not of an object as it is in reality, but of the mode under which it is thought by the mind; as individual, species, genus, &c. The former is the concept of a thing, real, immediate, direct: the latter the concept of a concept, formal, mediate, reflex."²

"Notions are of two kinds; they either have regard to things as they are, as horse, ship, tree, and are called *first notions*; or to things as they are understood, as notions of genus, species, attribute, subject, and in this respect are called *second notions*, which, however, are based upon the first, and cannot be con-

¹ The Americans call a cargo of fashionable goods, trinkets, &c., being "laden with notions," and on being hailed by our ships, a fellow (without an idea perhaps in his head) will answer through a speaking trumpet that he is "laden with notions."—*Moose's Diary*, p. 249.

² Sir William Hamilton, *Discussions*, p. 137.

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ceived without them. Now logic is not so much employed upon first *notions* of things as upon second; that is, it is not occupied so much with things as they exist in nature, but with the way in which the mind conceives them. A logician has nothing to do with ascertaining whether a horse, or a ship, or a tree exists, but whether one of these things can be regarded as a genus or species, whether it can be called a subject or an attribute, whether from the conjunction of many second *notions* a proposition, a definition, or a syllogism can be formed. The *first intention* of every word is its real meaning; the *second intention*, its logical value according to the function of thought to which it belongs."¹—Thomson.²—V.

INTENTION.**Notions, Intuitive and Symbolical.**

Leibnitz was the first to employ *intuitive* and *intuition* to denote our direct ostensive cognitions of an individual object either in sense or imagination, and in opposition to our indirect and *symbolical* cognitions acquired through the use of signs or language in the understanding.

"When our *notion* of any object or objects consists of a clear insight into all its attributes, or at least the essential ones, he would call it *intuitive*. But where the *notion* is complex and its properties numerous, we do not commonly realize all that it conveys; the powers of thinking would be needlessly retarded by such a review. We think more compendiously by putting a symbol in the place of all the properties of our *notion*, and this naturally is the term by which we are accustomed to convey the *notion* to others. A name, then, employed in thought is called a *symbolical cognition*; and the names we employ in speech are not always symbols to another of what is explicitly understood by us, but quite as often are symbols both to speaker and hearer, the full and exact meaning of which neither of them stop to unfold, any more than they regularly reflect that every sovereign which passes

¹ "See Buhle (Arist., 1, p. 432), whose words I have followed. See also Cracanthorp (*Log. Proem.*), and Sir W. Hamilton (*Edin. Rev.*, No. 116, p. 210). There is no authority whatever for Aldrich's view, which makes second intention mean, apparently, 'a term defined for scientific use'; though with the tenacious vitality of error, it still lingers in some quarters, after wounds that should have been mortal."—V. INTENTION.

² *Outline of the Laws of Thought*, 2d ed., pp. 39, 40.

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through their hands is equivalent to 240 pence. Such words as the State, Happiness, Liberty, Creation, are too pregnant with meaning for us to suppose that we realize their full sense every time we read or pronounce them. If we attend to the working of our minds, we shall find that each word may be used, and in its proper place and sense, though perhaps few or none of its attributes are present to us at the moment. A very simple *notion* is always *intuitive*; we cannot make our *notion* of brown or red simpler than it is by any symbol. On the other hand, a highly complex notion, like those named above, is seldom fully realized—seldom other than *symbolical*.”¹

NOTIONES COMMUNES, also called *prænotiones*, *anticipationes*, *communes notitiæ*, ἀπορίσεις, κοινὰ ἔννοιαι—*first truths*, *natural judgments*, *principles of common sense*, are phrases employed to denote certain *notions* or cognitions which are native to the human mind, which are intuitively discerned, being clear and manifest in their own light, and needing no proof, but forming the ground of proof and evidence as to other truths.—V. ANTICIPATION, TRUTHS (First).

NOUMENON (τὸ νοούμενον), in the philosophy of Kant (an object as conceived by the understanding, or thought of by the reason, νοῦς), is opposed to *phenomenon* (an object such as we represent it to ourselves by the impression which it makes on our senses). *Noumenon* is an object in itself, not relatively to us. But we have, according to Kant, no such knowledge of things in themselves. For besides the impressions which things make on us, there is nothing in us but the forms of the sensibility and the categories of the understanding, according to which, and not according to the nature of things in themselves, it may be, are our conceptions of them.

Things sensible considered as in themselves and not as they appear to us, Kant calls *negative noumena*; and reserves the designation of *positive noumena*, to intelligibles properly so called, which are the objects of an intuition purely intellectual.²

The two kinds of *noumena* taken together are opposed to *phenomena*, and form the *intelligible world*. This world we

¹ Thomson, *Outline of the Laws of Thought*, p. 47.

² Willm., *Hist. de la Philosophie. Allemande*, tom. I., p. 200.

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admit as possible, but unknown. Kantism thus trends towards scepticism.

"The word *phenomenon* has no meaning except as opposed to something intelligible—to a *noumenon*, as Kant says. Now, either we understand by the latter word a thing which cannot be the object of a sensuous intuition, without determining the mode in which it is perceived, and in this case we take it in a *negative* sense; or we understand it as the object of a real intuition, though not a sensuous one, an intellectual one, and then we take it in a *positive* sense. Which of these two is truth? It cannot unquestionably be affirmed *a priori* that the only possible manner of perception is sensuous intuition, and it implies no contradiction to suppose that an object may be known to us otherwise than by the senses. But, says Kant, this is only a possibility. To justify us in affirming that there really is any other mode of perception than sensuous intuition, any intellectual intuition, it must come within the range of our knowledge; and in fact we have no idea of any such faculty. We, therefore, cannot adopt the word *noumenon* in any positive sense; it expresses but an indeterminate object, not of an intuition, but of a conception—in other words a hypothesis of the understanding."¹—V. PHENOMENON.

NOVELTY (*novus*, new), "is not merely a sensation in the mind of him to whom the thing is new; it is a real relation which the thing has to his knowledge at that time. But we are so constituted, that what is new to us commonly gives pleasure upon that account, if it be not in itself disagreeable. It rouses our attention, and occasions an agreeable exertion of our faculties. . . . Curiosity is a capital principle in the human constitution, and its food must be what is in some respect new. . . . Into this part of the human constitution, I think, we may resolve the pleasure we have from *novelty* in objects."²

Any new or strange object, whether in nature or in art, when contemplated gives rise to feelings of a pleasing kind, the consideration of which belongs to *Æsthetics*—or that department of philosophy which treats of the Powers of Taste.

¹ Henderson, *Philosophy of Kant*, p. 76.

² Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay viii., chap. 2.

NUMBER was held by Pythagoras to be the ultimate principle of being. His views were adopted to a certain extent by Plato, and attacked by Aristotle. In the Middle Ages, *numbers* and the proportions subsisting between them, were employed in the systems of the alchemists and cabalists. But in proportion as the true spirit of philosophy prevailed, *numbers* were banished from metaphysics, and the consideration of them was allotted to a separate science—arithmetic and algebra.

OATH.—An *oath* is a solemn appeal to God, as the author of all that is true and right, and a solemn promise to speak the truth and to do what is right; renouncing the divine favour and imprecating the divine vengeance, should we fail to do so. *Oaths* have been distinguished as—1. The *assertory*, or *oath* of evidence, and 2. The *promissory*, or *oath* of office—the former referring to the past, and the latter to the future. But both refer to the future, inasmuch as both are confirmatory of a promise, to give true evidence, or to do faithful service.
—V. AFFIRMATION.

OBJECTIVE (*objicio*, to throw against), is now used to describe the absolute independent state of a thing; but by the elder metaphysicians it was applied to the aspect of things as *objects* of sense or understanding. So Berkeley, "Natural phenomena are only natural appearances. They are, therefore, such as we see and perceive them. Their *real* and *objective* natures are, therefore, one and the same." *Siris*, sect. 292, where *real* and *objective* are expressly distinguished. The modern nomenclature appears to me very inconvenient.¹

With Aristotle *ὑποκείμενον* signified the *subject* of a proposition, and also substance. The Latins translated it *subiectum*. In Greek *object* is *ἀντικείμενον*, translated *oppositum*. In the Middle Ages *subject* meant *substance*, and has this sense in Descartes and Spinoza; sometimes also in Reid. *Subjective* is used by Will. Occam to denote that which exists independent of mind, *objective* that which the mind feigned. This shows what is meant by *realitas objectiva* in Descartes,

¹ Fitzgerald, *Notes to Aristotle*, p. 191.

² *Med.* 2.

OBJECTIVE—

Kant and Fichte have inverted the meanings: *subject* is the mind which knows—*object* that which is known. *Subjective* the varying conditions of the knowing mind—*objective* that which is in the constant nature of the thing known.¹

By *objective reality* Descartes² meant the reality of the object in so far as represented by the idea or thought of it—by *formal*, or *actual reality* the reality of the object as conform to our idea of it. Thus the sun was *objectively* in our thought or idea of it—*actually* or *formally* in the heavens. He had also a third form of reality which he called *eminent*—that is, an existence superior at once to the *idea* and the *object*, and which contained in *posse* what both these had in *esse*.

"In philosophical language, it were to be wished that the word *subject* should be reserved for the *subject of inhesion*—the *materia in qua*; and the term *object* exclusively applied to the *subject of operation*—the *materia circa quam*. If this be not done, the grand distinction of *subjective* and *objective*, in philosophy, is confounded. But if the employment of *subject* for *object* is to be deprecated, the employment of *object* for purpose or final cause (in the French and English languages) is to be absolutely condemned, as a recent and irrational confusion of notions which should be carefully distinguished."³

—V. SUBJECT.

OBLIGATION (*obligo*, to bind), is legal or moral.

"*Obligation*, as used in moral inquiry, is derived from the doctrine of justification in the scholastic ages. In consequence of original sin man comes into the world a *debtor* to divine justice. He is under an *obligation* to punishment, on account of his *deficiency* from that form of original justice in which he rendered to God all that service of love which the great goodness of God demanded. Hence our terms *due* and *duty*, to express right conduct."⁴

Obligation (Moral) has been distinguished as *internal* and *external*; according as the reason for acting arises in the mind of the agent, or from the will of another.

¹ Trendelenburg, *Notes to Aristotle's Logic*.

² *Response à la Seconde Objection*.

³ Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 97, and App., note a.

⁴ Hampden, *Bampton Lect.*, vi., p. 294.

OBLIGATION—

In seeing a thing to be right we are under *obligation* to do it. This is *internal obligation*, or that reason for acting which arises in the mind of the agent along with the perception of the rightness of the action. It is also called *rational obligation*. Dr. Adams¹ has said, "*Right* implies duty in its idea. To perceive that an action is *right*, is to see a reason for doing it in the action itself, abstracted from all other considerations whatever. Now, this perception, this acknowledged rectitude in the action, is the very *essence of obligation*; that which commands the approbation of choice, and binds the conscience of every rational being." And Mr. Stewart² has said, "The very notion of virtue implies the notion of *obligation*."

External obligation is a reason for acting which arises from the will of another, having authority to impose a law. It is also called *authoritative obligation*. Bishop Warburton³ has contended that all *obligation* necessarily implies an *obligor* different from the party obliged; and moral *obligation*, being the *obligation* of a free agent, implies a law; and a law implies a lawgiver. The will of God, therefore, is the true ground of all *obligation*, strictly and properly so called. The perception of the difference between right and wrong can be said to oblige only as an indication of the will of God.

There is no incompatibility between these two grounds of obligation.⁴

By some philosophers, however, this stream of living waters has been parted. They have grounded *obligation* altogether on the will of God, and have overlooked or made light of the *obligation* which arises from our perception of rectitude. Language to this effect has been ascribed to Mr. Locke.⁵ And both Warburton and Horsley, as well as Paley and his followers, have given too much, if not an exclusive, prominence to the rewards and punishments of a future life, as prompting to the practice of virtue. But, although God, in

¹ *Sermon on the Nature and Obligation of Virtue*.

² *Act. and Mor. Pow.*, vol. II., p. 294.

³ *Div. Leg.*, book I., sect. 4.

⁴ See Whewell. *Sermons on the Foundation of Morals*, pp. 26-76. And Dr. Chalmers, *Bridgewater Treatise*, vol. I., p. 78.

⁵ *Life by Lord King*, vol. II., p. 129.

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accommodation to the weakness of our nature and the perils of our condition, has condescended to quicken us, in the discharge of our duty, by appealing to our hopes and fears, both in regard to the life that now is and that which is to come, it does not follow that self-love, or a concern for our own happiness, should be the only, or even the chief spring, of our obedience. On the contrary, obedience to the divine will may spring from veneration and love to the divine character, arising from the most thorough conviction of the rectitude, wisdom, and goodness of the divine arrangements. And that this, more than a regard to the rewards of everlasting life, is the proper spring of virtuous conduct, is as plain as it is important to remark. To do what is right, even for the sake of everlasting life, is evidently acting from a motive far inferior, in purity and power, to love and veneration for the character and commands of Him who is just and good, in a sense and to an extent to which our most elevated conceptions are inadequate. That which should bind us to the throne of the Eternal is not the iron chain of selfishness, but the golden links of a love to all that is right; and our aspirations to the realms of bliss should be breathings after the prevalence of universal purity, rather than desires of our own individual happiness. Self and its little circle is too narrow to hold the heart of man, when it is touched with a sense of its true dignity, and enlightened with the knowledge of its lofty destination. It swells with generous admiration of all that is right and good; and expands with a love which refuses to acknowledge any limits but the limits of life and the capacities of enjoyment. In the nature and will of Him from whom all being and all happiness proceed, it acknowledges the only proper object of its adoration and submission; and in surrendering itself to His authority is purified from all the dross of selfishness, and cheered by the light of a calm and unquenchable love to all that is right and good.¹—*V. RIGHT, SANCTION.*

¹ See Sanderson, *De Juramentis Obligatione*, prælec. 1., sect. 11; *De Obligatione Conscientie*, prælec. v.; Whewell, *Morality*, book 1., chap. 4, pp. 84-89; King, *Essay on Belief*, Prelim. Dissert., sect.

OBSERVATION. — "The difference between *experiment* and *observation*, consists merely in the comparative rapidity with which they accomplish their discoveries; or rather in the comparative command we possess over them, as instruments for the investigation of truth."¹

Mr. Stewart² has said, that according to Dr. Reid, "Attention to external things is *observation*, and attention to the subjects of our own consciousness is reflection. Yet Dr. Reid has said, that "reflection, in its common and proper meaning, is equally applicable to objects of sense and to objects of consciousness — and has censured Locke for restricting it to that reflection which is employed about the operations of our minds. In like manner we may *observe* the operations of our own minds as well as external phenomena. *Observation* is better characterized by Sir John Herschell as passive experience. —

V. EXPERIENCE.

It is the great instrument of discovery in mind and matter. According to some,⁴ *experiment* can be applied to matter, but only *observation* to mind. But to a certain extent the study of mind admits experiment.⁵

"We can scarcely be said to make experiments on the minds of others. It is necessary to an experiment, that the observer should know accurately the state of the thing observed before the experiment, and its state immediately after it. But when the minds of other men are the subject, we can know but little of either the one state or of the other. We are forced, therefore, to rely not on experiment, but on experience; that is to say, not on combinations of known elements effected for the purpose of testing the result of each different combination; but on our observation of actual occurrences, the results of the combination of numerous elements, only a few of which are within our knowledge. And the consequence is, that we frequently connect facts which are really independent of one another, and not unfrequently mistake obstacles for causes. . . .

¹ Stewart, *Philosoph. Essays*, Prelim. Dissert., chap. 2.

² *Elements*, vol. I., p. 106, note.

³ *Intell. Pow.*, essay vi., chap. 1.

⁴ *Edin. Rev.*, vol. III., p. 269.

⁵ See Hampden, *Introd. to Mor. Phil.*, sect. II., p. 51; and Mr. Stewart, *Philosoph. Essays*, Prelim. Dissert., chap. 2.

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“When we direct our attention to the workings of our own minds; that is to say, when we search for premises by means of consciousness instead of by means of *observation*, our powers of trying experiments are much greater. To a considerable degree we command our own faculties, and though these are few, perhaps none which we can use separately, we can at will exercise one more vigorously than the others. We can call, for instance, into peculiar activity, the judgment, the memory, or the imagination, and note the differences in our mental condition as the one faculty or the other is more active. And this is an experiment. Over our mental sensations we have less power. We cannot at will feel angry, or anxious, or frightened; but we can sometimes, though rarely, put ourselves really into situations by which certain emotions will be excited. And when, as is usually the case, this is impossible or objectionable, we can fancy ourselves in such situations. The first is an actual experiment. We can approach the brink of an unprotected precipice and look down — we can interpose between our bodies and that brink a low parapet, and look over it, and if we find that our condition in the two cases differ, that though there is no real danger in either case, though in both our judgment equally tells us that we are safe, yet that the apparent danger in the one produces fear, while we feel secure in the other, we infer that the imagination can excite fear for which the judgment affirms that there is no adequate cause. The second is the resemblance of an experiment, and which when tried by a person with the vivid imagination of Shakspeare or Homer, may serve for one; but with ordinary minds it is a fallacious expedient. Few men, when they picture themselves in an imaginary situation, take into account all the incidents necessary to that situation; and those which they neglect may be the most important.”¹

“Instead of contrasting *observation* and *experiment*, we should contrast spontaneous and experimental phenomena as alike subjects of *observation*. Facts furnished by artificial contrivances require to be *observed* just in the same way as those which are presented by nature without our interference;

¹ Senior, *Four Lectures on Pol. Econ.*, 1862, p. 31.

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and yet philosophers are nearly unanimous in confining *observation* to the latter phenomena, and speaking of it as of something which ceases where experiment begins; while in simple truth, the business of experiment is to extend the sphere of *observation*, and not to take up a subject where *observation* lays it down."¹

All men are apt to notice likenesses in the facts that come before them, and to group similar facts together. The faculty by which such similarities are apprehended is called *observation*; the act of grouping them together under a general statement, as when we say, "All seeds grow—all bodies fall," has been described as *generalization*. — V. GENERALIZATION.

According to M. Comte² there are three modes of *observation*:—1. *Observation*, properly so called, or the direct examination of the phenomenon as it presents itself naturally. 2. *Experiment*, or the contemplation of the phenomenon, so modified more or less by artificial circumstances introduced intentionally by ourselves, with a view to its more complete investigation. 3. *Comparison*, or the successive consideration of a series of analogous cases, in which the phenomenon becomes more and more simple. The third head (as to which see tom. iii., p. 343) seems not so much a species of *observation*, as a mode of arranging *observations*, with a view to a proper investigation of the phenomena.³

According to Humboldt⁴ there are three stages of the investigation of nature — *passive observation*, *active observation*, and *experiment*.

The difference between active and passive *observation* is marked in Bacon.⁵ The former is when *Experientia lege certa procedit, seriatim et continenter*.

"This word *experimental* has the defect of not appearing to comprehend the knowledge which flows from *observation*, as well as that which is obtained by *experiment*. The German

¹ S. Bailey, *Theory of Reasoning*, pp. 114–15, 8vo, Lond., 1851.

² *Cours de Philosoph. Positive*, tom. ii., p. 19.

³ Sir G. C. Lewis, *Meth. of Observ. in Politics*, chap. 5, note.

⁴ *Cosmos*, vol. ii., p. 212.

⁵ *Nov. Org.*, 1, Aphor. 100.

OBSERVATION —

word *empirical* is applied to all the information which experience affords; but it is in our language degraded by another application. I therefore must use *experimental* in a larger sense than its etymology warrants." — Sir J. Mackintosh.¹

Experiential has been proposed as equivalent to *empirical*.

OCCASION.—Cicero² says: — *Occasio est pars temporis, habens in se alicujus rei idoneam faciendi opportunitatem. Tempus autem actionis opportunum*, Græce, *εἰςαίτια*; Latine, *appellatur occasio*.³ The watchman falling asleep gives *occasion* to thieves to break into the house and steal.

"There is much difference between an *occasion* and a proper *cause*: these two are heedfully to be distinguished. Critical and exact historians, as Polybius and Tacitus, distinguish betwixt the *ἀρχή* and the *αἰτία*, the beginning *occasions* and the real causes, of a war." — Flavell.⁴

"What is *caused* seems to follow naturally; what is *occasioned* follows incidentally, and what is *created* receives its existence arbitrarily. A wound *causes* pain, accidents *occasion* delay, scandal *creates* mischief.

"Between the real cause and the *occasion* of any phenomenon, there is a wide diversity. The one implies the *producing power*, the other only some *condition* upon which this power comes into exercise. If I cast a grain of corn into the earth, the occasion of its springing up and producing plant, ear, and grain, is the warmth and moisture of the soil in which it is buried; but this is by no means the cause. The cause lies in the mysterious vital power which the seed contains within itself; the other is but the condition upon which this cause produces the effect."⁵

OCCASIONAL CAUSES (Doctrine of). — V. CAUSE.

OCCULT QUALITIES. — V. QUALITY

ONE. — V. UNITY.

ONEIROMANCY. — V. DREAMING.

¹ On Bacon and Locke, Works, vol. i., p. 333.

² 1. De Inventione.

³ De Offic., lib. i.

⁴ Discourse of the Occasions, Causes, Nature, Rise, Growth, and Remedies of Mental Errors.

⁵ Morell, Specul. Phil., vol. i., p. 99.

ONTOLOGY (ὄν and λόγος, the science of being). — “*Ontology* is a discourse of being in general, and the various or most universal modes or affections, as well as the several kinds or divisions of it. The word *being* here includes not only whatsoever actually is, but whatsoever can be.”¹

Ontology is the same as metaphysics. Neither the one name nor the other was used by Aristotle. He called the science now designated by them *philosophia prima*, and defined it as ἐπιστήμη τοῦ ὄντος ἢ ὅντος — *Scientia Entis Quatenus Entis*, that is, the science of the essence of things; the science of the attributes and conditions of being in general, not of being in any given circumstances, not as physical or mathematical, but as being. The name *ontology* seems to have been first made current in philosophy by Wolf. He divided metaphysics into four parts—*ontology*, psychology, rational cosmology, and theology. It was chiefly occupied with abstract inquiries into possibility, necessity, and contingency, substance, accident, cause, &c., without reference to the laws of our intellect by which we are constrained to believe in them. Kant denied that we had any knowledge of substance or cause as really existing. But there is a science of principles and causes, of the principles of being and knowing. In this view of it, *ontology* corresponds with *metaphysics* — q. v.

“*Ontology* may be treated of in two different methods, according as its exponent is a believer in τὸ ὅν, or in τὰ ὄντα, in one or in many fundamental principles of things. In the former, all objects whatever are regarded as phenomenal modifications of one and the same substance, or as self-determined effects of one and the same cause. The necessary result of this method is to reduce all metaphysical philosophy to a Rational Theology, the one substance or Cause being identified with the Absolute or the Deity. According to the latter method, which professes to treat of different classes of beings independently, metaphysics will contain three co-ordinate branches of inquiry, Rational Cosmology, Rational Psychology, and Rational Theology. The first aims at a knowledge of the real essence, as distinguished from the phenomena of the material world; the second discusses the nature and

¹ Watts, *On Ontology*, c. 2. — See also Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, book v., c. 1.

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origin, as distinguished from the faculties and affections, of the human soul and of other finite spirits; the third aspires to comprehend God himself, as cognizable *a priori* in his essential nature, apart from the indirect and relative indications furnished by his works, as in Natural Theology, or by his Word, as in Revealed Religion.

"These three objects of metaphysical inquiry, God, the World, the Mind, correspond to Kant's three ideas of the Pure Reason; and the object of his Critique is to show that in relation to all these, the attainment of a system of speculative philosophy is impossible."¹

"The science of *ontology* comprehends investigations of every real existence, either beyond the sphere of the present world, or in any other way incapable of being the direct object of consciousness, which can be deduced immediately from the possession of certain feelings or principles and faculties of the human soul."²

OPERATIONS (of the Mind).—"By the *operations of the mind*,"³ says Dr. Reid,⁴ "we understand every mode of thinking of which we are conscious.

"It deserves our notice, that the various modes of thinking have always and in all language, as far as we know, been called by the name of *operations of the mind*, or by names of the same import. To body, we ascribe various properties, but not *operations*, properly so called: it is extended, divisible, movable, inert; it continues in any state in which it is put; every change of its state is the effect of some force impressed upon it, and is exactly proportional to the force impressed, and in the precise direction of that force. These are the general properties of matter, and these are not *operations*; on the contrary, they all imply its being a dead, inactive thing, which moves only as it is moved, and acts only by being acted upon. But the mind is, from its very nature, a living and active being. Everything we know of it implies life and active energy; and the reason why all its modes of thinking are

¹ Mansel, *Prolegom. Log.*, p. 277.

² Archer Butler, *Lectures on Ancient Philosophy*.

³ *Operation*, *act*, and *energy*, are nearly convertible terms; and are opposed to *faculties* as the *actual* to the *potential*. — Sir Will. Hamilton

⁴ *Intrill. Pow.*, essay 1., chap. 1.

OPERATIONS—

called its *operations*, is that in all, or in most of them it is not merely passive as body is, but is really and properly active."
— V. STATES OF MIND.

OPINION (*opino*, to think).—"The essential idea of *opinion* seems to be that it is a matter about which doubt can reasonably exist, as to which two persons can without absurdity think differently. . . . Any proposition, the contrary of which can be maintained with probability, is matter of opinion."¹

According to the last of these definitions, matter of *opinion* is opposed not to matter of *fact*, but to matter of *certainty*. Thus, the death of Charles I. is a *fact*—his authorship of *Icon Basilike*, an *opinion*. It is also used, however, to denote knowledge acquired by inference, as opposed to that acquired by perception. Thus, that the moon gives light, is matter of *fact*; that it is inhabited or uninhabited, is matter of *opinion*.

It has been proposed² to discard from philosophical use these ambiguous expressions, and to divide knowledge, according to its sources, into matter of *perception* and matter of *inference*; and, as a cross division as to our conviction, into matter of *certainty* and matter of *doubt*.

Holding for true, or the subjective validity of a judgment in relation to conviction (which is, at the same time, objectively valid), has the three following degrees:—*opinion*, *belief*, and *knowledge*. *Opinion* is a consciously insufficient judgment, subjectively as well as objectively. *Belief* is subjectively sufficient, but is recognized as being objectively insufficient. *Knowledge* is both subjectively and objectively sufficient. Subjective sufficiency is termed *conviction* (for myself); objective sufficiency is termed *certainty* (for all).³— V. BELIEF, KNOWLEDGE, CERTAINTY, FACT, JUDGMENT.

OPPOSED, OPPOSITION (τὸ ἀντιτεταμένον, that which lies over against).—Aristotle has said, that "one thing may be opposed to another in four ways; by relation, by contrariety, or as privation is to possession, affirmation to negation. Thus, there is the *opposition* of relation between the double and the half;

¹ Sir G. C. Lewis, *Essay on Opinion*, p. 1, iv.

² *Edin. Rev.*, April, 1850, p. 311.

³ Meiklejohn, *Transl. of Crit. of Pure Reason*, p. 493

OPPOSED —

of contrariety between good and evil; blindness and seeing are *opposed* in the way of privation and possession; the propositions, he sits, and he does not sit, in the way of negation and affirmation." — *V. CONTRARY, PRIVATION, TERM.*

OPPOSITION (in Logic). — "Two propositions are said to be *opposed* to each other, when, having the same subject and predicate, they differ in *quantity*, or *quality*, or *both*. It is evident, that with any given subject and predicate, you may state four distinct propositions, viz., A, E, I, and O; any two of which are said to be *opposed*; hence there are four different kinds of *opposition*, viz., 1st, the two universals (A and E), are called *contraries* to each other; 2d, the two particular (I and O), *subcontraries*; 3d, A and I, or E and O, *subalterns*; 4th, A and O, or E and I, *contradictories*."¹

The *opposition* of propositions may be thus exhibited: —

All A is B.	}	Contraries — may be both false, but cannot both be true.
No A is B.		
Some A is B.	}	Subcontraries — may both be true, but cannot both be false.
Some A is not B.		
All A is B.	}	Contradictories — one must be true and the other false.
Some A is not B.		
No A is B.	}	Also Contradictories.
Some A is B.		
All A is B.	}	and { No A is B. Some A is not B. } Respectively subalternate.
Some A is B.		

"Of two subalternate propositions the truth of the universal proves the truth of the particular, and the falsity of the particular proves the falsity of the universal, but not *vice versa*."²

OPTIMISM (*optimum*, the superlative of *bonum*, good), is the doctrine, that the universe, being the work of an infinitely perfect Being, is the best that could be created.

This doctrine under various forms appeared in all the great philosophical schools of antiquity. During the Middle Ages it was advocated by St. Anselm and St. Thomas. In times comparatively modern, it was embraced by Descartes and Malebranche. But the doctrine has been developed in its highest form by Leibnitz.

¹ Whately, *Log.*, b. ii., ch. 2, § 3.

² Mill, *Log.*, b. ii., ch. 1.

OPTIMISM—

According to him, God, being infinitely perfect, could neither will nor produce evil. And as a less good compared with a greater is evil, the creation of God must not only be good, but the best that could possibly be. Before creation, all beings and all possible conditions of things were present to the Divine Mind in idea, and composed an infinite number of worlds, from among which infinite wisdom chose the best. Creation was the giving existence to the most perfect state of things which had been ideally contemplated by the Divine Mind.

The *optimism* of Leibnitz has been misunderstood and misrepresented by Voltaire and others. But the doctrine which Leibnitz advocated is not that the present state of things is the best possible in reference to individuals, nor to classes of beings, nor even to this world as a whole, but in reference to all worlds, or to the universe as a whole—and not even to the universe in its present state, but in reference to that indefinite progress of which it may contain the germs.¹

According to Mr. Stewart,² under the title of *optimists*, are comprehended those who admit and those who deny the freedom of human actions, and the accountableness of man as a moral agent.

ORDER means rank, *series* means succession; hence there is in *order* something of voluntary arrangement, and in *series* something of unconscious catenation. The *order* of a procession. The *series* of ages. A *series* of figures in uniform—soldiers in *order* of battle.³

Order is the intelligent arrangement of means to accomplish an end, the harmonious relation established between the parts for the good of the whole. The primitive belief that there is *order* in nature, is the ground of all experience. In this belief we confidently anticipate that the same causes, operating in the same circumstances, will produce the same effects. This may be resolved into a higher belief in the wisdom of an infinitely perfect being, who orders all things.

Order has been regarded as the higher idea into which moral rectitude may be resolved. Every being has an end to answer, and every being attains its perfection in accom-

¹ Leibnitz. *Essais de Théodicée*; Malebranche, *Entretiens Métaphysiques*.

² *Act. and Mor. Pow.*, b. iii., ch. 3, sect 1.

³ Taylor, *Synonyms*.

ORDER—

plishing that end. But while other beings tend blindly towards it, man knows the end of his being, and the place he holds in the scheme of the universe, and can freely and intelligently endeavour to realize that universal *order* of which he is an element or constituent. In doing so he does what is right.

"There is one parent virtue, the universal virtue, the virtue which renders us just and perfect, the virtue which will one day render us happy. It is the only virtue. It is the love of the universal *order* as it eternally existed in the Divine Reason, where every created reason contemplates it. The love of *order* is the whole of virtue, and conformity to *order* constitutes the morality of actions."¹

Such is the theory of Malebranche, and more recently of Jouffroy. In like manner, science, in all its discoveries, tends to the discovery of universal *order*. And art, in its highest attainments, is only realizing the truth of nature; so that the true, the beautiful, and the good, ultimately resolve themselves into the idea of *order*.

ORGAN.—An *organ* is a part of the body fitted to perform a particular action, which, or rather the performance of which action, is denominated its function.

"By the term *organ*," says Gall,² "I mean the material condition which renders possible the manifestation of a faculty. The muscles and the bones are the material condition of movement, but are not the faculty which causes movement; the whole organization of the eye is the material condition of sight, but it is not the faculty of seeing. By the term '*organ* of the soul,' I mean a material condition which renders possible the manifestation of a moral quality, or an intellectual faculty. I say that man in this life thinks and wills by means of the brain; but if one concludes that the brain is the thing that thinks and wills, it is as if one should say that the muscles are the faculty of moving; that the *organ* of sight and the faculty of seeing are the same thing. In each case it would be to confound the *faculty* with the *organ*, and the *organ* with the *faculty*."

¹ *Traité de Morale*, Rott., 1634.

² Vol. I., p. 228.

ORGAN—

"An *organ* of sense is an instrument composed of a peculiar arrangement of organized matter, by which it is adapted to receive from specific agents definite impressions. Between the agent that produces and the *organ* that receives the impressions, the adaptation is such, that the result of their mutual action is, in the first place, the production of sensation; and, in the second place, of pleasure."¹

According to phrenological writers, particular parts of the brain are fitted to serve as instruments for particular faculties of the mind. This is *organology*. It is further maintained, that the figure and extent of these parts of the brain can be discerned externally. This is *organoscopy*. Some who believe in the former, do not believe in the latter.

ORGANON or ORGANUM (*ὄργανον*, an instrument), is the name often applied to a collection of Aristotle's treatises on logic; because, by the Peripatetics, logic was regarded as the instrument of science rather than a science or part of science in itself. In the sixth century, Ammonius and Simplicius arranged the works of Aristotle in classes, one of which they called *logical* or *organical*. But it was not till the fifteenth century that the name *Organum* came into common use.² Bacon gave the name of *Novum Organum* to the second part of his *Instauratio Magna*. And the German philosopher, Lambert, in 1763, published a logical work under the title, *Das Neue Organon*.

Poste, in his translation of the *Posterior Analytics*, gives a sketch of the *Organum* of Aristotle, which he divides into four parts, — viz., *General Logic*, the *Logic of Deduction*, the *Logic of Induction*, and the *Logic of Opinion*; the third, indeed, not sufficiently articulated and disengaged from the fourth, and hence the necessity of a *Novum Organum*.

"The *Organon* of Aristotle, and the *Organon* of Bacon stand in relation, but the relation of contrariety; the one considers the laws under which the subject thinks, the other the laws under which the object is to be known. To compare them together, is therefore to compare together qualities of different species. Each proposes a different end; both in

¹ Dr. Southwood Smith.

² Barthélemy St. Hilaire, *De la Logique d'Aristote*, tom. I., p. 19.

ORGANON—

different ways are useful; and both ought to be assiduously studied.”¹

ORIGIN (*origo*) may be taken in two senses, essentially different from each other. It may mean the *cause* of anything being produced, or it may imply simply the *occasion* of its production.²

ORIGINATE, ORIGATION.—These words and their conjugates are coming to be used in the question concerning liberty and necessity. Does man *originate* his own actions? Is man a principle of *origination*? are forms of expression equivalent to the question, Is man a free agent?

“To deny all *originating* power of the will, must be to place the primordial and necessary causes of all things in the Divine nature. . . . Whether as a matter of fact an *originating* power reside in man, may be matter of inquiry; but to maintain it to be an impossibility, is to deny the possibility of creation.”³ “Will, they hold to be a free cause, a cause which is not an effect; in other words, they attribute to it a power of absolute *origination*.”⁴

OSTENSIVE (*ostendo*, to show).—“An *ostensive* conception indicates how an object is constituted. It is opposed to the *heuristic* (*heuretic*) conception which indicates how, under its guidance, the quality and connection of objects of experience in general are to be sought. The conception of a man, a house, &c., is an *ostensive* one; the conception of the supreme intelligence (for theoretic reason) is an *heuristic* conception.”⁵

OUGHTNESS.—V. DUTY.

OUTNESS.—“The word *outness*, which has been of late revived by some of Kant’s admirers in this country, was long ago used by Berkeley in his *Principles of Human Knowledge*;⁶ and at a still earlier period of his life, in his *Essay towards a New Theory of Vision*.⁷ I mention this as I have more than once heard the term spoken of as a fortunate innovation.”⁸—V. EXTERNALITY.

¹ Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid’s Works*, p. 712, note.

² Morell, *Specul. Phil.*, vol. 1., p. 99.

³ Thomson, *Christ. Theism*, book 1, chap. 8.

⁴ Sir W. Hamilton, *Discussions*, p. 595. See also Cairns, *On Moral Freedom*.

⁵ Haywood, *Explanation of Terms in the Crit. of Pure Reason*.

⁶ Sect. 43.

⁷ Sect. 46.

⁸ Stewart, *Philosoph. Essays*, part 1., essay 2.

PACT.—*V.* CONTRACT, PROMISE

PANTHEISM (πᾶς, all; θεός, God).—"It supposes God and nature, or God and the whole universe, to be one and the same substance—one universal being; insomuch that men's souls are only modifications of the Divine substance."¹

*Pantheistæ qui contendunt unicam esse substantiam, cujus partes sunt omnia entia quæ existunt.*²

Pantheism, when explained to mean the absorption of God in nature, is atheism; and the doctrine of Spinoza has been so regarded by many. When explained to mean the absorption of nature in God—of the finite in the infinite—it amounts to an exaggeration of theism. But *pantheism*, strictly speaking, is the doctrine of the necessary and eternal co-existence of the finite and the infinite—of the absolute consubstantiality of God and nature—considered as two different but inseparable aspects of universal existence; and the confutation of it is to be found in the consciousness which every one has of his personality and responsibility, which *pantheism* destroys.

PARABLE (παράβολή, from παραβάλλω, to put or set beside), has been defined to be a "fictitious but probable narrative taken from the affairs of ordinary life to illustrate some higher and less known truth." "It differs from the *Fable*, moving, as it does, in a spiritual world, and never transgressing the actual order of things natural; from the *Myth*, there being in the latter an unconscious blending of the deeper meaning with the outward symbol, the two remaining separate, and separable in the *Parable*; from the *Proverb*, inasmuch as it is longer carried out, and not merely accidentally and occasionally, but necessarily figurative; from the *Allegory*, comparing, as it does, one thing *with* another, at the same time preserving them apart as an inner and an outer, not transferring, as does the *Allegory*, the properties, and qualities and relations of one *to* the other."³

PARADOX (παρά δόξα, beyond, or contrary to appearance), is a proposition which seems not to be true, but which turns out to be true. Cicero wrote "*Paradoxa*," and the Hon. Robert

¹ Waterland, *Works*. vol. viii., p. 81.

² Lacoudre, *Inst. Philosoph.*, tom. ii., p. 120.

³ Trench. *On the Parables*.

PARADOX—

Boyle published, in 1666, *Hydrostatical Paradoxes*, made out by new experiments.

PARALOGISM (παράλογισμός, from παραλογίζομαι, to reason wrong), is a formal fallacy or pseudo-syllogism, in which the conclusion does not follow from the premises. We may be deceived ourselves by a *paralogism*; when we endeavour to deceive others by it, it is a *sophism* — *q v.*

Paralogism of Pure Reason. — “The logical *paralogism* consists in the erroneousness of a syllogism, according to form, whatever besides its content may be. But a transcendental *paralogism* has a transcendental foundation of concluding falsely, according to the form. In such a way, a like false conclusion will have its foundation in the nature of human reason, and will carry along with itself an inevitable, although not an insoluble illusion.”¹

PARCIMONY (Law of) (*parcimonia*, sparingness). — “That substances are not to be multiplied without necessity;” in other words, “that a plurality of principles are not to be assumed, when the phenomena can possibly be explained by one.” This regulative principle may be called the law or maxim of *parcimony*.²

Entia non sunt multiplicanda præter necessitatem. Frustra fit per plura quod fieri potest per pauciora. These are expressions of this principle.

PARONYMOUS. — *V. CONJUGATE.*

PART (μέρος, *pars*, part, or portion). — “*Part*, in one sense, is applied to anything divisible in quantity. For that which you take from a quantity, in so far as it is quantity, is a *part* of that quantity. Thus two is a *part* of three. In another sense, you only give the name of *part* to what is an exact measure of quantity; so that, in one point of view, two will be a *part* of three, in another not. That into which you can divide a genus, animal, for example, otherwise than by quantity, is still a *part* of the genus. In this sense species are *parts* of the genus. *Part* is also applied to that into which an object can be divided, whether matter or form. Iron is *part* of a globe, or cube of iron; it is the matter which receives the form. An

¹ Kant. *Crit. of Pure Reason*, p. 299.

² Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 751, note A.

PART—

angle is also a *part*. Lastly, the elements of the definition of every particular being are *parts* of the whole; so that, in this point of view, the genus may be considered as *part* of the species; in another, on the contrary, the species is *part* of the genus."¹

"Of things which exist by *parts*, there are three kinds. The first is of *things*, the *parts* of which are not *co-existent*, but *successive*; such as *time* or *motion*, no two parts of which can exist together.

"The next kind of things consisting of *parts*, is such where *parts* are *co-existent* and *contiguous*. Things of this kind are said to be *extended*; for *extension* is nothing else but *co-existence* and *junction* of *parts*.

"The third kind of things existing by *parts* is, when the *parts* are co-existent, yet not contiguous or joined, but separate and disjointed. Of this kind is *number*, the *parts* of which are separated by *nature*, and only united by the operation of the mind."²

PASSION (*passio*, πάσχω, to suffer), is the contrary of action.

"A passive state is the state of a thing while it is operated upon by some cause. Everything and every being but God, is liable to be in this state. He is pure energy—always active, but never acted upon; while everything else is liable to suffer change."³

PASSIONS (The).—This phrase is sometimes employed in a wide sense to denote all the states or manifestations of the sensibility—every form and degree of feeling. In a more restricted psychological sense, it is confined to those states of the sensibility which are turbulent, and weaken our power of self-command. This is also the popular use of the phrase, in which *passion* is opposed to reason.

Plato arranged the *passions* in two classes,—the concupiscible and irascible, ἐπιθυμία and θυμός, the former springing from the body and perishing with it, the latter connected with the rational and immortal part of our nature, and stimulating to the pursuit of good and the avoiding of excess and evil.

¹ Aristotle, *Metaphys.*, lib. iv., cap. 25.

² Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, book II., chap. 13.

³ See Harris, *Dialogue concerning Happiness*, p. 86, note.

PASSIONS—

Aristotle included all our active principles under one general designation of *oretic*, and distinguished them into the appetite irascible, the appetite concupiscible, which had their origin in the body, and the appetite rational (*βούλησις*), which is the will, under the guidance of reason.

Descartes and Malebranche have each given a theory and classification of the *passions*; also, Dr. Isaac Watts, Dr. Cogan, and Dr. Hutcheson.

PERCEPTION (*cipio*, to take; *per*, by means of), apprehension by means of the organs of sense.

Descartes¹ says, "*Omnes modi cogitandi, quos in nobis experimur, ad duos generales referri possunt: quorum unus est perceptio, sive operatio intellectus; alius vero, volitio, sive operatio voluntatis. Nam sentire, imaginari, et pure intelligere, sunt tantum diversi modi percipiendi; ut et cupere, aversari, affirmare, negare, dubitare, sunt diversi modi volendi.*"

Locke² says, "The two principal actions of the mind are these two; *perception* or *thinking*, and *volition* or *willing*. The power of thinking is called the *understanding*, and the power of volition the *will*; and these two powers or abilities of the mind are called *faculties*."

Dr. Reid thought that "*perception* is most properly applied to the evidence which we have of external objects by our senses." He says,³ "The *perception* of external objects by our senses, is an operation of the mind of a peculiar nature, and ought to have a name appropriated to it. It has so in all languages. And, in English, I know no word more proper to express this act of the mind than *perception*. Seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and touching or feeling, are words that express the operations proper to each sense; *perceiving* expresses that which is common to them all."

The restriction thus imposed upon the word by Reid, is to be found in the philosophy of Kant; and, as convenient, has been generally acquiesced in.

Sir Will. Hamilton⁴ notices the following meanings of *perception*, as applied to different faculties, acts, and objects:—

¹ *Princip. Philosoph.*, para 1, sect. 32.

² *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., chap. 6.

³ *Intell. Pow.*, essay I., chap. 1.

⁴ In note D* to *Reid's Works*, p. 876.

PERCEPTION—

1. *Perceptio*, in its primary philosophical signification, as in the mouths of Cicero and Quintilian, is vaguely equivalent to comprehension, notion, cognition in general.

2. An apprehension, a becoming aware of, consciousness. *Perception*, the Cartesians really identified with *idea*, and allowed them only a logical distinction; the same representative act being called *idea*, inasmuch as we regard it as a representation; and *perception*, inasmuch as we regard it as a consciousness of such representation.

3. *Perception* is limited to the apprehension of sense alone. This limitation was first formally imposed by Reid, and thereafter by Kant.

4. A still more restricted meaning, through the authority of Reid, is *perception* (proper), in contrast to *sensation* (proper).

He defines sensitive *perception*, or *perception* simply as that act of consciousness whereby we apprehend in our body,

a. Certain special affections, whereof, as an *animated* organism, it is contingently susceptible; and

b. Those *general relations of extension*, under which, as a *material* organism, it necessarily exists.

Of these *perceptions*, the former, which is thus conversant about a *subject-object*, is *sensation proper*; the latter, which is thus conversant about an *object-object*, is *perception proper*.

PERCEPTIONS (Obscure), or latent modifications of mind.

Every moment the light reflected from innumerable objects, smells and sounds of every kind, and contact of different bodies are affecting us. But we pay no heed to them. These are what Leibnitz¹ calls *obscure perceptions*—and what Thurot proposes to call *impressions*. But this word is already appropriated to the changes produced by communication between an external object and a bodily organ.

The sum of these *obscure perceptions* and latent feelings, which never come clearly into the field of consciousness, is what makes us at any time well or ill at ease. And as the amount in general is agreeable it forms the charm which attaches us to life—even when our more defined *perceptions* and feelings are painful.

¹ *Avant Propos de ses Nouv. Essais.*

² *De l'Entendement, &c.*, tom. 1, p. 11.

PERCEPTIONS—

The following account of Leibnitz's philosophy as to (*obscure*) *perceptions* is translated from Tiberghien:¹—

"*Confused or insensible perceptions* are without consciousness or memory. It is difficult enough to seize them in themselves, but they must be, because the mind always thinks. A substance cannot be without action, a body without movement, a mind without thought. There are a thousand marks which make us judge that there is, every moment, in us an infinity of *perceptions*; but the habit in which we are of perceiving them, by depriving them of the attraction of novelty, turns away our attention and prevents them from fixing themselves in our memory. How could we form a *clear perception* without the *insensible perceptions*, which constitute it? To hear the noise of the sea, for example, it is necessary that we hear the parts which compose the whole, that is, the noise of each wave, though each of these little noises does not make itself known; but in the confused assemblage of all the others together with it. A hundred thousand nothings cannot make anything. And sleep, on the other hand, is never so sound that we have not some feeble and confused feeling; one would not be wakened by the greatest noise in the world, if one had not some *perception* of its commencement, which is small.

"It is important to remark how Leibnitz attaches the greatest questions of philosophy to these *insensible perceptions*, in so far as they imply the *law of continuity*. It is by means of these we can say that the present 'is full of the past and big with the future,' and that in the least of substances may be read the whole consequences of the things of the universe. They often determine us without our knowing it, and they deceive the vulgar by the appearance of an indifference of equilibrium. They supply the action of substances upon one another, and explain the pre-established harmony of soul and body. It is in virtue of these insensible variations that no two things can ever be perfectly alike (the principle of *indiscernibles*), and that their difference is always more than numerical which destroys the doctrine of the tablets of the mind being empty, of a soul without thought, a substance without action

¹ *Essai des Connaiss. Hum.*, p. 586.

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a vacuum in space, and the atoms of matter. There is another consequence—that souls, being simple substances, are always united to a body, and that there is no soul entirely separated from one. This dogma resolves all the difficulties as to the immortality of souls, the difference of their states being never anything but that of more or less perfect, which renders their state past or future as explicable as their present. It also supplies the means of recovering memory, by the periodic developments which may one day arrive.”

“Obscure ideas, or more properly, sensations with dormant consciousness, are numerous. It is through them, so far as they proceed from the nervous system of vegetative life, and thus accompany all its functions, digestion, secretion, &c., that the soul, according to Stahl, secretly governs the body. ‘*Animus est instar oceani*,’ says Leibnitz, ‘*in quo infinita multitudo perceptionum obscurissimarum adest, et distinctæ ideæ instar insularum sunt, quæ ex oceano emergunt*.’ It is they which are active throughout the whole progress of the formation of thought; for this goes on, though we are unconscious of it, and gives us only the perfect results, viz., ideas and notions. It is they which in the habitual voluntary motions, for instance, in playing on the piano, dancing, &c., set the proper muscles in motion through the appropriate motor nerves, though the mind does not direct to them the attention of consciousness. It is they which in sleep and in disorders of mind act a most important part. It is their totality which forms what plays so prominent a part in life under the name of *disposition* or *temper*.”¹

Lord Jeffrey had a fancy, or said he had it, that though he went to bed with his head stuffed and confused with the names and dates and other details, of various causes, they were all in order in the morning; which he accounted for by saying, that during sleep “*they all crystallized round their proper centres*.”²

PERFECT, PERFECTION (*perficio*; *perfectum*, made out, complete).—To be *perfect* is to want nothing. *Perfection* is *relative* or *absolute*. A being possessed of all the qualities

¹ Feuchtersleben, *Med. Psychology*, 1847, p. 169.

² Cockburn, *Life of Jeffrey*, vol. 1, p. 248, note.

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belonging to its species in the highest degree may be called *perfect* in a *relative sense*. But *absolute perfection* can only be ascribed to the Supreme Being. We have the idea of a Being infinitely *perfect*—and from this Descartes reasoned that such a being really exists.

The *perfections* of God are those qualities which he has communicated to his rational creatures, and which are in Him in an infinitely *perfect* degree. They have been distinguished as *natural* and *moral*—the former belonging to Deity as the great first cause—such as independent and necessary existence—the latter as manifested in the creation and government of the universe—such as goodness, justice, &c. But they are all *natural* in the sense of being essential. It has been proposed to call the former *attributes*, and the latter *perfections*. But this distinctive use of the terms has not prevailed; indeed it is not well founded. In God there are nothing but *attributes*—because in Him everything is absolute and involved in the substance and unity of a perfect being.

PERFECTIBILITY (The Doctrine of) is, that men, as individuals, and as communities, have not attained to that happiness and development of which their nature and condition are capable, but that they are in a continual progress to a state of perfection, even in this life. That men as a race are capable of progress and improvement is a fact attested by experience and history. But that this improvement may be carried into their whole nature—and to an indefinite extent—that all the evils which affect the body or the mind may be removed—cannot be maintained. Bacon had faith in the intellectual progress of men when he entitled his work “Of the Advancement of Learning.” Pascal has articulately expressed this faith in a preface to his “Treatise of a Vacuum.” “Not only individual men advance from day to day in knowledge, but men as a race make continual progress in proportion as the world grows older, because the same thing happens in a succession of men as in the different periods of the life of an individual; so that the succession of men during a course of so many ages, ought to be considered as the same man always living and always learning. From this may be seen the injustice of the reverence paid to antiquity in philosophy: for as old age

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is the period of life most distant from infancy, who does not see that the old age of the universal man is not to be sought for in the period nearest his birth, but in that most remote from it." Malebranche¹ expressed a similar opinion; and the saying of a great modern reformer is well known, "If you talk of the wisdom of the ancients, we are the ancients." It cannot be denied that in arts and sciences, and the accommodations of social life, and the extension of social freedom, the administration of justice, the abolition of slavery, and many other respects, men have improved, and are improving, and may long continue to improve. But human nature has limits beyond which it cannot be carried. Its life here cannot be indefinitely prolonged, its liability to pain cannot be removed, its reason cannot be made superior to error, and all the arrangements for its happiness are liable to go wrong.

Leibnitz, in accordance with his doctrine that the universe is composed of monads essentially active, thought it possible that the human race might reach a perfection of which we cannot well conceive. Charles Bonnet advocated the doctrine of a *palingenesis*, or transformation of all things into a better state. In the last century the great advocates of social progress are Fontenelle, Turgot, and Condorcet, in France; Lessing, Kant, and Schiller, in Germany; Price and Priestley, in England. Owen's views are also well known.²

PERIPATETIC (*περιπατητικός*, *ambulator*, from *περιπατέω*, to walk about), is applied to Aristotle and his followers, who seem to have carried on their philosophical discussions while walking about in the halls or promenades of the Lyceum.

PERSON, PERSONALITY.—*Persona*, in Latin, meant the mask worn by an actor on the stage, within which the sounds of the voice were concentrated, and through which (*personuit*) he made himself heard by the immense audience. From being applied to the mask it came next to be applied to the actor, then to the character acted, then to any assumed character, and lastly, to any one having any character or station. Martinus gives as its composition—*per se una*, an individual

¹ Search after Truth, book ii., part ii., chap. 4.

² Mercier, *De la Perfectibilité Humaine*, 8vo, Paris, 1842

PERSON—

"Person," says Locke,¹ "stands for a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and as it seems to me essential to it: it being impossible for any one to perceive without perceiving that he does perceive." "We attribute *personality*," says Mons. Ahrens,² "to every being which exists, not solely for others, but which is in the relation of unity with itself in existing, or for itself. Thus we refuse *personality* to a mineral or a stone, because these things exist for others, but not for themselves. An animal, on the contrary, which exists for itself, and stands in relation to itself, possesses a degree of *personality*. But man exists for himself in all his essence, in a manner more intimate and more extensive; that which he is, he is for himself, he has consciousness of it. But God alone exists for himself in a manner infinite and absolute. God is entirely in relation to himself; for there are no beings out of him to whom he could have relation. His whole essence is for himself, and this relation is altogether internal: and it is this intimate and entire relation of God to himself in all his essence, which constitutes the divine *personality*."

"The seat of intellect," says Paley, "is a *person*."

A being intelligent and free, every spiritual and moral agent, every cause which is in possession of responsibility and consciousness, is a *person*. In this sense, God considered as a creating cause, distinct from the universe, is a *person*.

According to Boethius, *Persona est rationalis naturæ individua substantia*.

"Whatever derives its powers of motion from without, from some other being, is a *thing*. Whatever possesses a spontaneous action within itself, is a *person*, or, as Aristotle³ defines it, an ἀρχὴ πρᾶξεως."⁴

"*Personality* is individuality existing in itself, but with a nature as its ground."⁵

"If the substance be unintelligent in which the quality

¹ *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., chap. 27.

² *Cours de Psychologie*, tom. ii., p. 272.

³ *Nicom. Eth.*, lib. iii.

⁴ Sewell *Christ. Mor.*, p. 152.

⁵ Coleridge, *Notes on Eng. Div.*, vol. i., p. 43.

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exists, we call it a thing or substance, but if it be intelligent, we call it a *person*, meaning by the word *person* to distinguish a thing or substance that is intelligent, from a thing or substance that is *not* intelligent. By the word *person*, we therefore mean a thing or substance that is intelligent, or a conscious being; including in the word the idea both of the substance and its properties together."¹

"A subsisting substance or *suppositum* endued with reason as man is, that is, capable of religion, is a *person*."²

"*Person*, as applied to Deity, expresses the definite and certain truth that God is a living being, and not a dead material energy. Whether spoken of the Creator or the creature, the word may signify either the unknown but abiding substance of the attributes by which he is known to us; or the unity of these attributes considered in themselves."³—*V. IDENTITY (PERSONAL), REASON, SUBSISTENTIA.*

Personality, in jurisprudence, denotes the capacity of rights and obligations which belong to an intelligent will.⁴

PETITIO PRINCIPII (or *petitio quæsitæ*, begging the question).

—*V. FALLACY.*

PHANTASM.—*V. IDEA, PERCEPTION.***PHENOMENOLOGY.**—*V. NATURE.*

PHENOMENON (φαινόμενον, from φαίνομαι, to appear), is that which has appeared. It is generally applied to some sensible appearance, some occurrence in the course of nature. But in mental philosophy it is applied to the various and changing states of mind. "How pitiful and ridiculous are the grounds upon which such men pretend to account for the very lowest and commonest *phenomena* of nature, without recurring to a God and Providence!"⁵

"Among the various *phenomena* which the human mind presents to our view, there is none more calculated to excite our curiosity and our wonder, than the communication which is carried on between the sentient, thinking, and active

¹ Henry Taylor, *Apology of Ben Murdecai*, letter i., p. 85.

² Oldfield, *Essay on Reason*, p. 319.

³ R. A. Thompson. *Christian Theism*, book ii., chap. 7.

⁴ Jouffroy, *Droit. Nat.*, p. 19.

⁵ South, vol. iv., Sermon ix.

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principle within us, and the material objects with which we are surrounded.”¹

In the philosophy of Kant, *phenomenon* means an object such as we represent it to ourselves or conceive of it, in opposition to *noumenon*, or a thing as it is in itself.

“According to Kant, the facts of consciousness, in their subjective character, are produced partly from the nature of the things of which it is conscious; and hence, in their objective character, they are *phenomena*, or objects as they appear in relation to us, not things in themselves, *noumena*, or realities in their absolute nature, as they may be out of relation to the mind. The subjective elements which the mind itself contributes to the consciousness of every object are to be found, as regards intuition, in the forms of space and time; and as regards thought, in the categories, unity, plurality, and the rest.² To perceive a thing in itself would be to perceive it neither in space nor in time; for these are furnished by the constitution of our perceptive faculties, and constitute an element of the *phenomenal* object of intuition only. To think of a thing in itself would be to think of it neither as one nor as many, nor under any other category; for these, again, depend upon the constitution of our understanding, and constitute an element of the *phenomenal* object of thought. The *phenomenal* is the product of the inherent laws of our own mental constitution, and, as such, is the sum and limit of all the knowledge to which we can attain.”³

The definition of *phenomenon* is, “that which can be known only along with something else.”⁴ — V. NOUMENON.

PHILANTHROPY (φιλανθρωπία, from φιλανθρωπῆναι, to be a friend to mankind). — “They thought themselves not much

¹ Stewart, *Elements*, c. 1, sect. 1.

² I. *Categories of Quantity.*

Unity.
Plurality
Totality.

III. *Categories of Relation.*

Inherence and Subsistence.
Casuality and Dependence.
Community, or Reciprocal Action.

II. *Categories of Quality.*

Reality.
Negation.
Limitation.

IV. *Categories of Modality.*

Possibility, or Impossibility.
Existence, or Non-Existence.
Necessity or Contingence.

³ Mansel, *Lect. on Phil. of Kant*, pp. 21, 22.

⁴ Ferrier, *Inst. of Metaphys.*, p. 319

PHILANTHROPY—

concerned to acquire that God-like excellency, a *philanthropy* and love to all mankind.”¹

This state or affection of mind does not differ essentially from charity or brotherly love. Both spring from benevolence or a desire for the well-being of others. When our benevolence is purified and directed by the doctrines and precepts of religion, it becomes charity or brotherly love. When sustained by large and sound views of human nature and the human condition, it seeks to mitigate social evils and increase and multiply social comforts, it takes the name of *philanthropy*. But there is no incompatibility between the two. It is only when *philanthropy* proceeds on false views of human nature and wrong views of human happiness, that it can be at variance with true charity or brotherly love.

Philanthropy, or a vague desire and speculation as to improving the condition of the whole human race, is sometimes opposed to nationality or patriotism. But true charity or benevolence, while it begins with loving and benefiting those nearest to us by various relations, will expand according to the means and opportunities afforded of doing good. And while we are duly attentive to the stronger claims of intimate connection, as the waves on the bosom of the waters spread wider and wider, so we are to extend our regards beyond the distinctions of friendship, of family, and of society, and grasp in one benevolent embrace the universe of human beings. God hath made of one blood all nations of men that dwell upon the face of the earth; and although the sympathies of friendship and the charities of patriotism demand a more early and warm acknowledgment, we are never to forget those great and general relations which bind together the kindreds of mankind—who are all children of one common parent, heirs of the same frail nature, and sharers in the same unbounded goodness:—

“Friends, parents, neighbours, first it will embrace,
Our country next, and next all human race.
Wide and more wide, the o’erflowing of the mind,
Takes every creature in of every kind.
Earth smiles around, in boundless beauty dressed,
And heaven reflects its image in her breast.”—Pope.

¹ Bp. Taylor, vol. iii., Serm. i.

PHILOSOPHY (φιλοσοφία, φιλία, σοφία, the love of wisdom).—

The origin of the word is traced back to Pythagoras, who did not call himself σοφός, like the wise men of Greece, but merely declared himself to be a lover of wisdom, φίλος σοφίας. *Philosophy* is not so much the love of wisdom, as the love of wisdom may be said to be its spring. The desire of knowledge is natural to man. Ignorance is painful; knowledge is agreeable. Surrounded with ever-changing phenomena, he seeks to know their causes, and tries to bring their multiplicity to something like unity, and to reduce their variety to law and rule. When so employed he is prosecuting *philosophy*. It was defined by Cicero,¹ *Rerum divinarum et humanarum, causarumque quibus hæ res continentur, scientia*. But what man can attain or aspire to such knowledge, or even to the knowledge of one of the several departments into which *philosophy* may be divided? "In *philosophy*," says Lord Bacon,² "the contemplations of man do either penetrate unto God, or are circumferred to nature, or are reflected or reverted upon himself. Out of which several inquiries there do arise three knowledges, *Divine philosophy*, *natural philosophy*, and *human philosophy*, or humanity." Now the object-matter of *philosophy* may be distinguished as God, or nature, or man. But, underlying all our inquiries into any of these departments, there is a *first philosophy*, which seeks to ascertain the grounds or principles of knowledge, and the causes of all things. Hence *philosophy* has been defined to be the science of causes and principles. It is the investigation of those principles on which all knowledge and all being ultimately rest. It is the exercise of reason to solve the most elevated problems which the human mind can conceive. How do we know? and what do we know? It examines the grounds of human certitude, and verifies the trustworthiness of human knowledge. It inquires into the causes of all beings, and ascertains the nature of all existences by reducing them to unity. It is not peculiar to any department, but common to all departments of knowledge. Or if each department of knowledge may be said to have its

¹ *De Officiis*, lib. ii., c. 2.

² According to Lord Monboddo (*Ancient Metaphys.*, book i., chap. 5), the Romans had only the word *sapientia* for philosophy, till about the time of Cicero, when they adopted the Greek word *philosophia*.

³ *Of the Advancement of Learning*, book ii

PHILOSOPHY—

philosophy, it is because it rests upon that knowledge of principles and causes which is common to them all. Man first examines phenomena, but he is not satisfied till he has reduced them to their causes, and when he has done so he asks to determine the value of the knowledge to which he has attained. This is *philosophy* properly so called,—the mother and governing science—the science of sciences.

“‘*Philosophy* is the science of first principles,’ that, namely, which investigates the *primary grounds*, and determines the *fundamental certainty*, of human knowledge generally.”¹

Peemans’ proposes the following definition:—“*Philosophia est scientia rerum per causas primas, recto rationis usu comparata.*”

By this definition it is distinguished from other kinds of knowledge. 1. From simple *intelligence*, which is *intuitive*, while *philosophical* knowledge is *discursive*. 2. From *natural sciences*, which do not always reach to *first causes*. 3. From *arts*, which do not proceed by causes or principles, but by rule. 4. From *faith* or *belief*, which rests not on evidence but authority. 5. From *opinion*, which is not certain knowledge. And from the common love of knowledge and truth, which does not prosecute and acquire it *scientifically*.

“*Philosophy* is the attainment of truth by the way of reason.”²

PHRENOLOGY (φρήν, mind; λόγος, discourse).—This word ought to mean Psychology, or mental philosophy, but has been appropriated by Craniologists, on account of the light which their observations of the convolutions of the brain and corresponding elevations of the skull are supposed to throw on the nature and province of our different faculties. According to Dr. Gall, the founder of Craniology, “its end is to determine the functions of the brain in general, and of its different parts in particular, and to prove that you may recognize different dispositions and inclinations by the protuberances and depressions to be found on the cranium. The cranium being exactly

¹ Morell, *Philosoph. Tendencies of the Age*, 8vo, Lond., 1848, p. 18.

² *Introd. ad Philosoph.*, 12mo, Lovan., 1840, sect. 107.

³ Ferrier, *Inst. of Metaphys.*, p. 2.

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moulded upon the mass of the brain, every portion of its surface will present dimensions and developments according to the corresponding portion of the brain. But individuals in whom such or such a portion of the brain is largely developed, have been observed by phrenologists to be remarkable for such or such a faculty, talent, or virtue, or vice; and the conclusion is, that the portion of the cranium corresponding to that development of the cranium is the seat of that faculty, or virtue, or vice — is its *special organ*." — See writings of Gall, Spurzheim, and Combe.

"If it be true that the multitudinous cerebral fibres act always in the same specific fasciculi, or in the same combination of specific fasciculi, in order to produce the same faculty in the same process of ratiocination, then *phrenology* is so far true; and if the action of these fasciculi has the effect of elongating them, so as to produce pressure on the corresponding internal surface of the cranium, and if the bony case make a corresponding concession of space to the elongation of these specific fasciculi, then *cranioscopy* is true also; but there are so many arbitrary assumptions in arriving at such a result, that a vastly greater mass of evidence must be brought forward before phrenologists and cranioscopists have a right to claim general assent to their doctrine."¹

The British Association, established several years ago, refused to admit *phrenology* as a *section* of their society.

PHYSIOGNOMY (φύσις, nature; γνῶμων, an index) is defined by Lavater to be the "art of discovering the *interior* of man from his *exterior*." In common language it signifies the judging of disposition and character by the features of the face. In the Middle Ages, *physiognomy* meant the knowledge of the *internal* properties of any corporeal existence from *external* appearances.

"They found 't the *physiognomies*
Of the planets, all men's destinies."—*Hudibras*.

It does not appear that among the ancients *physiognomy* was extended beyond *man*, or at least beyond animated nature. The treatise on this subject ascribed to Aristotle is thought to

¹ Wigan, *Duality of Mind*, p. 162.

PHYSIOGNOMY—

be spurious. But all men, in the ordinary business of life, seem to be influenced by the belief that the disposition and character may in some measure be indicated by the form of the body, and especially by the features of the face.

“Every one is in some degree a master of that art which is generally distinguished by the name of *Physiognomy*, and naturally forms to himself the character or fortune of a stranger from the features and lineaments of his face. We are no sooner presented to any one we never saw before, but we are immediately struck with the idea of a proud, a reserved, an affable, or a good-natured man; and upon our first going into a company of strangers, our benevolence or aversion, awe or contempt, rises naturally towards several particular persons before we have heard them speak a single word, or so much as know who they are. For my own part, I am so apt to frame a notion of every man’s humour or circumstances by his looks, that I have sometimes employed myself from Charing Cross to the Royal Exchange in drawing the characters of those who have passed by me. When I see a man with a sour, rivelled face, I cannot forbear pitying his wife; and when I meet with an open, ingenuous countenance, I think of the happiness of his friends, his family, and his relations. I cannot recollect the author of a famous saying to a stranger who stood silent in his company, — ‘Speak that I may see thee.’ But with submission I think we may be better known by our looks than by our words, and that a man’s speech is much more easily disguised than his countenance.”¹

Young children are physiognomists—and they very early take likings and dislikings founded on the judgments which they intuitively form of the aspects of those around them. The inferior animals, even, especially such of them as have been domesticated, are affected by the natural or assumed expression of the human countenance. As to their taking likings or dislikings to particular persons, this is probably to be ascribed to the great acuteness not of the sense of sight, but of scent.

The taking a prejudice against a person for his looks is

¹ Addison, *Spectator*, No. 38.

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reckoned among the smaller vices in morality, and is called by More, in his *Enchiridion Ethicum*, *Prosopolepsia*.¹

PHYSIOLOGY and PHYSICS were formerly used as synonymous. The former now denotes the laws of *organized* bodies, the latter of *unorganized*. The former is distinguished into *animal and vegetable*. Both imply the *necessity of nature* as opposed to *liberty of intelligence*, and neither can be appropriately applied to mind. Dr. Brown, however, entitled the first part of one of his works, the *Physiology of mind*.—*V.*
PSYCHOLOGY.

Physiology determines the matter and the form of living beings. It describes their structure and operations, and then ascends from phenomena to laws; from the knowledge of organs and their actions, it concludes their functions and their end or purpose; and from among the various manifestations it seeks to seize that mysterious principle which animates the matter of their organization, which maintains the nearly constant form of the compound by the continual renewal of the component molecules, and which at death, leaving this matter, surrenders it to the common laws, from the empire of which it was for a season withdrawn.

. . . The facts which belong to it are such as we can touch and see—matter and its modifications.²

PICTURESQUE “properly means what is done in the style and with the spirit of a painter, and it was thus, if I am not much mistaken, that the word was commonly employed when it was first adopted in England. . . . But it has been frequently employed to denote those combinations or groups or attitudes of objects that are fitted for the purposes of the painter.”³

“*Picturesque* is a word applied to every object, and every kind of scenery, which has been or might be represented with good effect in painting—just as the word *beautiful*, when we speak of visible nature, is applied to every object and every kind of scenery that in any way give pleasure to the eye—and

See Lavater, Spurzheim. *J. Cross. Attempt to Establish Physiognomy upon Scientific Principles*, Glasg., 1817.

¹ *Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*

² Stewart, *Philosoph. Essays*, part 1., chap. 5.

PICTURESQUE —

these seem to be the significations of both words, taken in their most extended and popular sense." — Sir Uvedale Price.¹

"The two qualities of *roughness* and of *sudden variation*, joined to that of *irregularity*, are the most efficient causes of the *picturesque*"² — *Ibid.*

"*Beauty* and *picturesqueness* are founded on opposite qualities; the one on smoothness, the other on roughness; the one on grandeur, the other on sudden variation; the one on ideas of youth and freshness, the other on those of age, and even of decay."³

PNEUMATICS is now applied to physical science, and means that department of it which treats of the mechanical properties of air and other elastic fluids. It was formerly used as synonymous with *pneumatology*.

PNEUMATOLOGY (πνεῦμα, *spirit*; λόγος, *discourse*). — The branch of philosophy which treats of the nature and operations of mind, has by some been called *pneumatology*. Philosophy gives ground for belief in the existence of our own mind and of the Supreme mind, but furnishes no evidence for the existence of orders of minds intermediate. Popular opinion is in favour of the belief. But philosophy has sometimes admitted and sometimes rejected it. It has found a place, however, in all religions. There may thus be said to be a *religious pneumatology*, and a *philosophical pneumatology*. In *religious pneumatology*, in the East, there is the doctrine of two antagonistic and equal spirits of good and evil. In the doctrines of Christianity there is acknowledged the existence of spirits intermediate between God and man, some of whom have fallen into a state of evil, while others have kept their first estate.

Philosophy in its early stages is partly religious. Socrates had communication with a demon or spirit. Plato did not discountenance the doctrine, and the Neo-Platonicians of Alexandria carried *pneumatology* to a great length, and adopted

¹ *On the Picturesque*, ch. 3.

² "A *picturesque* object may be defined as that which, from the greater facilities which it possesses for readily and more effectually enabling an artist to display his art, is, as it were, a provocation to painting." — Sir Thos. L. Dick, note to above chap

³ Chap. 4.

PNEUMATOLOGY—

the cabalistic traditions of the Jews. In the scholastic ages, the belief in return from the dead, apparitions and spirits, was universal. And Jacob Boehm, in Saxony, Emanuel Swedenborg, in Sweden, and in France, Martinez Pasqualis and his disciple Saint Martin, have all given accounts of orders of spiritual beings who held communication with the living. And in the present day a belief in *spirit rapping* is prevalent in America.

Bp. Berkeley¹ admits the existence of orders of spirits.

Considered as the science of mind or spirit, *pneumatology* consisted of three parts, treating of the Divine mind, Theology—the angelic mind, Angelology, and the human mind. This last is now called Psychology, “a term to which no competent objection can be made, and which affords us, what the various clumsy periphrases in use do not, a convenient adjective—*psychological*.”²

POETRY or POESY.—“However critics may differ as to the definition of *poetry*, all competent to offer an opinion on the subject will agree that occasionally, in prose, as well as in verse, we meet with a passage to which we feel that the term *poetry* could be applied, with great propriety, by a figure of speech. In the other arts also we find, now and then, what we feel prompted from within to call the *poetry* of painting, of statuary, of music, or of whatever art it may be. The fact that books have been written under such figurative titles, and favourably received, proves that the popular mind conceives of something in *poetry* besides versification—of some spiritual excellence, most properly belonging to compositions in verse, but which is also found elsewhere. When Byron said that few poems of his day were half *poetry*, he evidently meant by *poetry* something distinguishable from rhythm and rhyme. True, such may be only a figurative use of the word; but the public accept that figurative use as corresponding to some actual conception which they entertain of *poetry* in its best degrees. And when they speak of the *poetry* of any other art, it is evident from the use of the same word that they believe themselves perceiving the same or similar qualities.

¹ *Principles of Human Knowledge*, sect. 81, and throughout.

² Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 219, note.

POETRY—

To such conceptions, then, without regard to whence they spring, I think, with Coleridge, that it would be expedient to appropriate the word *poesy*, thereby avoiding the ambiguity which now exists in the use of the word *poetry*; though popular choice, which always prefers a figurative application of a common word, has not adopted the suggestion."¹

POLLICITATION.—V. PROMISE.

POLYGAMY (πολύς, many; γάμος, marriage) means a plurality of wives or husbands. It has prevailed under various forms in all ages of the world. It can be shown, however, to be contrary to the light of nature; and has been condemned and punished by the laws of many nations. About the middle of the sixteenth century, Bernardus Ochinus, general of the order of Capuchins, and afterwards a Protestant, published Dialogues in favour of *polygamy*, to which Theodore Beza wrote a reply. In 1682, a work entitled *Polygamia Triumphatrix* appeared under the name of Theophilus Aletheus. The true name of the author was Lyserus, a native of Saxony. In 1780, Martin Madan published *Thelyphthora*, or a *Treatise on Female Ruin*, in which he defended *polygamy*, on the part of the male. See some sensible remarks on this subject in Paley's *Moral and Political Philosophy*.²

POLYTHEISM (πολύς, many; θεός, god).—"To believe no one supreme designing principle or mind, but rather two, three, or more (though in their nature good), is to be a *polytheist*."³

Three forms of *polytheism* may be distinguished. 1. *Idolatry*, or the worship of idols and false gods, which prevailed in Greece and Rome. 2. *Subaism*, or the worship of the stars and of fire, which prevailed in Arabia and in Chaldaea. 3. *Fetichism*, or the worship of anything that strikes the imagination and gives the notion of great power, which prevails in Africa and among savage nations in general.

POSITIVE.—V. MORAL, TERM.

POSITIVISM.—"One man affirms that to him the principle of all certitude is the *testimony of the senses*; this is *positivism*."⁴

Of late years the name *positivism* has been appropriated to

¹ Moffat, *Study of Aesthetics*, p. 221.

² *Shaflesbury*, b 1., pt. 1, sect. 2.

³ Book iii., ch. 6.

⁴ Morell, *Philosoph. Tract.*, p. 15.

POSITIVISM—

the peculiar principles advocated by M. Auguste Comte. This philosophy is thus described by an admirer:²—"This is the mission of *positivism*, to generalize science, and to systematize sociality; in other words, it aims at creating a philosophy of the sciences, as a basis for a new social faith. A social doctrine is the *aim of positivism*, a scientific doctrine the *means*; just as in a man, intelligence is the minister and interpreter of life.

"The leading conception of M. Comte is:—There are but three phases of intellectual evolution—the *theological* (supernatural), the *metaphysical*, and the *positive*. In the *supernatural* phase, the mind seeks *causes*, unusual phenomena are interpreted as the signs of the pleasure or displeasure of some god. In the *metaphysical* phase, the supernatural agents are set aside for abstract forces inherent in substances. In the *positive* phase, the mind restricts itself to the discovery of the *laws* of phenomena."

POSSIBLE (*possum*, to be able).—That which may or can be. "Tis *possible* to infinite power to endue a creature with the power of beginning motion."³

Possibilitas est consensio inter se, seu non repugnantia partium vel attributorum quibus res seu ens constituitur.

A thing is said to be *possible* when, though not actually in existence, all the conditions necessary for realizing its existence are given. Thus we say it is *possible* that a plant or animal may be born, because there are in nature causes by which this may be brought about. But as everything which is born dies, we say it is impossible that a plant or animal should live for ever. A thing is *possible*, when there is no contradiction between the idea or conception of it and the realization of it; and a thing is *impossible* when the conception of its realization or existence implies absurdity or contradiction.

We apply the terms *possible* and *impossible* both to beings and events, chiefly on the ground of experience. In proportion as our knowledge of the laws of nature increases, we say it is *possible* that such things may be produced; and in pro-

¹ In his *Cours de Philosophie Positive*.

² G. H. Lewes, *Comte's Philosophy of Sciences*, 1853, sect. 1.

³ Clarke, *On Attributes*, prop. 10.

POSSIBLE—

portion as our knowledge of human nature is enlarged, we say it is *possible* that such events may happen. But it is safer to say what is *possible* than what is *impossible*, because our knowledge of causes is increasing.

There are three ways in which what is *possible* may be brought about; *supernaturally*, *naturally*, and *morally*. The resurrection of the dead is *supernaturally possible*, since it can only be realized by the power of God. The burning of wood is *naturally* or *physically possible*, because fire has the power to do so. It is *morally possible* that he who has often done wrong should yet in some particular instance do right. These epithets apply to the causes by which the *possible* existence or event is realized.

"*Possible* relates sometimes to *contingency*, sometimes to *power* or liberty, and these senses are frequently confounded. In the first sense we say, *e. g.*, 'It is *possible* this patient may recover,' not meaning that it depends on his *choice*, but that we are *not sure* whether the event will not be such. In the other sense it is '*possible*' to the best man to violate every rule of morality; since if it were out of his *power* to act so if he chose it, there would be no moral goodness in the case, though we are quite sure that such never *will* be his choice."¹

POSTULATE (*αἴτημα*, *postulatum*, that which is asked or assumed in order to prove something else).—"According to some, the difference between axioms and *postulates* is analogous to that between theorems and problems; the former expressing truths which are self-evident, and from which other propositions may be deduced; the latter operations which may be easily performed, and by the help of which more difficult constructions may be effected."²

There is a difference between a *postulate* and a *hypothesis*. When you lay down something which may be, although you have not proved it, and which is admitted by the learner or the disputant, you make a hypothesis. The *postulate* not being assented to, may be contested during the discussion, and is only established by its conformity with all other ideas on the subject.

In the philosophy of Kant, a *postulate* is neither a *hypothesis*

¹ Whately, *Log.*, Appendix i.

² Stewart, *Elements*, vol. ii., chap. 2, sect. 3 From Wallis.

POSTULATE—

nor a *corollary*, but a proposition of the same binding certainty, or whose certainty is incorporated with that of another, so that you must reject that other, all evident as it is in self, or admit at the same time what it necessarily supposes. He has three *postulates*.

1. I am under obligation, therefore I am free.
2. Practical reason tends necessarily to the sovereign good, which supposes an absolute conformity with the moral law; such conformity is holiness; a perfection which man can only attain by an indefinite continuity of effort and of progress. This progress supposes continuity of existence, personal and identical, therefore the soul is immortal, or the sovereign good is a chimera.

3. On the other hand, the sovereign good supposes *felicity*, but this results from the conformity of things with a will, and has for its condition, obedience to the moral law; there must then be a harmony possible between morality and felicity, and this necessarily supposes a cause of the universe distinct from nature, — an intelligent cause, who is at the same time the Author of the moral law, and guarantee of this harmony of virtue and happiness, from which results the sovereign good; then *God exists*, and is himself the primitive sovereign good, the source of all good. Kant's *postulates* of the practical reason are thus freedom, immortality, and God.¹

POTENTIAL is opposed to *actual*—*q. v.* This antithesis is a fundamental doctrine of the Peripatetic philosophy. "Aristotle saith, that divided they (*i. e.*, bodies) be in infinitum *potentially*, but actually not."²

"Anaximander's infinite was nothing else but an infinite chaos of matter, in which were either actually or *potentially* contained all manner of qualities."³

POTENTIALITY (δύναμις).—*V. CAPACITY.*

POWER (*possum*, to be able; in Greek, δύναμις), says Mr. Locke, "may be considered as twofold, viz., as able to make, or able to receive, any change: the one may be called active, and the other passive power." Dr. Reid,⁴ in reference to this distinc-

¹ Willm, *His. de la Philosoph. Allemande*, tom 1., p. 420.

² Holland, *Plutarch*, p. 667.

³ Cudworth, *Intell. System*, p. 128.

⁴ *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, b. II., ch. 21.

⁵ *Act. Pow.*, essay I., chap. 3.

POWER —

tion, says, "Whereas he distinguishes *power* into active and passive, I conceive *passive power* to be no *power* at all. He means by it the possibility of being changed. To call this *power* seems to be a misapplication of the word. I do not remember to have met with the phrase *passive power* in any other good author. Mr. Locke seems to have been unlucky in inventing it; and it deserves not to be retained in our language." "This paragraph," says Sir W. Hamilton,¹ "is erroneous in almost all its statements." The distinction between *power* as active and passive, is clearly taken by Aristotle. But he says that in one point of view they are but one *power*,² while in another they are two.³ He also distinguishes *powers* into rational and irrational—into those which we have by nature, and those which we acquire by repetition of acts. These distinctions have been generally admitted by subsequent philosophers. Dr. Reid, however, only used the word *power* to signify *active power*. That we have the idea of *power*, and how we come by it, he shows in opposition to Hume.⁴

According to Mr. Hume, we have no proper notion of *power*. It is a mere relation which the mind conceives to exist between one thing going before, and another thing coming after. All that we observe is merely antecedent and consequent. Neither sensation nor reflection furnishes us with any idea of *power* or efficacy in the antecedent to produce the consequent. The views of Dr. Brown are somewhat similar. It is when the succession is constant—when the antecedent is uniformly followed by the consequent, that we call the one cause, and the other effect; but we have no ground for believing that there is any other relation between them or any virtue in the one to originate or produce the other, that is, that we have no proper idea of *power*. Now, that our idea of *power* cannot be explained by the philosophy which derives all our ideas from sensation and reflection, is true. *Power* is not an object of sense. All that we observe is succession. But when we see one thing invariably succeeded by another, we not only connect the one as effect and the other as cause, and view them

¹ *Reid's Works*, p. 519, note.

² *Ibid.*, lib. ix., cap. 1.

³ *Metaphys.*, lib. v., cap. 12.

⁴ *Act. Pow.*, essay 1., chap. 2, 4.

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under that relation, but we frame the idea of *power*, and conclude that there is a virtue, an efficacy, a force, in the one thing to originate or produce the other; and that the connection between them is not only uniform and unvaried, but universal and necessary. This is the common idea of *power*, and that there is such an idea framed and entertained by the human mind cannot be denied. The legitimacy and validity of the idea can be fully vindicated.

"In the strict sense, *power* and *agency* are attributes of mind only; and I think that mind only can be a *cause* in the strict sense. This *power*, indeed, may be where it is not exerted, and so may be without *agency* or causation; but there can be no *agency* or causation without *power* to act and to produce the effect. As far as I can judge, to everything we call a cause we ascribe power to produce the effect. In intelligent causes, the *power* may be without being exerted; so I have *power* to run when I sit still or walk. But in inanimate causes we conceive no *power* but what is exerted, and, therefore, measure the *power* of the cause by the effect which it actually produces. The *power* of an acid to dissolve iron is measured by what it actually dissolves. We get the notion of *active power*, as well as of cause and effect, as I think, from what we feel in ourselves. We feel in ourselves a *power* to move our limbs, and to produce certain effects when we choose. Hence we get the notion of *power*, *agency*, and *causation*, in the strict and philosophical sense; and this I take to be our first notion of these three things."¹

"The liability of a thing to be influenced by a cause is called *passive power*, or more properly susceptibility; while the efficacy of the cause is called *active power*. Heat has the *power* of melting wax; and in the language of some, ice has the *power* of being melted."²—V. CAUSE.

It is usual to speak of a *power* of resistance in matter; and of a *power* of endurance in mind. Both these are *passive power*. *Active power* is the principle of action, whether immanent or transient. *Passive power* is the principle of bearing or receiving.

¹ Dr. Reid, *Correspondence*, pp. 77, 78.

² Day, *On the Will*, p. 32.

POWER —

Aristotle, *Metaphys.*; ¹ Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*;
Hobbes, *Opera*.²


PRACTICAL (German, *praktisch*). — The strict meaning of this word in the philosophy of Kant, is immediate will-determining, and the Critick of Practical Reason is nothing else but the critick of that faculty of reason which immediately determines the will.⁴

PRÆDICATE, PRÆDICABLE, and PRÆDICAMENT, are all derived from *prædico*, to affirm. A *prædicate* is that which is actually affirmed of any one, as wisdom of Peter. A *prædicable* is that which may be affirmed of many, as sun may be affirmed of other suns besides that of our system. A *prædicament* is a series, order, or arrangement of *predicates* and *prædicables* in some summum genus, as substance, or quality.

What is affirmed or denied is called the *prædicate*; and that of which it is affirmed or denied is called the *subject*.⁵ — V. ATTRIBUTE, CATEGORY, UNIVERSAL.

Prædicables. — “Whatever term can be affirmed of several things, must express either their *whole essence*, which is called the *species*; or a *part* of their essence (viz., either the *material* part, which is called the *genus*, or the *formal* and distinguishing part, which is called *differentia*, or in common discourse, *characteristic*), or something joined to the essence; whether *necessarily* (i. e., to the *whole* species, or in other words, *universally*, to every individual of it), which is called a *property*; or contingently (i. e., to *some* individuals only of the species), which is an *accident*.

Every Prædicable expresses either



¹ Lib. viii, cap. 1.

² B. ii, chap. 21.

³ Tom. 1, p. 113, edit. by Molesworth

Haywood, *Critick of Pure Reason*, p. 401.

⁴ Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, vol. v., p. 152

PRAEDICATE—

“Genus, species, differentia, proprium, accidens, might, with more propriety, perhaps, have been called the *five classes of predicates*; but use has determined them to be called the *five predicables*.”¹

Prædicament.—These most comprehensive signs of things (the categories), are called in Latin the *prædicaments*, because they can be said or *prædicated* in the same sense of all other terms, as well as of all the objects denoted by them, whereas no other term can be correctly said of them, because no other is employed to express the full extent of their meaning.”²

Præ-prædicamenta and Post-prædicamenta.—“The Greek Logicians divided their speculations on this subject into three sections, calling the first section *τὸ πρὸ τῶν κατηγοριῶν*; the second, *τὸ περὶ αὐτῶν κατηγοριῶν*; the third, *τὸ μετὰ τὰς κατηγορίας*.³ The Latins adhering to the same division, coin new names: *ante-prædicamenta*, or *præ-prædicamenta*, *prædicamenta* and *post-prædicamenta*.”⁴

PREJUDICE (*præjudico*, to judge before inquiry).—A *prejudice* is a pre-judging, that is forming or adopting an opinion concerning anything, before the grounds of it have been fairly or fully considered. The opinion may be true or false, but in so far as the grounds of it have not been examined, it is erroneous or without proper evidence. “In most cases *prejudices* are opinions which, on some account, men are pleased with, independently of any conviction of their truth; and which, therefore, they are afraid to examine, lest they should find them to be false. *Prejudices*, then, are unreasonable judgments, formed or held under the influence of some other motive than the love of truth. They may therefore be classed according to the nature of the *motives* from which they result. These motives are, either, 1, Pleasurable, innocent, and social; or, 2, They are malignant.”⁵

Dr. Reid⁶ has treated of *prejudices* or the causes of error, according to the classification given of them by Lord Bacon, under the name of *idols*—q. v. Mr. Locke⁷ has treated of the

¹ Reid, *Account of Aristotle's Logic*.

² Ammon. in *Prædic.*, p. 146.

³ Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

Essay on Hum. Understand., book iv., chap. 20.

⁴ Gillies, *Analysis of Aristotle*, c. 2.

⁵ Sanderson, pp. 22, 51, 55, ed. Oxen., 1673

⁶ *Intell. Pow.*, essay vi., chap. 8.

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causes of error. And some excellent observations on the *prejudices* peculiar to men of study, may be seen in Malebranche, *Search after Truth*.¹

PREMISS (*propositiones præmissæ*, propositions which go before the conclusion, and from which it is inferred).—A regular syllogism consists of two *premisses* and a conclusion. The two *premisses* are sometimes called the *antecedent*, and the conclusion the *consequent*.

PRESCIENCE (*præscio*, to know before it happens).—"The *prescience* of God is so vast and exceeding the comprehension of our thoughts, that all that can be safely said of it is this, that this knowledge is most exquisite and perfect, accurately representing the natures, powers, and properties of the thing it does foreknow."—More.²

The *prescience* of God may be argued from the perfection of his nature. It is difficult or rather impossible for us to conceive of it, because we have no analogous faculty. Our obscure and inferential knowledge of what is future, is not to be likened to his clear and direct³ beholding of all things. Many attempts have been made to reconcile the *prescience* of God with the liberty of man. Each truth must rest upon its own proper evidence.—St. Augustin, *On the Spirit and the Letter*; Bossuet, *Traité du Libre Arbitre*; Leibnitz, *Theodicée*; Fénelon, *Existence de Dieu*.

PRESENTATIVE.—V. KNOWLEDGE.

PRIMARY (*primus*, first) is opposed to *secondary*. "Those qualities or properties, without which we cannot even imagine a thing to exist, are called *primary* qualities. Extension and solidity are called *primary* qualities of matter—colour, taste, smell, are called *secondary* qualities of matter."⁴

¹ Book II., part 2.

² *Immortality of Soul*, b. ii., ch. 4.

³ When the late Sir James Mackintosh was visiting the school for the deaf and dumb at Paris, then under the care of the Abbé Sicard, he is said to have addressed this question in writing to one of the pupils.—"Doth God reason?" The pupil for a short time appeared to be distressed and confused, but presently wrote on his slate, the following answer:—"To reason is to hesitate, to doubt, to inquire: It is the highest attribute of a limited Intelligence. God sees all things, foresees all things, knows all things: there fore God doth not reason."—Gurney, *On Habit and Discipline*, p. 138.

⁴ Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

PRIMARY—

Descartes, Locke, Reid, Stewart,¹ Sir W. Hamilton.²—**V**
MATTER.

PRINCIPIA ESSENDI or **PRINCIPLES OF BEING** are distinguished into the *principle of origination* and the *principle of dependence*.

The only proper *principle of origination* is God, who gives essence and existence to all beings.

The *principle of dependence* is distinguished into that of *causality* and that of *inherence*, or *effective dependence*, as the effect depends upon its cause, and *subjective dependence*, as the quality inheres or depends on its subject or substance.

PRINCIPLE (*principium*, ἀρχή, a beginning).—“A principle is that which being derived from nothing, can hold of nothing. ‘*Principio autem nulla est origo*,’ said Cicero, ‘*nam ex principio oriuntur omnia: ipsum autem nulla ex re; nec enim id esset principium quod gigneretur aliunde.*’”³

Aristotle⁴ has noticed several meanings of ἀρχή, which is translated *principle*, and has added—“What is common to all first principles is that they are the *primary source from which anything is, becomes, or is known.*”

The word is applied equally to thought and to being; and hence *principles* have been divided into those of being and those of knowledge, or *principia essendi* and *principia cognoscendi*, or, according to the language of German philosophers, *principles formal* and *principles real*. *Principia essendi* may also be *principia cognoscendi*, for the fact that things exist is the ground or reason of their being known. But the converse does not hold; for the existence of things is in no way dependent upon our knowledge of them.

Ancient philosophy was almost exclusively occupied with *principles of being*, investigating the origin and elements of all things, while, on the other hand, modern philosophy has been chiefly devoted to *principles of knowledge*, ascertaining the laws and elements of thought, and determining their validity in reference to the knowledge which they give.

PRINCIPLES OF KNOWLEDGE are those truths by means of

¹ *Phil. Essays*, ii., chap. 2.

² Sir Will. Drummond, *Acad. Quest.*, p. 5.

³ *Reid's Works*, note D.

⁴ *Metaphys.*, lib. iv., cap. i.

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which other truths are known. They have been distinguished into *simple* and *complex*, that is, they may be found in the form of ideas, as substance, cause—or in the form of propositions, as in the affirmation that every change implies the operation of a cause, or in the negation that qualities do not exist without a substance. *Complex principles* have been arranged in three classes, viz., hypotheses, definitions, and axioms. Hypotheses and definitions have been called *θετικά*, that is, conventional principles or truths assumed or agreed on for the purpose of disputation or teaching, and are confined to the department of knowledge to which they peculiarly belong. Axioms are *principles* true in themselves, and extending to all departments of knowledge. These were called *φυσικά* or *ἐμφυτά*, and are such as the mind of man naturally and at once accepts as true. They correspond with the first truths, primitive beliefs, or principles of common sense of the Scottish philosophy.—
V. COMMON SENSE, AXIOM.

"The word *principle*," says Mr. Stewart,¹ "in its proper acceptation, seems to me to denote an assumption (whether resting on fact or on hypothesis) upon which, as a *datum*, a train of reasoning proceeds; and for the falsity or incorrectness of which no logical rigour in the subsequent process can compensate. Thus the gravity and the elasticity of the air are *principles of reasoning*, in our speculations about the barometer. The equality of the angles of incidence and reflection: the proportionality of the sines of incidence and refraction, are *principles of reasoning* in catoptrics and in dioptrics. In a sense perfectly analogous to this, the *definitions* of geometry (all of which are merely *hypothetical*) are the first *principles of reasoning* in the subsequent demonstration, and the basis on which the whole fabric of the science rests."

Lord Herbert, *De Veritate*; Buffier, *Treatise of First Truths*; Reid, *Intell. Pow.*²

Principles as Express or as Operative correspond to *principles of knowing* and of *being*. An *express principle* asserts a proposition; as, truth is to be spoken. An *operative principle* prompts to action or produces change, as when a man takes

¹ *Elements*, vol. i., chap. 1, sect. 2.

² Essay vi.

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food to satisfy hunger. An *express principle* asserts an original law and is *regulative*. An *operative principle* is an original element and is *constitutive*.

PRINCIPLES OF ACTION may either mean those *express principles* which regulate or ought to regulate human actions, or those *operating* or *motive principles* which prompt human action. The latter, which is the common application of the phrase, is its psychological meaning.

When applied to human action psychologically, the word *principle* is used in the sense of the *principle of dependence*: and to denote that the action depends upon the agent for its being produced. It may signify the dependence of *causality*, that is, that the action depends for its production on the agent, as its efficient cause; or it may signify the dependence of *inherence*, that is, that the action depends for its production on some power or energy which inheres in the agent as its subject. Hence it has been said that a *principle of action* is two-fold—the *principium quod*, and the *principium quo*. Thus, man as an active being is the *principium quod* or efficient cause of an action being produced; his will, or the power by which he determines to act, is the *principium quo*.

But the will itself is stimulated or moved to exert itself; and in this view may be regarded as the *principium quod*, while that which moves or stimulates it, may be regarded as the *principium quo*. Before we act, we deliberate, that is, we contemplate the action in its nature and consequences; we then resolve or determine to do it or not to do it, and the performance or omission follows. Volition, then, or an exercise of will is the immediate antecedent of action. But the will is called into exercise by certain influences which are brought to bear upon it. Some object of sense or of thought is contemplated. We are affected with pleasure or pain. Feelings of complacency or displacency, of liking or disliking, of satisfaction or disgust, are awakened. Sentiments of approbation or disapprobation are experienced. We pronounce some things to be good, and others to be evil, and feel corresponding inclination or aversion; and under the influence of these states and affections of mind, the will is moved to activity. The forms which these feelings of pleasure or pain, of inclination

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or tendency to or from an object, may assume, are many and various; arising partly from the nature of the objects contemplated, and partly from the original constitution and acquired habits of the mind contemplating. But they are all denominated, in a general way, *principles of action*.

PRIVATION (*στέρησις*, *privatio*).—"A *privation* is the absence of what does naturally belong to the thing we are speaking of, or which ought to be present with it; as when a man or a horse is deaf, or blind, or dead, or if a physician or a divine be unlearned, these are called *privations*."¹

The principles of all natural bodies are matter and form. "To these Aristotle has added a third which he calls *στέρησις* or *privation*, an addition that he has thought proper to make to the Pythagorean and Platonic philosophy, in order to give his system the appearance of novelty; but without any necessity, as I apprehend; for it is not a cause, as he himself admits, such as *matter* and *form*, but is only that without which the first *matter* could not receive the impression of any *form*; for it must be clear of every *form*, which is what he calls *privation*, before it can admit of any.

"Now, this is necessarily implied in the notion of *matter*, for as it has the *capacity* of all *form*, so it has the *privation* of all *form*. In this way, Aristotle² himself has explained the nature of matter. And Plato, in the *Timæus*, has very much insisted upon this quality of matter as absolutely necessary, in order to fit it to receive all forms; and he illustrates his meaning by a comparison:—Those, says he, who make unguents or perfumes, prepare the liquid so, to which they are to give the perfume, that it may have no odour of its own. And, in like manner, those who take off an impression of anything upon any soft matter, clear that matter of every other impression, making it as smooth as possible, in order that it may better receive the figure or image intended. In like manner, he says, *matter*, in order to receive the specieses of all things, must in itself have the species of nothing."³

¹ Watts, *Log.*, pt. I., c. 2.

² *Physics*, lib. I., cap. 8.

³ Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, book II., chap. 2.

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Hence *privation* was defined—*Negatio formæ in subjecto apta ad habendam talem formam.*

According to Plato, *privation*, in the sense of limitation, imperfection, is the inherent condition of all finite existence, and the necessary cause of evil.—Leibnitz,¹ after Augustin, Aquinas, and others, held similar views.—*V. NEGATION.*

PROBABILITY.—V. CHANCES.

PROBABLE (*probabilis*, provable).—That which does not admit of demonstration and does not involve absurdity or contradiction, is *probable*, or admits of proof. “As demonstration is the showing the agreement or disagreement of two ideas, by the intervention of one or more proofs, which have a constant, immutable, and visible connection one with another; so *probability* is nothing but the appearance of such an agreement or disagreement, by the intervention of proofs, whose connection is not constant and immutable, or at least is not perceived to be so, but is, or appears for the most part to be so, and is enough to induce the mind to judge the proposition to be true or false, rather than the contrary. . . . The entertainment the mind gives this sort of propositions, is called belief, assent, or opinion, which is admitting or receiving any proposition for true, upon arguments or proofs that are found to persuade us to receive it as true, without certain knowledge that it is so. And herein lies the difference between *probability* and *certainly*, faith and knowledge, that in all the parts of knowledge there is intuition; each immediate idea, each step, has its visible and certain connection; in belief, not so. That which makes us believe, is something extraneous to the thing I believe; something not evidently joined on both sides to, and so not manifestly showing the agreement or disagreement of, those ideas that are under consideration.

“The grounds of probability are first, the conformity of anything with our own knowledge, observation, and experience. Second, the testimony of others, touching their observation and experience.”—Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.* Reid, *Intell. Pow.*²

¹ *Causa Dei*, sect. 69, 72. *Essais Sur la Bonté de Dieu*, 1, partie, sect. 29, 31; 3, partie, sect. 378.

² Book iv., chap. 13.

³ *Essay* vii., chap. 3.

PROBABLE—

"The word *probable*," says Mr. Stewart,¹ "does not imply any *deficiency* in the proof, but only marks the particular nature of that proof, as contradistinguished from another species of evidence. It is opposed not to what is *certain*, but to what admits of being demonstrated after the *manner of the mathematicians*. This differs widely from the meaning annexed to the same word in popular discourse; according to which, whatever event is said to be *probable*, is understood to be expected with some degree of doubt. . . . But although, in philosophical language, the epithet *probable* be applied to events which are acknowledged to be *certain*, it is also applied to events which are called *probable* by the vulgar. The philosophical meaning of the word, therefore, is more *comprehensive* than the popular; the former denoting that particular *species* of evidence of which contingent truths admit; the latter being confined to such *degrees* of this evidence as fall short of the highest. These different degrees of *probability* the philosopher considers as a *series*, beginning with bare possibility, and terminating in that apprehended *infallibility*, with which the phrase *moral certainty* is synonymous. To this last term of the *series*, the word *probable* is, in its ordinary acceptation, plainly inapplicable."

PROBLEM (πρόβλημα, from προβάλλω, to throw down, to put in question).—Any point attended with doubt or difficulty, any proposition which may be attacked or defended by probable arguments, may be called a *problem*. Every department of inquiry has questions, the answers to which are problematical. So that, according to the branch of knowledge to which they belong, *problems* may be called Physical, Metaphysical, Logical, Moral, Mathematical, Historical, Literary, &c. Aristotle distinguished three classes,—the *moral* or *practical*, which may influence our conduct; as whether pleasure is the chief good: the *speculative* or *scientific*, which merely add to our knowledge; as, whether the world is eternal: and the *auxiliary*, or those questions which we seek to solve with a view to other questions.

PROGRESS.—V. PERFECTIBILITY.

PROMISE and POLLICITATION. *Promittimus rogati*—*pollicemur ultro*.—A *pollicitation* is a spontaneous expression of

¹ *Elements*, part II., chap. 2. sect. 4.

PROMISE—

our intention to do something in favour of another. It does not necessarily imply the presence of the party in reference to whom it is made; and it does not confer upon him a right to exact its performance. But in so far as it has become known to him, and has awakened expectations of its being performed, we may be brought under a moral obligation to perform it, especially if its performance is seen to be highly beneficial to him, and in no way prejudicial to ourselves.

A *promise* is made in consequence of a request preferred to us. It implies the presence of the party preferring the request, or of some one for him, and confers upon him a perfect moral right to have it fulfilled, and brings us under a moral obligation to fulfil it. In order to constitute a *promise*, three things are necessary. 1. The voluntary consent or intention of the promiser. 2. The expression or outward signification of that intention. 3. The acceptance of the *promise* by the party to whom it is made.

A *promise* implies two parties at least—the *promiser* and the *promisee*. A *pact* implies two or more. In this it agrees with a *contract*—*q. v.*

It is a dictate of the law of nature, that *promises* should be fulfilled,—not because it is expedient to do so, but because it is right to do so.

The various questions concerning the parties competent to give a valid *promise*, the interpretation of the terms in which it may be given, and the cases in which the obligation to fulfil it may be relaxed or dissolved, belong to what may be called the *Casuistry of Ethics*, and *Natural Jurisprudence*.—V. **CONTRACT.**

PROOF.—“To conform our language more to common use, we ought to divide arguments into demonstrations, *proofs*, and probabilities. By *proofs*, meaning such arguments from experience as leave no room for doubt or opposition.”¹ Whately says that proving may be defined “the assigning of a reason or argument for the support of a *given* proposition,” and *inferring* “the deduction of a conclusion from given premises. In the one case our *conclusion* is *given*, and we have to *seek*

¹ Hume, *On the Understand.*, sect. 8. note.

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for *arguments*; in the other our *premises* are *given*, and we have to *seek* for a conclusion. *Proving* may be compared to the act of *putting away* any article into the proper receptacle of goods of that description, *inferring* to that of *bringing out* the article when needed." — See EVIDENCE, INFERENCE.

PROPERTY may be distinguished from *quality* or *attribute*, and also from *faculty*.

Qualities are primary or secondary, essential or non-essential. The former are called *attributes*, and the latter *properties*. Extension is the attribute of matter, taste and smell are *properties* of body.

Faculty implies understanding and will, and so is applicable only to mind. We speak of the *properties* of bodies, but not of their *faculties*. Of mind we may say will is a *faculty* or *property*; so that while all *faculties* are *properties*, all *properties* are not *faculties*.

PROPERTY (Generic) is the *property* of a subaltern genus, and which may be predicated of all the subordinate species. "Voluntary motion" is the *generic property* of "animal."

PROPERTY (Specific) is the *property* of an *infima species*, and which may be predicated of all the individuals contained under it. "Risibility" is the *specific property* of "man."

PROPOSITION. — A judgment of the mind expressed in words is a *proposition*.

"A *proposition*, according to Aristotle, is a speech wherein one thing is affirmed or denied of another. Hence it is easy to distinguish the thing affirmed or denied, which is called the *predicate*, from the thing of which it is affirmed or denied, which is called the *subject*; and these two are called the *terms* of the *proposition*."¹

As to their *substance*, propositions are *Categorical* (subdivided into *pure* and *modal*), and *Hypothetical* (subdivided into *conditional* and *disjunctive*).

A *Categorical proposition* declares a thing absolutely, as, "I love," or "Man is not infallible." These are *pure* categoricals, asserting *simply* the agreement and disagreement of subject and predicate. *Modal* categoricals assert the *manner* of

¹ Reid, *Account of Aristotle's Logic*, chap. 2, sect. 6.

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agreement and disagreement between subject and predicate, as, "The wisest man may *possibly* be mistaken." "A prejudiced historian will *probably* misrepresent the matter."

A *Hypothetical proposition* asserts, not absolutely, but under a hypothesis. Such *propositions* are denoted by the conjunctions used in stating them. "If man is fallible, he is imperfect." This is called a *conditional proposition*, denoted by the conjunction "if." "It is either day or night." This is a *disjunctive* hypothetical, and is denoted by the disjunctive conjunction "either."

As to their *quality*, *propositions* are either *affirmative* or *negative*, according as the predicate is said to agree or not to agree with the subject. "Man 'is' an animal." "Man 'is not' perfect." As to their *quantity*, *propositions* are *universal* or *particular*, according as the predicate is affirmed or denied of the *whole* of the subject, or only of *part* of the subject. "All tyrants are miserable." "No miser is rich." "Some islands are fertile." "Most men are fond of novelty."

Another division of *propositions* having reference to their *quantity* is into *singular* and *indefinite*. A *singular proposition* is one of which the subject is an individual (either a proper name, a singular pronoun, or a common noun with a singular sign). "Cæsar overcame Pompey." "I am the person." "This fable is instructive." But as these *propositions* predicate of the *whole* of the subject, they fall under the rules that govern *universals*. An *indefinite* or *indesignate proposition* is one that has no sign of universality or particularity affixed to it, and its quantity must be ascertained by the *matter* of it, that is, by the nature of the connection between the extremes.

As to their *matter*, *propositions* are either *necessary*, or *impossible*, or *contingent*. In *necessary* and in *impossible* matter, an *indefinite* is understood as a *universal*; as, "Birds have wings;" *i. e.*, *all*. "Birds are not quadrupeds;" *i. e.*, *none*. In *contingent* matter, that is, where the terms sometimes agree and sometimes not, an *indefinite* is understood as *particular*; as, "Food is necessary to life;" *i. e.*, some kind of food. "Birds sing;" *i. e.*, some birds sing. "Birds are not carnivorous;" *i. e.*, some birds are not; or, *all* are not.—**V. JUDGMENT OPPOSITION.**

PROPRIETY (τὸ πρέπον, that which is fit or congruous to the agent, and the relations in which he is placed).—This, according to some, is that which characterizes an action as right, and an agent as virtuous. “According to Plato, to Aristotle, and to Zeno, virtue consists in the *propriety* of conduct, or in the suitableness of the affection from which we act, to the object which excites it.”

Adam Smith¹ treats of those systems which make virtue consist in *propriety*.

PROPRIUM (The) or **Property** is a predicable which denotes something essentially conjoined to the essence of the species.²

Proprium is applied, — 1. To what belongs to some one but not to all, as to be a philosopher in respect of man. 2. To what belongs to a species, but not to it only, as blackness in respect of a crow. 3. To what belongs to all of the species, and to that only, but not always, as to grow hoary in respect of man. 4. To what belongs to species, to all of it, to it only, and always, as laughter in respect of man. This last is truly the *proprium*. *Quod speciei toti, soli et semper convenit.*³

“There is a *proprium* which belongs to the *whole* species, but not to the *sole* species, as sleeping belongs to man. There is a *proprium* which belongs to the *sole* species, but not to the *whole* species, as to be a magistrate. There is a *proprium* which belongs to the whole species, and to the sole species, but not *always*, as laughing; and there is a *proprium* which *always* belongs to it, as to be risible, that is, to have the faculty of laughing. Can one forbear laughing when he represents to himself these poor things, uttered with a mouth made venerable by a long beard, or repeated by a trembling and respectful disciple?”⁴

PROSYLLOGISM. — V. EPICHEIREMA.

PROVERB. — The Editor of the fourth edition of Ray's *Proverbs* says, “A *proverb* is usually defined, an instructive sentence, or common and pithy saying, in which more is generally designed than expressed; famous for its peculiarity and elegance, and therefore adopted by the learned as well as

¹ *Theory of Mor. Sent.*, part vii., sect. 2, chap. 1.

² Whately, *Log.*, book ii., chap. 5, sect. 3.

³ Derodon, *Log.*, p. 37.

⁴ Crousaz, *Art of Thinking*, part i., sect. 3, chap. 5.

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the vulgar, by which it is distinguished from counterfeits, which want such authority."

Lord John Russell's definition of a *proverb* is, "the wit of one, the wisdom of many."¹

Proverbs embody the current and practical philosophy of an age or nation. Collections of them have been made from the earliest times. The book of Scripture called the *Proverbs* of Solomon, contains more than one collection. They have always been common in the East. Burckhardt made a collection of Arabian *proverbs*, which was published at London in 1830. Seiler published at Augsburg, in 1816, *The Wisdom of the Streets*, or, the *Meaning and Use of German Proverbs*. Ray's *Proverbs*, Allan Ramsay's *Proverbs*, Henderson's *Proverbs*, have been published among ourselves.

Backer (Geo. de) has *Le Dictionnaire de Proverbes Francais*,² rare and curious. Panckouke published his *Dictionnaire des Proverbes* in imitation of it.

PROVIDENCE.—"What in opposition to Fate," said Jacobi, "constitutes the ruling principle of the universe into a true God, is *Providence*."

Providence is a word which leads us to think of conservation and superintending, or upholding and governing. Whatever is created can have no necessary nor independent existence; the same power which called it into being must continue to uphold it in being. And if the beauty and order which appear in the works of nature prove them to be the effects of an intelligent designing cause, the continuance of that beauty and order argues the continued operation of that cause. So that the same arguments which prove the existence of God imply his *providence*. With regard to the extent of *providence*, some have regarded it as general, and reaching only to things regarded as a whole, and to great and important results, while others regard it as particular, and as embracing every individual and every event. But the same arguments which prove that there is a *providence*, prove that it must be particular; or rather, when properly understood, there is no inconsistency between the two views. The *providence* of God can only be

¹ Moore, *Diary*, vol. vii., p. 204.

² 8vo, 1710.

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called general from its reaching to every object and event, and this is the sense in which we are to understand a particular *providence*. But while the *providence* of God extends to every particular, it proceeds according to general laws. And while these laws are fixed and stable, they may be so fixed as to admit of what we think deviations; so that both what we call the law, and what we call the deviation from the law, may be embraced in the plan of *providence*. As to the way in which this plan is carried forward, some have had recourse to the supposition of a plastic nature, intermediate between the Creator and the creature,—others to an energy communicated from the Creator to the creature. But the true view is to regard all things and all events as upheld and governed by the continual presence and power of God. There is a difficulty in reconciling this view with the freedom and responsibility of man, but it is not impossible to do so.¹

PRUDENCE (*prudencia*, contracted for *providentia*, foresight or forethought) is one of the virtues which were called cardinal by the ancient ethical writers. It may be described as the habit of acting at all times with deliberation and forethought. It is equally removed from rashness on the one hand, and timidity or irresolution on the other. It consists in choosing the best ends, and prosecuting them by the most suitable means. It is not only a virtue in itself, but necessary to give lustre to all the other virtues.

“The rules of *prudence* in general, like the laws of the stone tables, are for the most part prohibitive. *Thou shalt not* is their characteristic formula: and it is an especial part of Christian *prudence* that it should be so. Nor would it be difficult to bring under this head all the social obligations that arise out of the relations of the present life, which the sensual understanding (τὸ φρόνημα τῆς σαρκός, Rom. viii. 6) is of itself able to discover, and the performance of which, under favourable circumstances, the merest worldly self-interest, without love or faith, is sufficient to enforce; but which Christian *prudence* enlivens by a higher principle and renders symbolic and sacramental (Ephes. v. 32).”

¹ Sherlock, *On Providence*; M Cosh, *Meth. of Div. Govern.*, b ii, ch 2.

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"*Morality* may be compared to the consonant; *prudence* to the vowel. The former cannot be uttered (reduced to practice) but by means of the latter.

"The Platonic division of the duties of morality commences with the prudential or the habit of act and purpose proceeding from enlightened self-interest (*qui animi imperio, corporis servitio, rerum auxilio, in proprium sui commodum et sibi providus utitur, hunc esse prudentem statuimus*); ascends to the moral, that is, to the purifying and remedial virtues; and seeks its summit in the imitation of the divine nature. In this last division, answering to that which we have called the spiritual, Plato includes all those inward acts and aspirations, waitings, and watchings, which have a growth in godlikeness for their immediate purpose, and the union of the human soul with the supreme good as their ultimate object."¹ — V. MORALITY.

PSYCHISM (from ψυχή, soul) is the word chosen by Mons. Quesne² to denote the doctrine that there is a fluid, diffused throughout all nature, animating equally all living and organized beings, and that the difference which appears in their actions comes of their particular organization. The fluid is general, the organization is individual.

This opinion differs from that of Pythagoras, who held that the soul of a man passed individually into the body of a brute. He (Mons. Quesne) holds that while the body dies the soul does not; the organization perishes, but not the psychal or psychical fluid.

PSYCHOLOGY (ψυχή, the soul; λόγος, discourse.)—The name may be new, but the study is old. It is recommended in the saying ascribed to Socrates—Know thyself. The recommendation is renewed in the *Cogito ergo sum* of Descartes, and in the writings of Malebranche, Arnauld, Leibnitz, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, psychological inquiries held a prominent place. Still further prominence was given to them by the followers of Kant and Reid, and *psychology*, instead of being partially treated as an introduction to Logic, to Ethics, and to Metaphysics, which all rest on it, is now treated as a separate

¹ Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*, vol. 1., pp. 13, 21, 22.

² *Lettres sur le Psychisme*, 8vo, Paris, 1852.

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department of science. It is that knowledge of the mind and its faculties which we derive from a careful examination of the facts of consciousness. Life and the functions of our organized body belong to *physiology*; and, although there is a close connection between soul and body, and mutual action and reaction between them, that is no reason why the two departments of inquiry should be confounded, unless to those who think the soul to be the product or result of bodily organization. Broussais said, he could not understand those philosophers who shut their eyes and their ears in order to hear themselves think. But if the capacity of thinking be anterior to, and independent of, sense and bodily organs, then the soul which thinks, and its faculties or powers of thinking, deserve a separate consideration.¹

Mr. Stewart² objects to the use of the term *psychology*, though it is sanctioned by Dr. Campbell and Dr. Beattie, as implying a hypothesis concerning the *nature* or *essence* of the sentient or thinking principle, altogether unconnected with our conclusions concerning its phenomena and general laws. The hypothesis implied is that the sentient or thinking principle is different in its nature or essence from matter. But this hypothesis is not altogether unconnected with its phenomena. On the contrary, it is on a difference of the phenomena which they present that we ground the distinction between mind and matter. It is true that the reality of the distinction may be disputed. There are philosophers who maintain that there is but one substance—call it either matter or mind. And the question, when pushed to this extremity, cannot be solved by the human intellect. God only knows whether the two substances which we call matter and mind have not something which is common to both. But the phenomena which they exhibit are so different as to lead us to infer a difference in the cause. And all that is implied in using the term *psychology* is, that the phenomena of the sentient or thinking principle are different from the phenomena

¹ See *Memoire*, par Mons. Jouffroy, *De la Legitimité et de la Distinction de la Psychologie et de la Physiologie* (published in his *Nouveaux Mélanges*, and also in the 11th vol. of *Mémoires de l'Acad. des Sciences Morales et Politiques*).

² Prelim. Disc. to *Philosoph. Essays*, p. 24.

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of matter. And, notwithstanding the objection of Mr. Stewart, the term is now current, especially on the continent — to denote the science of the human mind as manifested by consciousness.

Dr. Priestley at one time maintained the materiality of mind, and at another the spirituality of matter. The apostle speaks of a spiritual body. A body which is spirit sounds to us contradictory.

Coleridge, in his *Treatise upon Method*, employs the word *psychological*, and apologizes for using an *insolens verbum*. "Goclenius is remarkable as the author of a work, the title of which is *Psychologia* (Marburg, 1597). This I think the first appearance of *psychology*, under its own name, in modern philosophy. Goclenius had, as a pupil, Otto Casmann, who wrote *Psychologia Anthropologica, sive animæ humanæ doctrina* (Hanau, 1594)."¹

Psychology has been divided into two parts—1. The *empirical*, having for its object the phenomena of consciousness and the faculties by which they are produced. 2. The *rational*, having for its object the nature or substance of the soul, its spirituality, immutability, &c.

Rational psychology, which had been chiefly prosecuted before his day, was assailed by Kant, who maintained that apart from experience we can know nothing of the soul. But even admitting that *psychology* rests chiefly on observation and experience, we cannot well separate between phenomena and their cause, nor consider the cause apart from the phenomena. There are, however, three things to which the psychologist may successively attend. 1. To the phenomena of consciousness. 2. To the faculties to which they may be referred. 3. To the Ego, that is, the soul or mind in its unity, individuality, and personality. These three things are inseparable; and the consideration of them belongs to *psychology*. Subsidiary to it are inquiries concerning the mutual action and reaction of soul and body, the effect of organization, temperament, age, health, disease, country, climate, &c.

Nemesius, *De Natura Hominis*; Buchanan (David), *Historia*

¹ Cousin, *Hist. of Mod. Philos.*, translated by Wright, vo. II., p. 45.

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Animæ Humanæ; Casmannus, *Psychologia*; Carus, *History of Psychology*,¹ in German.

PSYCHOPANNYCHISM (ψυχῆ, soul; and παν, all; νύξ, night — the sleep of the soul) is the doctrine to which Luther among divines, and Formey, among philosophers, were inclined—that at death the soul falls asleep and does not awake till the resurrection of the body.

PYRRHONISM.—V. SCEPTICISM, ACADEMICS.

QUADRIVIUM.—V. TRIVIUM.

QUALITY (ποιός, ποιότης, *qualis qualitas*, suchness) is the difference which distinguishes substances.

“There may be substances devoid of *quantity*, such as the intellectual and immaterial; but that there should be substances devoid of *quality*, is a thing hardly credible, because they could not then be characterized and distinguished from one another.”²

“Whatsoever the mind perceives in itself, or is the immediate object of perception, thought, or understanding, that I call *idea*; and the power to produce any idea in our mind I call the *quality* of the subject wherein that power is.”³

“We understand by a *quality* that which truly constitutes the nature of a thing — what it is — what belongs to it permanently, as an individual, or in common with others like it — not that which passes, which vanishes, and answers to no lasting judgment. A body falls: it is a fact, an accident: it is heavy, that is a *quality*. Every fact, every accident, every phenomenon, supposes a *quality* by which it is produced, or by which it is undergone: and reciprocally every *quality* of things which we know by experience manifests itself by certain modes or certain phenomena; for it is precisely in this way that things discover themselves to us.”⁴

Descartes⁵ says,—“*Et hic quidem per modos plane idem in*

¹ 8vo, Leipzig, 1808.

² Harris, *Phil. Ariæge*, chap. 8.

³ Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., chap. 8, sect. 8.

⁴ *Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*

⁵ *Princip. Philosoph.*, pars prima, sect. 56.

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telligimus, quod alibi per attributa vel qualitates. Sed cum consideramus substantiam ab illis affici, vel variari, vocamus modos; cum ab ista variatione talem posse denominare, vocamus qualitates; ac denique, cum generalius spectamus tantum ea substantie inesse, vocamus attributa. Ideoque in Deo non proprie modos aut qualitates sed attributa tantum esse dicimus, quia nulla in eo variatio est intelligenda. Et etiam in rebus creatis, ea quæ nunquam in iis diverso modo se habent, ut existentia et duratio in re existente et durante, non qualitates aut modi, sed attributa dici debent."

"As *qualities* help to distinguish not only one soul from another soul, and one body from another body, but (in a more general way) every soul from every body, it follows that *qualities*, by having this common reference to both, are naturally divided into *corporeal* and *incorporeal*."¹

Hutcheson also² reduces all *qualities* to two genera. Thought, — proper to mind. Motion, — proper to matter.

Qualities are distinguished as *essential*, or such as are inseparable from the substance—as thought from mind, or extension from matter; and *non-essential*, or such as we can separate in conception from the substance—as passionateness or mildness from mind, or heat or cold from matter.

"With respect to all kinds of *qualities*, there is one thing to be observed, that some degree of permanence is always requisite; else they are not so properly *qualities* as incidental affections. Thus we call not a man passionate, because he has occasionally been angered, but because he is prone to frequent anger; nor do we say a man is of a pallid or a ruddy complexion, because he is red by immediate exercise or pale by sudden fear, but when that paleness or redness may be called constitutional."³

On the question, historical and critical, as to the distinction of the *qualities* of matter as primary or secondary, see *Reid's Works*, by Sir W. Hamilton.⁴

"Another division of *qualities* is into *natural* and *acquired*. Thus in the mind, docility may be called a *natural quality*; science an *acquired* one: in the human body, beauty may be

¹ Harris, *Phil. Arrange.*, chap. 8.

² *Metaphys.*, part. 1., cap. 5.

³ Harris, *Phil. Arrange.*, chap. 8.

⁴ Note D.

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called a natural *quality*; gentility (good carriage) an acquired one. This distinction descends even to bodies inanimate. To transmit objects of vision is a *quality* natural to crystal; but to enlarge them while transmitted, is a character adventitious. Even the same *quality* may be *natural* in one substance, as attraction in the magnet; and *acquired* in another, as the same attraction in the magnetic bar." ¹—V. ATTRIBUTE, PROPOSITION.

Quality (Occult).—"It was usual with the Peripatetics, when the cause of any phenomena was demanded, to have recourse to their *faculties* or *occult qualities*, and to say, for instance, that bread nourished by its nutritive *faculty* (*quality*); and senna purged by its purgative."²

"Were I to make a division of the *qualities* of bodies as they appear to our senses, I would divide them first into those that are *manifest*, and those that are *occult*. The *manifest qualities* are those which Mr. Locke calls *primary*; such as Extension, Figure, Divisibility, Motion, Hardness, Softness, Fluidity. The nature of these is manifest even to sense; and the business of the philosopher with regard to them is not to find out their nature, which is well known, but to discover the effects produced by their various combinations; and, with regard to those of them which are not essential to matter, to discover their causes as far as he is able.

"The second class consists of *occult qualities*, which may be subdivided into various kinds; as *first*, the *secondary qualities*; *secondly*, the disorders we feel in our own bodies; and *thirdly*, all the *qualities* which we call powers of bodies, whether mechanical, chemical, medical, animal, or vegetable: or if there be any other powers not comprehended under these heads. Of all these the existence is manifest to sense, but the nature is *occult*; and here the philosopher has an ample field."³

QUANTITY (*πόσος*, *quantum*, how much) is defined by mathematicians to be "that which admits of more or less."

"Mathematics contain properly the *doctrine of measure*; and the object of this science is commonly said to be *quantity*;

¹ Harris, *Phil. Arrange.*, chap. 8.

² Hume, *Dial. on Nat. Relig.*, part iv.

³ Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay II. chap. 18; Sir W. Hamilton, *Discussions*, p. 611.

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therefore, *quantity* ought to be defined, *what may be measured*. Those who have defined *quantity* to be *whatever is capable of more or less*, have given too wide a notion of it, which, it is apprehended, has led some persons to apply mathematical reasoning to subjects that do not admit of it. Pain and pleasure admit of various degrees, but who can pretend to measure them?"¹

"According to the common definition, *quantity* is that which is susceptible of augmentation or diminution. But many things susceptible of augmentation or diminution, and that even in a continuous manner, are not *quantities*. A sensation, painful or pleasing, augments or diminishes, and runs through different phases of intensity. But there is nothing in common between a sensation and *quantity*."²

"There are some *quantities* which may be called *proper*, and others *improper*. . . . That *properly* is *quantity* which is *measured by its own kind*; or which, of its own nature, is capable of being doubled or tripled, without taking in any *quantity* of a different kind as a measure of it. *Improper quantity* is that which *cannot be measured by its own kind*; but to which we assign a measure by the means of some proper *quantity*, that is related to it. Thus velocity of motion, when we consider it by itself, cannot be measured." We measure it by the space passed in a given time.³

Quantity (Discrete and Continuous). — "In magnitude and multitude we behold the two primary, the two grand and comprehensive species, into which the *genus* of *quantity* is divided; magnitude, from its union, being called *quantity continuous*; multitude, from its separation, *quantity discrete*. Of the *continuous* kind is every solid; also the bound of every solid; that is, a superficies; and the bound of every superficies, that is, a line; to which may be added those two concomitants of every body, namely, time and place. Of the *discrete* kind are fleets and armies, herds, flocks, the syllables of sounds articulate, &c."⁴

"Discrete *quantity* is that of which the parts have no continuity, as in number. The number, *e. g.*, of inches in a foot

¹ Reid, *Essay on Quantity*.

² Reid, *Essay on Quantity*.

³ *Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*

⁴ Harris. *Phil. Arrange.*, chap. 9.

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rule, is the same whether the solid inches remain continuous, or are cut asunder and flung about the world; but they do not constitute a foot length (which is a continuous *quantity*), unless they are so joined together that the bounding lines of one coincide with those of another. Of *continuous quantities* there are two kinds; one, of which the parts are co-existent, as in extension; another, in which the parts are successive, as in duration. Discrete and continuous *quantities* are sometimes called *multitude* and *magnitude*.¹

According to Derodon² *quantity* is either — 1. *Permanent*, when its parts are together; or 2. *Successive*, when they exist some after others. Time and motion are *quantity successive*. *Permanent quantity* is — 1. *Continuous*, as a line which is length; *superficies*, which is length and breadth; and *mathematical body*, which is length, breadth, and depth. 2. *Discrete*, as number and speech.

Hutcheson³ notices magnitude, time, and number, as three genera of *quantity*.

Quantity is called *discrete* when the parts are not connected, as number; *continuous*, when they are connected, and then it is either *successive*, as time, motion; or *permanent*, which is what is otherwise called space or extension, in length, breadth, and depth; length alone constitutes lines; length and breadth, surfaces; and the three together, solids.⁴—V. PROPOSITION.

QUIDDITY or QUIDITY (*quidditas*, from *quid*, what).—This term was employed in scholastic philosophy as equivalent to the τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι of Aristotle, and denotes what was subsequently called the *substantial form*. It is the answer to the question, What is it? *quid est*? It is that which distinguishes a thing from other things, and makes it what it is, and not another. It is synonymous with essence, and comprehends both the substance and qualities. For qualities belong to substance, and by qualities substance manifests itself. It is the known essence of a thing; or the complement of all that makes us conceive of anything as we conceive of it, as different from any or every other thing.

¹ Fitzgerald, *Notes to Aristotle's Ethics*, 8vo, Dublin, 1850, p. 151.—See Aristotle in *Categor.* c. 6.

² *Phys.* pars 1. cap. 5.

³ *Metaphys.*, part i., cap. 5

⁴ *Part Roy. Log.*, part 1., ch. 2.

QUIETISM (*quies*, rest) "is the doctrine that the highest character of virtue consists in the perpetual contemplation and love of supreme excellence."¹

The two following propositions from Fenelon's *Maxims of the Saints*, were condemned by Innocent XII. in 1699. 1. There is attainable in this life a state of perfection in which the expectation of reward and the fear of punishment have no place. 2. Souls may be so inflamed with love to God, and so resigned to his will, that if they believed that God had condemned them to eternal pain, they would absolutely sacrifice their salvation.

Madame Guyon thought she had learned a method by which souls might be carried to such a state of perfection, that a continual act of contemplation and love might be substituted for all other acts of religion.

A controversy was carried on by Fenelon and Bossuet on the subject. See a dissertation by M. Bonnel, *De la Controverse de Bossuet et Fenelon, sur le Quétisme*;² Upham, *Life of Madame Guyon*.

RACE.—V. SPECIES.

RATIO.—When two subjects admit of comparison with reference to some quality which they possess in common, and which may be measured, this measure is their *ratio*, or the rate in which the one exceeds the other. With this term is connected that of *proportion*, which denotes the *portions*, or parts of one magnitude which are contained in another. In mathematics, the term *ratio* is used for *proportion*; thus, instead of the *proportion* which one thing bears to another, we say, the *ratio* which one bears to the other, meaning its comparative magnitude.

In the following passage *ratio* is used for *reason* or *cause*. "In this consists the *ratio* and essential ground of the gospel doctrine."³—V. REASON.

RATIOCINATION.—"The conjunction of images with affirmations and negations, which make up propositions, and the conjunction of propositions one to another, and illation of conclusions upon them, is *ratiocination* or discourse.

¹ Sumner, *Records of Creation*, vol. II., p. 239.

² Svo, Macon, 1850.

³ Waterland, *Works*, vol. IX., serm. I.

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"Some consecutions are so intimately and evidently connexed to, or found in, the premises, that the conclusion is attained *quasi per saltum*, and without anything of *rationative* process, and as the eye sees its objects immediately and without any previous discourse."¹

"The schoolmen make a third act of the mind which they call *rationation*, and we may style it the generation of a judgment from others actually in our understanding."²

"When from a general proposition, by combining it with other propositions, we infer a proposition of the same degree of generality with itself, or a less general proposition, or a proposition merely individual, the process is *rationation* (or syllogism)."³—*V. REASONING.*

RATIONALE.—"The chairs of theology and philosophy (during the scholastic ages) were the oracular seats from which the doctrines of Aristotle were expounded, as the *rationale* of theological and moral truth."⁴

"There cannot be a body of rules without a *rationale*, and this *rationale* constitutes the science. There were poets before there were rules of poetical composition; but before Aristotle, or Horace, or Boileau, or Pope could write their arts of poetry and criticism, they had considered the reasons on which their precepts rested, they had conceived in their own minds a theory of the art. In like manner there were navigators before there was an art of navigation; but before the art of navigation could teach the methods of finding the ship's place by observations of the heavenly bodies, the science of astronomy must have explained the system of the world."⁵

Anthony Sparrow, bishop of Exeter, is the author of a work entitled, *A Rationale upon the Book of Common Prayer*.⁶—*V. SCIENCE, ART.*

RATIONALISM, in philosophy, is opposed to *sensualism*, *sensuism*, or *sensism*, according to all which, all our knowledge is derived from sense. It is also opposed to *empiricism*, which

¹ Hale, *Prim. Orig. of Mankind*, pp. 50, 51.

² Tucker, *Light of Nature*, vol. 1, part 1, c. 11, sect. 13.

³ Mill, *Log.*, 2d edit., vol. 1, p. 223.

⁴ Hampden, *On Scholastic Philosophy*, lect. 1, p. 9.

⁵ Sir G. C. Lewis, *Method of Observ. in Politics*, chap. 18, sect. 2. 12mo, Lond., 1668.

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refers all our knowledge to sensation and reflection, or experience. According to *rationalism*, reason furnishes certain elements, without which experience is not possible. The philosophy of Condillac is of the former kind,—that of Royer Collard of the latter. The philosophy of Locke and Reid have been contrasted in the same manner, but not quite correctly. —V. SENSISM, SENSUISM, SENSUALISM.

RATIONALISM, in religion, as opposed to *supernaturalism*, means the adoption of reason as our sufficient and only guide, exclusive of tradition and revelation. Spinoza, in his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, tried to explain all that is supernatural in religion by reason. And Strauss and others in modern Germany have carried this line of speculation much farther.

RATIONALISTS.—“The *empirical* philosophers are like pismires; they only lay up and use their store. The *rationalists* are like the spiders; they spin all out of their own bowels. But give me a philosopher, who, like the bee, hath a middle faculty, gathering from abroad, but digesting that which is gathered by his own virtue.”¹

REAL (The).—“There is no arguing from ideal to *real* existence, unless it could first be shown, that such ideas must have their objective *realities*, and cannot be accounted for, as they pass within, except it be by supposing such and such *real* existences, *ad extra*, to answer them.”²

The term *real* always imports the existent. It is used—

1. As denoting the *existent*, as opposed to the *non-existent*. *something*, as opposed to *nothing*.

2. As opposed to the *nominal* or *verbal*, the *thing* to the *name*.

3. As synonymous with *actual*, and thus opposed—1. To *potential*, and 2. To *possible*, existence.

4. As denoting the *absolute* in opposition to the *phenomenal*, things in themselves in opposition to things as they appear to us, relatively to our faculties.

5. As indicating a subsistence in nature in opposition to a representation in thought, *ens reale*, as opposed to *ens rationis*.

¹ Bacon, *Apophtegms*.

² Waterland, *Works*, vol. iv., p. 436

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ô. As opposed to *logical* or *rational*, a thing which in itself, or *really*, *re*, is one, may logically, *ratione*, be considered as diverse or plural, and *vice versa*.¹ — V. **VIRTUAL**.

REALISM, as opposed to *idealism*, is the doctrine that in perception there is an immediate or intuitive cognition of the external object, while according to *idealism* our knowledge of an external world is mediate and representative, *i. e.*, by means of *ideas*. — V. **IDEA**, and **IDEALISM**.²

REALISM, as opposed to *nominalism*, is the doctrine that *genus* and *species* are *real things*, existing independently of our conceptions and expressions; and that as in the case of singular terms, there is some real individual corresponding to each, so, in common terms also, there is something corresponding to each; which is the object of our thoughts, when we employ the term.³

Cousin has said that the Middle Age is but a development of a phrase of Porphyry,⁴ which has been thus translated by Boethius — *Mox de generibus et speciebus illud quidem sive subsistant, sive in solis nudis intellectibus posita sint, sive substantia corporalia sint an incorporalia, et utrum separata a sensibilibus an in sensibilibus posita et citra hæc consistentia, dicere recusabo*. — V. **CONCEPTUALISM**, **NOMINALISM**. — See Chretien, *Log. Meth.*;⁵ Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*.⁶

REASON (*Ratio*, from *reor*, to think). — “The word *reason* in the English language has different significations; sometimes it is taken for true and clear principles; sometimes for clear and fair deductions from these principles; and sometimes for the cause, and particularly the final cause. But the consideration I shall have of it here is in a signification different from all these; and that is, as it stands for a faculty in man, that faculty whereby man is supposed to be distinguished from beasts,⁷ and wherein it is evident he much surpasses them.”

¹ Sir William Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note a.

² *Ibid.*, note c; *Edin. Rev.*, vol. lli., pp. 175-181.

³ Whately, *Log.*, book iv., ch. 5, § 1.

⁴ Ch. 3.

⁵ *Isagoge*, ch. 1.

⁶ Part I., sect. 23.

⁷ La Raison, dans sa définition la plus simple, est la faculté de comprendre, qu'il ne faut pas confondre avec la faculté de connaître. En effet les animaux connaissent ils ne paraissent pas comprendre, et c'est là qu'il les distingue de l'homme. — Jouffroy, *Profil Nat.*, tom. i., p. 38.

⁸ Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book iv., chap. 17.

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"All the operations of the mind when it thinks of the qualities of things separately from the things to which they belong; or when it forms general notions, and employs general terms; or when it judges of the agreement or disagreement of different things; or when it draws inferences; are comprehended under the term *reason*. *Reason* seems chiefly to consist in the power to keep such or such thoughts in the mind; and to change them at pleasure; instead of their flowing through the mind as in dreams: also in the power to see the difference between one thought and another, and so compare, separate, or join them together afresh. Though animals seem to have some little power to perform these operations, man has so much more of it, that he alone is said to be endowed with *reason*."¹

"This word is used to signify—1. All the intellectual powers collectively. 2. Those intellectual powers exclusively in which man differs from brutes. 3. The faculty of carrying on the operation of *reasoning*. 4. The premiss or premises of an argument, especially the minor premiss; and it is from *reason* in this sense that the word *reasoning* is derived. 5. A cause, as when we say that the *reason* of an eclipse of the sun is, that the moon is interposed between it and the earth."²

"In common and popular discourse, *reason* denotes that power by which we distinguish truth from falsehood, and right from wrong; and by which we are enabled to combine means for the attainment of particular ends."³

"*Reason* is used sometimes to express the whole of those powers which elevate man above the brutes, and constitute his rational nature, more especially, perhaps, his intellectual powers; sometimes to express the power of deduction or argumentation."⁴

Considering it as a word denoting a faculty or complement

¹ Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

² The idea of the *reason* is higher than that of cause. The ground or *reason* of all existence, actual or possible, is the existence of God. Had He not existed, nothing could ever have existed. But God is the cause only of such things as he has created in time, while he is the ground or *reason* of everything possible.

³ Whately, *Log.*, Appendix i.

⁴ Stewart, *Elements*, vol. II., chap. 1.

⁵ *Ibid.*, *Outlines*, part II., chap. 1, sect. 6.

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of faculties, Sir W. Hamilton¹ says, "*Reason* has been employed to denote —

"1. Our intelligent nature in general, as distinguished from the lower cognitive faculties, as sense, imagination, and memory; and in contrast to the feelings and desires, including — 1. Conception; 2. Judgment; 3. Reasoning; 4. Intelligence; *νοῦς*.

"2. The right and regular use of our rational faculties.

"3. The dianoetic and noetic functions of *reason*, as by Reid.²

"The dianoetic function or ratiocination, as by Reid in his *Inquiry*.³

"5. The noetic function or common sense. And by Kant and others opposed to the understanding as comprehending the other functions of thought."

REASON (Spontaneity of). — "I call *spontaneity of reason*, the development of *reason* anterior to reflection, the power which *reason* has to seize at first upon truth, to comprehend it and to admit it, without demanding and rendering to itself an account of it."⁴

REASON AND UNDERSTANDING. — "Pure *reason* or *intuition* holds a similar relation to the *understanding* that perception holds to sensation. As sensation reveals only *subjective* facts, while perception involves a direct intuition of the objective world around us; so with regard to higher truths and laws, the *understanding* furnishes *merely* the subjective forms in which they may be logically stated, while *intuition* brings us face to face with the actual matter, or reality of truth itself."⁵

"The faculty of thought manifests itself both as *understanding* and *reason*. By the *understanding* we inquire after and investigate the grounds, causes, and conditions of our representations, feelings, and desires, and of those objects standing in immediate connection with them; by *reason* we inquire

¹ *Reid's Works*, note A, sect. 5.

² *Intell. Pow.*, essay vi., chap. 2.

³ *Introd.*, sect. 3, chap. 2, sect. 5 and 7.

⁴ Cousin, *Hist. of Mod. Philos.*, vol. I., p. 112.

⁵ Morell, *Philos. of Relig.*, p. 19.

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after *ultimate* grounds, causes, and conditions. By the *understanding* we evolve rules for the regulation of our desiring faculty; by *reason* we subordinate these rules to a higher law, to a law which determines the unconditioned form, the highest end of acting. Through the power of thought, therefore, our knowledge, both theoretical and practical, is comprehended in unity, connection, and in being."¹

"By the *understanding*, I mean the faculty of thinking and forming *judgments* on the notices furnished by the sense, according to certain rules existing in itself, which rules constitute its distinct nature. By the pure *reason*, I mean the power by which we become possessed of principles (the eternal verities of Plato and Descartes) and of ideas (*n. b.*, not images), as the ideas of a point, a line, a circle, in mathematics; and of justice, holiness, free-will, &c., in morals. Hence in works of pure science, the definitions of necessity precede the reasoning; in other works they more aptly form the conclusion."²

"The definition and proper character of man—that, namely, which should contradicting him from other animals, is to be taken from his *reason* rather than his *understanding*; in regard that in other creatures there may be something of *understanding*, but there is nothing of *reason*."³

In the philosophy of Kant the *understanding* is distinguished from the *reason* —

1. By the sphere of their action. The sphere of the *understanding* is coincident with the *sensible* world, and cannot transcend it; but the *reason* ascends to the super-sensuous.

2. By the *objects* and results of their exercise. The *understanding* deals with *conceptions*, the *reason* with *ideas*. The knowledge obtained by the *understanding* is particular and contingent, the product of the *reason* is necessary and universal knowledge or truth.⁴

"The faculty which combines the simple perceptions, and so gives the knowledge of the complex objects, has been called the *understanding*. It is an energy of the mind as intelligent.

¹ Tenneman, *Grundriss*, sect. 41.

² Coleridge, *Friend*, pp. 150, 161.

³ Harrington, quoted in *Aids to Reflection*, vol. 1., p. 162.

⁴ *Crit. of Pure Reason*, see English translation, pp. 7, 20, 57, 268, 7, 277, *Prolegomena*, sect. 59. See also Morell, *Philos. of Relig.*, chap. 2; and *Philos. Tendencies*, p. 71; Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*.

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It is an ultimate fact of knowledge, that the mind is conscious of itself as unity, of the world as diversity. The outward world is seen as diverse through the various sensations, but is bound in certain relations — those of space — which are independent of the perceiving subject. The mind requires a cause external to itself, of the constant representation of unity in diversity, no less than of the representation of different qualities. The *reason*, therefore, in virtue of its causal principle, refers these relations to the object. Precisely as the intelligence refers the single perception to an external cause, so it refers the combination of perceptions to one object. The *understanding* is thus the same faculty with the *reason*, but in certain particular applications.”¹

“The assertion of a faculty of the mind by which it apprehends truth, which faculty is higher than the discursive *reason*, as the truth apprehended by it is higher than mere demonstrative truth, agrees with the doctrine taught and insisted on by the late Samuel Taylor Coleridge. And so far as he was the means of inculcating this doctrine, which is the doctrine of Plato, and, I might add, of Aristotle, and of many other philosophers, let him have due honour. But in his desire to impress the doctrine upon men’s minds, he combined it with several other tenets, which will not bear examination. He held that the two faculties by which these two kinds of truth are apprehended, and which our philosophical writers call the *intuitive reason*, and the *discursive reason*, may be called, and ought to be called respectively, the *reason* and the *understanding*; and that the second of these is of the nature of the *instinct* of animals, so as to be something intermediate between *reason* and *instinct*. These opinions, I may venture to say, are altogether erroneous. The *intuitive reason* and the *discursive reason* are not, by any English writers, called the *reason* and the *understanding*; and accordingly, Coleridge has had to alter all the passages, viz., those taken from Leighton, Harrington, and Bacon, from which his exposition proceeds. The *understanding* is so far from being especially the discursive or reasoning faculty, that it is, in universal usage, and by our best writers, *opposed* to the discursive or reasoning faculty. Thus

¹ E. A. Thomson, *Christian Theism*, book i., chap. 3.

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this is expressly declared by Sir John Davies in his poem 'On the Immortality of the Soul.' He says of the soul:—

'When she *rules* things, and moves from ground to ground,
The name of *reason* (*ratio*) she acquires from this,
But when by *reason* she the truth hath found,
And standeth fixt, she *understanding* is.'

"Instead of the *reason* being fixed, and the *understanding* discursive, as Mr. Coleridge says, the *reason* is distinctively discursive; that is, it obtains conclusions by running from one point to another. This is what is meant by *discursus*; or taking the full term, *discursus rationis*, *discourse of reason*. *Understanding* is fixed, that is, it dwells upon one view of a subject, and not upon the steps by which that view is obtained. The verb to *reason* implies the substantive, the *reason*, though it is not co-extensive with it; for, as I have said, there is the intuitive *reason* as well as the discursive *reason*. But it is by the faculty of *reason* that we are capable of reasoning; though undoubtedly the practice or the pretence of reasoning may be carried so far as to seem at variance with *reason* in the more familiar sense of the term; as is the case also in French. . . Molière's Crisale says (in the *Femmes Savantes*) -

'Raisonner est l'emploi de toute ma maison
Et le raisonnement en bannit la *Raison*.'

"If Mr. Coleridge's assertion were true that the *understanding* is the discursive and the *reason* the fixed faculty, we should be justified in saying that *the understanding is the faculty by which we reason, and the reason is the faculty by which we understand*. But this is not so. . . .

"Mr. Coleridge's object in his speculations is nearly the same as Plato's, viz., to declare that there is a truth of a higher kind than can be obtained by mere reasoning; and also to claim, as portions of this higher truth, certain fundamental doctrines of morality. Among these Mr. Coleridge places the authority of conscience, and Plato the supreme good. Mr. Coleridge also holds, as Plato held, that the *reason* of man in its highest and most comprehensive form, is a portion of a supreme and universal *reason*; and leads to truth, not in virtue of its special attributes in each person, but by its own nature.

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"The view thus given of that higher kind of knowledge which Plato and Aristotle place above ordinary science, as being the knowledge of and faculty of learning first principles, will enable us to explain some expressions which might otherwise be misunderstood. Socrates, in the concluding part of the Sixth Book of the *Republic*, says, that this kind of knowledge is 'that of which the *reason* (λόγος) takes hold,' *in virtue of its power of reasoning*.' Here we are plainly not to understand that we arrive at first principles by *reasoning*; for the very opposite is true, and is here taught, viz., that first principles are not what we *reason to*, but what we *reason from*. The meaning of this passage plainly is, that first principles are those of which the *reason* takes hold *in virtue of its power of reasoning*; they are the conditions which must exist in order to make any reasoning possible; they are the propositions which the *reason* must involve implicitly, in order that we may *reason* explicitly; they are the intuitive roots of the dialectical power.

"Plato's views may be thus exhibited:—

	Intelligible World, νοητόν.		Visible World, ὁρατόν.	
Object.....	Ideas. ἰδέαι.	Conceptions. διδόξα.	Things. ζῶα, κ.τ.λ.	Images. εἰκόνες.
Process....	Intuition. νόησις.	Demonstration. ἐπιστήμη.	Belief. πίστις.	Conjecture. εἰκασία.
Faculties.	Intuitive Reason. νοῦς.	Discursive Reason. λόγος.	Sensation. αἰσθησις.	

From a paper by Dr. Whewell, *On the Intellectual Powers according to Plato*.¹—V. UNDERSTANDING.

Reason (Impersonal).—*Reason*, according to Cousin and other French philosophers, is the faculty by which we have knowledge of the infinite and the absolute, and is *impersonal*.

"*Licet enim intellectus meus sit individuus et separatus ab*

¹ τῇ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ὁρμήν.

² In the Cambridge *Philos. Trans.*, 1855.

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intellectu tuo, tamen secundum quod est individuus non habet universale in ipso, et ideo non individuatur id quod est in intellectu. . . . Sic igitur universale ut universale est ubique et semper idem omnino et idem in animabus omnium, non recipiens individuationem ab animu."

These words are quoted from Averhøes, by Mons. Haureau,¹ who exclaims, "Voilà la thèse de l'intelligence ou de la *raison impersonnelle*!" But the truth is, that the root and germ of this doctrine may be found in the doctrine of Plato, that human *reason* is a ray of the Divine *reason*.

"He the great Father! kindled at one flame
The world as rational — one spirit pour'd
From spirit's awful fountain, poured Himself
Through all their souls, but not in equal stream:
Profuse or frugal of the inspiring God,
As His wise plan demanded; and when past
Their various trials in their common spheres
(If they continue rational as made)
Resorbs them all into himself again,
His throne their centre, and His smile their crown."—YOUNG.

"In truth," observes Fenelon,² "*my reason* is in myself, for it is necessary that I should continually turn inward upon myself in order to find it; but the higher *reason* which corrects me when I need it, and which I consult, is not my own, it does not specially make a part of myself. Thus, that which may seem most our own, and to be the foundation of our being, I mean our *reason*, is that which we are to believe most borrowed. We receive at every moment a *reason* superior to our own, just as we breathe an air which is not ourselves. There is an internal school, where man receives what he can neither acquire outwardly for himself, nor learn of other men who live by alms like himself."

"While we reflect on our own idea of *reason*, we know that our souls are not it, but only partake of it; and that we have it *κατὰ μέθεξιν*, and not *κατὰ οὐσίαν*. Neither can it be called a faculty, but rather a light, which we enjoy, but the source of which is not in ourselves, nor rightly by any individual to be denominated *mine*."³

¹ In his *Examen de la Philos. Scolastique*, tom. i., p. 69.

² *Existence of God*, chap. iv., sect. 3.

³ John Smith. *Posthumous Tracts*, 1660. See Coleridge, *Liter. Rem.*, vol. iii., p. 464.

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"*Reason* is impersonal in its nature," says Cousin,¹ "it is not we who make it. It is so far from being individual, that its peculiar characteristics are the opposite of individuality, viz., universality and necessity; since it is to *reason* that we owe the knowledge of universal and necessary truths, of principles which we all obey and cannot but obey." . . . "It descends from God and approaches man; it makes its appearance in the consciousness as a guest who brings intelligence of an unknown world, of which it at once presents the idea and awakens the want. If *reason* were personal it would have no value, no authority beyond the limits of the individual subject. . . . *Reason* is a revelation, a necessary and universal revelation which is wanting to no man, and which enlightens every man on his coming into the world. *Reason* is the necessary mediator between God and man, the λόγος of Pythagoras and Plato, the Word made flesh, which serves as the interpreter of God, and the teacher of man, divine and human at the same time. It is not, indeed, the absolute God in his majestic individuality, but his manifestation in spirit and in truth; it is not the Being of beings, but it is the revealed God of the human race."²

"*Reason* or intelligence is not individual, is not ours, is not even human; it is absolute, it is divine. What is personal to us is our free and voluntary activity; what is not free and not voluntary is adventitious to man, and does not constitute an integrant part of his individuality. Intelligence is conversant with truth; truth as necessary and universal is not the creature of my volition; and *reason*, which, as the subject of truth is also universal and necessary, is consequently impersonal. We see, therefore, by a light which is not ours; and *reason* is a revelation of God in man. The ideas of which we are conscious belong not to us, but to absolute intelligence." — Sir Will. Hamilton,³ giving the views of Cousin.

This doctrine of the impersonal *reason* is regarded by Bouillier⁴ and others as the true ground of all certainty. Admit the personality of *reason* and man becomes the measure of all

¹ *Expos. of Eclecticism*, translated by Ripley, p. 69.

² *Ibid.*, p. 78.

³ *Discussions*, &c., 8vo, Lond., 1852, p. 8.

⁴ *Theorie de la Raison impersonnelle*, 8vo, Paris, 1848.

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things—truth is individual. But the truths of *reason* are universal. No one, says Malebranche, can feel the pain which I feel; but any one or every one can contemplate the truth which I know. The scepticism of Kant, as to the relative nature of our knowledge, is thus demolished.

REASON (Determining or Sufficient).—“There are two great principles of reasoning: the one is the *principle of contradiction*, which means that of two contradictory propositions, the one is true, the other false: the other is the principle of *raison déterminante*, which is that nothing happens without a cause, or at least a *reason* determining, that is, something which may serve to render a *reason à priori*, why that thing is as it is rather than otherwise.”¹

“Nothing is done without a *sufficient reason*, that is, nothing happens without its being possible to him who knew things sufficiently to render a *reason* which is sufficient to determine why it is so, and not otherwise.”²—*V. SUFFICIENT REASON.*

REASONING, “in one of its acceptations, means syllogising, or the mode of inference which may be called concluding from generals to particulars. In another of its senses, to reason is simply to infer any assertion, from assertions already admitted: and in this sense induction is as much entitled to be called *reasoning* as the demonstrations of geometry. Writers on Logic have generally preferred the former acceptation of the term; the latter and more extensive signification is that in which I mean to use it.”³

“*Reasoning* is that operation of the mind through which it forms one judgment from many others; as when, for instance, having judged that true virtue ought to be referred to God, and that the virtue of the heathens was not referred to him, we thence conclude that the virtue of the heathens was not true virtue.”⁴

“Some appear to include under the title of *reasoning* every case in which a person believes one thing in consequence of his believing another thing, however far he may be from having any grounds to warrant the inference; and they ac-

¹ Leibnitz. *Theodicee*, partie 1, sect. 44.

² Ibid., *Principes de la Nat. et de la Grace*, sect. 7.

³ Mill, *Log.*, 2d edit. vol. 1., p. 3.

⁴ Port Roy. *Log.*

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cordingly include those processes which take place in the minds of infants and of brutes; which are apt to *associate* with the appearance of an object before them the remembered impression of something that formerly accompanied it. Such a process is attended to in the familiar proverbs that 'a burnt child dreads the fire;' or, as it is expressed in another form, 'the scalded cat fears cold water;' or again in the Hebrew proverb, 'he who has been bitten by a serpent is afraid of a rope.' Most logical writers, however, have confined the name of *reasoning* to *valid* argument; which cannot exist without a universal premiss, implied, if not expressed."¹

Mr. Stewart says that to adapt means to a proximate end is to *reason*.

RECOLLECTION.—V. REMEMBRANCE.

RECTITUDE.—"Rectitude of conduct is intended to express the term *κατόρθωσις*, which Cicero translates *recta effectio*: *κατόρθωμα* he translates *rectum factum*.² Now the definition of *κατόρθωμα* was *νόμον πρόσταγμα*, 'A thing commanded by law' (that is, by the law of nature, the universal law). Antoninus, speaking of the *reasoning* faculty, how, without looking farther, it rests contented in its own energies, adds, 'for which reason are all actions of this species called *rectitudes* (*κατορθώσεις, κατὰ ὁρὸς*, right onwards), as denoting the directness of their progression right onwards."³

"Goodness in actions is like unto *straightness*; wherefore that which is done well we term *right*, for as the *straight* way is most acceptable to him that travelleth, because by it he cometh soonest to his journey's end: so in action, that which doth lye the evenest between us and the end we desire, must needs be the fittest for our use."⁴

If a term is to be selected to denote that in action and in disposition of which the Moral Faculty approves, perhaps the most precise and appropriate is *rectitude* or *rightness*. Dr. Adams⁵ has remarked, "The man who acts *virtuously* is said to act *rightly*. This appears more proper than to say that he acts *according to truth*; and more clear and distinct than to

¹ Whately, *Log.* Introd. 4.

² Harris, *Dialogue on Happiness*, p. 73, note.

³ *Sermon on the Nature and Obligation of Virtue*.

⁴ *De Fin.*, lib. iii., cap. 4.

⁵ Hooker, *Eccles. Pol.*, b. I., a. 8.

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say that he acts *according to the nature and reason of things*; the meaning of which will, in all cases, be found to be only this—that he acts according to what reason, in the present circumstances of the agent, and the relation he stands in to the objects before him, pronounces to be right.” In like manner, Dr. Reid¹ has said, “Prudence is a virtue, benevolence is a virtue; but the essence and formal nature of virtue must lie in something that is common to all these, and to every other virtue. And this, I conceive, can be nothing else but the *rectitude of such conduct and turpitude of the contrary*, which is discerned by a good man. And so far only he is virtuous as he pursues the former and avoids the latter.” *Rectitude*, then, is that in action and in disposition of which the moral faculty approves. The contrary of what is *right* is *wrong*. *Rightness* and *wrongness*, then, are the characteristics of action and disposition, as contemplated by the moralist. So that the *foundation of morals*, the ground upon which moral distinctions are taken, is in the essential difference between what is *right* and what is *wrong*.

“There are other phrases which have been used, which I see no reason for adopting, such as, *acting contrary to the relations of things—contrary to the reason of things—to the fitness of things—to the truth of things—to absolute fitness*. These phrases have not the authority of common use, which, in matters of language, is great. They seem to have been invented by some authors with a view to explain the nature of vice; but I do not think they answer that end. If intended as definitions of vice, they are improper; because, in the most favourable sense they can bear, they extend to every kind of foolish and absurd conduct, as well as to that which is vicious.”²

But what is *rectitude* or *rightness* as the characteristic of an action? According to Price and others, this term denotes a simple and primitive idea, and cannot be explained. It might as well be asked, what is *truth*, as the characteristic of a proposition? It is a capacity of our rational nature to see and acknowledge truth; but we cannot define what truth is. We call it the conformity of our thoughts with the reality of things.

¹ *Act. Pbw.*, essay v., chap. 5.

² *Ibid.*, essay v., ch. 7.

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But it may be doubted how far this explanation makes the nature of truth more intelligible. In like manner, some explain *rectitude* by saying that it consists in a congruity between an action and the relations of the agent. It is the idea we form of an action, when it is, in every way, conformable to the relations of the agent and the circumstances in which he is placed. On contemplating such an action, we approve of it, and feel that if we were placed in such circumstances, and in such relations, we should be under an obligation to perform it. Now the circumstances and relations in which man is placed arise from his nature and from the nature of things in general: and hence it has been said, that *rectitude is founded in the nature and fitness of things*; that is, an action is right when it is fit or suitable to all the relations and circumstances of the agent; and of this fitness conscience or reason is the judge. Conscience or reason does not constitute the relations; these must arise from the nature of man and the nature of things; but conscience or reason judges and determines as to the conformity of actions to these relations; and these relations arising necessarily from the very nature of things, the conformity with them which constitutes *rectitude*, is said to be *eternal and immutable*.—V. RIGHT.

REDINTEGRATION.—V. TRAIN OF THOUGHT.

REDUCTION IN LOGIC.—The first figure of syllogism is called *perfect*; because, 1. It proceeds directly on the *Dictum*, and, 2. It arranges the terms in the most natural order. All arguments may be, in one way or other, brought into some one of the four moods in the first figure: and a syllogism is, in that case, said to be reduced (*i. e.*, to the first figure). These four are called the *perfect moods*, and all the rest *imperfect*. The mood to be reduced is called the *reducend*, and that to which it is reduced the *reduct*. Reduction is of two kinds. 1. *Direct or ostensive*, which consists in bringing the premisses of the *reducend* to a corresponding mood in the first figure, by transposition or conversion of the premisses, and from the premisses thus changed deducing either the original conclusion, or one from which it follows by conversion. 2. *Indirect, or reductio per impossibile* or *ad absurdum*, by which we prove (in the first

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figure) not, directly, that the original conclusion is *true*, but that it *cannot be false*; i. e., that an absurdity would follow from the supposition of its being false.¹

REFLECTION (*re-flecto*, to bend back).—"By *reflection* I would be understood to mean that notice which the mind takes of its own operations, and the manner of them; by reason whereof there come to be ideas of these operations in the understanding. Those two, viz.,—external material things, as the objects of *sensation*; and the operations of our own minds within, as the objects of *reflection*, are to me the only originals from whence all our ideas take their beginnings. The term operations here I use in a large sense, as comprehending not barely the actions of the mind about its ideas, but some sort of passions arising sometimes from them, such as in the satisfaction or uneasiness arising from any thought."²

"When we make our own thoughts and passions, and the various operations of our minds, the objects of our attention, either while they are present, or when they are recent and fresh in our memory, this act of the mind is called *reflection*."³

He⁴ gives a more extensive (but less proper) signification to *reflection*.

Attention is the energy of the mind directed towards things present. *Reflection* has to do with things past and the ideas of them. *Attention* may employ the organs of the body. *Reflection* is purely a mental operation. It is not a simple act. In *reflection* we may analyze and compound, abstract and generalize. These operations of mind so arranged as to gain some end, constitute a method. And a method is just the act of *reflecting* or properly employing the energies of the mind on the objects of its knowledge.

"*Reflection* creates nothing—can create nothing; everything exists previous to *reflection* in the consciousness, but everything pre-exists there in confusion and obscurity; it is the

¹ Whately, *Log.*, b. II., ch. 3, §§ 5, 6.

² Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book II., chap. 1.

³ Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay I., chap. 2. Also chap. 5, and essay VI.

⁴ *Ibid.*, essay III., chap. 5. Also essay VI., chap. 1.

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work of *reflection* in adding itself to consciousness, to illuminate that which was obscure, to develop that which was enveloped. *Reflection* is for consciousness what the microscope and the telescope are for the natural sight: neither of these instruments makes or changes the objects; but in examining them on every side, in penetrating to their centre, these instruments illuminate them, and discover to us their characters and their laws."¹—*V. OBSERVATION, SPECULATION.*

REFLEX SENSES.—*V. SENSE, IDEA.*

REGULATIVE (German, *Regulativ*) does not *à priori* determine how something must be or is to be, but how something must be sought.—*V. CONSTITUTIVE.*

RELATION (*re-fero, relatum*, to bear back).—"When the mind so considers one thing that it does as it were bring it to and set it by another, and carries its view from one to the other, this is, as the words import, *relation* and *respect*; and the denominations given to positive things, intimating that respect, and serving as marks to lead the thoughts beyond the subject itself denominated to something distinct from it, are what we call *relatives*; and the things so brought together *related*. Thus, when the mind considers Caius as such a positive being, it takes nothing into that idea but what really exists in Caius; *v. g.*, when I consider him as a man, I have nothing in my mind but the complex idea of the species man. So, likewise, when I say Caius is a white man, I have nothing but the bare consideration of a man who hath that white colour. But when I give Caius the name husband, I intimate some other person; and when I give him the name whiter, I intimate some other thing; in both cases my thought is led to something beyond Caius, and there are two things brought into consideration."² The two things thus brought into consideration are called *relatives* or *correllatives*, as father and son, husband and wife.

"In all *relation* there must be a subject whence it commences, as *snow*; another where it terminates, as a *swan*; the *relation* itself, *similitude*; and lastly, the source of that *rela-*

¹ Cousin, *Hist. of Mod. Phil.*, vol. 1., p. 275.

² Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., chap. 25.

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tion, whiteness; the swan is related to the snow by both of them being *white*.”¹

This is called predicamental *relation*, and forms one of the categories (*πρὸς τι*) of Aristotle.

“Any sort of connection which is perceived or imagined between two or more things; or any comparison which is made by the mind, is a *relation*. When we look at these two lines ————— we do not merely think of them separately, as *this* straight line and *that* straight line; but they are immediately connected together by a comparison which takes place in the mind as soon as they meet the eye. We perceive that these two lines are alike; they are both straight; and we call the notion that is formed by the comparison, the *relation of sameness*. We may then think of them as the same in length; this comparison gives us the notion which we call the *relation of equality*. We think of them again as equally distant from each other, from end to end, and then we say they are *parallel* lines; this word *parallel* represents nothing existing in the lines themselves, but only the notion formed by measuring the distance between them. All these notions spring up in the mind from the comparison of the two objects; they belong entirely to the *mind*, and do not exist in the things themselves.”²

“Another way,” says Dr. Reid,³ “in which we get the notion of *relations* (which seems not to have occurred to Mr. Locke), is when, by attention to one of the related objects, we perceive or judge that it must, from its nature, have a certain *relation* to something else, which before, perhaps, we never thought of; and thus our attention to one of the related objects produces the notion of a correlate, and of a certain *relation* between them. Thus, when I attend to colour, figure, weight, I cannot help judging these to be qualities which cannot exist without a substance; that is, something which is coloured, figured, heavy. If I had not perceived such things to be qualities, I should never have had any notion of their subject, or of their *relation* to it. By attending to the operations of thinking, memory, reasoning, we perceive or judge that there

¹ Harris, *Phil. Arrange.*, chap. 16.

² Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

³ *Intell. Pow.*, essay vi., chap. 2.

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must be something which thinks, remembers, and reasons, which we call the mind. When we attend to any change that happens in nature, judgment informs us that there must be a cause of this change which had power to produce it; and thus we get the notions of cause and effect, and of the *relation* between them. When we attend to body, we perceive that it cannot exist without space; hence we got the notion of space (which is neither an object of sense nor of consciousness), and of the *relation* which bodies have to a certain portion of unlimited space, as their place."— See also Reid.¹ Buffier calls *relation*, in this view, *Occasio quam præbet objectum cogitandi de alio*.— *V. SUGGESTION*.

Although *relations* are not real entities, but merely mental modes of viewing things, let it be observed that our ideas of *relation* are not vague nor arbitrary, but are determined by the known qualities of the related objects. We cannot at will see *relations* for which there is no foundation in the nature of the related objects. Of all *relations*, the *relations* of number are the clearest and most accurately appreciated.

RELATIVE is opposed to *absolute*— *q. v.*— *V. TERM*.

RELIGION (*relego, religo*).— This word, according to Cicero,² is derived from, or rather compounded of, *re* and *legere*, to read over again, to reflect upon or to study the sacred books in which *religion*, is delivered. According to Lactantius,³ it comes from *re-ligare*, to bind back— because *religion* is that which furnishes the true ground of obligation. St. Augustine⁴ gives the same derivation of the word. But he gives another origin of it,⁵ where he says, "*Deum, qui fons est nostræ beatitudinis, et omnis desiderii nostri finis, eligentes, immo potius religentes, amiseramus enim negligentes; hunc, inquam, religentes, unde et religio dicta est, ad eum dilectione tendamus, ut perveniendo quiescamus.*"

"As it is natural for man to review the train of his past actions, it is not incredible that the word *religion* is derived from *relegere*; and that its primary reference is to that activity of conscience which leads us to review the past actions of our lives."⁶

¹ *Inquiry*, chap. 1, sect. 7.

² *Div. Instit.*, 4.

³ *De Civit. Dei*, lib. x., c. 8

⁴ *De Nat. Deorum*, li., 28.

⁵ *De Vera. Relig.*, c. 55.

⁶ *Gellius, Noct. Atticæ*, Nc. 9.

RELIGION —

"*Religio*, according to its primary signification, is perpetually thoughtful, save in regard to some object affecting the conscience."¹

Müller, Professor of Theology at Bale, published a *Dissertation* on this word in 1834.

Religion is distinguished into natural and revealed, or that knowledge of God and of our duty which is derived from the light of nature or reason—and that knowledge of God and of our duty which comes to us from positive revelation.

The epithet natural (or physical) has been objected to as applied to *religion*, inasmuch as all knowledge of God is supersensuous.—*V. THEOLOGY.*

In all forms of *religion* there is one part, which may be called the doctrine or dogma, which is to be received by faith; and the *cultus*, or worship, which is the outward expression or mode of manifesting the religious sentiment.

REMEMBRANCE, REMINISCENCE, RECOLLECTION (*recolligo*, to gather together again; or *reminiscor*, to remember).

—"The perception which actually accompanies, and is annexed to any impression on the body, made by an external object, furnishes the mind with a distinct idea, which we call sensation; which is, as it were, the actual entrance of any idea into the understanding by the senses. The same idea, when it again recurs without the operation of the like object on the external sensory, is *remembrance*; if it be sought after by the mind, and with pain and endeavour found and brought again into view, it is *recollection*; if it be held there long under attentive consideration, it is *contemplation*."²

"In other cases, the various particulars which compose our stock of knowledge are *recalled* in consequence of an effort of our will. This latter operation, too, is often called by the same name (memory), but is more properly distinguished by the word *recollection*."³

"*Reminiscence* is the act of recovering, and *recollection* the act of combining *remembrances*. Those eminences to which we attach the subordinate parts of an object come first into

¹ Donaldson, *Varronianus*, p. 407, 2d edit.

² Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understanding*, book II., chap. 19.

³ Stewart, *Elements*, chap. 6, sect. 1.

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reminiscence; when the intervening portions present themselves in order, the *recollection* is complete."¹

REMINISCENCE.—Memory is knowledge of some former consciousness. *Reminiscence* is the act by which we endeavour to recall and reunite former states of consciousness. It is a kind of reasoning by which we ascend from a present consciousness to a former, and from that to a more remote, till the whole facts of some case are brought again back to us. It is peculiar to man, while memory, as spontaneous, is shared by the brutes. "When we have a *reminiscence*," said Aristotle,² "we reason to the effect that we formerly experienced some impression of such or such a kind, so that in having a *reminiscence* we syllogise."

"There is yet another kind of discussion, beginning with the appetite to recover something lost, proceeding from the present backward, from thought of the place where we miss at, to the thought of the place from whence we came last; and from the thought of that to the thought of a place before, till we have in our mind some place, wherein we had the thing we miss: and this is called *reminiscence*."³—**V. CONTEMPLATION, MEMORY, RETENTION.**

REMINISCENCE according to Plato.

"Plato imagined, after more ancient philosophers, that every man is born with a certain *reminiscence*, and that when we seem to be taught we are only put in mind of what we knew in a former state."⁴

The term employed by Plato was ἀνάμνησις, which may be translated "knowing up." He did not apply it to every kind or degree of knowledge, but to that spontaneous movement of the mind by which it ascended from mere opinion (δόξα) to science (ἐπιστήμη). On such occasions the appearances of truth and beauty suggested or evolved the ideas of the true and the beautiful; which seemed to belong to the soul and to have been formerly known. There was a stirring up or calling into act what was in the soul potentially. That they had been known in that former state of existence which Plato, in a

¹ Taylor, *Synonyms*.

² *De Mem. et Reminiscencia*, c. 2.

³ Hobbes, *Hum. Nat.*, chap. 4.

⁴ Bolingbroke, essay ii., *Presumption of Philosophers*.

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myth, represented the soul to have enjoyed, and were now merely recalled or remembered, is the view commonly given.¹ But what Plato meant more specially to intimate by the use of this word was, that all science or certainty is intuitive, and belongs to the reason, which gives knowledge in the last and highest degree. Conjecture (*εἰσασία*), belief (*πίστις*), which, when conjoined, give opinion (*δόξα*), and reasoning (*διάνοια*), which are the other degrees of knowledge, according to Plato, being unable to give ground for science or certainty.²

Olympiodorus, in a Commentary on the *Phædo* of Plato, quoted by Harris,³ says:—"Inasmuch as the soul, by containing the principles of all beings, is a sort of omniform representation or exemplar; when it is roused by objects of sense it recollects those principles which it contains within, and brings them forth."

"Plato, it is believed, proposed his theory of *reminiscence* as a sort of allegory, signifying the power which the mind has to draw from itself, on occasion of perceptions, universal ideas, and the manner in which it rises to them resembling the manner in which is awakened all at once within us the remembrance of what we have dreamed."⁴

It was in the same sense that Socrates called himself a midwife of the mind. He assisted in bringing to the birth truths with which the mind was big and in labour. He unfolded what was infolded.

Boethius⁵ says, the mind by teaching is only excited to know. And Aquinas, *De Magistro*, says, "*Omnis disciplina fit ex pre-existente cognitione. . . . Ex homine docente certitudinem scientiæ non acciperemus, nisi inesset nobis certitudo principiorum.*"

According to Mons. Chastel,⁶ Thomas Aquinas in his treatise, *De Magistro*, maintains the following points:—

1. To the acquisition of science you must admit as pro-

¹ Cicero, *Tuscul.*, i., 24.

² Heusle, *Init. Philosoph.*, Platon., 8vo, 1827, tom. i., pp. 33, 34.

³ *Hermes*, p. 282.

⁴ *Manuel de Philosophie*, 8vo, Paris, 1846, p. 139.

⁵ *De Consol.*

⁶ *Les Rationalistes et les Traditionalistes*, 12mo, Paris, 1850, p. 150.

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existent in us the knowledge of general principles, evident of themselves, and all those notions which the mind frames immediately to itself by the aid of the first sensations; for all teaching supposes, in him who learns, some anterior knowledge.

2. But these first-truths, conditions pre-requisite for all teaching, these general principles, these principles which are native and not taught, are known to us by that light of reason which God hath put in us as the image of that uncreated truth which is reflected in our mind. They are given to us by nature as the germ of all the cognitions to which we ultimately attain.

There are certain notions of which it is impossible for a man to be ignorant.

3. It is from these principles, known in advance, that he who teaches should set out with us, to teach us other truths connected with these. His teaching consists in showing us this connection. Properly speaking, it is the knowledge of these principles and not teaching which gives us secondary knowledge, although teaching is the mediate cause. It would be impossible for us to learn of a man the knowledge which he wishes to teach us, if there were not in us beforehand those principles to which he connects his knowledge; and all the certainty of that knowledge comes to us from the certainty of those principles, and ultimately from God, who has given us the light of reason to know them.

4. Thus the knowledge of first principles is not from teaching, although teaching may give secondary truths connected with them.

5. But these secondary truths we receive or reject according to their conformity with the truth that is in us.

6. Of these secondary truths which teaching gives, there are many which the mind may discover by its own force, as there are many diseases which cure themselves.

Augustine also has a treatise, *De Magistro*, in which, from a different point of view, he comes to conclusions substantially the same. "The certainty of science comes to us from God, who has given to us the light of reason. For it is by this light that we know principles, and it is from principles that we

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derive the certainty of science. And yet it is true, in a certain sense, that man produces in us knowledge. The pupil, if interrogated before teaching, could answer as to those principles by aid of which all teaching proceeds; but he could not answer upon those things which are taught, which are the consequences of those principles. So that he does not learn principles but only the consequences of them.

D'Alembert, as quoted by Mr. Stewart,¹ says, "It should seem that everything we learn from a good metaphysical book is only a sort of *reminiscence* of what the mind previously knew.

Sir Walter Scott and others have alluded to a mental affection which they designate the sense of pre-existence. When the mind is in this state the scenes and events which are present and passing appear to have formerly been objects of consciousness.²

On the *Reminiscence* of Plato, see Piccolomineus.³

REPRESENTATIVE.—V. KNOWLEDGE.

RESERVATION or RESTRICTION (as it is called by casuists) has reference to the duty of speaking what is true; and is distinguished as *real* and *mental*.

Real Restriction takes place when the words used are not true if strictly interpreted, but there is no deviation from truth if the circumstances be considered. One man asks another, Have you dined? and the answer given is, No. The party giving this answer has dined, times without number. But his answer is restricted by the circumstances to *to-day*; and in that sense is true.

Mental Restriction or Reservation consists in saying so far what is true, and to be believed, but adding mentally some qualification which makes it not to be true. A debtor asked by his creditor for payment of his debt, says,—“I will certainly pay you to-morrow” adding to himself—“in part,” whereas the words audibly uttered referred to the whole amount.

There was published in 12mo, Lond., 1851, *A Treatise of*

¹ Vol. II., p. 23.

² See quotations and references on this curious phenomenon in *Notes and Queries* 17th January, 1857, p. 50.

³ *Philosoph. De Moribus*. Francof., 1683, p. 410.

RESERVATION —

Equivocation, from a MS. in the Bodleian Library, written about 1600. It was referred to in the trials on the Gunpowder Plot.

The following occurs at p. 17: — "A farmer hath come to sell corn. He selleth all that he can sell, because he reserveth the rest for his own necessary use. Then cometh one and desireth to buy corn. He may truly say, and swear (if it be needful) that he hath none; for the circumstance of the person interpreteth the meaning to be that he hath none to sell." — This is *Reservation* or *Restriction*, rather than *Equivocation*.

At p. 29: — "If I be asked whether such a one be in my house, who is there indeed, I may answer in Latin, '*Non est hic*,' meaning he doth not *eat* in my house." — This is *Equivocation* — *q. v.*

RETENTION (*retineo*, to keep hold of).

"The power of reproduction (into consciousness) supposes a power of *retention* (out of consciousness). To this conservative power I confine exclusively the term *Memory*."¹

"There seems good reason for confining the appellation of memory to the simple power of *retention*, which undoubtedly must be considered as an original aptitude of mind, irresolvable into any other. The power of recalling the preserved impressions seems on the other hand rightly held to be only a modified exercise of the suggestive or reproductive faculty."²
— *V. MEMORY*.

RIGHT. — "*Right* and *duty* are things very different, and have even a kind of opposition; yet they are so related that the one cannot even be conceived without the other; and he that understands the one must understand the other. They have the same relation which credit has to debt. As all credit supposes an equivalent debt, so all *right* supposes a corresponding *duty*. There can be no credit in one party without an equivalent debt in another party; and there can be no *right* in one party, without a corresponding *duty* in another party. The sum of credit shows the sum of debt; and the sum of men's *rights* shows, in like manner, the sum of their *duty* to one another.

¹ Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 912.

² Dr. Tulloch, *Theism*, p. 206.

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"The word *right* has a very different meaning, according as it is applied to actions or to persons. A *right* action (*rectum*) is an action agreeable to our duty. But when we speak of the *rights of men* (*jus*), the word has a very different, and a more artificial meaning. It is a term of art in law, and signifies all that a man may lawfully do, all that he may lawfully possess and use, and all that he may lawfully claim of any other person.

"We can be at no loss to perceive the *duties* corresponding to the several kinds of *rights*. What I have a *right* to do, it is the *duty* of all men not to hinder me from doing. What is my property or real *right*, no man ought to take from me; or to molest me in the use and enjoyment of it. And what I have a *right* to demand of any man, it is his *duty* to perform. Between the *right* on the one hand, and the *duty* on the other, there is not only a necessary connection, but, in reality, they are only different expressions of the same meaning, just as it is the same thing to say, I am your debtor, and to say, you are my creditor; or as it is the same thing to say, I am your father, and to say, you are my son."

"As there is a strict notion of justice, in which it is distinguished from humanity and charity, so there is a more extensive signification of it, in which it includes those virtues. The ancient moralists, both Greek and Roman, under the cardinal virtue of Justice, included Beneficence; and in this extensive sense, it is often used in common language. The like may be said of *right*, which in a sense not uncommon, is extended to every proper claim of humanity and charity, as well as to the claims of strict justice. But, as it is proper to distinguish these two kinds of claims by different names, writers in natural jurisprudence have given the name of *perfect rights* to the claims of strict justice, and that of *imperfect rights* to the claims of charity and humanity. Thus all the duties of humanity have imperfect *rights* corresponding to them, as those of strict justice have perfect rights."¹

"The adjective *right* has a much wider signification than the substantive *right*. Everything is *right* which is conform-

¹ Reid, *Act. Pow.*, essay v., chap. 3.

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able to the supreme rule of human action ; but that only is a *right* which, being conformable to the supreme rule, is realized in society and vested in a particular person. Hence the two words may often be properly opposed. We may say that a poor man has no *right* to relief, but it is *right* he should have it. A rich man has a *right* to destroy the harvest of his fields, but to do so would not be *right*.

"To a *right*, on one side, corresponds an *obligation* on the other. If a man has a *right* to my horse, I have an *obligation* to let him have it. If a man has a *right* to the fruit of a certain tree, all other persons are under an *obligation* to abstain from appropriating it. Men are *obliged* to respect each others' rights.

"My *obligation* is to give another man his *right*; my *duty* is to do what is *right*. Hence duty is a wider term than obligation ; just as *right*, the adjective, is wider than *right* the substantive.

"Duty has no correlative, as obligation has the correlative *right*. What it is our duty to do, we must do, because it is *right*, not because any one can demand it of us. We may, however, speak of those who are particularly benefited by the discharge of our duties, as having a *moral claim* upon us. A distressed man has a moral claim to be relieved, in cases in which it is our duty to relieve him.

"The distinctions just explained are sometimes expressed by using the terms *perfect obligation* and *imperfect obligation* for *obligation* and *duty* respectively ; and the terms *perfect right* and *imperfect right* for *right* and *moral claim* respectively. But these phrases have the inconvenience of making it seem as if our duties arose from the rights of others ; and as if duties were only legal obligations, with an inferior degree of binding force."—V. JURISPRUDENCE, RECTITUDE.

ROSICRUCIANS, a name assumed by a sect of Hermetical philosophers, who came into notice in Germany towards the close of the fourteenth century. Christian Rosenkreuz, from whom, according to some, the name is derived, was born in 1378, travelled to the East, and after keeping company with magi

¹ Whewell, *Elements of Morality*. book I., § 84-89.

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cians and cabalists, returned to Germany with their secrets, which he communicated to three of his friends, or sons, and shutting himself up in a cave, died at the age of 106 in 1484. The secrets of the fraternity of the Rosy Cross, which gradually increased in numbers, had reference to four points—the transmutation of metals, the prolongation of life, the knowledge of what is passing in distant places, and the application of the Cabala and the science of numbers to discover the most hidden things. They assumed the signature F.R.C., or *Fratres Roris Cocti*, it being pretended that the matter of the philosopher's stone was dew concocted. Or, according to Mosheim, the name is compounded of *Ros*, dew; and *cruz*, the cross. In the language of alchemy, the figure of the cross signifies light, and dew was reckoned the most powerful dissolvent of gold; so that a *Rosicrucian* meant one who, by the assistance of dew, sought for light or the philosopher's stone.¹

RULE.—"Rectitude is a *law*, as well as a *rule* to us; it not only *directs*, but *binds* all, as far as it is perceived."²

A *rule* prescribes means to attain some end. But the end may not be one which all men are to aim at; and the *rule* may not be followed by all. A *law* enjoins something to be done, and is binding upon all to whom it is made known.

"A *rule*, in its proper signification, is an instrument, by means of which we draw the shortest line from one point to another, which for this very reason is called a straight line.

"In a figurative and moral sense, a *rule* imports nothing else but a principle or maxim, which furnishes man with a sure and concise method of attaining to the end he proposes."³

SABAISM (from סָבָא, signifying a host, or from *tsaba*, in Syriac, to adore; or from *Saba* the son of Cush, and grandson of Seth) means the worship of the stars, or host of heaven, which

¹ Mosheim, *Eccles. Hist.*, vol. iv.; Louis Figuler, *L'Alchimie et Les Alchimistes*. Par 1856.

² Price, *Rev. of Morals*, chap. 6.

³ Boriamaqui, *Principles of Nat. Law*, part i., chap. 5.

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prevailed from an early period in the East, especially in Syria, Arabia, Chaldea, and Persia. The Sabæans are not mentioned by the Greek or Roman writers, and by the Arabian authors they are called Nabatheans, as if descendants from Nebaioth, son of Ishmael. Their doctrines are expounded by Moses Maimonides in the third part of his work, *De More Nevochim*. There was a popular and a philosophic creed with them. According to the former the stars were worshipped; and the sun, as supreme God, ruled over heaven and earth, and the other heavenly bodies were but the ministers of his will. According to the philosophic creed, the stars consisted of matter and mind. God is not the matter of the universe, but the spirit which animates it. But both are eternal, and will externally exist, for the one cannot pass into, or absorb the other.

Pocock, *Specimen Hist. Arab.*; ¹ Hyde, *Veterum Persarum Historia*; ² Spencer, *De Legibus Hebræorum*.³

SAME, in its primary sense, denotes *identity* — *q. v.*

In a secondary sense it denotes great *similarity*, and in popular usage admits of degrees, as when we speak of two things being *nearly the same*. To this ambiguity, Whately refers much of the error of *realism*; of Plato's theory of *ideas*; of the personification and deification in poetical mythology, &c.⁴

SANCTION (*sancio*, to ratify or confirm). — "I shall declare the *sanction* of this law of nature, viz., those rewards which God hath ordained for the observation of it, and those punishments He hath appointed for its breach or transgression."⁵

"The *sanctions* of rewards and punishments which God has annexed to his laws have not, in any proper sense, the nature of obligation. They are only motives to virtue, adapted to the state and condition, the weakness and insensibility of man. They do not make or constitute duty, but presuppose it."⁶

The consequences which naturally attend virtue and vice are the *sanction* of duty, or of doing what is right, as they are intended to encourage us to the discharge of it, and to deter

¹ 4to, Oxf., 1649, p. 138.

² 8vo, Oxf., 1766

³ 2 vols., fol., Camb., 1724

⁴ Whately, *Log.*, App. I.

⁵ Tyrrell, *On the Law of Nature*, p. 125.

⁶ Adams, *Sermon on Nature and Obligation of Virtue*.

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us from the breach or neglect of it. And these natural consequences of virtue and vice are also a declaration, on the part of God, that He is in favour of the one and against the other, and are intimations, that His love of the one and His hatred of the other may be more fully manifested hereafter. By Locke, Paley, and Bentham, the term *sanction*, or enforcement of obedience, is applied to reward as well as to punishment. But Mr. Austin¹ confines it to the latter; perhaps, because human laws only punish, and do not reward.

SAVAGE and BARBAROUS.—Ferguson² states that the history of mankind, in their rudest state, may be considered under two heads, viz., that of the *savage*, who is not yet acquainted with property, and that of the *barbarian*, to whom it is, although not ascertained by laws, a principal object of care and desire.

The distinction here made between the *savage* and the *barbarous* states of society, resolves itself into the absence or presence of political government; for without political government, property cannot exist. The distinction is an important one; and it would be convenient to apply the term *savage* to communities which are permanently in a state of anarchy, which ordinarily exist without government, and to apply the term *barbarous* to communities, which, though in a rude state as regards the arts of life, are nevertheless subject to a government. In this sense, the North American Indians would be in a *savage*, while the Arab tribes, and most of the Asiatic nations, would be in a *barbarous* state. Montesquieu's³ distinction between *savages* and *barbarians*, is different in form, but in substance it is founded on the same principle. Hugh Murray⁴ lays it down that the *savage* form of society is without government.

According to many ancient and modern philosophers, the *savage* state was the primitive state of the human race. But others, especially Bonald and De Maistre, having maintained that the nations now found in a *savage* state have accidentally

¹ *Province of Jurispr. Determined*, p. 10.

² *Essay on Hist. of Civ. Soc.*, part II., sect. 2.

³ *Esprit des Loix*, xviii. 11

⁴ *Enquiries respecting the Character of Nations, and the Progress of Society*, Edin., 1808, p. 230.

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degenerated from the primitive state, which was a state of knowledge and civilization.

SCEPTICISM (*σκιπτομαι*, to look, to seek) is used as synonymous with *doubt*—*q. v.* But doubt may be removed by evidence, and give way to conviction or belief. The characteristic of *scepticism* is to come to no conclusion for or against—*ἐποχή*, holding off, and consequent tranquillity—*ἀραπαμία*. Absolute objective certainty being unattainable, *scepticism* holds that in the contradictions of the reason, truth is as much on one side as on the other—*οὐδὲν μάλλον*. It was first taught by Pyrrho, who flourished in Greece about 340 B.C. Hence it is sometimes called Pyrrhonism. The word is generally used in a bad sense, as equivalent to infidelity or unbelief. But in the following passages it means, more correctly, the absence of determination.

"We shall not ourselves venture to determine anything, in so great a point; but *sceptically* leave it undecided."¹

"That all his arguments (Bp. Berkeley's) are, in reality, merely *sceptical*, appears from this, that they admit of no answer and produce no conviction. Their only effect is to cause that momentary amazement, and irresolution, and confusion, which is the result of *scepticism*."²

Scepticism is opposed to *dogmatism*—*q. v.*

"The writings of the best authors among the ancients being full and solid, tempt and carry me which way almost they will. He that I am reading seems always to have the most force; and I find that every one in turn has reason, though they contradict one another."

This is said by Montaigne,³ in the true spirit of *scepticism*.

"*Que sçait-on?*" was the motto of Montaigne,
As also of the first academicians;
That all is dubious which man may attain,
Was one of their most favourite positions.
There's no such thing as certainty, that's plain
As any of mutability's conditions;
So little do we know what we're about in
This world, I doubt if doubt itself be doubting."

Byron.⁴

¹ Cudworth, *Intell. Syst.*, p. 806.

² Hume, *Essays*, note, p. 309, 4to edit.

³ Book ii., chap. 12.

⁴ *Don Juan*, Canto ix., xviii.

SCEPTICISM—

Glanvill (Joseph) has a work which he entitled *Scepsis Scientifica, or the Folly of Dogmatizing*; Staudlin wrote the *History and Spirit of Scepticism*; ¹ Sanchez (Fr.) or Sanctius wrote a *Tractatus de multum nobili et prima universali scientia, quod nihil scitur*; ² Crousaz has *Examen du Pyrrhonisme Ancienne et Moderne*.

SCHEMA (*σχήμα*, shape), "termed by Mr. Semple *effigiation*, is the representation of a universal proceeding of the imagination to procure for a conception its image. To all conceptions an object must be given, and objects are given to us only through the modification of the sensibility. Pure conceptions *à priori* must contain *à priori* formal conditions of the sensibility (of the internal sense especially), under which alone the pure understanding-conception *à priori* can be applied to any object *à priori*. This formal and pure condition of sensibility, and to which the pure understanding-conception is restricted in its use, is termed by Kant the transcendental *schema* of this understanding-conception. The procedure with these *schemata*, or the sensible conditions under which pure understanding alone can be used, he also termed the *schematismus* of the pure understanding. The *schema* is only in itself a product of the imagination, but it is still to be distinguished from an image in this respect, that it is a single intuition. Five dots in a line, for example, are an image of the number five; but the *schema* of a conception, for instance, of a number in general, is more the representation of a method of representing a multitude according to a certain conception, for instance a thousand, in an image, than this image itself."³

SCHOLASTIC.—*Scholasticus*, as a Latin word, was first used by Petronius. Quintilian subsequently applied it to the rhetoricians in his day: and we read in Jerome, that Serapion, having acquired great fame, received as a title of honour the surname *Scholasticus*. When the schools of the Middle Ages were opened, it was applied to those charged with the education of youth.

"We see the original sense of the word *scholastic*," says Dr Hampden,⁴ "in the following passage:—*Omnes enim in scrip*

¹ 2 vols., Leipzig, 1794-5.

² 4to., Lyons, 1581.

³ Haywood, *Explan. of Terms in C. of Pure Reason*.

⁴ *Bampton Lect.*, i., p. 7.

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is suis causas tantum egerunt suas; et propriis magis laudibus quam aliorum utilitatibus consulentes, non id facere adnisi sunt ut salubres et salutiferi, sed ut scholastici ac disertí haberentur."
— Salvianus.¹

Scholastic Philosophy.— This phrase denotes a period rather than a system of philosophy. It is the philosophy that was taught in the schools during the Middle Ages. The Middle Ages extend from the commencement of the ninth to the sixteenth century. What has been called the Classic Age of the *scholastic philosophy*, includes the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. It begins when the metaphysics of Aristotle were introduced into France by Latin translations, and terminates with the Council of Florence and the taking of Constantinople. The only philosophy that was taught during that period, was taught by the clergy; and was therefore very much mixed up with theology. The only way of teaching was by lectures or dictates; and hence the phrase, *legere in philosophia*. There was no one system uniformly taught; but different and conflicting opinions were held and promulgated by different doctors. The method was that of interpretation. Grammar was taught by prælections on *Donatus* and *Priscian*, and rhetoric by prælections on some parts of *Cicero* or *Boethius*. But logic shared most of their attention, and was taught by prælections on such of the works of Aristotle as were best known. The *Timæus* of Plato also occupied much of their attention; and they laboured to reconcile the doctrines of the one philosopher with those of the other.

Mr. Morell² says, "It has been usual to divide the whole *scholastic* periods into three eras.³—1. That which was marked by the absolute subordination of philosophy to theology, that is, authority. 2. That which was marked by the friendly alliance of philosophy with dogmatic theology. 3. The commencement of a separation between the two, or the dawn of the entire independence of philosophy.

The first years of *scholastic philosophy* were marked by authority. In the ninth century, Joannes Scotus Erigena

¹ *De Gubern. Dei, Præfat.*

² *Phil. of Religion*, p. 360.

³ Tennenman makes four periods of *scholastic philosophy*, according to the prevalence of Realism or Nominalism.

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attempted to assert the claims of reason. Two hundred years after, the first era was brought to a close by Abelard. The second is marked by Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, and Duns Scotus. Raymond Lully, Roger Bacon, followed by Occam and the Nominalists, represent the third and declining era.

The taking of Constantinople by the Turks, the invention of printing, and the progress of the Reformation, put an end to the *scholastic philosophy*. Philosophy was no longer confined to the schools and to prælections. The press became a most extensive lecturer, and many embraced the opportunities offered of extending knowledge.

In addition to general histories of philosophy, see Rousselet, *Etudes sur la Philosophie dans le Moyen Age*;¹ Haureau, *De la Philosophie Scholastique*;² Cousin, *Fragments Philosophiques*.³ Also his *Introduction to Œuvres inédites d'Abelard*.

SCIENCE (*scientia*) means knowledge, emphatically so called, that is, knowledge of principles and causes.

Science (*ἐπιστήμη*) has its name from bringing us (*ἐπιστάω*) to some stop and boundary of things, taking us away from the unbounded nature and mutability of particulars; for it is conversant about subjects that are general and invariable. This etymology given by Nicephorus (Blemmida), and long before him adopted by the Peripatetics, came originally from Plato, as may be seen in his *Cratylus*.

“*Ὅτι scientiæ fundamentum est, διότι fastigium.*”⁴

“Sir Will. Hamilton, in his *Lectures on Logic*, defined *science* as a ‘complement of cognitions, having, in point of form, the character of logical perfection, and in point of matter, the character of real truth.’”⁵

Science is knowledge evident and certain in itself, or by the principle from which it is deduced, or with which it is certainly connected. It is *subjective* as existing in a mind—*objective*, as embodied in truths—*speculative*, as resting in attainment of truths, as in physical *science*—*practical*, as leading to do something, as in ethical *science*.

¹ 3 tom., 8vo, Paris, 1840-2.

² Tom. iii., Paris, 1840.

³ Dava, *Political Science*, p. 76

⁴ 2 tom., 8vo, Paris, 1850.

⁵ Trendelenburg, *Elementa Log. Arist.*, p. 76

SCIENCE—

Science, art, and empiricism, are defined by Sopater,¹ as follows:—

Science consists in an infallible and unchanging knowledge of phenomena.

Art is a system formed from observation, and directed to a useful end.

Empiricism is an unreasoning and instinctive imitation of previous practice.

Art is of three kinds—theoretic, practical, and mixed.

"No art, however, is purely theoretic or contemplative. The examples given are of *science*, not art. It is a part of grammatical *science* to say that all words with a certain termination have a certain accent. When this is converted into a rule, it becomes part of an art."²

"In *science*, *scimus ut sciamus*; in art, *scimus ut producamus*. And, therefore, *science* and art may be said to be investigations of truth:³ but one, *science*, inquires for the sake of knowledge: the other, art, for the sake of production:⁴ and hence *science* is more concerned with the higher truths, art with the lower: and *science* never is engaged as art is in productive application.⁵ And the most perfect state of *science*, therefore, will be the most high and accurate inquiry; the perfection of art will be the most apt and efficient system of rules: art always throwing itself into the form of rules."⁶—Karslake.⁷

"*Science* and art differ from one another, as the understanding differs from the will, or as the indicative mood in grammar differs from the imperative. The one deals in facts, the other in precepts. *Science* is a collection of truths; art a body of rules, or directions for conduct. The language of *science* is, This is, or, This is not; This does, or does not happen. The language of art is, Do this, Avoid that. *Science* takes cogniz-

¹ On *Hermogenes*, apud Rhet. Gr., vol. v., pp. 3-5, ed. Wals.

² Sir G. O. Lewis, *On Methods of Observ. in Politics*, chap. 19, sect. 2.

³ This is, speaking logically, "the Genus" of the two.

⁴ These are their *differentia*, or distinctive characteristics.

⁵ These are their specific properties.

⁶ This distinction of science and art is given in Aristotle — See *Posterior Analyst*, b. 194, ii., 18.

⁷ *Aids to Log.*, b. 1, p. 24.

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ance of a *phenomenon*, and endeavours to discover its *law*; art proposes to itself an *end*, and looks out for means to effect it.”¹

—*V. ART, DEMONSTRATION.*

SCIENCES (The Occult) are so called (from *occulto*, to hide or conceal) because they have reference to qualities or powers which are not such as are common or commonly known. The belief in beings having superhuman powers, as fairies, familiars, *dæmons*, &c., in augury, oracles, witchcraft, &c., in dreams and visions, &c., in divination and astrology, &c., and in talismans and amulets, &c., leads to the prosecution of what has been called the *Occult Sciences*.—See a vol. under this title in the cabinet edition of the *Encyclopædia Metropolitana*.

SCIENTIA (Media).—“According to Molina, the objects of the divine knowledge are the *possible*, the *actual*, and the *conditional*. The knowledge of the *possible* is *simple intelligence*; of the *actual*, *scientia visionis*; and of the *conditional*, *scientia media*, intermediate between that of *intelligence* and *vision*. An example of *scientia media* is that of David asking the oracle if the inhabitants of the city of Keilah, in which he meant to take refuge, would deliver it up to Saul if he laid siege to it. The answer was in the affirmative, whereupon David took a different course.”²

Leibnitz³ has said, “*Scientia media* might rather be understood to mean the science not only of future conditionals, but universally of all future contingents. Then science of *simple intelligence* would be restricted to the knowledge of truths possible and necessary; *scientia visionis* to that of truths contingent and actual. *Scientia media* would thus have it in common with the first that it concerned truths *possible*; and with the second, that it applied to truths *contingent*.”⁴

SCIOLIST (*sciolus*, one who thinks he knows much and knows but little).—“Some have the hap to be termed learned men, though they have gathered up but the scraps of knowledge here and there, though they be but smatterers and mere *sciolists*.”⁵

SCIOMACHY (*σκιὰ*, a shadow; and *μάχη*, a fight).—“But pray,

¹ J. S. Mill, *Essays on Pol. Econ.*

² Leibnitz, *Sur la Bonté de Dieu*, partie 1, sect. 40.

³ In *La Cause de Dieu*, &c., sec. 17.

⁴ See Reid, *Ac. Pow.*, essay iv., chap. 11.

⁵ Howell, *Letters*, b. iii. c. 1.

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countryman, to avoid this *sciomachy*, or imaginary combat with words, let me know, sir, what you mean by the name of tyrant.”¹

SECULARISM is the Latin for *this-world-ism*, and means, “attend to the world that you are now in, and let the next alone.”²

Its capital principles are—1. That attention to temporal things should take precedence of considerations relating to a future existence. 2. That science is the providence of life, and that spiritual dependency in human affairs may be attended with material destruction. 3. That there exist, independently of scriptural religion, guarantees of morality in human nature, intelligence, and utility.

The aim of *secularism* is to aggrandize the present life. For eternity, it substitutes time; for providence, science; for fidelity to the Omniscient, usefulness to man. Its great advocate is Mr. Holyoake.

SECUNDUM QUID (τὸ καθ' ὅ) is opposed to *Secundum ipsum* (τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ) as the *relative* to the *non-relative* or the *limited* to the *unlimited*. Mr. Maurice illustrates *Secundum quid* by a passage from “As you like it:” “In *respect* that it is of the country it is a good life, but in *respect* it is not of the court it is a vile life.”³—V. FALLACY.

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS.—V. APPERCEPTION.

SELFISHNESS “consists not in the indulging of this or that particular propensity, but in disregarding, for the sake of *any* kind of personal gratification or advantage, the rights or the feelings of other men. It is, therefore, a *negative* quality; that is, it consists in *not* considering what is due to one's neighbours, through a deficiency of justice or benevolence. And *selfishness*, accordingly, will show itself in as many different shapes as there are different dispositions in men.

“You may see these differences even in very young children. One *selfish* child, who is greedy, will seek to keep all the cakes and sweetmeats to himself; another, who is idle, will not care what trouble he causes to others, so he can save his own; another, who is vain, will seek to obtain the credit which is due to others; one who is covetous, will seek to gain at another's

¹ Cowley, *On the Government of Oliver Cromwell*.

² Arnot, *Illustr. of Proverbs*, p. 368.

³ Arist., *Metaphys.*, lib. iv., c. 20.

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expense, &c. In short, each person 'has a *self* of his own.' And, consequently, though you may be of a character very unlike that of some *selfish* person, you may yet be, in your own way, quite as *selfish* as he. And it is possible to be *selfish* in the highest degree, without being at all too much actuated by self-love, but unduly neglectful of others when your own gratification, of whatever kind, is concerned."¹

Selfishness exists only in reference to others, and could have on place in one who lived alone on a desert island, though he might have, of course, every degree of *self-love*; for selfishness is not an excess of self-love, and consists not in an over-desire of happiness, but in placing your happiness in something which interferes with, or leaves you regardless of that of others. Nor are we to suppose that selfishness and want of feeling are either the same or inseparable. For, on the one hand, I have known such as have had very little feeling, but felt for others as much nearly as for themselves, and were, therefore, far from selfish; and, on the other hand, some, of very acute feelings, feel for no one but themselves, and, indeed, are sometimes among the most cruel."²

SELF-LOVE is sometimes used in a general sense to denote all those principles of our nature which prompt us to seek our own good, just as those principles which lead us to seek the good of others are all comprehended under the name of benevolence. All our desires tend towards the attainment of some good or the averting of some evil—having reference either to ourselves or others, and may therefore be brought under the two heads of benevolence and *self-love*.

But besides this general sense of the word to denote all those desires which have a regard to our own gratification or good, *self-love* is more strictly used to signify "the desire for our own welfare as such." In this sense, "it is quite distinct from all our other desires and propensities," says Dr. Whately,³ "though it may often tend in the same direction with some of them. One person, for instance, may drink some water because he is *thirsty*; and another may, without thirst, drink—suppose from a mineral spring, because he believes it will

¹ Whately, *Lessons on Morals*, p. 143.

² Whately, *On Bacon*, p. 221.

³ *Lessons on Morals*, p. 142.

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be good for his health. This latter is impelled by *self-love*, but not the other.

"So again, one person may pursue some course of study in order to qualify himself for some *profession* by which he may advance in life, and another from having a *taste* for that study, and a desire for that branch of knowledge. This latter, though he may perhaps be, in fact, promoting his own welfare, is not acting from *self-love*. For as the object of thirst is not happiness, but drink, so the object of curiosity is not happiness, but knowledge. And so of the rest."

Self-love may, like any other of our tendencies, be cherished and indulged to excess, or it may be ill-directed. But within due bounds it is allowable and right, and by no means incompatible with benevolence, or a desire to promote the happiness of others. And Dr. Hutcheson, who maintains that kind affection is what constitutes an agent virtuous, has said, that he who cherishes kind affection towards all, may also love himself; may love himself as a part of the whole system of rational and sentient beings; may promote his own happiness in preference to that of another who is not more deserving of his love; and may be innocently solicitous about himself, while he is wisely benevolent towards all.¹

The error of Hobbes, and the school of philosophers who maintained that in doing good to others our ultimate aim is to do good to ourselves, lay in supposing that there is any antagonism between *benevolence* and *self-love*. So long as *self-love* does not degenerate into *selfishness*, it is quite compatible with true benevolence.

In opposition to the views of Hobbes and the selfish school of philosophers, see Butler, *Sermons*;² Turnbull, *Nature and Origin of Laws*;³ Hume, *On General Principles of Morals*;⁴ Hutcheson, *Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil*;⁵ Hazlitt, *Essay on Principles of Hum. Action*;⁶ Mackintosh, *View of Ethical Philosophy*.⁷

SEMATOLOGY (*σημα*, a sign; and *λόγος*, discourse), the doctrine of signs — *q. v.*

¹ *Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil*, sect. iii.

² *On Hum. Nat., or Compassion, &c.*

⁴ Sect. 2.

⁵ Sect. 2.

⁶ P. 239.

² Vol. II., p. 258.

⁷ P. 192.

SENSATION.—“The earliest sign by which the Ego becomes perceptible is *corporeal sensation*.

“Without this general innate *sensation* we should not possess the certainty that our body is *our* body; for it is as much an *object* for the other senses as anything else that we can see, hear, taste, or feel. This original general innate *sensation* is necessary to the existence of all other particular sensations, and may exist independently of the nervous system. Polypi, animals of the simplest structure, without a nervous system distinct from the rest of the organic mass, show traces of innate *sensation*. The light by means of which we see, acts not only on the visual nerves, but also on the fluids of the eye, and the *sensations* of sight partly depend on the structure of the eye. *This sensibility*, therefore, appears to be a necessary attribute of animated organic matter itself.

“All the perceptions of sense are rooted in the general *sensation*. The child must be conscious of his senses before he applies them. This *sensation*, however, is very obscure; even pain is not clearly felt by it at the place where it exists. Equally obscure is the notion which it entertains of an object. Though Brach, therefore, is right in ascribing something objective, even to the general *sensation*, since conditions cannot communicate themselves, without communicating (though ever so obscurely) something of that which produces the condition—nay, strictly speaking, as even in the idea ‘subject,’ that of an ‘object’ is involved, yet it is advisable to abide by the distinction founded by Kant, according to which, by innate *sensation*, we *especially* perceive our own personality (subject), and by the senses we *specially* perceive objects, and thus in the ascending line, feeling, taste, smell, hearing, and sight.

“The next step from this obscure original innate *sensation* is particular *sensation* through the medium of the nervous system, which, in its more profound, and yet more obscure sphere, produces common *sensation* (CŒNESTHESIS), and in a higher manifestation, the perceptions of the senses. *Cœnesthesis*, or common feeling, is referred to the ganglionic nerves. It may be called subjective, inasmuch as the body itself gives

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the excitement to the nerve concerned.¹ By the *Cœnesthesia* states of our body are revealed to us which have their seat in the sphere of the vegetative life. These states are —

"1. *General*: — corporeal heaviness and buoyancy, atony, toniety.

"2. *Special*: — hunger, thirst, sexual instinct, &c.

"The *sensations* of pain, titillation, itching, &c., which are generally cited here, belong, in their more common acceptation, to the general corporeal feeling; in their more local limitation, with distinct perception of the object exciting, to the sense of touch; but when they arise from the nervous system allotted to the vegetative sphere of the body, they certainly belong to the *Cœnesthesis* in the more limited sense of the word.

"To this class belongs especially the anxiety arising from impediment in respiration, and from nausea.

"In the analysis of the psycho-physical processes proceeding outwards from *sensation* to perception, we encounter after the organs of the *Cœnesthesis*, the organs of sense."²

Sensation and Perception. — "A conscious presentation, if it refers exclusively to the subject, as a modification of our own being, is = *sensation*. The same if it refers to an object, is = *perception*."³

Rousseau distinguished *sensations* as *affectives*, or giving pleasure or pain; and *representatives*, or giving knowledge of objects external.

Paffe⁴ distinguishes the element *affectif* and the element *instructif*.

In like manner Dr. Reid regards *sensation* not only as a state of feeling, but a *sign* of that which occasions it.

Bozelli⁵ calls *sensations*, in so far as they are representative,

¹ However subjective this sensation is, there is always in it the indication of an object, as Brach shows: hence illustrating the instinct of animals. Presentiment, too, chiefly belongs to this system.

² Feuchtersleben, *Med. Psychology*, 1847, p. 83.

Coleridge, *Church and State* — quoted by Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought* p. 104.

⁴ *Sur la Sensibilité*.

⁵ *De l'Union de la Philosophie avec la Morale*.

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in their *philosophical* form, in so far as they give pleasure or pain, in their *moral* form or character.

"To *sensation* I owe all the certainty I have of my existence as a sentient being, to *perception* a certainty not less absolute, that there are other beings besides me."¹

Sensation properly expresses *that change in the state of the mind* which is produced by an impression upon an organ of sense (of which change we can conceive the mind to be conscious, without any knowledge of external objects): *perception*, on the other hand, expresses the *knowledge* or the *intimations* we obtain, by means of our *sensations*, concerning the qualities of matter; and consequently involves, in every instance, the notion of *externality* or *outness*, which it is necessary to exclude in order to seize the precise import of the word *sensation*.

* *Sensation* has been employed to denote —

1. The process of sensitive apprehension, both in its subjective and its objective relations; like the Greek *æsthesis*.

2. It was limited first in the Cartesian school, and thereafter in that of Reid, to the subjective phasis of our sensitive cognitions.²

"*Sensation* proper, is not purely a passive state, but implies a certain amount of mental activity. It may be described, on the psychological side, as resulting directly from the attention which the mind gives to the affections of its own organism. This description may at first sight appear to be at variance with the facts of the case, inasmuch as every severe affection of the body produces pain, quite independently of any knowledge we may possess of the cause or of any operation of the will being directed towards it. Facts, however, rightly analyzed, show us, that if the attention of the mind be absorbed in other things, no impulse, though it amount to the laceration of the nerves, can produce in us the slightest feeling. Extreme enthusiasm, or powerful emotion of any kind, can make us altogether insensible even to physical injury. For this reason it is that the soldier on the field of battle is often wounded during the heat of the combat, without discovering it till exhausted by loss of blood. Numerous facts

¹ Thurot, *De l'Entrainement*, &c., tom. i., p. 43.

² Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note v^o.

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of a similar kind prove demonstrately, that a certain application and exercise of mind, on one side, is as necessary to the existence of *sensation*, as the occurrence of physical impulse, on the other."—Morell, *Psychology*; ¹ Stewart, *Phil. Essays*; ² see also *Outlines*; ³ Reid, *Essays, Intell. Pow.*; ⁴ Morell, *Phil. of Religion*.⁵

SENSE, in psychology, is employed ambiguously — 1. For the faculty of sensitive apprehension. 2. For its act. 3. For its organ.

Sense and Idea.—In the following passage from Shaftesbury, *sense* is used as equivalent to *idea*; "Nothing surely is more strongly imprinted on our minds, or more closely interwoven with our souls than the *idea* or *sense* of order and proportion."

In like manner Dr. Hutcheson has said, "There is a natural and immediate *determination* to approve certain affections and actions consequent upon them; or a natural *sense* of immediate excellence in them, not referred to any other quality perceivable by our *senses* or by reasoning." We speak of a *determination* of blood to the head. This is a *physical* determination or tendency. Now, there may be a mental tendency, and this, in Dr. Hutcheson's philosophy, is called *determination* or *sense*. He defined a *sense* in this application of it "a determination to receive *ideas*, independent of our will," and he enumerates several such tendencies or determinations, which he calls *reflex senses*.

SENSES (REFLEX). — Dr. Hutcheson seems to have been in some measure sensible of the inadequacy of Mr. Locke's account of the origin of our ideas, and maintained, that in addition to those which we have by means of sensation and reflection, we also acquire ideas by means of certain powers of perception, which he called internal and *reflex senses*. According to his psychology, our powers of perception may be called *direct* or *antecedent*, and *consequent* or *reflex*. We hear a sound, or see colour, by means of senses which operate directly on their objects; and do not suppose any antecedent perception. But we perceive the harmony of sound, and the

¹ P. 107.² Note r (it is a in last edit.)³ Sect. 14.⁴ Essay I., chap. 1.⁵ P. 7.⁶ *Moralists*, part III., sect. 2.

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beauty of colour, by means of faculties which operate reflexly or in consequence of some preceding perception. And the moral sense was regarded by him as a faculty of this kind. Reflection, from which, according to Mr. Locke, we derive the simple ideas of the passions and affections of mind, was considered by Hutcheson as an *internal* sense or faculty, operating *directly*. But that faculty by which we perceive the beauty or deformity, the virtue or vice, of these passions and affections, was called by Hutcheson, a *reflex, internal* sense.—*Illustrations of the Moral Sense*; ¹ *Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil*; ² *Mor. Phil.*³

SENSIBILITY or SENSITIVITY (τὸ αἰσθητικόν) is now used as a general term to denote the capacity of feeling, as distinguished from intellect and will. It includes sensations both external and internal, whether derived from contemplating outward and material objects, or relations and ideas, desires, affections, passions. It also includes the sentiments of the sublime and beautiful, the moral sentiment and the religious sentiment; and, in short, every modification of feeling of which we are susceptible. By the ancient philosophers the *sensibility* under the name of appetite was confounded with the will. The Scotch philosophers have analyzed the various forms of the *sensibility* under the name of active principles; but they have not gathered them under one head, and have sometimes treated of them in connection with things very different.

SENSIBLES, COMMON and PROPER (*sensile* or *sensibile*, that which is capable of affecting some sense; that which is the object of sense).

Aristotle⁴ distinguished *sensibles* into *common* and *proper*. The *common*, those perceived by all or by a plurality of senses, were magnitude, figure, motion, rest, number. To these five, some of the schoolmen (but out of Aristotle) added place, distance, position, and continuity.⁵ Aristotle⁶ admitted, however, that the *common sensibles* are not properly objects of

¹ Sect. 1.² Sect. 1.³ Book I., chap. 4, sect. 4, and also sect. 5.⁴ *De Anima*, lib. II., c. 2; lib. III., c. 1. *De Sensu et Sensibili*, c. 1.⁵ Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 124, note.⁶ *De Anima*, lib. III., chaps. 1, 4.

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sense; but merely con-comitants or con-sequents of the perception of the *proper sensibles*. This is noticed by Hutcheson, commended by Price,¹ by Mr. Stewart,² and by Royer Collard.⁴

"Sensibile commune dicitur quod vel percipitur pluribus sensibus, vel ad quod cognoscendum, ab intellectu vel imaginatione desumitur occasio, ex variis sensibus; ut sunt figura, motus, ubicatio, duratio, magnitudo, distantia, numerus,"³ &c.

The *proper sensibles* are those objects of sense which are peculiar to one sense; as colour to the eye, sound to the ear, taste to the palate, and touch to the body.

SENSISM, SENSUALISM, or SENSUISM, is the doctrine that all our knowledge is derived originally from sense.

It is not the same as *empiricism*, though sometimes confounded with it. *Empiricism* rests exclusively on experience, and rejects all ideas which are *à priori*. But all experience is not that of sense. *Empiricism* admits facts and nothing but facts, but all facts which have been observed. *Sensism* gives the single fact of sensation as sufficient to explain all mental phenomena. Locke is *empirical*, Condillac is *sensual*.

Sensism, "in the emphatic language of Fichte, is called 'the dirt-philosophy.'"⁴—V. **EMPIRICISM, IDEOLOGY.**

SENSORIUM (*αισθητήριον*), is the organ by which, or place in which, the sensations of the several senses are reduced to the unity of consciousness. According to Aristotle it was in all warm-blooded animals the heart, and therefore so in man. According to modern philosophers the central organ is the brain, the pineal gland according to Descartes, the ventricles or the *corpus callosum* according to others.

Sensorium signifies not so properly the *organ* as the *place* of sensation. The eye, the ear, &c., are organs; but they are not *sensoria*. Sir Isaac Newton does not say that space is a *sensorium*; but that it is (by way of comparison), so to say, the *sensorium*, &c.⁵

¹ *Mor. Phil.*, book 1., chap. 1.

² *Review*, p. 56, first edit.

³ *Philosoph. Essays*, pp. 31, 46, 551, &to.

⁴ *Œuvres de Reid*, tom. III., p. 422.

⁵ Compton Carleton, *Phil. Univ. De Anima*, diss. 16, lect. II., sect. 1.

⁶ Sir Will. Hamilton, *Discussions*, p. 38, see also p. 2.

⁷ Clarke, *Second Reply to Leibnitz*.

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Leibnitz¹ adopted and defended the explanation of Rudolphus Goclenius, who, in his *Lexicon Philosophicum*, under *Sensorium*, says, "Barbarum scholasticorum, qui interdum sunt simise Græcorum. Hi dicunt Αἰσθητήριον. Ex quo illi fecerunt *sensorium* pro *sensorio*, id est, organum sensationis."

SENSUS COMMUNIS (κοινὴ αἰσθησις). — This latter phrase was employed by Aristotle and the Peripatetics "to denote the faculty in which the various reports of the several senses are reduced to the unity of a common apperception."²

This faculty had an organ which was called *Sensorium Commune* — q. v.

Mr. Stewart³ says: — The *sensus communis* of the school men denotes the power whereby the mind is enabled to *represent* to itself any absent object of perception, or any sensation which it has formerly experienced. Its *seat* was supposed to be that part of the brain (hence called the *sensorium* or *sensorium commune*) where the nerves from all the organs of perception terminate. Of the peculiar function allotted to it in the scale of our intellectual faculties, the following account is given by Hobbes: — "Some say the senses receive the species of things and deliver them to the common sense; and the common sense delivers them over to the fancy; and the fancy to the memory; and the memory to the judgment — like handling of things from one to another, with many words making nothing understood."⁴

Mr. Stewart says the *sensus communis* is perfectly synonymous with the word conception, that is, the power by which we represent an object of sense, whether present or absent. But it is doubtful whether *sensus communis* was applied by the schoolmen to the reproduction of absent objects of sense.

SENTIMENT implies an idea (or judgment), because the will is not moved nor the sensibility affected without knowing. But an idea or judgment does not infer feeling or *sentiment*.⁵

¹ Answer to the Second Reply of Clarke.

² Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 767, note.

³ Note D, to part II. of *Elements*.

⁴ *Of Man*, part I., chap. 2.

⁵ Butler, *Log.* II., art. 9.

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"The word *sentiment*, in the English language, never, as I conceive, signifies mere feeling, but *judgment accompanied with feeling*.¹ It was wont to signify opinion or judgment of any kind, but, of late, is appropriated to signify an opinion or judgment that strikes, and produces some agreeable or uneasy emotion. So we speak of *sentiments* of respect, of esteem, of gratitude; but I never heard the pain of the gout, or any other severe feeling, called a *sentiment*."²

"Mr. Hume sometimes employs (after the manner of the French metaphysicians) *sentiment* as synonymous with *feeling*; a use of the word quite unprecedented in our tongue."³

"There are two sensibilities—the one turned towards nature and transmitting the impressions received from it, the other hid in the depths of our organization and receiving the impression of all that passes in the soul. Have we discovered truth—we experience a *sentiment*. Have we done a good deed—we experience a *sentiment*. A *sentiment* is but the echo of reason, but is sometimes better heard than reason itself. *Sentiment*, which accompanies the intelligence in all its movements, has, like the intelligence, a spontaneous and a reflective movement. By itself it is a source of emotion, not of knowledge. Knowledge or judgment is invariable, whatever be our health or spirits. *Sentiment* varies with health and spirits. I always judge the Apollo Belvidere to be beautiful, but I do not always feel the *sentiment* of his beauty. A bright or gloomy day, sadness or serenity of mind, affect my *sentiments*, but not my judgment.

Mysticism would suppress reason and expand *sentiments*."⁴

Those pleasures and pains which spring up in connection with a modification of our organism or the perceptions of the senses, are called *sensations*. But the state of our mind, the exercise of thought, conceptions purely intellectual, are the occasion to us of high enjoyment or lively suffering; for these

¹ "This is too unqualified an assertion. The term *sentiment* is in English applied to the higher feelings."—Sir William Hamilton.

² Reid, *Act. Princ.* essay v., chap. 7.

³ Stewart, *Philosoph. Essays*, last ed., note x.

⁴ See Cousin, *Œuvres*, tom. II., p. 96.

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pleasures and pains of a different kind is reserved the name of *sentiments*.¹

"The word *sentiment*, agreeably to the use made of it by our best English writers, expresses, in my opinion, very happily those complex determinations of the mind which result from the co-operation of our rational powers and our moral feelings. We do not speak of a man's *sentiments* concerning a mechanical contrivance, or a physical hypothesis, or concerning any speculative question whatever, by which the feelings are not liable to be roused or the heart affected.

"This account of the meaning of the word corresponds, I think, exactly with the use made of it by Mr. Smith in the title of his *Theory (of Moral Sentiments)*."²

Sentiment and Opinion.—Dr. Beattie³ has said, "that the true and the old English sense of the word *sentiment*, is a formed *opinion*, notion, or principle." Dr. Reid, in his *Essays on the Intell. Powers*, speaks of the *sentiments* of Mr. Locke concerning perception; and of the *sentiments* of Arnauld, Berkeley, and Hume concerning ideas.

The title of chap. 7, essay ii., of Reid on *Intell. Powers*, is *Sentiments of Philosophers, &c.*, on which Sir W. Hamilton's note,⁴ is, "*Sentiment*, as here and elsewhere employed by Reid, in the meaning of *opinion* (*sententia*), is not to be imitated."

"By means of our sensations we feel, by means of our ideas we think: now a *sentiment* (from *sentire*) is properly a judgment concerning sensations, and an *opinion* (from *opinari*) is a judgment concerning ideas: our *sentiments* appreciate external, and our *opinions*, internal, phenomena. On questions of feeling, taste, observation, or report, we define our *sentiments*. On questions of science, argument, or metaphysical abstraction, we define our *opinions*. The *sentiments* of the heart. The *opinions* of the mind. It is my *sentiment* that the wine of Burgundy is the best in the world. It is my *opinion* that the religion of Jesus Christ is the best in the world. There is more of instinct in *sentiment*, and more of definition in *opinion*.

¹ *Manuel de Philosophie*, 8vo, Paris, 1846, p. 142.

² Stewart, *Philosoph. Essays*, note D.

³ *Essay on Truth*, part II., chap. 1, sec. 1.

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The admiration of a work of art which results from first impressions, is classed with our *sentiments*; and when we have accounted to ourselves for the approbation, it is classed with our *opinions*.”¹

SIGN (*signum*, a mark).—The definition of a sign is “that which represents anything to the cognitive faculty.” We have knowledge by sense and by intellect, and a *sign* may be addressed to either or to both—as smoke, which to the eye and to the intellect indicates or signifies fire; so that a *sign* has a twofold relation—to the thing signified and to the cognitive faculty.

“*Signs* are either to represent or resemble things, or only to intimate and suggest them to the mind. And our ideas being the *signs* of what is intended or supposed therein, are in such sort and so far right, as they do either represent or resemble the object of thought, or as they do at least intimate it to the mind, by virtue of some natural connection or proper appointment.”²

Signs are divided into *natural* and *conventional*. A *natural sign* has the power of signifying from its own nature, so that at all times, in all places, and with all people it signifies the same thing, as smoke is the sign of fire. A *conventional sign* has not the power of signifying in its own nature, but supposes the knowledge and remembrance of what is signified in him to whom it is addressed, as three balls are the conventionally understood *sign* of a pawnbroker’s shop.

In his philosophy Dr. Reid makes great use of the doctrine of *natural signs*. He arranges them in three classes,—1. Those whose connection with the thing signified is established by nature, but discovered only by experience, as *natural causes* are *signs* of their *effects*; and hence philosophy is called an interpretation of nature. 2. Those wherein the connection between the *sign* and thing signified is not only established by nature, but discovered to us by a natural principle without reasoning or experience. Of this class are the *natural signs* of human thoughts, purposes, and desires, such as modulations of the voice, gestures of the body, and features of the face, which may be called natural language, in opposition to that which is

¹ Taylor *Synonyms*.

² Oldfield, *Essay on Reason*, p. 184.

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spoken or written. 3. A third class of *natural signs* comprehends those which, though we never before had any notion or conception of the thing signified, do suggest it and at once give us a conception and create a belief of it. In this way consciousness, in all its modifications, gives the conception and belief of a being who thinks — *Cogito ergo sum*.

“As the first class of *natural signs* is the foundation of true philosophy, so the second is the foundation of the fine arts or of taste, and the last is the foundation of common sense.”¹

The doctrine or science of *signs* has been called *Sematology*. And as the *signs* which the mind makes use of in order to obtain and to communicate knowledge are words; the proper and skilful use of words is in different ways the object of—1. *Grammar*; 2. *Logic*; and 3. *Rhetoric*.²

See Berkeley, *Minute Phil.*;³ *New Theory of Vision*;⁴ *Theory of Vision Vindicated*.⁵ Hutcheson, *Synopsis Metaphys.*;⁶ *Mor. Phil.*⁷ De Gerando, *Des Signes et de l'Art de Penser*; Adam Smith, *On the Formation of Language*.

SIMILE.—V. METAPHOR.**SIN**.—V. EVIL.

SINCERITY implies singleness and honesty. — The Latin word *sincerus* signifies what is without mixture, and has been thought to be compounded of *sine cera*, without wax, as pure honey is.

“*Sincerity* and *sincere* have a twofold meaning of great moral importance. *Sincerity* is often used to denote ‘mere reality of conviction;’ that a man actually believes what he professes to believe. Sometimes, again, it is used to denote ‘unbiassed conviction,’ or, at least, an earnest endeavour to shake off all prejudices, and all undue influence of wishes and passions on the judgment, and to decide impartially.”⁸

SINGULAR.—V. TERM.

SOCIALISM.—In the various forms under which society has

¹ Reid, *Inquiry*, chap. 5, sec. 3.

² Smart, *Sematology*, 8vo, Lond., 1839.

³ Dial. iv, sect. 7, 11, 12.

⁴ Sect. 38–43.

⁵ B. i., ch. 1, p. 6.

⁶ Sect. 144, 147.

⁷ Part II, chap. 1.

⁸ Whately, *Log.*, Append. i

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existed, private property, individual industry and enterprise, and the rights of marriage and of the family, have been recognized. Of late years several schemes of social arrangement have been proposed, in which one or all of these principles have been abandoned or modified. These schemes may be comprehended under the general term of *socialism*. The motto of them all is *solidarité*.

Communism demands a community of goods or property. *Fourierism* or *Phalansterism* would deliver men over to the guidance of their passions and instincts, and destroy all domestic and moral discipline. *Saint Simonism* or *Humanitarianism* holds that human nature has three great functions, that of the priesthood, science, and industry. Each of these is represented in a College, above which is the father or head, spiritual and temporal, whose will is the supreme and living law of the society. Its religion is pantheism, its morality materialism or epicurism, and its politics despotism.¹

SOCIETY (Desire of). — “God having designed man for a sociable creature, made him not only with an inclination, and under a necessity to have fellowship with those of his own kind, but furnished him also with language, which was to be the great instrument and common tie of *society*.”²

That the *desire of society* is natural to man, is argued by Plato in the Second Book of his *Republic*. It is also hinted at in his dialogue entitled *Protagoras*. The argument is unfolded by Harris in his *Dialogue Concerning Happiness*.³ Aristotle has said at the beginning of his *Politics*, — “The tendency to the social state is in all men by nature.” The argument in favour of *society* from our being possessed of speech is insisted on by him.⁴ Also by Cicero.⁵

In modern times, Hobbes argued that man is naturally an enemy to his fellow-men, and that *society* is a device to defend men from the evils which they would bring on one another. Hutcheson wrote his inaugural oration when

¹ *Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*

² Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book III., chap. 1.

³ Sect. 12

⁴ *Polit.*, lib. I., cap. 2.

⁵ *Legibus*, lib. I., cap. 9; *De Officiis*, lib. I., cap. 16; *De Nat. Decorum*, lib. II. cap. 52.

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admitted Professor of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow, in opposition to Hobbes.¹

Man is a *social animal*, according to Seneca.² Lactantius says that he is a social animal by nature,³ in which he follows Cicero.⁴ "Mankind have always wandered or settled, agreed or quarrelled, in troops and companies."⁵ "La nature de l'homme le porte à vivre en société. Quelle qu'en soit la cause, le fait se manifeste en toute occasion. Partout où l'on a rencontré des hommes, ils vivaient en troupes, en herdes, en corps de nation. Peut-être est ce afin d'unir leur forces pour leur sûreté commune; peut-être afin de pourvoir plus aisément à leur besoins; toujours il est vrai qu'il est dans la nature de l'homme de se réunir en société, comme font les abeilles et plusieurs espèces d'animaux; on remarque des traits communs dans toutes ces réunions d'hommes, en quelque parti du monde qu'ils habitent."⁶

This *gregarious propensity* is different from the *political capacity*, which has been laid down as the characteristic of man.

Society (Political, Capacity of).—Command and obedience, which are essential to government, are peculiar to mankind. Man is singular in commanding not only the inferior animals, but his own species. Hence men alone form a *political community*. It has been laid down by Aristotle⁷ and others, that this difference is owing to the exclusive possession of reason and speech by man, and to his power of discriminating between justice and injustice. Animals, says Cicero,⁸ are unfitted for *political society*, as being "*rationis et orationis expertes.*" *Separat hæc nos a grege mulorum.*⁹

SOMATOLOGY.—V. NATURE.

SOPHISM, SOPHISTER, SOPHISTICAL (Σόφισμα, from σοφία, wisdom).—"They were called *sophisters*, as who would say, Counterfeit wise men."¹⁰

De Naturæ Hominum Socialitate, 4to, Glasg., Typis Academ., 1730.

¹ *De Clem.*, i., 3.

² *Div. Inst.*, vi., 10.

⁴ *De Offi.*, i., 14.

³ Ferguson, *Essay on Hist. of Civ. Soc.*, p. 26. See also Lord Kames, *Hist. of Man*, c. li., sketch 1; Filangieri, *Scienza della Legislazione*, lib. i., c. 1.

⁵ Bay, *Cours d'Econ. Polit.*, tom. vi. Compare Comte, *Ibid.*, tom. iv., p. 54.

Polit., i., 2.

⁸ *De Offi.*, i., 16.

Juvenal. xv., 142-158

¹⁰ North, *Plutarch*, p. 96

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"For lyke wyse as though a *Sophyster* woulde with a fonde argumente, prove unto a symple soule, that two egges were three, because that ther is one, and that ther be twayne, and one and twayne make three; yt symple unlearned man, though he lacke learyning to soyle hys fonde argument, hath yet wit ynough to laugh thereat, and to eat the two egges himself, and byd the *Sophyster* tak and eat the thyrd."¹

"*Sophism* is a false argument. This word is not usually applied to mere errors in reasoning; but only to those erroneous reasonings of the fallacy of which the person who maintains them is, in some degree, conscious; and which he endeavours to conceal from examination by subtilty, and by some ambiguity, or other unfairness in the use of words."²

According to Aristotle, the *sophism* is a *sylogismus contentiosus*, a syllogism framed not for enouncing or proving the truth, but for disputation. It is constructed so as to seem to warrant the conclusion, but does not, and is faulty either in form or argument.³

See Reid, *Account of Aristotle's Logic*.⁴

On the difference of meaning between φιλόσοφος and σοφιστής, see Sheppard, *Characters of Theophrastus*.⁵ See also Grote, *Hist. of Greece*,⁶ and the *Cambridge Journal of Philosophy*.⁷—

V. FALLACY.

SORITES (σωρός, a heap) is an argument composed of an indeterminate number of propositions, so arranged that the predicate of the first becomes the subject of the second, the predicate of the second the subject of the third, and so on till you come to a conclusion which unites the subject of the first with the predicate of the last. A is B, B is C, C is D, D is E, therefore A is E.

This is the Direct or Common form of the Sorites. The Reversed form is also called the Goelenian, from Goelenius of Marburg, who first analyzed it about the end of the sixteenth century. It differs from the common form in two respects.

¹ Sir T. More, *Works*, p. 475.

² Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

³ Trendelenburg, *Lineamenta Log. Arist.*, sect. 33, 8vo., Berol., 1842.

⁴ Chap. 5, sect. 3.

⁵ 8vo., Lond., 1652, p. 81, and p. 200.

⁶ Vol. viii., pp. 434-486.

⁷ No. 2.

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1. Its premises are reversed; and, 2. It begins with the premise containing the two terms which have the greatest extension, while the common form starts with the premise containing the terms which have the greatest comprehension. Thus — D is E, C is D, B is C, A is B, therefore A is E.

SOUL (ψυχή, *anima*, soul).

This word had formerly a wider signification than now. In the Second Book of his Treatise Περὶ ψυχῆς, Aristotle has given two definitions of it. In the first of these he calls it "the Entelechy, or first form of an organized body which has potential life." The word ἑντελέχεια, which Dr. Reid begged to be excused from translating, because he did not know the meaning of it, is compounded of ἔτελες, perfect; ἔχειν, to have; and τέλος, an end. Its use was revived by Leibnitz, who designated by it that which possesses in itself the principle of its own activity, and tends towards its end. According to his philosophy, the universe is made up of monads or forces, each active in itself, and tending by its activity to accomplish its proper end. In the philosophy of Aristotle, the word Entelechy, or first form, had a similar meaning, and denoted that which in virtue of an end constituted the essence of things, and gave movement to matter. When the *soul* then is called the Entelechy of an organized body having potential life, the meaning is, that it is that force or power by which life develops itself in bodies destined to receive it.

Aristotle distinguished several forms of *soul*, viz., the *nutritive* or vegetative soul, by which plants and animals had growth and reproduction. The *sensitive*, which was the cause of sensation and feeling. The *motive*, of locomotion. The *appetitive*, which was the source of desire and will; and the *rational* or *reasonable*, which was the seat of reason or intellect. These powers or energies of *soul* exist all in some beings; some of them only in other beings; and in some beings only one of them. That is to say, man possesses all; brutes possess some; plants one only. In the scholastic philosophy, desire and locomotion were not regarded as simple powers or energies — and only the *nutritive* or *vegetative soul*,

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the *sensitive* or *animal*, and the *rational* or *human* were recognized.

In the system of Plato, three forms or energies of *soul* were assigned to man. The *rational*, which had its seat in the head and survived the dissolution of the body—the *irascible*, which had its seat in the heart and was the spring of activity and movement, and the *appetitive* or *concupiscible*, which was the source of the grosser passions and physical instincts, and which died with the bodily organs with which it was united. A similar distinction between the forms or energies of the *soul* has been ascribed to Pythagoras, and traces of it are to be found in several of the philosophical systems of the East.

Among modern philosophers in Germany, a distinction is taken between *ψυχή* (Seele) and *πνεῦμα* (Geist), or *soul* and *spirit*. According to G. H. Schubert, professor at Munich, and a follower of Schelling, the *soul* is the inferior part of our intellectual nature—that which shows itself in the phenomena of dreaming, and which is connected with the state of the brain. The *spirit* is that part of our nature which tends to the purely rational, the lofty, and divine. The doctrine of the *natural* and the *spiritual* man, which we find in the writings of St. Paul, may, it has been thought, have formed the basis upon which this mental dualism has been founded. Indeed it has been maintained that the dualism of the thinking principle is distinctly indicated by the apostle when he says of the Word of God that it is able to “divide asunder *soul* and *spirit*.” The words in the original are *ψυχή* and *πνεῦμα*, and it is contended that by the former is meant the *sentient* or *animal soul*, and by the latter the higher or *rational soul*. A similar distinction has been traced in the language of the Old Testament Scriptures, where one word is employed to denote the life that is common to man with the inferior animals, נֶפֶשׁ, and another word, רוּחַ, to denote that inspiration of the Almighty which giveth him understanding, and makes of him a *rational soul*. It may be doubted, however, whether this distinction is uniformly observed, either in the Scriptures of the Old or of the New Testament. And it may be better for us, instead of attempting to define the *soul* *à priori* by its essence, to define it rather

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a posteriori by its operations. This also has been done by Aristotle, in a definition which has been generally adopted. He says, "The *soul* is that by which we live, feel, or perceive [will], move and understand." This is a full enumeration of all the energies which Aristotle assigned to the *soul*, and they are all manifested by the soul as it exists in man. Two of them, however, the energies of growth and motion, are usually treated of by the physiologist, rather than by the psychologist. At the same time, life and movement are not properties of matter; and therefore they were enumerated by Aristotle as the properties of *soul*—the *soul nutritive*, and the *soul motive*. "The animating form of a natural body is neither its organization, nor its figure, nor any other of those inferior forms which make up the system of its visible qualities; but it is the power which, not being that organization, nor that figure, nor those qualities, is yet able to produce, to preserve, and to employ them."¹ This is what is now called the principle of life, and the consideration of it belongs to the physiologist—for, although in the human being life and soul are united, it is thought they may still be separate entities. In like manner some philosophers have contended that all movement implies the existence of a *soul*, and hence it is that the various phenomena of nature have been referred to an *anima mundi*, or *soul* of the universe. A modern philosopher of great name enumerated among the energies of the human *soul* a special faculty of locomotion, and the power of originating movement or change is ascribed to it when we call it active. The same view is taken by Adolphe Garnier.² Still, life and locomotion are not usually treated of as belonging to the *soul*, but rather as belonging to the bodies in which they are manifested. Hence it is that Dr. Reid, in his definition of the human *soul*, does not enumerate the special energies by which we live and move, but calls it that by which we think. "By the mind of a man," says he,³ "we understand that in him which thinks, remembers, reasons, wills. . . . We are

¹ Harris, *Phil. Arrange.*, p. 279.

² Jouffroy, in his *Cours Professi à la Faculté des Lettres* in 1837

³ In his *Traité des Facultés de l'âme*, iii. tom., 8vo, Par., 1862.

⁴ *Intell. Pow.*, essay i., chap. 1.

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conscious that we think, and that we have a variety of thoughts of different kinds—such as seeing, hearing, remembering, deliberating, resolving, loving, hating, and many other kinds of thought—all which we are taught by nature to attribute to one internal principle; and *this principle of thought we call the mind or soul of man.*¹ It will be observed that Dr. Reid uses the word *soul* as synonymous with *mind*. And, perhaps, no very clear nor important distinction can be taken between them. The plainest and most common distinction taken in the use of these words is, that in speaking of the *mind* of man we refer more to the various powers which it possesses, or the various operations which it performs: and in speaking of the *soul* of man we refer rather to the nature and destiny of the human being. Thus we say the *immortality* of the *soul*, and the *powers* of the *mind*.² A difference of meaning is more observable in our language between the terms *spirit* and *mind* than between *soul* and *mind*. Both the latter terms may be and are applied indifferently to the mental principle as living and moving in connection with a bodily organism. But the term *spirit* properly denotes a being without a body. A being that never had a body is a *pure spirit*. A human soul when it has left the body is a *disembodied spirit*. Body is animated matter. *Mind* or *soul* is incorporated *spirit*.

Into these verbal criticisms, however, it is not necessary to enter very minutely, because in psychological inquiries the term *mind* is commonly employed to denote that by which we feel, know, will, and reason—or in one word the principle of

¹ Dr. Reid's is the psychological definition. But the *soul* is something different from the *ego*, from any of its faculties, and from the sum of them all. Some have placed its essence in thought, as the Cartesians—in sensation, as Locke and Condillac—or in the will or activity, like Maine de Biran. A cause distinguished from its acts, distinguished from its modes or different degrees of activity, is what we call a force. The soul then is a force, one and identical. It is, as defined by Plato (*De Leg.*, lib. 10), a self-moving force. Understanding this to mean bodily or local motion, Aristotle has argued against this definition. — *De Anima*, lib. 1. cap. 3. But Plato probably meant self-active to be the epithet characteristic of the mind or *soul*. — *κίνησις τὴν αὐτὴν κίνησιν*.

² Mind and the Latin *mens* were probably both from a root which is now lost in Europe, but is preserved in the Sanscrit *mena*. to know. The Greek *νόος* or *νέεσ*, from the verb *νόεω*, is of singular origin and import. *Mind* is more limited than *soul*. *Soul*, besides the rational principle, includes the living principle, and may be applied to animals and vegetables. Voluntary motion should not be denied to *mind*, as is very generally done

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thought. We know this inward principle as manifested through a system of bodily organization with which it is united, and by which it is in many ways affected. But “we are taught by nature,” says Dr. Reid, “or it is a primitive belief, that the thinking principle is something different from the bodily organism, and when we wish to signalize its peculiar nature and destiny, we call it *soul* or *spirit*.”

Spirit, Mind, and Soul. — “The *first* denoting the animating faculty, the breath of intelligence, the inspiring principle, the spring of energy and the prompter of exertion; the *second* is the recording power, the preserver of impressions, the storer of deductions, the nurse of knowledge, and the parent of thought; the *last* is the disembodied, ethereal, self-conscious being, concentrating in itself all the purest and most refined of human excellences, every generous affection, every benevolent disposition, every intellectual attainment, every ennobling virtue, and every exalting aspiration.”¹

“*Animus, Anima, πνεῦμα* and *ψυχή* are participles. *Anima* est ab *Animus*. *Animus* vero est a Græco *ἄνεμος* quod dici volunt quasi *ἄεμος*, ab *ἄω* sive *ἄεμι*, quod est *πνέω*; et Latinis a *Spirando*, *Spiritus*. Immo et *ψυχή* est *ψύχω* quod Hesychius exponit *πνέω*.” — Vossius — quoted from Horne Tooke in *Stewart's Philosoph. Essays*, essay v.

“Indulsi mundi communis conditor illis

Tantum *Animas*; nobis *Animum* quoque.” — *Juv., Sat. 9, v. 134.*

Anima, which is common to man and brutes, is that by which we live, move, and are invigorated; whilst *Animus* is that which is peculiar to mankind, and by which we reason.

The triple division of man into *νοῦς, ψυχή, σῶμα*, occurs frequently in ancient authors. Plato, *Timæus*; Aristotle, *Pol. 1*. The Hellenist Jews seemed to have used the term *πνεῦμα* to denote what the Greeks called *νοῦς*, with an allusion to Gen. ii. 7. Josephus, *Ant. Jud.*, i., c. 2. Thence in the New Test we have, 1 Thess. v. 23, *πνεῦμα, ψυχή, σῶμα*. — Heb. iv. 12, and Grotius, *Note on Matthew xxvi. 41*.²

Ψυχή, soul, when considered separately, signifies the prin-

¹ *The Purpose of Existence*, 12mo, 1860, p. 79.

² Fitzgerald. *Notes on Aristotle's Ethic*, p. 179.

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ciple of life; *Noûs*, mind, the principle of intelligence. Or, according to Plutarch, *soul* is the cause and beginning of motion, and *mind* of order and harmony with respect to motion. Together they signify an intelligent soul (*ἡ ψυχὴ λογική*) which is sometimes called a rational soul (*ἡ ψυχὴ λογική*). Hence, when the nature of the soul is not in question, the word *ψυχὴ* is used to express both. Thus in the *Phædo* the soul (*ψυχὴ*) is said sometimes to use the body for the examination of things; at which times, according to Plato, it forms confused and imperfect notions of things, and is involved in error. But, when it examines things by itself, it arrives at what is pure and always existing, and immortal, and uniform, and is free from error. Here the highest operations of *νοῦς* "mind" are indisputably attributed to *ψυχὴ*, "soul." Aristotle¹ describing *ψυχὴ*, says that during anger, confidence, desire, &c., it participates with the body; but that the act of understanding belongs peculiarly to itself."²

SOUL OF THE WORLD. — ANIMA MUNDI — q. v.

SPACE (*spatium*). — "Space, taken in the most general sense, comprehends whatever is extended, and may be measured by the three dimensions, *length*, *breadth*, and *depth*. In this sense it is the same with *extension*. Now, *space*, in this large signification, is either occupied by *body*, or it is not. If it be not, but is void of all matter, and contains nothing, then it is *space* in the strictest signification of the word, and as it is commonly used in English philosophical language, being the same with what is called a *vacuum*."³

Mr. Locke⁴ has attempted to show that we acquire the idea of *space* by sensation, especially by the senses of touch and sight. But according to Dr. Reid,⁵ "*space* is not so properly an object of sense as a *necessary* concomitant of the objects of sight and touch. It is when we see or touch body that we get the idea of *space*; but the idea is not furnished by sense—it is a conception, *a priori*, of the reason. Experience furnishes the occasion, but the mind rises to the conception by

¹ *De Anima*. lib. 1., cap. i.

² Morgan, *On Trinity of Plato*, p. 64.

³ Monboddo, *Anc. Metaphys.*, b. iv., ch. 2.

⁴ Book ii., ch. 4.

⁵ *Intell. Princ.*, essay ii., ch. 10.

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its native energy. This view has been supported by Cousin, *Cours d'Histoire de la Philosophie au xviii. Siècle*;¹ and by Royer Collard.²

"In the philosophy of Kant *space* and time are mere forms of the sensibility. By means of the external sense we represent to ourselves everything as in *space*; and by the internal sense all is represented in the relationship of time."³

According to Kant, *space* is a subjective condition of the sensibility, the form of all external phenomena; and as the sensibility is necessarily anterior in the subject to all real intuition, it follows that the form of all these phenomena is in the mind *a priori*. There can, then, be no question about *space* or extension but in a human or subjective point of view. It may well be said of all things, in so far as they appear existing without us, that they are enclosed in *space*; but not that *space* encloses things absolutely, seen or not seen, and by any subject whatsoever. The idea of *space* has no objective validity, it is real only relatively to phenomena, to things, in so far as they appear out of us; it is purely ideal in so far as things are taken in themselves, and considered independently of the forms of the sensibility.⁴

"Space (German, *Raum*) is a pure intuition which lies at the foundation of all external intuitions, and is represented as an infinitely given quantity. It is the formal condition of all matter, that is, without it, no matter, and consequently no corporeal world, can be thought. *Space* and time have no transcendental objectivity, that is, they are in themselves non-existing, independent of our intuition-faculty; but they have objectivity in respect of the empirical use, that is, they exist as to all beings that possess such a faculty of intuition as ourselves."⁵

"According to Leibnitz, *space* is nothing but the order of things co-existing, as time is the order of things successive—and he maintained, 'that, supposing the whole system of the

¹ 2 tom., 17 leçon.

² In Jouffroy's *Œuvres du Reid*, tom. iii., fragmen 4, p. 424; tom. iv., fragmen 9, p. 338.

³ Analysis of Kant's *Critick of Pure Reason*, 8vo, Lond., 1844, p. 9.

⁴ Willm, *Hist. de la Philosoph. Allemande*, tom. i., p. 142.

⁵ Haywood, *Crit. of Pure Reason*, p. 603.

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visible world to be moved out of the place which it presently occupies, into some other portion of *space*, beyond the limits of this universe, still it would be in the same *space*, provided the order and arrangement of the bodies, with respect to one another, was continued the same.' Now, it is true, that bodies placed in any kind of order, must necessarily be in *space*; but the order in which bodies are placed, and the *space* in which they are placed, must necessarily be distinct."¹

"1. *Space* is not pure nothing, for nothing has no capacity; but *space* has the capacity of receiving body.

"2. It is not an *ens rationis*, for it was occupied by heaven and earth before the birth of man.

"3. It is not an accident inhering in a subject, *i. e.*, body, for body changes its place, but *space* is not moved with it.

"4. It is not the superficies of one body surrounding another, because superficies is an accident; and as superficies is a quantity it should occupy *space*; but *space* cannot occupy *space*. Besides, the remotest heaven occupies *space*, and has no superficies surrounding it.

"5. It is not the relation or order with reference to certain fixed points, as east, west, north, and south. For if the whole world were round, bodies would change place and not their order, or they may change their order and not their place, if the sky, with the fixed points, were moved by itself.

"6 and 7. It is not body, nor spirit.

"8. It may be said with probability that *space* cannot be distinguished from the divine immensity, and therefore from God. It is infinite and eternal, which God only is. He is the place of all being, for no being is out of Him. And although different beings are in different places externally, they are all virtually in the divine immensity."²

Bardili argued for the reality of time and *space* from the fact that the inferior animals perceive or have notions of them. Yet their minds, if they can be said to have minds, are not subject to the forms or laws of the human mind.

But if *space* be something to the mind, which has the idea

¹ Monboddo, *Anc. Metaphys.*, book iv., chap. 1. *Letters of Clarke and Leibnitz.*

² Diderot, *Physic.*, pars. 1. ch. 6.

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of it, and to the bodies which exist in it, what is it? "Perhaps," says Dr. Reid (*ut supra*), "we may apply to it what the Peripatetics said of their first matter, that whatever it is, it is potentially only, not actually." This, accordingly, is the view taken of it by a great admirer of the Peripatetic philosophy. "Space," says Lord Monboddo,¹ "is but a *relative*; and it is relative to *body*, and to *body* only, and this in three respects, *first*, as to its capacity of receiving *body*; *secondly*, as to its connecting or limiting *body*; and *lastly*, as to its being the distance between *bodies* that are separated. . . . *Place* is *space* occupied by *body*. It is different from *body* as that which contains is different from that which is contained. . . . *Space*, then, is *place*, *potentially*; and when it is filled with *body*, then it is *place*, *actually*."

Space, as containing all things, was by Philo and others identified with the Infinite. And the text (Acts xvii. 28) which says that "in God we live, and move, and have our being," was interpreted to mean that *space* is an affection or property of the Deity. Sir Isaac Newton maintained that God by existing constitutes time and *space*. "*Non est duratio vel spatium sed durat et adest, et existendo semper et ubique, spatium et durationem constituit*." Clarke maintained that *space* is an attribute or property of the Infinite Deity. Reid and Stewart, as well as Cousin and Royer Collard, while they regard *space* as something real and more than a relation, have not positively said what it is.

As *space* is a necessary conception of the human mind, as it is conceived of as infinite, and as an infinite quality, Dr. Clarke² thought that from these views we may argue the existence of an infinite substance, to which this quality belongs.

Stewart, *Act. and Mor. Pow.*; Pownall, *Intellectual Physics*; Brougham, *Nat. Theology*.

SPECIES (from the old verb, *specio*, to see) is a word of different signification, in different departments of philosophy.

In *Logic*, *species* was defined to be, "*Id quod predicatur de pluribus numero differentibus, in quæstione quid est?*" And

¹ *Anc. Metaphys.*, book iv., chap. 2.

² See his *Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God*, with Butler's *Letters to him and the Answers*.

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genus was defined to be, "*Id quod predicatur de pluribus differentiis specie, in quaestione quid est?*" According to Derodon,¹ the adequate definition of *genus* is, "*Res similes eodem nomine substantivo donatæ, et identificatæ cum omnibus inferioribus diverso nomine substantivo donatis, et proprietate quadam incommunicabili distinctis.*" And of *species*, "*Res similes eodem nomine substantivo donatæ, et identificatæ cum omnibus inferioribus diverso nomine substantivo donatis et omnes proprietates ita similes habentibus, ut quodlibet possit habere attributa eorum, nullum tamen habeat actu idem sed tantum simile.*"

In the process of *classification* (q. v.), the first step is the formation of a *species*. A *species* is a group of individuals agreeing in some common character, and designated by a common name. When two or more *species* are brought together in the same way, they are called a *genus*.

"In Logic, *genus* and *species* are relative terms; a conception is called in relation to its superior, *species*—to its inferior, *genus*. The *summum genus* is the last result of the abstracting process, the *genus* which can never in turn be a *species*. The *infima species* is the *species* which cannot become a *genus*; which can only contain individuals, and not other *species*. But there can only be one absolute *summum genus*, whether we call it 'thing,' 'substance,' or 'essence.' And we can scarcely ever ascertain the *infima species*, because even in a handful of individuals, we cannot say with certainty that there are no distinctions on which a further subdivision into smaller classes might be founded."²

In *Mathematics*, the term *species* was used in its primitive sense of *appearance*; and when the form of a figure was given, it was said to be given in *species*.

Algebra, in which letters are used for numbers, was called, at one time, the *specious notation*.

In *Mineralogy*, *species* is determined by perfect identity of composition; the form goes for nothing.

In the *organized kingdoms* of nature, on the contrary, *species* is founded on identity of form and structure, both external and internal. The principal characteristic of *species* in animals

¹ *Log.*, p. 293.

² Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*, second edition, sect. 27.

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and vegetables, is the power to produce beings like themselves, who are also productive. A *species* may be modified by external influences; and thus give rise to races or varieties; but it never abandons its own proper character to assume another.

In *Natural History*, *species* includes only the following conditions; viz., separate origin and distinctness of race, evinced by a constant transmission of some characteristic peculiarity of organization.¹

"*Species*," according to Dr. Morton (author of *Crania Americana*), "*is a primordial organic form.*" See a description of *species* in Lyell's *Geology*.²

"By maintaining the unity of the human *species*, says A. v. Humboldt,³ we at the same time repel the cheerless assumption of superior and inferior races of men." "This eminent writer appears in the passage quoted to exaggerate the extent of uniformity implied in a common *species*. It is unquestionable that mankind form one *species* in the sense of the natural historian; but it does not follow from this fact that there are no essential hereditary differences, both physical and mental, between different varieties and races of men. The analogy of animal *species* would make it probable that such essential differences do exist; for we see that, although all horses, dogs, oxen, sheep, &c., form respectively one *species*, yet each *species* contains varieties or races, which possess certain properties in different degrees, — which are more or less large, active, gentle, intelligent, hardy, and the like. If we are guided by the analogy of animal *species*, it is as probable that an Englishman should be more intelligent than a negro, as that a greyhound should be more fleet than a mastiff, or an Arabian horse than a Shetland pony."⁴

Species in Perception.

In explaining the process of external perception, or how we come to the knowledge of things out of and distant from us, it was maintained that these objects send forth *species* or *images* of themselves, which, making an impression on the

¹ Dr. Prichard.

² Chap. 37.

³ *Cosmos*, vol. 1., p. 355, Eng. trans.

⁴ E. G. C. Lewis. *On Politics*, chap. 27, sect. 10.

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bodily organs, next imprinted themselves on the mind and issued in knowledge.

The *species* considered as the vicarious representative of the object, was called *intentional*. And as it affected both the intellect and the sense, was distinguished as *sensible* and *intelligible*.

Species, as *sensible*, was distinguished as *species impressa*, as making an impression upon the sense — and *species expressa*, in consequence of the sense or imagination, from the impression, elaborating another *species* of the object.

Species, as *intelligible*, was also distinguished into *species impressa* and *species expressa*. The *species intelligibilis* was called *impressa*, as it determined the faculty to the apprehension of this object, rather than of that. And it was called *expressa*, as in consequence of the operation of the faculty, knowledge of the object was attained to.

According to some, the *species* as intelligible were conge-nite, and according to others they were elaborated by the intellect in the presence of the phantasms.

The process of perception is thus described by Tellez.¹

Socrates by his figure, &c., makes an impression upon the eye, and vision follows—then a *species* is impressed upon the phantasy, *phantasma impressum*; the phantasy gives the *phantasma expressum*, the *intellectus agens* purifies and spiritualizes it, so that it is received by the *intellectus patiens*, and the knowledge of the object is elicited.

“The philosophy schools teach that for the cause of vision, the thing seen sendeth forth on every side a visible *species* (in English), a visible show, apparition, or aspect, or a being seen, the receiving of which into the eye is seeing. . . . Nay, for the cause of understanding also the thing understood sendeth forth an *intelligible species*, that is, an intelligible being seen, which, coming into the understanding, makes it understood.”²

For the various forms under which the doctrine of *species* has been held, see Reid.³

¹ *Summa Phil. Arist.*, Paris, 1645, p. 47.

² Hobbes, *Of Man*, part I., chap. 1.

³ *Intell. Pow.*, essay II., chap. 8, with notes by Sir W. Hamilton. and note D

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The doctrine was not universally received during the Middle Ages.

"Scholasticism had maintained that between the exterior bodies, placed before us, and the mind of man, there are images which belong to the exterior bodies, and make more or less a part of them, as the *εἰδωλα* of Democritus, images or sensible forms which represent external objects by the conformity which they have with them. So the mind was supposed to be able to know spiritual beings only through the medium of intelligible *species*. Occam destroyed these chimeras, and maintained that there is nothing real but spiritual or material beings, and the mind of man, which directly conceives them. Gabriel Biel, a pupil of Occam (born at Spire, and died 1495), exhibited with much sagacity and clearness the theory of his master. Occam renewed, without knowing it, the warfare of Arcesilas against the Stoics; and he is in modern Europe the forerunner of Reid and of the Scotch school."¹

Mons. Haureau² says of Durandus de St. Pourcain that he not only rejected *intelligible species*, but that he would not admit *sensible species*. To feel, to think, said he, are simple acts which result from the commerce of mind with an external object; and this commerce takes place directly without anything intermediate.

SPECIFICATION (The Principle of) is, that beings the most like or homogeneous disagree or are heterogeneous in some respect. It is the principle of variety or difference.

Specification (Process of) "is the counterpart of *generalization*. In it we begin with the most extensive class, and descend, step by step, till we reach the lowest. In so doing we are thinking *out* objects, and thinking *in* attributes. In generalization we think *in* objects and think *out* attributes."³

SPECULATION (*specular*, to regard attentively).—"To *speculate* is, from premisses given or assumed, but considered unquestionable, as the constituted point of observation, to look abroad upon the whole field of intellectual vision, and thence

¹ Cousin, *Hist. of Mod. Phil.*, vol. II., p. 26.

² *Exam. de Phil. Scholast.*, tom. I., p. 416.

³ Spalding, *Log.*, p. 15.

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to decide upon the true form and dimension of all which meets the view."¹

"*Speculation* stands opposed to *reflection*, a method of thought which has to do with something given, and appropriates the same by continued analysis and synthesis of its elements. If *speculative* stand thus opposed to *reflective* thinking, it must necessarily belong to the former not to set out from anything given as its subject, but from determinations which thought finds in itself as the necessary and primary ground of all being as of all thinking. In this sense, all *speculative* thinking is of an *à priori*, and all *reflective* thinking of an *à posteriori* nature."²

It is that part of philosophy which is neither practical nor experimental. The *speculative* part of philosophy is metaphysics. The *speculative* part of mathematics is that which has no application to the arts.

SPIRITUALISM (*spiritus*, spirit) is not any particular system of philosophy, but the doctrine, whether grounded on reason, sentiment, or faith, that there are substances or beings which are not cognizable by the senses, and which do not reveal themselves to us by any of the qualities of matter, and which we therefore call immaterial or *spiritual*. *Materialism* denies this. But *spiritualism* does not deny the existence of matter, and, placing itself above materialism, admits both body and spirit. Hence it is called dualism, as opposed to the denial of the existence of matter. The idealism of Berkeley and Malebranche may be said to reduce material existences to mere phenomena of the mind. Mysticism, whether religious or philosophical, ends with resolving mind and matter into the Divine substance. Mysticism and idealism tend to pantheism, materialism to atheism. *Spiritualism*, grounded upon consciousness, preserves equally God, the human person, and external nature, without confounding them and without isolating the one from the other.³

SPONTANEITY.—Leibnitz⁴ explains "*spontaneity* to mean the true and real dependence of our actions on ourselves." Hei-

¹ Marsh, *Prelim. Essay to Aids to Reflection*, p. 13.

² Müller, *Doctrine of Sin*, Introd.

³ *Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*

⁴ *Opera*, tom. 1. p. 489.

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neccius calls it “the faculty of directing one’s aim to a certain end.”¹ It is a self-active causality.

SPONTANEOUS is opposed to *reflective*. Those operations of mind which are continually going on without any effort or intention on our part are *spontaneous*. When we exercise a volition, and make an effort of attention to direct our mental energy in any particular way, or towards any particular object, we are said to *reflect*, or to *observe*.

STANDARD OF VIRTUE.—*Standard* is that by which other things are rated or valued. “Labour alone, therefore, never varying in its own value, is alone the ultimate and real *standard* by which commodities can at all times and places be estimated and compared.”²

A *standard* is something set up by which to measure the quantity or quality of some other thing. Now rectitude is the foundation of virtue. The *standard* of virtue is some law or rule by which rectitude can be measured. To the law of God, and to the testimony of an enlightened conscience, if they agree not, it is because there is no truth nor rightness in them. Now the will of God, as declared by the constitution and course of nature, or as revealed by His Word, is a *standard* by which we may measure the amount of rectitude, in action or disposition. According as they agree, in a greater or less degree, with the indications of the divine will, in the same proportion are they right, or in accordance with rectitude. The *standard* of virtue, then, is the will of God, as declared in His Word, or some law or rule deduced from the constitution of nature and the course of providence. The foundation of virtue is the ground or reason on which the law or rule rests. — V. CRITERION.

STATE (States of Mind).—“The reason why madness, idiotism, &c., are called *states*³ of mind, while its acts and operations are not, is because mankind have always conceived the mind to be passive in the former and active in the latter.”⁴

¹ Turnbull, *Trans.*, vol. i., p. 35.

² Smith, *Wealth of Nat.*, b i., c. 5.

³ “The term *state* has, more especially of late years, and principally by Necessitarian philosophers, been applied to all modifications of mind indifferently.”—Sir William Hamilton.

⁴ Reid’s *Correspondence*, p. 55.

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Such were the views of Dr. Reid. But since his day, a change has passed over the language of Scottish psychology. No change of phraseology, because no change of doctrine, is to be found in the writings of Mr. Stewart. But in those of Dr. Brown the difference is manifest. Instead of speaking of the mind as *operating*, or as *acting*, or as *energizing*, he delights rather to speak of it as exhibiting phenomena, and as passing through, or existing in, different *states*. This phraseology has been by many accepted and applauded. It is thought that by adopting it, we neither affirm nor deny the activity of the mind, and thus proceed to consider its manifestations, unembarrassed by any questions as to the way in which these manifestations are brought about. But it may be doubted if this phraseology leaves the question, as to the activity of the mind, entire and untouched.

If Dr. Brown had not challenged the common opinion, he would not, probably, have disturbed the language that was previously in common use; although it must be admitted that he was by no means averse to novel phrases. At all events, the tendency of his philosophy is to represent the mind in all its manifestations as passive—the mere recipient of changes made upon it from without. Indeed, his system of philosophy, which is sensational in its principles, may be said to take the bones and sinews out of the mind, and to leave only a soft and yielding mass, to be magnetized by the palmistry of matter. That the mind in some of its manifestations is passive, rather than active, is admitted; and in reference to these, there can be no objection to speak of it as existing in certain *states*, or passing into these *states*. But in adopting, to some extent, this phraseology, we must not let go the testimony which is given in favour of the activity of mind, by the use and structure of language. Language is not the invention of philosophers. It is the natural expression of the human mind, and the exponent of those views which are natural to it. Now, the phrase *operations of mind*, being in common use, indicates a common opinion that mind is naturally active. That opinion may be erroneous, and it is open to philosophers to show, if they can, that it is so. But the observation of Dr. Reid is, that “until it is proved that the mind is not active in thinking, but merely

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passive, the common language with regard to its operations ought to be used, and ought not to give place to a phraseology invented by philosophers, which implies its being merely passive."

And in another place,¹ he says, "There may be distinctions that have a real foundation, and which may be necessary in philosophy, which are not made in common language, because not necessary in the common business of life. But I believe no instance will be found of a distinction made in all languages, which has not a just foundation in nature."

If any change of phraseology were expedient, the phrase "*manifestations of mind*" would touch less upon the question of its activity. But in the language of Dr. Reid—"The mind is from its very nature, a living and active being. Everything we know of it implies life and active energy; and the reason why all its modes of thinking are called its operations, is, that in all or in most of them, it is not merely passive, as body is, but is really and properly active. In all ages, and in all languages, ancient and modern, the various modes of thinking have been expressed by words of active signification, such as seeing, hearing, reasoning, willing, and the like. It seems, therefore, to be the natural judgment of mankind, that the mind is active in its various ways of thinking; and for this reason they are called its operations, and are expressed by active verbs."

One proof of the mind being active in some of its operations is, that these operations are accompanied with effort, and followed by languor. In attention, we are conscious of effort; and the result of long continued attention is languor and exhaustion. This could not be the case if the mind was altogether passive—the mere recipient of impressions made—of ideas introduced. — *V. OPERATIONS OF MIND.*

STATISTICS.—"The observation, registration, and arrangement of those facts in politics which admit of being reduced to a numerical expression has been, of late years, made the subject of a distinct science, and comprehended under the do

¹ *Intell. Proc.*, essay I., chap. 1.

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signation of *statistics*. Both the name and the separate treatment of the subject were due to Achenwall,¹ who died in 1772.² This science, it is there remarked, does not discuss causes, nor reason upon probable effects; it seeks only to collect, arrange, and compare, that class of facts which *alone* (?) can form the basis of correct conclusions with respect to social and political government. . . . Its peculiarity is, that it proceeds wholly by the accumulation and comparison of facts, and does not admit of any kind of speculation. . . . The statist commonly prefers to employ figures and tabular exhibitions."³

STOICS (from *στωά*, a porch). — Zeno opened a school at Athens, in the "variegated porch," so called from the painting of Polygnotus, with which it was adorned, whence his adherents were called "philosophers of the porch." — Stoics.⁴

"From the *Tusculan Questions*," says Bentham,⁵ "I learnt that pain is no evil. Virtue is of itself sufficient to confer happiness on any man who is disposed to possess it on these terms. . . .

"This was the sort of trash which a set of men used to amuse themselves with talking, while parading backwards and forwards in colonnades, called porches: that is to say, the *Stoics*, so called from *στωά*, the Greek name for a porch. In regard to these, the general notion has been, that compared with our cotemporaries in the same ranks, they were, generally speaking, a good sort of men; and assuredly, in all times, good sort of men, talking all their lives long nonsense, in an endless variety of shapes, never have been wanting; but that from talking nonsense in this or any other shape, they or their successors have, in any way or degree, been the better, this is what does not follow."

¹ God-froy Achenwall was born at Elbingen, in Prussia, in 1719, studied at Jena, Halle, and Leipzig, established himself at Marburg in 1746, and in 1748, where he soon afterwards obtained a chair. He was distinguished as Professor of History and Statistics. But he also published several works on the Law of Nature and of Nations.

² Upon the nature and province of the science of *statistics*, see the Introduction to the *Journal of the London Statistical Society*, vol. 1., 1839.

³ Sir G. C. Lewis, *Method of Observ. in Polit.*, chap. 5, sect. 10.

⁴ Schweigler, *Hist. of Phil.*, p. 138.

⁵ *Devinol.*, vol. 1., p. 302.

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Their philosophy of mind may be judged of by the motto assigned to them — *Nihil est in intellectu nisi prius fuerit in sensu*. Yet, along with this, they held that the mind had the power of framing general ideas, but these were derived from experience. Zeno compared the hand open to sensation; half closed upon some object to judgment; fully closed upon it to *παρασία καταληπτική*, comprehensive judgment, or synthesis of judgment. And when the one hand grasped the other to enable it to hold more firmly, this was universal and definitive synthesis or science. In physics they said all things were made of cause and matter. In morals their maxim was "to live agreeably to nature." Mind ought to govern matter. And the great struggle of life was, to lift the soul above the body, and the evils incident to it. Their two great rules were *ἀνίσχου* and *ἀπέχεο* — *sustine, abstine*.¹

Heinsius (Dan.), *Philosoph. Stoica*;² Lipsius (Justus), *Manuductio ad Stoicam Philosoph.*;³ Gataker (Thomas), *Dissertatio de Disciplina Stoica*, prefixed to his edition of *Anthoninus*.⁴

SUBJECT, OBJECT, SUBJECTIVE, OBJECTIVE. — "We frequently meet," says Dr. Reid, "with a distinction between things *in the mind* and things *external* to the mind. The powers, faculties, and operations of the mind, are things in the mind. Everything is said to be in the mind, of which the mind is the *subject*. . . . Excepting the mind itself and things in the mind, all other things are said to be external."

By the term *subject* Dr. Reid meant substance, that to which powers belong or in which qualities reside or inhere. The distinction, therefore, which he takes between things in the mind and things external to the mind, is equivalent to that which is expressed among continental writers by the *ego* and the *non ego*, or *self* and *not self*. The mind and things in the mind constitute the *ego*. "All other things," says Dr. Reid, "are said to be external." They constitute the *non ego*.

"In the philosophy of mind, *subjective* denotes what is to be referred to the thinking subject, the *ego*; *objective*, what belongs to the object of thought, the *non ego*."⁵

¹ *Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.*

² 4to, Leyd., 1627.

³ 4to, Antw., 1664.

⁴ 4to, Camb., 1648.

⁵ Sir W. Hamilton, *Discussions*, Lond., 8vo, 1852, p. 5, note.

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"The *subject* is properly, *id in quo*; the *object*, *id circa quod*. Hence, in psychological language, the *subject* absolutely is the mind that knows or thinks, i. e., the mind considered as the *subject* of knowledge or thought—the *object*, that which is known or thought about. The adjectives *subjective* and *objective* are convenient, if not indispensable expressions."¹

Sir Will. Hamilton² explains how these terms should have come into common use in mental philosophy.

"All knowledge is a relation, a relation between that which knows (in scholastic language, the *subject* in which knowledge inheres) and that which is known (in scholastic language, the *object* about which knowledge is conversant); and the contents of every act of knowledge are made up of elements, and regulated by laws, proceeding partly from its *object* and partly from its *subject*. Now, philosophy proper is principally and primarily the *science of knowledge*—its first and most important problem being to determine, What can we know? that is, what are the conditions of our knowing, whether these lie in the nature of the *object*, or in the nature of the *subject* of knowledge.

"But philosophy being the science of knowledge; and the science of knowledge supposing, in its most fundamental and thorough-going analysis, the distinction of the *subject* and *object* of knowledge; it is evident that to philosophy the *subject of knowledge* would be by pre-eminence, the *subject*, and the *object of knowledge*, the *object*. It was therefore natural that the *object* and *objective*, the *subject* and *subjective*, should be employed by philosophers as simple terms, compendiously to denote the grand discrimination, about which philosophy was constantly employed, and which no others could be found so precisely and promptly to express."

For a disquisition on *subject*, see Tappan.³—V. OBJECTIVE.

SUBJECTIVISM is the doctrine of Kant, that all human knowledge is merely relative; or rather that we cannot prove it to be absolute. According to him, we cannot *objectify the subjective*; that is, we cannot prove that what appears true to

¹ Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 221, note.

² In note B to *Reid's Works*, p. 108.

³ *Log.*, sect. 4.

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us must appear true to all intelligent beings; or that with different faculties what now appears true to us might not appear true. But to call our knowledge relative is merely calling it human or proportioned to the faculties of a man; just as the knowledge of angels may be called angelic. Our knowledge may be admitted to be relative to our faculties of apprehending it; but that does not make it less certain.¹

SUBLIME (The).—"In reflecting on the circumstances by which *sublimity* in its primitive sense is specifically distinguished, the first thing that strikes us is, that it carries the thoughts in a direction opposite to that in which the great and universal law of terrestrial gravitation operates."²

A sense of grandeur and sublimity has been recognized as one of the reflex senses belonging to man. It is different from the sense of the beautiful, though closely allied to it. Beauty charms, sublimity moves us, and is often accompanied with a feeling resembling fear, while beauty rather attracts and draws us towards it.

There is a *sublime* in nature, as in the ocean or the thunder—in moral action, as in deeds of daring and self-denial—and in art, as in statuary and painting, by which what is *sublime* in nature and in moral character is represented and idealized.

Kant has accurately analyzed our feelings of sublimity and beauty in his *Critique du Judgment*; Cousin, *Sur le Beau, le Vrai, et le Bon*; Burke, *On the Sublime and Beautiful*; Addison.³ Dr. Parr addressed an Essay on the *Sublime* to D. Stewart.

SUBSISTENTIA is a substantial mode added to a singular nature, and constituting a *suppositum* along with it. It means, 1. The thing itself, the *suppositum*; hence we call the three persons of the Trinity three *hypostases* or *subsistences*. 2. The mode added to the singular nature to complete its existence; this is the metaphysical sense. 3. The act of existing *per se*.

"Subsistentia est '*substantiæ completio*;' qua carent rerum naturalium partes a reliquis divulsæ. Subsistens dicitur suppositum aut hypostasis. Persona est suppositum ratione præditum."⁴

¹ Reid's Works, by Sir W. Hamilton, p. 513.

² Stewart, *Phil. Essays, Essay on the Sublime*.

³ Spectator, vol. vi.

⁴ Hutcheson, *Metaphys.*, pars 1, cap. 5.

SUBSTANCE is "that which is and abides."

It may be derived from *subsistens* (*ens per se subsistens*), that which subsists of or by itself; or from *substans* (*id quod substat*), that which lies under qualities—the *ὑποκείμενον* of the Greeks. But in Greek, substance is denoted by *οὐσία*—so that which truly is, or essence, seems to be the proper meaning of *substance*. It is opposed to *accident*; of which Aristotle has said¹ that you can scarcely predicate of it that it is anything. So also Augustine² derives *substance* from *subsistendo* rather than from *substando*. "*Sicut ab eo quod est esse, appellatur essentia; ita ab eo quod est subsistere, substantiam dicimus.*" But Locke prefers the derivation from *substando*. He says:³ "The idea, then, we have, to which we give the name of *substance*, being nothing but the supposed but unknown support of these qualities we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist, *sine re substante*, without something to support them, we call that support *substantia*; which, according to the true import of the word, is, in plain English, standing under or upholding."

Dr. Hampden⁴ has said, "*Substance*, in its logical and metaphysical sense, is that nature of a thing which may be conceived to remain when every other nature is removed or abstracted from it—the ultimate point in analyzing the complex idea of any object. *Accident* denotes all those ideas which the analysis excludes as not belonging to the mere being or nature of the object."

Substance has been defined, *ens per se existens*; and *accident*, *ens existens non in se sed in alio*.

Our first idea of *substance* is probably derived from the consciousness of *self*—the conviction that, while our sensations, thoughts, and purposes are changing, *we* continue the same. We see bodies also remaining the same as to quantity or extension, while their colour and figure, their state of motion or of rest, may be changed.

Substances, it has been said, are either *primary*, that is, singular, individual substances; or *secondary*,⁵ that is genera and

¹ *Metaphys.*, lib. vii.

² *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii., ch. 23.

³ Haurneau (*Phil. Scholast.*, tom. i., p. 60), says that what has been called *second substance* is just one of its modes or a species.

⁴ *De Trinitate*, lib. vii., c. 4.

⁵ *Bampton Lect.*, vii., p. 337.

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species of *substance*. *Substances* have also been divided into *complete* and *incomplete*, *finite* and *infinite*, &c. But these are rather divisions of *being*. *Substance* may, however, be properly divided into matter and spirit, or that which is extended and that which thinks. — V. ESSENCE.

Substance (The Principle of) denotes that law of the human mind by which every quality or mode of being is referred to a *substance*. In everything which we perceive or can imagine as existing, we distinguish two parts, qualities variable and multiplied, and a being one and identical; and these two are so united that we cannot separate them in our intelligence, nor think of qualities without a *substance*. Memory recalls to us the many modes of our mind; but amidst all these modes we believe ourselves to be the same individual being. So in the world around us the phenomena are continually varying; but we believe that these phenomena are produced by causes which remain, as *substances*, the same. And as we know ourselves to be the causes of our own acts, and to be able to change the modes of our own mind, so we believe the changes of matter to be produced by causes which belong to the *substance* of it. And underlying all causes, whether of finite mind or matter, we conceive of one universal and absolute cause, *one substance*, in itself persistent and upholding all things.

SUBSUMPTION (*sub*, under; *sumo*, to take). — “When we are able to comprehend why or how a thing is, the belief of the existence of that thing is not a primary datum of consciousness, but a *subsumption* under the cognition or belief which affords its reason.”¹

To *subsume* is to place any one cognition under another as belonging to it. In the judgment, “all horses are animals,” the conception “horses” is *subsumed* under that of “animals.” The minor proposition is a *subsumption* under the major when it is placed first. Thus, if one were to say, “No man is wise in all things,” and another to respond, “But you are a man,” this proposition is a *subsumption* under the former. And the major being *assumed ex concessio*, and the minor *subsumed* as evidence, the conclusion follows, “You are not wise in all things.”

¹ Sir Will. Hamilton, *Read's Works*, note A.

SUCCESSION.—“By reflecting on the appearance of various ideas one after another in our understanding, we get the notion of *succession*.”¹ He traces our notion of *duration* or *time* to the same origin; or rather he confounds *succession* and *duration*, the measure with the thing measured. According to Cousin and others, the notion of time is logically antecedent and necessary to the notion of *succession*. Events take place in time, as bodies exist in space. In the philosophy of Kant, time is not an empirical notion, but like space, a form of the sensibility.—*V. DURATION, TIME.*

SUFFICIENT REASON (Doctrine of).—“Of the principle of the *sufficient reason*, the following account is given by Leibnitz, in his controversial correspondence with Dr. Clarke:—‘The great foundation of mathematics is the principle of *contradiction* or *identity*; that is, that a proposition cannot be true and false at the same time. But, in order to proceed from mathematics to natural philosophy, another principle is requisite (as I have observed in my *Theodicæa*). I mean, the principle of the *sufficient reason*; or, in other words, that nothing happens without a *reason* why it should be so, rather than otherwise. And, accordingly, Archimedes was obliged, in his book *De Equilibrio*, to take for granted, that if there be a balance, in which everything is alike on both sides, and if equal weights are hung on the two ends of that balance, the whole will be at rest. It is because no *reason* can be given why one side should weigh down rather than the other. Now by this single principle of the *sufficient reason*, may be demonstrated the being of a God, and all the other parts of metaphysics or natural theology; and even, in some measure, those physical truths that are independent of mathematics, such as the dynamical principles, or the principles of forces.’”
—*V. REASON (DETERMINING).*

The principle of *sufficient reason* as a law of thought is stated by logicians thus—“Every judgment we accept must rest upon a sufficient ground or reason.” From this law follow such principles as these:—1. Granting the reason, we must grant what follows from it. On this, syllogistic inference depends. 2. If all the consequents are held to be true, the

¹ Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, b. II., ch. 14.

² See Reid, *Act. Pow.*, essay IV., chap. 9.

SUFFICIENT—

reason must be true. 3. If we reject the consequent we must reject the reason. 4. If we admit the consequent, we do not of necessity admit the reason, as there may be other reasons or causes of the same effect.

Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*.¹ But according to Mr. Mansel,² "The principle of *sufficient reason* is no law of thought, but only the statement that every act of thought must be governed by some law or other."

SUGGESTION (*suggero*, to bear or place under, to prompt).

"It is the received doctrine of philosophers, that our notions of relations can only be got by comparing the related ideas: but it is not by having first the notions of mind and sensation and then comparing them together, that we perceive the one to have the relation of a subject or substratum, and the other that of an act or operation: on the contrary, one of the related things, viz., sensation, *suggests* to us both the correlate and the relation.

"I beg leave to make use of the word *suggestion*, because I know not one more proper, to express a power of the mind, which seems entirely to have escaped the notice of philosophers, and to which we owe many of our simple notions which are neither impressions nor ideas, as well as many original principles of belief."³

To this power Dr. Reid refers our natural judgments or principles of common sense. Mr. Stewart⁴ has expressed surprise that Reid should have apologized for introducing a word which had already been employed by Berkeley, to denote those intimations which are the results of experience and habit. And Sir W. Hamilton⁵ has shown that in the more extensive sense of Reid the word had been used by Tertullian; who, speaking of the universal belief of the soul's immortality, has said,⁶ "*Natura pleraque suggeruntur, quasi de publico sensu quo animam Deus ditare dignatus est.*"

The word *suggestion* is much used in the philosophy of Dr. Thomas Brown, in a sense nearly the same as that assigned to association, by other philosophers. He calls judg

¹ P. 206.² Reid, *Enquiry*, ch. 2, s. 7.³ Reid's *Works*, p. 3, note.⁴ *Prolegom. Log.*, p. 198.⁵ *Dissert.*, p. 167, second ed.⁶ *De Anima*, c. 2.

SUGGESTION—

ment, *relative suggestion*. Hutcheson¹ says, "*Sensus est internus qui suggerit præcipue intellectiones puras; quæ conscientia, aut reflectendi vis dicitur.*" It is not so properly consciousness or reflection which gives the new ideas, but rather the occasion on which these ideas are suggested. It is when we are conscious and reflect on one thing, some other thing related to it, but not antecedently thought, is *suggested*.

Locke² said, "Simple ideas, the materials of all our knowledge, are *suggested and furnished* to the mind only by those two ways mentioned above, viz., *Senses* and *Reflection*. Cumberland³ had said before him, "*Utrobique intelligimus propositiones quasdam immutabilis veritatis. Hujusmodi aliquot veritates a rerum hominumque natura mentibus humanis necessario suggeri, hoc est quod a nobis affirmatur, hoc idem ab adversariis non minus diserte denegatur.*"

SUICIDE (*sui* and *cædes*, self-murder) is the voluntary taking away of one's own life. The Stoics thought it was not wrong to do so, when the pains and inconveniences of our lot exceeded its enjoyments and advantages. But the command, "Thou shalt not kill," forbids *suicide* as well as homicide. It is contrary to one of the strongest instincts of our nature, that of self-preservation—and at variance with the submission which we owe to God, and the duties incumbent upon us towards our fellow-creatures. All the apologies that can be offered for it are futile.

Aristotle;⁴ Hermann, *Disputatio de Autocheiria et philosophice et ex legibus Romanis considerata*;⁵ Madame de Staël, *Reflexions sur le Suicide*; Stœudlin, *Hist. des Opinions et des Doctrines sur le Suicide*;⁶ Tissot, *Manie du Suicide*; Adams, *On Self-murder*; Donne, *Biathanatos*.

SUPERSTITION (so called, according to Lucretius, *quod sit superstantium rerum*, i. e., *cælestium et divinarum quæ supra nos stant, nimis et superfluous timor*, Aulus Gellius,⁷) is not an "excess of religion" (at least in the ordinary sense of the word *excess*), "as if any one could have too much of true

¹ *Log. Compend.*, cap. 1.

² *De Legg. Nat.*, c. 1., sect. 1.

³ 4to. Leipz., 1809.

⁴ *Noct. Attic.*, lib. 10.

⁵ *Essay on Hum. Understand.* b. II., ch. 2, § 2.

⁶ *Ethic.*, lib. III., cap. 7, lib. V., cap. 11.

⁷ 8vo, Gœtting., 1824.

SUPERSTITION —

religion, but any *misdirection* of religious feeling; manifested either in showing religious veneration or regard to objects which deserve *none*; that is, properly speaking, the worship of false gods; or, in the assignment of such a degree, or such a kind of religious veneration to any object, as that object, though worthy of some reverence, does not deserve; or in the worship of the true God through the medium of improper rites and ceremonies.”¹

“Superstition,” says Dr. Hartley, “may be defined a mistaken opinion concerning the severity and punishments of God, magnifying these in respect to ourselves or others. It may arise from a sense of guilt, from bodily indisposition, or from erroneous reasoning.”

SUPRA-NATURALISM (*supra*, above; *natura*, nature) is the doctrine that in nature there are more than physical causes in operation, and that in religion we have the guidance not merely of reason but of revelation. It is thus opposed to *Naturalism* and to *Rationalism* — *q. v.* In Germany, where the word originated, the principal *Supra-naturalists* are Tholuck, Hengstenberg, Guericke, &c.

SYLLOGISM (συλλογισμός, a putting together of judgments, or propositions or reasonings).

This word occurs in the writings of Plato, in the sense of judging or reasoning; but not in the technical sense assigned to it by Aristotle.

According to Aristotle,² “a *syllogism* is a speech (or enunciation) (λόγος) in which certain things (the premises) being supposed, something different from what is supposed (the conclusion) follows of necessity; and this solely in virtue of the suppositions themselves.”

“A *syllogism* is a combination of two judgments necessitating a third judgment as the consequence of their mutual relation.”³

Euler likened the *syllogism* to three concentric circles, of which the first contained the second, which in its turn contained the third. Thus, if A be predicable of all B, and B of all C, it follows necessarily that A is also predicable of C.

¹ Whately, *On Bacon*, p. 155.

² *Prior. Analyt.*, lib. I., cap. 1, sect. 7.

³ Mansel, *Prolegom. Log.*, p. 61.

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In a *sylllogism*, the first two propositions are called the *premisses*; because they are the things premised or put before, they are also called the *antecedents*: the first of them is called the *major* and the second the *minor*. The third proposition, which contains the thing to be proved, is called the *conclusion* or *consequent*: and the particle which unites the conclusion with the premisses is called the *consequentia* or *consequence*.¹

In a *sylllogism*, "the conclusion having two terms, a subject and a predicate, its predicate is called the *major term*, and its subject the *minor term*." In order to prove the conclusion, each of its terms is, in the premisses, compared with the *third term*, called the *middle term*. By this means one of the premisses will have for its two terms the major term and the middle term; and this premise is called the *major premise*, or the *major proposition* of the *sylllogism*. The other premise must have for its two terms the minor term and the middle term; and it is called the *minor proposition*. Thus the *sylllogism* consists of three propositions, distinguished by the names of the *major*, the *minor*, and the *conclusion*; and although each of these has two terms, a subject and a predicate, yet there are only three different terms in all. The major term is always the predicate of the conclusion, and is also either the subject or predicate of the major proposition. The minor term is always the subject of the conclusion, and is also either the subject or predicate of the minor proposition. The middle term never

¹ Thus: —

Every virtue is laudable;
Diligence is a virtue;
Wherefore diligence is laudable.

"The two former propositions are the *premisses* or *antecedents*, the last is the *conclusion* or *consequent*, and the particle wherefore is the *consequentia* or *consequence*."

"The *consequent* may be true and the *consequence* false.

"What has parts is divisible;
The human soul has parts;
Wherefore the human soul is divisible.

"The *consequent* may be true although the *consequence* is false.

"Antichrist will be powerful,
Therefore he will be impious

"His impety will not flow from his power."

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enters into the conclusion, but stands in both premises, either in the position of subject or of predicate."¹

According to the various positions which the middle term may have in the premises, *sylogisms* are said to be of various *figures*. And as all the possible positions of the middle term are only four, the regular figures of the *sylogisms* are also four; and a *sylogism* is said to be drawn in the first, second, third, or fourth *figure* according to the position of its middle term.

There is another division of *sylogisms* according to their *moods*. The *mood* of a *sylogism* is determined by the *quality* and *quantity* of the propositions of which it consists. There are sixty-four *moods* possible in every *figure*. And the theory of the *sylogism* requires that we show what are the particular *moods* in each *figure*, which do or do not form a just and conclusive *sylogism*. The legitimate *moods* of the first *figure* are demonstrated from the axiom called *Dictum de omni et de nullo*. The legitimate *moods* of the other *figures* are proved by reducing them to some *mood* of the first.²

According to the different kinds of propositions employed in forming them, *sylogisms* are divided into Categorical and Hypothetical. Categorical *sylogisms* are divided into Pure and Modal. Hypothetical *sylogisms* into Conditional and Disjunctive.

In the Categorical *sylogism*, the two premisses and the conclusion are all categorical propositions.

One premiss of a conditional *sylogism* is a conditional proposition; the other premiss is a categorical proposition, and either asserts the antecedent or denies the consequent. In the former case, which is called the *modus ponens*, the conclusion infers the truth of the consequent; in the latter case, which is called the *modus tollens*, the conclusion infers the falsity of the antecedent. The general forms of these two cases are, "If A is, B is; but A is, therefore B is; and if A is, B is not; but B is, therefore A is not." "If what we learn from the Bible is true, we ought not to do evil that good may come; but what we learn from the Bible is true, therefore we ought not to do evil that good may come."

¹ Reid, *Account of Aristotle's Logic*, chap. 3, sect. 2.

² Christian Wolf, *Smaller Logic*, ch. 6.

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In the Disjunctive *syllogism*, we commence with a disjunctive judgment, and proceed either by asserting the truth of one member of the division, and thence inferring the falsity of all the rest, which is called the *modus ponens*, or else by asserting the falsity of all the members but one, and hence inferring the truth of that one, which latter method is called the *modus tollens*. The general form of these two cases will be, "Either A is, or B is, or C is; but A is; therefore neither B is, nor C is." And "Either A is, or B is, or C is; but neither B is, nor C is; therefore A is." Either the Pope is infallible, or there is at least one great error in the Romish Church; but the Pope is not infallible, therefore there is at least one great error in the Romish Church.¹

Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*;² Aldrich, Wallis, Watts, and other authors on Logic.

SYMBOL. — V. MYTH.**SYMPATHY** (*συμπάθεια*, fellow-feeling).

"This mutual affection which the Greeks call *sympathy*, tendeth to the use and benefit of man alone."³

"These sensitive cogitations are not pure actions springing from the soul itself, but *compassion* (*sympathy*) with the body."⁴

"Pity and compassion are words appropriated to signify our fellow-feeling with the sorrow of others. *Sympathy*, though its meaning was, perhaps, originally the same, may now, however, without much impropriety, be made use of to denote our fellow-feeling with any other passion whatever."⁵

Sympathy with sorrow or suffering is *compassion*; *sympathy* with joy or prosperity is *congratulation*. — V. ANTIPATHY.

SYNCATEGOREMATIC. — V. CATEGOREMATIC.

SYNCRETISM (*συκρητισμός*, from *σύν*, together, and *κρητίζω*, to behave like a Cretan). — "The Cretans are herein very observable, who, being accustomed to frequent skirmishes and fights, as soon as they were over, were reconciled and

¹ Solly, *Syll. of Logic*.

² B. iv., chap. 17

³ Holland, *Pliny*, b. xx., Proem.

⁴ Cudworth, *Immut. Mor.*, book iii., chap. 1, p. 18.

⁵ Smith, *Theory of Mor. Sent.*, part i., sect. 1.

SYNCRETISM —

went together. And this was it which they commonly called a *Syncretism*.¹

Syncretism is opposed to *Eclecticism* in philosophy. *Eclecticism* (*q. v.*) while it takes from various systems, does so on the principle that the parts so taken, when brought together, have a kind of congruity and consistency with one another. *Syncretism* is the jumbling together of different systems or parts of systems, without due regard to their being consistent with one another. It is told of a Roman consul that, when he arrived in Greece he called before him the philosophers of the different schools, and generously offered to act as moderator between them. Something of the same kind was proposed by Charles V.² in reference to the differences between Protestants and Papists; as if philosophy, and theology which is the highest philosophy, instead of being a search after truth, were a mere matter of diplomacy or compromise—a playing at protocols. But *Syncretism* does not necessarily aim at the reconciling of the doctrines which it brings together; it merely places them in juxtaposition.

Philo of Alexandria gave the first example of *syncretism*, in trying to unite the Oriental philosophy with that of the Greeks. The Gnostics tried the same thing with the doctrines of the Christian religion. About the beginning of the seventeenth century, George Calixtus, a German theologian, attempted to set down in one common creed the belief of the Papists and the Protestants; but succeeded only in irritating both. To him and his partizans the name *Syncretist* seems to have been first applied.³ Similar efforts were made to unite the metaphysics of Aristotle with those of Descartes. And the attempts which have frequently been made to reconcile the discoveries of geology with the cosmogony of Moses, deserve no name but that of *syncretism*, in the sense of its being “a mixing together of things which ought to be kept

¹ Plutarch, *Of Brotherly Love*.

² After his retiring from the toils of empire, Charles V. employed his leisure in constructing time-pieces, and on experiencing the difficulty of making their movements synchronous, he is said to have exclaimed, in reference to the attempt to reconcile Protestants and Papists, “How could I dream of making two great bodies of men think alike when I cannot make two clocks to go alike!”

³ See Walch's *Introduction to Controversies of Lutheran Church*.

SYNCRETISM —

distinct." On the evils of *syncretism*, see Sewell,¹ who quotes as against it the text, Deut. xxii. 9, "*Thou shalt not sow thy vineyard with divers seeds,*" &c.

SYNDERESIS (σύν διαίρεσις, to divide, to tear asunder) was used to denote the state of conviction or remorse in which the mind was when comparing what it had done with what it ought to have done.²

SYNEIDESIS (συνείδησις, joint knowledge; from σύν and εἶδω). — Conscience, as giving knowledge of an action in reference to the law of right and wrong, was called the Witness who accused or excused. The operations of conscience were represented by the three members of a syllogism; of which the first contained the law, the second the testimony of the witness, and the third the decision of the judge. But conscience not only pronounces sentence; it carries its sentence into effect. — V. SYNDERESIS.

He who has transgressed any of the rules of which conscience is the repository, is punished by the reproaches of his own mind. He who has obeyed these rules, is acquitted and rewarded by feelings of complacency and self-approbation. — V. SYNDERESIS.

SYNTERESIS (συντήρησις, the conservatory; from συντηρέω). — Conscience, considered as the repository of those rules, or general maxims, which are regarded as first principles in morals, was called by this name among the early Christian moralists, and was spoken of as the law or lawgiver.

SYNTHESIS (σύνθεσις, a putting together, composition) "consists in assuming the causes discovered and established as principles, and by them explaining the phenomena proceeding from them and proving the explanation."³

"Every *synthesis* which has not started with a complete *analysis* ends at a result which, in Greek, is called *hypothesis*; instead of which, if *synthesis* has been preceded by a sufficient *analysis*, the *synthesis* founded upon that *analysis* leads to a result which in Greek is called *system*. The legitimacy of every *synthesis* is directly owing to the exactness of *analysis*;

¹ *Christ. Morals*, chap. 9.

² Aquinas, *Summa Theolog.*, pars prima, quæst. 79, articulus 12.

³ Newton, *Optics*.

SYNTHESIS—

every system which is merely an hypothesis is a vain system; every *synthesis* which has not been preceded by analysis is a pure imagination: but at the same time every analysis which does not aspire to a *synthesis* which may be equal to it, is an analysis which halts on the way. On the one hand, *synthesis* without analysis gives a false science; on the other hand, analysis without *synthesis* gives an incomplete science. An incomplete science is a hundred times more valuable than a false science; but neither a false science nor an incomplete science is the ideal of science. The ideal of science, the ideal of philosophy, can be realized only by a method which combines the two processes of *analysis* and *synthesis*."—V. ANALYSIS, METHOD, SYSTEM.

SYSTEM (*συστήμα*; from *συνίστημι*, to place together) is a full and connected view of all the truths of some department of knowledge. An organized body of truth, or truths arranged under one and the same idea, which idea is as the life or soul which assimilates all those truths. No truth is altogether isolated. Every truth has relation to some other. And we should try to unite the facts of our knowledge so as to see them in their several bearings. This we do when we frame them into a *system*. To do so legitimately we must begin by analysis and end with synthesis. But *system* applies not only to our knowledge, but to the objects of our knowledge. Thus we speak of the planetary *system*, the muscular *system*, the nervous *system*. We believe that the order to which we would reduce our ideas has a foundation in the nature of things. And it is this belief that encourages us to reduce our knowledge of things into systematic order. The doing so is attended with many advantages. At the same time a spirit of systematizing may be carried too far. It is only in so far as it is in accordance with the order of nature that it can be useful or sound. Condillac has a *Traité des Systemes*, in which he traces their causes and their dangerous consequences.

System, Economy, or Constitution.—"A *System, Economy, or Constitution*, is a one or a whole, made up of several parts, but yet that the several parts even considered as a whole do

¹ Cousin, *Hist. Mod. Phil.*, vol. i., pp. 277, 278.

SYSTEM —

not complete the idea, unless in the notion of a whole you include the relations and respects which these parts have to each other. Every work, both of nature and of art, is a *system*; and as every particular thing, both natural and artificial, is for some use or purpose out of and beyond itself, one may add to what has been already brought into the idea of a *system*, its conduciveness to this one or more ends. Let us instance in a watch—suppose the several parts of it taken to pieces, and placed apart from each other; let a man have ever so exact a notion of these several parts, unless he considers the respects and relations which they have to each other, he will not have anything like the idea of a watch. Suppose these several parts brought together and any how united: neither will he yet, be the union ever so close, have an idea which will bear any resemblance to that of a watch. But let him view these several parts put together, or consider them as to be put together in the manner of a watch; let him form a notion of the relations which these several parts have to each other—all conducive in their respective ways to this purpose, showing the hour of the day; and then he has the idea of a watch. Thus it is with regard to the inward frame of man. Appetites, passions, affections, and the principle of reflection, considered merely as the several parts of our inward nature, do not give us an idea of the system or constitution of this nature; because the constitution is formed by somewhat not yet taken into consideration, namely, by the relations which these several parts have to each other, the chief of which is the authority of reflection or conscience. It is from considering the relations which the several appetites and passions in the inward frame have to each other, and, above all, the supremacy of reflection or conscience, that we get the idea of the *system* or constitution of human nature. And from the idea itself it will as fully appear, that this our nature, *i. e.*, constitution, is adapted to virtue, as from the idea of a watch it appears that its nature, *i. e.*, constitution or *system*, is adapted to measure time.”¹—V. METHOD, THEORY.

TABULA RASA (a tablet made smooth).—The ancients were in use to write upon tablets covered with soft wax, on which the writing was traced with the sharp point of the stylus, or iron pen. When the writing had served its purpose, it was effaced by the broad end of the stylus being employed to make the wax smooth. The tablet was then, as at first, *tabula rasa*, ready to receive any writing which might be put upon it. In opposition to the doctrine of *innate ideas* (*q. v.*) the mind of man has been compared to a *tabula rasa*, or a sheet of white paper—having at first nothing written upon it, but ready to receive what may be inscribed on it by the hand of experience. This view is maintained by Hobbes, Locke, and others. On the other hand, Lord Herbert of Cherbury compares the mind to a book all written over within, but the leaves of which are closed, till they are gradually opened by the hand of experience, and the imprisoned truths or ideas set free. Leibnitz, speaking of the difference between Locke and him, says:—"The question between us is whether the soul in itself is entirely empty, like a tablet upon which nothing has been written (*tabula rasa*), according to Aristotle,¹ and the author of the *Essay on Hum. Under.* (book ii., ch. 1, sect. 2); and whether all that is there traced comes wholly from the senses and experience; or whether the soul originally contains the principles of several notions and doctrines, which the external objects only awaken upon occasions, as I believe with Plato." Professor Sedgwick, instead of likening the mind to a sheet of white paper, would rather liken it to what in the art of dyeing is called a "prepared blank," that is, a piece of cloth so prepared by mordants and other appliances, that when dipped into the dyeing vat it takes on the colours intended, and comes out according to an expected pattern.

"The soul of a child is yet a white paper unscribbled with observations of the world, wherewith, at length, it becomes a blurred note-book."²

"If it be true that the mind be a blank apart from the external creation, yet how elaborately must that apparent blank be prepared, when by simply bringing it into the light and warmth of the objective, it glows with colours not of earth,

¹ *De Anima*, lib. iii., cap. 4, sect. 14.

² Bishop Earle.

TABULA RASA —

and shows that from the first it had been written over with a secret writing by the hand of God.”¹

TACT.—“By *tact* we mean an inferior degree of talent—a skill or adroitness in adapting words or deeds to circumstances, involving, of course, a quick perception of the propriety of circumstances. It is also applied to a certain degree of mechanical skill.”²

TALENT.—“By *talent*, in its distinctive meaning, we understand the power of acquiring and adroitly disposing of the materials of human knowledge, and products of invention in their already existing forms, without the infusion of any new enlivening spirit. It looks no farther than the attainment of certain practical ends, which experience has proved attainable, and the dexterous use of such means as experience has proved to be efficient.

“*Talent* values effort in the light of practical utility; *genius* always for its own sake, labours for the love of labour. *Talent* may be acquired. . . . *Genius* always belongs to the individual character, and may be cultivated, but cannot be acquired.”³

“*Talent* describes power of acquisition, excellence of memory; *genius* describes power of representation, excellency of fancy; *intellect* describes power of inference, excellence of reason.”

“*Talent* lying in the understanding is often inherited; *genius* being the action of reason and imagination, rarely, or never.”

TASTE (POWERS, OR PRINCIPLES OF).—

“His *tasteful* mind enjoys
Alike the complicated charms, which glow
Thro’ the wide landscape.”—Cowper, *Power of Harmony*, b. II.

“That power of the mind by which we are capable of discerning and relishing the beauties of nature, and whatever is excellent in the fine arts, is called *Taste*. . . . Like the taste of the palate, it relishes some things, is disgusted with others; with regard to many, is indifferent or dubious;

Harris, *Man Primæval*, chap. 3.

² Ibid., p. 204.

³ R. T. Coleridge.

¹ Moffat, *Study of Esthetics*, p. 206.

² Taylor, *Synonyms*.

TASTE —

and is considerably influenced by habit, by associations, and by opinion. . . .

"By the objects of *Taste*, I mean those qualities and attributes of things which are, by nature, adapted to please a good taste. Mr. Addison¹ and Dr. Akenside² after him, has reduced them to three—to wit, *Novelty*, *Grandeur*, and *Beauty*."³
—q. v.

The best definition of *Taste* was given by the editor of Spenser (Mr. Hughes), when he called it a kind of *extempore judgment*. Burke explained it to be an instinct which immediately awakes the emotions of pleasure or dislike. Akenside is clear as he is poetical on the question:—

"What, then, is *Taste* but those internal powers,
Active, and strong, and feelingly alive
To each fine impulse? a discerning sense
Of decent and sublime, with quick disgust
From things deformed, or disarranged, or gross,
In species? This, nor gems, nor stores of gold,
Nor purple state, nor culture, can bestow,
But God alone, when first his sacred hand
Imprints the secret bias of the soul."

Pleasures of Imagin., b. III., l. 523.

"We may consider *Taste*, therefore, to be a settled habit of discerning faults and excellencies in a moment—the mind's independent expression of approval or aversion. It is that faculty by which we discover and enjoy the beautiful, the picturesque, and the sublime in literature, art, and nature."⁴

The objects of *Taste* have also been classed as the *Beautiful*, the *Sublime*, and the *Picturesque*—q. v. The question is whether these objects possess certain inherent qualities which may be so called, or whether they awaken pleasing emotions by suggesting or recalling certain pleasing feelings formerly experienced in connection or association with these objects. The latter view has been maintained by Mr. Alison in his *Essay on Taste*, and by Lord Jeffrey in the article "*Beauty*" in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*.

Lord Jeffrey has said, "It appears to us, then, that objects

¹ *Spectator*, vol. vi.

² *Pleasures of Imagination*

³ *Reid, Intell. Pow.*, essay viii., chap. 1 and 2.

⁴ *Pleasures, &c., of Literature*, 12mo, London, 1851, pp. 55, 56.
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TASTE—

are sublime or beautiful — first, when they are the *natural* signs and *perpetual concomitants* of pleasurable sensations, as the sound of thunder, or laughter, or, at any rate, of some lively feeling or emotion in ourselves, or in some other sentient beings; or secondly, when they are the *arbitrary* or *accidental concomitants* of such feelings, as ideas of female beauty; or thirdly, when they bear some *analogy* or *fancied resemblance* to things with which these emotions are necessarily connected. All poetry is founded on this last — as silence and tranquillity — gradual ascent and ambition — gradual descent and decay.

Mr. Stewart¹ has observed that “association of ideas can never account for a new notion or a pleasure essentially different from all others.”

Gerard, *Essay on Taste*; Sir Joshua Reynolds, *Discourses before Royal Society*; Burke, *On Sublime and Beautiful*; Payne Knight, *Enquiry into Principles of Taste*; Hume, *Essay on Standard of Taste*; Brown, *Lectures*;² Stewart, *Philosoph. Essays*,³ *Relative to Taste*; Sir T. L. Dick, *Essay on Taste*, prefixed to Price on the *Picturesque*.⁴ — V. *ÆSTHETICS*.

TELEOLOGY (τέλος, an end; λόγος, discourse) is the doctrine of *Final Causes* — q. v. It does not constitute a particular department of philosophy; as the end or perfection of every being belongs to the consideration of that branch of philosophy in which it is included. But *teleology* is the philosophical consideration of final causes, generally.

TEMPERAMENT (*tempero*, to moderate, to season). — “There are only *two species of temperament*. The four well-known varieties, and the millions which are less known, are merely modifications of two species, and combinations of their modifications. These are the *active* and the *passive* forms; and every other variety may be conveniently arranged under them.”⁵

¹ *Elements*, ch. 5. part II., p. 364, 4to.

² 77.

³ Part II.

⁴ 8vo, 1842.

⁵ Lavater, Zimmerman, and Von Hildebrandt adopt a similar classification. The author of the treatise on “Diet,” included among the works of Hippocrates, takes the same view of *temperaments*; as likewise the Brunonian school, which maintained two antagonistic, *sthenic* and *asthenic*, states

TEMPERAMENT—

"As character comprises the entire sphere of the educated will, so *temperament* is nothing else than the sum of our natural inclinations and tendencies. Inclination is the material of the will, developing itself, when *controlled*, into character, and when *controlling*, into passions. *Temperament* is, therefore, the root of our passions; and the latter, like the former, may be distinguished into two principal classes. Intelligent psychologists and physicians have always recognized this fact; the former dividing *temperaments* into active and passive, the latter classifying the passions as exciting and depressing.

"We would apply the same statement to the affections or emotions. The *temperament* commonly denominated sanguine or choleric is the same as our active species; and that known as the phlegmatic, or melancholy, is the same as our passive one."¹

Bodily constitutions, as affecting the prevailing bias of the mind, have been called *temperaments*; and have been distinguished into the *sanguine*, the *choleric*, the *melancholic*, and the *phlegmatic*. To these has been added another, called the *nervous temperament*. According as the bodily constitution of individuals can be characterized by one or other of these epithets, a corresponding difference will be found in the general state or *disposition* of the mind; and there will be a bias, or tendency to be moved by certain principles of action rather than by others.

Mind is essentially one. But we speak of it as having a constitution, and as containing certain primary elements; and, according as these elements are combined and balanced, there may be differences in the constitution of individual minds, just as there are differences of bodily *temperaments*; and these differences may give rise to a *disposition* or bias, in the one case, more directly than in the other. According as intellect, or sensitivity, or will, prevails in any individual mind, there will be a correspondent bias resulting.

But, it is in reference to original differences in the *Primary desires*, that differences of *disposition* are most observable. Any *desire*, when powerful, draws over the other tendencies

¹ Feuchtersleben, *Didactics of the Soul*, 12mo, Lon., 1852, p. 88.

TEMPERAMENT—

of the mind to its side ; gives a colour to the whole character of the man, and manifests its influence throughout all his temper and conduct. His thoughts run in a particular channel, without his being sensible that they do so, except by the result. There is an under-current of feeling, flowing continually within him, which only manifests itself by the direction in which it carries him. This constitutes his temper.¹ *Disposition* is the sum of a man's desires and feelings.

In the works of Galen² is an essay to show, *Quod animi mores corporis temperamenta sequuntur*.

See also Feuchtersleben, *Medical Psychology*.

TEMPERANCE (*temperantia*) is moderation as to pleasure.

Aristotle³ confined it chiefly to the pleasures of touch, and of taste in a slight degree. Hence, perhaps, Popish writers in treating of the vices of intemperance or luxury, dwell much on those connected with the senses of touch and taste. By Cicero the Latin word *temperantia* was used to denote the duty of self-government in general. *Temperantia est quæ ut in rebus expetendis aut fugiendis rationem sequamur monet*.

Temperance was enumerated as one of the four cardinal virtues. It may be manifested in the government and regulation of all our natural appetites, desires, passions, and affections, and may thus give birth to many virtues, and restrain from many vices. As distinguished from fortitude, it may be said to consist in guarding against the temptations to pleasure and self-indulgence ; while fortitude consists in bearing up against the evils and dangers of human life.

TENDENCY (*tendo*, to stretch towards).—"He freely moves and acts according to his most natural *tendence* and inclination."⁴

"But if at first the appetites and necessities, and *tendencies* of the body, did tempt the soul, much more will this be done when the body is miserable and afflicted."⁵—**V. INCLINATION.**

TERM (*ὅρος*, *terminus*, a limit).—A *term* is an act of appre-

¹ The balance of our animal principles, I think, constitutes what we call a man's *natural temper*.—Reid, *Act. Pow.*, essay iii, part ii, chap. 8.

² Tom. iv., Leips., 1822.

³ *Ethic.*, lib. iii., cap. 1st.

⁴ Scott, *Christ. Life*, pt. i., c. 1.

⁵ Taylor, *Of Repent.*, c. 7, § 1.

TERM —

hension expressed in language; also the subject or predicate of a proposition. "I call that a *term* into which a proposition is resolved, as for instance, the predicate and that of which it is predicated."¹

"As lines terminate a plane and constitute figure, so its *terms* are the limits of a proposition. A proposition consists of two *terms*; that which is spoken of is called the *subject*; that which is said of it the *predicate*; and these are called the *terms* (or extremes), because logically the subject is placed *first* and the predicate *last*. In the middle is the *copula*, which indicates the act of judgment, as by it the predicate is affirmed or denied, of the subject." — Whately. — V. PROPOSITION, SYLLOGISM.

Term (An Absolute or Non-Relative), one that is considered by itself, and conveys no idea of relation to anything of which it is a part, or to any other part distinguished from it. *Absolute terms* are also named *non-connegative*, as merely denoting an object without implying any attribute of that object; as "Paris," "Romulus."

Term (An Abstract) denotes the quality of a being, without regard to the subject in which it is; as "justice," "wisdom." *Abstract terms* are nouns substantive.

Term (A Common), such as stands for several individuals, which are called its *significates*; as "man," "city." Such *terms*, and such only can be affirmatively predicated of several others, and they are therefore called predicables.

Terms (Compatible or Consistent) express two views which can be taken of the same object at the same time; as "white and hard."

Term (A Complex) is a *proposition* — *q. v.*

Term (A Concrete) denotes the quality of a being, and either expresses, or must be referred to, some subject in which it is; as "fool," "philosopher," "high," "wise." *Concrete terms* are usually, but not always, nouns adjective.

Terms (The Contradictory Opposition of) is, when they differ only in respectively wanting and having the particle "not," or its equivalent. One or other of such *terms* is applicable to every object.

¹ Arist., *Prior. Analyt.*, lib. i, cap. 1.

TERM —

Terms (Contrary) come both under some one class, but are the *most different* of all that belong to that class; as "wise" and "foolish," both coming under the class of mental qualities. There are some objects to which neither of such *terms* is applicable; a stone is neither wise nor foolish.

Term (A Definite), one which marks out an object or class of beings; as "Cæsar," "corporeal." *Positive terms* are *definite*.

Term (An Indefinite), one which does not *mark out*, but only *excludes* an object; as, "not-Cæsar," "incorporeal." *Privative and negative terms* are called *indefinite*.

Term (A Negative) denotes that the positive view *could not* be taken of the object; it affirms the absence of a thing from some subject in which it *could not* be present; as, "a dumb statue" (you would not say "a speaking statue"). "A lifeless corpse" (you would not say "a living corpse"). The same *term* may be *negative*, *positive*, or *privative*, as it is viewed with relation to contrary ideas. Thus "immortal" is *privative* or *negative* viewed with relation to *death*, and *positive* viewed with relation to *life*.

Terms (Opposite) express two views which cannot be taken of one single object at the same time; as "white and black."

Term (A Positive) denotes a certain view of an object, as being actually taken of it; as "speech," "a man speaking."

Term (A Privative) denotes that the positive view *might* conceivably be taken of the object, but *is not*; "dumbness," "a man silent" (you might say, "a man speaking"). "An unburied corpse" (you might say, "a buried corpse").

Term (A Relative), that which expresses an object viewed in relation to the whole, or to another part of a more complex object of thought; as "half" and "whole," "master and servant." Such nouns are called *correlative* to each other; nor can one of them be mentioned without a notion of the other being raised in the mind.

Term (A Simple) expresses a completed act of apprehension, but no more; and may be used alone either as the subject or predicate of a proposition. "Virtue is its own reward." Virtue is a simple term, and its own reward is also a simple term.

TERM—

Term (A Singular), such as stands for an individual; as "Socrates," "London," "this man," "that city." Such *terms* cannot be predicated affirmatively of anything but themselves. But *general terms*, as "fowl," "bird," may be truly affirmed of many.

TERMINISTS.—V. NOMINALISM.

TESTIMONY "is the declaration of one who professes to know the truth of that which he affirms."

"The difficulty is, when *testimonies* contradict common experience, and the reports of history and witnesses clash with the ordinary course of nature, or with one another."¹

If *testimony* were not a source of evidence, we must lose all benefit of the experience and observation of others. Much of human knowledge rests on the authority of *testimony*.

According to Dr. Reid,² the validity of this authority is resolvable into the constitution of the human mind. He maintains that we have a natural principle of veracity, which has its counterpart in a natural principle of credulity—that is, while we are naturally disposed to speak the truth, we are naturally disposed to believe what is spoken by others.

But, says Mr. Locke,³ "*Testimony* may be fallacious. He who declares a thing, 1. May be mistaken, or imposed upon. 2. He may be an impostor and intend to deceive."

The evidence of *testimony* is, therefore, only probable, and requires to be carefully examined.

The nature of the thing testified to—whether it be a matter of science or of common life—the character of the person testifying—whether the *testimony* be that of one or of many—whether it be given voluntarily or compulsorily, hastily or deliberately, are some of the circumstances to be attended to.

Testimony may be oral or written. The coin, the monument, and other material proofs have also been called *testimony*. So that *testimony* includes tradition and history.

Mr. Hume maintained that no amount of *testimony* can be sufficient to establish the truth of a miracle. See reply to him

¹ Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book iv., chap. 16.

² *Inquiry*, ch. 6, sect. 24.

³ *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book iv., ch. 15, 16.

TESTIMONY—

by Dr. Adams,¹ in his *Essay on Miracles*, and Dr. Campbell on *Miracles*, and Dr. Douglas on *Miracles*.

It was maintained by Craig, a celebrated English geometri-
cian, and by Petersen, that the value of *testimony* decreases
by the lapse of time. And Laplace, in some measure, favoured
this view. But if the matter of fact be well authenticated in
the first instance, lapse of time and continued belief in it may
add to the validity of the evidence.—V. EVIDENCE.

THEISM (Θεός, God) is opposed to atheism. It is not absolutely
opposed, by its derivation, to *Pantheism*, or the belief that the
universe is God; nor to *Polytheism*, or the belief that there
are many Gods; nor to *Ditheism*, or the belief that there are
two divine principles, one of good and another of evil. But
usage, *penes quem est arbitrium et norma loquendi*, has re-
stricted this word to the belief in one intelligent and free
spirit, separate from his works. "To believe that everything
is governed, ordered, or regulated *for the best*, by a designing
principle or mind, necessarily good and permanent, is to be a
perfect *Theist*."²

"These are they who are strictly and properly called *Theists*,
who affirm that a perfectly conscious, understanding being, or
mind, existing from eternity, was the cause of all other things;
and they, on the contrary, who derive all things from senseless
matter, as the first original, and deny that there is any con-
scious, understanding being, self-existent or unmade, are those
that are properly called *Atheists*."³

"Though, in a strict and proper sense, they be only *Theists*
who acknowledge one God perfectly omnipotent, the sole
original of all things, and as well the cause of matter as of
anything else; yet it seems reasonable that such consideration
should be had of the infirmity of human understandings, as to
extend the word further, that it may comprehend within it

¹ "Hume told Caddell the bookseller, that he had a great desire to be introduced to
as many of the persons who had written against him as could be collected; and re-
quested Caddell to bring him and them together. Accordingly, Dr. Douglas, Dr.
Adams, &c., were invited by Caddell to dine at his house in order to meet Hume. They
came; and Dr. Price, who was of the party, assured me that they were all delighted
with David."—Rogers's *Table Talk*.

² Shaftesbury, *Inquiry*, book 1, pt. 1, sect. 2.

³ Cudworth, *Intell. Syst.*, book 1, ch. 4, sect. 4.

THEISM—

those also who assert one intellectual self-existent from eternity, the framer and governor of the whole world, though not the creator of the matter; and that none should be condemned for absolute *Atheists* merely because they hold eternal uncreated matter, unless they also deny an eternal unmade mind, ruling over the matter, and so make senseless matter the sole original of all things."¹

Theist and *Deist* both signify simply one who believes in God; and about the beginning of last century both were employed to denote one who believes in God independently of revelation. "Averse as I am to the cause of *Theism* or name of *Deist*, when taken in a sense exclusive of revelation, I consider still that, in strictness, the root of all is *Theism*; and that to be a settled Christian, it is necessary to be first of all a *good Theist*."² But from about the time of Shaftesbury, the term *Deist* has generally been applied to such as are indifferent or hostile to the claims of revelation. Balguy's *First Letter to a Deist* was against Lord Shaftesbury. His *Second Letter to a Deist* was against Tindal. All the Deistical writers noticed by Leland were unfriendly to revelation.

"The words *Deist* and *Theist* are, strictly speaking, perhaps synonymous; but yet it is generally to be observed that the former is used in a *bad*, and the latter in a *good* sense. Custom has appropriated the term *Deist* to the enemies of revelation and of Christianity in particular; while the word *Theist* is considered applicable to all who believe in one God."³

"*Theistæ generatim vocantur, qui Deum esse tenent, sive recte sive prave cæteroquin de Deo sentiant. Deistæ vocantur praesertim sæculo proxime elapso philosophi, qui Deum quidem esse affirmabant, providentiam vero, revelationem, miracula, uno verbo, quidquid supernaturale audit, tollebant.*"⁴

THEOCRACY (Θεός, God; *κράτος*, rule).—Government under the Mosaic dispensation is called *theocracy*.

"It will easily appear," says Lowman,⁵ "that the general

¹ Cudworth, *Intell. Syst.*, sect. 7.

² Shaftesbury, *The Moralists*, part 1., sect. 2.

³ Irons, *On Final Causes*, App., p. 207.

⁴ Ubaghs, *Theodiceæ Elementa*, p. 11.

⁵ *On Civil Government of the Hebrews*, chap. 1.

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union of the tribes as one body may be conceived after this manner—that the congregation of Israel, or the whole people enacted by themselves or their representatives; that the great council advised, consulted, proposed; that the judge presided in their councils, and had the chief hand in executing what was resolved in them; and that Jehovah, by the oracle, was to assent to and approve what was resolved, and authorize the execution of it in matters of the greatest importance to the whole state, so that the general union of the whole nation may not improperly be thus expressed. It was by the command of the people and advice of the senate, the judge presiding and the oracle approving.”

Egypt, down to a certain period, was governed by priests in the name of their gods, and Peru by Incas, who were regarded as the children of the sun. Mahomet, speaking in the name of God, exercised a theocratic sway, and that of the Grand Lama in Thibet is similar.

“In the *Contrat Social* of Rousseau, the sovereignty of number, of the numerical majority, is the fundamental principle of the work. For a long time he follows out the consequences of it with inflexible rigour; a time arrives, however, when he abandons them, and abandons them with great effect; he wishes to give his fundamental laws, his constitution, to the rising society; his high intellect warned him that such a work could not proceed from universal suffrage, from the numerical majority, from the multitude: ‘A God,’ said he, ‘must give laws to men.’ It is not magistracy, it is not sovereignty. . . . It is a particular and superior function, which has nothing in common with human empire.”¹

The term *theocracy* has been applied to the power wielded by the Pope during the Middle Ages; and Count de Maistre, in his work *Du Pape*, has argued strenuously in support of the supreme power, temporal and spiritual, of the sovereign pontiff. But the celibacy of the Romish priests is an obstacle to their theocratical organization. “Look at Asia, Egypt; all the great *theocracies* are the work of a clergy, which is a con-

¹ Guizot, *Hist. of Civilization*, vol. I., p. 387. *Contrat Social*, b. II., ch. 3.

THEOCRACY—

plete society within itself, which suffices for its own wants, and borrows nothing from without.”¹

THEODICY (Θεός, God; δίκη, a pleading or justification), a vindication of the ways of God.—This word was employed by Leibnitz, who² maintained that the existence of moral evil has its origin in the free will of the creature, while metaphysical evil is nothing but the limitation which is involved in the essence of finite beings, and that out of this both physical and moral evil naturally flow. But these finite beings are designed to attain the utmost felicity they are capable of enjoying, while each, as a part, contributes to the perfection of the whole, which, of the many worlds that were possible, is the very best. On this account it has been called the theory of *optimism*—q. v.

In Manuals of Philosophy the term *theodicy* is applied to that part which treats of the *being, perfections, and government* of God, and the *immortality of the soul*.

In the *Manuel de Philosophie, à l'usage des Collèges*,³ *Theodicee*, which is written by Emille Saisset, is called rational theology, or the theology of reason, independent of revelation. “It proposes to establish the existence of a being infinitely perfect, and to determine his attributes and essential relations to the world.” It treats of the existence, attributes, and providence of God, and the immortality of the soul—which were formerly included under metaphysics.

According to Kant, the objections which a *theodicy* should meet are: 1. The existence of moral evil, as contrary to the holiness of God. 2. Of physical evil, as contrary to his goodness. 3. The disproportion between the crimes and the punishments of this life as repugnant to his justice. He approves of the vindication adopted by Job against his friends, founded on our imperfect knowledge of God's ways.

“When the Jewish mind began to philosophize, and endeavoured to produce dialectic proofs, its *theodicean* philosophy, or *justification of God*, stopped, in the book of Job, at the avowal of the incomprehensibility of the destinies of mankind.”

¹ Guizot, *Hist. of Civilization*, vol. i., p. 182.

² In his *Essais de Theodicee, sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l'homme et l'origine du mal*, published in 1710.

³ 8vo. Paris. 1846.

⁴ Buisson, *Hippolytus*, vol. ii., p. 7

THEODICY—

Butler, *Analogy*, part i., ch. 7, treats of the government of God; considered as a scheme or constitution imperfectly comprehended, part ii., ch. 4.

THEOGONY (Θεός, God; γονή, generation) is that part of Pagan theology which treats of the genealogy and filiation of their deities. It is the title of a celebrated Greek poem by Hesiod, which has been commented on by M. J. D. Guigniaut.¹ The *Works and Days*, and *Theogony* of Hesiod were translated from the Greek, with remarks by Thomas Cooke.²

THEOLOGY (Θεός, God; λόγος, discourse).—“*Theology*, what is it but the science of things divine? What science can be attained unto without the help of natural discourse and reason?”³

“I mean *theology*, which, containing the knowledge of God and his creatures, our duty to Him and to our fellow-creatures, and a view of our present and future state, is the comprehension of all other knowledge directed to its true end, i. e., the honour and veneration of the Creator, and the happiness of mankind. This is that noble study which is every man’s duty, and every one that is a rational creature is capable of.”⁴

The word *theology* as now used, without any qualifying epithet, denotes that knowledge of God and of our duty to him which we derive from express revelation. In this restricted sense it is opposed to philosophy, and is divided into speculative or dogmatic—and moral or practical, according as it is occupied with the doctrines or the precepts which have been revealed for our belief and guidance. But the Greeks gave the name of (θεολόγος) to those who, like Hesiod and Orpheus, with no higher inspiration than that of the poet, sang of the nature of the gods and the origin of all things. Aristotle⁵ said that of the three speculative sciences, physics, mathematics, and *theology*—the last was the highest, as treating of the most elevated of beings. Among the Romans, from the time of Numa Pompilius to that of the emperors, the knowledge and worship of the gods was made subservient

¹ *De la Theogonie d'Hésiode*, Paris, 1835.

² 2 vols., 4to, Lond., 1728.

³ Hooker, *Eccl. Pol.*, b. iii. c. 8.

⁴ Locke, *On the Cmd. of the Understand.*, sect. 22.

⁵ *Metaphys.*, iii. xi., ch. 6.

THEOLOGY —

to the interests of the state. So that, according to Augustin,¹ there were three kinds of *theology*—the *poetical*, or that of the poets—the *physical*, or that of the philosophers—and the *political*, or that of the legislator.

Among the Greeks and Romans, there being no divine revelation, the distinction between faith and reason was not taken. Christians were long unwilling to admit that any satisfactory knowledge of God and his attributes, and of the relations between Him and his creatures, could be had independently of revelation. And it was not till after Descartes that the distinction of *theology*, as *natural*, and *positive* or *revealed*, was commonly taken. The distinction is rather obscured in the *Essais de Theodicée* of Leibnitz, but clearly expressed by Wolf in the title of his work, *Theologia Naturalis Methodo Scientifica Pertractata*.² He thinks it is demonstrative, and calls it³ “The science which has for its object the existence of God and his attributes, and the consequences of these attributes in relation to other beings, with the refutation of all errors contrary to the true idea of God; in short, all that is now commonly included under *natural theology* or *theodicy*, or both.

Natural Theology.—This phrase has been very commonly employed, but it has been challenged.

“The name *natural theology*, which ever and anon we still hear applied to the philosophical cognition of the Divine Being and his existence, ought carefully to be avoided. Such a designation is based on a thorough misconception and total inversion of ideas. Every system of *theology* that is not supernatural, or at least that does not profess to be so, but pretends to understand naturally the idea of God, and regards the knowledge of the divine essence as a branch of natural science, or derives the idea simply from nature, is even on that account false. Missing and entirely mistaking its proper object, it must, in short, prove absolutely null and void. Properly, indeed, this inquiry needs no peculiar word, nor special division, and scientific designation. The name generally of philosophy, or specially of a philosophy of God, is perfectly

¹ *De Civitate*, lib. vi., c. 1.

² 2 vols., 4to, Frankfort and Leipzig, 1736-37.

³ *Prolegom.*, sect. 1.

THEOLOGY.—

sufficient to designate the investigation into science and faith, and their reciprocal relation—their abiding discord, or its harmonious reconciliation and intrinsic concord.”¹

In Coleridge's *Aids to Reflection*, *natural* is opposed to *spiritual*, as *sensuous* to *super-sensuous* or *super-natural*.

This objection might be obviated by calling that knowledge of God and of his attributes and administration which the light of reason furnishes, *rational theology*. But this phrase has been of late years employed in a different sense, especially in Germany. *Natural theology* confines itself exclusively to that knowledge of God which the light of nature furnishes, and does not intermeddle with the discoveries or the doctrines of *positive* or *revealed theology*. It prosecutes its inquiries by the unassisted strength of reason within its own sphere. But *rational theology* carries the torch or light of reason into the domain of revelation. It criticises and compares texts—analyzes doctrines—examines traditions—and brings all the instruments of philosophy to bear upon things divine and spiritual, in order to reduce them to harmony with things human and rational. — V. RATIONALISM.

THEOPATHY (θεός, Deity; πάθος, suffering or feeling).—A word used by Dr. Hartley as synonymous with *piety*, or a sense of Deity.

THEORY (θεωρία, contemplation, speculation). — *Theory* and *theoretical* are properly opposed to *practice* and *practical*. *Theory* is mere knowledge; *practice* is the application of it. Though distinct they are dependent, and there is no opposition between them. *Theory* is the knowledge of the principles by which practice accomplishes its end. Hypothetical and theoretical are sometimes used as synonymous with conjectural. But this is unphilosophical in so far as theoretical is concerned. *Theory* always implies knowledge—knowledge of a thing in its principles or causes.

“*Theory* is a general collection of the inferences drawn from facts and compressed into principles.”²

“With Plato, *θεωρεῖν* is applied to a deep contemplation of

¹ Schlegel, *Philosoph. of Life, &c.*, Bohn's edit., p. 194.

² Parr, *Sequel to a Printed Paper*.

THEORY—

the truth. By Aristotle it is always opposed to *πραγματις*, and to *νοσιν*, so that he makes philosophy *theoretical*, *practical*, and *artistical*. The Latins and Boethius rendered *θεωρητικὴ* by *speculari*. With us it means a learned discourse of philosophers of speculative use."¹

"Theory denotes the most general laws to which certain facts can be reduced." — Mackintosh;² and³ the distinctions between *hypothesis* and *theory* are thus stated:—

1. The principles employed in the explanation (of the phenomena) should be known really to exist; in which consists the main distinction between *hypothesis* and *theory*. Gravity is a principle universally known to exist; ether and a nervous fluid are mere suppositions. 2. These principles should be known to produce effects *like* those which are ascribed to them in the *theory*. This is a further distinction between *hypothesis* and *theory*; for there are an infinite number of degrees of *likeness*, from the faint resemblances which have led some to fancy that the functions of the nerves depend on electricity, to the remarkable coincidences between the appearances of projectiles on earth, and the movements of the heavenly bodies, which constitute the Newtonian system; a *theory* now perfect, though exclusively founded on analogy, and in which one of the classes of phenomena brought together by it is not the subject of direct experience. 3. It should correspond, if not with all the facts to be explained, at least with so great a majority of them as to render it highly probable that means will in time be found of reconciling it to all. It is only on this ground that the Newtonian system justly claimed the title of a legitimate *theory* during that long period when it was unable to explain many celestial appearances, before the labours of a century and the genius of Laplace at length completed the *theory*, by adapting it to all the phenomena. A *theory* may be just before it is complete.

"*Theory* and *hypothesis* may be distinguished thus: a *hypothesis* is a guess or supposition, made concerning the cause of some particular fact, with the view of trying experiments or making observations to discover the truth. A *theory* is a com-

¹ Trendelenburg, *Elementa Log. Arist.*, p. 76.

² *Phil. Diss.*, p. 61, Whewell's edit.

³ *Id.* p. 367

THEORY—

plete system of suppositions put together for the purpose of explaining *all* the facts that belong to some one science. For example—astronomers have suggested many *hypotheses*, in order to account for the luminous stream which follows comets. They have also formed many *theories* of the heavens; or in other words, complete explanations of all the appearances of the heavenly bodies and their movements. When a *theory* has been generally received by men of science, it is called a *system*; as the Ptolemaic *system*; the Copernican *system*; the Newtonian *system*.”¹

See a paper on *Theory* in *Blackwood's Mag.* for August, 1830.—V. HYPOTHESIS.

THEOSOPHISM or THEOSOPHY (θεός, God; σοφία, knowledge).

“The *Theosophists*, neither contented with the natural light of human reason, nor with the simple doctrines of Scripture understood in their literal sense, have recourse to an internal supernatural light superior to all other illuminations, from which they profess to derive a mysterious and divine philosophy manifested only to the chosen favourites of heaven.”²

See Tholuck (F. A. D.), *Theosophia Persarum Pantheistica*.³

Theosophia seems at one time to have been used as synonymous with *theologia*. Thus in John Major's *Commentary on the First Book of the Sentences*, published in 1510, Mr. David Cranston is styled *In Sacra Theosophia Baccalaureus*.

The *theosophists* are a school of philosophers who would mix enthusiasm with observation, alchemy with theology, metaphysics with medicine, and clothe the whole with a form of mystery and inspiration. It began with Paracelsus at the opening of the sixteenth century, and has survived in Saint Martin to the end of the eighteenth. Paracelsus, Jacob Boehm, and Saint Martin, may be called popular, while Cornelius Agrippa, Valentine Weigelius, Robert Fludd, and Van Helmont, are more philosophical in their doctrines. The Rev. Will. Law was also a *theosophist*. But they all hold different doctrines; so that they cannot be reduced to a system.

¹ Taylor, *Elements of Thought*.

² Enfield, *Hist. of Phil.*, vol. II.

³ 8vo, Berlin, 1821. App. 1838.

THEOSOPHISM —

"The *theosophist* is one who gives you a theory of God, or of the works of God, which has not reason, but an inspiration of his own for its basis."¹

"Both the politics and the *theosophy* of Coleridge were at the mercy of a discursive genius, intellectually bold, educationally timid, which, anxious, or rather willing, to bring conviction and speculation together, mooting all points as it went, and throwing the subtlest glancing lights on many, ended in satisfying nobody, and concluding nothing."²

THESIS (*thesis*, from *τίθημι*, to lay down) is a position or proposition, the truth of which is not plain from the terms, but requires evidence, or explanation, or proof. In the schools it was especially applied to those propositions in theology, philosophy, law, and medicine, which the candidates for degrees were required to defend.

THOUGHT AND THINKING "are used in a more, and in a less restricted signification. In the former meaning they are limited to the *discursive* energies alone; in the latter, they are co-extensive with consciousness."³

Thinking is employed by Sir Will. Hamilton⁴ as comprehending all our cognitive energies.

By Descartes,⁵ *cogitatio*, *pensée*, is used to denote or comprehend "all that in us of which we are immediately conscious. Thus all the operations of the will, of the imagination and senses, are *thoughts*." Again, in reply to the question, What is a thing which thinks? he says,⁶ "It is a thing which doubts, understands, conceives, affirms, desires, wills, and does not will, which imagines, also, and feels."

"Though *thinking* be supposed ever so much the proper action of the soul, yet it is not necessary to suppose that it should be always *thinking*, always in action."⁷

"*Thought* proper, as distinguished from other facts of con-

¹ Vaughan, *Hours with Mystics*. vol. 1, p. 45.

² Hunt, *Imagination and Fancy*, 12mo, 1844, p. 276.

³ Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 222, note.

⁴ *Discussions*. Ac.. Append. i., p. 578.

⁵ *Resp. ad Sec. Obj.*, p. 85, Ed., 1663.

⁶ *Medit. II.*, p. 11.

⁷ Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.* book II., ch. 1

THOUGHT—

sciousness, may be adequately described as the *act of knowing or judging of things by means of concepts.*"¹—V. TRAIN OF THOUGHT.

TIME (*tempus*).—Continuation of existence is duration; duration unlimited is eternity; duration limited is *time*.

By Aristotle, *time* was defined to be "the measure of motion, *secundum prius et posterius*. We get the idea of *time* on the occasion when we observe first and last, that is succession. Duration without succession would be timeless, immeasurable. But how are we to fix what is first and last in the motion of any body? By men in all ages the motions of the heavenly bodies have been made the measure of duration. So that the full definition of *time* is—'It is the measure of the duration of things that exist in succession, by the motion of the heavenly bodies.'"²

"As our conception of space originates in that of body, and our conception of motion in that of space, so our conception of time originates in that of motion; and particularly in those regular and equable motions carried on in the heavens, the parts of which, from their perfect similarity to each other, are correct measures of the continuous and successive quantity called *time*, with which they are conceived to co-exist. *Time*, therefore, may be defined the perceived number of successive movements; for as number ascertains the greater or lesser quantity of things numbered, so *time* ascertains the greater or lesser quantity of motion performed."³

According to Mr. Locke,⁴ "Reflection upon the train of ideas, which appear one after another in our minds, is that which furnishes us with the idea of succession; and the distance between any two parts of that succession, is that we call duration." Now by attending to the train of ideas in our minds we may have the idea of succession—but this presupposes the idea of duration in which the succession takes place. "We may measure duration by the succession of thoughts in the mind, as we measure length by inches or feet, but the notion

¹ Mansel, *Prolegm. Log.*, p. 22.

² Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, book iv., chap. 1.

³ Gillies, *Analysis of Aristotle*, chap. 2.

⁴ *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book II., chap. 14.

TIME—

or idea of duration must be antecedent to the mensuration of it, as the notion of length is antecedent to its being measured."¹

See also Cousin (On Locke) *Cours de Philosoph.*;² Stewart, *Phil. Essays*;³ see also the *Fragments* of Royer Collard.⁴

Dr. Reid⁵ says, "I know of no ideas or notions that have a better claim to be accounted simple and original than those of space and time. . . . The sense of seeing, by itself, gives us the conception and belief of only two dimensions of extension, but the sense of touch discovers three; and reason, from the contemplation of finite extended things, leads us necessarily to the belief of an immensity that contains them.

"In like manner, memory gives us the conception and belief of finite intervals of duration. From the contemplation of these, reason leads us necessarily to the belief of an eternity which comprehends all things that have a beginning and an end." In another passage of the same essay,⁶ he says, "We are at a loss to what category or class of things we ought to refer them. They are not beings, but rather the receptacles of every created being, without which it could not have had the possibility of existence. Philosophers have endeavoured to reduce all the objects of human thought to these three classes, of substances, modes, and relations. To which of them shall we refer time, space, and number, the most common objects of thought?"

In the philosophy of Kant, "Time is a necessary representation which lies at the foundation of all intuition. Time is given, *a priori*—it is the form of the internal sense, and the formal condition, *a priori*, of phenomena in general. Hence it will be seen that all intuition is nothing but the representation of phenomena; that the things we see or envisage are not in themselves what they are taken for; that if we did away with ourselves, that is to say, the subject or subjective quality of our senses in general, every quality that we discover in time and space, and even time and space themselves, would disappear. What objects may be in themselves,

¹ Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay ii., chap. 5.

² Leçons, 17, 18.

³ At the end of tom. iv. of *Œuvres de Reid*.

⁴ *U. supra*.

⁵ Essay II., ch. 2.

⁶ Chap. 3.

TIME—

separated from the receptivity of our sensibility, is quite unknown to us."¹

"One of the commonest errors is to regard *time* as an *agent*. But in reality, *time* does nothing, and *is* nothing. We use it as a compendious expression for all those causes which operate slowly and imperceptibly; but unless some positive cause is in action, no change takes place in the lapse of 1,000 years: *e. g.*, a drop of water encased in a cavity of *silex*."²—V. SPACE.

TOPOLOGY.—V. MEMORIA TECHNICA.

TRADITION (*trado*, to hand down) "is any way of delivering a thing or word to another."—Bp. Taylor.³ "Tradition is the Mercury (messenger) of the human race."—Tiberghien.⁴

"Tradition! oh tradition! thou of the seraph tongue,
The ark that links two ages, the ancient and the young."

Adam Mickiewitz.

*Nescire quid antea quam natus sis accide: il, id est semper esse puerum.*⁵

When we believe the testimony of others not given by themselves directly, but by others, this is *tradition*. It is testimony not written by the witness, nor dictated by him to be written, but handed down *memoriter*, from generation to generation.

"According to the principle of *tradition* (as the ground of certainty), it is supposed that God himself first imparted truth to the world, pure and unmixed from heaven. In the paradisiacal state, and during the whole period from the first man down to the Christian era, it is said by these philosophers there was a channel of divine communication almost perpetually open between the mind of man and God. Here accordingly, it is thought we lay hold upon a *kind* of truth which is not subject to the infirmity of human reason, and which coming down to us by verbal or documental *tradition* from the mind of Deity itself, affords us at once a solid basis for all truth, and a final appeal against all error."⁶

¹ *Analysis of Kant's Criticism of Pure Reason*. By the Translator, 8vo, Lond., 1844, p. 10.

² Coplestone, *Remains*, p. 123.

³ *Essai des Connaiss. Humaines*, p. 50.

⁴ Mirell, *Philosoph. Tenden.*, p. 17.

⁵ *Dissuasive from Popery*.

⁶ Cicero, *Orator*, cap. 14.

TRADITION —

See Molitor (J. F.), *Philosophie de la tradition*.¹

On the necessity of *Tradition*, see *Irenæus*.²

TRAIN OF THOUGHT. — “The subject of the association of ideas,” says Mr. Stewart,³ “naturally divides itself into two parts. The *first* relates to the influence of association in regulating the *succession* of our thoughts; the *second*, to its influence on the intellectual powers, and on the moral character, by the more indissoluble *combinations* which it leads us to form in infancy and early youth.” — V. COMBINATION OF IDEAS.

While we are awake a constant succession of thoughts is passing through the mind. Hobbes calls it the *con-sequence* or train of imaginations, the *train of thoughts* and mental discourse. He says it is of two sorts. The *first* is unguided, without design, and inconstant. The *second* is more constant, as being regulated by some desire and design. That is, it is *spontaneous* or *intentional*.

In the *Train of Thought*, or the succession of the various modes of consciousness, it has been observed that they succeed in some kind of order. “Not every thought to every thought succeeds indifferently,” says Hobbes. And it has long been matter of inquiry among philosophers to detect the law or laws according to which the train or succession of thought is determined.

According to Aristotle, the consecution of thoughts is either *necessary* or *habitual*. By the *necessary* consecution of thoughts, it is probable that he meant that connection or dependence subsisting between notions, one of which cannot be thought without our thinking the other; as cause and effect, means and end, quality and substance, body and space. This consecution or connection of thoughts admits of no further explanation, than to say, that such is the constitution of the human mind.

The *habitual* consecution of thoughts differs in different individuals: but the general laws, according to which it is regulated, are chiefly three, viz.: — The law of *similars*, the law of *contraries*, and the law of *co-adjacents*. From the time of

¹ 8vo, Paris, 1837.

² I., 10.

³ *Elements*, vol. I., chap. 5

TRAIN OF THOUGHT —

Aristotle, these laws have been noticed and illustrated by all writers on the subject. But it has been thought that these may be reduced to one supreme and universal law; and Sir James Mackintosh¹ expresses his surprise that Dr. Brown should have spoken of this as a discovery of his own, when the same thing had been hinted by Aristotle, distinctly laid down by Hobbes, and fully unfolded both by Hartley and Condillac.

The brief and obscure text of Aristotle, in his *Treatise on Memory and Reminiscence*, has been explained as containing the universal law as to the consecution of thoughts.² It is proposed to call this the law of *Redintegration*. "Thoughts which have, at any time, recent or remote, stood to each other in the relation of co-existence or immediate consecution, do, when severally reproduced, tend to reproduce each other." In other words, "The parts of any total thought, when subsequently called into consciousness, are apt to suggest, immediately, the parts to which they were proximately related, and mediately, the whole of which they were constituent."³

Hobbes, *Leviathan*; ⁴ *Human Nat.*; ⁵ Reid, *Intell. Pow.*⁶

TRANSCENDENT, TRANSCENDENTAL (*transcendo*, to go beyond, to surpass, to be supreme).

"To be impenetrable, discernible, and unactive, is the nature of all body and matter, as such; and the properties of a spirit are the direct contrary, to be penetrable, indiscernible, and self-motive; yea, so different they are in all things, that they seem to have nothing but *being* and the *transcendental* attributes of that in common."⁷

Transcendental is that which is above the prædicamental. Being is *transcendental*. The *prædicamental* is what belongs to a certain category of being; as the ten *summa genera*. As being cannot be included under any genus, but transcends them all, so the properties or affections of being have also been called *transcendental*. The three properties of being commonly enumerated are *unum*, *verum*, and *bonum*. To these some add

¹ *Dissert.*, p. 348, Edit. Whewell.

² Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, p. 897.

³ Part I., chap. 3.

⁴ P. 17.

⁵ Essay I.

⁶ Glanvill, *Essay* i.

TRANSCENDENT—

aliquid and *res*: and these, with *ens*, make the six *transcendentals*. But *res* and *aliquid* mean only the same as *ens*. The first three are properly called *transcendentals*, as these only are passions or affections of being, as being.—V. UNITY, TRUTH, GOOD.

"In the schools, *transcendentalis* and *transcendens* were convertible expressions employed to mark a term or notion which *transcended*, that is, which rose above, and thus contained under it, the categories or *summa genera* of Aristotle. Such, for example, is being, of which the ten categories are only subdivisions. Kant, according to his wont, twisted these old terms into a new signification. First of all, he distinguished them from each other. *Transcendent* (*transcendens*) he employed to denote what is wholly beyond experience, being neither given as an *à posteriori* nor *à priori* element of cognition—what therefore transcends every category of thought. *Transcendental* (*transcendentalis*) he applied to signify the *à priori* or necessary cognitions which, though manifested in, as affording the conditions of, experience, transcend the sphere of that contingent or adventitious knowledge which we acquire by experience. *Transcendental* is not therefore what transcends, but what in fact constitutes a category of thought. This term, though probably from another quarter, has found favour with Mr. Stewart, who proposes to exchange the expression *principles of common sense*, for, among other names, that of *transcendental truths*."¹

In the philosophy of Kant all those principles of knowledge which are original and primary, and which are determined *à priori* are called *transcendental*. They involve necessary and universal truths, and thus transcend all truth derived from experience which must always be contingent and particular. The principles of knowledge, which are pure and *transcendental*, form the ground of all knowledge that is empirical or determined *à posteriori*. In this sense *transcendental* is opposed to *empirical*.

"There is a *philosophic* (and inasmuch as it is actualized by an effort of freedom, an *artificial*) *consciousness* which lies beneath, or (as it were) *behind* the spontaneous consciousness

¹ Sir WILL. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note A, sect. 5.

TRANSCENDENT—

natural to all reflecting beings. As the elder Romans distinguished their northern provinces into Cis-Alpine and Trans-Alpine, so may we divide all the objects of human knowledge into those on this side, and those on the other side of the spontaneous consciousness; *citra et trans conscientiam committentem*. The latter is exclusively the domain of pure philosophy, which is, therefore, properly entitled *transcendental* in order to discriminate it at once, both from mere reflection and representation on the one hand, and on the other from those flights of lawless speculation, which, abandoned by all distinct consciousness, because transgressing the bounds and purposes of our intellectual faculties, are justly condemned as *transcendent*.”¹

Transcendent is opposed to *immanent*—*q. v.*

Transcendental is opposed to *empirical*—*q. v.*

TRANSFERENCE and TRANSLATION are terms employed by the author of the *Light of Nature Pursued*, to denote the fact that our desires are often transferred from primary objects to those which are secondary or subservient; as from the desire of greatness or honour may arise, in a secondary way, the desire of wealth as a means of greatness or power.²—*V. DESIRE.*

TRANSMIGRATION.—*V. METEMPSYCHOSIS.*

TRANSPOSITION.—*V. CONVERSION.*

TRIVIUM.—The seven *Liberal Arts* were Grammar, Rhetoric, Logic, Arithmetic, Geometry, Astronomy, and Music.

Lingua, Tropus, Ratio, Numerus, Tonus, Angulus, Astra Grammar, Logic, and Rhetoric, constituted the *Trivium*—*tres viæ in unum*, because they all refer to words or language. Arithmetic, Geometry, Music, and Astronomy, constituted the *Quadrivium*—*quatuor viæ in unum*, because they all refer to quantity.

“Gramm. loquitur, Dia. verba Æcet, Rhet. verba colorat;

Mus. canit, Ar. numerat, Geo. ponderat, Ast. colit astra.”

The Mechanical Arts were Rus, Nemus, Arma, Faber, Vulnera, Lana, Rates; or, Agriculture, Propagation of Trees,

¹ Coleridge, *Biograph. Liter.*, p. 143.

² Tucker, *Light of Nature*; chapter on *Transference or Translation*.

TRIVIUM —

Manufacture of Arms, Carpenters' work, Medicine, Weaving, and Ship-building.

TRUTH has been distinguished by most metaphysical writers, according as it respects being, knowledge, and speech, into *veritas entis, cognitionis, et signi*. By others, *truth* has been distinguished as *entitative, objective, and formal*, the *truth* of signs being included under the last.

Veritas entis — Transcendental or Metaphysical Truth.

The pillar and ground of all *truth* is in *truth* of being—that *truth* by which a thing is what it is, by which it has its own nature and properties, and has not merely the appearance but reality of being. Thus gold has *truth* of being *i. e.*, is real gold, when it has not only the appearance, but all the properties belonging to that metal. Philosophy is the knowledge of being, and if there were no real being, that is, if *truth* could not be predicated of things, there could be no knowledge. But things exist independently of being known. They do not exist because they are known, nor as they are known. But they are known because they are, and as they are, when known fully.

Veritas Cognitionis.

Truth, as predicated of knowledge, is the conformity of our knowledge with the reality of the object known—for, as knowledge is the knowledge of something, when a thing is known as it is, that knowledge is formally true. To know that fire is hot, is true knowledge. Objective truth is the conformity of the thing or object known with true knowledge. But there seems to be little difference whether we say that *truth* consists in the conformity of the formal conception to the thing known or conceived of, or in the conformity of the thing as it is to true knowledge.

Veritas Signi.

The *truth* of the sign consists in its adequateness or conformity to the thing signified. If falsity in those things which imitate another consists not in so far as they imitate, but in so far as they cannot imitate it or represent it adequately or fully, so the *truth* of a representation or sign consists in its being adequate to the thing signified. The *truth* and adequacy of signs belongs to enunciation in logic.

TRUTH—

"Independent of the truth which consists in the conformity of thoughts to things, called *scientific*—and of that which lies in the correspondence of words with thoughts, called *moral truth*—there is a *truth* called *logical*, depending on the self-consistency of thoughts themselves. . . . Thought is valueless except in so far as it leads to correct knowledge of things; a higher *truth* than the merely logical, in subservience to which alone the logical is desirable. The reason that we sedulously avoid the purely logical error of holding two contradictory propositions is, that we believe one of them to be a fair representation of facts, so that in adopting the other we should admit a falsehood, which is always abhorrent to the mind. If we call the *logical truth*, *subjective*, as consisting in the due direction of the thinking subject, we may call this higher metaphysical *truth*, *objective*, because it depends on our thoughts fairly representing the objects that give rise to them."¹

Veritas est adæquatio intellectus et rei, secundum quod intellectus dicit esse quod est, vel non esse quod non est."²

Truth, in the strict logical sense, applies to propositions and to nothing else; and consists in the conformity of the declaration made to the actual state of the case; agreeably to Aldrich's definition of "a true" proposition—*vera est quæ quod res est dicit*.

In its etymological sense, *truth* signifies that which the speaker "trows," or believes to be the fact. The etymology of the word ἀληθής, τὸ μὴ ἄλθον, seems to be similar; denoting non-concealment. In this sense it is opposed to a *lie*; and may be called *moral*, as the other may be called *logical truth*.

"*Truth* is not unfrequently applied, in loose and inaccurate language, to *arguments*; when the proper expression would be 'correctness,' 'conclusiveness,' or 'validity.'

"*Truth* again, is often used in the sense of *reality*, τὸ ὄν. People speak of the *truth* or *falsity* of *facts*; properly speaking, they are either *real* or *fictitious*: it is the *statement* that is

¹ Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*; sect. 81, 82.

² Aquinas, *Contra. Gent.*, i., 49.

TRUTH—

'true' or 'false.' The 'true' cause of anything, is a common expression; 'meaning that which may with *truth* be assigned as the cause.' The senses of *falsehood* correspond."¹

"*Necessary truths* are such as are known independently of inductive proof. They are, therefore, either *self-evident* propositions, or deduced from self-evident propositions."²

Necessary truths are those in which we not only learn that the proposition is true, but see that it *must* be true; in which the negation is not only false, but impossible; in which we cannot, even by an effort of the imagination, or in a supposition, conceive the reverse of what is asserted. The relations of numbers are the examples of such *truths*. Two and three make five. We cannot conceive it to be otherwise.

"A *necessary* truth or law of reason, is a truth or law the opposite of which is inconceivable, contradictory, nonsensical, impossible; more shortly, it is a truth, in the fixing of which nature had only *one* alternative, be it positive or negative. Nature might have fixed that the sun should go round the earth, instead of the earth round the sun; at least we see nothing in that supposition which is contradictory and absurd. Either alternative was equally possible. But nature could not have fixed that two straight lines should, in any circumstances, enclose a space; for this involves a contradiction."³

Contingent truths are those which, without doing violence to reason, we may conceive to be otherwise. If I say "Grass is green," "Socrates was a philosopher," I assert propositions which *are* true, but *need* not have been so. It might have pleased the Creator to make grass blue—and Socrates might never have lived.

"There are *truths* of *reasoning* (reason) and *truths* of *fact*. *Truths* of reason are necessary, and their contradictory is impossible—those of *fact* are contingent, and their opposite is possible. When a *truth* is necessary you can find the reason by analysis, resolving it into ideas and *truths* more simple, till you come to what is primitive."⁴

¹ Whately, *Log.*, Appendix I.

² Kidd, *Principles of Reasoning*, chap. 7.

³ Ferrier, *Inst. of Metaphys.*, p. 19.

⁴ Leibnitz, *Nouveaux Essais*, iv., 2; *Monadologie*, sect. 33.

TRUTH —

"Though the *primary truths of fact* and the *primary truths of intelligence* (the *contingent* and *necessary* truths of Reid) form two very distinct classes of the original beliefs or intuitions of our consciousness, there appears no sufficient ground to regard their sources as different, and therefore to be distinguished by different names. In this I regret that I am unable to agree with Mr. Stewart. See his *Elements*, vol. ii., chap. 1, and his *Account of Reid*, *supra*, p. 27, b."¹

"*Truth* implies something really existing. An assertion respecting the *future* may be probable or improbable, it may be honest or deceitful, it may be prudent or imprudent, it may have any relation we please to the mind of the person who makes it, or of him who hears it, but it can have no relation at all to a *thing which is not*. The Stoics said, Cicero will either be Consul or not. One of these is true, therefore the event is certain. But *truth* cannot be predicated of that which is not."²

"*Truth* implies a *report* of something that *is*; *reality* denotes the existence of a thing, whether *affirmed* and *reported* of or not. The thing reported either *is* or *is not*; the report is either *true* or *false*. The things themselves are sometimes called *truths*, instead of *facts* or *realities*. And *assertions* concerning matters of fact are called *facts*. Thus we hear of *false facts*, a thing literally impossible and absurd."³

"No pleasure is comparable to the standing upon the vantage-ground of truth (a hill not to be commanded, and where the air is always clear and serene), and to see the errors and wanderings and mists and tempests in the vale below; 'so always that this prospect be with pity, and not with swelling or pride.'"⁴—V. FALSITY, REALITY.

TRUTHS (First) are such as do not depend on any prior truth. They carry evidence in themselves. They are assented to as soon as they are understood. The assent given to them is so full, that while experience may confirm or familiarize it, it can scarcely be said to increase it, and so clear that no proposition

¹ Sir William Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, note A, p. 742.

² Coplestone, *Enquiry into Necessity*, Preface, p. 15.

³ *Ibid.*, *Remains*, p. 105.

⁴ *Bacon's Essay on Truth*.

TRUTHS —

contradicting them can be admitted as more clear. That a whole is greater than any of its parts; that a change implies the operation of a cause; that qualities do not exist without a substance; that there are other beings in the world besides ourselves; may be given as examples of *first truths*. These truths are and must be assented to by every rational being, as soon as the terms expressing them are understood. They have been called *κοινὰί ἴσωςαι*, *communes notitiæ*, natural judgments, primitive beliefs, fundamental laws of the human mind, principles of common sense, principles of reason, principles of reasoning, &c.

. . . "To determine how great is the number of these propositions is impossible; for they are not in the soul as propositions; but it is an undoubted truth that a mind awaking out of nothing into being, and presented with particular objects, would not fail at once to judge concerning them according to, and by the force of, some such *innate principles* as these, or just as a man would judge who had learnt these explicit propositions; which indeed are so nearly allied to its own nature, that they may be called almost a part of itself.

. . . . Therefore I take the mind or soul of man not to be so perfectly indifferent to receive all impressions as a *rasa tabula*, or white paper. . . . "Hence there may be some practical principles also innate in the foregoing sense, though not in the form of propositions."¹

"From the earliest records of time, and following the course of history, we everywhere find the principles of common sense, as universal elements of human thought and action. No violence can suppress, no sophisms obscure them. They steadily and unerringly guide us through the revolutions and destruction of nations and empires. The eye pierces with rapid glance through the long vista of ages amid the sanguinary conflicts, the territorial aggrandizements, and chequered features of states and kingdoms; and from the wreck of all that is debasing, glorious, or powerful, we still recognize the great and universal truths of humanity. One generation passes away after another, but they remain for ever the same. They are the life-blood of human nature; the intellectual air we

¹ Watts, *Philosoph. Essays*, sect. 4 and 3.

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breathe. Without them society could not for a single hour subsist; governments, laws, institutions, religion, the manners and customs of men, bear the indelible imprint of their universality and indestructibility. They are revealed in the daily and hourly actions, thoughts, and speech of all men; and must ever form the basis of all systems of philosophy; for without them it can only be a phantom, a delusion, an unmeaning assemblage of words.”—Van de Weyer.

On the nature, origin, and validity of *first truths*, the following authors may be consulted:—Lord Herbert, *De Veritate*; Buffier, *Treatise of First Truths*; Reid, *Inquiry and Essays on Intell. Pow.*; Sir Will. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*.¹—
V. COMMON SENSE, REMINISCENCE.

TYPE (*τύπος*, *typus*, from *τύπτω*, to strike).

“Great father of the gods, when for our crimes
Thou send’st some heavy judgment on the times,—
Some tyrant king, the terror of his age,
The *type* and true vicegerent of thy rage!
Thus punish him.”—Dryden, *Persius*, sat. 3.

“So St. Hierome offered wine, not water, in the *type* of his blood.”²

Among the Greeks the first model which statuary made in clay of their projected work was called *τύπος*. *Type* means the first rude form or figure of anything—an adumbration or shadowing forth. The thing fashioned according to it was the *ectype*, and the *type* in contrast the *prototype*. But *archetype* was applied to the original idea, model, or exemplar, not copied, but of which other things were copies.

“A *type* is an example of any class, for instance, a species of a genus, which is considered as eminently possessing the characters of the class.”³

For the meaning of a *type* in the arts of design, see Sir Edmund Head, *Hist. of Painting*.⁴—V. HOMOTYPE.

¹ Appendix, note A.

² Bishop Taylor, *Of Real Presence*, sect. 6.

³ Whewell, *Induct. Sciences*, viii., §1., 10.

⁴ Preface, p. 39.

UBIETY (*ubi*, where) is the presence of one thing to another, or the presence of a thing in place. The schoolmen distinguished *ubiety* as —

1. *Circumscriptive*, by which a body is so in one place that its parts are answerable to the parts of space in which it is, and exclude every other body.

2. *Definitive*, as when a human spirit is limited or defined in its presence to the same place as a human body.

3. *Repletive*, as when the Infinite Spirit is present through every portion of space.

This last is sometimes called *ubiquity*, and means the Divine Omnipresence.¹

UNCONDITIONED. — “This term has been employed in a two fold signification, as denoting either the entire absence of all *restriction*, or more widely, the entire absence of all *relation*. The former we regard as its only legitimate application.”²

In the philosophy of Kant it is that which is absolutely and in itself, or internally possible, and is exempted from the conditions circumscribing a thing in time or space. — *V. ABSOLUTE, INFINITE.*

UNDERSTANDING. — “Perhaps the safer use of the term, for general purposes, is to take it as the mind, or rather as the man himself considered as a concipient as well as a percipient being, and reason as a power supervening.”³

“In its wider acceptation, *understanding* is the entire power of perceiving and conceiving, exclusive of the sensibility; the power of dealing with the impressions of sense, and composing them into wholes according to a law of unity; and in its most comprehensive meaning it includes even simple apprehension. Thus taken at large it is the whole spontaneity of the representing mind; that which puts together the multifarious materials supplied by the passive faculty of sense, or pure receptivity. But we may consider the *understanding* in another point of view, not as the simple faculty of thought, which produces intuitions and conceptions spontaneously, and causes into play as the mere tool or organ of the spiritual mind; but as a

¹ Leibnitz, *Nouv. Essais*, liv. II., chap. 23, sect. 21.

² Calderwood, *Phil. of the Infinite*, p. 86.

³ Coleridge, *Statesman's Manual* App. 2, p. 264.

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power that is exercised on objects which it supplies to itself, which does not simply *think* and reflect, but which examines its thoughts, arranges and compares them; and this for scientific, not for directly practical, purposes. To intellectualize upon religion, and to receive it by means of the *understanding* are two different things, and the common exertion of this faculty should of course be distinguished from that special use of it, in which one man differs from another, by reason of stronger original powers of mind, or greater improvement of them by exercise.”¹

“The *understanding* is the medial faculty, or faculty of means, as *reason* on the other hand is the source of ideas or ultimate ends. By *reason* we determine the ultimate end; by the *understanding* we are enabled to select and adopt the appropriate means for the attainment of, or approximation to, this end, according to circumstances. But an ultimate end must of necessity be an idea, that is, that which is not representable by the senses, and has no correspondent in nature, or the world of the senses. . . . *Understanding* and sense constitute the natural mind of man, mind of the flesh, *φρόνημα σαρκός*, as likewise *ψυχική σύνεσις*, the intellectual power of the living or animal soul, which St. Paul everywhere contradistinguishes from the spirit, that is, the power resulting from the union and co-influence of the will and reason — *σοφία* or wisdom.”²

“The *reason* and the *understanding* have not been steadily distinguished by English writers. . . . To *understand* anything is to apprehend it according to certain assumed ideas and rules; we do not include in the meaning of the word an examination of the ground of the ideas and rules by reference to which we *understand* the thing. We *understand* a language, when we apprehend what is said, according to the established vocabulary and grammar of the language; without inquiring how the words came to have their meaning, or what is the ground of the grammatical rules. We *understand* the sense without *reasoning* about the etymology and syntax.

“Reasoning may be requisite to *understanding*. We may

¹ Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*, vol. II., p. 33.

² *Ibid.*, *Notes on English Div.*, vol. II., p. 333.

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have to reason about the syntax in order to *understand* the sense. But *understanding* leaves still room for reasoning. Also we may *understand* what is not conformable to reason; as when we *understand* a man's arguments, and think them unfounded in reason.

"We reason in order to deduce rules from first principles, or from one another. But the rules and principles which must be expressed when we reason, may be only implied when we *understand*. We may *understand* the sense of a speech without thinking of rules of grammar.

"The reason is employed both in *understanding* and in reasoning; but the principles which are explicitly asserted in reasoning, are only implicitly applied in *understanding*. The reason includes both the faculty of seeing first principles, and the reasoning faculty by which we obtain other principles. The *understanding* is the faculty of applying principles, however obtained."¹

Anselm considered the facts of consciousness under the fourfold arrangement of Sensibility, Will, Reason, and Intelligence; and showed that the two last are not identical.²

"'There is one faculty,' says Aristotle,³ 'by which man comprehends and embodies in his belief first principles which cannot be proved, which he must receive from some authority; there is another by which, when a new fact is laid before him, he can show that it is in conformity with some principle possessed before. One process resembles the collection of materials for building—the other their orderly arrangement. One is intuition,—the other logic. One *νοεῖς*, the other *ἰσχυρίζεται*.' Or to use a modern distinction, one is *reason* in its highest sense, the other *understanding*."⁴

"I use the term *understanding*, not for the *noetic* faculty, intellect proper, or place of principles, but for the *dianoetic*, or discursive faculty in its widest signification, for the faculty

¹ Whewell, *Elements of Morality*, Introd., sect. 11.

² Matter, *Hist. de la Philosophie dans ses Rapports avec Religion*, p. 148. Paris 1754.

³ *Eth.*, lib. 6.

⁴ Sewall, *Christ. Mor.*, chap. 21.

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of relations or comparisons; and thus in the meaning in which *Verstand* is now employed by the Germans."¹

"*Understanding, intellect (Verstand)* is the faculty which conjoins the diversity which is furnished us by the senses, and forms into a whole the sensible representations which are given to us. The word *Verstand* is used occasionally as being synonymous with *Vernunft* (reason), and is the faculty of cognition in general, and in this sense the critic of pure reason might be termed also the critic of pure *understanding*. The discursive *understanding* is the faculty of cognizing objects, not immediately, but through conceptions. And as intuition belongs to cognition, and as a faculty of a complete spontaneousness of intuition, or which perceives the intuition not passively, but produces spontaneously from itself, a cognition-faculty different from, and independent of, what is the sensibility, would be, consequently, *understanding* in the widest sense; we might think such an intuitive, envisaging *understanding (intellectus intuitivus)* negatively, as a non-discursive *understanding*. The *gemeiner Menschen Verstand* and the *Gemeinsinn* are *sensus communis logicus*, or common sense; and the *gesunder Verstand*, sound sense. Sir J. Mackintosh prefers the term *intellect* to that of *understanding* as the source of conceptions."²—V. REASON, INTELLECT.

UNIFICATION is the act of so uniting ourselves with another as to form one being. *Unification* with God was the final aim of the Neo-Platonicians. And *unification* with God is also one of the beliefs of the Chinese philosopher, Lao Tseu.

UNITARIAN (A) is a believer in one God. It is the same in meaning as *Monotheist*. In this large-sense it is applicable to all Christians, for they all believe in the unity of the Divine nature; and also to Jews and Mahomedans. It may even include Deists, or those who believe in God on grounds of reason alone. But the name is commonly opposed to Trinitarian, and is applied to those who, accepting the Christian revelation, believe in God as existing in one person, and acknowledge Jesus Christ as his messenger to men.

UNITY or ONENESS (*unum*, one) is a property of being. If anything is, it is one and not many. *Omne ens est unum.*

¹ Sir W. Hamilton. *Discussions*. &c., 8vo. Lond., 1852. p. 4. note.

² Haywood. *Crit. of Pure Reason*. p. 105.

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Unity is defined to be that property, *qua ens est indivisum in se et divinum ab omni alio*.

Locke¹ makes *unity* synonymous with number. But Aristotle² more correctly makes *unity* the element of number, and says that *unity* is indivisibleness. That which is indivisible, and has no position, is a *monad*. That which is indivisible, but has a position, is a *point*. That which is divisible only in one sense is a *line*. That which is divisible in two senses is a *plane*. And that which is divisible in three senses is a *body* in respect of quantity.

According to Aristotle,³ the modes of *unity* are reducible to four, that of continuity, especially natural continuity, which is not the result of contact or tie—that of a whole naturally, which has figure and form, and not like things united by violence—that of an individual or that which is numerically indivisible—and that of a universal, which is indivisible in form and in respect of science.

Unity has been divided into *transcendental* or *entitative*, by which a being is indivisible in itself—*logical*, by which things like each other are classed together for the purposes of science—and *moral*, by which many are embodied as one for the purposes of life, as many citizens make one society, many soldiers one army.

Unity is opposed to plurality, which is nothing but *plures entitates aut unitates*.

Unity is *specific* or *numerical*. The former may rather be called *similitude*, and the latter *identity*.⁴

"The essential diversity of the ideas *unity* and *sameness* was among the elementary principles of the old logicians; and the sophisms grounded on the confusion of these terms have been ably exposed by Leibnitz in his critique on Wissowatius."⁵—

V. DISTINCTION, IDENTITY.

UNIVERSALS.—"The same colour being observed to-day in chalk or snow, which the mind yesterday received from milk, it considers that appearance alone, makes it a representative

¹ *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, b. ii., ch. 16.

² *Metaphys.*, lib. iv., cap. 6, lib. x., cap. 1.

³ *Ibid.*, lib. x., cap. 1.

⁴ Hutcheson, *Metaphys.*, pars 3, cap. 2.

⁵ Coleridge, *Second Lay Sermon*, p. 367. See also, *Aids to Reflection*, p. 167.

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of all of that kind, and having given it the name of whiteness, it by that sound signifies the same quality, wheresoever to be imagined or met with, and thus *universals*, whether ideas or terms, are made.”¹

Universal terms may denote, 1. A *mathematical* universality, as all circles (no exception) have a centre and circumference. 2. A *physical* universality, as all men use words to express their thoughts (though the dumb cannot). 3. A *moral* universality, as all men are governed by affection rather than by reason.

Universal (*unum versus alia*) means, according to its composition, one towards many. It is defined by Aristotle,² “that which by its nature is fit to be predicated of many.” And³ “that which by its nature has a fitness or capacity to be in many.” It implies unity with community, or unity shared in by many.

Universals have been divided into, 1. *Metaphysical* or *universalia ante rem*. 2. *Physical*, or *universalia in re*. 3. *Logical*, or *universalia post rem*.

By the first are meant those archetypal forms, according to which all things were created. As existing in the Divine mind and furnishing the pattern for the Divine working, these may be said to correspond with the *ideas* of Plato.

By *universals* in the second sense are meant certain common natures, which, one in themselves, are diffused over or shared in by many—as *rationality* by all men.

By *universals* in the third sense are meant general notions framed by the human intellect, and predicated of many things, on the ground of their possessing common properties—as *animal*, which may be predicated of man, lion, horse, &c.

Realists give prominence to *universals* in the first and second signification. *Nominalists* hold that the true meaning of *universals* is that assigned in the third sense. While *conceptualists* hold an intermediate view.⁴

In ancient philosophy the *universals* were called *prædicables*

¹ Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book II., ch. 6.

² *Lib. de Interpret.*, cap. 5.

³ *Metaphys.*, lib. V., cap. 13.

⁴ Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, essay V., chap. 6; Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*, 2d edit. sect. 23.

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(q. v.), and were arranged in five classes, *genus*, *species*, *differentia*, *proprium*, and *accidens*. It is argued that there can be neither more nor fewer. For whatever is predicated of many is predicated *essentially* or *accidentally*; if *essentially*, either of the whole essence, and then it is a *species*; of a common part of the essence, and then it is a *genus*; or of a proper part of the essence, and then it is the *differentia essentialis*; if *accidentally*, it either flows from the essence of the subject, and is its *proprium*, or does not flow from its essence, and is its *accidens*.

Or it may be argued thus—*universality* is a fitness of being predicated of many, which implies identity or sameness, or at least resemblance. There will therefore be as many classes of *universals* as there are kinds of identity. Now, when one thing is said to be the same with another, it is so either *essentially* or *accidentally*; if *essentially*, it is so either *completely* or *incompletely*; if *completely*, it gives a *species*; if *incompletely*, it is so in *form*, and gives the *differentia*, or in *matter* and gives the *genus*; if *accidentally*, it is the same either *necessarily* and *inseparably*, and constitutes the *proprium* — or *contingently* and *separably*, and is the *accidens*.—Tellez.¹ But the fivefold classification of *universals* is censured by Derodon.²

UNIVOCAL WORDS (*una*, one; *vox*, word or meaning) “are such as signify but one idea, or at least but one sort of thing; the words book, bible, fish, house, elephant, may be called *univocal words*, for I know not that they signify anything else but those ideas to which they are generally affixed.”³

“I think it is a good division in Aristotle, that the same word may be applied to different things in three ways: *univocally*, *analogically*, and *equivocally*. *Univocally*, when the things are *species* of the same *genus*; *analogically*, when the things are related by some similitude or analogy; *equivocally*, when they have no relation but a common name.”⁴

In Logic a common term is called *univocal* in respect of those things or persons to which it is applicable in the same signification, as the term “man.” Whately observes that the “usual

¹ *Summa*, pars 1, dis. v., sect. 1.

² *Log.*, pars. 2, cap. 6. See also Thomson, *Outline of Laws of Thought*, sect. 37.

³ Watts, *Log.*, b. 1., c. 4.

⁴ Reid, *Correspondence*, p. 75.

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division of nouns into *univocal*, *equivocal*, and *analogous*, and into nouns of the *first* and *second intention*, are not, strictly speaking, divisions of words, but divisions of the *manner of employing them*; the *same word* may be employed either *univocally*, *equivocally*, or *analogously*; either in the first intention or the second.”¹

V. ANALOGOUS, EQUIVOCAL, INTENTION.

UTILITY, said Kant,² “is nothing scarcely but a frame or case which may serve to facilitate the sale of a picture, or draw to it the attention of those who are not connoisseurs; but cannot recommend it to true lovers of the art, or determine its price.”

“What is useful only has no value in itself; but derives all its merit from the end for which it is useful.”³

“*Utility* is an idea essentially relative, which supposes a higher term.”⁴

The doctrine of *utility* in morals is, that actions are right because they are useful. It has been held under various forms. Some who maintain that *utility* or beneficial tendency is what makes an action right, hold that a virtuous agent may be prompted by self-love (as Paley), or by benevolence (as Rutherford), or partly by both (as Hume). And the beneficial tendency of actions has by some been viewed solely in reference to this life (as Hume and Bentham), while by others it has been extended to a future state (as Paley), and the obligation to do such actions has been represented as arising from the rewards and punishments of that future state, as made known by the light of nature and by revelation (as Dwight).

The fundamental objection to the doctrine of *utility* in all its modifications, is that taken by Dr. Reid,⁵ viz., “that agreeableness and *utility* are not moral conceptions, nor have they any connection with morality. What a man does, merely because it is agreeable, is not virtue. Therefore the Epicurean system was justly thought by Cicero, and the best moralists among the ancients, to subvert morality, and to substitute another principle in its room; and this system is

¹ Whately, *Log.*, b. ii., ch. 5, § 1.

² Reid, *Act. Princ.* essay v., ch. 5.

³ *Act. Princ.*, essay v., ch. 5.

⁴ *Metaphys. des Mœurs*, p. 15.

⁵ *Manuel de Philosophie*, p. 334.

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liable to the same censure." "*Honestum, igitur, id intelligimus. quod tale est, ut, detracta omni utilitate, sine ullis premiis fructibusve, per seipsum jure possit laudari.*"¹

VELLEITY (*volo*, to will) is an indolent or inactive wish or inclination towards a thing, which leads to no energetic effort to obtain it, as when it is said, "The cat likes fish but will not touch the water."

"The *wishing* of a thing is not properly the *willing* it, but it is that which is called by the schools an imperfect *velleity*, and imports no more than an idle inoperative complacency in, and *desire* of the end, without any consideration of the means."²

"A volition which cannot carry itself into execution." — Muller. — *V. VOLITION.*

VERACITY is the duty of preserving the truth in our conversation. It is natural for us to speak as we think, and to believe that others do the same. So much so that Dr. Reid enumerates an instinct of *veracity* and a corresponding instinct of *credulity* as principles of human nature: Children do not distrust nor deceive. It is not till interest or passion prompts men, that they conceal or disguise the truth. The means employed for this purpose are either saying what is *false*, or *equivocation* and *reservation* — *q. v.*

VERBAL is opposed to *real* (*q. v.*), 1. As *name* is opposed to *thing*; and 2. As *insincere* is opposed to *sincere*. "Great acclamations and *verbal* praises and acknowledgments, without an honest and sincere endeavour to please and obey him, are but pieces of mockery and hypocritical compliment."³

"Sometimes the question turns on the meaning and extent of the *terms* employed; sometimes on the *things* signified by them. If it be made to appear, therefore, that the opposite sides of a *certain* question may be held by parties not differing in their *opinion of the matter in hand*, then that question

¹ *De Finibus*, li., 14.

² South.

³ Hale, *Cont. Of Afflictions*.

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may be pronounced *verbal*; or depending on the different senses in which they employ the *terms*. If, on the contrary, it appears that they employ the terms in the same sense, but still differ as to the application of one of them to the other, then it may be pronounced that the question is *real* — that they differ as to the opinions they hold of the *things* or questions."¹

VIRTUAL is opposed to *actual*. — "It is not, in this sense, the foundation of Christian doctrine, but it contains it all; not only in general, but in special; not only *virtual*, but *actual*; not mediate, but immediate; for a few lines would have served for a foundation general, *virtual*, and mediate."²

A thing has a *virtual* existence when it has all the conditions necessary to its *actual* existence. The statue exists *virtually* in the brass or iron, the oak in the acorn. The cause *virtually* contains the effect. In the philosophy of Aristotle, the distinction between *δύναμις*, and *ἐντελέχεια*, or *ἐνέργεια*, i. e., *potentia* or *virtus*, and *actus* is frequent and fundamental.

"A letter of credit does not *in reality* contain the sum which it represents; that sum is only *really* in the coffer of the banker. Yet the letter contains the sum in a certain sense, since it holds its place. This sum is in still another sense, contained; it is *virtually* in the credit of the banker who subscribes the letter. To express these differences in the language of Descartes, the sum is contained *formally* in the coffer of the banker, *objectively* in the letter which he subscribed, and *eminently* in the credit which enabled him to subscribe; and thus the coffer contains the reality *formal* of the sum, the letter the reality *objective*, and the credit of the banker the reality *eminent*."³

VIRTUE. — "For if *virtue* be an election annexed unto our nature, and consisteth in a mean, which is determined by reason, and that mean is the very myddes of two things vicious, the one is surplussage, the other in lacke,"⁴ &c.

¹ Whately.

² Bp. Taylor, *Dissuas. from Popery*, sect. 2.

³ Royer Collard. *Œuvres de Reid*, tom. II., p. 356.

⁴ Sir T. Elyot. *The Governour*, b. II., a. 10.

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Virtus, in Latin, from *vir*, a man, and ἀρετή in Greek, from ἄρης, Mars, give us the primary idea of manly strength. *Virtue* then implies opposition or struggle. In man, the struggle is between reason and passion—between right and wrong. To hold by the former is *virtue*, to yield to the latter is vice. According to Aristotle, *virtue* is a practical habit acquired by doing virtuous acts. He called those *virtues intellectual*, by which the intellect was strengthened, and *moral*, by which the life was regulated. Another ancient division was that of the cardinal *virtues*—which correspond to the moral *virtues*. The theological *virtues* were *faith*, *hope*, and *charity*.

The opposite of *virtue* is *vice*.

Aristotle is quoted by Bacon in Seventh Book *Of the Advancement of Learning*, as saying,

“As beasts cannot be said to have vice or *virtue*, so neither can the gods; for as the condition of the latter is something more elevated than *virtue*, so that of the former is something different from vice.”¹

As *virtue* implies trial or difficulty, it cannot be predicated of God. He is holy.

Kant frequently insists upon the distinction between *virtue* and *holiness*. In a holy being, the will is uniformly and without struggle in accordance with the moral law. In a virtuous being, the will is liable to the solicitations of the sensibility, in opposition or resistance to the dictates of reason. This is the only state of which man is capable in this life. But he ought to aim and aspire to the attainment of the higher or holy state, in which the will without struggle is always in accordance with reason. The Stoics thought the *beau idéal* of virtue, or the complete subjection of sense and appetite to reason, attainable in this life.—V. DUTY, MERIT, OBLIGATION, RECTITUDE, STANDARD, NATURE OF THINGS.

VOLITION (*volo*, to will) “is an act of the mind knowingly exerting that dominion it takes itself to have over any part of the man, by employing it in, or withholding it from, any particular action.”²

¹ Moffet, *Trans.*, p. 200.

² Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book II., chap. 21, sect. 18.

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"There is an error which lies under the word *volition*. Under that word you include both the *final perception* of the understanding which is passive, and also the *first operation* or exertion of the active faculty of self-motive power. These two you think to be necessarily connected. I think there is no connection at all between them; and that in their not being connected lies the difference between action and passion; which difference is the essence of liberty."¹

Things are sought as *ends* or as *means*.

The schoolmen distinguished three acts of will, *circa finem*, *Velleity*, *Intention*, and *Fruition*. Gen. iii. 6:—When the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was pleasant to the eyes, and a tree to be desired to make one wise (this is *velleity*), she took thereof (this is *intention*) and did eat (this is *fruition*). There are also three acts, *circa, media*, viz., *consent*, approving of means—*election*, or choosing the most fit, and *application, use*, or employing of them.—*V. ELECTION, WILL.*

WELL-BEING.—"This is beyond all doubt, and indisputable," says Leighton in his *Theological Lectures*, "that all men wish well to themselves; nor can the mind of man divest itself of this propensity, without divesting itself of its being. This is what the schoolmen mean when in their manner of expression they say that 'the will (*voluntas*, not *arbitrium*) is carried towards happiness, not simply as will, but as nature.' 'No man hateth his own flesh.'"

"One conclusion follows inevitably from the preceding position," says Coleridge,² "namely, that this propensity can never be legitimately made the principle of morality, even because it is no part or appurtenance of the moral will: and because the proper object of the moral principle is to limit and control this propensity, and to determine in what it may be, and in what it ought to be, gratified; while it is the business of

¹ Dr. Sam. Clarke, *Second Letter to a Gentleman*, p. 410.

² *Aids to Reflection*, vol. I., p. 20, edit. 1848.

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philosophy to instruct the understanding, and the office of religion to convince the whole man, that otherwise than as a regulated, and of course therefore a subordinate, end, this propensity, innate and inalienable though it be, can never be realized or fulfilled." — V. HAPPINESS.

WHOLE (ὅλος).—"There are *wholes* of different kinds; for, in the *first place*, there is an *extended whole*, of which the parts lie contiguous, such as *body* and *space*. *Secondly*, There is a *whole*, of which the parts are separated or discrete, such as *number*, which, from thence, is called *quantity discrete*. *Thirdly*, There is a *whole*, of which the parts do not exist together, but only by succession, such as *time*, consisting of *minutes*, *hours*, and *days*, or as many more parts as we please, but which all exist successively, or not together. *Fourthly*, There is what may be called a *logical whole*, of which the several specieses are *parts*. *Animal*, for example, is a *whole*, in this sense, and man, dog, horse, &c., are the several parts of it. And *fifthly*, The different qualities of the same substance, may be said to be *parts* of that substance."¹

A *whole* is either divisible or indivisible.

Every *whole* as a *whole* is one and undivided. But though not divided, a *whole* may be *divisible* in thought, by being reduced to its elements mentally, or it may be altogether *indivisible* even in thought. This latter is what metaphysicians call *Totum perfectionale*, and it is only applicable to Deity, who is wholly in the universe, and wholly in every part of it.

A *divisible whole* is distinguished as *potential*, or that which is divisible into parts by which it is not constituted, as animal may be divided into man and brute, but is not constituted by them; and *actual*, or that which is divisible into parts by which it is constituted, as man may be divided into soul and body.

An *actual whole* is either *physical* or *metaphysical*. A *physical whole* is constituted by physical composition, and is *integral* when composed of the integrant parts of matter, or *essential* when composed of matter and form. A *metaphysical whole* is constituted by metaphysical composition, which is

¹ Mos Vaddo, *Ancient Metaphys.*, book ii., chap. 12.

WHOLE—

fourfold: 1. A *whole* made up of genus and differentia is an *essential specific whole*—as man, in so far as he is a species of animal, is made up of the genus (animal) and the differentia (rational). 2. A *whole* made up of the specific nature and the individual differentia, is an *essential numerical whole*. 3. A *whole of existence* contains a singular essence and existence added. 4. A *whole of subsistence* has subsistence added to existence.¹

According to Derodon,² an *essential whole* is that from which if any part be taken the being perishes — as man in respect of his body and soul. An *integral whole* is that from which, if any part be taken, the being is not entire but mutilated. Man with all his members is an *integral whole*; cut off a limb, he is not an *integral*, but still an *essential whole*.

"A *whole* is composed of distinct parts. Composition may be *physical*, *metaphysical*, or *logical*.

"A *physical whole* is made up of parts distinct and separate, and is *natural*, as a tree, *artificial*, as a house, *moral*, or *conventional*, as a family, a city, &c.

"A *metaphysical whole* arises from metaphysical composition, as potency and act, essence and existence, &c.

"A *logical whole* is composed by genus and differentia, and is called a *higher notion*, which can be resolved into notions under it, as genus into species, species into lower species. Thus, *animal* is divided into *rational* and *irrational*, *knowledge* into science, art, experience, opinion, belief.

"Of the parts into which a *whole* is divisible, some are *essential*, so that if one is wanting the being ceases, as the head or heart in man; others are *integral*, of which if one or more be wanting the being is not entire, as in man, an eye or arms; others are *constituent*, such as concur to form the substance of the thing, as oxygen and hydrogen in water."³

WHY?—As an interrogative, this word is employed in three senses, viz., — "By what proof (or reason)?" "From what cause?" "For what purpose?" This last is commonly called the "*final cause*,"—e. g., "*Why* is this prisoner guilty of the crime?" "*Why* does a stone fall to the earth?" "*Why*

¹ Scotus, *Metaphys. Generalis*, sect. 15.

² *Log.* 3 pars., p. 70.

³ Peemans, *Introd. ad Philosoph.* p. 72.

WHY?—

did you go to London?" Much confusion has arisen from not distinguishing these different inquiries.¹

WILL.—Some modern philosophers, especially among the French, have employed the term activity as synonymous with *will*. But the former is of wider signification than the latter. Activity is the power of producing change, whatever the change may be. *Will* is the power of producing acts of willing.—**V.** VOLITION.

"Every man is conscious of a power to determine," says Dr. Reid,² "in things which he conceives to depend upon his determination. To this power we give the name of *will*."

"*Will* is an ambiguous word, being sometimes put for the faculty of willing; sometimes for the act of that faculty, besides other meanings. But *volition* always signifies the act of willing, and nothing else. Willingness, I think, is opposed to unwillingness or aversion. A man is willing to do what he has no aversion to do, or what he has some desire to do, though perhaps he has not the opportunity; and I think this is never called volition."³

"By the term *will* I do not mean to express a more or less highly developed faculty of *desiring*; but that innate intellectual energy which, unfolding itself from all the other forces of the mind, like a flower from its petals, radiates through the whole sphere of our activity—a faculty which we are better able to feel than to define, and which we might, perhaps, most appropriately designate as the purely practical faculty of man."⁴

"Appetite is the *will's* solicitor, and the *will* is appetite's controller; what we covet according to the one, by the other we often reject."⁵

On the difference between *desiring* and *willing*, see Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*;⁶ Reid, *Act. Pow.*;⁷ Stewart, *Act. and Mor. Pow.*⁸

By some philosophers this difference has been overlooked and they have completely identified desire and volition.

¹ Whately, *Log.*, Appendix 1.

² *Correspondence of Dr. Reid*, p. 79.

³ Hooker, *Eccles. Pol.*, book 1.

⁴ *Essay* ii., ch. 2.

⁵ *Act. Pow.*, essay II., ch. 1.

⁶ Feuchtersleben, *Dialectics of the Soul*

⁷ Book II., ch. 21.

⁸ *Append.*, p. 471.

WILL—

"What is desire," says Dr. Priestley,¹ "besides a wish to obtain some apprehended good? And is not every wish a volition? Every volition is nothing more than a desire, viz., a desire to accomplish some end, which end may be considered as the object of the passion or affection."

"Volition," says Mr. Belsham, "is a modification of the passion of desire." Mr. James Mill, in his *Analysis of the Hum. Mind*, holds that the *will* is nothing but the desire that is most powerful at the time. Dr. Thomas Brown, in his *Lectures on Mor. Philosophy*, has not spoken of the faculty of *will* or of acts of volition as separate from our desires. And in his *Essay on Cause and Effect*,² he has said, "Those brief feelings which the body immediately obeys are commonly termed volitions, while the more lasting wishes are simply denominated desires."

The view opposed to this is strongly asserted in the following passage:—"We regard it as of great moment that the *will* should be looked on as a distinct power or energy of the mind. Not that we mean to represent it as exercised apart from all other faculties; on the contrary, it blends itself with every other power. It associates itself with our intellectual decisions on the one hand, and our emotional attachments on the other, but contains an important element which cannot be resolved into either the one or the other, or into both combined. The other powers, such as the sensibility, the reason, the conscience, may influence the will, but they cannot constitute it, nor yield its peculiar workings. We have only by consciousness to look into our souls, as the *will* is working, to discover a power, which, though intimately connected with the other attributes of mind, even as they are closely related to each other, does yet stand out distinctly from them, with its peculiar functions and its own province. We hold that there cannot be an undertaking more perilous to the best interests of philosophy and humanity, than the attempt to resolve the *will* into anything inferior to itself. In particular it may be, and should be distinguished from that with which it has been so often confounded, the emotional part of man's nature."

¹ *Philosoph. Necess.*, p. 35

² *Ibid.* p. 3

WILL—

According to Ritter,¹ "it was a principle with the Stoics that *will* and desire are one with thought, and may be resolved into it." Hence their saying, *Omne actem est in intellectu*. And hence they maintained that passion was just an erroneous judgment. But this is to confound faculties which are distinct. By the intellect we know or understand, by the sensitivity we feel or desire, and by the *will* we determine to do or not to do, to do this or to do that.

Intellectus est prior voluntate, non enim est voluntas nisi de bono intellecto. — Thomas Aquinas.²

*Ea quæ sunt in intellectu sunt principia eorum quæ sunt in affectu, in quantum scilicet bonum intellectum movet affectum.*³

In what sense the understanding moves the *will* is shown by Aquinas.⁴

"Whether or no the judgment does certainly and infallibly command and draw after it the acts of the *will*, this is certain, it does of necessity precede them, and no man can fix his love upon anything till his judgment reports it to the *will* as amiable."⁵

On the question, whether the connection between the intellect and the *will* be direct or indirect, see Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*;⁶ Jonathan Edwards, *Inquiry*;⁷ Dr. Turnbull, *Christ. Philosoph.*⁸

Will (Freedom of).—"This is the essential attribute of a *will*, and contained in the very idea, that whatever determines the *will* acquires this power from a previous determination of the *will* itself. The *will* is ultimately self-determined, or it is no longer a *will* under the law of perfect freedom, but a nature under the mechanism of cause and effect."⁹

"We need only to reflect on our own experience to be convinced that the man makes the motive, and not the motive the man. What is a strong motive to one man, is no motive at all to another. If, then, the man determines the motive, what determines the man to a good and worthy act, we will say, or a virtuous course of conduct? The intelligent *will*, or the self-determining power? True, in part it is; and therefore

¹ *Hist. of Anc. Philosoph.*, vol. iii., p. 555.

² *Ibidem*, ii., 2, quest. 7, art. 2.

³ South. *Sermons on Matt. x.*, 37.

⁴ P. 196.

⁵ *Sum. Th. col.*, ii., 1, quest. 83.

⁶ *Ibid.*, ii., 1, quest. 9, art. 1.

⁷ B. i., ch. 21.

⁸ Part i., sect. 2.

⁹ Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*, vol. i., p. 227.

WILL—

the *will* is pre-eminently, the spiritual constituent in our being. But will any man admit, that his own *will* is the only and sufficient determinant of all he is, and all he does? Is nothing to be attributed to the harmony of the system to which it belongs, and to the pre-established fitness of the objects and agents, known and unknown, that surround him, as acting on the *will*, though, doubtless, with it likewise? a process which the co-instantaneous, yet reciprocal action of the air and the vital energy of the lungs in breathing, may help to render intelligible."¹

"It is very true that in willing an act, or in any act of self-determination, I am or may be induced by a variety of motives or impulses—my *will* may be moved; but this does not exclude the power of origination, for the consent even to the outward inducement or stimulus, still requires this unique act of self-determination in order to the energy requisite to the fulfilment of the deed. That it is so, who shall doubt who is conscious of the power? or if he believes that he has not this consciousness he belies his own nature. The actuation of the individual *will* not only does not exclude self-determination, but implies it—implies that, though actuated, but actuated only because already self-operant, it is not compelled or acting under the law of outward causation. How often do we not see that a stern resolve has produced a series of actions, which, sustained by the inward energy of the man, has ended in its complete achievement? Contrast this with the life and conduct of the wayward, the fickle and the unsteady, and it is impossible not to find the inward conviction strengthened and confirmed, that the *will* is the inward and enduring essence of man's being."²

"The central point of our consciousness—that which makes each man what he is in distinction from every other man—that which expresses the real concrete essence of the mind apart from its regulated laws and formal processes, is the *will*. *Will* expresses power, spontaneity, the capacity of acting independently and for ourselves."³

"*Will* may be defined to be the faculty which is apprehended in the consciousness, as the originating power of the personal

¹ Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*, vol. I., p. 44.

² Green, *Mental Dynamics*, p. 54.

³ Morell, *Phil. of Relig.*, p. 2.

WILL—

self. Not that it can be seen to be an absolute power of self origination; it is possible that it may always be determined by subtle forces which do not fall within the sphere of consciousness. But so far as apprehension can reach, the phenomena of the *will* appear to have their origin in an activity of the personal self."¹—V. NATURE, FREE-WILL, LIBERTY, NECESSITY.

WISDOM, says Sir W. Temple, "is that which makes man judge what are the best ends, and what the best means to attain them."

"Wisdom," says Sir J. Mackintosh, "is the habitual employment of a patient and comprehensive understanding in combining various and remote means to promote the happiness of mankind."

Wisdom is the right use or exercise of knowledge, and differs from knowledge, as the use which is made of a power or faculty differs from the power or faculty itself.

Proverbs ch. xv., v. 2, *The tongue of the wise useth knowledge aright.* Knowledge puffeth up. Knowledge is proud that he hath learned so much. Wisdom is humble that he knows no more.

The word corresponding to *wisdom* was used among the Greeks to designate philosophy. And in our translation of the Scriptures, the word *wisdom* frequently denotes the religious sentiment, or the fear and love of God.

WIT (*wile*, to know) originally signified knowledge or wisdom.

We still say, *in his wits*, *out of his wits*, for in or out of a sound mind. Mr. Locke² says, "*Wit* lies most in the assemblage of ideas, and putting those together with quickness and variety, wherein can be found any resemblance or congruity, thereby to make up pleasant pictures, and agreeable visions in the fancy. Judgment, on the contrary, lies quite on the other side, in separating carefully one from another, ideas, wherein can be found the least difference, thereby to avoid being misled by similitude, and by affinity to take one thing for another. This is a way of proceeding quite contrary to metaphor and allusion, wherein, for the most part, lies that entertainment; and pleasantry of *wit*, which strikes so lively on the fancy,

¹ Thompson, *Christ. Theism*, book i., ch. 3.

² *Essay*, b. ii., ch. 11

WIT--

and therefore is so acceptable to all people; because its beauty appears at first sight, and there is required no labour of thought to examine what truth or reason there is in it."

"This," says Mr. Addison,¹ "is, I think, the best and most philosophical account that I ever met with of *wit*, which generally, though not always, consists in such a resemblance and congruity of ideas as this author mentions. I shall only add to it, by way of explanation, that every resemblance of ideas is not that which we call *wit*, unless it be such an one that gives delight and surprise to the reader: these two properties seem essential to *wit*, more particularly the last of them. . . . Mr. Locke's account of *wit*, with this short explanation, comprehends most of the species of *wit*, as metaphors, similitudes, allegories, enigmas, mottoes, parables, fables, dreams, visions, dramatic writings, burlesques, and all the methods of allusion; as there are many other pieces of *wit*, how remote soever they may appear at first sight, from the foregoing description, which, upon examination, will be found to agree with it."

"It is the design of *wit*," says Dr. Campbell,² "to excite in the mind an agreeable surprise, and that arising, not from anything marvellous in the subject, but solely from the imagery she employs, or the strange assemblage of related ideas presented to the mind. This end is effected in one or other of these three ways: first, in debasing things pompous or seemingly grave: I say *seemingly* grave, because to vilify what is *truly* grave, has something shocking in it, which rarely fails to counteract the end; secondly, in aggrandizing things little and frivolous; thirdly, in setting ordinary objects, by means not only remote but apparently contrary, in a particular and uncommon point of view."

Dr. Barrow,³ speaking of *facetiousness*, says, "Sometimes it lieth in pat allusion to a known story, or in seasonable application of a trivial saying, or in forging an apposite tale: sometimes it playeth in words and phrases, taking advantage from the ambiguity of their sense, or the affinity of their sound: sometimes it is wrapped in a dress of humorous expression; sometimes it lurketh under an odd similitude;

¹ *Spectator*, 62.

² *Phil. of Rhct.*, b 1, ch 2. sect. 1.

³ *Sermon against Foolish Talking*.

WIT—

sometimes it is lodged in a sly question, in a smart answer, in a quirkish reason, in a shrewd intimation, in cunningly diverting or cleverly retorting an objection: sometimes it is couched in a bold scheme of speech, in a tart irony, in a lusty hyperbole, in a startling metaphor, in a plausible reconciling of contradictions, or in acute nonsense: sometimes a scenical representation of persons or things, a counterfeit speech, a mimical look or gesture passeth for it: sometimes an affected simplicity: sometimes a presumptuous bluntness giveth it being; sometimes it riseth from a lucky hitting upon what is strange: sometimes from a crafty wresting obvious matter to the purpose: often it consisteth in one knows not what, and springeth up one can hardly tell how."

"True wit is like the brilliant stone
Dug from the Indian mine;
Which boasts two various powers in one—
To cut as well as shine.

"Genius, like that, if polished bright,
With the same gifts abounds,
Appears at once both keen and bright,
And sparkles while it wounds."—ARON.

WIT and **HUMOUR** commonly concur in a tendency to provoke laughter, by exhibiting a curious and unexpected affinity; the first generally by comparison, either direct or implied, the second by connecting in some other relation, such as causality or vicinity, objects apparently the most dissimilar and heterogeneous; which incongruous affinity gives the true meaning of the word *oddity*, and is the proper object of laughter."¹

"The feeling of the *ludicrous* seems to be awakened by the discovery of an unexpected relation between objects in other respects wholly dissimilar."²

Dr. Trusler says that *wit* relates to the matter, *humour* to the manner; that our old comedies abounded with *wit*, and our old actors with *humour*; that *humour* always excites laughter, but *wit* does not; that a fellow of *humour* will set a whole company in a roar, but that there is a smartness in *wit*, which cuts while it pleases. *Wit*, he adds, always implies sense and abilities,

¹ Campbell, *Phil. of Rhet.*, b. i., chap. 2, sect. 2.

² M-Cosh, *Typical Forms*, b. iii., chap. 2, § 5.

WIT and HUMOUR—

while *humour* does not; *humour* is chiefly relished by the vulgar, but education is requisite to comprehend *wit*.¹

Lord Shaftesbury has an *Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour*.²

ZOONOMY (ζῷον, animal; νόμος, law).—That department of knowledge which ascertains the laws of organic life. Dr. Darwin published a well-known work under this title, in which he classifies the facts belonging to animal life, and by comparing them seeks to unravel the theory of diseases.

¹ Taylor, *Synonyms*.

² *Characteristicks*, vol. 1.

VOCABULARY

OF

THE PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES.

A. 1. In Logic, the Symbol of general affirmative propositions.

Asserit A, negat. E, verum generaliter ambo;

Asserit I, negat. O, sed particulariter ambo.

A and I are the vowels of *affirmo*: E and O of *nego*.—See

Barbara, Proposition and Syllogism.

2. In Complex and Modal propositions, the affirmation of the mode and of the proposition.—Aristotle.¹ Port Royal Logic.²

3. Symbol of the Absolute. A = A expresses the principal of Absolute Identity.

ABDERITISM, from the citizens of Abdera, renowned for their stupidity: in Kant,³ moral A., the theory that the human race will never advance beyond its present moral state.

***ABDUCTION**, in Logic.

ABERRANCE, ABERRANCY, ABERRANT (in Biology),

ABERRATION (Lat.), all mark wandering, deviation from what is sound, normal, typical, or standard.—Sir T. Browne,⁴

Ch. Darwin,⁵ Glanville,⁶ Sir H. Holland,⁷ T. V. Wollaston.⁸

***ABILITY and INABILITY** — (NATURAL AND MORAL).

***Ability Natural.** ***Inability Natural.**

***Ability Moral.**—"Sufficiency of ethical motive for the fulfilment of all ethical law."—C. F. V.

***Inability Moral.**—"Deficiency in ethical motive consequent upon want of harmony between personal inclination and moral requirements."—C. F. V.

¹ *Prior Analytics*. ² *Transl.* by J. S. Baynes, p. 11, ch. 3. ³ *Streit d. Facultäten*, 134, seq. ⁴ *Vulgar Errors*, 189, iv. 12. ⁵ *Origin of Species*, ch. 13, vi. 202. ⁶ *Scepais Scientifica*, ch. 11. 16. ⁷ *Mental Physiology*, vi. 114. 117. ⁸ *Variation of Species*, 2, 3. 15.

ABNORMAL (Lat.), departing from a law, type, or standard. — Darwin.¹

ABORIGINAL (Lat.), in Psychology, original, in the primitive condition. — Herbert Spencer.²

ABORTIVE (Lat.); in Biology, prematurely born, failing of its ends, or of complete development. — Whewell.³

ABROGATION (*abrogo*, to recall) is the annulling or recalling of a law. — F. V. 8.

***ABSCISSIO INFINITI.** — Bacon.⁴

***ABSOLUTE.** — "Properly, self-sufficient, independent both in nature and in action." — C. F. V.⁵

"The term *absolute* is of twofold (if not threefold) antiquity, corresponding to the double (or treble) signification of the word in Latin. 1. *Absolutum* means what is *freed* or *loosed*; in which sense the *absolute* will be what is aloof from relation, comparison, limitation, dependence, etc., and is thus tantamount to τὸ ἐξέλευτον of the lower Greeks. In this meaning the *Absolute* is not opposed to the *Infinite*. 2. *Absolutum* means *finished*, *perfected*, *completed*; in which sense the *Absolute* will be what is out of relation, etc., as finished, perfect, complete, total, and thus corresponds to τὸ ἔλεον, and τὸ τέλειον of Aristotle. In this acceptance (and it is that in which I invariably use it) the *Absolute* is diametrically opposed to, is contradictory of, the *Infinite*." — Sir W. Hamilton.⁶

"By the *Absolute*, is meant that which exists in and by itself, having no necessary relation to any other being. By the *Infinite* is meant that which is free from all possible limitation; that than which a greater is inconceivable, and which, consequently, can receive no additional attribute or mode of existence, which it had not from all eternity." — Mansel.⁷

"The plain and etymological meaning of the term is *freed* or *loosed*, and hence it means freed from restriction or condition. In this sense it is evident that the *Infinite* must be absolute, for that which is not limited does not afford the possibility of restriction. This is the sense in which philosophers have uniformly used the word; and in this sense Sir W. Hamilton admits that 'the *Absolute* is not opposed to the *Infinite*.'" — Calderwood.⁸

***Absolute (Unconditioned, Infinite).** — See Reid,⁹ J. S. Mill,⁹ Tennemann,¹⁰ Whewell.¹¹

***Abstinence.**

¹ *Origin of Species*, ch. 1. ² *Psychology*, vi. 130. ³ *Hist. of Scientific Ideas*, b. vii., ch. 1. ⁴ *Novum Organon*, bk. II., 26. ⁵ *Discussions*, p. 14, note. ⁶ *Limits of Religious Thought*, p. 45. ⁷ *Phil. of Infinite*, 2 ed., p. 165. ⁸ *Intellectual Powers*, essay v., ch. 3. ⁹ *Logic*, I. 2, 7. ¹⁰ *Hist. Philos.* (Johnson's Translation), § 390. ¹¹ *Hist. Scientific Ideas*, 60.

***ABSTRACT, ABSTRACTION.**—"Abstract is applied to a quality considered in itself apart from the object in which it exists. **Abstraction** is the exercise of mind by which attention is withdrawn from certain qualities in an object, or from certain objects among many, and concentrated upon others."—C. F. V.

*Abstraction (Logical). *Abstraction (Psychological).

***ABSTRACTIVE (Knowledge) and INTUITIVE.**—"Cognitio abstractiva, Cognitio intuitiva: in the Scholastic Philosophy, the former applies to all representations of objects by the imagination or memory, as well as to what is more properly abstract knowledge."—See Hamilton,¹ Mill.² F. V. 3.

*Absurd.

ACADEMICAL DISPUTATION.—See **Disputation, Academic**.

***ACADEMICS.**—"Ἀκαδημία, or Ἀκαδήμια, academy, the name of the garden or gymnasium in which Plato taught, has been used to describe his philosophy. The successive Platonic Schools have been named the Academies, their teachers the Academics."—C. F. V. See Archer Butler,³ Foucher,⁴ Gerlach,⁵ Vossius.⁶

ACADEMISM.—Doctrine of the Academy.—And. Baxter.⁷

*Academy. *Acatalepsy.

ACCENT (Fallacy of).—The ambiguity arising from a misplaced emphasis, or from the separation of words from their context, or by italicising what was not meant to be italicised.—Jevons.⁸

*Accident. *Accidental.

ACCIDENTAL DEFINITION assigns the properties of a species, or the accidents of an individual; description.

ACCIDENTALLY, in Scholastic Logic, is applied to an attribute which is not indeed part of the essence, but which is a consequence of it, and is therefore inseparably attached to the species.—Mill.⁹

ACCIDENTIS FALLACIA.—See **Fallacy**.

¹ Reid, 812. ² *Examinat. of Hamilton's Phil.*, 336, 3d edit., 392, note. ³ *Lect. on Ana. Phil.*, 4th series. ⁴ *Disertatio de Phil. Academ.*, Par. 1692. ⁵ *Commentatio exhibens de Probabilitate Disputationes*, 4to Goett. ⁶ *De Philosophorum, sectis*, 1687. ⁷ *Nat. of Soul*, ii. 275. ⁸ *Elem. Less. in Logic*, 174. ⁹ *Logic*, b. ii., ch. 7, § 7.

ACHILLES (and the Tortoise).—In Logic, a sophism used by the Eleatic School to demonstrate the impossibility of movement.—Aristotle,¹ Diogenes Laertius.²

ACOSMIST.—"One who theoretically denies the existence of the Universe, as distinct from the Absolute Being."—C. F. V.

***ACROAMATICAL**.—"Designed for the hearing of the initiated; applied to the lessons which were *Esoteric* (*ἑσωτερικὸς*), in contrast with the *Exoteric*; those given to general audiences (*ἐξωτερικὸς*)."—C. F. V.

***ACT**.—"In its widest sense, any exercise of Vital Energy."—C. F. V.

*Action. *Action and Act.

***Action, Moral**.—"Self-directed Action, which comes under the scope of moral law. An overt action which possesses moral quality must have *motive*, *act*, and *end*."—C. F. V.

*Active. *Activity.—See **Will**.

ACTUAL marks what is now in being, or in act—opposed to **Potential**.

ACTUATION, in Psychology, operation of the faculties of the soul.—Glanville.³

*Actus Primus. *Actus Secundus. *Adage.

ADEPT (*adipiscor*, to attain).—Among Alchemists, those who were said to have found the Panacea, a universal medicine, and the Philosopher's Stone, were called *Adepts*, *Adepti*.—C. F. V.

ADEQUATE (*adequo*, to equal) is applied to our cognitions and ideas. Our knowledge of an object is *adequate* or complete when it extends to all the properties of that object. An idea is *adequate* when it is conformable to the nature of the object which it represents.—F. V. 3.

Adequate. 1. (Idea), conformed to the nature of the objects represented. Applied by Spinoza⁴ especially to our knowledge of God.

Watts:⁵ "Those are adequate ideas which perfectly represent their archetypes or object; **Inadequate** are but a partial or incomplete representation of those archetypes to which they are referred."

¹ *Physics*, iv., ch. 9. ² ix., xxiii., xxix. ³ *Pre-existence of Souls*, 110. ⁴ *Eth.*, Part II. *de Anima*. ⁵ *Logic*.

Locke: "All our simple ideas are adequate, because, being nothing but the effects of certain powers in things, fitted and ordained by God to produce such sensations in us, they cannot but be correspondent and adequate to those powers."

2. (Definition) in Logic.

Whately: "Neither too extensive nor too narrow for the thing defined; *e. g.*, to define '*fish*, an animal that lives in the water,' would be too extensive, because many insects live in the water; to define it 'an animal that has an air-bladder,' would be too narrow, because many fishes are without any."¹

ADHERENT, united with.—In Logic, applied to modes as improper or accidental; opposed to inherent or proper.

ADHESION, ADHESIVENESS (Lat.), clinging to.—In Psychology, connection on a basis of association.—Bain.²

A DICTO.—See **Fallacy**.

***ADJURATION**, a solemn appeal under sanction of the forms of justice.—C. F. V.

***ADMIRATION**, delight in contemplation of an object.—Buckle.⁴ — C. F. V.

*Adoration. *Adscititious.

EQUIPOLLENT, EQUIPOLLENCE.—See **Equipollent, Equipollency**.

ÆSTHEMA, AISTHEMA (Gr.), the thing perceived by the senses; the sensation of any object; sense or perception of a thing. — Aristotle.⁶

ÆSTHESIS, AISTHESIS (Gr.), *perception by the senses*, especially by feeling, but also by seeing, hearing, etc.; a sensation, sense of a thing, as *visions* of the gods; also of the mind, observation, knowledge. — Plato,⁶ Hamilton.⁷

ÆSTHETIC, a. and s. ÆSTHETICAL, ESTHETIC, ESTHETICAL.—See **Æsthetics**.

ÆSTHETICS, ESTHETICS (Ger. *Æsthetik*), in the Critical Philosophy, doctrine of the senses, theory and science of the sensitive faculty. It is divided into 1. The *Physiological*—the sensations in general; 2. The *Physical*—the bodily organs; 3. *Practical*—pleasure and pain in sensation; 4. *Transcendental, pure, à priori*—the distinguishing between presentations of the senses and the intellect. As a *Cri-*

¹ *Hum. Understand.*, b. II., ch. 31. ² *Logic*, v., § 6. ³ *The Senses and The Intellect*, b. II., ch. I., 320-325. ⁴ *Hist. of Civilization*, II. 188. ⁵ *Anal. Post.*, 2, 19, 3. ⁶ *Phæd.*, 111 C., 240 C. *Theætet.*, 192 B. ⁷ *Metaphys.* (Am. ed.) 563.

tique of Taste, Æsthetics may be styled *Psychological*, but is not to be confounded with the *Critique of the Æsthetic Power of Judgment*, which investigates the possibility of Taste, and shows that Taste involves no principle of reason.

Æsthetics of Morals is a subjective exhibition of the Metaphysics of Morals.

ÆSTHETICAL is applied to a presentation to which the form of sense is necessarily attached, and the subject grasps the object as phenomena. — Kant.¹ See Dippel (1871); Horwicz (1869); Kirchmann (1868); Karl Köstlin (1869); Lemcke (3d. ed. 1870); Mundt (new ed. 1868); Schasler (1871); Stöckl (1871).

ÆTIOLOGICAL, ETIOLOGICAL, *ÆTIOLOGY, ETIOLOGY, in Rhetoric, applied to the form of speech in which the reason is given, along with a statement made. — F. V. 3. In Whewell,² applied to the sciences which treat of causes as well as of effects — Philosophical History. — See **Palætiological**.

AFFECT (Ger. *afficiren*), to make immediate impressions, originate a new state of mind. "The mode in which we are *affected* by objects is called sensitivity." — Kant.³

***AFFECTION**. — "Inclination of the nature towards another, regarded either as good or evil. The term is sometimes used in the general sense, conscious sensibility, the experience of the mind, as when the physical nature is affected by some external object." — C. F. V.

AFFILIABLE, AFFILIATE, AFFILIATION, applied in Herbert Spencer⁴ to connection in the way of descent, of paternity and filiation.

*Affinity. *Affirmation.

AFFIRMATIVE, in Logic, positive, opposed to negative. — Herbert Spencer.⁵

***A FORTIORI**. — Argument from the greater to the less. — F. V. 3.

*Agent.

AGGLUTINATION, AGGLUTINATIVE, to mark union, coinciding actions. — Bain.⁶

AGGREGATE, s. (Lat.), a mass, complex result of conjunction. — Herbert Spencer.⁷

¹ *Rein. Vern.*, 35, 76. *Urtheilskraft*, Pref. viii., 4. *Jugendlehre*, 48. ² *Hist. of Scientific Ideas*, b. x., ch. 1, and note, ii. 274. ³ *Rein. Vern. Transc. Æsthet.* § 1. ⁴ *First Principles*, ch. 17. *Principles of Psychology*, pt. iii., ch. 8, 12. ⁵ *Principles of Psychology*, ch. 1. ⁶ *The Senses and the Intellect*, b. ii., ch. 1. ⁷ *Principles of Psychology*, pt. i., ch. 2.

* **Agniology.**

AGNITION (Lat.), acknowledgment.

AGREEABLE.—The quality of an object in virtue of which it pleases and satisfies. It may coincide with the good, but is not to be confounded with it. — Kant.¹

AGREEMENT, in Logic, the method which compares the different instances in which a phenomenon occurs. Opposed to difference, method of. — Mill.²

* **ALCHEMY** (*al* and *kimia*, black, the black art). — See *Albertus Magnus*.³

ALGEBRA (Arab.), called by Newton, "Universal Arithmetic;" the abstract science of magnitudes. Computing by symbols instead of numbers.—See **Mathematics**.

ALiquot (Lat.), part of a number or quantity which will exactly measure it without any remainder. — Clarke:⁴ "*Aliquot* or constituent parts of infinite."

ALL, in Logic.—1. All taken together, the whole of. 2. All, severally, every one; involving, if the distinction is not marked, the fallacies of composition and division.—Fowler.⁵

ALL-PERFECTNESS, absolute perfection.—In Dr. H. More,⁶ to translate *πavτέλεια*, consummation, the Pythagorean name of the number *Ten*.

* **Allegory.**

ALONENESS.—Applied, by Bishop Mountagu,⁷ to the state of God prior to creation; "alone himself and beside himself nothing."

ALPHABET OF HUMAN THOUGHT, in Hamilton,⁸ a systematised view of the condition of the thinkable.

ALTERANT, in Bacon, producing alterations, opposed to altered.

AM, I AM, EGO SUM, the primary, self-affirmation of existence involved in self-consciousness. — Des Cartes, Herbert Spencer.⁹

AMBIGUOUS (Lat.), drifting to both sides; uncertain.—In Logic, applied in the fallacy arising from different senses of the same words.

¹ *Rein. Vern.*, 576. *Metaph. d. Sitten*, 38. *Sample's Translat.* (1836), 27 (1869), 24. *Urtheilskr. I.*, §§ 3-7. ² *Logic*, b. iii., ch. 8, § 2. ³ "*De Alchemia*." ⁴ *Dem. of Being and Attrib. of God*, p. 36. ⁵ *Deduct. Logic*, 145. ⁶ *Conjectura Cabbalistica*, p. 153. ⁷ *Appeal to Cæsar*, p. 61. ⁸ *Discussions* (Am. ed.), 567. ⁹ *Prin. of Psychol.*, b. iii., ch. 2.

*Ambition.

***AMPHIBOLOGY, *AMPHIBOLY.**—Kant.¹

AMPLIATE, AMPLIATION, AMPLIATIVE, in Logic and Mental Philosophy, applied to judgments which attribute to the subject something not directly implied in it. They are *ampliative*, because they enlarge or increase our knowledge. They are also called Synthetic, *q. v.*—Hamilton,² Thomson.³

ANALOGICAL, applied to reasoning by analogy, *q. v.*; opposed to demonstrative. — Herbert Spencer.⁴

ANALOGOUS.—See **Analogue**.

*Analogue.

***ANALOGY.**—"An argument from A. is a defensive argument drawn from similarity of phenomena recognized in different relations. It is not constructive in nature, being competent only for defence, not for proof."—C. F. V.

*Analogy and Metaphor. *Analogy and Example. *Analogy and Experience. *Analogy and Induction.

***ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS**, in Mental Philosophy, the resolution of our experience into its simple or original elements, and the reconstruction of these with full regard to their relations in the mental state to which they belong. Analysis is *psychological* when we distinguish the elements which constitute a state of consciousness. — C. F. V.

ANALYST, ANALYTIC, ANALYTICAL, ANALYTICALLY, ANALYZABLE.—Associated with **Analysis**, *q. v.* See Craik,⁵ Hamilton,⁶ Herbert Spencer,⁷ Whately,⁸ Whewell.⁹

*Analytics.

ANAMNESTIC (Gr.), able to recall to mind readily.—Aristotle.¹⁰ See **Mnemonic**.

*Angelology.

ANIMA (Lat.), air; breath; the vital principle; life; the rational soul of man; the mind.—See **Animus**.

*Anima Mundi.

¹ *Critique of Pure Reason*, *Transc. Analytic*, ch. iii. (p. 326, seq.) ² *Discussions*, p. 529.

³ *Laws of Thought*, § 81. ⁴ *Princip. of Psychol.*, pt. ii., ch. 6. ⁵ *Eng. Lit.*, i. 137, 138.

⁶ *Logic*, lect. i., i. 8; ii., i. 21, 44. ⁷ *Elements of Psychology*, part ii., ch. i., ii., iii. ⁸ *Logic*, *Introd.* ⁹ *Hist. of Scientific Ideas*, b. ii., ch. 12. ¹⁰ *De Memor.*, i. 1.

ANIMADVERSION, ANIMADVERSIVE, applied in Glanville to perception; power of the soul to notice.

ANIMAL (Lat.), endowed with sensitive life. Contrasted with *vegetable*, as less than animal; with *spiritual*, as more.—Owen,¹ Whewell.²

ANIMALITY, ANIMALISH, ANIMALIST, ANIMANT, in Cudworth,³ to mark the possession of life, or imparting life.

ANIMISM (Lat.), a doctrine of soul as distinct from body, and separated from it at death. For the extent to which such a doctrine is believed among uncivilized tribes, v. Tyler.⁴—C. F. V. Animism attributes to the soul not only the operation in mental phenomena, but all the vital functions. It is opposed to **Vitalism** and **Organicism**. See Saissset, Lemoine, Lelat, Bouillier, Ravaisson, H. Martin.

ANIMUS (Lat.), akin to **Anima**, *q. v.*—The rational soul or intellectual principle of life in man, in opposition to the body and physical life; the thinking faculty; the mind; the intellect. Though in actual use there is some interchange of *anima* and *animus*, *animus* is the higher and less ambiguous term for the soul proper, as the seat of cognition, emotion, and volition.

ANNIHILATION, reduction to **Nothing**, *q. v.*—Hamilton.⁵

ANSCHAUUNG (Ger.), looking at, *looking on*.—In Kant, sense-presentation, sense-perception, direct, immediate, or intuitive presentation, external or internal; intuition. It is of individual objects, primary, antecedent to logical thinking; the object is given to it purely as phenomenon, immediately. Empirical intuition (*empirische Anschauung*) is that in which the mind is linked with the object by sensation, as of the watch which lies before me. Pure intuition is apart from sensation, as of a triangle in pure geometry. To make an intuition intelligible (*verständlich*), is to bring it under concepts, as to explain the music I hear by the laws of sound or the principles of melody. *Anschauungsvermögen* is the intuitive faculty or power.—Mellin,⁶ C. C. E. Schmid.⁷

A. is rendered by Morell,⁸ "intuitional and sensational

¹ *Lect. on Comparat. Anatomy*, Introd. iv. 2. ² *Hist. of Scientific Ideas*, b. ix., ch. 6, § 15. ³ *Intell. System*. ⁴ *Primitive Culture*. ⁵ *Metaphys.* (Am. ed.), 552. ⁶ *Kunst-sprache: Encyclop. Wörterbuch*, s. v. ⁷ *Wörterbuch*. ⁸ *Tennemann's Manual*.

perception," and is said to "give immediate representations of things."

"We are in want," says Hamilton,¹ "of a general term to express what is common to the presentations of Perception and the representations of Phantasy, that is, their individuality and immediacy. The Germans express this by the term *Anschauung*, which can only be translated by *intuition* (as it is in Latin by Germans), which literally means *a looking at*,"—"the intuitive presentations of Sense and representations of Imagination."—See Wallace.²

AN SICH (Ger.), *per se*, in itself, in themselves.—In Kant,³ without reference to our sensitive faculty. "Space is *an sich*, in itself, nothing; it has its ground merely in the character of our sensitive faculty. If the faculty falls away, space falls away with it."—Mellin.⁴

In Hegel, "implicit, natural; in, at, or by self; which is given in germ, but undeveloped; which is for others to see, feel, and recognize. It is what is native and spontaneous, as opposed to what is imparted; latent, as opposed to what is developed and realized; potential, as opposed to what is actual; natural, as opposed to artificial; abstract, as opposed to concrete."—Wallace.⁵—See **Für sich**, and **An und für sich**.

Ding an sich, thing or object in itself, is the noumenon, as opposed to the phenomenon.

Für sich (Ger. for self).—Explicit; actual, whether native or not; the result of an *an sich* when developed, looked at, apart from the process; what has been acquired and made our own, as opposed to what is merely given. Man is abstractly rational *an sich* in capacity; he should be rational in fact, become rational *für sich*.—Wallace.⁶

An und für sich (Ger. in and for self).—In Hegel, absolute; pure and entire; spontaneous and independent; taken in the entirety of development; due to the evolution of its own native forces.

***ANTECEDENT**, in Logic.—Hamilton.⁷

ANTEMUNDANE (Lat.), before the world; before creation.

¹ *Logic*, lect. vii, xx., lect. x., xxx. *Reid's Works*, 291, 365, 407, 412. ² *Logic of Hegel*, *Prolegomena*, ch. 23. ³ *Rein. Vernunft*, 44. ⁴ *Kunstsprache*, s. v. ⁵ *Logic of Hegel*, *Proleg.*, ch. 23. ⁶ *Hegel's Logic*, *Prolegom.*, ch. 23. ⁷ *Lect. xili.*, i. 238.

ANTEPREDICAMENTS (Lat.), before predicaments; terms which must be defined and understood in order that the predicaments and categories may be understood, as Homonyms, Synonyms, Paronyms; opposed to **Postpredicaments**.

***ANTHROPOLOGY**. On man, his spirit, and its development and immortality; his place in the world; as microcosm.

See Engelken (1868); I. H. Fichte (1869); Kant (*in Phil. Bibliothek*, 1869, with Kirchmann's Notes, 1870); Lotze (1869); C. Werner (1870).

***ANTHROPOMORPHISM**, a theory which represents divine attributes as only human attributes enlarged. In modern times, the name has been restricted to theories which attribute the characteristics of the human mind to the divine mind.

ANTHROPOPATHY (Gr.), human passion, or suffering, attributed to God.

***ANTICIPATION**, the power of the mind to project itself from the known into the unknown, in expectation of finding what it is in search of. — See Thomson,¹ J. S. Mill,² Whewell.³

*Anticipation of Nature.

ANTIMORALISTS, opposers of morality, applied by Warburton⁴ to a "sect who have our Hobbes and the French duke de la Rouchefoucault for their leaders."

***ANTINOMY**, in Kant's philosophy, the conflict or self-contradiction (held by him to be inevitable) which emerges when the Reason deals with problems concerning the Universe. The Conflict is complete, and the Reason is unable to settle the dispute. Kant treats of the Antinomies in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (*Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*) under Transcendental Dialectic.⁵ — C. F. V.

The Antinomy is 1. Of the *purely speculative Reason*. This Antinomy Kant meets by the transcendental Idealism, and by correcting the notion in regard to the range of determination which pertains to reason. These Antinomies are

¹ *Laves of Thought*. ² *Exam. of Hamilton's Philosophy*, ch. 11. ³ *Ibid. of Scientific Ideas*, b. iii., ch. 2, 15. ⁴ *Prodig. and Miracles*, 26. ⁵ B. II., ch. 2, 398. (Meiklejohn's Translation, p. 266.) *Pract. Vern.*, 204, seq. *Urtheilskr.*, § 56, 70, seq. *Rechtslehr.*, § 7.

partly mathematical, partly dynamical. The investigation of them belongs to transcendental Antithetics.¹

2. *Of the practical Reason.* This involves the summum bonum. It is met by the facts of the supersensuous and supernatural.² 3. *Of the Faculty of Judgment.*³

*Antipathy.

ANTIPERISTASIS (Gr.), in Aristotle,⁴ opposition or reaction of the surrounding parts.

ANTISTROPHE (Gr.), in Logic, conversion; the transposition of the terms of a proposition.—Aristotle.⁵

ANTITHESIS (Gr.), placing in opposition. 1. Opposition; contrast; as ideas and sensations, theory and fact.—Whe-well.⁶ 2. Judgment opposed to a Thesis, and with it forming an **Antinomy** of the reason. "The world has had a beginning," is a Thesis. "The world has not had a beginning," is its Antithesis.

ANTITYPIE (Gr.), blow against blow. Leibnitz: "Those who, in defining the constituents of body, have added to extension a certain impenetrability, or, to use their own terms, antitypie, or mass, as Gassendi and other scholars have done, have shown themselves better philosophers than the Cartesians." "Antitypie and extension are nothing more than purely passive forces."⁷

APAGOGICAL (Gr.), in Logic, deductive; the deductio ad absurdum. "I demand a reason why any other apagogical demonstration, or demonstration ad absurdum, should be admitted in geometry rather than this."—Berkeley.⁸

APARITHMESIS (Gr.), division by parts. In Logic, partition, when the parts which it sunders are contained in the divided whole.—Hamilton.⁹

*A parte ante and A parte post.

*Apathy. *Aphorism.

***APODEICTIC, APODEICTICAL, APODICTIC, APODICTICAL**, demonstrative; beyond contradiction. — C. F. V. Hamilton.¹⁰

***APOLOGUE**, a fable or allegory.—C. F. V.

*Apology.

¹ *Crit. d. Rein. Vern.*, 432, 596. *Prolegomena*, §§ 50-56. ² *Practisch. Vern.* 204, seq. ³ *Urtheilskraft*, 240, seq., 308. ⁴ *Anal. Post.*, 2, 16, 1. *Probl.*, 33, 5, 1. ⁵ *Anal. Pr.*, i. 3, 3. ⁶ *Hist. Scient. Idææ*, 4. ⁷ *Vraie Méthode—Lettre à Wagner*. ⁸ *Analyst*, § xxv. ⁹ *Logic*, 351. ¹⁰ *Logic*, i 8, 12.

APOPHANSIS, for **APOPHASIS** (Gr.), a declaration; statement; in Aristotle,¹ a logical proposition, affirmative or negative.

APOPHANTIC (Gr.), in Aristotle,² declaratory; stating something; applied to a proposition.—See **Judgments**.

APOPHASIS (Gr.), in Aristotle³ and Plato,⁴ denial; negation; opposed to **Cataphasis**.

*Apophthegm.

A POSTERIORI.—See **A priori**.

APOTELESMATIC, with a view to final causes.—Whewell.⁵

APPEARANCE, that which seems to the senses in contrast with that which is verified. *Phenomenon*, in contrast with *fact*. Ger. *Erscheinung*.—C. F. V. Appearance may also be contrasted with phenomenon. In that case it is *Schein*, semblance, over against *Erscheinung*, phenomenon.

APPELLATIVES, in Logic, common names standing for universal ideas, or a whole rank of beings, whether general or special—as fish, bird, man, city, river.—Watts.

APPERCEIVE, perceive, **Apperceiving**, perception, are found in Chaucer, Gower, and Browne.—See Richardson.⁶

***APPERCEPTION**, internal perception.—See Taylor,⁷ Stewart.⁸

APPETENCE, **APPETENCY**, **APPETITION** (Lat.), appetite; desire; as of truth (Digby); “endeavor perpetuated and imperceptibly working its effect through an incalculable series of generations” (Paley⁹).—Hamilton.¹¹

APPETIBILITY, **APPETIBLE**, marking the quality which excites appetite, desire.—Bramhall.¹²

***APPETITE**, physical craving. Appetites are classified under desires.

*Appetite and Instinct.

APPETITIVE, applied to the power or faculty of desire.—Hale, Norris.

APPLIED LOGIC, in Kant “angewandte L.”¹³ is what Hamilton¹⁴ calls Modified or Concrete Logic. “The term can only with propriety be used to denote Special or Concrete Logic.”—See Krug.¹⁵

¹ *Interpr.*, 6. ² *Interpr.*, 5. ³ *Interpr.*, 6–114. ⁴ *Soph.*, 263 E. *Crat.*, 426 D. ⁵ *Hist. of Inductive Sciences*, b. iv., ch. 3. ⁶ *New Dictionary*, s. v. ⁷ *Elements of Thought*. ⁸ *Philosophical Essays*, ess. 1., ch. 1. ⁹ *Letters*, p. 96. ¹⁰ *Nat. Theology*, ch. 9. ¹¹ *Metaphysics*, ii. 185. ¹² *Against Hobbes*. ¹³ *Logik* (Ed Jäsche-Kirchmann), 20. ¹⁴ *Logic*, 43. ¹⁵ *Logik*, § 11.

APPREDICATE, Lat. *appredicatum*, after the Gr. προσκατηγορημενον.—In Logic, addition to the predicate; the Copula, in the Greek Logicians after Aristotle.—Hamilton.¹

***APPREHEND** and **COMPREHEND**.—Farrar.²

Apprehend.—See **Apprehension**.

***APPREHENSION**, (Ger. *Die Apprehension*), simple cognition; knowledge of fact, simple or complex.—C. F. V.

***APPROBATION** (**Moral**), applies properly to the moral agent, whether self or another. It is a judgment of commendation on account of well-doing.—C. F. V.

Approximative. **Approximate**.—Herbert Spencer.³

***A PRIORI** and **A POSTERIORI**, commonly, reasoning from a general principle, held to be self-evident, to its application; and reasoning from observed facts to a general principle. Sometimes from cause to effect, and from effect to cause. According to Kant, the *first* applies to forms of knowledge which are not ingathered, but are prior in logical order to experience; the *second*, to knowledge consequent upon experience.—C. F. V.

ARBITRIUM (Lat.), presence, persons present, judgment, definitive sentence, decision; power, will, mastery, dominion, **free will**. The derivatives arbitrariness, arbitrary, refer to an abuse of the will—will uninfluenced by reason or principle.

***ARBOR PORPHYRIANA**, ladder of the prædicaments (*scala prædicamentalis*), consists of three lines; the middle line is called *recta*, or direct; the two at either side are called *collateral*, or indirect. The direct is considered the trunk (genera and species, nouns), the collateral as the branches (differences, adjectives).

1	I	1
<i>Cogitant</i>	SUBSTANCE	<i>Extended</i>
2	II.	2
<i>Inanimate</i>	BODY	<i>Animate</i>
3	III.	3
<i>Irrational</i>	ANIMAL	<i>Rational</i>
4	IV.	4
<i>This</i>	MAN	<i>That</i>
	V.	
	PLATO	

See Chauvin⁴, Lossius.⁵

¹ *Logic*, li. 228. ² *Bampt. Lect.*, 521. ³ *Princ. of Psychol.*, pt. iii., ch. 8. ⁴ *Lexicon Philosoph.*, s. v. ⁵ *Philosoph. Real-Lexik.*, s. v.

ARCANE (Lat. *arcanum*), secret, mysterious.—Berkeley.¹

ARCHA, ARCHÆ (Gr.), in composition, ancient.

ARCHÆOLOGY, ARCHÆOLOGISTS OF NATURE, applied by Kant to the science of the ancient condition of the globe.

*Archæus.

ARCH-ARCHITECT, Supreme Architect, God.

ARCHE (Gr.), in composition, marks beginning, the primal, original, the model or pattern, the chief.

*Archelogy.

ARCHETYPAL (Gr.), first moulded; related to an **Archetype**, *q. v.*

ARCHICAL (Gr.), belonging to rule, royal; applied to reason, as properly controlling the passions.

*Architectonic.

*Argument. *Argument (The Indirect).

***ARGUMENTATION**.—Hamilton.²

ARGUMENTUM, argument, *q. v.*

Argumentum per Impossible or Reductio ad Absurdum.

ARISTOTELIAN, ARISTOTELIC, ARISTOTELIANISM, related to the philosophy of Aristotle. As Aristotelian questions.—See Bibliographical Index.

***ART**, skill in practice. More especially skill in giving embodiment or representation to the ideal.—C. F. V. See Hamilton,³ Sir G. C. Lewis.⁴

Arts (The Fine), those which appeal to the love of the beautiful and sublime.

ARTICULATION, applied by Kant⁵ to systematic unity.

ARTIFICIAL, in classification, opposed to natural. "The diataxis, or plan of the system, may aim at a natural or at an *Artificial* system. But no classes can be absolutely *Artificial*, for if they were, no assertions could be made concerning them. An *Artificial* system is one in which the smaller groups (the genera) are natural, and in which the wider divisions (classes, orders) are constructed by the peremptory association of selected characters (selected, however, so as not to break up the smaller groups)." —Whewell.⁶

ARTILISE, to render artificial.

¹ *Siris*, 289. ² *Logic*, i. 276. ³ *Logic*, i. 9. ⁴ *Authority in Matters of Opinion*, ch. iii., 48. ⁵ *Rein. Vern.*, 862. ⁶ *Nov. Org. Renovat. Axioms*, 89-92.

***ASCETICISM.**—The practice of self-denial beyond the requirements of moral law, avowedly for the attainment of a higher moral life. — C. F. V.

***Assent.** ***Assertion.**

ASSERTIVE, *ASSERTORY, affirmative.

ASSISTANCE (of God), in the commerce of soul and body. Cartesian theory of Occasional Causes.

***ASSOCIATION,** applied to laws of mental combination which facilitate recollection. The philosophy which traces all knowledge to experience, regards association as also a means of developing higher powers. — C. F. V. See Hamilton,¹ J. S. Mill² (specially on “insolubility, the revivability, and the associability” of feelings). — Herbert Spencer,³ Bain,⁴ Krauth.⁵

ASSUEFACTION (Fr., Lat.), rendering accustomed. — Sir T. Browne. L. J.

ASSUETUDE (Lat.), custom, habit. — Bacon. L. J.

***ASSUMPTION.**—The major is sometimes called the *Presumption*.

ASSURANCE, the highest degree of faith and of expectation.

ASTIPULATE, ASTIPULATION, agree, agreement.

ASTRICT, constrain, bind up. — Hamilton.⁶

ASTROTHEOLOGY.—The part of Natural Theology which draws its arguments and illustrations from Astronomy. — Derham.⁷

ASTUTE (Lat.), furnished with *astues*, craft; shrewd, sagacious, expert, sly, cunning.

ASYMMETRAL, ASYMMETRICAL, lacking symmetry, agreement, harmony; incommensurate.

“A. or unsociable, that is, such as we see not how to reconcile with other things evidently and confessedly true.” — Boyle, in Norris.⁸

ASYMPTOTE (Gr.), not falling together; never reaching coincidence; applied to lines which, “though they may approach still nearer together, till they are nearer than the least assignable distance, yet, being still produced infinitely, will never meet.”—(Grew.) Everlasting approximation and impossible concurrence. — Bp. Ward. L. J.

¹ Reid, Notes D** and D***, p. 889. *Lects. in Metaph.* II., p. 223. ² *Exam. of Hamilton's Philosoph.* 3 ed., p. 219. ³ *Principles of Psychology*, I. 228. ⁴ *Senses and Intellect*, 2 ed., 327. ⁵ *Art. Association of Ideas*, (Johnson's Univ. Cyclop.) ⁶ *Discuss.* (Am. ed.), 581. ⁷ *Physico-Theology*. ⁸ *Reason and Faith*.

ATARAXIA (Gr.), impassiveness, coolness, calmness, in the Skeptical System, "freedom from passionate disturbances."—Glenville.¹

***ATHEISM** is a term properly applied to every system of the universe which does not postulate an Intelligent First Cause.—See Farrar.² The term "Ethical Atheism" has been applied to Schopenhauer's view, by Thilo.³

ATHEIST.—By the theological writers of the sixteenth century, it is applied to the unbelief of such persons as Pomponatius; and in the seventeenth it is used by Bacon,⁴ Milton,⁵ and Bunyan,⁶ to imply general unbelief. Toward the end of the same century it is found *e. g.*, in Kortholt,⁷ to include Deism such as that of Hobbes, as well as blank Pantheism like Spinoza's. Tillotson⁸ and Bentley⁹ use the word more exactly; and the invention of the term *Deism* induced in the writers of the eighteenth century a more limited and exact use of the former term. But in Germany, Reimarrus¹⁰ and Buddeus¹¹ use it most widely, and make it include disbelief of immortality. Walch¹² uses it to include the Pantheism of Spinoza. The term was subsequently applied to the French writers, such as D'Holbach, who did not see the necessity of believing in a personal First Cause. It is now applied to such writers as Comte, who refuse to entertain the question of a Deity as not discernible by science.—Farrar.¹³

ATHEIZE, to reason or conclude atheistically (Cudworth); to render others atheistic (Berkeley).

ATHEOLOGY, a body of atheistic doctrine. Contrasted with theology (Swift).

ATHEOUS, atheistic.—Milton, Bp. Hall. L. J.

***ATOM, ATOMIC PHILOSOPHY, A. THEORY, ATOMISM.**

—Atoms are the ultimate particles of matter. The atomic theory is that which accounts for existence by the action, interaction, and combination of atoms.—C. F. V. See Hamilton,¹⁴ Hegel,¹⁵ Whewell,¹⁶ Wiener.¹⁷

***ATTENTION**, concentrated observation.—C. F. V.

*Attention and Thought. *Attribute.

¹ *Steps. Scientific.* ² *Bampton Lect.*, p. 586. ³ *Zeitschr. f. exacte Philos.*, 1868. ⁴ *Essay on Atheism.* ⁵ *Par. Lost*, bk. vi. ⁶ *Pilgrim.* ⁷ *De Tribus Impostoribus* (1680). ⁸ *Serm. on Atheism.* ⁹ *Boyle Lect.* ¹⁰ *Hist. Univ. Atheismi*, 1725. ¹¹ *De Atheismi et Superstitionis*, 1723. ¹² *Bibl. Theol. Selecta*, 1757. ¹³ *Bampton Lect.*, p. 586. ¹⁴ *Metaphys.*, II., App. 527. ¹⁵ *Logic*, § 98. ¹⁶ *Hist. of Scientific Ideas*, b. vi., ch. 5. ¹⁷ *Wörterbuch, Atomlehre*, 1869.

ATTRIBUTIVE, in Logic, applied to terms which mark attributes; connotative, *q. v.*—Whately,¹ Mill.²

AUFHEBEN (Ger.), suspend; set aside; absorb; put in abeyance; abrogate.—In Hegel, it denotes: 1. That something, having been deprived of its independent existence, is for practical purposes lost and gone. But, 2. What has thus disappeared is retained as an element or factor in the result to which it has led. Thus, the seed is *aufgehoben* in the plant which has grown from it; it has perished and disappeared as a seed, but it is transfigured and retained.—W. Wallace.³ See **Setzen**.

AUTARCHY (Gr.), the state of sufficiency in oneself; independence.—Aristotle,⁴ Plato.⁵

***AUTHENTIC** (*αὐθεντικός*), trustworthy; reliable.

*Authority (The Principle of). *Authority (The Argument from).

***AUTOCRACY, AUTOCRASY**, underived power; absolute power within the thing itself.—C. F. V.

AUTOGENEAL (Gr.), self-begotten; applied to the Supreme Power.

*Automatic. Automatal. Automatous. Automatism.

***AUTOMATON**, a self-acting machine.—C. F. V.

AUTONOMOUS, under **Autonomy**, *q. v.*

***AUTONOMY** of the will is Kant's⁶ phrase for the doctrine that the human will is a law unto itself, or carries its guiding principle within itself. This, with him, implies the essential unity, if not identity, of reason and will, the law-revealing and the law-executing powers.—C. F. V.

***AUTOTHEISTS**, those who make themselves God.—C. F. V.

***AXIOM**.—"Bacon's way of using the word '*axioma*' as if it were equivalent to '*enuntiatum*' or '*propositio*,' he derived from Peter Ramus. Hasse, an early commentator on Ramus, remarks that the word is used in the same way by Cicero, who probably took it from the Stoics."—Bain.⁷

Axiom of the Antiphrasis, a name applied by Ammonius and Philoponus to the principle or law of contradiction.—Hamilton.⁸

¹ *Logic*, b. II., ch. 5, § 1. ² *Logic*, b. I., ch. 3, § 6. ³ *Logic of Hegel, Prolegom.* clxxviii.
⁴ *Eth. Nic.*, I., 7, 5. ⁵ *Phil.*, 67 A. ⁶ *Groundwork of the Metaph. of Ethics*, end of ch. 2 and beginning of ch. 3. ⁷ *Works*, ed. 1857, vol. I., p. 136. ⁸ *Logic* (Am. ed.), 63.

B. In Logic, 1. indicates that all the modes of the three other figures in Syllogism which begin with B, can be reduced to the first mode marked with B. Barbari and Baraco can, by different methods of conversion, be reduced to *Barbara*.

2. It marks the predicate in a judgment. A is B; A is not B; unless the subject and predicate are identical, $A = A$.

BACCALARIUS, (**BACILLARIUS**, **BACULARIUS**, **BATTALARIUS**), Bachelor of Philosophy, an ancient academic degree which preceded the mastership and doctorate.

BACONIAN METHOD and Philosophy, Baconism, from Francis Bacon,¹ the method and philosophy of experience and experiment; not "anticipating nature" but collecting and systematizing facts.—See Buhle,² De Morgan,³ Dorner (1868).

BACULUS stat in angulo, ergo pluit—the staff is standing in the corner, therefore it rains—a sportive exposure of the fallacy post hoc, or of a non causa.

BAD (Ger. *Böses*), the broadest designation of the evil, natural or moral; the wrong, the opposite of good. It is applied to things and persons, thoughts and acts.—See Plato.⁴ Kant⁵ defines the bad (morally) as "the object of abhorrence, necessarily such, in accordance with a principle of reason." For the views from Spinoza to the present, see Steudel.⁶

BAMALIP or **BRAMANTIP**.—Mnemonic of the first word of the fourth figure.

BANAUSIC (Gr.), mechanical, base, ignoble, vulgar, selfish.

BARALIPTON or **BARALIP**, in Logic, a mnemonic term to indicate the first indirect number of the first of the three figures in Syllogism, recognized by Aristotle. In it the first two propositions are universal affirmatives; the third is a particular affirmative, and the middle term the subject in the first proposition, and the predicate in the second. The last syllable is simply added to make the line metrical. Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio, Baralipton.

BARBARA, in Logic, a mnemonic term to designate the first mode of the first figure of Syllogism, and the type of all the others. In it all the propositions are universal affirmatives,

¹ *Novum Organon*. ² *Geschichte d. Phils.*, II., 950-968. *Lehrbuch*, vi. 493-520. ³ *Budget of Paradoxes*, 49-57. ⁴ *De legg.*, ix. 17; x. 106. *Phædrus*, 301. *Alcibiad.* II., 87, 94. *De rep.*, viii. 206. *Gorgias*, 48. *Meno*, 842. *Symp.*, 234. *Theæt.* 122. ⁵ *Pract. Vern.*, 103-106. ⁶ *Philosophie im Umrisse. Zweit. Theil. Erst. Abtheil.*, 169-182.

the middle term being the subject of the first proposition, and the predicate in the second. — Jevons.¹

BARBARI, in Logic, a mnemonic term to designate one of the modes of the fourth figure in Syllogism.

BAROCO, in Logic, a mnemonic term designating the fourth mode of the second figure in Syllogism. In it the first proposition is a universal affirmative, the second and third are particular negatives, and the middle term is the predicate in the first two propositions.

BASEOLOGY (Gr.), fundamental philosophy.

BASIC, relating to the basis, furnishing a basis.

BATHOS (Gr.), depth. The name given by some of the later Greek logicians to the intensive quantity of concepts.—Hamilton.²

BATHOLOGY (Gr.), empty repetition of words.

BEAUTIFUL.—See **Beauty**, **Sublime**.

***BEAUTY** (Fr. *Beau*; Ger. *Schön*, *Schönheit*).—See **Æsthetics**, **Sublime**. Bacon,³ Plato,⁴ A. G. Baumgarten,⁵ Crousaz,⁶ Home,⁷ Kant.⁸

BECOME, BECOMING (Ger. *Werden*), mark: 1. The coming into being; genesis. 2. The transition from state to state.—Spinoza.⁹ 3. In Hegel,¹⁰ the unity of Being and of Nothing, or rather of Non-being.

Becoming, the Principle of, in Heraclitus, is "that the totality of things is in eternal motion and mutation."¹¹

BEGGING THE QUESTION (*Petitio Principii*).—See **Fallacy**.—Reid.¹²

BEGINNING, absolute, the transition from non-being into being; the result of the transition. "In its beginning, the thing is not yet, but it is more than merely nothing, for its being is already in the beginning."¹³—Hegel.

BEGRIFF (Ger.), conception; concept; notion. "In consequence of the establishment of this distinction (between *symbolical* and *intuitive* knowledge) by Leibnitz, a peculiar expression (**Begriff**, **Conceptus**) was appropriated to the

¹ *Elem. Less. in Logic*, Less. xvii. ² *Logic*, 100. ³ *Essays*, xlili. ⁴ *The Greater Hippias*. ⁵ *Æsthetica*. ⁶ *Traité du Beau*, 1721. ⁷ *Elements of Criticism*. ⁸ *Crit. d. Urtheilskraft* Einl., vii., §§ 5-82. ⁹ *Schwegler Hist. (Stirling)*, 242-425. ¹⁰ *Buhle, Græc.*, ii.: 519. ¹¹ *Logic*, Wallace, § 88. ¹² *Schwegler-Stirling*, 24. ¹³ *Schwegler-Stirling*, 20. *Annotat.*, 871. ¹⁴ *Hamilton's ed.*, 707. ¹⁵ *Logic*, Wallace, § 88.

symbolical notions of the understanding, in contrast to the intuitive presentations of sense and representations of imagination, which last also are furnished with the distinctive appellations of *intuitions* (*Anschauungen*, *intuitus*.)"—Hamilton.¹ On the science of the Begriff, see Biedermann (1869, 1870.)—Jordanus Brunus.²

BEËNT and NON-BEËNT.—Stirling's translation of *Seiend* and *Nicht-Seiend*, used by Schwegler³ in his account of Parmenides, the Eleatic. The *Beënt* is strictly the non-existent; the *Non-beënt* is the existent. The *Beënt* is possessed of identity or affirmation alone. Things themselves, as mere becoming and perpetual change, were but the non-beënt, the simply existent.⁴

***BEING** (Fr. *Etre*, *Essence*; Ger. *Sein*, *Seyn*).—It has been classified as absolute, logical, possible, real: in Hegel,⁵ as determinate, Being-by-self, Being-for-self.

Being-for-self (Ger. *Für-sich-sein*), in Hegel's Quality in the doctrine of Being (*Sein*), the reference to self which is conditioned by negative relation to another; independent, self-contained individuality.—Schwegler, Stirling.⁶

***BELIEF** (Gr. *πίστις*; Lat. *Fides*, *Fiducia*; Fr. *Foi*; Ger. *Glaube*).

"The recognition of the reality of an object which is neither present in consciousness nor discovered by the senses. Also, the mind's assent to the truth of a proposition."—C. F. V. "Sir W. Hamilton⁷ says: 'The sphere of our belief is much more extensive than the sphere of our knowledge, and, therefore, when I deny that the Infinite can by us be *known*, I am far from denying that by us it is, must, and ought to be believed. In the order of nature, belief always precedes knowledge.' See Hamilton.⁸ The meaning is, that knowledge has in each particular instance faith as its basis, and all human knowledge finds its resting-place on necessary belief.—Calderwood,⁹ Bailey.¹⁰

Belief, in contradistinction to knowledge, always ought to indicate some case in which the objective evidence is incomplete, and of which the opposite does not imply either

¹ *Logic*, 129. ² *De umbris idearum*, ed Nov., Jurguri, 1868. ³ *Gesch. d. Philosoph.*, § 6, 3. ⁴ *Stirling's Translat. of Schwegler, Annotat.*, 359. ⁵ *Logic*, Wallace, 144-161. ⁶ § 45, i. 1. ⁷ *Letter to Mr. Calderwood in App. to Lect. ii.*, 530. ⁸ *Metaph.*, i. 44. ⁹ *Phil. of Inf.*, 2d ed., p. 29. ¹⁰ *Essays on Formation of Opinion*, 8vo, 1831.

impossibility or absurdity. We cannot accordingly, in propriety of language, say, "I *believe* I have a pen in my hand and a sheet of paper before me," or "I *believe* that two and two make four," or "I *believe* in my own existence or the law of gravitation." These are things which we *know*. We have used the adjective *natural*, in connection with the word belief, to indicate that state of rational intelligence which comes next of all to knowledge; which forms the transition point between positive knowledge and personal conviction. —Morell.¹ See Thomson.²

BENEFICENCE (Lat.; Ger. *Wöthätigkeit*), the quality of the beneficus, the generous, liberal person; noble goodness and noble giving.

BENEPLACIT, BENEPLACITURE (Lat.), good pleasure.—Sir T. Browne,³ Glanville.⁴

***BENEVOLENCE**, the motive which prompts us to seek the good of others for its own sake.—C. F. V.

BIBLIOLATRY (Gr.), book-worship; excessive reverence for authority embodied in the writings especially of the great thinkers, as Plato, Aristotle, Hegel.

BIEN (Fr.), good.

BILATERAL (Lat.), two-sided; applied to arguments which can be used on either side.

BINDEGEWEBE (Ger.), the connective tissue; the main principle in the physiology of Virchow.—"This tissue so runs through all the anatomical frame, that the rest of it (organs and all) are but contained in or even constituted by it. Philosophy—in priority to Virchow—had endeavored to demonstrate the sustentation of the whole crass universe in even such a diamond net of connective tissue, under the name of 'Logic.'"—Stirling.⁵

BIO (Gr.), life (not *existence*, but *the time or course of life*).—In combinations, it is confounded in a number of cases with *ζωή*.—See **Biology**.

BIODYNAMICS (Gr.), doctrine, system of the vital forces; dynamics of life.

BIOLOGY (*βίος λόγος*, the science of life).—See Whewell.⁶ Baden Powell⁷ protests against the use of the term Biology,

¹ *Mental Philos.*, p. 325. ² *Laws of Thought*, § 118. ³ *Relig. Med.*, 59. ⁴ *Pre-exist. of Souls*, ch. 4. ⁵ *Schwegler, Annotat.*, 359. ⁶ *Hist. of Scientific Ideas*, II, 174. ⁷ *Order of Nature*, essay 1., § 4.

on the ground that *βιω* does not mean vitality, but life as progressing in time.—F. V. 3. See Herbert Spencer,¹ Whewell.²

BIOMAGNETIC, relating to Biomagnetism, animal magnetism.

BIOMANTICS, BIOMANTY (Gr.), ascertaining from symptoms the extent of life; foretelling the duration of life.

BIOMETRY (Gr.), measure of life; probable calculation of human life; calculation of time for the purposes of a wise and happy life.—See B. Franklin.³

BIONOMY (Gr.), doctrine, science of the laws of life.

BIOSOPHY (Gr.), wisdom applied to practical life; **Biology**.—Troxler, 1807–1808.

BIOTOMY (Gr.), the science of the natural division of the life of man according to its periods.—Butte (1829).

BIRD-WITTED, without the faculty of attention.—Bacon.⁴

BITHRISM, DITHRISM (Gr.), doctrine of the existence of two gods.—See **Dualism, Polytheism**.

BIZARRE, in *Æsthetics*, odd, fanciful.

*Blasphemy.

BOCARDO, in *Logic*, a mnemonic term designating the fifth mode of the third figure in Syllogism. In it the major and conclusion are particular negatives, the minor is a universal affirmative.

***BODY** (Fr. *Corps, Matière*; Ger. *Körper, Materie*).—Classified as *atomic*, indivisible, insectile, minimum, organic, organized.

***BONUM** (Good).—Wolff: Whatever tends to perfect us and our state.

Bonum Apparens.—Wolff: What only seems to perfect us and our state.

Bonum Internum.—Wolff: That which tends to perfect our internal state.

***Bonum Morale. *Bonum Summum**—Wolff—or *Beatitude* (to wit, philosophic or natural), is the perpetual or unimpeded progress to higher forms of perfection.

Bonum Verum.—Wolff: That which really renders us and our state more perfect.—Baumeister.⁵

BRACHYLOGY (Gr.), brevity in words. It is a distinguishing

¹ *First Principles, Biology*, ch. 7. ² *Hist. of Scient. Ideas*, II. 170. ³ *Essays*. ⁴ *Adv. of Learn.*, b. II. (*Works*, I. 218). ⁵ *Philosophia definitiva hoc est Definitiones Philosophicæ ex Systemate Wolffii*, Ed. Sept. Vitembergæ, 1746; 150, 151, 199.

trait of Aristotle, whom Lessing called "the greatest sparer of words." Plato is an illustration of excellence in the opposite direction.

BRAHMA, in the later Hindoo Philosophy, the divine substance in general, unpersonified.

BRAIN.—The central organ of sensation and motion, and chief instrument of the intellectual faculties; hence, the understanding, reason, the intellect. See Reid,¹ Gall (1833), Combe (1833), Chenevix (1838), Engeldue and Elliotson (1846).—See **Craniology**, **Phrenology**.

BREADTH, the extensive quantity of concepts. See **Bathos**.—Hamilton.²

BROAD, in Logic.—A definition is too broad when it includes more than the objects covered by what is defined.—Atwater.³

BRODWISSENSCHAFTEN (Ger.), the professional or lucrative sciences; "the bread and butter sciences."—Hamilton.⁴

BUDDHA, **BOUDDHA**, literally, wise, learned. The name of several of the Sages deified by the Buddhists. The most renowned of these lived, it is generally supposed, about 1000 B. C. The Brahmins consider him as the ninth incarnation of Vichnu.

BUDDHISM.—The system founded by Buddha (about six centuries B. C.). See Bastian (1870), Max Müller (1869), Schopenhauer,⁵ Taranatha.⁶

BURDEN OF PROOF, *onus probandi*, in Logic, the obligation to give some reason for a view which conflicts with another which has a presumption of some kind in its favor.—Whately.⁷

BURIDAN, ASS OF, a form of the Sophisma *Heterogeteseos*.—Hamilton.⁸ The illustration is not found in Buridan. De Morgan⁹ gives it thus: "An ass is *equally* pressed by hunger and thirst; a bundle of hay is on one side, a pail of water on the other." In the common statement, it is a hungry ass between two bundles of hay.

C., in Logic, in the conversion of judgments, marks *contraposition*.

¹ *Intellect. Powers*, Ess. II. ² *Logic*, 100. ³ *Logic*, 73. ⁴ *Metaph.*, 5, 15. ⁵ *S. Lexikon*, Frauenstüdt, *Buddhismus*. ⁶ *De doctr. Buddhicæ propagat.* ed. Schiefelerr, 1868, transl., 1869, into German. ⁷ *Rhetoric*, pt. i., ch. 3, § 2. ⁸ *Logic*, 333. ⁹ *Budget of Paradoxes*, 28.

CABAL, CABALA, CABBALA.—See **Kabala**. Hence Cabalism, science of the Cabala, Cabalist, n., Cabalistic, Cabalistical, Cabalistically, Cabalize.—H. More:¹ “St. John seems to cabbalize . . . that is, to speak in the language of the learned of the Jews.”

CADENTES.—See **Calentes**.

*Cænesthesia, Cænesthesia.

CALCULUS (Lat.), a small stone, a pebble or counter used in reckoning; fluxions; a method of investigating indefinitely small quantities.—See Berkeley,² Playfair,³ Ueberweg,⁴ Whewell.⁵

C. in General, in Wolff:⁶ “The invention of any signs or characters, from others, whether they be primitive or derivative, by the continuous substitution of equivalents.”

Calculus Differential.—See **Differential**.

Calculus Infinitesimal.—See **Infinitesimal**.

Calculus Integral.—See **Integral**.

Calculus in Logic, used by Boole,⁷ as furnishing symbolical language for the fundamental laws of reasoning, and a form for Logic.

CALENTES or **CADENTES**, third mode of Syllogism in the fourth figure; the major is a universal affirmative, the minor and conclusion are universal negatives.

CALLÆSTHETIC, CALLÆSTHETICS, Æsthetics.—The science of the perception of beauty; a term proposed by Whewell⁸ for Æsthetics, reserving that term for the doctrine of perception in general, as Kant has done.

CALORIC (Fr.), from the Latin *Calor*, heat; heat or the cause of heat as a physical force, distinguished from heat or warmth as a sensation. The school of Descartes defined *Calor* as “a motion of insensible corpuscles.” Chauvin.⁹ Wolff¹⁰ defines it as “consisting in the motion of some peculiar subtle fluid, passing from one body into another.”

CALUMNIATION, CALUMNY (Lat. *Calumnia*; Fr. *Calomnie*; Ger. *Verleumdung, Lästörung*), in Ethics, a false state-

¹ *Mystery of Godliness*, I., 8. ² *Principles*, § 130–132. ³ *Prel. Dissert. Enc. Brit.*, 650.

⁴ *Annotat. on Berkeley's Principles* (Krauth's Transl.), 109, 110. ⁵ *Hist. of Scientif. Ideas*, i., 153–163. ⁶ *Psychologia Empirica*, § 298. ⁷ *Laws of Thought*, 1854, ch. 1. ⁸ *Novum Organon renovat.*, p. 345. ⁹ *Lexicon Philosophicum*, s. v. ¹⁰ *Baumeister: Philosophia Dogmatica*, 237.

ment involving the reputation of the person slandered. Hence Calumniate, Calumniator, Calumniation, Calumnious, Calumniously.

CAMESTRESS, in Logic, mnemonic term for the second mode of Syllogism, in the second figure. The major is a universal affirmative, the minor and conclusion are universal negatives.

cAm	:	every	A is B:
Es	:	no	C is B:
trEs	:	no	C is A:

Every true philosopher (A) reckons virtue a good in itself (B). The Epicureans (C) do not reckon virtue a good in itself (B). Therefore, no Epicurean (C) is a true philosopher (A). Cicero,¹ Whately.²

CANDOR (Lat., literally, whiteness; Fr. *Ingénuité*; Ger. *Offenherzigkeit*), in Ethics, open-hearted, simple truthfulness, frankness, opposed to the disingenuous and the evasive.

CANON (from the Lat., a rule).—In the Critical Philosophy, the science of the right use of our faculty of cognition. Epicurus uses this name in his *Canonics*. In Kant, the Canon exposes the causes of false conclusions. He has: 1. A Canon of the understanding and of the reason, according to their form. This is universal, pure Logic. 2. A Canon of the pure understanding. This is transcendental Analytics. 3. A Canon of the practical reason, for the pure speculative reason, which as such can have no Canon. The Canon for the pure reason involves: 1. The ultimate aim of the pure use of reason; 2. the ideal of the supreme good, as a determining cause of the ultimate aim of the pure reason; 3. Opinion, cognition, and belief.³

Canon Supreme, in Hamilton, a new law of the syllogism by which the validity of all its forms may be tested.—See **Worse Relation**.

CANONICS (Fr. *Canonique*), in the Epicurean philosophy, Logic, not as a distinct science, as in Aristotle's *Organon*, but as a summary in ten rules, forming a Canon.

CANONS OF SYLLOGISM, its fundamental principles or self-evident truths.—Jevons.⁴

¹ *De Offic.* I., iii. ² *Logic*, ch. 3, § 4. ³ *Crit. d. Rein. Vernunft*, 26, 170, 823-869.

⁴ *Elem. Less. in Logic*, 121.

CAPABILITY, capacity; ability; used of men and things.

***CAPACITY** (Fr. *Capacité*; Ger. *Fähigkeit*), allied with Ability, Faculty, Power, Talent.—“Receptive power. Taking a twofold view of human power, faculty is power of acting; capacity is power of receiving impression.”—C. F. V.

***CARDINAL (THE) VIRTUES** (Fr. *Vertus Cardinales*; Ger. *Cardinaltugenden, Haupttugenden*).

CARTESIANISM.—The system of Des Cartes, whose points involve cause, certitude, consciousness, doubt, the ego, egoism, form, innate ideas, method, notion, perception, soul.

CASTLE-BUILDING (in the air), visionary play of the imagination in scenes in which we or those we love take an important part.—Reid.¹

CASUALISM, the assumption that all things are originated and controlled by *casus*, accident, or chance.

CASUALIST, one who holds the theory of Casualism.—Ulrici.²

***CASUISTRY** (Ger. *Casuistik*. See **Collision**).—“Disputation as to conflicting duties. In the best sense, a system of the rational grounds for adjustment of such conflict. It does not imply dispute as to right and wrong, but presupposes the absence of dispute on the fundamental moral distinctions.”—C. F. V. “A sort of dialectic of the conscience.” Kant. “The Jurisprudence of Theology,” Sir G. C. Lewis.

CASUS (Lat.), in Cosmology, chance; as, *casus purus*, pure chance. In Psychology, case; as, “expectation of similar cases,” (*casuum similitum*.)

***CATALEPSY** (Gr.), grasping.—1. In Stoic philosophy, comprehension; apprehension; in the plural, perceptions. 2. “Sudden physical prostration, affecting the whole nervous system, and involving loss of sensibility and voluntary motion.”—C. F. V.

CATEGOREM, CATEGOREMA (from Gr. predicate).—In the Aristotelian Logic, something asserted of a subject. Shedden:³ Names are called categorematic words, or *categorems*, because they can be predicated independently of any other word. Some logicians would exclude adjective names from the class of *Categorems*.

CATEGORY, CATEGORIES, the Hindoo. There are two sys-

¹ *Works* (Hamilton), 381. ² *Strauss* (Krauth's Tr.), 108. ³ *Elements of Logic*, ch. 2.

tems of these: I. The System *Vaisēchica*; II. The System *Nyāya*. I. The Categories of the System *Vaisēchica*, of which Kanada is the author, are six: 1. Substance; 2. Quality; 3. Action; 4. The Common, comprising genus and species; 5. The Proper; 6. Intimate Relation, or Aggregation. These approximate the Categories and Categorems of Aristotle. II. The Categories of the System *Nyāya*, of which Gôtama is the author, are sixteen: 1. Evidence; 2. Object or Matter of Evidence; 3. Doubt; 4. Motive; 5. Example; 6. Demonstrated Truth; 7. Regular Argument or Syllogism; 8. Reductio ad Absurdum; 9. The Acquisition of Certitude; 10. Discussion; 11. Investigation or Interlocution; 12. Controversy; 13. Fallacious Assertion; 14. Fraud or Evil Construction; 15. Futile Answer; 16. Defect in Argument. The Categories of Gôtama are merely the heads of a Logic, and should be completed by uniting them with those of Kanada. — D. A. C.

*Categorematic. Categorematical.

***CATEGORICAL**, adj. — See **PROPOSITION**. Whately:¹ "Propositions, as sentences, are distinguished into categorical and hypothetical. The categorical asserts simply that the predicate does or does not apply to the subject."

Categorical, s. — Whately:² "A hypothetical proposition is defined to be two or more categoricals united by a copula."

Categorical Imperative. — See **IMPERATIVE CATEGORICAL**.

CATEGORIES (*Stammbegriffe*) **OF THE PURE UNDERSTANDING**, in Kant,³ **Tabular view of**. — See **JUDGMENTS, Tabular View of**. The Categories are:

- I. According to Quantity: 1. Unity. 2. Plurality (Multitude). 3. Universality (Totality). II. According to Quality: 1. Reality. 2. Negation. 3. Limitation. III. According to Relation: 1. Inherence and Subsistence (Substance and Accident). 2. Causality and Dependence (Cause and Effect). 3. Simultaneity, Community (*Gemeinschaft*, Action and Reaction, Reciprocal Action), Reciprocity between the agent and the patient. IV. According to Modality: 1. Possibility \times Impossibility. 2. Existence \times Non-existence. 3. Necessity \times Contingence.

¹ *Log.*, b. II., ch. 2, § 1. ² *Log.*, b. II., ch. 4, § 2. ³ *Rein. Vernunft*, 106, (Haywood's Transl., pp. 80, 81; Meiklejohn's, p. 64.)

***CATEGORY** (from Greek, accusation), a class to which things or thoughts may be referred; in Aristotle's *Logic*, predicament, head of predicables, a predicate. — Chauvin: "Prædicament, order or series of many predicates or attributes under some highest genus." Saint-Hilaire:¹ "The highest classes into which are distributed ideas and things, in a certain order of subordination and of system." "According to Kant, the manifold is arranged by us in accordance with the logical functions of our judgment. 'The categories are nothing else than these functions of judgment, so far as the manifold in a given intuition is determined in relation to them.'"²—C.F.V.

CATHARTICON (*Kathartikon*), (Gr.), fitted to purify.—A name given by Kant³ to applied *Logic*, as a means of removing the causes of false judgments.

CAUSABLE, capable of being caused.

CAUSAL, in *Logic*, of or pertaining to cause.—Glanville:⁴ "We can have no true knowledge of any [motion], except we would distinctly pry into the whole method of causal concatenations." Watts:⁵ "Causal propositions are where two propositions are joined by causal particles; as, houses were not built that they might be destroyed." *Causal* is used to qualify judgment, nexus, principle, proposition, way.—See *Cause*.

CAUSALITY and **CAUSATION**, the act of originating new forms of existence.—C. F. V. "Invariableness can have place only where there are more instances of sequence than one; and therefore can have nothing to do with constituting the causal character of the individual sequences amongst which the relation of invariableness comes to subsist."—Sam. Bailey.⁶

Causality is that reason contained in the cause, in virtue of which the thing caused (*causatum*) either simply exists or exists as it is.—Wolf.⁷

Causality, the Law of. Notion of.—The rational principle that there must be power adequate for the production of everything which begins to be. Hamilton makes it refer to

¹ *Dict. Ph. Sc.*, 2d. ed., 1875. ² *Critique of Pure Reason*, (Meiklejohn's Transl.), p. 88. *Werke* (Rosenkranz), II., Supplem. 14, Sec. 20, p. 470. ³ *Rein. Vernunft*, 78. *Logik*. Jaesche-Kirchmann, 1870. 19. ⁴ *Sceps. Scientif.* ⁵ *Logick*. ⁶ *Letters on Philosophy*, 3d series, p. 50. ⁷ *Ontologia*, § 884.

the sum of existence rather than to power. He¹ says: "When an object is presented phenomenally as commencing, we cannot but suppose that the complement of existence which it now contains has previously been."—C. F. V. See Strümpell (1871), Ulrici.²

Causality, Way of (*via causalitatis*), method of reaching the divine attributes by the supposition that all the perfections implied in the effects, the creatures, must exist in God, the Cause, the Creator.

CAUSE (Ger. *Ursach*).—See **Ground, Occasion, Principle, Reason**. Operating power. More strictly, power "which in operating originates new forms of being."—C. F. V. "The popular meaning I think I can express by a definition: *Causa est id, quo posito ponitur effectus, qui sublato tollitur*. In the strict philosophical sense, I take a cause to be that which has the relation to the effect which I have to my voluntary and deliberate actions."—Reid.³

Hamilton⁴ says: "Of second causes, there must always be at least a concurrence of two to constitute an effect." "We think the causes to contain all that is contained in the effect."—See Krauth.⁵

Maxims in regard to Cause: "The same causes produce the same effects" (in physical nature). "The cause of a cause is a cause of the caused." "An efficient cause must be present with that in which it acts, either *per se*, or through another (immediately or mediately)." "Second causes are real causes."

Cause administrant (Lat. *causa administra*).—That active entity which is used as an instrument by the principal efficient cause.

Cause efficient.—The operative or working cause "whose causality consists in action." The efficient cause asserted may be *sufficient* or *insufficient*. Efficient causes are said to be *of the same order* when they are defined in the same way, that is, are of the same kind. They are immediate or mediate, as the effect is or is not in continuity. A number of these constituting together a sufficient efficient cause are called *associate causes*. As aiding each other, they are called *aux-*

¹ *Metaph.*, ii. 400. ² *Strauss* (Krauth's Tr.), 81–87. ³ *Works* (Hamilton), pp. 76, 77.

⁴ *Lects. on Metaphys.*, ii. 377, 408. ⁵ Article *Cause* in *Johnson's Univers. Cyclopædia*.

iliary causes. When there is but one cause, it is said to be *solitary*. A cause is *principal* when the source of its action is in itself; it is *instrumental* when its force is dependent.—Wolf.¹

Cause impulsive is a reason determining the will. It is *internal*, if the reason is contained in the agent; *external*, if it is drawn from outward things.—Wolf.²

***CAUSES (FINAL, DOCTRINE OF.)**—Ends contemplated by the agent as the final results of his voluntarily directed effort. (An improper use of the word "Cause.") The argument from final causes is the most popular mode of reasoning as to the perfections of Deity.—C. F. V. See Whewell,³ Ulrici,⁴ Krauth.⁵

Causes Immanent. C. Material.—See **Cause**.

***Causes (Occasional, Doctrine of).**—Descartes,⁶ Malebranche,⁷ Hamilton.⁸

Causes Transient and Transeunt.—See **Cause**.

CELARENT, in Logic, mnemonic term for the second mode of Syllogism. The major is a universal negative, the minor a universal affirmation, the conclusion a universal negative. No one (cE) whose mind is limited is omniscient. Every man (lA) has a limited mind. No man (rEnt) is omniscient. **CEREBEL, CEREBELLUM** (Lat., the little brain), the lower hind portion of the brain.—Hamilton.⁹

CEREBRAL, relating to the brain, the cerebrum, the superior, front, and larger portion of the brain. The brain, spinal cord, and nerves form the Cerebro-spinal system, the animal, opposed to the Ganglionic or Vegetative.

CERTAINTY, CERTITUDE (Ger. *Gewissheit*), "personal assurance of reality possessed in the exercise of immediate knowledge, or attained by the ingathering of sufficient evidence." Moral certainty as subject to the law of moral life.—C. F. V.

CESARE, in Logic, mnemonic term of the first mode of Syllogism, in the second figure. The major is a universal negative, the minor a universal affirmative, the conclusion a universal negative.

¹ *Ontologia*, §§ 881 seq. ² *Ontologia*, § 940. ³ *Induct. Sciences*, II. 90. ⁴ *Rev. of Strauss* (tr. by Krauth), 1874, pp. 56-58, 86, 91. ⁵ Art. *Final Causes* in *Johnson's Univers. Cyclop.* ⁶ *Principia*, pars. II., § 36. ⁷ *Recherche de la Vérité*, vi. 2, 3. ⁸ *Lects. on Metaph.*, I. 300. ⁹ *Metaph.*, 651-653.

CHALDEAN PHILOSOPHY.—See **Synthetic Table**.

***CHANCE.**—A name under which are classified events, the occurrence of which cannot be computed by application of known natural law. Events are referred to *chance*, in acknowledgment at once of causality and of ignorance, which restricts us to the statement, "They happened."—C. F. V. Ulrici.¹

***Chances, Theory of.**—Hume.²

CHAOS, in Natural Theology, confused mass of matter assumed as prior to the organized form of the universe.—See Ovid.³ Wolf⁴ and others have shown that there never has been or can be chaos in the strict sense. Leibnitz⁵ says, "There is nothing neglected, nothing barren, nothing dead in the universe; no chaos, no confusion, except in appearance."

CHARACTER, in Kant: 1. The law by which a causality works, without which a cause would not be a cause. This may be *empirical* or *intelligible*, q. v.⁶

2. State of the will.⁷—See Calderwood.⁸

3. Mental and moral habit; principle or tendency fixed in life; complex of characteristics—as character of the sexes, races, nations.

CHARACTERISM, in Kant,⁹ designation of the notion (*Begriff*) by the sensible marks which accompany it.

CHARACTEROLOGY, scientific treatment of character.—Bahnsen (1867).

*Charity.

***CHASTITY.**—The duty "or virtue."—C. F. V.

CHEMISM.—1. The theory which maintains that the origin and constitution of nature are the result of chemical process. "The metaphysics of the future will be chemistry." L. Feuerbach. It is a species of materialism.

2. In Hegel's Doctrine of the Notion (*Begriff*), the second form of objectivity, the reciprocal attraction, interpretation, and neutralizing of independent elements, which come to completion in unity.—Schwegler.¹⁰

¹ Strauss (Krauth's tr.), 103. ² *Essay on Probability*. ³ *Lib. 1., Metamorph.* ⁴ *Theolog. Natur.*, part II., sect. I., ch. 5, § 402. ⁵ *Princip. Phil.*, § 72. ⁶ *Rain. Vern.*, 567–569. ⁷ *Grundl. u. Metaph. d. Sitten*, I., Semple's Translat., 1836, 1869; Abbott's Tr., 1873, II. ⁸ *Moral Philos.*, 262–264. ⁹ *Urtheilskraft*, 256. ¹⁰ *Geschichte*, § 45, I., I. 3.

CHIMERA (a mythological monster, made up of lion, goat, and dragon), in Logic, a confused and irrational hypothesis or system.—Locke: "Nobody joins the voice of a sheep with the shape of a horse, to be the complex ideas of any real substances, unless he has a mind to fill his head with chimeras." Hence, Chimerical and Chimerizing (Obsol.).

CHINESE PHILOSOPHY.—See Synthetical Table, Philosophical Schools, I. 2.

***CHOICE** (Ger. *Wahl*), "voluntary selection from a variety of objects," often used as synonymous with *volition*. Properly, *choice* applies to things, *volition* to forms of action.—See Aristotle¹ for exposition of *προαίρεσις*, deliberate preference, and for the passage here referred to, where it is needful to keep in view the dispute as to the authorship of Books V., VI., and VII.—C. F. V.

*Chrematistics.

CHRYSIPPEAN, of Chrysippus the Stoic, reputed inventor of a sophism called by the ancient authors, Sorites.—Hamilton.²

CIRCLE (*circulus in probando*), in Logic, explaining by the thing to be explained, or proving by the thing to be proved: *Petitio principii*, begging the question.—Watts:³ "When one of the premises in a Syllogism is questioned and opposed, and we intend to prove it by the conclusion." For the circle in definition and proofs, see Beck,⁴ Jevons.⁵

CIRCULAR, in Logic, involving a circle.

CIRCUMSCRIPTIVE, with measurable outline or boundary, after the manner of bodies. The soul is said to be in a place, but not circumscriptively. God is everywhere present, but not circumscriptively.

***CIVILITY**, courteousness (Ger. *Höflichkeit*).—See Ferguson.⁶

CLAIRVOYANCE (Fr.; Ger. *Hellssehen*), clear-sightedness, acuteness; extraordinary power of vision or sensation without the organs of sensation in their normal modes, claimed for some who are in a state, either of natural or artificial *somnambulism*, q. v.—Jos. Beck.⁷

¹ *Nic. Eth.*, iii. 2. *Ib.* vi. 2, 5. ² *Logic*, 268, n. 2. ³ *Logick*. ⁴ *Logik*, § 241. ⁵ *Elementary Lessons in Logic*, 5th edit., London, 1875, 110, 114, 179. ⁶ *Institut. of Mor. Philosoph.*, part vi., ch. 5. ⁷ *Empir. Psychologie*, § 111.

CLARIFICATION, in Mental Science, process of rendering clear; explication of ideas.—Whewell.¹

CLASS, in Logic, the generic term of division and arrangement which comprehends race, genus, and species. — Whately: "The same object may be referred to various different classes, according to the occasion."² Hence, to class, classable, classification, classificatory, classifier, classify, classing, class-system.

CLASSES.—In Plato's *State*, there are three: 1. The rulers, correspondent with reason. 2. The warriors, correspondent with the heart. 3. The working-men, correspondent with appetite.

***CLASSIFICATION, CLASSIFICATORY, CLASSING**.—See J. S. Mill,³ Whewell.⁴

CLEARNESS (Ger. *Klarheit*), in Logic, is a judgment which so separates and classifies each part in the manifold as to be free from indistinctness; simplifies so as to render a proposition comprehensible, and defines and states it so as to make it intelligible.

CLEMENCY, in Ethics, mildness and kindness, as revealed in the giving and forgiving on the part of superiors. *Seneca on Clemency* was addressed to Nero when that monarch was yet clement. Calvin wrote a commentary on this treatise (1532).

CLIMACTERIC, date from which decline begins; applied to the mind by Johnson.⁵

COACTION, in Ethics, (Ger. *Zwang*), compulsion, force controlling external action against the inclination. The coaction is psychological when terror is the force; it is mechanical when external force is employed. In the former case, moral responsibility may be lessened, but is not destroyed; in the latter, it is not involved. The former kind allows of degrees, the latter allows of none. Of the former only, the saying holds true: "A being who can die, cannot be coerced."

COAGMENT, heaped together, as, "the world from supposed fortuitous jumble." — Glanville.

COALITION, in the Kantian⁶ philosophy, the synthesis which connects the homogeneous in intensive magnitudes.

¹ *Nov. Org. Pref.*, vii. ² *Logic*, 21. ³ *Logic*, b. iv., ch. 7, § 1, 2; t. 174. ⁴ *Hist. of Scientif. Ideas*, b. viii., *The Classificatory Sciences*. ⁵ *Rambler*, No. 161. ⁶ *Rein. Vernunft*, 201, note.

COAPPREHEND, to apprehend conjointly.—Sir T. Browne.

COAPTATION, the adjustment of parts to each other, with reference to a common end.—Boyle.

CODIVISION is one in which the total object is the same in two divisions, but each of them classifies from a different point of view. Thus, the same triangle is the object of a codivision when it is classified by one division with reference to its angles, and by another with reference to its sides.—K.

COEFFICACY, COEFFICIENCY, COEFFICIENT, used of what is efficient in conjunction with an efficient; co-operation.

COERCION.—See *Coaction*.

COESSENTIALITY, participation of the same essence.

COETERNITY, in Ontology, the eternity in relation, of two or more objects of thoughts. Anaxagoras and Plato considered the Supreme Intelligence and Matter as coeternal. Zoroaster and Manes held that a supremely good being and a supremely evil one existed coeternally.

COEXISTENCE, simultaneous existence.—Herbert Spencer: "The axiom, 'Things which coexist with the same thing coexist with each other,' cannot, however often repeated, help us to any knowledge beyond that of the coexistence of an indefinite number of things."¹

COEXISTENT, adj., simultaneously existent, having coexistence; substant., that which coexists.—Locke: "Time is taken for so much of duration as is coexistent with the motions of the great bodies of the universe." Herbert Spencer: "All modes of extension are resolvable into relations of coexistent position."² J. S. Mill: "Bacon seems to have thought that as every event has a cause, or invariable antecedent, so every property of an object has an invariable coexistent, which he called its Form."³

COEXTENSION, common extension in time or space.—Herbert Spencer: "*Coextension*, as ordinarily determined by the juxtaposition of the coextensive objects, involves no comparison between two series of states of consciousness,

¹ *Princ. of Psychology*, 128, 297. ² *Princ. of Psych.*, 297. ³ *Logic*, b. iii., ch. 22, § 4.

but merely an observation that the ends of the objects coincide."¹

COGENCY, force tending to conviction.—Locke: "Maxims and axioms, principles of science, because they are self-evident, have been supposed to be innate, though nobody ever showed the foundation of their clearness and cogency." Hence, Cogent, Cogently.

COGITABLE, thinkable. — Sir W. Hamilton: "Creation is cogitable by us only as a putting forth of divine power."²

COGITATION (Lat. *Cogitatio*), act of thinking; thought. — Bentley: "If these powers of cogitation, volition, and sensation are neither inherent in matter as such, nor acquirable to matter by any motion and modification of it, it necessarily follows that they proceed from some cogitative substance, some incorporeal inhabitant within us, which we call spirit." Hence, Cogitate, Cogitative, Cogitativity (capacity of thinking).

COGITO ERGO SUM (I think therefore I am), a system in three words—the essential postulate of Cartesianism and of all real Psychology, contested only by those who have not taken the trouble fairly to understand it, or who are too critical to be wise. It conjoins the primary, absolute, and infallible act of consciousness with an intuitive, absolute, and infallible act of logic or reason. It does not mean my existence is the resultant effect of my cogitation—my thinking is the cause of my being—but it means that the absolute affirmation of consciousness that there is concrete thinking, involves, not by *inference*, but in the proposition *per se*, that there is a thinker, and marks me as the particular thinker in this particular case. *Cogito* is *sum cogitans*. That is, *cogito*, affirmed by consciousness, *a fortiori* affirms *sum*. If consciousness is valid for the infallible proof of *cogito*, it is *a fortiori* for the proof of *sum*, for *sum* is here but a part of *cogito*. *Sum* *per se* marks only being. *Cogito* marks being + thinking + thought. It is not true *sum, ergo cogito*, that is, *sum, ergo sum cogitans*. On the contrary, the proposition is thinkable, *sum sed non sum cogitans*. *Sum* is *esse* lifted

¹ *Princ. of Psych.*, 299.

² *Disc.*, 593.

into personality. It is no longer possible to say *is est*, still less *id est*, but, inseparable with the consciousness expressed in *cogito*, simultaneous with it in time, prior to it in the necessary order of thought, is the *ego*. Hence, Des Cartes¹ himself puts it not in the form in which it is ordinarily quoted, but "*Ego cogito ergo sum.*" The *Ego* does not weaken his proposition, but clears it up.

COGNATE, kindred; of a common nature, in Ontology and Logic.—Howell: "Which atoms are still hovering up and down, and never rest till they meet with some pores proportionable and cognate to their figures."² Hence, Cognation.—Sir T. Browne: "To ascribe effects unto causes of no cognation."³

COGNATES, COGNATA, things which agree: 1. In Category, in genus or species, as man and beast; 2. In Causes; 3. In Parts; 4. In Accidents; 5. In Adjuncts.—Ch.

***COGNITION**, knowledge.—In its widest sense embracing sensation, perception, conception, notion.—C. F. V.

"*Cognition*, when we find it needful to separate it from *faith*, might be confined in strictness to those mental energies in which the mind looks on an object now present—say on a body perceived by the senses, or on self in a particular state, or on a representation in the mind; and thus *faith* would be applied to all those exercises in which we *believe* in the existence of an object not now before us, and under immediate inspection."—McCosh.⁴

COGNITIVE, related to the faculty or act of cognition.—Sir W. Hamilton: "Thinking (employing that term as comprehending all our cognitive energies) is of two kinds. It is either (A) negative or (B) positive."⁵

COGNIZANCE, cognition.—Ingleby: "But what if light be but a sensation? and whether or no, how else have we any cognizance of light."⁶ Hence, Cognizant.

COGNIZE, to bring into cognition.—Herbert Spencer: "As the reasoning faculty can deal with no facts until they are cognized by it—as, until they are cognized by it, they are to it non-existent—it follows that, in being cognized, that is, in becoming beliefs, they begin to exist relatively to our reason."⁷

¹ *Princip. Phil.*, p. 1., vii. ² *Letters*, iv. 50. ³ *Vulgar Errors*. ⁴ *Intuitions*, p. 196.
⁵ *Discuss.*, 578. ⁶ *Intro. to Metaph.*, 9. ⁷ *Princ. of Psych.*, 15.

COGNOSCECE, knowledge.

COGNOSCIBILITY, capability of being known.

COGNOSCIBLE, capable of being known.

COGNOSCITIVE, able to know.

COHERENCE, COHERENCY, in Logic, closeness in reasoning; the strict attachment of part to part.

COHERENT, in Logic, consistent; close; without break.

COINCIDE, in Logic, concur; harmonize with.—Watts: "The rules of right judgment and of good ratiocination often coincide with each other."¹ Hence, Coincidence, Coincidency, Coincident, Coincider.

COINTENSE, equally intense.—Herbert Spencer: "We can recognize changes as connatural, and connatural changes we can recognize as cointense, or the reverse."²

COINTENSION, COINTENSITY, common condition and degree of intension.—Herbert Spencer: "Reasoning, which has for its fundamental ideas coextension, coexistence, and connature, proceeds by establishing cointension in degree between relations connate in kind. Intension being synonymous with intensity, cointension will be synonymous with cointensity, and is here used to express the parallelism with coextension. Cointension is consequently here chosen to indicate the equality of relations in respect of the contrast between their terms."³

COLLATION (Ger. *Vergleichung*), in Logic, the act of collating; comparison.

COLLECT, in Logic, to gather by deduction from logical premises.

COLLECTION, in Logic, inference.—Obsolete.

COLLECTIVE, in Logic: 1. United under a common point of view.—Watts: "The difference between a compound and a collective idea is that a compound idea unites things of a different kind, but a collective idea things of the same."⁴

2. Inferential.—Sir T. Browne.⁵

COLLIGATE, in Inductive Philosophy, to bind together, to bring together the simpler elements for colligation.

Whewell: "Sciences begin by a knowledge of the laws of phenomena, and proceed by the discovery of the scientific ideas by which the phenomena are colligated."⁶

¹ *Logic*. ² *Princ. of Psych.*, 295. ³ *Princ. of Psych.*, 117. ⁴ *Logic*. ⁵ *Vulgar Errors*.
⁶ *Philos. of Discovery*.

***COLLIGATION OF FACTS.**—Whewell.¹

COLLISION, in Ethics, conflict of rights or of duties (Ger.

Widerstand der Pflichten).—This affords the great questions of casuistry. The collisions of duties have been classified by Krug as between: 1. Duty to ourselves and duty to others. 2. Duties of rectitude, which are called perfect duties, and duties of kindness, or imperfect duties. 3. Duties to the whole or duties to a part, to the many or the few. Daub classifies cases of alleged collision thus: *a*, between two social duties obligatory on the same person; *b*, a social duty and a personal duty; *c*, two personal duties; *d*, duty to God and duty to man, whether to ourselves or others.²—Whewell.³

Objectively and absolutely as they appear to God, duties cannot come into collision. Thus considered, the collision is seeming only. Subjectively and relatively, the collision is of such a character at times as hopelessly to perplex and divide the judgment of good men.

COLLUSION, in Ethics, joint-play; a secret and dishonorable understanding by which persons "play into each other's hands."

***Combination and Connection of Ideas.** ***Combination of Ideas.**

COMBINED METHOD, COMPLETE M.—Jevons's⁴ name for what Mill calls the *Deductive Method*—the alternate use of induction and deduction.

COMMENSURATE, having a common measure; equal.—Glanville, Coleridge.

COMMENTITIOUS, fictitious.—Glanville.⁵

COMMERCE OF SOUL AND BODY (*Commercium animæ et Corporis*; Ger. *Gemeinschaft der Seele und des Leibes*), the reciprocal action of the soul on the body, and of the body on the soul. This has been explained by three hypotheses: 1. Physical influence; 2. Occasional causes; 3. Pre-established harmony. To these may be added, 4. Personal unity.

COMMERCIAL, in Metaphysics, to have communication with.—Cheyne.

COMMERCIUM ANIMÆ ET CORPORIS, the union, fellow-

¹ *Nov. Org. Ren.*, 60. ² *Phil. u. Theolog. Vorlesungen*, iv. 241-257. ³ *Elements of Morality and Polity*, book iii., ch. 16-18. ⁴ *Elem. Less. in Log.*, 258. ⁵ *Scop. Scientifica*

ship, reciprocal action of soul and body, in personal conjunction.

COMMISERATION, in Ethics, compassion.

***COMMON SENSE** (*Sensus communis*, κοινή διαθεσις).—The word "sense" is here used as equivalent to cognitive power in its widest acceptation. "Common Sense" is the cognitive power common to humanity. Popular usage, in making it equivalent to sagacity, and thus a mark of distinction among men, is opposed to the philosophic use.—C. F. V. "This phrase, 'common sense,' meant once something very different from that plain wisdom, the common heritage of men, which now we call by this name, having been bequeathed to us by a very complex theory of the senses, and of a *sense* which was the *common* bond of them all, and which passed its verdicts on the reports which they severally made to it."—Trench.¹

***Common Sense (The Philosophy of)**.—Applied specially to the philosophy of "the Scotch School," as distinguished for an ultimate appeal to consciousness, and to the principles of intelligence, common to the mind of man.—C. F. V. M'Cosh.²

Common Sense and Science.—Whately:³ "Many who allow the use of systematic principles in other things are accustomed to cry up common sense as the sufficient and only safe guide in reasoning. Now by *common sense* is meant, I apprehend, (when the term is used with any distinct meaning,) an exercise of the judgment unaided by any art or system of rules; such an exercise as we must necessarily employ in numberless cases of daily occurrence; in which, having no established principles to guide us, no line of procedure, as it were, distinctly chalked out, we must needs act on the best extemporaneous conjectures we can form. He who is eminently skilful in doing this, is said to possess a superior degree of *common sense*. But that *common sense* is only our second best guide—that the rules of art, if judiciously framed, are always desirable when they can be had, is an assertion, for the truth of which I may appeal to the testimony of mankind in general; which is so much the more valuable,

¹ *Glossary of English Words*. ² *The Scottish Philosophy*. ³ *Elements of Logic*, prof.

inasmuch as it may be accounted the testimony of adversaries. For the generality have a strong predilection in favor of *common sense*, except in those points in which they, respectively, possess the knowledge of a system of rules; but in these points they deride any one who trusts to unaided *common sense*. A sailor, *e. g.*, will perhaps despise the pretensions of medical men, and prefer treating a disease by *common sense*, but he would ridicule the proposal of navigating a ship by *common sense*, without regard to the maxims of nautical art. And the induction might be extended to every department of practice. Since, therefore, each gives the preference to unassisted *common sense* only in those cases where he himself has nothing else to trust to, and invariably resorts to the rules of art, wherever he possesses the knowledge of them, it is plain that mankind universally bear their testimony, though unconsciously and often unwillingly, to the preferableness of systematic knowledge to conjectural judgments."

COMMON SENSORY, CENTRAL S., in Aristotle, the place in which the external senses were united.—Hamilton.¹

COMMON TERM, in Logic. — Whately: "Common terms therefore are called 'predicables' (*viz.*, affirmatively predicable), from their capability of being affirmed of others."²—
See **Term** and **Singular**.

COMMUNICATION, COMMUNION, impartation, participation, fellowship in.

COMMUNISM, doctrine that property should be held in common.

COMMUTABILITY, in Logic, applied to what is capable of interchange, of a commutable character, as of predicates and subjects in particular affirmative propositions. — Dr. R. G. Latham.³

*Compact.

COMPARATIVE, applied to a proposition, marks precedence or superiority in the comparison of predicate or subject, as "wisdom is better than riches."

***COMPARISON (Faculty of)** has the threefold products, Concepts, Judgments, and Reasonings.—Hamilton.⁴

¹ *Metaph.*, 512. ² *Log.*, b. 1., § 6. ³ *Logic as applied to Language*. — L. J. ⁴ *Logic*, 83-88.

*Compassion.

COMPATIBLE TERMS are those which, though distinct, are not contradictory, and can therefore be affirmed of the same subject; as "large" and "heavy;" "bright colored" and "nauseous."—Jevons.

COMPETIBLE, consistent.—Glanville: "Properties compatible to body or matter."—Sir M. Hale: "The duration of Eternity *a parte ante* is such as is only compatible to the Eternal God."—Dr. H. More: "What is compatible to human nature."

COMPLEMENT, in Logic, the filling up, that which completes. Each part of a totality is to all the other parts the completing element—the *complementum ad totum*.

COMPLEMENT OF POSSIBILITY, (*Complementum possibilitatis*), in Metaphysics.—Wolf's definition of existence or actuality, as that which the possible can have beside its possibility.¹ The conception of existence is that of a possible become actual.

COMPLETE, in Logic, perfect in parts, entire in the constituent elements. Thus we have complete notions, judgments, syllogisms, and proofs.

Complete, in Ontology, entire in essence and subsistence.

***COMPLEX, COMPLEX CONCEPTION** (Immediate Inference by) consists in employing the subject and predicate of a proposition as parts of a more complex conception.—Jevons.²

COMPLEXEDNESS, complication.—Locke: "Complexedness of moral ideas."

COMPLEXION.—1. In Logic, complication, state of the complex.

2. In the Atomistic Philosophy, the combinations of atoms, the grouping of the like-shaped.—Schwegler.³

COMPLICATION, in Logic, the involving of many parts so as not to allow of their ready separation.—Watts: "By admitting a complication of ideas, and taking too many things at once into one question, the mind is dazzled and bewildered."⁴

COMPOSITE, compound.—Harris: "Each man's understanding, when ripened and mature, is a *composite* of natural capacity and superinduced habit."⁵ In the Leibnitzo-Wolfian

¹ *Ontol.*, § 179. ² *Less. in Logic*, 87. ³ *Gesch. d. Phil.*, § 9, 4. ⁴ *Logick*. ⁵ *Hermes*, quot. in L. J.

Ontology, a *composite* entity (*ens compositum*) is one which consists of a number of distinct parts; a continuous *composite* (*continuum compositum*) is one which allows of no disturbance of the order or continuity of its parts; a divisible *composite* (*compositum divisibile*) is that in which the existence of one part is not affected by the destruction of another part; in Cosmology, an organic *composite* (*organicum compositum*) is that whose parts are organic.—B. W.

COMPOSITION, in Logic: 1. Bringing into conjunction: Synthesis. 2. *Fallacy of Composition* arises from the confusion of a universal and a collective term.

Composition of Causes.—The principle which is exemplified in all cases in which the joint effect of several causes is identical with the sum of their separate effects.—Mill.¹

Composition of Phantasms (*Compositio phantasmatum*).—In the Leibnitzo-Wolfian Psychology, the compounding of partial percepts into one composite—as to invest the human form with wings and horns.

Compositum substantiale.—The result of the union of matter and form, as a statue.

COMPOSSIBLES, COMPOSSIBILIA, in the Leibnitzo-Wolfian Natural Theology, joint possibles, those which can be conjoined without contradiction in one subject or object.

COMPOUND, COMPOUNDED, in Logic, embracing more than one simple.—Locke, Watts.

***COMPREHENSION**.—Associated words: Comprehend, Comprehensibility, Comprehensible, Comprehensibleness, Comprehensibly, Comprehensive, Comprehensively, Comprehensiveness, Comprehensor.

COMPULSION, in Ethics, force put upon the acts of a moral agent.—Locke: "When the beginning or continuation of any act is contrary to the preference of his mind."

COMPUNCTION, in Ethics, pricking or goading of conscience.

COMPUTATION (Lat.), thinking together; reckoning.—The equivalent of syllogism.—Jevons.²

CONATION, CONATUS, striving; effort; endeavor.—In the terminology of Hamilton, the faculty, desire, and act of vo-

¹ *Logic*, book iii., ch. 10.

² *Lessons in Log.*, 127.

lition. **Conative**, of or pertaining to Conation.—Ralph Cudworth: "The hegemonic of the soul may by conatives and endeavors acquire . . . power."¹—Sir Wm. Hamilton: "What is common both to will and desire: that is the *nîsus* or *conatus*. This division into cognitive faculties, feelings, and the exertive or *conative* powers, was first promulgated by Kant." "In actual life, the feelings intermediate between the cognitions and the conations. Without the previous cognition, there could be neither feeling nor conation; and without the previous feeling, there could be no conation. The manifestations of the conative powers are determined by the feelings."² "In conation there is a want and a tendency supposed, which results in an endeavor. Conation has reference only to the future, for conation is a longing, a striving . . . the power of overt activity which pain and pleasure set in motion."³

CONCATENATED, in Logic, linked together.—Applied to Syllogisms, when the conclusion of the antecedent is the premise of the one that follows, or when a number of conclusions considered as a complex notion forms the premise for the syllogism which follows.—B. W.

CONCAUSE, in Ontology, a cause in co-operation with another cause.

CONCEIVABLE, CONCEIVABLENESS, mark adaptation to our power of conceiving or conception, *q. v.*—"Conceivableness is not the test of truth."—Calderwood.⁴

***CONCEIVING**, and **APPREHENDING**, or **UNDERSTANDING** (Ger. *Fassungs-gabe, -kraft, -vermögen; Begreifen, Verstand*).—The act of gathering up in a single mental representation the qualities which are characteristic either of one object or of many objects. *Conception* has been used for the act, and *concept* for the thing conceived. *Conception* and *notion* have commonly been taken as synonymous. It would be better to reserve *notion* for the more generalized knowledge, expressed in general or abstract terms. The German name is *Begriff*, the gathering together, as if into a

¹ *Treatise on Free Will*, edited by Allen, Lond., 1838, 31. ² Translated by Hamilton (*Metaphysics*, Boston, 1868, 567, 569) from F. X. Blundl: *Versuch d. Empirisch-Psycholog.*, II., § 208, (Trieves, 1831, 2 v., 8vo.) ³ *Metaphysics*, lect. xiii., 671, 672. ⁴ *Mor. Phil.*, 116-118.

single *grip* or form of knowledge, the properties common to a species or genus.—C. F. V. See Hamilton.¹

CONCENTRATION, fixing the mind in a central act.

CONCEPT.—"That which is conceived; the result of the act of conception; nearly synonymous with general notion, idea, thought."—Jevons.

***Concept, A.**—Every *concept* is a general term which includes on the one hand a variety of attributes, and on the other comprehends a variety of objects. The attributes included are called the *contents*, and the objects comprehended the *extent* of the concept. The greater the contents the smaller the extent, and the smaller the contents the greater the extent of a concept.—F. V. **Conceptible**, in Logic, capable of being conceived, formed into a concept or notion.

CONCEPTIO, CONCEPTUS, CONCIPERE (Lat.), mark the process of embracing or comprehending the many into the one, a multitude of different objects by their common qualities into one act of thought.—Hamilton.²

***CONCEPTION** (*con*, and *cipio*).—See Kant.³

***Conception and Imagination.**—See Chretien,⁴ Coleridge,⁵ Stoddart,⁶ Whewell.⁷

CONCEPTS.—See **Notions, Quantity, Comprehension, Extension, Quality, Opposition.**

***CONCEPTUALISM.**—See Thomson.⁸

CONCEPTUALISTS.—Those who say that the general notion is the knowledge of the common properties or resemblances of the things embraced under the notion.—Jevons.⁹

CONCEPTUS, CONCIPERE.—See **Conceptio.**

***Conclusion.**

CONCOMITANCE, CONCOMITANCY, in the Scholastic Metaphysics, natural conjunction of substances so as to involve a real common presence. Largely used in the controversy concerning the communion in one kind.—See Krauth.¹⁰

***Concrete.**

CONCRETIANISM, in Psychology, the doctrine that body and soul are generated together, and have a common growth.—K.

¹ *Logic*, i. 40. ² *Logic*, 86. ³ *Critique of Pure Reason*, (Meiklejohn's Translat.,) p. 45. ⁴ *Essay on Logical Meth.*, p. 137. ⁵ *Notes on English Divines*, 12mo, 1853, i. 27. ⁶ "Univ. Grammar," in *Encyclop. Metropol.* ⁷ Pref. to *Philos. of Inductive Sciences*. ⁸ *Laws of Thought*, 3d ed., p. 126. ⁹ *Less. in Logic*, 13. ¹⁰ *Conservative Reformation*, 620.

CONCUBINAGE, in Ethics : 1. Permanent cohabitation, under definite agreement, without marriage; 2. Marriage, under limitations which restrict, in a measure, its ordinary legal results. — See **Morganatic**.

CONCUPISCENCE (Ger. *Gelüsten*), in Ethics, illicit desire.

CONCURRENCE, CONCURSUS, (Ger. *Gemeinschaft, Wechselwirkung*), in Metaphysics and Natural Theology, a coming together, combination to a common end. It may be *general* or *special*, and the *special* may be *indeterminate* or *determinate*. We may also discriminate between physical and moral concurrence. In God, the distinction is drawn between the *ordinary* and the *extraordinary*, or miraculous concursus. In the Scholastic and Leibnitzo-Wolfian Philosophy, it is maintained : 1. That God concurs in general in all the acts of finite things by the powers with which He has endowed them. 2. He specially concurs physically, and determines necessary future things; 3. In the actions of moral freedom God concurs in a moral mode; 4. By His conservation he concurs in general in the acts of His creatures; 5. By this conservation of powers He *so far* concurs even in the bad actions of free agents; 6. But with this free action, as morally evil, God does not concur. — See Leibnitz.¹ L.

***CONDIGNITY**, in Ethics, common worth, desert. — See **Merit**. The equal proportion between a moral act and its result, whether of reward or punishment.

***CONDITION**.—That which is attendant on the cause, or co-operates with it, for the accomplishment of the result; or that which limits the cause in its operation. — C. F. V. “*Condition* means that on which something else is contingent, or (more definitely) which being given something else, exists or takes place. I promise to do something on *condition* that you do something else; that is, if you do this, I will do that; if not, I will do as I please.” — J. S. Mill.²

***CONDITION** and **CONDITIONED**.—“The conditioned” is the expression employed to describe the relative and limited, in contrast with the expression “unconditioned,” which is applied to the absolute and infinite. — Hamilton,³ Mansel.⁴

***CONDITIONAL**, (see **Proposition**), a syllogism in Logic, involving a condition, hypothetical. — J. S. Mill : “When the

¹ Theodecte, p. i., § 22, 27, 31; p. ii., § 9. ² On Hamilton's Phil., p. 50. ³ Discussions.

⁴ Limits of Relig. Thought.

simple propositions are connected by the particle *Or*; as, either A is B or C is D; or by the particle *If*; as A is B if C is D. In the former case the proposition is called *disjunctive*, in the latter *conditional*; the name hypothetical was originally common to both."¹

CONDITIONAL JUDGMENT OR PROPOSITION.—See Judgments.

***CONDITIONED (Law of the).**—"I lay it down as a law which, though not generalized by philosophers, can be easily proved to be true by its application to the phenomena—that all that is conceivable in thought, lies between two extremes, which, as contradictory of each other, cannot both be true, but of which, as mutual contradictories, one must."—Hamilton.² "From this impotence of intellect, we are unable to think aught as absolute."

"Now the law of mind, that the conceivable is in every relation bounded by the inconceivable, I call the *Law of the Conditioned*."

Conditioned (Philosophy of the,) in Hamilton's *Metaphysics*.

"The philosophy of the conditioned is the express converse of the philosophy of the absolute. For this asserts to man a knowledge of the unconditioned—of the absolute and infinite; while that denies to him a knowledge of either, and maintains all which we immediately know or can know, to be only the Conditioned, the Relative, the Phenomenal, the Finite."³ "The mental law of the conditioned supposes that the mind is limited; the law of limitation—the law of the conditioned constituting, in one of its applications, the law of causality. The mind is astricted to think in certain forms; and, under these, thought is possible only in the conditioned interval between two unconditioned contradictory extremes or poles, each of which is altogether inconceivable, but of which on the principle of Excluded Middle, the one or the other is necessarily true." "Philosophy as more than a science of the conditioned is impossible."

CONDUCTIBLENESS, having the power to conduce, promote.

—Dr. H. More. I. J.

¹ *Logic*, i., iv., § 3. ² *Lect.*, vol. II., pp. 368, 369. *Reid's Works*, 911. *Ibid.*, p. 373.

³ *Discussions*, New York, 1868, 19–22, 568–587. *Works of Thomas Reid*, 2d Ed. Edinburgh, 1844, 602. *Lectures on Metaphysics*, Boston, 1868, 549.

CONFAMILIAR, of a common family.—Glanville. L. J.

CONFATAL, CONFATED, involved in a common fate or decree.—See *Fatalism*.

CONFERENCE, comparison of views, especially by conversation or oral discussions.—Bacon: "Reading makes a full man, *conference* a ready man, and writing an exact man; and, therefore, if a man write little, he had need have a great memory; if he *confer* little, he had need have a present wit; and if he read little, he had need have much cunning, to seem to know that he doth not."

CONFIGURATIONS (Ger. *Freie Bildungen*), in the Critical Philosophy, the assumption of harmonious figures, as in crystallization. Used by Kant to illustrate the *Æsthetic* in Nature.¹

CONFORTATION, strengthening.—Bacon.

CONFUSEDNESS, confusion.—Norris. L. J.

CONFUSION, mental indistinctness; identification in whole or part of things which should be separated.—Locke. L. J.: "Ambiguity arises from the *confusion* of entirely different words, derived from different languages, or from different roots of the same language; as *mean*, from *moyen*, medium; *mean*, from *gemeine*, low-minded."—Jevons.²

CONFUTATIVE, contributive to confutation.—Warburton: "Albinus divides Plato's Dialogues into classes—natural, moral, dialectic, *confutative*, civil, explorative, obdetric, and subversive."—L. J.

CONGENEROUSNESS, affinity of origin and nature.—L. J.

CONGENIALITY, community of genius, spirit, mind, taste, character.

CONGENITE, of a common birth; connate.—Glanville. L. J.

CONGRUENCE, CONGRUENCY, *CONGRUITY (Ger. *Gleichheit*), in Ontology, quality of the congruous, agreement. "Equality of similars."—Dr. H. More, Locke. L. J., B. W.

CONIMBRICENSAINS, CONIMBRICENSIAN PHILOSOPHERS, the Jesuit scholars of the university of Coimbra, in Portugal, chiefly expositors of Aristotle.

CONJECTURE (Ger. *Muthmassung*), a provisional opinion, especially in regard to facts.

*Conjugate.

¹ *Urtheilskraft*, i., § 58.

² *Less. in Log.*, 31.

CONJURATIO, in Ethics, conspiracy under oath.

CONNASCENCE, CONNASCENCY, connate origin. — Sir T. Browne. L. J.

CONNATE, born together; innate.

CONNATURAL, of a common nature; innate.—See **Conna-**
ture.

CONNATURALITY, participation in the connatural; state of common nature.—Sir M. Hale. L. J.

CONNATURE, participation of a common nature or character. Herbert Spencer: "Similarity; the cointension of two connatural relations between states of consciousness which are themselves like in kind, but commonly unlike in degree. **Connature**, likeness in kind between either two changes in consciousness or two states of consciousness."¹

CONNECT, in Logic, to conjoin.—Locke: "The natural order of the connecting ideas must direct the syllogisms, and a man must see the connection of each intermediate idea with that it *connects*, before he can use it in a syllogism."

CONNECTED, in the Leibnitzo-Wolfian Cosmology, things are said to be *connected* with one another when one of them contains the sufficient reason of the co-existence or succession of another.—B. W.

CONNECTION, connexion; reciprocal union.

CONNEXIVE, making or marking connection.—Watts:² "The predicate and subject are joined in a form of words by *connexive* particles."—L. J.

CONNOTATE, v., to note or mark at the same time; adj., correlate; connotated.

CONNOTATION, in Logic, the act of conjoining a note or mark.—J. S. Mill:³ "In the case of connotative names, the meaning is the *connotation*; and the definition of a connotative name is the proposition which declares its *connotation*."

*Connotative, A.

CONNOTE, in Logic, to note or mark at the same time.—J. S. Mill:⁴ "The words genus, species, etc., are therefore relative terms; they are names applied to certain predicates, to express the relation between them and some given subject: a relation grounded not on what the predicate *connotes*, but on the class which it *denotes*, and on the place which, in

¹ *Elem. of Psych.*, § 94.

² *Logick.*

³ *Logic*, ch. 8, § 1.

⁴ *Logic.*

some given classification, that class occupies relatively to the particular subject." In Analysis, "we replace one word which *connotes* a set of attributes collectively by two or more which *connote* the same attributes singly or in smaller groups"

CONNUMERATE, to number at the same time.—Cudworth.

Hence, Connumeration.—L. J.

*Consanguinity.

***CONSCIENCE**.—Strictly, the name is applicable to the power by which we know moral law. Popularly, the name is given indiscriminately to the knowing power, and to the dispositions and sentiments concerned with morals. "The internal sanction of duty, whatever our standard of duty may be, is one and the same—a feeling in our own mind, a pain more or less intense, attendant on violation of duty. . . This feeling, when disinterested, and connecting itself with the pure idea of duty, and not with some particular form of it, or with any of the merely accessory circumstances, is the essence of conscience."—J. S. Mill.¹ "I entirely dissent from Dugald Stewart, and the great majority of writers on the theory of morals, who represent conscience as a primitive and independent faculty of the mind, which would be developed in us, although we never had any experience of external authority. On the contrary, I maintain that conscience is an imitation within ourselves of the government without us."—Bain.² "I find that I undoubtedly seem to perceive, as clearly and certainly as I see any axiom in arithmetic or geometry, that it is 'right' and 'reasonable,' and the 'dictate of reason,' and 'my duty,' to treat every man as I should think that I myself ought to be treated in precisely similar circumstances."—Sedgwick.³ C. F. V. Ulrici.⁴

Conscience, Terms applied to.—In Ethics, a large number of terms has arisen, in which are indicated the various theoretical and practical judgments involved in its questions. Among the most important of these are the following: approving and disapproving; careless, lax; morbid, narrow, micrologic, solicitous about trifles; scrupulous; certain and uncertain; proportional; complete and incomplete; concomitant, when it regards things present; consequent, things

¹ *Utilitarianism*, p. 41. ² *Emotions and Will*, 3d ed., p. 285. ³ *Methods of Ethics*, 470.

⁴ *Strauss* (Krauth's Transl.), 126.

past; antecedent, things future; dissuading and persuading; natural; educated and uneducated; erroneous and right; free and servile; gnawing, biting, stinging, wounded; good and bad; tranquil, calm, quiet; improbable and probable; torpid and wakeful.

CONSCIENTIA, CONSCIUS.—See **Conscious, Consciousness.**

CONSCIOUS, immediately cognizant.—J. S. Mill: "What I am conscious of when I see the color blue, is a feeling of blue color, which is one thing; the picture on my retina, or the phenomenon of hitherto mysterious nature which takes place in my optic nerve or in my brain, is another thing, of which I am not at all conscious, and which scientific investigation alone could have apprised me of. These are states of my body; but the sensation of blue, which is the consequence of these states of body, is not."

***CONSCIOUSNESS** (Ger. *Bewusstseyn*), the knowledge which the mind has of itself, and of the facts of its own experience.—See Fearn,¹ Garnier.² Hamilton³ identifies consciousness with immediate knowledge. He says consciousness and immediate knowledge "are terms universally convertible, and if there be an immediate knowledge of things external, there is consequently the consciousness of an outer world." The reliability of consciousness has been disputed. It has been said that "the madman's delusion is of itself sufficient to excite profound distrust, not only in the objective truth, but in the subjective worth of the testimony of an individual's self-consciousness."—Maudsley.⁴ Maudsley does not apprehend the real question. The madman's consciousness is unerring as to his own actual modifications of mind. In calling him a madman, Maudsley assumes that there is relative truth in the testimony of a sound mind.

***Consciousness and feeling.**

Consciousness, Terminology of.—In Des Cartes, Consciousness bears the name *Conscientia*; in Leibnitz, it is styled *Apperceptio*, *Apperception*. In the German metaphysics, we meet as its equivalent *Apperception*, *Bewusstseyn*, *Selbstbewusstseyn*; in French, *Perception*, *Conscience*, *Sentiment Intérieur*.

¹ *Essay on Consciousness*. ² *Traité des Facultés*, pref., p. 24. ³ *Lects.*, i. 221. ⁴ *Physiology and Pathology of Mind*, p. 11.

CONSECTARY, adj., consequent; **CONSECTARY**, n. (Ger. *Zusatz*), in Logic, immediate consequence, corollary, porism.

CONSECUTIVE, in Logic, strictly following upon.—Locke: "Actions consecutive to volition."

CONSENSION, agreement.—Bentley.

CONSENSUS, agreement.

***CONSENT** (*con*, with, and *sensio*, I feel or think).—Voluntarily expressed agreement with another in thought or feeling, but more commonly in action.—C. F. V.

*Consent, Argument from Universal.

CONSENTANEOUS, in harmony with; accordant.—Sir T. Browne. L. J. Hence, Consentaneity, Consentaneously, Consentaneousness, Consentient.

*Consequent.

CONSEQUENT, CONSEQUENCE (*con sequor*, to follow from or with).—A *consequent* viewed by itself is a proposition the truth or falsity of which is ascertained by fact. A *consequence* is a conclusion or inference which is true or false, according as it follows or does not follow from the premises.—F. V. 3.

CONSEQUENTIARIES, in Logic, a word used by Leibnitz to designate those who attempt to create personal odium or ridicule by the inferences they unfairly deduce from the arguments of their opponents; those who use the *argumentum ab invidia*.

CONSEQUENTNESS, in Logic, consequence.—Sir K. Digby. L. J.

CONSERVATION, CONSERVATIVE, mark preservation; applied to the faculty of retaining or conserving knowledge acquired; mental retention; memory proper.—Hamilton.¹

Conservation of Energy or Force, the theory that the total amount of energy existing in the universe is fixed and unalterable, like the quantity of matter.

*Consilience of Inductions.

CONSISTENCY, self-harmony; agreement, Locke: as of propositions, Jevons.

CONSISTENT (Terms).—See **Compatible (Terms)**.

CONSOLIDATED, in Psychology, brought into unity.—Herbert Spencer. L. J.

¹ *Metaph.*, 274, 275.

CONSONANCE, in Psychology, accord, concord.—See **Dissonance**.

CONSONANT (Judgments), those which may be applied to a common subject without conflicting; as, this flower is red, and it is sweet.

CONSONANTLY, consistently.—Glanville. L. J.

CONSOPITE, calmed.—Dr. H. More. L. J.

CONSORTION, fellowship.—Sir T. Browne. L. J.

CONSPECIES.—Notions, in so far as they are considered the co-ordinate species of the same genus.—Hamilton.¹

CONSPICUITY, clearness.—Glanville. L. J.

CONSTABLISHED HARMONY, in Ontology, used by Swedenborg to express the harmony of the laws by which the orders of creation are controlled. It is not to be confounded with Pre-established Harmony.

CONSTANCY, in Ethics, fixedness in a state; firmness; steadfastness in conviction, determination, affection, and conduct.

***CONSTITUTIVE**.—This is Kant's distinction: *Constitutive* (*constitutiv*) is applied to knowledge verified in experience, knowledge whose object is found in the concrete. *Regulative* (*regulative*) is applied to forms of knowledge which are simply regulative of the mind (in its exercise of the sensory, *Sinnlichkeit*, or of the ~~understanding~~ ^{intellect}, *Verstand*, or of the reason, *Vernunft*) while acquiring and asserting its knowledge. The ground of the distinction is well explained in the preface to the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.² The distinction itself is given in the *Critique*,³ and it is applied to the ideas of the reason.⁴ In this relation, it is needful to keep in mind Kant's distinction between *to know* (*erkennen*) and *to think* (*denken*). According to this, we can think anything which is not self-contradictory, but we can *know* only that whose possibility can be proved either by experience or by reason.⁵—C. F. V.

CONSTRUCTION, in the Critical Philosophy, the act or process of construing, that is, the exhibiting of the *a priori* intuition correspondent with a notion. When it is occupied with

¹ *Logic*, 148. ² Meiklejohn's *Trans.*, p. 24; *Werke*, Rosencranz, II.; suppl., II. 664.

³ *Trans.*, p. 67. (*Transcendental Analytic*), *Werke*, Rosencranz, II.; suppl., xII. 722.

⁴ *Trans.*, 407. *Werke*, Rosen., II. 515. ⁵ *Trans. Pref.*, xxIII. *Werke*, Rosen., II. 676, note.

objects which possess magnitude (*quanta*), it is called *geometrical*; when occupied only with magnitude in the abstract (*quantitas*), it is called *symbolical*.—Kant.¹

CONSTRUE.—See **Construction**.

CONSUSISTING, subsisting under a common generic condition.

CONSUBSTANTIAL, of a common substance; identical in substance.

CONSUBSTANTIATION, conjunction or transition of two or more substances into a common complex of substance.

CONTAIN, to have within, as in Metaphysics the cause is said to contain the effect; in Logic, the universal contains the particulars; the genus contains the species, the species the individuals.—C.

*Contemplation.

CONTEMPLATIVE (Ger. *Beschaulich*), used by Kant in regard to the judgment involved in taste, to mark that this judgment is indifferent in respect to the existence of an object, but associates its characteristics with a feeling of pleasure or pain.—See **Judgment of Taste**.

*Continence, Continency.

***CONTINGENT**, depending for occurrence upon events which we cannot forecast.—C. F. V. That which may or may not happen; opposed to *necessary* and *impossible*.—Jevons.

Contingent Conversion, in Logic of the lower Greeks, is nothing more than the assertion that in contingent matter subcontrary propositions are both true.—Hamilton.²

***CONTINUITY** (Law of), affirms persistence of being on the ground of indestructibility of nature. Applicable either to matter or force.—C. F. V. For more recent usage in physical science, see Balfour Stewart,³ and Tait.⁴

Continuity of Forms, in the Critical Philosophy, a special application of the law of continuity to logical forms or notions.

***CONTRACT** (Ger. *Vertrag*), voluntary agreement or pact.

CONTRACTION, in Logic, reduction to a compacter statement.

*Contradiction, Principle of, Law of.

CONTRADICTION IN THE ADJECTIVE, in Logic, the

¹ *Cr. d. rein. Vernunft*, Vor. xii., 221, 222, 271, 741-766. ² *Logic*, 521, n. 1. ³ *Conservation of Energy*. ⁴ *Recent Advances of Physical Science*.

assertion by the predicate of that which contradicts the nature of the subject; as, wooden iron, square triangle.

CONTRADICTION, CONTRADICTORY TERMS, are opposites, of which the one involves the absolute negation of the other.

CONTRADISTINCTION, distinction by contrary qualities.

Hence, Contradistinct, Contradistinctive, Contradistinguish.

CONTRANATURAL, opposite to nature.

CONTRAPOSITION, in Logic, a process of conversion which consists in taking the negative of the predicate of the proposition A as a new subject, and affirming of it universally the negative of the old subject. From "all metals are elements," it necessarily follows that "all not elements are not metals."—Jevons.¹ Hence, Contrapositives, the propositions in Contraposition.—Jevons.

CONTRAREGULARITY, conflict with rule.—Norris. L. J.

*Contraries.

CONTRARIETY, in Logic, the character of Contraries, *q. v.*

CONTRARY and **CONTRADICTORY**.—"Pleasure and pain are opposed to each other as *contraries*, not as *contradictories*; that is, the affirmation of the one implies the negation of the other, but the negation of the one does not infer the affirmation of the other; for there may be a third or intermediate state, which is neither one of pleasure nor one of pain, but one of indifference."—Sir W. Hamilton.² See Knauer (1868).

CONTRAST, comparison so made as to bring out sharply the points of difference.

CONTRITION, in Ethics, sorrow for sin considered as an offence against God; the state of a contrite or broken heart.

CONVERSE, in Logic, transposition of the terms of a proposition; converted proposition.—Whately,³ Jevons.⁴

***CONVERSION**.—See Aristotle,⁵ Baumgarten,⁶ Devey,⁷ Hamilton.⁸

CONVERT, to transpose the subject and predicate of a proposition.

CONVERTEND, that which is to be converted.

¹ *Lessons in Logic*, 83, 186. ² *Lect. II.*, p. 436. ³ *Elem. of Logic*, b. II., ch. 3, § 5.

⁴ *Lessons in Log.*, 82. ⁵ *Prior Analyt.*, I., II., III.; II., VIII., IX.; *Topics*, II., I., VIII. ⁶ *Acroasis Logica*, §§ 278-282. ⁷ *Logic*, 97. ⁸ *Logic*, 185, 614-629.

CONVERTIBLE, in Logic, capable of conversion; equivalent.

—Whately.¹

CONVICTION, in Logic, state of belief following one of disbelief or doubt.

CO-OPERATION, working in common, joint operation.

CO-OPTATION, choice, adoption.

CO-ORDINATION, making or treating as co-ordinate; arranging with, putting into, considering as in a common order or rank. Opposed to subordination.

COPARTITION, a division or partition in which a common total is classified under different aspects; as, the human body is divided into the external and internal parts.—K.

***COPULA** (Ger. *Binde-wort*).—De Morgan: "The study of elementary logic includes the special consideration of: 1. The term or name, the written or spoken sign of an object of thought, or of a mode of thinking. 2. The copula or relation, the connection under which terms are thought of together. 3. The proposition. 4. The syllogism."²

COPULATIVE PROPOSITIONS, in Logic, "are those which have more subjects or predicates connected by affirmative or negative conjunctions; as, riches *and* honors are temptations to pride."—Watts.³

COPY (Ger. *Copie*), in Transcendental Logic, used by Kant to mark the character of all things created as copies—*ectypes*—of the ideal prototype.⁴

CORELATIVE, CORRELATIVE, in correlation, that which stands in a correlative, mutual, reciprocal relation.—Herbert Spencer: "Whatever amount of power an organism expends in any shape is the *correlate* and equivalent of a power that was taken into it from without."⁵ Carpenter: "Mutual relationship, or *correlation*, has been shown to exist among the chemical and physical forces themselves."⁶

CORNUTE, in Logic, horned, pertaining to the horns.—1. Applied to the fallacy of Eubulides, the Megarian: "What you have not put away, you still have; you have not put away horns; you have horns." The questions must be answered with Yes or No.—Diogenes Laertius.⁷ 2. Both horns of the dilemma.

¹ *Elem. of Logic*, b. i., § 5. ² *Syllabus of a Proposed System of Logic*, § 3. ³ *Logick*, p. 11., s. 6. ⁴ *Rein. Fernun/*, 806. ⁵ *Biology*, § 23. ⁶ *Hum. Physiology*, § 124. ⁷ *Vil. Phil.*, vii. 187.

COROLLARY, in Logic, "a proposition which follows immediately from another which has been proved."—Jevons. "We use the word corollary to denote a consequence or a conclusion flowing from something previously demonstrated, but the word in its earlier use signified a surplus or addition, and is so used by Shakespeare.¹ Prospero says:

' Well,—

Now come, my Ariel! bring a corollary,
Rather than want a spirit.'

The word is handed down to us from the Romans, and was used by them in their dramatic entertainments to signify a reward given to the players over and above their just hire, and was derived from the word *corolla*, a little crown or garland, such being the reward usually given."—Knapp.² F. V. 3.

CORPORALITY, CORPOREALITY, state of the corporeal, the bodily.

CORPOREALISM, system of the Corporealists, who maintain that body is the sole real existence; Materialism.

CORPOREITY, state of the corporeal, being of a bodily nature.

CORPUS.—1. (Ger. *Körper*, body,) a word in large use, direct and in its combinations, in the intellectual sciences. In the Leibnitzo-Wolfian Cosmology, "Corpora" is defined as the "composite of which in its parts the universe is composed." Corpus, body, may be present, or absent, hard, soft, fluid, rough, smooth, porous, cold, warm, thick, thin, elastic, simple, compound, organic, in motion, at rest, active, passive.

Corpus, 2. (Ger. *Leib*) is also applied to animated body, especially the human.

CORPUSCLE, CORPUSCULE, little body; *corpusculum*, the minutest portion of matter having extension, but indivisible and impenetrable: an *atom*, a concrete unit, without a concrete half; applied to the "star-dust," and the primary elements of matter.

CORPUSCULAR, relating to, consisting of corpuscles.

CORPUSCULAR (CORPUSCULARIAN) PHILOSOPHY is synonymous with Atomism, as the atoms are assumed to be the minutest corpuscles (*corpuscula minima*). Bentley:

¹ In *The Tempest*, Act IV., Scene 1.

² *Roots and Ramifications*.

"The mechanical or *corpuscular* philosophy, peradventure the oldest, as well as the best in the world."¹ "The modern *corpuscularians* talk in most things more intelligibly than the peripatetics." Berkeley: "Newton seems to have made a greater progress than all the sects of *Corpuscularians* had done before him."²

CORRELATE.—See **Corelate** and **Relation**.

CORRESPONDENCE, parallelism, conformity, harmony, reciprocal adaptation.

COSMIC, COSMICAL, pertaining to the cosmos, or general system of the Universe.

COSMICS (Gr.) 1. Cosmology. 2. Fundamental Philosophy.

COSMOGONIST, the speculator in cosmogony.

***COSMOGONY** (Ger. *Weltentstehungslehre*), doctrine of the origin of the Cosmos, or Universal System.

COSMOLOGICAL, of or relating to Cosmology, the doctrine or science of the cosmos. C. Antithetics, in Kant,³ the Antinomy in which the speculative reason is involved, when it develops the C. idea, in the four points of view, Quantity, Quality, Relation and Modality, and deduces the four C. problems. C. Argument, in Teleology, demonstration, proof of the existence of God from the *contingency* of the world, as involving a *necessary* primal cause. C. Kingdom, in the classification of Ampère,⁴ embraces, with the Noölogic Kingdom, all the sciences. C. series, the things in the cosmos in the relations of space, time, and cause.—See Krug.⁵

COSMOLOGICAL IDEA, in the transcendental dialectic of the Critical Philosophy, the regulative idea that "in Cosmology we are to follow up, in an endless investigation, the conditions alike of the internal and external phenomena of nature, as if those phenomena were in themselves endless, without an ultimate or supreme member. Such a member is not denied, but we do not bring it into the connection of this explanation of Nature, because we do not know it."⁶

***COSMOLOGY** is the science of the Kosmos, World, or Universe, as such. As the science of the world in general, it is

¹ *Sermons*, iv. ² *Siris*, § 245. ³ *Rein. Vern.*, 448, seq. ⁴ *Essai sur la Philosophie d. Sciences*, 1838-1843. ⁵ *Handb. d. Philosophie*, §§ 320-325; *Allg. Handwörterbuch*, s. v. ⁶ *Rein. Vernunft*.

general, or transcendental: as it demonstrates a general theory of the World from the principles of Ontology, it is *scientific*: as it elicits a theory from observations, it is called *experimental*.—Wolf.¹

Cosmology Rational, in Metaphysics and the Critical Philosophy. Kant: "The thinking subject is the object of *Psychology*; the sum of all phenomena (the Universe) is the object of *Cosmology*; and the entity, which as the supreme condition of the possibility of all that can be thought, embraces (as the Being of all beings) the object of all *Theology*. Pure reason furnishes consequently the idea of a transcendental-rational-*Psychology*; the idea of a transcendental-rational-*Cosmology*; finally, also the idea of a transcendental *Theology*."²

Cosmology Rational, the Philosophy of Nature, the doctrine concerning the world, the first part of special Metaphysics, embraces the questions concerning the Universe as in time and space: Matter, the mechanical, the inorganic and organic: the nature, reality and contingency of the World: Casualism, Emanation, Pantheism, origin, antiquity, perfection, and end of the world: Laws of Nature: Elements: Monadology, Dynamism, Atomism: Natural and Supernatural effects: Teleology, Miracles, Providence, Optimism: Immortality. Jos. Beck,³ F. H. A. Von Humboldt,⁴ Liberatore,⁵ Rothenflue,⁶ G. E. Schulze,⁷ Stöckl,⁸ Tongiorgi.⁹

COSMONOMY, science of the laws of the cosmos.

COSMOPLASTIC, Cosmos-forming. Hallywell: "Seneca . . no better than a *Cosmoplastic* Atheist, *i. e.*, he made a certain plastic or spermatick nature, devoid of all animality or conscious intellectuality, to be the highest principle in the Universe."¹⁰

COSMOS (Gr. *Kosmos*, order, form), the World or Universe, from its perfect order and arrangement, opposed to the *indigesta moles* of chaos, first in Philosophy of Pythagoras. The Stoics used it also of the *Anima Mundi* and of the Universe as itself divine.

¹ *Logica*, §§ 77, 78. *Cosmologia*, § 1, 4. ² *Critik der rein. Vernunft*, Fünft. Aufl., 1799, 391, 574. ³ *Enc. d. Theoretisch. Philosoph.*, §§ 338-365. ⁴ *Kosmos*, 5 vols., 1845-62. ⁵ *Institut. Philosoph.*, ii. 9-96. ⁶ *Institut. Philosoph. Theoret.*, ii. 1-100. ⁷ *Grundr. d. Philosoph. Wissenschaften*, ii. 323-428. ⁸ *Lehrb. d. Philosophie*, Vierte Aufl., 1876; ii. §§ 120-138. ⁹ *Institutiones Philosophicæ*, Ed. Sept. 1875; ii. 198-420. ¹⁰ *Metampronea*, 1681, 84.

COSMOTHEISM, deification of the cosmos; the system which identifies God and the cosmos. One form of it is Pantheism; another is presented in Strauss's Old Faith and New Faith.

COSMOTHEOLOGY, a system which deduces from the facts presented in the cosmos, arguments and illustrations bearing on the existence and attributes of God. Hence *Cosmotheological*.

COSMOTHETIC (Gr. positing a cosmos, or external world), applied by Hamilton¹ to the Idealism which seeks to explain and establish the existence of an external world, which it denies to be given in consciousness.

COURAGE.—See **Fortitude**.

***CRANIOLOGY**, (see **Phrenology**,) theory of the cranium as a key to the mind.—C. F. V.

***CRANIOSCOPY**.—See **Organ**.

CRASIS, mingling of elements in the human constitution.—Glanville. L. J.

CRASSNESS (grossness).—Glanville.²

***CREATION** (Ger. *Schöpfung*).

CREATIONISM, the doctrine of the *Creationists*—the theory of Aristotle that the souls of men are immediately created by God—opposed to *Traducianism*. Some hold that this took place at the original creation of all things; others that it is a successive creation. Both hold that these souls are united with the fœtus, either at conception, or at some period (forty days) after.

CREATURE, an entity which has come into existence by divine power.—Wolf.³

CREATURELINESS (Ger. "*Geschöpflichkeit*," Tauler), the condition and relation of a created being.

***CREDULITY** (Ger. *Leichtgläubigkeit*), a disposition to believe without evidence.—C. F. V.

CRETINISM (Fr.), condition of a *Cretin*; one of the lowest grades of idiocy.—Stöckl.⁴

***CRITERION** (*Criterion*), all means proper to judge. More properly, a test of certainty.—C. F. V. See Stöckl.⁵

¹ *Discussions*, 61, 192. ² *Pre-exist. of Souls*, 118. L. J. ³ *Theolog. Naturalis*, § 777.
⁴ *Lehrbuch*, i., § 41. ⁵ *Lehrb. d. Philosophie*, i., §§ 80, 81.

CRITICAL IDEALISM.—See **Idealism**.

***CRITICK, CRITICISM, CRITIQUE, CRITICAL METH-
OD**, also styled the Propædæutic—preliminary exercise, training to Philosophy, General Phenomenology—opposed to *Dogmatism* and *Scepticism*. “It is the name given to the investigation of the faculty of Reason, whether pure Cognition *a priori* rises from it, how it is possible, what it is, and what is its compass, and whether the objects of experience solely, or besides these, suprasensuous objects can be cognized by it.”—Mellin, Kant.¹ “It is used in Germany, as with us, to designate a criticism of any work, but specially employed by Kant as the name of a philosophy attained by critical discrimination of elements of knowledge gathered by experience, from those which are given by the Reason itself, called by him the *Pure Reason*.”—C. F. V

CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (in Kant, Classification of):

I. Doctrine of Elements, Elementary Doctrine: i. *Æsthetics*. ii. Logic: (a) Analytics—1. of Concepts; 2. of Principles: (b) Dialectics—1. Paralogisms; 2. Antinomies; 3. The Ideal of Pure Reason.

II. Doctrine of Method, Methodology. i. Discipline. ii. Canon. iii. Architectonic.—See **Metaphysics, Tabular View**. iv. History of Pure Reason, with reference to Rational Cognition, contemplates: (a) Object—Sensualists (Epicurus), Intellectualists (Plato), or (b) Origin—Empirists (Aristotle, Locke), Idealists, Noologists (Plato, Leibnitz), or (c) Method—Naturalists, Scientific Thinkers, either Dogmatists (Wolf), or Sceptics (Hume). Last of all, the Critical Method (Kant).²—See **Judgment, Critique of; Reason Practical, Critique of**.

CROCODOLINE SYLLOGISM, an illustration of a fallacious dilemma. The crocodile promises to restore a child if the mother will tell the truth as to whether he intends to keep his promise. If she says he does not—if she tells the truth in that—her child will not be restored. If she says he does, the crocodile has only to say he does not, and the mother has not told the truth, and forfeits the child. Some of the an-

¹ *Crit. d. rein. Vernunft*, 860. ² *Crit. d. rein. Vernunft*, 879-882; Melklejohn's Tr., 515-517.

cients put in the mouth of the mother an antistrophe: "If it is the truth that you do not intend to keep the promise, you are bound to return the child because I have spoken the truth. If it is the truth that you intend to keep the promise, you are bound to keep it."—Jos. Beck.¹

CROSS (Division), one in which there is more than one principle of division, and the species in consequence cross each other and produce confusion.—Jevons.²

CRUCIAL TEST, severe and decisive.

CULMINATION, the attaining of the highest point.

CULPABLENESS, in Ethics, blamableness.

CULTURE (Ger. *Bildung*), the process by which the intellectual and moral nature is developed; the result of that process.—On the ideal of culture and war, Lasson, 1868.

CUMULATION (Ger. *Anhäufung*), heaping up; accumulation; opposed to distribution.

***CUMULATIVE** (The Argument), an argument gaining in force by steady increase of evidence as it advances from step to step.—C. F. V.

CUPIDITY, in Ethics, inordinate, lawless longing.

CURIOSITY (Ger. *Neugier*), in Ethics, an ill-regulated desire of knowledge—either a desire to know what we ought not to know, or a desire disproportioned to the value of the object.

CURSORY, hasty; superficial.

CURSUS, a course; applied to a methodical series of studies; to nature in the phenomena and processes conditioned by law.

***CUSTOM** (Ger. *Gewohnheit*).—"Consuetudo. That which is familiar in thought, feeling, or action. That which is common in the practice either of an individual or of society. It is to be carefully distinguished from habit, which is an acquired facility."—C. F. V. See Smith.³

CYCLE, circle; complete round of time or of events. Hence, Cyclic.

CYCLOGNOMIC ART (called the Lullian, from Lullius, its inventor,) arranges the objects of thought in seven concentric circles. The outermost circle embraces substances; the next, accidents; the third, absolute predicates; the fourth, relatives; fifth, virtues; sixth, vices; seventh, questions.—K.

¹ *Logik*, § 284.

² *Less. in Log.*, 105.

³ *Moral Sentiments*, part v., ch. 1.

CYCLOPEAN, like the Cyclopes, gigantic; applied to gigantic erudition, some of which, says Kant, "is Cyclopean in wanting one eye—that of true philosophy."—K.

CYCLOPEDE, CYCLOPEDIA.—See *Encyclopedia*.

*Cynic.

CYNOSURE (Gr., dog's tail).—A bright star, the pole-star, by which the old mariners steered. Logic has been styled the "Cynosure of the mind," and the same title has been claimed for philosophy in general.—K.

CYRENIAN (Philosophy, School), from Cyrene, the place of its establishment, about 380 B. C. See Aristippus, Hedonism, Diogenes Laertius.¹

D, in Logic, mnemonic, marking that the three other figures in syllogism which begin with D, can by conversion be reduced to the first. Darepti, Disamis, Datisi, can be reduced to Darii.—D. P. S.

DABITIS, in Logic, mnemonic word designating one of the indirect modes of the first of the three figures of the Aristotelian syllogism.

DÆDALEAN, labyrinthine, perplexed and involved, from Dædalus, the framer of the labyrinth.—K.

DÆMON, DEMON, a spiritual nature of whatever kind. 1.

It was sometimes applied, by Plato and others, in the plural to distinguish the inferior deities from God, the superior dæmon. Dæmonic in this use is equivalent to divine. 2.

It was commonly used for Genii, beings intermediate between god and men. Diotima, in Plato's *Banquet* (202 D.), is a dæmon. 3. The separate spirits of great men. 4. Of men in general. 5. Of evil spirits, devils, lost angels. In

Hesiod,² the *dæmons* were deified men of the earliest period, distinguished from *heroes*, who belong to the time of the Trojan war. They watch over the actions and interests of men, and move everywhere veiled in the air, and have power to confer wealth. The *dæmons*, in Democritus,³ aerial

¹ II. 92. Yonge's Translat., London, Bohn, 1853, 81-96. ² *Opp. et dios.*, v. 110, 152.

³ *Cicero de Nat. Deor.*, i. 12, 43.

beings, similar to men, rising by chance from the round and fiery atoms of which animal souls are composed, some of them good, some bad, huge enough to encompass the world, subject to decay. They manifest themselves to sight and by voice, reveal the future, and have the attributes assigned in the popular faith to the gods. The views of Epicurus¹ were similar. In Maximus of Tyre, the dæmons correspond in some respects with the Bible conception of guardian angels.² In Plotinus, after deities of two orders, follow the dæmons, as a third class, originating from the soul of the world, intermediate between gods and men, having fellowship with both the intellectual and the sensible world; less spiritual than the gods, less material than men, their essence is "intelligible matter." They assume elementary bodies, work on the visible world, especially on men, to whom they appear, and whose destinies they control. Reason and the sensual in man are dæmonlike, in the two kinds.³ Alcinous had taught that in every element, visible or invisible, there are dæmons, which have everything earthly under their supervision. Porphyry expands the view of Plotinus.⁴ Hence *dæmonolepsy*, or *dæmonoplexy*, the possession by evil spirits. *Dæmonomagic*, magic by the aid of dæmons. *Dæmonomania*, insanity produced by dæmoniac possession. *Dæmonomantia*, prophecy by means of dæmons. There were *Agathodæmons*, who were good spirits; *Cacodæmons*, who were evil spirits.

DÆMON OF SOCRATES (see **Demon**), the something supernatural and divine to which Socrates attributed his illumination.—Xenophon,⁵ Plato,⁶ Lewes.⁷

*Dæmonist.

DÆMONOLOGY, DEMONOLOGY.—1. Science concerning dæmons; discourse or treatise on dæmons. For Bibliography, see Denis-Pinçon-Martonne.⁸ 2. In Kant,⁹ an anthropomorphic mental representation of God. "*Moral Teleology* completes the *physical*, and lays the basis of *Theology*, which, if we had stopped at the *physical Teleology*, would

¹ *Lucretius*, iii. 18, v. 147. *Cicero de Nat. Deorum*, i. 16. ² *Buhle. Gesch. d. neu. Phil.*, i. 669; *Tiedemann Geist. d. Philos.*, iii. 259. ³ *Enneades*, iii. 5, 6. ⁴ *Tiedemann, Geist. d. Philosophie*, iii. 187, 144, 146. ⁵ *Memorab.*, i., i. 2. ⁶ *Apol.*, 40 A; *Theat.*, 151, A; *Euthyd.*, 272, E. ⁷ *Hist. of Philosophy*. ⁸ *Bibliographie Universelle*, s. v. ⁹ *Urtheilskraft*, §§ 86, 89.

have been nothing more than Dæmonology." "The limitation of the reason, as respects the supersensuous, to the conditions of practical use, has these advantages: It prevents Theology from being exaggerated into Theosophy, or being degraded into Dæmonology: Religion does not fall into Theurgy, or into Idolatry."

DARAPTI, in Logic, mnemonic term for first mode of the third figure in Syllogism; two universal affirmatives, with the conclusion a particular affirmative. Da: Every body is divisible. Rap: Every body is a substance. Ti: Therefore some substance is divisible.—See Whately.¹

DARII, in Logic, mnemonic term for the third mode in the first figure; the major a universal affirmative, the minor and conclusion special affirmatives.

DARSTELLUNG, Hypotyposis, exhibition, presentation: bringing into view in the sphere of sense; in the Critical Philosophy the function of the judgment, by which it furnishes to a concept, which it would employ in cognition, a correspondent Intuition; intuitive mode of Representation—in the case of a concept of time or space, *Construction*. It may be *schematic* or *symbolic*, *q. v.* The Faculty itself is called *Darstellungs-Vermögen*.—See Kant.²

DARWINISM, (from Charles Robert Darwin,) a theory of *Development*, involving the doctrines of *Evolution*, the struggle for existence, Natural Selection, the survival of the fittest.

DASEYN.—1. In Kant,³ the absolute position of a thing, existence, actuality, the being (*das Seyn*) of the object exterior to the thought, or in itself.

2. In Hegel, "Being-there-and-then; determinate being; real and definite as opposed to mere or abstract being. To bring a thing into Daseyn is to give it definite being."—See **Existence**. W. Wallace.⁴

***DATA**, facts or postulates from which an inference is drawn.

DATISI, in Logic, mnemonic term for the fourth mode of Syllogism. The major is a universal affirmative, the minor and conclusion particular affirmatives. Da: All who serve God are happy. Ti: Some who serve God are poor. Si: Some who are poor are happy.

¹ *Logic*, ch. 3, § 4. ² *Urtheilskr.*, I., Th. § 80. *Anthropol.*, §§ 241-243. ³ *Rein. Vern.*, 667. ⁴ *Logic of Hegel, Prolegom.*, ch. 28.

DEATH (Ger. *Tod*), the separation of the psychical from the physical: the state which follows that separation.—See Schopenhauer,¹ L. A. Feuerbach,² J. H. Friedrich (1821), F. Richter (1833–44), Klencke (1840), Alexius (1843), Splittgerber (1866).

DECLARATION, in Kant,³ the nominal definition of an arbitrary concept, the reality of which concept depends on empirical conditions, *e. g.*, a flying-machine—opposed to Explication and Exposition. “The German language has but the solitary term *Erklärung* for the words Exposition, Explication, Declaration and Definition. When the concept rests on empirical conditions, the object and its possibility is not established by the arbitrary concept. I do not by means of it know at all that it has an object, and it is better to style my explanation a *declaration* (of my project) than a definition of an object.”

DECOMPOSITION (Ger. *Theilung*), analysis, resolution into elements.

DEDUCE.—See Deduction.

DEDUCTIO AD ABSURDUM, AD IMPOSSIBILE, in Logic, the proof of the falsity of a proposition by the absurdities or impossibilities deducible from it.

***DEDUCTION, DEDUCTIO, DEDUCTIVE REASONING**, in the Critical Philosophy, is transcendental or critical argument—the explanation of the mode in which notions or *a priori* propositions may be referred to objects, or the justification of their objective and universal validity and possibility. “The physical sciences (with Psychology) rest on *induction*.” Kant.⁴

DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES.—See Categories.

*De Facto and De Jure.

***DEFINITION** (*definitio*, to mark out limits).—A definition is a categorical proposition, consisting of two classes or members, *viz.*, a subject defined (*membrum definitum*), and of the defining attributes of the subject, that is, those by which it is distinguished from other things (*membrum definiens*). It must contain the *genus proximum* and the *differentia*. *Est definitio, earum rerum, quæ sunt ejus rei propriæ, quam definire volumus,*

¹ Quoted in Krauth's *Berkeley Prolegom.*, xlii., xxiv. ² *Sämmtliche Werke*, 3d B., 1846–48. ³ *Rein. Vern.*, 757, 758. ⁴ *Rein. Vernunft*, 106–169. *Prolegomena* (Kitchmann), Vol. 7.

brevis et circumscripta quædam explicatio.—Cicero.¹ See Kant,² Hegel.³

DEGREE, grade, amount, extent.—Jevons: "Great care should be taken to avoid confusing terms which express the presence or absence of a quality, with those which describe its degree. Less is not the negative of greater, because there is a third alternative, equal. The rule is, that wherever the question is one of degree or quantity, a medium is possible, and the subject belongs rather to the science of quantity than to simple logic."⁴ "We must carefully distinguish questions of degree or quantity from those of simple logical fact."⁵ In Hegel,⁶ intensive magnitude, the limit as in itself simple determinateness.

DEICTIC (Gr., able to show), in the Aristotelian Logic, direct, ostensive; opposed to the indirect or elenctic, or *reductio ad impossibile*.⁷

DEIFORMITY, conformity with the divine.—Dr. H. More.⁸

DEISIDAIMONY, fear of the gods; religion; superstition.

***DEIST.**—One of the first instances of the use of this word occurs in Vivet,⁹ quoted by Bayle.¹⁰ It is appropriated, in the middle of the seventeenth century, by Herbert to his scheme, and afterwards by Blount,¹¹ to distinguish themselves from Atheists. In strict truth, Herbert calls himself a *Theist*, which slightly differs from the subsequent term *Deist*, in so far as it is intended to convey the idea of that which he thought to be the true worship of God. It is Theism as opposed to error, rather than natural religion as opposed to revealed; whereas Deism always implies a position antagonistic to revealed religion. But the distinction is soon lost sight of; and Nichols (1696) entitles his work against the Deists, *Conference with a Theist*. Towards the close of the seventeenth century, and in the beginning of the eighteenth, the Christian writers sometimes even use Deist as interchangeable with Atheist, as shown above. It is also used as synonymous with one of the senses of the word *Naturalist*.—Farrar.¹²

¹ *De Orat.*, lib. i., cap. 42. ² *Rrin. Vernunft*, 300, 755. ³ *Encyklopädie d. Philosoph. Wissensch.*, § 229. ⁴ *Element. Lessons in Logic*, 24. ⁵ *Do.*, 120. ⁶ *Encyklopädie*, §§ 103-106. ⁷ *Anal. Pr.*, I., xxix. 1. ⁸ *Song of the Soul*, iv. 27. ⁹ *Epist. Dedicat. du 2 vol. de l'Instruction Chrétienne*, 1563. ¹⁰ Note under the word *Vivet*. ¹¹ *Oracles of Reason*, p. 99. ¹² *Bampton Lect.*, p. 587.

DEITY, nature of God; Godhead; God.—Blakey.¹

DEMI-ATHEISM, half Atheism.—Berkeley.²

DEMIGOD, half-god in nature or origin.

***DEMIURGE**, demiurgus.

***DEMON**, and its compounds.—See *Dæmon* and its compounds.

See Paellus (Mich.),³ Jacobus (I. Rex),⁴ Abbe Migne.⁵ Bodinus⁶ speaks of his familiar spirit; and Cardan⁷ does the same. In Stanley⁸ there is a dissertation on the subject.

DEMONSTRABLE, in the Critical Philosophy, applied to a notion or proposition when its corresponding object, whether it be one of pure or of empirical intuition, can be given.—See *Acroamatic*. Thus, the notion of magnitude is demonstrable, for in the *a priori* intuition of space, it can be applied to a right line for example.

***DEMONSTRATION**, ἀποδείξις, in the Critical Philosophy, apodictic, intuitive proof, confined to the mathematics. It is *apodictic*, for it is associated with the consciousness of necessity; it is intuitive, for it is capable of presentation to external perception. In Hegel,⁹ the process of mediation itself, from which cognition derives the necessity of a synthetical nexus.

DENKBARKEIT (Ger., thinkableness).—"Capacity of being thought."—M. T. M.

DENOMINATE, in Logic, to name.—J. S. Mill: "*Connotative* names have been also called *denominative*, because the subject which they denote is *denominated* by or receives an attribute from the name which they connote. The attribute or attributes may therefore be said to *denominate* those objects, or to give them a common name." Hence denominate, denominate; adj., denominative.

DENOMINATION, EXTERNAL.—See *Mode*.

DENOTE, in Logic, to mark, to associate with a sign.—J. S. Mill:

"Proper names are not *connotative*: they *denote* the individuals who are called by them; but they do not indicate or imply any attributes as belonging to those individuals."¹⁰

Hence denotable, denotate, denotative.—See *Connotation*, *Denomination*, *Definition*.

¹ *Hist. of Philosophy*, vol. iv., Index of Subjects, *Deity*. ² *Principles*, § 155. ³ *De Operatione Dæmonum*, 8vo, Paris, 1615. ⁴ *Dæmonologia*, 4to, 1603. ⁵ *Dictionnaire des Sciences Occultes*, 6 tom., Paris, 1846. ⁶ In his *Demonology*, (Paris, 1587.) ⁷ *De Vita Propria*. ⁸ *Hist. of Phil.*, fol., Lond., 1761. ⁹ *Encyclopædie*, § 231. ¹⁰ *System of Logic*, b. i., ch. 3, § 6.

***DEONTOLOGY**, theory of duty.—C. F. V. “Bentham’s view might more properly be styled *Ophelimology*. The genuine *Deontology* might also be named *Cathecontology*.”—Krug.

DEPENDANCE, DEPENDENCE, DEPENDANCY (Ger. *Abhängigkeit*), in Metaphysics, the relation of sequence to its ground, of effect or operation to its cause. That which could not be were there not some other thing, is dependent on that thing—*ens dependens*, *ens ab alio*. Dependence may be 1. Logical. 2. Metaphysical. 3. Psychological. 4. Physical, in the natural world. 5. Moral. 6. Social, involving the political.

***DESIGN** (*designo*, to mark out), (Ger. *Absicht*).—Adaptation of means to ends. The evidence of design consists in the marks found in objects or in the course of events, of adaptation to the attainments of definite results. A philosophical theory of such evidence is named Teleology (*τέλος*, end, and *λόγος*, discourse), the theory of ends, awkwardly named “final causes.”—C. F. V.

Design.—For Kant’s criticism of the argument from design as, at the most, proving only an architect of the universe, and thereby driving us back on something more than the testimony of experience, see **Critique of Pure Reason**.¹—C. F. V. See **Cause (Final)**.

***DESIRE** (Ger. *Begierde*, *Verlangen*).—“Craving; uneasiness from sense of want, and longing for satisfaction.”—C. F. V.

DESTINATION (of **Man**), (Ger. *Bestimmung des Menschen*), in Ethics, the supreme aim of man’s life and work.—Mendelssohn: “It is the vocation and destination given to us alone, by the author of our being, to be upright, and to be happy in our uprightness, to follow truth, to love beauty, to desire good and to do the best, to be devout and to be beneficent.”

***DESTINY** (Ger. *Schicksal*).

DETERMINATION, constant direction to a certain end; mental decision contemplating action; the fixing of limitations or bounds of activity. It is called *effective*, when it proceeds from an efficient cause; *moral*, when the cause is moral, operative by the laws of personal, free agency.

¹ *Transcendental Dialectic*, ch. 3; Meiklejohn’s Transl., p. 370. *Werke*, Rosenkranz, II. 470.

***DETERMINISM, PREDETERMINISM**, in Metaphysics, the system which regards the operations of the will as necessarily determined by causes antecedent; the motive is an irresistible motor; there is no proper self-determination, as the Indeterminists maintain. The theory that all our volitions are determined by the force of motives within, which motives produce their results as invariably as physical forces effect their ends. Determinism is the name more recently preferred by the upholders of this theory of will to the earlier designation—Necessitarianism.—C. F. V.

DEVELOPMENT (Fr.; Ger. *Entwicklung*), the freeing from cover or constraint; the unfolding in an unbroken sequence of cause and effect; growth from the idea toward the end. It may be logical or physical—see Owen;¹ intellectual, moral, or social.—J. K. Passavant (1835), Buisson (1859), Geiger (1871).

DIACRITIC, DIACRITICAL, separating; **DIACRITICS**, the art of making and marking distinctions.

DIÆRESIS, DIERESIS, in Logic, the division of a notion; the negation, in a negative judgment, as separating the predicate from the subject.

DIÆTETICS, the doctrine concerning intellectual nutrition and health.—Beskow,² Feuchtersleben.³

DIALANTHANON, in Logic, the concealing; a form of sophistry, like the veiled.

DIALECTIC (*Dialektik*), a philosophy worked out by the dialectic or rationalizing process from assumed premises. This stands in contrast with a philosophy which starts with observation and analysis of facts, such as inductive psychology. Spinoza's philosophy is a dialectic, from postulated definitions; Hegel's philosophy is a dialectic founded on the law of the evolution of dialectic thought.—C. F. V. In Kant,⁴ the logic of illusion; general logic as an assumed organon. The *Διαλεκτική* of Plato was the method of analysis by means of language, and comprised the field which his successor Aristotle separated into two, viz., *Διαλεκτική*, logic, the inquiry concerning method; and *Σοφία*, metaphysics, the inquiry concerning being.—Farrar.⁵

¹ *Comparat. Anatomy*, lect. xxiv. ² From the Swedish, *Prædilectus*, 1868; *Svenskan*, 1869. ³ 36th ed., 1872. ⁴ *Rein. Vern.*, 85–88, 349–354. ⁵ *Bampton Lect.*, p. 108.

***DIALECTICS.**—Aristotle says there are two kinds, *διαλεκτικῶν λόγων*, viz., *Ἐπαγωγή καὶ συλλογισμὸς*—induction and deduction.—C. F. V. See Chlebig (1869), E. V. Hartman (1868).

DIALLEL (Gr., through one another), in Logic, the argument in a circle; in the ancient scepticism, cognition itself, as doomed to move in a circle of unproved postulates.

DIAMOND-NET, a term used by both Seelye and Stirling to translate "*diamantenes Netz*" in Schwegler's¹ account of Hegel. *Adamantine* would be as literal, and corresponds better with the English associations with the term. "The shadows of the realms of logic are the simple essences freed from all sensuous materialization—essences within whose adamantine net the whole universe is built."

DIANOETIC, in Metaphysics, pertaining to the *dianoia*, which Hamilton characterizes as the "discursive, elaborative, or comparative faculty."

DIANOIAGONY (Gr., Understanding-begetting), the doctrine concerning intellectual generation. Absolute Idealism, which explains all the objects of perception as ideas begotten of the mind, has been styled a *dianoia*gonic theory.—K.

***DIANOIOLOGY, DIANOIALOGY**, science of the *dianoetic*, Logic.

DIAPHONY (Gr. discord), in the History of Philosophy, used by the ancient Sceptics to characterize the conflict of the various systems.

DIAPHORIC (Gr., pertaining to difference), in Logic, applied to the Aristotelian *diaphora*, the *differentia* of species; species.

DIAPORETIC (Gr., doubting, perplexed), in History of Philosophy, applied to the Sceptics.

DIATHEISIS (Gr., arrangement), in Metaphysics, disposition.—Aristotle.²

DIATRIBE (Gr.), a discussion, argument.

DIBATIS, in Logic, a mnemonic term, which marks the fourth mode of the fourth figure in Syllogism. The major is particular affirmative; the minor, universal affirmative; the conclusion, particular affirmative. Thus, Di: Some fools tell the truth; Ba: All who tell the truth we must believe; Ti: Some fools we must believe. This mode is called the Galenian.—See *Dabitis*.

¹ *Gesch. d. Philosophie*, § 45, 1.

² *Metaphys.*, iv. 19.

DICHOLGY, the same as Dichotomy.

***DICHOTOMY**, hence Dichotomist (Bacon), dichotomize.

DICTATE, authoritative rule, prescription.

DICTION, SOPHISM OF, (*sophisma dictionis*, or fallacy of the figure of diction; *fallacia figuræ dictionis*,) a sophism based on the double sense of a word.

***DICTION DE OMNI ET NULLO**, called also *Dictum de Diverso et Exemplo*.

DICTION DE RECIPRICO, in Logic, the principle of conversion, or of conclusion to the converse. If no organic being is inanimate, no inanimate thing is an organic being.—See *Enthymeme*.

**Dictum Simpliciter*.

DIDACTICS, a division of *Pædagogics*; the art of instruction.

DIDACTRA, the teacher's fee. It was exacted by the Sophists, but was not received by Socrates, who however did not refuse the purely voluntary presents of articles of necessity from his wealthier pupils.

DIDASCALIC, DIDACTIC, applied by Aristotle to Syllogisms which were meant to attain scientific cognition, the apodictic or demonstrated Syllogisms.

DIETETICS.—See *Diætics*.

***DIFFERENCE, DIFFERENTIA**.—Animal and stone are generically different; Highflyer and Eclipse are numerically or individually different.—F. V. 3.

DIFFERENTIATION, in Logic, distinguishing by difference.

DIFFORMITY, difference of form.

***DILEMMA**.—See *Antistrephon*, *Cornute*, *Crocodoline*, *Pentalemma*, *Polylemma*, *Tetralemma*, *Trilemma*. See *Atwater*.¹

DIMENSION (Ger. *Mass*), measured extension; in time, measured length; in space, length, breadth, and depth. See *Whewell*.²

DISAMIS, in Logic, mnemonic term for the third mode of Syllogism in the third figure. The major is a particular, the minor a general, the conclusion a particular affirmative. Di: Some good men are poor. Sa: All good men are happy. Mis: Some happy men are poor.

DISCERNIBLE, capable of being distinguished.

¹ *Logic*, ch. 5, sect. ix.

² *History of Scientific Ideas*, B. II., ch. 8, arts. 4, 5.

DISCIPLINAL PHILOSOPHY.—Used by Crusius to mark contingent and practical verities, over against metaphysics, as embracing necessary and theoretic truths.

DISCIPLINE (Lat.).—1. A branch of scientific knowledge. 2. Training. 3. The means of training.

DISCONFORMABLE, lacking conformity; not in unison.—J. S. Mill: "Facts previously unheard of, but which could not from any known law of causation be pronounced impossible, are what Hume characterizes as not contrary to experience, but merely unconformable to it; and Bentham, in his treatise on evidence, denominates them facts disconformable in specie, as distinguished from such as are disconformable in toto or in degree."¹

***DISCOVERY.**—See **Invention**.

DISCRETE, distinct; **DISCRETION**, distinctness.—Hegel, under Quantity, in the Doctrine of Being, in Logic: "In so far as the *magnitude* contains many units, as distinguishable in it, it is a discrete, or the moment of discretion pertains to it."—Schwegler.²

DISCURSIVE, of or pertaining to discursus, or reason.—Sir M. Hale: "There hath been much dispute touching the knowledge of brutes, whether they have a kind of discursive faculty, which some call reason." "We have a principle within, whereby we think, and know we think; whereby we do discursively, and by way of ratiocination deduce one thing from another."³ Milton:⁴

"The soul

Reason receives, and reason is her being,
Discursive or intuitive."

Discursive, in the Critical Philosophy, marks the acroamatic, dogmatic, philosophic in knowledge over against intuition (in Kant's sense).—A discursive notion embraces the general in a conception; is a product of the understanding; is related to an object by a mark common to several things. Discursive judgments rest on evidence derived from pure notions, without direct intuition.—L.

***DISCURSUS**, a reasoning process.—C. F. V.

DISJUNCTIVE, in Logic, marking alternative.—A *disjunctive*

¹ *System of Logic*. ² § 45, I., 1, b. ³ *Origination of Mankind*. ⁴ *Paradise Lost*, v. 486.

proposition is when the parts are opposed to one another by disjunctive particles—either, or. A *disjunctive syllogism* is when the major proposition is disjunctive. It is founded on the principle of excluded middle.—Atwater,¹ Watts.²

DISPARATA, DISPARATE, in Logic, incapable of being paired or associated as a common notion. The rational and animal are disparate notions; they exclude each other as notions; they are logical opposites, though they can be joined in the complex subject, man.

***DISPOSITION**, commonly, an inclination of our nature towards certain objects, which prompts to action. It is applied sometimes to particular motive forces, sometimes to a general characteristic of the nature.—C. F. V.

DISTANCE, measure of external space.—Berkeley,³ Ueberweg.⁴
*Distinction.

DISTINGUISHABLE, characterized by discernible differences.
—Herbert Spencer: "Wherever the terms of the comparison are both elementary."

DISTRIBUTED.—See **Distribution**, §§ 2, 3.

*Distribution.

***DITHEISM**, theory of two gods or co-eternal beings.—C. F. V.

DIVERSA, diverse things.—In Logic, notions or things which are incapable of mutual substitution. Notions are logically diverse, things are really diverse. The logical *diversa* may be totally diverse, either *per se* or accidentally, or may be partly diverse.

DIVERSITY, character of the *diversa*.—Locke: "Considering anything as existing at any determined time and place, we compare it with itself existing at another time, and thereon form the ideas of identity and diversity."

DIVIDUAL, divisible; divided with others.

DIVISIBILITY, capability of separation or of reduction to parts.

DIVISIBILITY, INFINITE, OF MATTER.—The theory that there is no final reduction of the parts of matter, no product of division which is not itself capable of further division; that the mental process by which thinking *one* necessarily involves thinking *halves*, has a correspondent fact in every case of concrete application. There are three theories on

¹ *Logic*, ch. 5, § 8. ² *Logick*, p. lli., ch. 2, § 5, p. 298. ³ *Principles*, §§ 42, 43. ⁴ *Notes on Berkeley's Principles* (Krauth's Translat.), 54, 55.

this question : 1. The Atomistic—which maintains that there are ultimate indivisibles, such at least in fact, if not in thought. 2. The Monadic—matter is divisible till we reach the individual monads; then the phenomena of matter vanish. 3. The Critical—matter is infinitely divisible, but does not consist either of a finite or infinite number of parts, inasmuch as parts are intuited, become objects of sense, only after division.

*Division.

***DIVORCE**.—See Milton.¹

DOCESISOPHY, in the Platonic philosophy, conceit of wisdom.

DOCIMASTIC, in the Greek philosophy, proving by test.

DOCTRINARIANISM, system of the Doctrinaires, who applied to practical matters the principles of their philosophy. In France they considered the state as a fellowship of citizens. From Royer-Collard, the most distinguished of the original Doctrinaires, they were sometimes styled Collardists.

DOGMA (Gr.), that which seems true; an opinion; an ordinance; a principle; Lat. *decretum*, *placitum*; in the Stoical system, axiom, or premises, “a formulated truth or article of belief.”—C. F. V. Kant defines dogma as dogmatic judgment, a directly synthetic judgment derived from notions. It is distinct :

1. From analytic judgments which, strictly speaking, add nothing to our knowledge, as the predicate is embraced in the notion of the subject.

2. From principles derived from experience, which have no apodictic certitude.

3. From mathematical propositions, that is, from synthetic judgments formed on the construction of notions.

4. From axioms, that is, indirect synthetic apodictic judgments, as, for example, the principle of the sufficient reason.

The speculative, pure reason has no dogmas, inasmuch as ideas have no constitutive objective reality; nor has it a dogmatic method.²

DOGMATICAL, in the critical system, “that which takes upon itself the execution of the task of metaphysics, without an antecedent testing of the ability or inability of reason to execute so great a work with success.”—Kant.³

¹ *Doctrine of Divorce*. ² *Crit. d. rein. Vernunft, Fünft. Auflage*, 1799, 764. ³ *Crit. d. rein. Vern.*, 7, 22.

DOGMATICAL PROCESS.—See Dogmatism, in the Critical Philosophy.

***DOGMATISM**, the affirmation of a principle or dogma as true, without evidence sufficient to sustain it.—C. F. V.

Dogmatism, in the Critical Philosophy.—Kant: “The critical system is not opposed to the dogmatic process of the reason in its pure cognition, as science (for this must always be dogmatic, that is, must be strictly demonstrative on sure *a priori* principles), but it is opposed to dogmatism, that is, the assumption of being able to advance, with a pure cognition derived from philosophical notions, in accordance with principles which reason has long had in use, without investigating the mode in which she has reached them, and the right by which she uses them. Dogmatism, therefore, is the dogmatic process of the pure reason without an antecedent criticism of its own ability.”¹

***DOUBT** (*dubito*, to go two ways; Ger. *Zweifel*).—“Either indecision or absence of dogmatic conclusion upon a subject; or, more positively, an affirmation that a dogmatic conclusion is unattainable.” For the Cartesian Doubt, see Descartes.²—C. F. V. “There is a great difference,” says Malebranche,³ “between *doubting* and *doubting*. We doubt through passion and brutality; through blindness and malice, and finally through fancy, and from the very wish to doubt; but we doubt also from prudence and through distrust, from wisdom and through penetration of mind. The former doubt is a doubt of darkness, which never issues to the light, but leads us always farther from it; the latter is a doubt which is born of the light, and which aids in a certain sort to produce light in its turn.” Philosophy, according to Aristotle,⁴ is the art of doubting well.

DRASTIC, in Platonic usage, vigorous, active, efficacious.⁵

***DREAMING, DREAM** (Ger. *Traum*), “the play of thought, feeling, and fancy during physical repose in sleep.”—C. F. V.

***DUALISM, DUALITY**, any affirmation of dual or twofold principles.—“A theory of duality of being or force (1) as to the origin of the world, in opposition to monotheism; (2) as

¹ *Crit. d. raïn. Vernunft*, Vor. xxxv. ² *Method*, part ii. ³ *Recherche de la Vérité*, liv. i., cap. 20, sec. 3. ⁴ *Metaph.*, ii. 1. ⁵ *Legib.*, 815, A.

to the essential difference of mind and matter in the universe in opposition to materialism."—C. F. V.

Dualism, anthropological, affirms that there are in man two principles—one spiritual, the other corporeal.

Dualism, empirical, the system which accepts the diversity and opposition of the two principles only as they are brought into consciousness; holds them to be mere phenomena. Hence, empirical dualist.

Dualism, transcendental, is the system which regards the antitheses as objectively true, as things in themselves. Hence, transcendental dualists.—See **Monism**.

DUALIST, one who holds any form of dualism.—In the Wolfian Rational Psychology, one who admits the existence of both material and immaterial substances; that is, grants to bodies a real existence apart from ideas, and defends the immateriality of the soul.—See **Dogmatists**.¹

DUALITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS is employed by Sir William Hamilton² to denote the fact that in perception we are immediately conscious of an *ego* and a *non-ego*, known together and known in contrast to each other. "In this act I am conscious of myself as the perceiving subject, and of an external reality as the object perceived; and I am conscious of both existences in the same indivisible moment of intuition. The knowledge of the subject does not precede nor follow the knowledge of the object—neither determines, neither is determined by the other."

DUBITATION, doubt (Ger. *Zweifel*).

DUEL (Ger. *Zweikampf*), in Ethics, fight between two; a preconcerted fight between two persons, with weapons, for the satisfaction of an injury, real or imaginary.—De Wette.³

DUPLICITY, in Ethics, doubleness; covert falsity of words or acts.

***DURATION** (Ger. *Dauer*).—It may be absolute, infinite, or eternal; relative, finite, as, longer or shorter.

***DUTY** (Ger. *Pflicht*), in Ethics, "Oughtness or obligedness to act in accordance with moral law. It is uniform for all in what law forbids; special and variable for individuals in what it requires. For Kant's celebrated address to Duty, see

¹ *Psych. Rational*, §§ 30, 43.

² *Metaph.*, lect. xvi.

³ *Stellenlehre*, II. 2, § 117.

*Kritik der Pract. Vernunft.*¹—C. F. V. "Duty is every moral necessity, of whatever kind, and whatever may be the object to which it is directed. It must be simply moral necessity, without reference to some other thing which binds us to render it."—Eberhard. "Duty is the necessity of an action arising from respect to law."—Kant. Duties are universal, special, and individual. They are also divided into duties of justice, which imply a perfect right and just claim on the part of those to whom they are performed, and duties of benevolence or love; into internal, moral, perfect, and imperfect. The doctrine of duty (*Pflichtenlehre*) forms a part of Ethics. To Fleming's statement, "There is a complete synthesis between *rectitude* and *obligation*," Calderwood adds a ?.

DYADIC, consisting of two.—See **Monad** and **Pythagoras**.

DYASM, dualism.

DYNAMIC, DYNAMICAL, relating to force; "having the property of force."—C. F. V. In the Critical Philosophy, applied in general to anything as it is regarded not in its magnitude in sense-presentation, but with reference to the ground of its existence.

Dynamical Categories are notions of the understanding in which a dynamic synthesis attains unity; a dynamical relation is thought as universal; as, for example, causality, necessity.

Dynamical Connection (*Gemeinschaft*) real, is a connection in which there is a reciprocal influence. It is in antithesis to local connection, or mere coexistence.

Dynamical Distribution is the distribution of one substance among several substances.

Dynamical Ideas, notions of the reason which rest on dynamical categories.

Dynamical Natural Philosophy, the antithesis to the mechanical or the atomistic. It derives the specific diversities from attraction and repulsion as primary motory forces.

Dynamical Principles are judgments which express the conditions under which we may subsume the phenomena under dynamic categories. They are laws of nature.

¹ *Werke*, Rosen., viii.; Semple's Trans., 1st ed., p. 130; 2d. ed. (Calderwood), p. 120.

Dynamical Probability, in Logic, involves that it is the force of arguments, not their number, which renders them weighty.

Dynamical Relations are those which arise from dynamical synthesis; as, for example, the relation of accident to substance, of cause to effect. They are opposed to ideal relations, which simply involve comparison.

Dynamical Sublime, in Kant's *Analytic of Æsthetic Judgment*, quantity or magnitude of power—opposed to the mathematical sublime, quantity or magnitude of extension.—Schwegler-Stirling.¹

Dynamical Synthesis, is that in which the things associated necessarily belong to each other, but need not be homogeneous, as they do not together involve, as in mathematics, a *quantum* or magnitude. Such, for example, is the synthesis of a cause with its effect. This synthesis is also styled a *nexus*, and is either physical or metaphysical. It is physical, when the phenomena are united among themselves. It is metaphysical, when they are united *a priori* in the cognitive faculty.

DYNAMICS, doctrine or theory of force or forces.

Dynamics Social, in Comte, is “the theory of society considered in a state of progressive movement.”—Mill.²

*Dynamism.

E, in Logic, 1. marks universal negatives in Syllogisms; 2. in complex and modal propositions the affirmation of the mode and the negation of the proposition.—Aristotle,³ Port Royal Logic.⁴

***ECLECTICISM, ECLECTIC PHILOSOPHY (ECLECTICS).**

—See **Syncretism**. “A philosophic theory constructed by selection and combination from conflicting schemes of thought.”—C. F. V. See Jouffroy,⁵ Plotinus and Proclus, Royer-Collard, Cousin.

***ECONOMICS** (Ger. *Haushaltungskunst, Hauswirthschaft, Oekon-*

¹ § 38, iii., 1, a. ² *Logic*. ³ *Anal. Prot.* ⁴ Part II., chaps. iii., iv., viii.; T. S. Baynes's Translat., 7th edition, 113, 114, 120. ⁵ *Essays transl. by Ripley*.

omik), "the science of those laws which provide for increase of comfort in the distribution and saving of what is produced."—C. F. V.

***ECSTASY** (Ger. *Entzückung*).

ECTYPAL, of the **Ectype**, copies of the original.

ECTYPE (Gr.), literally, worked in high relief; formed from a mould, a cast; hence a copy, not so much *from* an original, as a copy produced *by* the original, such as the impression of a seal, a coin. The original is the type, archetype, or prototype; the copy is the ectype. Locke, treating of "real and fantastical ideas," shows that "real ideas are conformable to their archetypes," that "simple ideas are *ἔκτυπα*, or copies, but yet certainly adequate," and that "the complex ideas of substances are ectypes, copies too, but not perfect ones, not adequate."¹

***EDUCATION** (Ger. *Erziehung*).—See **Pædagogics**.

Education of the Human Race (Ger. *Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts*), used by Lessing to express the aim and results of the divine providence and government of the world.

EDUCT, used by Kant² to mark one form of the theory of pre-established harmony, "which may consider each organic thing generated by its like, as either an educt or a product. The system which holds that they are educts may be styled the system of individual preformation, or the theory of evolution; the system which maintains that they are products may be called the system of epigenesis, or generic preformation. In antithesis to this we might call the system of educts one of involution." Kant holds that organic beings are not educts, but products.

***EFFECT** (Ger. *Wirkung*), the principiated, correspondent with cause as the principium, the principle. "No effect is without a cause." "Whatever is in the effect must previously in some sense have been in the cause, to wit, either formally, virtually, or by eminence." "The effect is proportioned to the cause."

EFFICIENCY, having the power of producing effects.—Mill.³

EFFICIENT, adj., producing effects, operative causally. 1. Opposed to Final. 2. Opposed to Metaphysical.—Mill.⁴

¹ *Human Understanding*, Book II., ch. xxx., xxxi. ² *Urtheilskraft*, II., § 81. ³ *Logic*, iii. 5, 9. ⁴ *Logic*, iii. 5-9.

Efficient, subs., operative cause.

EFFLUVIUM, EFFLUVIA (Lat. flowing out), the object of perception in smell.—Hamilton,¹ Reid.

***EGO** (self).

Ego, the, in Des Cartes, was regarded as the surest, and hence the supremest, element of cognition, and that part of our nature in virtue of which we stand in immediate relation to the Deity.

Ego, the, in Fichte, is regarded as that of which consciousness is the product; the absolute or pure Ego brings forth or construes consciousness. The pure Ego is absolute activity which posits itself ($A = A$. Ego is Ego), and counterposits to itself a non-ego (object). Ego is all that is. In the later form of his philosophy, Fichte "attempts to transform his subjective idealism into objective pantheism, or the Ego of his earlier philosophy into the absolute, into the notion of God."²

Ego, the, in Herbart, assumes that Fichte's Ego involves a contradiction. The Ego is an entity, a definite being, endowed with many attributes. Mutable in its state, the sense of personality (*Ichheit*) is begotten of existing conceptions, where there is sufficient occasion. The Central-Real, the substance of the Ego, is the soul.—Zeller.³

Ego, the, in Hume, a complex of successive ideas, with an imaginary substance beneath it.

Ego, the, in Kant, is that whose activity is the condition of all consciousness, and from which arises all cognition by the "Synthesis of Apperceptions." The conception of the Ego is the product and object of the pure activity of consciousness, the consciousness of consciousness grasping itself in its activity. "The dualism of Kant represents the Ego now as theoretical Ego in subjection to the external world, and now as practical Ego in superiority to it; in other words, now as receptive and now as spontaneous, in regard of objectivity."⁴

Ego, the, in Schelling, the ultimate ground of knowledge, the principle of philosophy.⁵

Ego, Self-Positing of the, in Fichte, (Formula of.)—I. The

¹ Reid's Works, 101, n. ² Schwegler-Stirling, XLI., II. ³ Gesch. d. deutsch. Philos., 853. ⁴ Schwegler-Stirling, xxxix. 3. ⁵ Vom Ich als Princ. d. Philosophie, 1796.

Ego posits primarily simply its own being: A is A, *Ego* is *Ego*. II. The *Ego* counterposits to itself a *Non-Ego*: Non-A is not A, *Non-Ego* is not *Ego*. III. The *Ego* counterposits to the divisible *Ego* a divisible *Non-Ego*, in which act lies the double result: 1. *Theoretical*. The *Ego* posits itself as limited or determined by the *Non-Ego*. 2. *Practical*. The *Ego* posits the *Non-Ego* as limited and determined by the *Ego*. Thus is furnished the essential character of cognition and volition.—Stöckl,¹ Zeller.²

***EGOISM, EGOITY, EGOMISM, EGOIST**, relate to the theory that self-existence is the only certainty.—C. F. V.

EGOTISM, in Anthropology and Ethics, excessive self-esteem, shown by constant reference, though often covert, to oneself.—Kant:³ “Egotism may involve three sorts of pretension—pretensions of the understanding, of the taste, and of the practical interest—that is, it may be logical, æsthetic, or practical. The *logical egotist* considers it useless to submit his judgment to be tested by others, as though he had no need whatever of a touchstone of that sort. The *æsthetic egotist* is entirely satisfied with his own taste. It matters not to him that his verses, his pictures, his music seem detestable or ridiculous to others. He makes an advance in his taste impossible, isolates himself by his judgment, and seeks the touchstone of the beautiful in his own taste. The *moral egotist* concentrates all his aims on himself. Nothing is useful, except as it is useful to him. His supreme motive is not duty, but his own welfare. All Eudæmonists are practical egotists. The only thing which can be successfully opposed to egotism is *Pluralism*,” q. v.

EIMARMENE (Gr.), destiny, fate, q. v.

ELABORATIVE, applied to the faculty which operates upon the materials furnished by the presentative, conservative, and reproductive faculties—the discursive faculty; comparison; the faculty of relation.—Hamilton.⁴

ELASTICITY, (ELASTIC), (Fr.; Ger. *Federkraft*), the property of bodies, the form of reciprocal force which causes them to return to or toward their former dimension and shape, after alteration by stretching or by compression. A gum-elastic

¹ *Lehrb. d. Gesch. d. Philosophie*, § 159, 9, 10. ² *Gesch. d. Deutsch. Philos.*, 604-607.

³ *Anthropologie*, § 2. ⁴ *Metaphysics*, lect. xx. 5.

string illustrates the former, *attractive E.*; a gum-elastic ball the latter, *expansive E.*—Newton,¹ Kant.²

ELATER (Gr.), driver; applied by Kant³ to the springs, incitements, or motives of the pure, practical reason.

ELATION (Lat.), lifting up; exaltation; intense feeling; haughtiness.—Reid.⁴

ELEATICISM, system of the Eleatics, of the school of Xenophanes, in Ella, in Lower Italy (B. C. 540–460); reaching after a unity transcending the empirical, and finding it in idealistic pantheism.

***ELECTION** (Ger. *Wahl*), “properly, voluntary choice among objects presented or means at our command.”—C. F. V.

***ELEMENT** (Ger. *Elemente, Urmaterie, Grundstoff, Urstoff*), “an original constituent of material existence, or, more generally, an inherent property of an object, or an essential part of a question under discussion.”—C. F. V. The individual element of a body is an *Atom*, *q. v.*

ELEMENTARY CONCEPT or **NOTION** (Ger. *Elementar-begriff*), in Kant, an undeduced concept or notion, one which cannot be referred to one more simple. Such elementary concepts are the Categories, the Concepts of Reflection, the Quantitative Unities, the Unity of the Primary Synthetical Apperception.⁵

Elementary doctrine (Ger. *Elementarlehre*), in Kant, doctrine of elements, the investigation in regard to the elements, or constituent parts of all our cognition, as such, whether the objects of it pertain to speculation, will, or judgment.⁶ The Critique of pure reason is divided into I. Transcendental Doctrine of Elements. II. Transcendental Doctrine of Method.

Elementary forces (Ger. *Elementarkräfte*). 1. The primary forces of nature.—See **Elementary spirits**. 2. Elementary functions of the mind.

Elementary functions, the primary or chief activities of the mind, such as thinking and willing.

Elementary Logic, in Kant, universal logic, universal doctrine of reason, formal logic, formal philosophy, embracing

¹ *Philosoph. Nat. Princip. Mathem.*, L. II., prop. 23, *Optic*; L. III., Q. xxxi. ² *Met. Anf. d. Naturlehre*, II., II. 1; iv. 1. ³ *Praktisch. Vernunft* (Kirchmann), 86. ⁴ *Works* (Hamilton), 576. ⁵ *Critik d. rein. Vernunft*, 89, transl. by Meiklejohn, 54, 55. ⁶ *Crit. d. rein. Vernunft*, 29; Meiklejohn's Trans., 18.

the absolutely necessary laws of thought, the laws apart from which the understanding is incapable of exercise.

Elementary parts, the primary constituents, the main parts, whether of an entity or of a concept.

Elementary Philosophy, the philosophy involving the primary elements, the fundamental parts of doctrine and science, elementary science.

Elementary propositions, statements of the primary or of the supreme principles of a science.

Elementary spirits, in the mystic, cabalistic philosophy, the elements personified: spirits of the earth, or Gnomes; spirits of the water, Undines; spirits of the air, Sylphs; spirits of the fire, Salamanders.

Elementary substance, the primary substance in a compound, that which results from an ultimate decomposition, a simple.

***ELEMENTOLOGY**.—See **Methodology**. **Logic**.

ELEMENTS, in Empedocles, four imperishable, eternal, self-subsistent, mutually inderivative, but divisible primal forms of substance—what we now call the four elements. E. in the Platonic Physics are two—the ideal world as the eternal archetype, and the chaotic mass which holds within it the germs of the material world.

ELENCH, ELENCHUS, from the Greek.—A means of testing, convincing or refuting; an argument of disproof or refutation; a testing, examining, scrutiny, especially for purposes of a disproof or refutation. In Logic, 1. The convincing or refuting element in an argument, that which clenches it. 2. That which endeavors to pass for such, a specious and deceptive argument, a sophism, fallacy.—Aristotle,¹ Stier.² The Sophistical Elenchi.

ELENCHI IGNATIO, ignorance or ignoring of the real point to be proved, Heterozetesis.—A. Baumgarten.³

Elenchi mutatio, is a changing of the real question, either ignorantly or designedly.

***Elicit**.

ELICITATION, in scholastic use, "is a deducing of the power of the will into act."—Bramhall.

***Elimination**.

¹ *Organon, Prior Analytics*, II. xx.

² *Præcepta Doctrinæ Logicæ*, Oxon., 1667, 37.

³ *Acroasis Logica*, 1763, §§ 410, 411.

ELOQUENCE (Lat., outspeaking; Ger. *Beredsamkeit*), a form of the æsthetic of language; applied rhetoric; the art of oratory.—Quintilian.¹ It is depreciated by Plato, Locke,² and Kant,³ though each of them illustrates it in his own writings.—See Melanchthon.⁴

ELPISTICS, in Plutarch, a philosophical sect who considered hope (*elpis*) the great stay of human life.

*Emanation.

EMINENCE, WAY OF (*via eminentiæ*), the way of reaching the divine attributes by supposing that what is good in the creature exists pre-eminently in God. From the knowledge possessed by the rational, we reach by the *via eminentiæ* the omniscience of God.—See **Negative, Way of**.

EMINENTLY.—See **Virtual**. With reference to the *via eminentiæ* (eminence, way of), the scholastics say, "God has all things eminently, which his creatures have only virtually or formally."

***EMOTION**.—Properly, a distinct order of feeling, indicative of disturbance within, and which throws an agitating influence out upon the physical frame. The effect of emotion is to restrain or even paralyze active force. The chief emotions are wonder, fear, grief.—C. F. V.

***EMPIRIC, EMPIRICISM** (Ger. *Empirismus*; Fr. *Empirisme*), the theory of knowledge or practice which regards experience as the sole criterion of truth. Its theory of knowledge derives all from sensation; its moral philosophy depends wholly upon association of feelings.—C. F. V. Empiricism has been classified as: 1. Intellectual (Locke); 2. Sensualistic (Condillac), or Materialistic (Büchner); 3. Positivist (Comte); 4. Ethical.—Hamilton,⁵ Stöckl.⁶

Empiric, Empirical, in Kant,⁷ *a posteriori*, derived from experience; the character of intuition which involves sensation, and which assumes the actual presence of the object. The *empirical of thinking* presupposes sensation. *Empirical Psychology* is derived from internal perception. *Empirical Cognition* demands determinate perception distinguished

¹ *Institut. Orat.*, L. II., ch. 16. ² *Hum. Underst.*, B. IV. ch. 10, § 34. ³ *Urtheilskraft*, §§ 51-53. ⁴ Quoted by J. A. St. John, in his *Note on Locke*. ⁵ *Metaph.*, lect. iii. ⁶ *Lehrbuch d. Philosophie*, §§ 83, 84. ⁷ *Crit. d. rein. Vernunft*, 74, 400; Meiklejohn's Transl., 238, 46.

from every other by sensation; the *Cognition of the Empirical*, on the other hand, may be wholly a thing of the reason, teaching in a wholly *a priori* way the possibility of experience in general and the relation of perceptions to each other. "The very least object of perception (were it nothing more than pleasure or pain), added to the general mental state of self-consciousness, would transmute rational psychology at once into empirical."

Empirical Law, a law of nature ascertained purely by induction from certain observations or experiments, with no other guarantee of its truth.—Jevons. "Scientific inquirers give the name of empirical laws to uniformities which observation or experiment has shown to exist, but on which they hesitate to rely in cases varying much from those which have been actually observed, for want of seeing any reason why such laws should exist."—Mill.

*Emulation.

ENANTIODROMY (running contrary ways), and **ENANTIOTROPY** (opposite tendency), in Heraclitus, the constant opposition or contrariety in things, by which one rises, while another passes away.—Diogenes Laertius.¹

ENCEPHALON, ENCEPHALOS (Gr.), within the head; the brain.

ENCYCLICAL ARTS, the liberal arts which constituted the circle of instruction considered necessary for a cultivated Greek or Roman.

ENCYCLOPÆDIA, the treatment either of the circle of knowledge in general, general encyclopædia, or of some special part of it; special encyclopædia. The arrangement may be logical or alphabetical. The encyclopædia may be formal, presenting a summary sketch of the plan and method, the form or outline; or it may be material, presenting the matter itself. The formal is like the atlas; the material like the geography. Among the most important of the philosophical encyclopædias are those of Bacon (*Organon*), Herbart, Hegel (Rosenkranz),² Ritter (1862-64).

ENCYCLOPÆDISTS, in the History of Philosophy, the co-laborers in the French *Encyclopedie*, 1751-1772, of which Diderot was editor.

***END, (Ends,)** "that for the attainment of which something is

¹ ix. 7.

² *Journ. Spec. Phil.* (Harris), v. 234.

done. The contemplated result of activity. More generally, the actual result."—C. F. V. "The value of ends is absolute; the value of means is relative."—Hamilton.¹

End-in-Himself, End-in-Itself.—Kant maintains that human nature is an *end-in-itself*, meaning by that expression that personality—freedom of will placed in subjection to moral law—implies that the perfection of human nature is an end-in-itself. The dignity of human nature is such that man is never to use himself as merely a means to an end, or to use his fellow-man as such, as if he were only a working machine. "In the whole creation, everything may be used as an end, man alone excepted. He is alone an end-in-himself."²—C. F. V.

ENDELECHY (Gr.), continuance, constancy. It is used by Plato. It ought not to be confounded with *Etelechy*, *q. v.*

ENDOGAMOUS MARRIAGE, is when the parties are of the same tribe—Exogamous, when of different tribes. These words are used by McLennan,³ who maintains that the primitive form of marriage was by capture—that symbols of this practice still remain among many nations. He also holds that originally kinship was counted from the female.

ENDOSMOSE, ENDOSMOSIS, EXOSMOSIS, OSMOSE (Gr.), in the theory of organism and vitality, inward impulsion, outward impulsion, impulsion. "If two fluids of unequal density, are separated by an animal or vegetable membrane, the denser will attract the less dense through the membrane that divides them. It is *endosmose* when the attraction is from the outside to the inside; and *exosmose*, when it operates from the inside to the outside."—Lindley.⁴ Osmose is the generic term for the two processes. Hence, Osmotic.—Herbert Spencer.⁵

ENERGY (Gr.), in Aristotle,⁶ act, action, operation, actuality, development, vivacity; opposed to *δύναμις*, possibility, germ, the virtual. E., the first of the dialectic of Plato, a true exercise of the soul in the speculation of things.—Taylor.⁷

¹ *Metaphysics*, lect. II. ² *Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft; Werke*, Rosencranz, viii., Semple's Transl., 8vo ed., p. 137; Calderwood, p. 121. ³ *Primitive Marriage*, 8vo, Edin., 1865. ⁴ *Introduction to Botany*, ii. 331. ⁵ *Principles of Biology*, ch. 8. ⁶ *Ethics*, B. I., ch. 1 (see Browne's Note); B. II., ch. 2; *Organon. Interpretat.*, ch. 13. See Trendelenburg: *Elem. Logic*, Aristot. ed., Sept., 1874, § 6, p. 64; *Metaphysics*, book viii., ch. 3, 6, 8, 9, of McMahon's Analysis. ⁷ *Note on Aristotle's Topics*, VIII., ch. 14.

ENGLISH PHILOSOPHY.—1. Philosophy so far as it has used the English language as its organ, embracing in this sense the philosophy of Great Britain and the United States of America. 2. Philosophy of English writers (including Irish authors of English stock), and in this sense contradistinguished from the Scotch and American. (Bacon, Hobbes, Herbert of Cherbury, Glanville, Henry More, Cudworth, Locke, Berkeley, Samuel Clarke, James and John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, Lewes, Collins Simon, Grote.)

ENNEADS (Gr.), ninefold collection; the fifty-four Tractates of Plotinus, collected by Porphyry, in six sections of nine books each.

ENNOELOGY, ENNOEMATOLOGY, ENNOEMATICS (Gr.), doctrine of thought, Logic; art of thinking.

ENNOEMATIC (Gr.), intellectual, formed in the mind itself, as opposed to the empirical, which is derived from experience.

ENNOEME (Gr.), thought, notion; the product of simple conception, or of ennoergy, *q. v.* For this and the associated Greek terms, see Hamilton.¹

ENNOERGY (Gr.), simple active conception; the faculty by which ideas are formed immediately upon sensation, or sense-perception.

ENNUI, the state in which we find nothing on which to exercise our powers.—Hamilton.²

***ENS** (Lat.), that which is; essence, or true nature; a being, thing, something, entity; opposed to *nonens*, nonentity, nothing, *q. v.*; enters, in the scholastic terminology, into many combinations.

E. Aggrigativum, or **collectivum**, a mass or body of things.

E. Artificiale, formed by man, opposed to *ens naturale*, produced by nature.

E. a se, or **E. Necessarium**, or **E. Originarium**, independent, necessary, original, God; opposed to *E. ab alio*, derived, or *E. contingens*, contingent.

E. Cogitationis Meræ, what can be thought, but cannot be brought under perception; *E. Intellectus*, *E. Reale*, *q. v.*, *E. Rationis*, entity of the understanding or reason merely. Concept without an object. Ger. *Gedankending*.

¹ *Logic*, lect. vii., § 19, n. 1.

² *Lect. xliv.*

E. Entium (Being of beings), *perfectissimum* (most perfect), *reallissimum* (most real), *summum* (supreme), God.

E. Existens, participialiki. **E. Imaginarium**, **E. Sensus interni**, form without object proper, presented in internal perception.

E. Intelligens, intellectual, rational, intelligent.

E. Organisatum, **E. Organicum**, organized, organic being or body.

E. Phænomen, object with form.

E. Possibile, **E. Potentiâ**.—See **E. Cogitationis**.

E. Privativum, something made known by sense-perception, but as wanting positive quality, as negative.—See **Nihil**.

E. Rationis, **ratiocinatæ**. **E. Singulare**, the individual; opposed to *E. Universale*, the universal.

E. Substantiale, form with object, in the empirical intuition, rational being.

E. Transcendentaliter imaginarium, an ideal mental representation.

ENSOPH, the Allwise Being. In the Cabbalistic System, a name of God.

ENSOPHIC, World. In the Cabbalistic System, the world of infinity, within which four worlds are produced by emanation.

***ENTELECHY**, "complete attainment, actuality, distinctness of realized existence."—C. F. V. This word has been called the "*cruz metaphysicorum*." This has been partly the result of confounding it with *Endelechy*, a mistake into which even Cicero¹ fell. Krug: "Entelechy (from *εντελης*, complete, and *εχειν*, to have,) means strictly the actual having of that which belongs to the completeness of a thing, and then completeness in general. It is contrasted in Greek as the actual with the virtual. When Aristotle and the Peripatetics call the soul an entelechy, they mean that the soul is the principle by which the body, which is in itself simply capable of receiving life and sensation, actually lives and is sentient as long as it is united with the soul." See Aristotle.² Aristotle defines the soul of man to be an *entelechy* (that without which the body cannot live); a definition of which Dr. Reid³ said he did not know the meaning.

¹ *Tuscul. Q.*, I. 10, and *Note of Ernesti* in *Clavis & Donaldson's New Cratylus*, 418; *Ciceronianus*, s. v. ² *De Anima*, ii. 1; *Metaphysics*, x. 9. ³ *Inquiry*, Hamilton's ed., p. 203.

ENTENDEMENT (Fr.), understanding, intellect, intellectual apprehension, judgment.

ENTHEASM, ENTHEISM, from the Greek, *ἐνθεος* (full of the god, inspired; used by Aristotle and Plato). 1. Enthusiasm. 2. Of God in the world, Pantheism. Hence, entheal, enthean, entheastic, entheat.

***ENTHUSIASM** (Ger. *Begeisterung*), in Kant,¹ the idea of the good, accompanied by vehement feeling, uncontrolled by reflection.

***ENTHYMEME**.—See Aristotle,² Atwater,³ Devey,⁴ Hamilton,⁵ Jevons,⁶ Port Royal Logic,⁷ Ueberweg,⁸ Whately,⁹ Wolf.¹⁰

ENTITATIVE, pertaining to the essence of a thing, to the *ens* or entity as such; that which in whole or part makes it an entity.—Ellis.¹¹

Entitative Act, in the scholastic system, existence as an entity is actual only as it acts.

***ENTITY**.—Being.

ENUNCIABLE, capable of expression in words; that which we can enounce.

***ENUNCIATION** (Ger. *Satz*), a judgment or proposition considered as enounced or stated in words. It embraces subject, predicate, and copula. It is either affirmative or negative, cryptic or explicit.—Aristotle,¹² Wolf.¹³

ENVY, "feeling of uneasiness and displeasure at the prosperity of another," C. F. V., with the illicit wish that it was ours, not theirs.

EPAGOGUE (from the Greek), a bringing in; in Logic, a bringing a number of particular examples so as to lead to a universal conclusion; the argument by induction. See **Apagoge**.—Aristotle.¹⁴

EPAGOGICAL, by Epagoge, inductive.

EPANORTHOSIS (Gr.), correcting; improvement; as the object of chastening or of punishment.

EPHECTICS (Gr.), literally, holden back, the Sceptic philoso-

¹ *Urtheilskraft*, 121, § 29. ² *Prior Analyt.*, II., xxvii. ³ *Logic*, ch. 5, 10. ⁴ *Logic*, 140.

⁵ *Discussions*, 163; *Logic*, lect. xx., § 72. ⁶ *Logic*, less. xviii. ⁷ Part III., ch. 14 (Baynes). ⁸ *Logik*, § 125. ⁹ *Logic*, 10, 52. ¹⁰ *Philosoph. Rat. sive Logica*, §§ 421-444.

¹¹ *Knowledge of Divine Things*, 340. ¹² *On Interpretation*, ch. 5, x. ¹³ *Logica*, § 41, 199, 204. ¹⁴ *Prior Analyt.*, II., 23 (25); Top. viii. 1.

phers, from their always suspending their judgment (*ἐποχή*), and refusing to affirm or deny positively.

**Epicheirema*, *Epichirema*, *Epicherema*.

EPICRISIS (Gr.), determination; adjudication; applied in Ethics to the conscience.

**Epicurean*.

EPIEIKEIA (Gr.), reasonableness; a manifest reason, or a principle of equity, coming in to control the strict letter of the law.—Aristotle.¹

EPIGENESIS, the theory that in generation a true product, not a mere educt, results; generic preformation.—Kant.²

Epigenesis of the Pure Reason, in Kant,³ the system of the generation of experience from the pure abstract ideas, the concepts of the understanding; that is, that these concepts render experience possible, are the ground of all experience.—Mellin.⁴

EPINOMIS, addition to a law; appendix; the name of a dialogue appended to Plato's Twelve Books of the Laws.—Diogenes Laertius.⁵

**Epistemology*.

EPISTEMONIC, in Aristotle, capable of knowledge; antithetic to the logistic or practical; scientific.⁶

**Episyllogism*.

EPOCH (Gr.), a check; cessation; pause of light during an eclipse; the point at which a star seems to halt after reaching its highest.—1. In the Sceptical Philosophy, a suspension of judgment. 2. In the Philosophy of History, and History of Philosophy, an *æra*, memorable period, considered as completed. 3. In Schelling,⁷ Philosophy (Transcendental Idealism), as a history of self-consciousness, has three *epochs*, grasped successively in one absolute synthesis. The *first* epoch is from primary sensation to productive intuition. The *second* is from productive intuition to reflection. The *third* is from reflection to absolute act of will.—See **Periods**.

***EQUANIMITY**.—See **Magnanimity**.

EQUIPOLLENT, in Logic, having equivalent signification.

¹ *Eth.*, N v. 10, 8. ² *Urtheilskraft*, § 81. ³ *Rein. Vern.*, 167, § 27. ⁴ *Encyclop. Wörterbuch*. ⁵ *Liées*, III., xxxv. ⁶ *Eth.*, vi. 6; *Top.* i. 1. ⁷ *System d. transc. Idealismus* (1800); *Werke*, Abth. I., Bd. III., 399–531.

EQUIPOLLENCE, EQUIPOLLENCY, in Logic, an equivalence between two or more propositions.

***EQUITY**, "That which determines the equal between man and man, their rights being equal."—C. F. V.

*Equivocal or Homonymous. *Equivocation.

ERETRIANS, disciples of Menedemus, the Eretrian.—Ritter.¹

ERISTIC, given to strife; the *eristic art*, wrangling, sophistry; *eristic syllogisms*, sophisms, fallacies; *Eristics*, a nickname of the Megarean school, which was devoted to dialectics.

ERKENNT (Ger.), cognized; a word for which we have the sanction of Sir William Hamilton.—M. T. M.

ERKENNTNISS (Ger.), in Kant, cognition, representing the active co-operation of the intellect, bearing on the object presented by sensational and intuitional perception.—M. T. M.

EROS (Gr.), love. Hence, erotical.

***ERROR**, "deviation from fact in observation, or from the laws of logic in reasoning."—C. F. V.

***ESOTERIC** and **EXOTERIC**.—See Sir A. Grant,² Blakesly.³

ESPRIT (Fr.), spirit; soul; talent; wit.

ESSE (Lat., to be), existence, essence. Berkeley:⁴ "The absolute existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being perceived is . . . unintelligible. Their *esse* is *percipi*; nor is it possible that they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them." *Esse simpliciter*, unconditioned being, applied to God as self subsistent.

***ESSENCE, ESSENTIAL**, subs. **ESSENTIALITY** (Ger. *Wesen, Wesenheit, Wesentlichkeit*), in J. H. Fichte,⁵ "that true being, which remains in itself the same, over against the infinitely non-being, the appearance." In Hegel,⁶ "Being (*Sein*), coming into mediation with self through the negativity of itself—the truth of being;" the concept as established;⁷ in Kant,⁸ Logical E, "the primary internal principle (the ground) of all that belongs to the possibility of a thing;" in Schelling,¹⁰ "that whereby a thing is in conformity with all things: opposed to Form, that whereby it is itself."—See Mill.¹¹

¹ *Gesch. d. Philos. Alt. Zeit*, II. 155. ² *Aristotle's Ethics*, App. B., 3d ed., 1. 397. ³ *Life of Aristotle*, p. 119. ⁴ *Principles*, § 3; see *Annotat.* (Ueberweg-Krauth), 340. ⁵ *Ontologie*, 209. ⁶ *Logic*, Wallace, § 42. ⁷ *Werke*, iv. 3. ⁸ *Do.*, vi. 223. ⁹ *Mellin, W. B. d. Kr. Phil.* ¹⁰ *Werke*, Abth. I., Bd. II., 360, iv. 615. ¹¹ *Logic*, B. III., ch. vii., § 7.

ESSENCE, DOCTRINE OF.—*Lehre vom Wesen*, in Hegel,¹ the Second Division of the Science of Logic, embracing, A. Essence as ground of existence; B. The Phænomenon; C. The Actuality. Essence is divided into real and notional, common and individual.

ESSENTIAL, adj., necessary to the existence or constitution of an object, constitutive. E. propositions, explicative, merely affirm a predicate which is known to belong to the subject by all who can define it; as, "a triangle has three sides and three angles."—Jevons.

ESSENTIATE, v. n., to become of the same essence; v. a., to render an essence.

ESTEEM (Fr.), regard, value, honor.—Reid.²

ESTHETICS.—See *Æsthetics*.

ÉTAT (Fr.), state.

ETERNALIST, one who maintains the eternity of matter.—T. Burnet. L. J.

***ETERNITY** (Ger. *Ewigkeit*). "Infinite duration."—C. F. V.

***Eternity (of God).**—"To exist in time is the same thing as to exist imperfectly. God, in the language of Plotinus, is necessarily *ἀχρονος*, timeless."—Jules Simon.³

ETHER, a hypothetical element, "a material substance of extreme subtilty, volatility, and energy." It is used by Frederick Hoffmann in his theory of life, and as "lumeniferous ether," in the theory of light.—Mill,⁴ Whewell.⁵

ETHICAL DETERMINATION (Principles of), those which account for the moral decisions of the will. They are classified by Kant thus—

A. Subjective. I. External: 1. Education (Montaigne); 2. The Civil Constitution (Mandeville). II. Internal: 1. Physical feeling (Epicurus); 2. Moral sentiment (Hutcheson).

B. Objective. I. Internal. Perfection (Wolf and the Stoics): II. External. The will of God (Crusius and other theological writers on morals).

ETHICO-THEOLOGY, the theology which rests upon the ethical doctrine, the moral law as a voice of God in the conscience. It precedes or supplements Physico-theology by moral Teleology, and furnishes the Ethico-theological proof of the existence of God.

¹ *Encyclopædie*, §§ 112–159. ² *Works* (Hamilton), 554–563. ³ *Hist. de l'École d'Alexandrie*, Pref. ⁴ *Logic*, XIV. iii., § 6. ⁵ *Hist. Scient. Ideas*, ii. 186.

***ETHICS** (Fr. *Morale*; Ger. *Sittenlehre*). Synonymous with "Moral Philosophy."—According to etymological usage (*ἠθικά*, from *ἔθος*, custom), it applies only to that department of moral science which treats of practice in submission to moral law.—C. F. V. In Kant,¹ the science of that part of material philosophy which has to do with the laws of freedom.—See Edmunds.² See Zeller,³ for the ethics of Melanchthon,⁴ Leibnitz,⁵ Kant,⁶ Fichte,⁷ Schiller,⁸ Baader,⁹ Schleiermacher,¹⁰ Hegel,¹¹ Herbart.¹²

ETHNARCHY (Ger.), used by Stöckl,¹³ for the powers of an international association, Congress of Nations.

ETHNEGETICS (Gr.), that which embraces the art of guiding nations; used by Ampère to designate the second subdivision of the *political sciences*, which comprise, 1. Politics proper; 2. Pædagogics.

ETHNICISM (Gr.), heathenism; idolatry; divided into, 1. the brutish or coarser, and 2. the specious or more refined.

ETHNODICY (Gr.), right of nations; in Ampère's classification, the first part of Syncimenics.

ETHNOGENY (Gr.), science which treats of the origin of nations and peoples; in Ampère's classification, the second subdivision of Comparative Ethnology.

***ETHNOGRAPHY**, in Ampère's classification, the first part of Elementary Ethnology, devoted particularly to the localities inhabited by nations at different eras of their history.

ETHNOLOGIC (Gr.), of Ethnology, *q. v.*, the knowledge of nations. In Ampère's classification, the E. sciences form the first division of the social sciences.

***ETHNOLOGY**, in Ampère's classification, the first division of the ethnological sciences. Ethnology is thus divided:—
I. *Elementary*: 1. Ethnography; 2. Toporistics. II. *Comparative*: 1. Comparative Geography; 2. Ethnogeny.

ETHNORYTICS (Gr.), science of national defence; in Ampère, the first subdivision of the political sciences; it embraces nomology and the military art.

ETHOCRAT, ETHOCRATIC, ETHOCRATY (Gr.), terms relating to a government based on the ethical alone.

¹ *Grund.*, z. *Met. d. Sille*, Vorr. x. 415. ² *Journ. of Spec. Phil.* (Harris), v. 27; *Kant's Ethics*, 108, 287. ³ *Gesch. der Deutsch Philosophie*. ⁴ 38-40. ⁵ 146-152. ⁶ 474-497. ⁷ 621-625. ⁸ 633-640. ⁹ 736, 737. ¹⁰ 772-774. ¹¹ 814-817. ¹² 860-862. ¹³ *Lehrb. d. Philosoph.*, § 224, 11.

ETHOGENY (Gr.), science of the causes which determine the characters, morals, and passions of men.

ETHOGNOSY (Gr.), thorough knowledge of the moral character of men; in Ampère, the second branch of ethics.

ETHOGRAPHY (Gr.), description of the moral characteristics of man; in Ampère, the first branch of elementary ethics.

***ETHOLOGY**.—Hence, Ethologic and Ethologue.

ETIOLOGY.—See *Ætiology*.

ÊTRE (Chose), n., (Fr.), that which is; being; ens, entity, existence; thing. It corresponds with the German *Wesen*, *Seyn*, and *Daseyn*.

ETYMOLOGY (Gr.), analysis of a word so as to find its origin; aid in reaching its derivation and true literal meaning; it is useful in philosophy, if soberly and cautiously employed; but the source of fallacy, if it be fanciful, or if it be urged without reference to the actual sense in which words are employed. Aristotle¹ uses *ετυμως*, lit. truly, as equivalent to etymologically.

EUBULIA (Gr.), prudence, in the form of careful consideration.

EUCOLOS (*ευκολος*), in Plato, antithetical to *duscolos* (*δυσκολος*), means easily satisfied; contented.—Schopenhauer: "The Platonic antithesis is that which exists between an easy and a discontented tone of mind. The *duscolos* is dissatisfied if he lacks one thing in ten; the *eucolos* finds satisfaction if he has one thing in ten."²

***EUDEMONISM, EUDÆMONISM, EUDÆMONOLOGY** (Ger. *Eudämonie, Glückseligkeitslehre*), the doctrine of the *summum bonum*.

Eudemonism (Classification of).—The theories which identify happiness and virtue may be arranged, from the lowest to the highest, thus: 1. Hedonism, *q. v.* 2. Happiness is not merely sensuous, but is intellectual—there is the calm satisfaction of a well-ordered mind, which transcends the pleasures of sense. This is the view of Democritus and of Epicurus. 3. The happiness of others—universal happiness is to be the object of our striving, as essential to our own real happiness. 4. Happiness can only arise from a consciousness of moral excellence. This is the Stoic form.

¹ *Mund.*, 6, 30.

² *Lexikon* (Frauenstädt), v. *Eukolos*.

In Eudemonism, the question whether virtue is happiness is sometimes confounded with the question whether happiness is virtue; and in the use of terms, the proper distinction is not drawn between pleasure and happiness, between external welfare and real blessedness. "Bentham¹ thinks 'happiness' a term too high, and prefers pleasure, as embracing lower forms of enjoyment. This is Hedonism rather than Eudæmonism."—C. F. V.

Eudemonism, Moral, in Kant,² the theory in human history that the race is constantly advancing morally. It is opposed to the theories (1) of Terrorism (the race is always getting worse); (2) of Abderitism, *q. v.*

EUDEMONIST, in Kant,³ one who finds the supreme motive not in duty, but in utility and his own welfare; practical egotist.

EULER (Diagrams of), indicate the nature of propositions and syllogisms by circles.—Jevons.⁴

EULER'S, LIGHT (Theory of), the undulatory.

***EURETIC** or **EURISTIC**, *v.*, heuretic, heuristic, ostensive.

EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY.—I. The Ancient, Greek, Roman.

II. The Mediæval, the Scholastic. III. Modern, British, Dutch (Grotius, Spinoza), French, German, Italian, &c.

EUSEBIOLOGY, doctrine of reverence towards God, piety, doctrine of religion in its practical aspect.

EUTHANASIA (Gr.).—1. Easy, happy death.—Wieland.⁵ 2.

Kant⁶ calls the sceptical hopelessness in the solution of the problem of pure reason the euthanasia of the pure reason.

EUTHYMY, in Democritus, a tranquil mind as the *summum bonum*.⁷

EUTUCHY, in Aristotle, success, prosperity, and is distinguished from Eudemony.⁸

EVENT (Lat.), outcome; that which happens; result; issue; Ger. *Begebenheit*.—Kant.⁹

EVHEMERISM, the doctrine of Evhemeres, that the gods were but mythical outgrowths of the history of men.

***EVIDENCE**, "testimony to reality, either from witnesses or from concomitant facts."—C. F. V. In Kant,¹⁰ the assurance,

¹ *Deontology*, i. 78. ² *Religion innerhalb*. (Kirchmann), 20. *Streit d. Facultäten*, 134 e.

³ *Anthropologie*, 8. ⁴ *Less. in Logic*, Less. IX., XV., XVI. ⁵ *Euthanasia* (on the Life after Death), 1806. ⁶ *Rein. Vern.*, 434. ⁷ *In Seneca de Tranq.*, 2. ⁸ *Rhet.*, I., 5, 17. ⁹ *Rein. Vern.*, 243, 816; *Prolegom.*, § 26. ¹⁰ *Rein. Vern.*, 162.

apodictic in its character, when the object is given in pure intuition; intuitive assurance. Evidence is classified as objective, metaphysical, physical and moral; immediate or direct, mediate or indirect.

***EVIL**, "in its physical application, that which injures; in its ethical, that which violates moral law."—C. F. V.

***Evil, Origin of.**—For views of Böhme and Leibnitz, see Zeller.¹

EVOLUTION, THEORY OF (Ger. *Entwicklung*), opposed to epigenesis, *q. v.*, supposes that in generation all organic individual being is already preformed—an evolution takes place from an involution, the result is an educt, *q. v.* Kant² called it "the nest-box theory"—a small box fitting into a larger, and all finally inclosed in one box.—See Leibnitz.³

Evolution, Law of, in Comte, the assertion that "every distinct class of human conceptions" has, in its historical development, "necessarily" exhibited three successive stages, the Theological, the Metaphysical, and the Positive.—Stirling.⁴

EVOLVE (Lat.), to unroll, analyze, resolve, explicate, develop.

EXACT SCIENCES, the mathematical and physical sciences.

***EXAMPLE**, (see *Analogy*).—Two adages in philosophy point to a common vice in reasoning: "Examples are odious;" "examples prove nothing, they only elucidate."

EXCEPTIVE, applied to a proposition, marks that a part of the subject is excepted from the predicate, or a part of the predicate from the subject, as "all animals, except man, are devoid of reason."—See Hamilton.⁵

***Excluded Middle.**

EXCLUSIVE, applied to a particle, or a proposition, marks that a predicate belongs exclusively to one subject, or that to one subject a single predicate only belongs: "God alone is eternal;" "An angel is spirit alone."—Hamilton,⁶ Stöckl.⁷

EX CONCESSIS (Lat.), from things conceded; in Logic, the argument from what is granted to what is to be proved.

EXEMPLAR, primary, original, model, earliest example.

EXEMPLARY, in the products of genius, marks their character as examples, models for study.—Kant.⁸

¹ *Gesch. d. Deutsch. Phil.*, 21, 172-176. ² *Urtheilekraft*, § 81. ³ Zeller—*Gesch. d. Deutsch. Philos.*, 129-132, and n. 1. ⁴ *Annotations on Schwegler*, 447, 452. ⁵ *Logic*, Append., 517, 518. ⁶ *Logic*, Am. ed., 517, 518. ⁷ *Lehrb. d. Phil.*, I., 169, 170. ⁸ *Urtheilekr.*, § 46.

EXERCISE (Fr.), action for the purpose of training, developing faculty.—Reid.¹

EXERTION.—Stirling's rendering of *Aeusserung* in Schwegler's statement of Hegel's doctrine of essence. Seelye renders it "expression," which is better. The sense of *Aeusserung* is closely allied with *phenomenon*, and *manifestation*, but its best equivalent would be *utterance*, taken etymologically as *ouurance*, in which sense it is used in old English writers. Udal: "Yet did he hide within himself a secret power . . . which than & never afore *utted* itself."² This rendering would preserve the connection between the *Aeusserung* and *Aeusseres*, which is so marked in the paragraph.

EXERTIVE, applied by Hamilton³ to the faculties of will and desire. Ger. *Bestrebungsvermögen*.

EXHAUSTIVE, in Logic, is applied to the division of genus into two species by a difference: **Dichotomy**.

EXHIBITION.—See **Darstellung**, **Demonstration**, **Hypotyposis**.

***EXISTENCE (Being)**, (Ger. *Dasein*).—"Existence (*Dasein*) is more than esse or being in general (*Sein überhaupt*); it is a completely determined being."—K. See Hamilton,⁴ Mill.⁵

Existence, in Hegel. ⁶ *Existenz* (see *Daseyn*) implies a source of being, a ground or essence, from which the determinate and apparent being (*Daseyn*) has sprung. Existence is always the consequence of some ground.—W. Wallace.⁷

EXISTENTIAL PROPOSITION, in Logic, affirms the existence of an object, either immediately—as "the sun is," exists—or mediately, as "the sun shines," is a body which illumines the earth. See **Coexistence**.—K.

EXOTERIC.—See **Esoteric**.

EXPANSIVE.—See **Elasticity**.

EXPECTANCE, EXPECTATION OF SIMILAR CASES, in the Leibnitzo-Wolfian Psychology, is a method of directing our actions by what formerly happened in a like case; sometimes called the Analogy of Reason.

EXPEDIENCY, "applied prudence; a wise regard to results; use of competent means for legitimate ends. It is subordinate

¹ *Works* (Hamilton), 330, 381. ² *On Luke*, c. 17; see *Richardson's Dictionary*.

³ *Metaph.*, Lect. xi. ⁴ *Discussions*, 591. ⁵ *Logic*, ch. 24, § 1. ⁶ *Logik*, in *Encyclopæd.*, § 122-124. ⁷ *Prolegomena*, ch. 23.

to morality. Expediency is the wise use of means for what may be sought. Morality, the performance of what is binding on all."—C. F. V. Expediency is a word much used by the advocates of the doctrine of utility. Paley has said whatever is *expedient* is *right*. "But," says Dr. Whewell,¹ "the main significance of such assertions is in the rejection which they imply of any independent and fundamental meaning in the term *right*. Those who make such assertions intend to say that actions are right because they promote some object — human happiness, for instance; and that those who speak of actions as absolutely right are in error. In the common use of language, we speak of actions as *expedient*, when they promote some end which we have selected, and which we do not intend to have questioned. If we are prepared to put forward the end of our actions as the proper end of action, we call them not *expedient*, but *right*. It may be expedient for a man to lie, in order to free himself from captivity. He may stay in captivity because he will not tell a lie, but in this case we say that he does what is right, and rejects what is expedient. *Expedient* implies, according to its etymology, a way out of difficulties. But morality places before us a higher object than merely to escape from difficulties; she teaches us to aim at what is *right*. What is expedient may be expedient as a means to what is right. It may be expedient to tell the truth to rescue an innocent person from death. But we do not describe such an action properly by calling it *expedient*. It is much more than expedient—it is right; it is recommended not by *expediency*, but by *duty*. In such cases we can speak approvingly not only of it as a right means, but of the end as a right end. Truth is not properly commended when it is described as a good way of getting out of a difficulty or gaining our ends."

***EXPERIENCE** (Ger. *Erfahrung*), "Personal knowledge. It is identical with the facts of our consciousness."—C. F. V. Experience is derived from and gained by experiment. It is related as effect to cause. "That all our knowledge begins with experience, there can be no doubt. . . . But . . . it by no means follows that all arises out of experience. . . . It is therefore a question which requires close investigation,

¹ *Elements of Morality*, bk. ii., ch. 25.

and is not to be answered at first sight—whether there exists a knowledge altogether independent of experience, and even of all sensuous impressions? Knowledge of this kind is called *a priori*, in contradistinction to empirical knowledge, which has its sources *a posteriori*, that is, in experience.”—Kant.¹ Schelling:² “Innumerable phenomena have been foreseen by physicists, in advance of any demonstration in experience, and this daily becomes more and more the case.”

EXPERIENTIAL, experimental.

***EXPERIMENT** (Ger. *Versuch*), (see **Observation**.)—Voluntary application of tests for the discovery of truth.—C. F. V. “Every experiment is a question addressed to nature. It involves a secret judgment *a priori*. Every experiment, worthy of the name, is a prophecy.”—Schelling.³

EXPERIMENTAL, connected with experiment; derived from experience; empirical. Such are experimental philosophy, experimental judgment, experimental physics, the experimental or exact sciences.

Experimental Concept (Ger. *Erfahrungsbegriff*), an empirical concept; a concept of the understanding (notion) in the concrete.—Kant.⁴

***EXPERIMENTUM CRUCIS**.—See **Crucial**.

EXPLANATION (Lat.), literally, the making plain or clear, so that there shall be nothing uneven or obscure to interrupt our view.—See **Explication**. *Explanation of fact by fact*, consists in harmonizing fact with fact, or fact with law, or law with law, so that we may see them both to be cases of one uniform law of causation.—Jevons,⁵ Mill.⁶

EXPLETION (of **Space**), (Lat.), filling out; the mathematical or dynamical occupance of space by matter, to the exclusion of all other material substance which might otherwise move into it; impenetrability.

EXPLICATION (Ger. *Ausklärung*), explanation; the clear and determinate derivation of a principle.—Kant.⁷

EXPLICATIVE.—See **Essential**.

EXPONENT, in Kant,⁸ the expression of the necessary relation

¹ *Kritik of Pure Reason*, Introd. Meiklejohn's Transl., p. 1. ² *Zeitschr. f. Specul. Phys.*, 1800. ³ *Specul. Physik*. ⁴ *Rein. Vern.*, 595. ⁵ *Elem. Lessons in Logic*, Lesson XXXI. ⁶ *Syst. of Logic*, B. III., ch. 12-14. ⁷ *Urtheilskraft*, § 78. ⁸ *Rein. Vern.*, 263; Meiklejohn, 160.

in which things in nature stand to each other—the relation of time (in so far as it contains all existence in itself) to the unity of apperception.

EXPONIBLE, explicable; capable of being unfolded; applied to the “exclusive, restrictive, exceptive, or reduplicative propositions, the imperfectly or secondarily modal.”—Reid.¹

EXPOSE (Ger. *Exponiren*), expound.—See **Exposition**.

EXPOSITA, given to be treated by some logical process.—Jevons.

EXPOSITION (Lat.), a setting forth, explanation, clearing up; definition, the “clear, though not necessarily detailed, representation of that which belongs to a concept. It is metaphysical, if it embrace what represents the concept as given *a priori*.”—Kant.²

EXPRESSION, in æsthetics, form as representative of idea.

EXPROPRIATION (Fr.).—1. Passive, deprivation of property in surrender, as of our reason or our will. 2. Active, deprivation of property, in jurisprudence.

***EXTENSION** (Fr. *Étendue*; Ger. *Ausdehnung*).—Uniform extension is that in which the difference is merely numerical, as for example in a mass of lead; difform is that in which the parts of the object extended are different or unlike, as the parts of the human body.—W. Geometrical extension is in space, chronometrical in time.—See Des Cartes,³ Leibnitz,⁴ Locke,⁵ Wolf,⁶ Kant.⁷

***EXTENSION, LOGICAL**.—See **Comprehension**. Hence, extensive, as applied to syllogism.

***EXTERNALITY** or **OUTNESS**, “separateness from self. It applies to all that is known as distinct from myself, the knower.”—C. F. V.

EXTRA-MUNDANE (Ger. *Ausserweltlich*), out of, beyond the world.—1. In Physics, of space, or a vacuum beyond the world; 2. In Metaphysics, beyond or above the world of sense; supersensuous, as God; not absolutely immanent in, as Pantheism supposes, but distinct from the world.

Extra Nos (Lat.), outside of us, external to us; distinct, as object from subject; in another place.

¹ *Works*, 704. ² *Rein. Vern.*, 38; Meiklejohn, 23; Haywood, 28, 29. ³ *Princ. Phil.*, p. II., § 1. ⁴ *Essais sur l'ent. hum.*, II., iv. ⁵ *Human Underst.*, B. II., ch. viii., § 9. ⁶ *Vern. Geilank*, v. *Gott. d. Welt u. d. Seele*, § 773. ⁷ *Rein. Vern.*, 36, 66.

EXTRAVAGANCE, in Ethics, passing far beyond due limits; in thought, feeling, passion, expenditure.

EXTREMES, in Logic, or material parts of a proposition, are its ends or terms, the subject and predicate. See **Conversion**.—Aristotle,¹ Baumgarten.² In speaking of a Syllogism, the word is often understood to imply the extremes of the conclusion.—Whately.³

EXTRINSIC or **EXTRINSICAL**, opposed to intrinsic; from without.—Locke: "Outward objects that are extrinsic to the mind; and its own operations, intrinsic and proper to itself, are the original of all knowledge."

EYE, in Anthropology and Æsthetics, the organ of vision, *q. v.*, and of the subtlest and most powerful forms of expression.—"As the eyes are the windows to let in the species of all exterior objects into the dark cells of the brain, for the information of the soul, so are they flaming torches to reveal to those abroad how the soul within is moved or affected."—Ray.⁴ Hippocrates said: "As is the eye so is the whole body."—See Berkeley,⁵ Cudworth,⁶ Reid,⁷ Schopenhauer,⁸ Stöckl.⁹

F, in Logic, indicates that the three other figures beginning with F can be reduced to the mode of the first. Felapton or Festino can be reduced, for example, to Ferio.—See **Conversion**, **Syllogism**.

***FABLE**.—The Greek writers distinguish: 1. The fable, *mythos*, or myth; 2. The promyth, or introduction to the fable. 3. The epimyth, coming after the fable, the moral.—K.

FACILITY (**The Law of**), in Mental Reproduction, is that a thought easier to suggest will be roused in preference to a more difficult one.—Hamilton.¹⁰

***FACT**, "strictly, that which is done or accomplished. More widely, that which is known as existing."—C. F. V. Whewell: "The distinction between theory (that is, true theory)

¹ *Prior Analyt.*, II., xxii. ² *Acroas. Logic*, § 207. ³ *Logic*, B. II., ch. i., § 2. ⁴ *On the Creation*, pt. ii. ⁵ *Principles*, § 29; see *Überweg's Note* (43). ⁶ *Intellectual Syst.*, (Harris), II., 593, and n. 4. ⁷ *Works* (Hamilton): *Of the Human Mind*, ch. vi., 132–20.

⁸ *Passages collected under Auge*, in *Schopenhauer-Lexikon* (Frauenstädt). ⁹ *Lehrb. d. Philos.*, I., 32. ¹⁰ Note D, in Reid's *Works*, 916–917.

and fact is this: that in theory the ideas are considered as distinct from the facts; in facts, though ideas may be involved, they are not in our apprehension separated from the sensations. A true theory is a fact; a fact is a familiar theory. That which is a fact under one aspect is a theory under another. The most recondite theories, when firmly established, are facts; the simplest facts involve something of the nature of theory."¹

Fact, Factum, in the Critical Philosophy, is applied to the consciousness of the fundamental law of the pure, practical reason, inasmuch as that law is not deduced from previous data of reason, but presses itself on us as a synthetic proposition *a priori*. It is given through the pure reason; is consequently nothing empirical, but is the single fact of the pure reason, which, in it, proclaims itself as primarily legislative (*sic volo, sic jubeo*).² The fact or factum is qualified as: 1. *A priori*, intelligible, noumenon, original, cognizable by reason apart from all condition of time. 2. *A posteriori*, sensible, empirical, phenomenon, derivative, cognizable by the conditions of time, actual doing, or failing to do.³

FACTION, contentious and unprincipled party.—Lewis, Sir G. C.: "When a party abandons public and general ends, and devotes itself only to the personal interests of its members and leaders, it is called a *faction*, and its policy is said to be factious."⁴

*Factitious.

FACTOR, that which, in conjunction with a second, produces a third. The premises are the factors of the conclusion. The co-operating forces in which life originates, or is perpetuated, are the factors of life.—Krug.

***FACULTIES OF THE MIND** (Fr. *Facultés de l'Ame*; Ger. *Seelenvermögen*), (Classification of).—"The development theory of mind, which would trace all mental power to sensation as the primitive experience, is naturally opposed to the acknowledgment of distinct faculties."—C. F. V. The faculties of the soul, in Kant, are classified on a psychological principle, and are three in number: cognition, feeling,

¹ *History of Scientific Ideas*, Vol. I., l. i. l., § 10. ² *Pract. Vernunft*, I., l. i., § 7. ³ *Relig. innerhalb*, 26, 39. ⁴ *On the Influence of Authority in Matters of Opinion*, ch. 10, note.

appetition. The first of these faculties contains the principles, the guiding laws for all three.—Schwegler.¹

***FACULTY** (Lat. *Facultas*; Fr. *Faculté*; Ger. *Vermögen*), the quality of the *facilis*, or easy; capability; power, whether physical, mental, or moral.—“A distinct power of the mind, by the action of which a distinct order of mental phenomena is produced. Properly, it is power belonging to our rational nature. The correlative designation is capacity—the capability of being influenced or moved under the action of thought, or by external objects.”—C. F. V.

FACULTY AND FACULTIES (Combination with Qualifying Terms).—1. There are numerous combinations with the possessive, marked by *of*: F. of abstraction; of the mind, soul (*animæ*); of cognition, judgment, feeling, appetition, desire, conation, will; of intelligence, the intellect, reason, reflection, understanding; of sense-perception; of internal perception. 2. With adjectives and participles: as, appetitive F.; cognitive, locomotive, moral; presentative, conservative, reproductive, representative, elaborative, regulative. The superior appetitive faculty is the Will.

FAITH (see **Belief**), (Lat. *Fides*; Fr. *Foi*; Ger. *Glaube*).—Faith so far as it belongs to philosophy, has two distinct, but closely related senses, into one or other of which all its applications may be resolved. First of all, it is simply equivalent to *belief*, holding for true and real. Secondly, it is used to mean confidence, trust in a statement, a principle, a person, in anything. The second of these senses necessarily includes the first, but the first may exist without the second. We may firmly believe a thing to be true, in which there may be no need, not even a possibility, for the exercise of trust or confidence. But that in which we confide, we must, first of all, necessarily hold to be true.—Young.² F. V. 3.

FALLACIA, fallacy, *q. v.*

***FALLACIA EQUIVOCATIONIS**, (*F. *Amphibolæ*, *F. *Compositionis*, *F. *Divisionis*, *F. *Accentus*, *F. *Figureæ Dictionis*, *F. *Accidentis*, *F. *a Dicto Secundum quid ad Dictum Simpliciter*).—“The converse, *a dicto simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid*, is also fallacious. Whatever gives pain should be abstained from; therefore, surgical operations should be abstained from.”—F. V. 3.

¹ *Gesch. d. Philosophie*, § 38.

² *Province of Reason*, p. 286.

***F. Ignorationis Elenchi.**—The principal forms of it are: 1. Mistaking the question. To prove that men unacquainted with logic have reasoned well, does not prove the inutility of it. 2. Diverting attention from the point at issue; as Demosthenes does in his oration *De Corona*, and Cicero in his *Pro Archia Poeta*. 3. Misstating the question; as when the Jews perverted our Saviour's saying, "Destroy this temple," i. e., this body, into "Destroy the temple." 4. Imputing consequences or the constructive sophism; as, phrenology leads to materialism, therefore it is not true. 5. Introduction of rhetorical expedients, as irony, personalities, appeals to the passions, &c.

Fallacia a non Causa pro Causa, appears in the following forms:—1. *Non vera pro vera*; as, when Des Cartes explains sensation by animal spirits, the existence of which is not ascertained. 2. *Non talis pro tali*; as, when the Norwegians attributed the disappearance of the fish from their coast to the introduction of inoculation. Or, when one said: "I don't believe it's any use, this vaccination. I had a child vaccinated, and he fell out of a vinder a week arter, and got killed." 3. *Post hoc ergo propter hoc*, when accidental antecedence and subsequence are regarded as cause and effect.—F. V. 8.

***Fallacia plurium Interrogationum** is the Fallacia Compositionis in an interrogative form.—F. V. 8.

F. sumptionis precariæ, F. of precarious assumption, F. petitionis principii, *q. v.*

***FALLACY, A** (Ger. *Trugschlüss*).—See Paralogism, Sophism.

FALLACY, FALLACIES (Mill's Classification of, Alphabetically).—They are: A priori, confusion, distinction, deduction, generalization, induction, inference, inspection simple, observation, ratiocination. His synoptic table is:

FALLACIES.

A. Of Simple Inspection.

a. Fallacies a priori.

B. Of Inference.

I. From evidence distinctly conceived,

1. Inductive Fallacies.

b. Fallacies of Observation.

c. Fallacies of Generalization.

2. Deductive Fallacies.

d. Fallacies of Ratiocination.

II. From evidence indistinctly conceived.

e. Fallacies of Confusion.¹

FALLIBILITY, liability to error; illusory character.—Reid.²

***FALSE, FALSITY**, "want of harmony between statement and reality."—C. F. V. *Falsity transcendental*, impossibility.

FAMILY (from Lat. *famulus*, a servant; Fr. *Famille*; Ger. *Familie*), in Ethics, a household, as under one head, who is a parent, or in place of a parent.—See Fairchild,³ Haven.⁴

Family.—1. In classification, usually lower than an order, and higher than a genus. 2. In the Critical Philosophy, the entire faculties of cognition, grouped together in as far as they allow of a derivation from a common ground. See **Constitutive**.—Kant.⁵

FANATICISM (Fr. *Fanatisme*, *Exaltation*; Ger. *Schwärmerei*), extravagance of emotion, especially in religion; the rule of feeling in the sphere of reason; the overriding of the natural by the disordered recognition of the supernatural; the trusting in the immediate, where the mediate is in place; the expectation of results without means; visionary judgments of the supersensuous and divine; the confounding of imagination with reality. "Fanaticism is, so to speak, a pious presumption. It is the product of a sort of pride and overweening self-reliance, which makes a man imagine that he can by a marvellous soaring approach the natures of heaven, lifting himself above the usual and prescribed order."—Kant.⁶

***FANCY, FANTASY** (Fr. *Fantaisie*; Ger. *Phantasie*), the imaginative faculty in its "creative" character, giving vivid expression to its representations. "Fancy (*Phantasie*), imagi-

¹ *Logic*, B. V. See Aristotle: *Prior Analyt.*, I., XLVI. *Sophistical Elenchi*, L. i., iv., v. Atwater: *Log.*, ch. 6. Baumgarten: *Acroasis Log.*, §§ 404 seq. Devey: *Log.*, B. VI. Hamilton: *Log.*, Lect. XXIII. Gravesande: *Introd. ad Philos. Logic*, ch. 28. Jevons: *Elem. Less. in Logic*, Less. XX., XXI. Do.: *Logic, in Science Prim.*, sect. 25-27. Keckermann: *Syst. Log.*, 544-578. Krug: *Logik*, §§ 115-117. Lotze: *Logik*, sechst. Kap., 323-340. Pöhlitz: *Encyklopädie*, I., 86. Port Royal *Logic* (Baynes), Part III., ch. 19, 20. Rothenflue: *Institut. Philosoph. Theoretic.*, I., 90. Stier: *Præcept. Doctrinæ Logiæ*, 35-37. Ueberweg: *Log.*, §§ 126, 130, 137. Watts: *Log.*, Part III., ch. 3, § 1. Whately: *Logic*, ch. v. ² *Intellect. Powers*, Ess. VII., ch. 4. ³ *Moral Philosophy*, 199-210. ⁴ *Mor. Philos.*, 198-220. ⁵ *Urtheilskr. Einl.*, III. ⁶ *Ueber d. Gefühl d. Schön. u. Erhab.* IV. Absch.; *Werke*, vii., 433.

nation (*Einbildungskraft*), and poetical power (*Dichtungskraft*) involve in common the faculty of mental representation of objects which are not perceived by the senses. The language of common life, as well as that of philosophy, makes a distinction between these terms. The Greeks used *phantasia* to designate both fancy and imagination. The Latins translated it by *Imaginatio*. Some philosophers use fancy to designate the faculty of mental representation of absent things; when fancy presents its objects with great completeness and clearness, they call it imagination. But in common use, imagination is the faculty by which we have a clear mental representation of absent objects, and fancy implies a facility in combining new creations from the stores of imagination."—Eberhard. Goethe employs the word in this sense when he styles fancy "the ever-moving, ever-new Jove's loveliest daughter, child of his heart." The English usage is not entirely fixed. Sometimes imagination and fancy are identified; sometimes imagination is the collecting, and fancy the plastic power; sometimes the reverse. All these differences are represented in Fleming's *Quotations*.—See Reid,¹ Stewart.²

FANTASY (Fr. *Fantaisie*), fancy.

FAS (Lat.).—1. That which is right in the sight of God; divine law; opposed to *jus, q. v.*, or human law. 2. That which is right, whether by law, equity, custom, or permission; right justice, equity; lawful, fit, permitted.

***FATALISM**.—1. "The theory of a blind necessity of nature in the connection of nature itself, without a first principle."—Kant.³ 2. The theory of a blind necessity of nature in the causality of the first principle.

FATALIST, one who maintains the doctrine of *Fatalism*.—Mill: "Though the doctrine of necessity, as stated by most who hold it, is very remote from fatalism, it is probable that most necessarians are fatalists, more or less, in their feelings."

FATALITY (Fr. *Sort*; (*fatalité*); Ger. *Verhängniss*).—1. Result determined by fate. South: "The Stoics held a fatality and a fixed unalterable course of events; but then they held also that they fell out, by a necessity emergent from and inherent

¹ *Works*, 367, 379–382. ² II., 259, 260, 278–282, 436; V., 264. ³ *Prolegomena*, § 61.

in the things themselves, which God himself could not alter." 2. Fatalism.—Kant.¹

***FATE** (Fr. *Destin* (*sort*); Ger. *Schicksal*).—"No necessity in nature is blind, but is conditioned; consequently, is intelligible necessity—*non datur fatum*."—Kant.²

FATUITY, extreme feebleness of mind; foolishness.

FAVOUR (Lat. *Favor*; Fr. *Faveur*; Ger. *Gunst*), goodwill; grace; mark of love; the opposite of injury.—Reid.³ In Kant:⁴ "The only free complacency, satisfaction, pleasure;" applied to the love of the beautiful—the beautiful makes its appeal to our favour; not to our love of the pleasures of sense, nor to our reason. The same, he says, is true of the speculative argument for the existence of God.

***FEAR**, "internal agitation on account of apprehended evil. This agitation throws a paralyzing influence over the body. It takes rank among the emotions."—C. F. V.

***FEELING**.—"In its widest sense, all passive experience. In this sense it includes all forms of sensibility. In a more restricted sense, it is applied to the pleasurable and painful in mind, by contrast with sensibility as a characteristic of the physical." Feeling has been applied (though not at all accurately) to the immediate knowledge which we have of first truths.—C. F. V.

Feeling (Ger. *Gefühl*), in Jacobi, immediate knowing, belief; the one organ of certainty of the highest ideas; of that which lies beyond the understanding, the eternal and divine.—See **Belief**.

FERVOUR (Ger. *Inbrunst*), ardor of thought, feeling, desire, purpose, or devotion.

FETICH, FETICH-WORSHIP, FETICH-MAKING, FETICH-FAITH.—See **Fetichism**.

***FETICHISM**, in Kant, a service of God in which statutory commands, rules of faith, and observances (the externals or non-essentials of religion) constitute the basis and fundamental part.

FICHTEANISM, FICHTEAN SYSTEM, system of Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814), a logical carrying through of transcendental subjective idealism. His later theory is that of

¹ *Urtheilsk.*, § 72. ² *Rein. Vern.*, 280; Meiklejohn, 170. ³ *Active Powers*, Ess. V., ch. 5. ⁴ *Urtheilskraft*, § 5. *Crit. d. rein. Vern.*, 615, 652, 665.

absolute being as one original divine life, revealing itself only in the moral acts of free subjects.—See **Science, Doctrine of**.

FIELD, of concepts, the objects to which they can be applied. Kant.¹

FIGURE.—1. In Logic, the way in which the terms of a Syllogism, *q. v.*, can be disposed. The figures are four, and can be most easily fixed in the memory by noting the position of the middle term, in the premises, on which the figure depends. The first three are Aristotelian, the fourth Galenian. *F. First*, middle term subject of the major, predicate of the minor. *F. Second*, middle term predicate of both. *F. Third*, middle term subject of both. *F. Fourth*, middle term predicate of major, subject of minor. See Aristotle,² Atwater,³ Fowler,⁴ Hamilton,⁵ Jevons,⁶ Kant,⁷ Thomson,⁸ Ueberweg,⁹ Ulrici.¹⁰ 2. In Ontology, the boundary of a thing extended.

FIN (Fr.; Lat. *Finis*; Ger. *Zweck*), end; aim; scope. *Fin absolu*, main, final aim, design, purpose; Ger. *Endzweck*.

FINAL CAUSES.—See **Causes Final, Design**.

FINE ARTS.—See **Æsthetics**.

FINIS (Lat.), end; aim; final cause.

FIRE.—1. Formed, according to Anaximenes, by rarefaction from air. 2. In Parmenides, one of the two immutable elements (heat-fire, cold-earth) by the mixture of which the phenomena of nature are produced. 3. In Heraclitus, the primary elementary principle of nature, of movement, and of vitality. 4. In Stoicism, identified with the divine power and being.

***FIRST CAUSE**, the origin or source of all dependent being; that is, of all being which is not self-sufficient.—C. F. V.

FIRST NOTION, “the concept of a thing as it exists of itself, and independent of any operation of thought, as John, Man, Animal. It is real, immediate, direct.” Opposed to Second Notion.—Hamilton.¹¹

¹ *Urtheilskraft*, Einl. ii. ² *Prior Analyt.*, I., iv.-xi., xiv.-xxiii.; *Poster. Analyt.*, I. xiv.; *Element. Logic. Aristotel.* (Trendelenburg), §§ 24, 28, 30. ³ *Logic*, ch. v., 3. ⁴ *Deductive Logic*, ch. iii., §§ 2, 3. ⁵ *Logic*, lect. xx. ⁶ *El. Less. in Logic*, less. xvi. ⁷ *Die falsche Spitzfindigk. der vier Syllogistischen Figuren*, 1762; *Werke* (Hartenstein, 1838), I. 1-18; *Logique par J. Taisot*, sec. edit., Paris, 1862, 217-241. ⁸ *Laws of Thought*, §§ 96-100. ⁹ *System d. Logik*, Dritt. Aufl., 1868, tr. by T. M. Lindsay, 1871, §§ 103-118. ¹⁰ *Compend. d. Logik*, 2d ed., 1872, §§ 83-86. ¹¹ *Discussions* (Am. ed.), 189, 140 n.

FIRST PRINCIPLES.—See *Principles*.

FISSILE, capable of being cleft. *Fission*, the act of cleaving, or of being cleft.

***FITNESS and UNFITNESS.**—"The one is applied to the harmony of right actions with the dignity of our nature and with the order of things under the moral government of the world; the other to the want of such harmony, or to conflict with established order."—C. F. V.

FIX, FIXATION, FIXING, in Fichte: "The intuiting becomes intuition, by being fixed as such. To this pertain three things: 1. The act of fixing, which is the result of the absolute spontaneity of the Ego—the Reason; 2. That which is fixed, or is to be fixed. This is the imagination, in so far as its activity is bounded by the fixing. 3. That which arises from the fixation of the imagination—the intention."—Buhle.¹

FLUID, n. (Lat.), flowing; matter which flows, whose molecular parts are most easily moved and displaced without separation of the mass; opposed to the rigid and solid; it embraces the liquids or incompressibles, the gaseous, and the ethereal; is applied in the old theory to the subtlest forces, as electricity, light, caloric, nerve action, which are the imponderable fluids. It is applied by way of analogy to the soul by Ulrici.

FLUIDIST (Fr.), one who adopts a fluid in his hypothesis; one who explains the phenomena of animal magnetism as the result of a fluid.

FLUX (Lat.), flowing; passing away; in Heraclitus, the eternal motion and mutation of all things. We cannot bathe twice in the same river.

FOCUS (Lat.), hearth; centring point of straight lines or rays; applied to the imaginary brain centre (*F. imaginarius*) of impressions made on the nerves of sensation.

FOLIE (Fr.), mania.

***FORCE**, in the Physics and Metaphysics of the present time, one of the most characteristic, important, and difficult terms. Bouillet: "In Philosophy we mean by force, 1. An active substance (see *Soul, Substance*). 2. The power of acting (see *Activity*). 3. A direct manifestation of that power, as,

¹ *Geesch.*, vi. 761; *Lehrb.*, viii. 747.

for example, voluntary effort. In Mechanics, we give the name of force to any cause which sets a body in motion, or modifies its movement."¹ "Every cause of an operation, whether in the world of mind or of matter."²

Force (*Kraft*), in Hegel,³ with its exertion, operation, expression, outurance (*Aeusserung*), is essence as a negative reference to itself, and repelling itself from itself into reflection-into-other,—reflection in an *alterum*.

Force, in Kant,⁴ the causality of a substance, or substance considered as causality—substance *has* force; a general name for everything which is the ground on which depends the production of a determinate result; physical cause; condition of the actuality of the operation of essence. Krug: "The internal principle of operativeness." Lemoine: "The idea of force involves the idea of cause, and of substance. Force is substance capable of acting, and, in reality, acting. Force and substance can be separated in thought only; all force is substance, and all substance is force; that which does not act, does not exist."⁵ Meineke: "That in substance which contains the sufficient reason of its accidents." Schopenhauer: "That which imparts to every cause its causality, that is, its power of working."⁶ Wolf: "That which contains in itself the sufficient reason of the actuality of action, or, the conation, the perpetual effort of acting."⁷

Force, in its combinations, 1. With adjectives and participles: absolute, relative; active, passive; attractive, repulsive; dead, living; impelling; motive, dynamic; essential, mechanical; penetrative, superficial; primary, derivative. 2. With nouns, F. of bodies in general; of attraction; of extension; of inertia; of repulsion.

Forces, the two, of Empedocles, the unity of Parmenides, conjoined with the plurality of Heraclitus; the force of attraction and the force of repulsion.

FORGIVENESS, in Ethics, "implies, 1. The remission of the right to retaliate, when safe or proper; 2. The dismissal of

¹ *Dictionnaire Universel*, s. v. ² Brockhaus: *Convers. Lexic.*, 11th ed., Kraft. ³ *Encyclopaedia*, § 136; *Logic*, transl. by Wallace, 212-216; Schwegler: *Gesch. d. Philos.*, XLV. l. 2 b., trans. of Seelye & Stirling. ⁴ *Crit. d. rein. Vern.* § 10, 107, 108; Meiklejohn's Transl., § 6, pp. 66-67; *Naturlehre*, 14; *Original Ideen Abh. d. Empir. Anthropologie*, 45 seq.

⁵ *Dict. des Scienc. Philos.* Force. ⁶ *Welt als Wille*, II., 51. ⁷ *Ontologia*, § 722-724.

the resentful feelings which injury may have excited; 3. The revival of those feelings of good will which it becomes us habitually to cherish."—Fleming.¹

FORM.—Primarily, the figure or shape of material objects. The "form" of knowledge, in the system of Kant,² is that which the mind itself contributes as the condition of knowing. So, with him, space and time are "forms" of knowledge. "That which in the phenomenon corresponds to the sensation, I term its *matter*; but that which effects (secures) that the content of the phenomenon can be arranged under certain relations, I call its *form*."—C. F. V.

***Form of Cognition**, in the Critical Philosophy, the mode in which the union of particular mental representations is determined—the *F. of intuition*, and the *F. of thinking*, or of *understanding*. *F. of a proposition*, the relation of the concepts to unity. *F. of external intuition*, space; *F. of internal intuition*, time. *F. of experience*, that which gives universal validity to the empirical judgments. *F. of appetition*, *desire*, the mode in which the object is desired or disliked.—See Grove,³ Hallam,⁴ Arbp. Thomson.⁵

FORMAL, "connected with conditions rather than causes."—Latham. "Space, time, and number, may be conceived as forms by which the knowledge derived from our sensations is moulded, and which are independent of the differences in the matter of our knowledge, arising from the sensations themselves. Hence, the sciences which have these ideas for their subject may be termed *formal sciences*."—Whewell. Formal as opposed to material.—Hamilton.⁶

Formal, as *adj.*, enters into various combinations, as *F. error*, involving the logical form, opposed to material.—*F. indifference* of action, in the freedom of the will, *q. v.*, opposed to the objective indifference. *F. principle of the will*, abstracted from all subjective ends, resting on the ground that rational nature exists as end in itself. *F. use of reason*, abstracts from all content, as the reason is itself the source of certain concepts and principles. It borrows them neither from the senses nor the understanding.

¹ *Manual of Mor. Philos.*, 272, 273.—See Bp. Butler: *Sermon on Forgiveness of Injuries*. ² *Krit. der rein. Vernunft*, Meiklejohn's Trans., p. 21. ³ *Correlat. of Physic. Forces*, 7. ⁴ *Literat. of Europe*, Pt. II., ch. III., § 50. ⁵ *Necessary Laws of Thought*, §§ 11-14. ⁶ *Logic* (Am. edit.), Appendix, 539-542.

Formal, as *noun*, also has a number of combinations. *F. of law*, the mental representation of the identity and uniformity of the manifold; opposed to the material of law, which is the manifold itself. *F. of nature*, the legitimacy of all objects of experience, which, so far as they are cognized *a priori*, is necessary. *F. of virtue*, in Plato, the cognition of the law of reason.

FORMALLY, in the writings of the Scholastics, has a wide and indeterminate range of meaning. It marks—1. What belongs truly to the existence of a thing; 2. the essence; 3. essential distinction; 4. essential attribute; 5. simple concept, *rei ut sic*, opposed to *rei ut talis*; 6. a thing in the abstract, opposed to *materialiter* or *in concreto*; 7. the direct signification, opposed to oblique; 8. as we conceive a thing, *concupiendi modus*, as opposed to *a parte rei*.—L. See **Real**, **Virtual**, **Action**.

FORMATIVE, "having the power of giving form; plastic."—Latham.

FORMULA, FORMULARY, a rule, law, or statement framed with precision. Hence, *Formularize*, *Formulate*.

***FORTITUDE**.—See *Fleming*.¹

FOURIERISM (from Fourier, its author), a system of social economy, establishing a new method of association.—See **Group**, **Passion**, **Passional**, **Phalanstery**, **Phalanx**, **Series**.

FREE AGENT, FREEDOM.—See **Liberty**, **Necessity**, **Will**.

***FREE-THINKER**.—This term is applied to Toland, "a candid Free-thinker," by Molyneux, in a letter to Locke, 1697;² and Shaftesbury,³ in 1709, speaks of "our modern free-writers." But it was Collins,⁴ in 1713, who first appropriated the name to express the independence of inquiry which was claimed by the Deists. There is no parallel word in other languages.—Farrar.⁵

***FREE-WILL** (Ger. *Freie Willkühr*; Lat. *Arbitrium liberum*).—See **Freedom**, **Will**.

FRENCH PHILOSOPHY.—See **Synthetical Tables**.

FRESISOM, FRESISON, in Logic, marks the first mode in the fourth figure. The major is a universal negative, the minor a special affirmative, the conclusion a special negative.

¹ *Man. of Mor. Phil.*, 254. ² *Works*, fol. ed., III. 624. ³ *Works*, Vol. I., p. 65. ⁴ In his *Discourse of Free-thinking*. ⁵ *Bampton Lect.*, p. 588.

FrE: No miserable man is content;

SI: Some are content who are poor;

SOM: Some poor people are not miserable.

See **Frisesomorum**, Port Royal Logic.¹

*Friendship.

FRISESOMORUM, in Logic, mnemonic term, which marks one of the indirect modes of the first figure recognized by Aristotle. The last two syllables are added, simply for the sake of the metre.—Celentes, Dabitis, Fopesmo, Frisesomorum.—D. P. S.

FUERWAHRHALTEN (Ger., the holding of a thing to be true).—"When a judgment is valid for every rational being, the ground of it is objectively sufficient, and the *Fürwahrhalten* is termed conviction (*Ueberzeugung*). If it has its ground in the character of the personal subject, it is called persuasion (*Ueberredung*)."—Kant.²

***FUNCTION**.—1. "The special exercise or form of activity belonging to a power when operating for the attainment of its proper end."—C. F. V. "The word *functio*, in Latin, simply expresses performance or operation; *functio muneris* is the exertion of an energy of some determinate kind, but with us the word *function* has come to be employed in the sense of *munus* alone, and means not the exercise, but the specific character of a power. Thus, the *function* of a clergyman does not mean, with us, the performance of his duties, but the peculiarity of these duties themselves. The function of nutrition does not mean the operation of that animal power, but its discriminate character."—Hamilton.³ 2. In Quantitative Induction, any quantity which depends upon and varies with another quantity, and either may be considered the function of the other.—Jevons.⁴

FUNDAMENTAL, serving to lay the foundation; pertaining to the foundation.—*F. Philosophy*, the primary scientific basis, forming the first grand division of philosophy. Biedermann (1838), Gerlach (1843), Krug (1827), Lantier (1837), H. F. Richter (1824), Tafel (1848), and others. *F. Laws of Thought*, in Hamilton:⁵ 1. Identity; 2. Contradiction or Non-Contradiction; 3. Excluded Middle. 4. Reason and Conse-

¹ (Bynes) 204. ² *Prin. Vern.*, 848; Meiklejohn, 496. ³ *Lects.*, I., 180. ⁴ *Principles of Science*, II., 113. ⁵ *Logic* (Am. ed.), 67-77.

quent or Sufficient Reason.—*F. Principles*, ultimate and supreme principles.—*F. Proposition*, that on which other propositions rest. It may be relative or absolute.

FUNDAMENTUM (Lat.), foundation.—*F. Divisionis*, the ground, basis, or principle of division.—*F. Relationis*, the ground of relation, i. e., the series of events or circumstances which establish a relation between two correlative terms.—Jevons.

FUTURE (Lat.), that which is yet to be; time to come; opposed to *past* and *present*. Hence, Futurity.—Reid,¹ Hamilton.²

FUTURITION, in the Leibnitzian metaphysics, the fortuitous character or contingency of truths or things.³

GALEN, FIGURE OF, GALENIAN SYLLOGISM, in Logic, the ordinary name of the fourth figure, attributed, on slender authority, to Galen. The first three are the Aristotelian.—Hamilton.⁴

GAUTAMA, GODOMA, GOTAMA, Buddha, commonly supposed to be the founder of Boodhism (prob. 624–548 B. C.). See *Brahmanism*, *Karma*, *Metempsychosis*, *Nirvana*.—J. Thomas.⁵

GEDANKE (Ger.), “not only a thought, but as a thought truly is, a *Ge-danke*, a putting or bringing together of things.”—Stirling.⁶

GEFÜHL (Ger.), feeling, 1. of pleasure or pain; emotion; 2. of touch.—Hamilton.⁷

GEMÜTH (Ger.), mind, soul, heart, spirit; disposition, nature, temper, feeling.—1. The total faculty of desire, sensuous and rational.—Eberhard. 2. The faculty which brings into synthesis the sense-representations, and effects the unity of empirical apperception.—Kant. 3. The soul, reflected in itself, drawn to its own individuality, and inwardly feeling.—Mussmann. 4. The totality of those manifestations of the intellectual life in man which constitute the feelings, and the desire which they determine.—Schulze. It has a large number of compounds.

¹ *Works* (Hamilton), 340–342, 629. ² *Reid's Works*, Notes 340, 342, 629. ³ *Theodicee*, I., § xxvi., § lll., § cill. ⁴ *Logic*, 285, 302. ⁵ *Dict. of Biography and Mythology*, s. v. (of special value on Hindoo topics). ⁶ *Annotat. on Schwegler*, 353. ⁷ *Metaphysics*, 562.

GENERA.—See **Genus**.

GENERAL (Ger. *Allgemein*), the opposite of special or particular; *universal*. It comprehends a plurality of objects under a common point of view. It may be absolute or relative.

General Idea, A (abstract idea), "is an idea of the mind, considered there as separated from time and place, and so capable to represent any particular being that is conformable to it."

—Locke.¹

General Names, Terms.—"The function of naming, and particularly of general names, in induction, may be recapitulated as follows: Every inductive inference which is good at all, is good for a whole class of cases. A process of experimentation and comparison is necessary, in which . . . some uniformity in the course of nature (must be) evolved and ascertained. . . . If, being ascertained, it can be remembered, it will serve as a formula for making, in particular cases, all such inferences as the previous experience will warrant. But we can only secure its being remembered, or give ourselves even a chance of carrying in our memory any considerable number of such uniformities, by registering them through the medium of permanent signs, which (being, from the nature of the case, signs not of an individual fact, but of a uniformity, that is, of an indefinite number of facts similar to one another) are general signs; universals; general names, and general propositions."—J. S. Mill.²

General Notions, Abstract Notions (Ger. *Geschlechtsbegriffe*), are notions by which several particular things are presented in common; as, mineral, plant, animal. They are opposed to individual notions.

General Propositions (Signs).—See **General Names**.

General Term.—See **Term**.

General Truths are those which "exist independent of experience."—Devey.³

General Words.—"General and universal belong not to the real existence of things; but are the inventions and creatures of the understanding. Words are general . . . when used for signs of general ideas."—Locke.⁴

¹ *Hum. Underst.*, II., ch. xi., 9. ² *Logic*, b. iv., ch. iii., § 3, 4. ³ *Logic*, b. iv., ch. ii., § 4.

⁴ *Hum. Underst.*, B. III., ch. 3, § 11.

GENERALIA, "intermediate scientific truths derived from the higher generalities of science, and destined to serve as the *generalia*, or first principles of the various arts."—J. S. Mill.¹

***GENERALIZATION, GENERALIZING**.—*G. of a name* applies it to a wider class of objects than before, so that the extension of its meaning is increased, and the intension diminished.—Jevons.²

Generalizations, Empirical, are based upon "phenomena whose concomitant occurrence is so frequent as to warrant the inference of some antecedent connection between them, without affording us any secure ground for affirming the manner of its existence."—Devey.³

GENERALIZE, to reduce to genus; to go through the act of *generalization*.

GENERALS, the constituents of a *genus*.—"It is to Bacon we owe the development of the idea that the whole of natural philosophy consists entirely of a series of inductive generalizations . . . and of a corresponding series of inverted reasoning from *generals* to particulars."—Sir J. Herschel.⁴

GENERANT, *s.*: "Begetting or productive power."—Glanville. L. J.

GENERATE, cause; produce.—Herbert Spencer. L. J.

GENERATIO (Lat.), generation; production.—*G. æquivoca*, equivocal generation; production of animals and plants without the procreative medium; spontaneous generation.—*G. teleologica*, teleological generation; the bringing forth an organic being in accordance with an aim.

GENERATION OF IDEAS, "the simple ideas *generate*, rather than . . . compose, the complex ones."—Mill.⁵

GENERATIONAL PASSION, in the Societary school, family love, as existing between the successive generations.

GENERIC, of or pertaining to genus or generic notions; general; opposed to specific. It is applied to characters or properties, differences, names, terms.

GENERIFICATION, the reducing to genera. It stands in reciprocal relation to specification.—"The abstraction which carries up species into genera, is called, in that respect, *generification*, or, more loosely, *generalization*. The process of

¹ *Logic*, VI., x1. 6. ² *Less. in Logic*, 45. ³ *Logic*, B. V., i. 6. ⁴ *Disc. on Nat. Philos.*, art. 96. ⁵ *Logic*, B. VI., iv.

abstraction, by which out of a proximately lower we evolve a proximately higher concept, is, when we speak with logical precision, called the process of Generification."—Hamilton.¹

GENEROSITY, in Ethics, nobleness, largeness of nature, shown especially, but not exclusively, in giving. It corresponds with *ἐλευθεριότης*, freeness, largeness of mind and spirit, in Aristotle² and Plato.³

GENESIS, in Biology, origin, source, productive cause; evolution.—Herbert Spencer divides it into *Homo-genesis*, or *Gamo-genesis*, in which the successive generations are alike, and have a sexual origin; and *Hetero-genesis*, when the recurrence of the same form is cyclical.⁴

GENETIC, related to the genesis.—(*G. definitions* consider the defined subject as in the process of becoming.—Hamilton.⁵

***GENIUS and TALENT.**—*Genius, Wit, and Humour* (have been considered by many as words of equivalent signification. There is, however, a real difference between them. They) are all the offspring of imagination, but a much greater share of it is requisite to constitute true *genius* than either of the other two. *Genius* is characterized by a copious and plastic, as well as a vivid and extensive imagination; by which means it is equally qualified to invent and create, or to conceive and describe, in the most lively manner, the objects it contemplates. On the other hand, *wit* and *humour* neither invent nor create; they neither possess the vigor, the compass, nor the plastic power of the other quality. Their province is to assemble with alertness those sentiments and images which may excite pleasantry or ridicule. *Wit* is the most shining, *humour* is the most pleasing and the most useful quality. Wit discovers itself in smart repartees, in ingenious conceits, in fanciful allusions, and in brilliant sentiments. Humour, on the other hand, manifests itself in ludicrous representations, in masterly strokes of manners and character, in shrewd observations, and in facetious argumentation and narrative. This quality may be divided into two kinds,—into that which is displayed in the representation of characters, and may be denominated *humour of character*; and into that which is displayed in composition, and may be

¹ *Logic*, Lect. XI. ² *Eth. N.*, IV., l. 1. ³ *Repub.*, 402 C. *Theat.*, 144 D. ⁴ *Inductions of Biology*, ch. 7. ⁵ *Logic* (Am. ed.), 343.

called *humour in writing*. The first consists in the art of marking the follies, the foibles, or the oddities of the character exhibited so strongly, and exposing them in such a ludicrous light, as to excite pleasantry and laughter. *Humour in writing* consists either of random strokes of *ridicule* and *facetiousness*, occasionally thrown out, as subjects of *drolery* and *pleasantry* happen to occur; or of a vein of *irony* and delicate satire, purposely displayed on a particular subject.¹

GENIUS OF SOCRATES.—See *Dæmon*.

***GENUINE.**—See *Authentic*.

***GENUS**, a class made up of two or more species.—*G. generalissimum*, *sumum genus*, the most general genus; that which is not part of any higher genus.

GEOMETRY, in Kant,² the science which determines the properties of space synthetically, and yet *a priori*. "In G. we argue by intuitive perception of each step. *Geometrical reasoning* has a close resemblance to the inductive."—Jevons,³ Pascal.⁴

GERMAN PHILOSOPHY.—See *Synthetical Tables*.

GHOST (Ger. *Geist*), spirit; soul; disembodied soul.

GIVE, GIVEN, in the Critical Philosophy, applied to, 1. The recognition of the object by its impression on the senses. 2. The concept in a judgment, when it is presupposed as already known, and furnishing the means for further cognition. 3. A pure intuition, when the cognitive faculty derives it from itself, not arbitrarily, but on the necessary ground of its own character.—Kant,⁵ Mellin.⁶

GLAUBE (Ger.).—1. Faith, as a theological virtue. 2. Belief, *q. v.*, in the philosophical sense.—Hamilton.⁷

GLOSSOGRAPHY.—See *Glossology*.

GLOSSOLOGY, "Comparative philology."—Whewell. "The most useful signification which could be given to this word, would be the details of the number, connection, and condition of the languages of the earth; in which case it might supplant the barbarous term *Linguistic*."—Latham.⁸ See *Terminology*.

¹ *Essay on Original Genius*, 8vo, London, 1767. ² *Crit. d. rein. Vern.*, 16 s. 40 s. 120, 204. ³ *Less. in Logic*, 58, 218, 115. ⁴ In *Port Royal Logic* (Baynes), 317. ⁵ *Rein. Vern.*, 33, 193 s., 521 s., 540, 698; Meiklejohn's Transl., 21, 117, 308, 319, 410. ⁶ *Wörterb. d. kr. Philos.* ⁷ *Reid's Works*, Note A, 793, 794. ⁸ *Dictionary*, s. v.

***Gnome.**

Gnome, in the Paracelsian school, the elementary spirit of the earth.—Whewell.¹

GNOMIC, having the character of a *gnome*; sententious.—The term *gnomic* denoted a school of elegiac poetry, the object of which was **Gnomic Philosophy**.—See **Synthetical Tables**.

GNOMOLOGY, collection of *gnomic* maxims.

GNOSEOLOGY, GNOSOLOGY, GNOSTOLOGY, in *Metaphysics*, doctrine or system of cognition; theory of knowledge; used by Stirling to render *Wissenschaftslehre* (Fichte's).

GNOSIS (Gr.), a seeking to know, *cognitio*; a knowing, knowledge (Plato); deeper wisdom; secret or mystic doctrine; a philosophy of religion which made its appearance in the early church doctrine of the Gnostics.

GNOSTICISM, a system of Gnosis, which arose from the mingling of the Perso-Chaldean philosophemes with Greek and Christian elements, in the first two centuries of the Christian era.—See **Æons, Demiurge, Emanation, Hyle, Manichæism, Matter**. See Baur (1835), Erdmann (1847), Matter (1828), Neander (1818) translated; Schmidt (1828).

GOCCLENIAN, from Rudolph Goclenius (1547–1628), in *Logic*, a name of the regressive *Sorites*.

***GOD** (Gr. *θεος*; Lat. *Deus*; Fr. *Dieu*; Ger. *Gott*).—For the etymology, see Adelung,² Meidinger,³ Wachter.⁴

God, Attributes of, in *Ethics, Metaphysics, Natural Theology*, see special articles, *Eternity, Necessary, Omnipotence, Omnipresence, Omniscience, Self-Existent, &c.* The attributes, according to the Scholastics, are determined by the three ways of causality, negation, and eminence—He is a final cause of all things, possessor of all perfections involved in the effect: He is not in any degree evil or limited: He is by pre-eminence all that is good.

God, Attributes of; Classification of.—"God is—

"I. According to his special relations, 1. to the moral world, holy, good, righteous; 2. to the physical world, *a*, according to the mathematical—omnipresent, eternal; *b*, according to the dynamic—almighty, omniscient; 3. to the conjoined moral and physical world—all-wise, blessed.

¹ *Hist. of Scientif. Ideas*, II. 175, ed. 1858. ² *Gramm. kritisch. Wörterb.*, s. v. ³ *Vergl. Etymol. Wörterbuch*, 158. ⁴ *Glossarium Germanicum*.

"II. According to His general relations to the universe, 1. infinite, unchangeable, independent; 2. purely spiritual—self-sufficient, absolutely necessary."—Boehme.¹ The attributes have also been classified as physical, metaphysical, and moral; internal or immanent, and external or transeunt; passive and active.

God, Definitions of.—"The Supreme Being, who contains within Himself the cause of all things."—Adelung. "The first ground of all being; the divine spirit which, unmoved itself, moves all; absolute, efficient principle; absolute notion; absolute end."—Aristotle. "The moral order of the universe, actually operative in life."—Fichte. "The absolute Spirit; the pure essential Being that makes Himself object to Himself; absolute holiness; absolute power, wisdom, goodness, justice."—Hegel. "A being who, by His understanding and will, is the Cause (and by consequence the Author) of nature; a being who has all rights and no duties; the supreme perfection in substance; the all-obligating Being; Author of a universe under moral laws; the moral author of the world; an Intelligence infinite in every respect."—Kant. "God is derived incontestably from *good*, and means the Good itself in the perfect sense, the absolute Good, the primal Good, on which all other good depends—as it were, the fountain of good. Hence, God has been styled the Being of beings (*ens entium*), the supreme Being (*ens sumum*), the most perfect Being (*ens perfectissimum, s. realissimum*)."—Krug. "The sufficient reason of all monads; primitive simple substance; single primitive unity; pure, immaterial actuality."—Leibnitz. "The independent Supreme Being, author and maker of all things, from whom we receive all our good, who loves us, and gives us all things."—Locke. "Most perfect, most real, most holy, most righteous, and best Being; the supremest Intelligence, the primal essence; Creator, ruler, and judge of the world."—Lossius. "The absolute substance, containing all things in Himself, seeing all things in Himself, according to their true nature and being."—Malebranche. "The word God, fairly used, means a *cause of the world*, distinct and separate from it,

¹ Quoted by Krug, *Gott*.

and with *personality*. Theism demands not alone a Cause of the World distinct from it, but an intelligent cause, that is, with cognition and will—consequently, personal and individual. An impersonal God is no God at all; it is an abuse of the word, a non-concept, a contradiction in the adjective.”—Schopenhauer. “The absolute, universal substance; the real cause of all and every existence; the alone, actual, unconditioned being—not only cause of all being, but itself all being, of which every special existence is only a modification.”—Spinoza. “The *ens a se*, spirit independent, in which is embraced the sufficient reason of the existence of things contingent, that is, of the universe.”—Wolf. “God is all eye, understanding, ear; unmoved, undivided, undisturbed; ruling all through thought; and like to man neither in form nor understanding.”—Xenophanes.

God, Existence of, Argument for, Demonstration, Proofs of.—The terms used in defining or classifying these are: Cosmological, historical, naturalistic, ontological or teleological, prattical or moral (the Kantian), supernaturalistic, theoretical, on which see the special articles.

God, Philosophical Systems Concerning.—See **Atheism, Deism, Pantheism, Theism**. Among the names of authors who have a historical place in the philosophical discussions of the doctrine of God and the associated topics, may be mentioned: the Fichtes, Hegel, Herder, Jacobi, Kant, Leibnitz, Mendelssohn, Reimarus, Ritter, Ulrici, Des Cartes, Bledsoe, Brougham, Cudworth.

GOOD (in General), “that which has a value.”—Kant. “Everything which promotes the end to which the springs of action in any being are directed.”—Reinhard. “All that is the object of desire.”—Schulze. “That which has a more abiding value than what is simply pleasant.”—De Wette. “That which is as it should be, or that which fulfils its destination.”—Zerrenner.—See **Bonum**. Fu.

***Good (The Chief)**, (Ger. *Gut, höchstes*).

GOOD, GOODNESS (Classification of).—“The good or perfect may be divided into metaphysical, physical, and moral good. In the phrases ‘morally good’ and ‘morally bad,’ the term ‘morally’ is used to indicate the specific nature of goodness or badness alleged to exist, namely, such goodness or badness as can belong to personal actions, and to the agents, in

contrast with other forms of goodness or badness, such as may belong to things. The 'right' thus comes under a wider generalization, namely, the 'good.' Happiness is a *good within a man*; property, on the other hand, is an *external good*; but the *morally good* is distinct from both, as good connected with what a man is and does, in contrast with what a man experiences and has."—Calderwood.¹

GORGONIZATION, from Gorgon, who turned all she looked upon into stone.—Used by Stirling to mark the theory "that mind is so peculiar a Gorgon, that it transforms objects into its own nature—the *Gorgonization* of the object on the part of the subject—the belief of all subjective idealism."²

GRACE, in *Æsthetics*, beauty of form, in movement, in carriage, in attitude.—Chesterfield (to his son): "Senza la Grazia tutta fatica è fana" (without grace all your trouble is of no account).

GRADATION, GRADUATION, in *Logic*, process from step to step; progression by regular degrees.—"The method of gradation consists in taking a number of stages of a property in question, intermediate between two extreme cases which appear to be different."—Whewell.³

GRADE, GRADUS, in *Ontology*, degree, "the distinction of internal qualities of the same things."—Welf. "The intensive magnitude of a thing. . . . Between any two supposed grades there are intermediate grades."—Krug.

GRADUAL, proceeding by grades or degrees.

*Grammar (Universal).

GRAMMATICAL PREDICATE, the verb, containing both copula and logical predicate.—*G. sentence* may contain any number of distinct propositions, which admit of being separated, but which are combined together for the sake of brevity.—Jevons.⁴

GRAMMATOLOGY, science or theory of the grammatic; philosophical grammar.

*Grandeur. *Gratitude.

GRAVITATION, GRAVITY, THEORY OF, in *Metaphysics*, conjecture in regard to the nature of the force by which

¹ *Handb. of Moral Philosophy*, 17. ² *Annotat. on Schweigger*, 387, 391, 392, 418. ³ *Novum Organon*, Aphorisms, 49-51. ⁴ *Less. in Logic*, less. xi.

bodies tend to the centre of attraction. "If it were true that the fall of an apple was the occasion of Newton's pursuing the train of thought which led to the doctrine of universal gravitation, the habits and constitution of Newton's intellect, and not the apple, were the real source of this great event in the progress of knowledge."—Whewell.¹ "True philosophy has shown it to be unsoivable by any hypothesis, and resolved it into the immediate will of the Creator."—Quincy. L. J. In Hegel's *Mechanics*, in his Science of Nature, "Gravity is the being in *se*, the self-internality (the being within self) of matter, its longing to come to itself, the first trace of subjectivity. The centre of gravity of a body is *the one*, the oneness which it seeks."—Schwegler.² See Jevons.³ In Kant,⁴ "The operation of general attraction which all matter exercises *immediately* upon all matter, at all degrees of remoteness." Ger. *Schwere*. "It differs from gravity, which is the effort to move in the direction of the greater gravitation."

Gravitation, in Ethics, is applied to a central and universal principle of morals.

GREEKS, PHILOSOPHY OF.—See *Synthetical Tables*.

GROTESQUE, in *Æsthetics*, from *Grotta* (Italian), an artificial cave, where wild and comic figures were often painted.—The grotesque in art is the counter-ideal, handled ideally. "Farce is that in poetry which grotesque is in a picture."—Du Fresnoy.⁵

GROUND (Ger. *Grund*), in Logic, *fundamental* cause, principle, or reason; the *sufficient reason*, *q. v.*

GROUP (Fr.), in the Societary school, a union of persons, attracted to each other by one of the four affective passions.

*Gymnosophist.

HABILITATION (*Habilitas*, aptitude, ability), the formal admission of a teacher, especially of a university, into the faculty to which he desires to attach himself.

***HABIT** (Fr. *Habitude*; Ger. *Gewohnheit*).—"The virtues are

¹ *Nov. Organ.*, 48. ² *Gesch. d. Philos.*, § 45, II. 1., Seelye, Stirling. ³ *Less. in Logic*, 260. ⁴ *Naturlehre*, 71. ⁵ *Art of Printing*, translated by Dryden.

neither passions nor capacities; they are habits acquired."—Aristotle.¹ See Hamilton,² Reid.³

HABITUDE.—"Relation; respect; state with regard to something else."—L. J. "Names being supposed to stand perpetually for the same ideas, and the same ideas having immutably the same *habitudes* one to another; propositions concerning any abstract ideas, that are once true, must needs be eternal verities."—Locke.⁴

HAECCEITY (lit., *thisness*), a Scholastic term to express individuality or singleness, which we mark by the word "*this*," as, *this* man, *this* fruit, *this* star.—K.

HALF-KANTIANS (Ger. *Halb-Kantianer*), a term applied by H. Ritter, in his book (1827) directed against pantheism. It is applied to those who accepted Kant's views with modifications, as Beck and Bardeli.—See Kuhn.⁵

HALF-VIRTUES (Ger. *Halbtugenden*), in Ethics, actions in which virtue or duty has some influence, but not enough to form their exclusive or main motive.—L.

HALLUCINATION, "a delusion, consequent either on temporary confusion of mind, or more enduring disorder of thought, originated and continued by a diseased condition of brain."—C. F. V. Wandering of mind; mental illusions; "False perceptions without disease of the organs of sense."—Copland. "Sensations perceived at a time when there are no appropriate external objects to excite them in the organs of sense." "Images and ideas reproduced by the memory, associated by the imagination, and personified by habit."—Esquirol. L. J. See Brierre de Boismont,⁶ Maudsley,⁷ Porter.⁸

HAND, "the instrument of instruments."—Aristotle. "Oxen would be men, if they had hands."—Anaxagoras.

*Happiness.

HARDNESS (see Touch), a secundo-primary attribute of body.—Hamilton.⁹

HARMONIC, of or pertaining to harmony; concordant; in agreement.—"Harmonic reason, which compels the nature of things to accord with itself."—Pliny.¹⁰

¹ *Ethics*, II., 5. ² *Metaphysics* (Am. ed.), 124, 247-249, 265-267. *Reid's Works*, 221, 551. ³ *Hamilton's Ed.*, 221 b, 333 a, 387 a, 533 b, 550, 551. ⁴ *Hum. Underst.*, B. IV., c. II. ⁵ *Grac. d. Philos.*, 84. ⁶ *Hallucinations*, tr. from the French, Philada., 1853. ⁷ *Physiology and Pathology of the Mind*, 1867. ⁸ *Human Intellect*, §§ 227, 342-344. ⁹ *Reid's Works*, 848, 837-859. ¹⁰ *Hist. Natur.*, 2, 109, 113.

HARMONICS (Gr.), the theory of music; in Plato, a *system* or science of music, "which shall be free from the defects and inaccuracies which occur in actual instruments."—Whewell.¹

HARMONY (Gr.), means of joining; joining; union; accordant system, government; accordant relation of sounds; concord; the necessary union of all things in the universe, so that they work together to a common end. When it is considered as resting on the common ground of things subsistent and derived from common laws, it is styled, by Kant,² *H. generally established*; when it involves the relation of individual parts, he calls it *H. singularly established*.

Harmony of Mind and Body, in Leibnitzo-Wolfian Psychology, is the name given to any explanation of mental perceptions by changes which occur in the body, and of voluntary motions in the body by volitions and nolitions of the mind, or by its desires and aversions. It covers the common ground of the three hypotheses.³

***Harmony, Pre-established, System of**, "is that by which the intercourse (*commercium*) of soul and body is explained by a series of perceptions and desires in the soul, and a series of motions in the body, which are harmonic or accordant through the nature of soul and body."—Wolf.⁴ Those who accept this system are called *Harmonists*.

Harmony Social, or Absolute Harmony, in Fourierism, the era of prosperity which is to follow the infancy of the race.

***Harmony of Spheres.**

***HATE, HATRED** (Fr. *Haine*; Ger. *Hass*).—See **Love**. "Revulsion of feeling against things and persons regarded as evil. As concerned with persons, it takes the form of antagonism, and is to be ranked among the affections."—C. F. V.

HAZARD (Ger. *Ungefähr, Zufall*), chance; accident; "an event, or a series of events, which does not seem to be the result of natural necessity nor of intelligent plan."—D. P. S.

HEARING, perception of sound.—Porter,⁵ Reid.⁶

HEART (Fr. *Cœur*; Ger. *Herz*), used in Psychology to signify, in popular phrase, the seat of the emotions, the desires and conations; in Ethics, the moral condition, tone of feeling.

¹ *Hist. of Scientific Ideas*, III., lii. ² *Rein. Vern.*, 331, 706. Meiklejohn, 198, 415.
Mund. Sensib., § 22. *Entdeck.*, II., lii. ³ *Psychol. Rat.*, § 539. ⁴ *Psychol. Rat.*, § 612.
⁵ *Human Intellect*, §§ 125, 126, 139. ⁶ *Human Mind*, ch. 4, sec. 1.

In the ancient usage, biblical and classical, the range of the word was wider. The word sometimes embraced all the intellectual faculties. What we now call "head," and make antithetical to "heart," was then embraced in "heart."

HEAT.—1. Caloric; 2. the sensation referred to caloric as its cause.—Reid.¹

HEAUTONOMY (Gr.), law to self; applied by Kant² to the faculty of judgment as giving law *to itself*; not to nature, not to freedom, but *to itself only*.—J. S. Beck.³

HEAVEN (Angl. Sax.; Lat. *Cœlum*; Fr. *Ciel*; Ger. *Himmel*).—1. The seeming blue arch above us, in which, when unclouded, the sidereal bodies appear. 2. The infinite space which encompasses the earth. 3. The portions of the universe exterior to the earth. 4. The home of the blessed.—Kant.⁴ "Two things fill the soul with a reverence ever new and ever growing the oftener we return to them, the more we dwell upon them—the starry heavens above us, the moral law within us. The one annihilates my significance as an animate being, the other infinitely exalts my value as an intelligence endowed with personality."⁵

HEBREW PHILOSOPHY.—See **Synthetical Tables**.

***HEDONISM**, hence Hedonists.

HEGELIANISM, from G. W. Hegel (1770–1831),—Fichte's method, Schelling's system developed. The system of absolute idealism, of the absolute identity between cognition and being; the process of the thing is identical with the process of thinking; thought works out to absolute cognition by the resolution of every concept into its proper antithesis. Philosophy divided into 1. Logic: i. Being (*Sein*); ii. Essence (*Wesen*); iii. Notion (*Begriff*). 2. Philosophy of Nature: i. Mechanics; ii. Physics; iii. Organics. 3. Philosophy of the Spirit: i. Subjective S.; ii. Objective S.; iii. Absolute S.

HEGESIANISM, system of Hegesias, of the Cyrenic school, fl. 310 B. C.—See **Suicide**.

HEMEROSIS (Gr.), taming; in Ethics, the subjugation of the passions, of the evil in human nature.

HENADS, unities: in Plato, ideas; simple essences, monads.

¹ *Human Mind*, ch. v., sec. i. ² *Urtheilskraft* (Kirchmann), 24. ³ *Evl. Auszug*, II., 567.

⁴ *Religion innerhalb*, 191, 192, 193. ⁵ *Praktisch. Vernunft* (Kirchmann), 194.

HERBARTIANISM, (from J. F. Herbart, 1776–1841,) the system which maintains that the conceptions or internal conditions of the soul are psychic forces, and that their mutual operation can be reduced to an exact mathematical calculation. It claims to be “exact,” and as against the transcendental idealism of Kant, the School of Realism.—Meyer, H. L.

HERMENEUTIC (Gr.), interpreting.—Plato.¹

HERMESIANISM, the system of George Hermes (1775–1831), an attempt at a philosophico-dogmatic establishing of the Roman Catholic religion over against Kant and Fichte; condemned 1835.

*Hermetic Books.

Hermetic Chain, the series of sages beginning with Hermes Trismegistus (the thrice-great Hermes).

Hermetics, Alchemists, receivers of the Hermetical philosophy, and practisers of the Hermetical arts (transmutation of baser metals into gold; prolongation of life).

HEROIC, HEROISM, in Ethics, the principle or act which involves a lofty conception of duty, and a willingness to make great sacrifices for it.

HETEROGENEAL, HETEROGENEOUS, of another kind; the opposite of homogeneous. Hence, Heterogeneity, Heterogeneousness.

HETEROGENEITY, LAW OF (*principium Heterogeneitatis*), “that every concept contains other concepts under it; and therefore, when divided proximately, we descend always to other concepts, but never to individuals; in other words, things the most homogeneous—similar—must in certain respects be heterogeneous—dissimilar.”—Hamilton,² Krug.³ See **Genus and Species**.

HETEROGENY, production of a living being, by beings of a different species from it.

HETERONOMY, (*ἕτερος*, another; *νόμος*, law,) subjection to the law or rule of another. Opposed to Autonomy, *q. v.*—“This is Kant’s⁴ designation for a false principle of morals, such as receives acknowledgment when personal desire determines the right for us, instead of moral law. In contrast with Heteronomy, the recognition of moral law as the absolute

¹ *Phil. D.* ² *Logic*, Am. ed., 148. ³ *Logik*, § 45, b. ⁴ *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, Metaph. of Ethics*, Sempke’s Transl., new ed.; Calderwood, p. 98.

law of life is autonomy of the will, or autonomy of the reason."—C. F. V. Hence, Heteronomous.

HETEROPATHIC, "regulating by a different action, force, or law."—Latham, J. S. Mill. L. J.

***HEURISTIC**.—See **Ostensive**. The art of invention. *Heuristic Method*, the analytic.

HIATUS (Lat.), a gaping, opening, break; (Ger. *Lücke, Kluft*), a supposed break between phenomena; opposed to continuity. —"There is no hiatus in the universe."—Kant.¹

HIEROPHANT, an initiator into mysteries; a pretender to the possession of secret knowledge; a mystagogue.

HILARITY (Lat.), cheerfulness, gayety, joyousness, merriment; (Ger. *Frohseyn*.)

HINDOO (HINDU) PHILOSOPHY.—See **Synthetical Tables**.

HISTORY (Gr.), a learning or knowing by inquiry, information; narrative of what is thus gained; narrative of past events.—*H. of man, H. proper*, "narration of the phenomena of the freedom of the will, or of human actions, of the constant evolutions of the primary elements of human nature. *H. of nature*, natural history, account of impersonal nature, or of man as under the laws of external nature."—Kant.

History, Philosophy of, the application and the result of the application of philosophical principles to historical events, either particular or general.

HOBBSISM, system of Thomas Hobbes. Materialism; despotism.

HODEGETICS, a system for showing the way; in Philosophy, an introduction or guide to study.

***HOLINESS** (Ger. *Heiligkeit*).—"For the divine will, and for a holy will in general, there can be no imperative; the *shall* would here be in the wrong place, because the *will* is of itself necessarily in harmony with the law."—Kant.²

HOMEOMERY.—See **Homoiomery**.

HOMICIDE (Lat.), generic term for manslaughter; the killing of a human being.—See **Murder**.

HOMILETIC, social; in Ethics, applied to the social virtues.

HOMINEM, AD, to the man; in Logic, an argument whose force is derived from something in the views or interests of those to whom it is addressed.

¹ *Rein. Vernunft*, 221, 281, seq.; Meiklejohn, 134, 170, 171. ² *Grundlegung n. Met. d. Sitten*, 39; Semple's Tr. (Calderwood), 24.

HOMOGENEITY, HOMOGENEOUSNESS (Lat.), likeness of genus, *q. v.*; of kind. (Ger. *Gleichartigkeit*.) — *H. Law of*, "that however different any two concepts may be, they both are subordinate to some higher concept — things most unlike must in some respects be like." — Hamilton.¹

HOMOGENEOUS, HOMOGENE, HOMOGENEAL, of the same kind; opposed to Heterogeneous.

HOMOGENY, same nature or kind; the generation of a being by two others of the same kind.

HOMOIOMERY, HOMOIOMERIS, consisting of like parts; in Anaxagoras, the homogeneous particles constituting every distinct substance, each being characteristic of its own substance. The doctrine is styled Homoeomeria. — Grote.²

*Homologue.

HOMOLOGY (Gr.), a special term for the analogy existing between parts of different plants and animals, as between the wing of a bird and the fore-leg of a quadruped, or between the scales of a fish and the feathers of a bird. — Jevons.

HOMONYMOUS. — See *Equivocal*.

HOMOPATHY, similarity of feeling; sympathy. — Cudworth. L. J.

*Homotype.

HONESTY (Gr. τὸ καλόν; Lat. *Honestas, Honestum*; Fr. *Honnêteté*; Ger. *Ehrlichkeit*), moral beauty, nobleness, virtue, honorableness — distinguished from *utile*, the useful, by Cicero.³

HONOR, in Ethics,

"the finest sense

Of justice which the human mind can frame,

Intent each lurking frailty to disclaim,

And guard the way of life from all offense

Suffered or done." — WORDSWORTH.

HOPE (Fr. *Espérance*; Ger. *Hoffnung*), joyous anticipation, with a less degree of probability than expectation.

HORIZON (Lat., from the Greek), the boundary line between the atmosphere and the surface of the earth; line that terminates the view; (Ger. *Gesichtskreis*), "the circle in which the apparent plane of the earth terminates in the concave of the sky." — Roget. Kant:⁴ "We may illustrate the systematic

¹ *Log.* 148. ² *Plato*, I. 50. ³ *De Finibus*, ii. 14. ⁴ *Rein. Vern.*, 686; Meiklejohn's Tr., 403.

unity produced by the three logical principles in the following manner. Every conception may be regarded as a point, which, as the standpoint of a spectator, has a certain horizon, which may be said to enclose a number of things, that may be viewed, so to speak, from that centre. Within this horizon there must be an infinite number of other points, each of which has its own horizon, smaller and more circumscribed; in other words, every species contains sub-species, according to the principle of specification, and the logical horizon consists of smaller horizons (sub-species), but not of points (individuals), which possess no extent. But different horizons or genera, which include under them so many conceptions, may have one common horizon, from which, as from a mid-point, they may be surveyed; and we may proceed thus, till we arrive at the highest genus, or universal and true horizon, which is determined by the highest conception, and which contains under itself all differences and varieties, as genera, species, and sub-species."

HOSPITALITY (Lat.; Ger. *Gastfreiheit*), in Ethics, kindness to strangers and guests.

HOSTILITY (Lat.), feeling of enmity; act of enmity.

HUMAN, HUMANE (Lat.), of or pertaining to man.—We speak of the *human* race, body, mind, soul, reason. The proper tenderness of the human heart is designated as *humane*. Hence, Humanity, in the Ethical sense.

HUMANIORA, HUMANISTIC STUDIES, HUMANISM, HUMANITIES, HUMANISTS, words used in connection with the branches of knowledge, and the culture which rests in general on a classical training, considered as developing what is most truly characteristic of cultivated man.

HUMANITY (Lat.).—1. Human nature or condition; qualities, feelings, and inclinations of mankind; the human race; mankind. 2. Humane, philanthropic behavior; philanthropy; gentleness; kindness. 3. Mental cultivation; liberal education; refinement.

HUMATION, in the Hermetic Philosophy, an alchemistic change of water into earth.

HUME (David, 1711–1776), **SYSTEM OF**, idealistic scepticism; denial of the objective validity of the notion of *cause*.

HUMILIATION (Lat.), abasement; humbling; bringing low.

HUMILITY (Lat.; lit., lowness), in Ethics, lowliness of mind; modest self-estimate. The pretence of it is called *spurious*, affected, false humility.

***HUMOUR** (Lat., liquid), frame of mind; whimsical or extravagant peculiarities, as "Ben Jonson paints *humours* rather than characters;" the power of reducing objects of thought to the sphere of the laughable, by the use of some element really in them; in wit, the relation of the object involved is always ideal; in humour it is real. See **Wit**.—Kant.¹

HYBRID, mixed; in Logic, applied to mixed syllogisms.—See **Enthymeme**.

HYLARCHICAL (Gr.), presiding over *Hyle*, matter.

HYLE (Gr.), matter; in Plato, the material in which the world-forming power works up and works out the ideas.

HYLICISTS, philosophers of the *Hyle*, or matter; the earlier Ionic natural philosophers.

HYLOBIANS (Gr.), lives in the woods; Hindoo sages who pursued their meditations in woods and other solitary places.

HYLOGENY, origin of matter.

HYLOLOGY, doctrine or theory of matter, as unorganized.

HYLOPATHISM, the attributing of feelings and passions to matter; Hylozoism.

HYLOTHEISM, the identification of God with matter; materialism.

HYLOZOIC, HYLOZOICAL (Gr.), connected with the doctrine of *Hylozoism*, *q. v.*—"The numen to which the *Hylozoic* corporealist pays all his devotion is a certain blind she-god, or goddess, called Nature, or the life of matter."—Cudworth.² "When Spinoza and his followers speak of the intelligence and knowledge of God, they mean to attribute these powers to Him in no other sense than the ancient *Hylozoics* attributed them to all matter."—S. Clarke.³

***HYLOZOISM, HYLOZISM**.—See **Pantheism**. Hence, Hylozoist.

HYPERESTHESIA (Gr.), morbidly exalted sensibility.—Winslow.⁴

HYPERPHYSICAL (Gr.), transcending nature; supernatural.

HYPOCHONDRIA, HYPOCHONDRIACISM, HYPOCHONDRIASIS, egotistic melancholy, sympathetic with diseased conditions, especially of the digestive organs.

¹ *Urtheilskraft*, § 54. ² *Intell. Syst.*, p. 106. ³ *Attributes*, § 9. ⁴ *Obs. Diseases*, ch. 20.

HYPOCRISY, simulation of virtue; dissimulation of real character; dissembling; insincerity.

HYPOCRITISM, systematic hypocrisy.

HYPOGRAPHIC, in ancient Logic, applied to a definition which gives merely a general, not an exact idea of the object.

HYPOLEMMA, minor proposition or subsumption of a syllogism.—Hamilton.¹

HYPONOEME, in ancient philosophy, supposition, prejudice, suspicion.

***HYPOSTASIS** (Gr.), (see **Subsistentia**, **Substance**), person; personality.—See Whately.²

HYPOSTATICAL, personal.—*Hypostatical union*, such a union as renders the natures united, one person.

HYPOSTATIZE, to consider as substance.

HYPOTHEORY, in the Aristotelian theory of the categories, opposed to Protheory.

***HYPOTHESIS**.—See Bacon,³ Hamilton,⁴ Leibnitz,⁵ Mill,⁶ Whewell.⁷

***HYPOTHETICAL** (see **Proposition**), involving a hypothesis or condition; *hypothetical* argument, dualism, form, imperative, judgment, proposition, realism, reasoning, right, sorites, syllogism, use of reason. Hypothetical disjunctive syllogism, see **Dilemma**.—Hamilton.⁸

HYPOTHETICO-DISJUNCTIVE, dilemmatic.—See **Judgments**, **Syllogism**.

HYPOTYPOSIS (Gr., a sketch; outline; Lat. *Adumbratio*). Hypotyposeis was the title of the work of Sextus Empiricus on the Pyrrhonian or sceptical philosophy.—Diogenes Laertius.⁹

HYSOLOGY (Gr.), the theory or science of the sublime.

I, in Logic, the sign of a particular affirmative; in complex and modal propositions, it marks the negation of the mode, and the affirmation of the proposition.—See **Darii**, **Datissi**, **Diamis**, and **Dibatis**.

***I**, in Psychology.—See **Ego**, **Me**, **Subject**.

¹ *Logic*, 199. ² *Logic*, Append. I. ³ *Nov. Org.*, i., ch. 104. ⁴ *Logic*, 188, 449, 461. *Metaphys.*, 117-119, 362 seq. ⁵ *Nov. Ess.*, 4, ch. 12. ⁶ *Logic*, iii., 16, xiv. ⁷ *Nov. Org. Renov.*, ii., ch. 4 and 5. ⁸ *Logic*, 239-255, 512, 598-618. ⁹ *U.*, ix., 78.

IATRICS (Gr.), science of healing; applied to Logic as a medicine for the mind.

ICH (Ger.), Ego, I.

ICHOGRAPHY (Gr.), tracing of a ground-plan; sketch; compend. Hence, *Ichnographical*, compendious, summary.

ICHNOSCOPY (Gr.), seeking of traces; in Philosophy, the searching in earlier systems for traces or germs of thought which were matured at a later period.

***IDEA** (*Idea*, *εἶδος*, *forma*, *species*, image).—This word has gone through such a variety of meanings, that it is possible to deal with it only by giving in succession the more important of them. 1. Descartes used the word to designate both an impression made upon the brain, and also, but more commonly, a mental representation of an object—"all that is in our mind when we conceive a thing." 2. "Whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks."—Locke. 3. A mental image or representation of an external object. 4. A notion of the understanding. 5. The pattern according to which all created things were made by the Deity—the eternal reality, of which visible things are only the shadows.—Plato. 6. "Pure conceptions of the reason,"¹—*a priori* conceptions—transcendental ideas—(God, soul, the universe)—essentially different from the *forms* of the sensory and the *categories* of the understanding. These ideas, as given by pure reason, are only regulative, guiding our intellectual procedure. As given by the practical reason, they are more than regulative, and represent the really existing.—Kant. 7. The absolute—"Truth in itself and for itself,"—the universal and one, of which the manifold is only a dim representation—to which all things tend in progress of dialectic evolution—and of which Logic is the science.—Hegel. C. F. V.

***Idea**, in the History of Philosophy, before Kant, see citations in Fleming's article and Calderwood's additions. Aristotle, 223, 224, 228; Augustine, 223; Boethius, 223; Condillac, 228; Des Cartes, 224, and C. F. V.; Diogenes Laertius, 223; Gassendi, 228; Hobbes, 228; Locke, 224, 228, and C. F. V.; Peripatetics, 224; Plato, 222, 223, and C. F. V.; Plutarch,

¹ According to Kant, reason is the faculty which furnishes us with the principles of knowledge *a priori*.

223; Pythagoras, 224; Reid, 224; Sophists, 228; Zeno, 228.
— See Berkeley,¹ Brucker.²

Idea (in the History of Philosophy, from Kant to the present).— Erdmann:³ "The aim of the object coinciding with its inmost nature." J. G. Fichte:⁴ "Self-dependent thought having life in itself and giving life to matter, and having as its emanations the fine arts, social virtue, science and religion." J. H. Fichte:⁵ "That which, transcending the empirical, incidental, individual content of consciousness, bears the character of the absolutely universal and of universal validity, the perfect and eternal, and is accompanied by the recognition in consciousness of this universal validity,"—virtually Kant's. Hamilton avoids the word. When he uses it at all, it is "in a loose and general signification, to comprehend the presentations of sense, the representations of phantasy, and the concept or notions of the understanding."⁶ "Idea properly denotes an act of thought considered in relation to an external something beyond the sphere of consciousness—a representation."⁷ In Hegel, the idea (without a plural), "is the absolute of which everything actual is but the realization—above it there is no higher something—external to it there is nothing, for in all that is it actualizes itself. The universe is the reality into whose manifold forms the idea expands itself."⁸ "The Idea is the supremest logical definition of the Absolute. It is neither the barely subjective, nor the barely objective notion, but the notion which, immanent in the object, releases it into its complete self-dependence, yet none the less holding it in unity with itself. The supremest notion is the absolute idea, the unity of life and cognition, the Universal, which alike infinitely actual, and distinguishing itself from this its immediate actuality, is self-thinking, and as self-thinking, self-actualizing."⁹ Kant: "Necessary concept of the reason, which transcends the possibility of experience, and to which no congruent objects can be given

¹ *Principles*, with Ueberweg's Notes, and Prolegomena and Annotations (Krauth), Index: Idea, Ideas. ² *Hist. Crit. Phil.*, Index. ³ *Haller Monatschr.*, 1850. II., 394.

⁴ *Werke*, vii. 55. ⁵ *Psychologie*, 694. ⁶ *Logic*, Am. ed., 90. ⁷ *Reid's Works*, 279 n.

⁸ Schwegler: *Geach. d. Philosoph.*, § 44. ⁹ *Do.*, § 45, I. 3 c.; *Encyclopaed.*, §§ 213-215, 236-244; *Logic*, tr. by Wallace, 304, 322.

in experience."¹ Schelling: "The special entities, so far as in their specialty they are absolute, are consequently special, at the same time universal — the universal in the form of the particular—God, but a special God (for Art)."² "The substance and the being itself."³ Schopenhauer: "In the true original sense of the word introduced by Plato, the different gradations of the objectivation of the will."⁴ Schwarz:⁵ "The primary essence or principle, grasped by the mind, or reason." Ulrici: "Archetypes of things."⁶— See Steudel.⁷

Idea and Ideas, Division and Qualities of, marked by adjectives and participles: Absolute, abstract, acquired, actual, adequate, adventitious, æsthetic, æsthetico-normal, clear, complex, composite, confused, cosmological, deceptious, determinate, distinct, divine, dubious, dynamical, empirical, erroneous, essential, eternal, expressed, extensive, factitious (*ens rationis*), false, fixed, formal, fundamental, general, immediate, impressed, impure, inadequate, individual, innate, intellectual, intelligible, just, material, mathematical, mediate, metaphysical, mixed, moral, normal, obscure, physical, positive, practical, præteressential, precise, primary, problematical, psychological, pure, real, regulative, sensible, sensual, simple, singular, social, subjective, theoretic, transcendent, transcendental, true, universal, vague. See all those words.

Idea and Ideas, combined with a governing *of*.—*I. of* abstract, accidents, concrete, ideas, imagination, mode, pure reason, reflection, relation, sensation, sense, the singular, singularity, substance, the thing, things, the universal.

Idea and Ideas, governed by *of*; archetypes *of I.*, association, cause, cave, clearness, combination, comprehension, criterion, development, extension, formal distinction, latitude, materiality, nature, objectivity, occasion, organ, origin, relation, scheme, signs, succession, table (Gassendi's), theory, trains (or of thought); *trains of*, conditioned, irregular, natural, regular.—See **Thought**, **trains of**.

¹ *Werke*, II., 268, 263, 483, III., 95-97, VII., II. 104, § 42; see Krauth's *Berkeley*, p. 338.

² *Philosophie der Kunst*, *Werke* I., v. 390. 391. ³ *Do.*, Bruno, *Werke* I., iv. 303. ⁴ *Welt als Wille u. Vorstellung*. I. 154, II. 414. ⁵ *Gott Natur, u. Mensch.*, 133. ⁶ *Zeitschr. v. Fichte*, xxvi. 69-71, 265; *Glauben u. Wissen*, 190. ⁷ *Philosophie im Umriss*, I. 222.

***IDEAL.**—"That which the mind contemplates as a representation of the normal excellence of any form of being, or of what ought to be, in contrast with what exists."—C. F. V.

Ideal, as noun, applied with *of*, to the imagination, beauty, sense; reason, practical, speculative, or pure; the *summum bonum*, the highest ontological perfection. **Ideal**, as noun, qualified by transcendental.

***Ideal**, applied as adjective, to cause, ground, image, philosophy, realism, world. **Ideal Legality.**—"Kant's phrase to designate the form of moral law as simple or direct command—'Thou shalt.' Its formula is—Act from a maxim at all times fit for law universal."—C. F. V.

***IDEALISM**, defined, divided, and qualified: absolute (*Hegel*), abstract, æsthetic, æsthetic-causal, autotheistic (*Fichte*), Berkeley (*theological*), Cartesian, concrete, cosmothetic, critical (*Kant*), dogmatic, egoistic (*Fichte*), empiric, Fichtean (*autotheistic*, *egoistic*), Hegelian (*absolute identity*), Hume's (*sceptical*), of identity (*Hegel*), Kant's (*critical*, *transcendental*), Leibnitzian, Malebranchian (*mystic*), material, mystic (*Malebranche*), objective (*Schelling*), practical, problematic, psychologic, real (*synthetism*), Schelling, sceptical (*Hume*), Schopenhauer (*theoretical*), subjective (*Fichte*), theoretical (*Schopenhauer*) transcendental (*critical*, *Kant*). These names are in many cases vague, and have little more than a mnemonic and methodic value.

***IDEALIST**, one who accepts some form of idealism.

IDEALITY, mental state or construction in accordance with some form of idealism, or in sympathy with the ideal.

IDEALIZE, to lift into the sphere of the ideal; to invest with ideal or imaginary attributes.

***Ideation and Ideational.** ***Identical Proposition.**

IDENTIFICATION, the process of marking as identical.

IDENTIFY, to mark or recognize as identical.

***Identity or Identity.**

***IDENTITY (PERSONAL).**—"The identity of our personal existence through all changes of experience. As the knowledge of personality is given in consciousness, that of personal identity is secured by the aid of memory."—C. F. V.

***Identity**, absolute, generic, logical, numeric, (principle of), philosophy of, specific, system of.

IDEOCRAT, the adherent of the system of **Ideocracy**, **Ideocratism**, the rule of ideas, especially as in opposition to existing legal enactments; visionary.

IDEOGENICAL, **IDEOGENY**, terms related to the rise or origin of ideas.

IDEOGRAPHICS, **IDEOGRAPHY**, writing by signs of ideas, which are understood by every one; opposed to phonographics.

Ideological, Ideologue, *Ideology (Idealogy).

IDIOCRASY (Gr.), peculiar temperament; idiosyncrasy; the special or proper character of a human or animal body; natural peculiarity.

IDIIGNOM (Gr.), holding one's own opinion.

IBIOLATRY (Gr.), self-worship.

IDIOMA (Gr.), peculiarity; attribute.

IDIOPATHY (Gr.), peculiar affection; feeling for one's self only.

*Idiosyncrasy.

IDIOT (Gr.), private; peculiar; one of extreme weakness of mind; imbecile.

*Idol. Idolatry.

IDOLA, idols, in the sense of illusions, false appearances. In Bacon,¹ the causes of the fallacies and errors of the human mind. They are four:

Idola fori, "arising from the current usage of words, which represent things much otherwise than as they really are"—idols of the market.

Idola specus, "which, from peculiar dispositions and circumstances of individuals, mislead them in different manners"—idols of the den.

Idola theatri, "which false systems of philosophy and erroneous methods of reasoning have introduced"—idols of the theatre.

Idola tribus, "to which, from certain common weaknesses of human nature, we are universally liable"—idols of the tribe.—See Hallam.²

***IGNORANCE**, "*Ignorantia*, want of knowledge,"—C. F. V.,—(Ger. *Unwissenheit*), is qualified by such terms as affected, inexcusable, gross, profound, invincible, vincible.—Whately.³

¹ *Nov. Org.*, summary of second part in *Aphorisms*, Aphor. 38 seq. *Works*, Phila., 1841, III., 347. ² *Literat. of Europe*, pt. III., ch. 3, § 58, 59. ³ *Logic*, App. I.; *Ambig. Terms*, x1.

IGNORANTISM, a system which would keep the masses in ignorance.

IGNORATIO ELENCHI, irrelevant conclusion; lit., ignorance of the refutation; ignorance of the proof of the real issue.— See **Fallacy**.

IGNORE, not to know; to treat or pass over as if unknown.

IGNOTI NULLA CUPIDO, there can be no desire of what we do not know. This is true of specific desire, but does not exclude a general restlessness of desire, which is destitute of any well-defined object.

ILLABILE (hence Illability), incapable of error.

***ILLATION** (Illative, *adj.*, illative, *n.*, illatively, *adv.*), in its "more limited sense, an imperfect syllogism formed by conversion or inversion; in which there are only *two* terms, *i. e.*, no middle-term; as,

"Some pagans were good men.
Some good men were pagans." L. J.

ILLATIVE, that which can be inferred.

ILLICIT PROCESS, in Logic, improper treatment, producing *illicit major*, or *illicit minor*.

ILLIMITABLE, incapable of being bounded; boundless (illimitation, illimited, illimitedness).

ILLOGICAL, destitute of logic; contrary to logic.

ILLUMINATES, *s.*, ***ILLUMINATI**, "persons of special intellectual attainment and culture."—C. F. V.

ILLUMINATIVE, light-giving.—Sir K. Digby. L. J.

ILLUMINISM, the system of the Illuminati, has been applied especially to the opinions of Saint-Martin, and to Swedenborgianism, *q. v.*

ILLUSION (Lat.), deception, false show, error; (not to be confounded with Elusion;) (Ger. *Schein*, *Sinnenschein*), "a deceptive representation of an object, occasioned by organic or functional disorder."—C. F. V. "The subjective ground of the judgment is regarded as objective."—Kant.

Illusion Æsthetic.—1. Deception of the senses, as optical illusion. 2. An illusion produced by the influence of the fine arts on the imagination.

Illusion Empirical, produced by the limitations of the senses; illusion of the sense.

Illusion, Logical, produced by neglect or misapplication of logic, by sophisms. Kant calls Dialectics the logic of illusion.

Illusion, Metaphysical or Transcendental, is the confounding of the phenomenon with the thing; the illusion that the objects of perception exist outside of perception, and apart from it, exactly as they seem presented in it.

ILLUSORY, meant to deceive; adapted to deceive.—Locke. L. J.

ILLUSTRATION, explanation, rendering clear.—Locke. L. J.

IMAGE, (Lat. *Imago*,) lit., imitation, copy, likeness; in Psychology, a copy, or likeness formed in the mind. (Gr. *εἰδωλον*; Ger. *Bild*.)—See **Imagination**. Wolf defines image in general as the representation of any composite; a *material image* is the representation of a composite in a composite; an *immaterial image* is the representation of a composite in the simple.

***IMAGINANT**, in Bacon, as *adj.*, imagining; as *subst.*, one who imagines.¹

***IMAGINATION (as an Act)**, (Ger. *Einbildung*), imagining.—

1. Mental representation in general, as in the presence of the object pictured in our consciousness. 2. Mental representation of the absent object, "passive imagination." In the first sense it involves an actual object, and actual external perception. In the second there is an antithesis to both—the object of it is subjective, the perception is internal. 3. The result of the "creative," "plastic," "inventive," "productive" processes of the Imagination as a faculty, *q. v.*

Imagination as a Faculty (Ger. *Einbildungskraft*).—"The faculty of representation by which the mind keeps before it an image of visible forms. This power operates either as simply reproductive, or as in some sense creative."—C. F. V. 1. The "passive" faculty of recalling and reproducing, representing sensible phenomena.—See **Imagination as an Act**, 2. Bacon: "The representation of an individual thought." 2. The active, associating or creative faculty of conceiving and expressing the ideal. In its loftier degrees it appears in art and literature as genius; in industry as invention; in science as brilliant and suggestive hypothesis.—See Akenside. Sir W. Hamilton² says, Imagination is not *productive* or *creative*, but merely *plastic*.

¹ *Adv. of Learning*, B. II.

² *Metaphysics*, lect. xiv.

*Imagination and Conception. *Imagination and Fancy.

*Imagination and Memory (Imaginative, Imagine, Imaginer, Imagining, *verbal absol.* imaginous).

IMBECILITY, weakness of mind; feebleness of character.

***IMITATION** (Ger. *Nachahmung*), "the act of copying, or writing according to a model."—C. F. V.

IMMANATION, a flowing in.—See **Emanation**.

***IMMANENCE, IMMANENCY** (lit., a remaining in), "indwelling, in contrast with transcending."—C. F. V.

Immanence of Soul and Body, in Psychology, their mutual indwelling; their being one in another.

Immanence of the Object, in Metaphysics, the indwelling of the representation or image in the mind. When this is assumed as the totality, it involves *Idealism*.

***IMMANENT**, remaining in; involving immanence.

Immanent, in antithesis, in the Critical Philosophy, to the *transcendent*, q. v., and the *transeunt*, q. v.—1. In the phrase, "immanent use of the understanding," the immanent is that which keeps within the limits of the ordinary circle of cognition, remains within the range of possible experience—which the transcendent transcends. 2. In the phrase "immanent activity of the ego," internal; shut up; remaining in the mind; theoretical; in opposition to the transeunt, the practical, going forth in outward manifestations.

Immanent, in Pantheism, applied by Spinoza to God, as the indwelling *cause*, ground, or principle of the world, in which He abides in essential union, all particular things being but phenomena of the one eternal substance. It is antithetical to *transitory*. The acts of God, as the sole substance, are therefore immanent acts, self-modifications, like those of the mind in thinking.

IMMATERIAL, without matter; incorporeal; spiritual.—See **Soul**. The term is applied to forms, man, mind, spirit, substances.

***IMMATERIALISM**, is also applied to any system opposed to *materialism*; especially to a system which maintains the immateriality of the soul. It is "attributed to" Berkeley. "To attribute to Berkeley a denial of the existence of matter is hardly warranted, though there is much to favor it. He does say that, 'the existence of external bodies wants

proof,' and that the 'supposition of external bodies is not necessary for the producing of our ideas.' But his point was to show that 'the philosophical notion of matter involves a contradiction.' 'He wanted to induce men to settle what the substantial existence of the sensible world could in reason amount to.'—Fraser.¹ "Berkeley's philosophy of the causation that is in the universe, rather than a philosophy of the mere material world."²—C. F. V. Berkeley³ claims to have shown "that there is no corporeal or material substance." He goes far beyond what is quoted by Calderwood, and maintains that the idea of matter involves a contradiction, and is pernicious.⁴

***IMMATERIALITY**, manner or state of an immaterial being; incorporeal nature; spirituality.

IMMATERIALIZED, divested of matter; disembodied.—Glanville.⁵

IMMEDIATE, "direct. *Immediate* knowledge is knowledge of the thing itself, in contrast with knowledge of one thing by the intervention of another. (Ger. *Unmittelbar*.)"—C. F. V. It is opposed to intermediate, mediate; without the intervention of a medium or second cause; direct. It is applied to action, cause, effect, power, will.—Herbert Spencer.⁶

Immediate Inference by Privative Conception, passes from any affirmative proposition to a negative proposition implied in it, or equivalent to it, or *vice versa*.—Jevons,⁷ Thomson.⁸

IMMEDIATION (*Immediatio*), the divine operation, involving immediate presence and power.

IMMENSITY, in Natural Theology: 1. Absence of bounds, or of limitation in space; apart from or free from bodily dimension or measure. 2. Infinity, "the simultaneous and perpetual possession of all perfections, natural and moral."—Wolf. See *Infinite*.

IMMETHODIC, IMMETHODED, destitute of method, without order, confused (Immethodicalness).

IMMOBILITY, character of the immobile; incapacity of being moved, or of motion, either absolute or relative.

¹ *Life of Berkeley*, 365. ² *Ib.*, 366. ³ *Principles*, § 26. ⁴ *Principles*, §§ 9, 26, 96, 133. ⁵ *Seeps. Scientif.* ⁶ *Principles of Psychology*. L. J. ⁷ *Less. in Logic*, Lem. X. ⁸ *Laws of Thought*, §§ 85-92.

IMMORALITY, conflict in principle or action with the moral.

IMMORTAL, free from death; consciously existent forever in the future. *Eternal* differs from immortal, in involving necessary and unbeginning existence.

IMMORTALIST, believer in the immortality of the soul. — Jer. Taylor. L. J.

***IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL** (Ger. *Seelenunsterblichkeit*), "rests upon the basis that the soul is distinct from the body." Kant:¹ "The endlessly enduring existence and personality of the same rational being." See I. H. Fichte (1867), Mendelssohn,² W. Menzel (1869), E. R. Pfaff,³ H. Richter (1871), Teichmüller.

*Immutability.

IMPALPABILITY, incapability of detection by touch.

IMPARTIBILITY, in Natural Theology, incapability of partition, because existent as a simple and absolute totality, without parts.

IMPASSIBILITY, in Natural Theology, essential incapacity of suffering.

IMPEDIMENT (Lat. hinderance; Ger. *Hinderniss*), that which prevents a cause from acting. It may be positive or negative. — Kant.⁴

*Impenetrability.

***IMPERATE**, lit., commanded; done by mental impulse or guidance. — See **Elicit, Act**.

***IMPERATIVE**. — "This is the characteristic of moral law, distinguishing it from all law beside." — C. F. V.

Imperative. — "The representation of an objective principle, so far as it necessitates the will, is called a commandment (of reason); and a formula expressing such is called an *imperative*. An *imperative* commands hypothetically or categorically. The former expresses that an action is necessary as a mean towards somewhat further; but the latter is such an *imperative* as represents an action to be in itself necessary and without regard had to anything out of and beyond it, i. e. objectively necessary. . . . When we attend to the dissimilar grades of necessitation expressed by the *imperative* they might be called: 1. Rules of art; 2. Dictates of prudence;

¹ *Pract. Vern.*, 220. ² *Phædon*, 4th edit., 1868. ³ *Eulhamasia*, 2d ed., 1870. ⁴ *Crit. d. rein. Vern.*, 701.

8. **Laws of morality.** The first and second are hypothetical imperatives. The third involves the conception of an intermediate and objective and universally valid necessity."—Kant.¹

Imperative Apodictic, that which affirms that the action looking to an objectively necessary aim is good. It is virtually only another form of stating the *Imperative Categorical*, q. v.

***Imperative (The Categorical), Imperative (The Practical).**—See **Duty**.

Imperative Hypothetic, conditioned; as a means, not as an end.

IMPERCEPTIBLENESS, character of the imperceptible, of that which is too minute or feeble to be grasped in sense-perception.

IMPERCIPIENT, not percipient; incapable of perception; as, "the soul in sleep."—A. Baxter.²

IMPERFECT, in Logic, applied (1) by Aristotle to the second and third figures, which it was necessary to reduce to the first; (2) to induction or inductive reasoning, when it is impossible to examine all the cases or instances to which the conclusion can refer; opposed to perfect induction.—Jevons.³

IMPETUS (Lat.), assault; attack; impulse; vigor; force; instinct; natural impulse. (Ger. *Trieb*, *Naturtrieb*.)

IMPLICATION, (lit., intertwining), the opposite of *explication* and the *explicit*; quality of the *implicit*; that which is involved, though not expressed; that which may fairly be inferred.

IMPONDERABILITY, character of the imponderable; incapacity of being weighed; destitution of weight, absolute or relative; used especially of "the imponderables" light, heat, and the electric force, when considered as substances.

IMPOSSIBLE, in Logic, applied to matter involving a universal negative (E)—opposed to *necessary* and *contingent*.

***Impossible (The).** Impossibility.

***Impression.**

IMPROBITY (Lat.), bad quality; wickedness; depravity; dishonesty.—See **Impurity**.

IMPROPER, in Scholastic Logic, is applied to a combination

¹ *Groundwork of Metaphys. of Ethics*, ch. 2. ² *Enq. into the Nature of the Soul*, I., 369.

³ *Logic*, Less. XVII., XXV.

of extremes, which does not accord with any properly logical mode of expression, yet is justified by a mystic or supernatural explanation; such is the phrase "God is man."

***IMPULSE** and **IMPULSIVE**, "apply to every form of mental force which simply and directly urges to action."—C. F. V.

IMPURITY, MORAL, applied by Kant to the mingling of spurious, immoral motives for conformity to the law.

IMPUTABILITY, IMPUTABLENESS, liability to imputation; power of being imputed.

***IMPUTATION**, a judgment by which a person is "charged with the doing of a wrong action."—C. F. V.

INABILITY, want of ability, natural or moral, physical or intellectual; the result of defect of power or of means.—See **Force, Power, Will**.

IN ABSTRACTO (Lat.), in the abstract; in mere conception or notion—opposed to *in concreto*.

INACTUATE, to put into action. **Inactuation**, operation.—Glanville. L. J.

INADEQUATE IDEAS, opposed to adequate, *q. v.*, "are such, which are but a partial or incomplete representation of those archetypes to which they are referred."—Locke.¹

INANIMATE, INANIMATED, INANIMATION, are applied to bodies as void of life, and are thus opposed to the animate or vital; by transfer they mark want of intellectual vivacity.

INANITY, emptiness, physical (Sir K. Digby²) or mental.

INAPPLICABLE, not suitable for application; destitute of applicability.—Mill.³

INCHOATE, v. a., to begin; **INCHOATE. adj.**, begun; **INCHOATIVE**, inceptive.—"The higher congruity of life, being yet but imperfectly inchoated."—Glanville.⁴ "Plato mentions that the great soul of this world does at least inchoate, and rudely delineate the fabrick of our body at first."—Dr. H. More.⁵

INCIDENT, applied, in Logic, to a proposition additional to a primary or chief proposition.—Watts. L. J.

INCIPIENT, commencing.—Berkeley.⁶

INCIRCUMSCRIPTIBLE, incapable of circumscription or limit.

INCITABILITY (Lat.), faculty of being incited, urged, moved

¹ *Hum. Underst.*, B. II., ch. xxxi. 1. ² *Nature of Bodies*. L. J. ³ *Log.*, Pt. V., ch. III.

⁴ *Pre-existence of Souls*, 139. ⁵ *Song of the Soul*, Notes, p. 383. ⁶ *Analyst*, § 4.

— physical, mental, or moral. **Incitation**, faculty or act of inciting. **Incitement**, medium or motive of incitation. **Inciter**, agent or producer of incitation.

***INCLINATION**, "tendency of the nature towards an object."
— C. F. V.

INCOEXISTENCE, the opposite of coexistence, *q. v.* — Locke. L. J.

INCOGITATIVE, the opposite of cogitative; destitute of the power of thought; unthinking.—"There are but two sorts of beings in the world that man knows or conceives. First, such as are purely material, without sense, perception, or thought; incogitative beings. Secondly, sensible, thinking, perceiving beings; cogitative beings." — Locke.¹

INCOGNIZABLE, incapable of cognition. — Herbert Spencer.²

INCOHERENCE, want of coherence, or connection. — Locke. L. J.

INCOMMENSURABLE, **INCOMMENSURATE**, not reducible to a common measure. — Watts, Dr. H. More. L. J.

INCOMMUNICABLE, incapable of impartation. — Glanville. L. J.

INCOMMUTABILITY, incapacity of change. — L. J.

IMPOSSIBILITY, character of the impossible.—"Quality of not being possible, but by the negation or destruction of something." — L. J.

INCONCEPTIBLE, inconceivable.

INCONCLUSIVENESS, in Logic, character of the inconclusive, want of cogency or force to the reason.

IN CONCRETO (Lat.), in the *concrete*, *q. v.*, in actual nature — opposed to *in abstracto*.

INCONSEQUENCE, inconclusiveness; lack of logical sequence.

INCONSISTENT, implies qualities or assertions which cannot coexist in the same thing or proposition; opposed to compatible.

INCORPOREAL, without body; without bodily qualities; immaterial.

INCORPOREALIZE, to assert the doctrine of the incorporeal. — Cudworth. L. J.

INCORPOREITY, without body and its limitations. — Berkeley.³

INCORRUPTIBILITY, freedom from the power of corruption, physical, moral, or essential. (Ger. *Unverweslichkeit*.)

¹ *Hum. Understand.*, IV., x. 9.

² *Princip. of Psychology*. L. J.

³ *Siris*, § 270.

INCREDULITY, inclination to doubt; disbelief. It is distinguished as moral, historical, rational, naturalistic.

INCREMENT (Lat.), increase, growth. (Ger. *Wachsthum*.)

INCULPABLE (Lat.), incapable of being blamed; unblamable. (Ger. *Unstrüflich*.)

***INDEFINITE**, "properly, want of clearness and exactness of demonstration in our thoughts. It does not apply to objects."—C. F. V. The indefinite is that of which there is no limit fixed, "by us."

Indefinite Judgment.—See Judgment Indefinite.

INDESIGNATE, indefinite.

INDESINENT, unceasing.—A. Baxter.¹

INDETERMINATE, unfixed. *I. Judgments*, see Judgments I.

INDETERMINATENESS, INDETERMINATION, character of the indeterminate.—Bramhall.² L. J.

INDETERMINISM, in Kant, the theory that freedom consists in the fortuitous character of an action; that it is not determined by reasons; that to a free being good or evil must be alike possible.—Fu.

***INDIFFERENCE (LIBERTY OF)**, is "meant to describe a state of mind in which the will is not influenced or moved to choose or to refuse an object, but is equally ready to do either. There is no such state as volition, irrespective of motive, and this phrase should be discarded. Liberty of indifference is no part of the libertarian or free-will doctrine."—C. F. V.

***INDIFFERENT**, an action is said, "though inaccurately" (C. F. V.), to be *indifferent*, that is, neither right nor wrong, when *considered in itself*.

*Indifferentism, or Identism, *q. v.*

INDIRECT (Lat.), not in a straight line; circuitous; by intermediate process; applied to a method of inference and reduction of the syllogism.

*Indiscernibles (Identity of).

INDISCERPTIBILITY, incapacity of discription, or separation into parts; applied to God, soul, spirit; quality of the indiscerptible.—Bp. Butler.³

***INDIVIDUAL, *INDIVIDUALISM, *INDIVIDUALITY,**

¹ *Nat. of Human Soul*, I., 351.

² *Answer to Hobbes*.

³ *Analogy*, Pt. I., ch. 1.

***INDIVIDUATION, INDIVIDUATOR**, relate to "a being having a distinct, circumscribed existence," or "separateness of being which distinguishes one person from another."—C. F. V. See Whewell,¹ Herbert Spencer.²

INDIVISIBILITY (Ger. *Untheilbarkeit*), incapability of reduction to parts; impartibility.—See **Atom, Divisibility, Monad, Simplicity.**

INDOLES (Lat.).—1. Of things—inborn or native quality; natural quality; nature. 2. Of persons—natural abilities, talents, genius, disposition.

INDUCIANS (opposed to *Traducians*), those who believe that the soul exists before the body, and is brought in, induced into it, at conception.

***INDUCTION** (**Method or Process of**), (see Mill³), "that form of the reasoning process which proceeds from particulars to generals."—C. F. V. Hence, *inductive*, applied to syllogism.

*Induction (Principle of).

INEPT (Lat.), trifling; foolish. Hence, *Ineptitude*, unfitness; *ineptly, ineptness.*

***INERTIA** (Ger. *Trägheit*).—Kant: "The incapacity of matter to move itself." Whewell:⁴ "The property of matter by which it resists the reception of motion—by which it reacts and requires an adequate force in order that any motion may result . . . its inertness." It is applied also intellectually and morally.

*In Esse; In Posse.

INEXISTENCE.—1. (From the negative particle), non-existence; 2. (From the preposition), existence in; inherence.

***INFERENCE** (see Mill):⁵ "The act of drawing a conclusion from premises."—C. F. V. It is mediate or immediate.

*Inference and Proof.

INFIMA (Lat.), the lowest; applied to *species*.

***INFINITE** (Gr. *ἀπειρος*; Ger. *Unendliches*)—to be distinguished from the *indefinite*—divided into *mathematical* and *transcendental*. Hence, *infiniteness, infinitude, infinity.*

INFINITESIMAL, infinitely divided.—Berkeley,⁶ Herbert Spencer.⁷

¹ *Hist. of Scientific Ideas*, II., 148 (ed. 1858). ² *Biology*, §§ 72-74. Do., p. iii., ch. 3, p. 355, ed. 1855. ³ *Logic*, pt. iv., ch. 1, § 1. ⁴ *Hist. of Scientific Ideas*. ⁵ *Logic*, pt. iv., ch. 1, § 1. ⁶ *Analyst*, § 12. ⁷ *Psychology*.

INFLUENCE (Lat.; Ger. *Einfluss*), the operation of substance on substance; of the *active* on the *passive*; of matter on matter (*physical I.*) or mind; of mind on mind or matter; of principle on character, or of character on principle.

*Influx (Physical).

INFLUXIONISTS (opposed to the Cartesians and Leibnitzians), in Psychology, the defenders of the system of physical influx, the Aristotelian scholastics, and many others.

INGENIOUS (Lat.; Ger. *Sinnreich*).—1. Of persons—endowed with good capacity or genius; talented; inventive; felicitous. 2. Of things, as bearing the marks of the ingenious mind, showing happy adaptation, skilful mode of reaching an end. Hence, *Ingenuity*.

INGENITE, innate.—South.

INGENUOUS (Lat.), of good birth; open; open-hearted; frank; noble; the opposite of furtive, evasive. (Ger. *Offenhertzig*.) Hence, *Ingenuousness*.

INHABILITY, unskilfulness.

INHERENCE, existence in, as of properties in subject or substance.

INHERITANCE, in Darwin,¹ transmission and reception by plant or animal generation.—“Perhaps the correct way of viewing the whole subject, would be to look at the inheritance of every character whatever as the rule, and non-inheritance as the anomaly.”

***INNATE IDEAS**.—*A priori* principles of knowledge and of action. “Innate” implies that the power of recognizing such principles is provided for in the constitution of the mind. “Innate” does not mean inborn, in the sense of alleging that such principles are a conscious possession from the moment of birth. The term “idea” should be discarded.—C. F. V.

UNOBSERVABLES, in Cosmology, objects which lie beyond the reach of the senses.

IN OMNIBUS ALIQUID, IN TOTO NIHIL, something in all the parts, nothing in the whole; applied to the pretenders to universal knowledge.

INORGANIC, void of organs; destitute of organization.

INSANITY (Lat.), unsoundness, unhealthiness, disease, mental

¹ *Origin of Species*, 5th ed., Lond., 1869, 14; 6th ed., N. Y., 1877, 10.

sickness. — Cicero:¹ "Wisdom is the sanity (health) of the mind; folly, as it were, a sort of insanity (sickness)." It is the generic term for mental disease. Kant,² in the classification of mental aberration (*Verrückung*), has, 1. Amentia (*Unsinnigkeit*), frantic, tumultuary aberration; 2. Dementia (*Wahnsinn*), methodic aberration; 3. Insanity (*Wahnwitz*), fragmentary, distracted aberration; 4. Vesania (*Aberwitz*), systematic aberration. "Insanity is a disturbed power of judgment, in which the mind is held by analogies, which are confounded with concepts of things resembling each other."

INSEPARABLE, in Logic, marks accidents which can never be changed; opposed to separable.

INSTANCE, an example. — Jevons.³

INSTAURATIO, INSTAURATION, RESTORATION.—"The great instauration of Lord Bacon — *Instauratio Magna*."

***INSTINCT** (Ger. *Trieb. Naturtrieb*).—"Literally, direct or immediate stimulus from within. The word is thus an acknowledgment of our ignorance as to the exact nature of the stimulating power. It is an impulse guiding the living creature in actions, which is quite apart from the reasoning process in us, and superior to the lessons of experience, gathered by application of our rational power." — C. F. V. "We have every reason to believe that the power of specialized *instincts* is transmitted from one generation to another, and, where the circumstances favor it, goes on increasing from age to age in intensity, and in particular adaptations to the purposes demanded. All domesticated animals were originally wild; but when once tamed, the offspring in the next generation partake of the domesticated character by a specialized instinct. The case is the same with animals trained to particular purposes. The young pointer signals the game the very first time he takes the field; the young watch-dog barks at a stranger without ever being taught to do so. All confirmed habits which become a part of the animal nature seem to be imparted by hereditary descent; and thus what seems to be an original instinct may, after all, be but the accumulated growth and experience of many generations." — Morell.⁴ See Whewell.⁵

¹ *Twac.*, 3, 5, 10. ² *Anthropologie* (1798), § 42. ³ *Less. in Log.*, 227. ⁴ *Introd. to Ment. Phil.*, pt. 6, ch. 3. ⁵ *Hist. of Scientif. Ideas*, ch. viii.

Instinct is divided into general, special, primary, voluntary, mechanical; natural, cultivated, diverted, perverted; I. of Affection; I. of Art.

Instinct, Definitions of.—1. In the article of Fleming and the additions of Calderwood reference is made to Addison, Badham, Barlow, Bougeant, Bushnan, Coleridge, Erasmus Darwin, Descartes, French, Good, Green, Hancock, Kirby, Morell, Newton, Norris, Paley, Polignac, Priestley, Reid, Smellie, Virey, Whately. 2. To these might be added from the ancients, Aulus Gellius,¹ Cicero,² Seneca,³ the Stoics and Zeno.⁴ 3. In Philosophy, from Kant to the present. Büchner: "There is no such thing as animal instinct, in the ordinary sense of the word. No blind, involuntary impulse controls the animals in their acts, but reflection based on comparison and arguments; the intellectual process through which this takes place, is in its essential character entirely the same as in man, though the faculty of judgment in animals is weaker."⁵ Charles Darwin: "There is no fundamental difference between man and the higher mammals in their mental faculties. As man possesses the same senses as the lower animals, his fundamental intuitions must be the same. The more complex instincts seem to have originated independently of intelligence."⁶ Hegel: "The sole distinction between animal and man is thinking" (Denken, cognition through notions). "The animal is in itself unity (*Eins*) with God."⁷ Kant: "The animals *distinguish*, but they cannot *cognize* the distinction—that is done by *judgment*, of which they are not capable. If man had mere understanding, without reason, he would be in no respect distinguishable from the animals. An animal is already all that it is through its instinct; a reason foreign to it, the reason of another, has already made every provision for it, while man uses his own reason." "*Instinct* is the internal necessitation of the faculty of desire toward the possession of the object before it is cognized."⁸ Lichtenberg: "The animal is always to himself subject only, man is to himself object

¹ *Noctes*, XII. 5. ² *De Finib.*, III., v.-vii.; IV. x., xiii.; V. ix. ³ *Epist.*, 121. ⁴ *Diogenes Laertius*, lib. vii. in Zenon. ⁵ *Kraft und Stoff*, 273-275. ⁶ *Descent of Man* (1876), Part I., ch. iii. See "*Instinctive*." ⁷ *Werke*, IX. 391. ⁸ *Werke*, I., 72, 73; IX., 369; X., 330.

also.”¹ Schelling: “‘God is the soul of animals,’ ‘man is his own soul.’”² Schopenhauer: “The aim toward which animals work so directly in the acts of instinct, as if it were a known motive, remains entirely unknown to them. The activity of instinct in insects, connected as it is with the ganglionic system, bears a striking resemblance to the activity of somnambulists. The animal is capable of receiving intuitive representations only, man can have abstract representations, or concepts.”³—See Steudel.⁴

INSTINCTIVE, derived from instinct; of the nature of instinct.—Darwin:⁵ “An action, which we ourselves should require experience to enable us to perform, when performed by an animal, more especially by a very young one, without any experience, and when performed by many individuals in the same way, without their knowing for what purpose it is performed, is usually said to be *instinctive*. But I could show that none of these characters of instinct are universal.”

INSTITUTE, established law, principle, precept; institution.

“Thou’rt pale in nightly studies grown,
To make the Stoick *institutes* thy own.”—DRYDEN.⁶

INSTITUTION (Lat.).—1. Arrangement; setting in order; disposition; act of establishing; founding; that which is established; that on which the establishing depends; primary principles. (Ger. *Grundlegung*.) 2. Instruction; education; training. 3. Subject matter of instruction or education; principles; methods. 4. Books which supply elementary instruction.

INSTRUCTION, impartation of knowledge.—Hamilton.⁷

INSTRUCTIVE, imparting knowledge; applied, in Philosophy, to sight, touch, and hearing, over against taste and smell, which are styled *affective*. *Instructive* senses, *instructive* perceptions.—See **Intellectual**.

INSTRUMENTAL PHILOSOPHY, a name of Logic, as the *organon*, instrument, or implement of all philosophy and all science.—Krug.

¹ *Verm. Schrift*, I., 78. ² *Naturprocess. Werke*, Ab. I., x. 387. ³ *Well als Wille*, I., 7 136, 191, 192. *Beiden Grundprobleme*, 240, 241. ⁴ *Philosophie im Umrisse*, Erst. Th. Zweit. Abth., 158-166. ⁵ *Origin of Species*, ch. 8, (6th edit.) ⁶ *Persius*, v. 84. ⁷ *Logic*, Lect. I.

INSURRECTION (Lat.), uprising; insurgency; outbreak against civil power. (Ger. *Empörung*.)

INTEGRAL (Lat.), untouched; whole, entire; essential to entirety; constituent, as a part.

INTEGRATION, LAW OF.—Relativity, law of, *q. v.*

INTEGRITY (Lat.), completeness; entirety; blamelessness; innocence; probity in the measure of the highest principle.

***INTELLECT** (Intellected, *a.*, Intellectual, *a.*, Intellectual, *n.*).—"More exactly, the understanding regarded as a power of comparison; more widely, the whole rational nature of man."—C. F. V.

*Intellect and Intellection. *Intellect and Intelligence.

INTELLECTUAL, of, pertaining to, derived from the intellect. *I. cognition*, through the understanding—opposed to sensitive cognition through the senses. *I. philosophers*, represented in Plato, maintain that in the senses is nothing but illusion; only the understanding cognizes the true. *I. sense*, the instructive sense, applied especially to sight. *I. sensibility*, deriving pleasure or pain from the exercise or restraint of the intellect. *I. world*, the intelligible world. *I. system* of the world, the system of Leibnitz, which applied to the world the laws of the pure understanding, without regard to sense-perception.—Kant.¹

INTELLECTUALISM, Intellectual Philosophy, the system which maintains that thinking (the activity of the understanding, or of the reason taken as equivalents), is the source of all true cognition. This was the view of the Eleatists, who rejected all sense cognition. (Intellectually.)

INTELLECTUALIZE, INTELLECTUATE (Ger. *Intellectualisieren*), in Kant, to exalt to the rank of intellectual objects. Leibnitz *intellectualized* phenomena, as Locke *sensualized* the conceptions of the understanding.²

INTELLECTUS (Lat.).—1. Perception, discernment, by the senses. 2. Mental: understanding, comprehension. 3. The understanding, the faculty of understanding: intellect, intelligentia, rationalitas. (Gr. *νοῦς*; Fr. *Entendement*; Ger. *Verstand*.)

***Intellectus Agens.**—*I. archetypus*, the archetypal understanding, the divine mind as furnishing model and law. *I. discurs-*

¹ *Rein. Vern.*, 312, 336, 381; *Prolegom.*, 107. ² *Rein. Vern.*, 327; Meiklejohn's Transl., 196.

sivus, the discursive understanding, the faculty of cognizing objects *through concepts*, not immediately. *I. ectypus*, ectypal, derivative understanding, opposed to *I. archetypus*. *I. intuitivus*, intuitive, immediate understanding; acting by direct perception; opposed to *I. discursivus*. **I. patiens*. *I. purus*, pure intellect, in contrast to sense and imagination. *I. speculativus*, the speculative understanding, possessing the power of abstract processes. — Kant.¹

INTELLIGENCE, (*Intellectus*, *Intelligentia*), lit., perception, discernment by the senses.—1. Understanding, knowledge; the power of discernment; the intellectual faculty. 2. Substance, spiritual and rational, as “God is the supreme, is pure intelligence,” “Man is an intelligence, served by organs.” Hence, Intelligent, Intelligential.

Intelligence, Faculties or Modes of, the intellectual faculties. They embrace conception, memory, abstraction and generalization, judgment and reason, imagination and the faculty of signs. — C. D. A.

INTELLIGIBLE (Lat.), lit. perceptible to the senses; capable of being grasped by the intellect; pertaining to the intellect only; supersensuous, (Ger. *Uebersinnliches*.) It is applied to universals, the categories, to the *ens rationis*, or pure being of the mind, to the world beyond the range of the senses.

Intelligible gods, in Plotinus, ideas considered as the forms of which intelligence is the matter.

INTELLIGIBILIA (Lat.), intelligibles, objects of the understanding.

INTELLIGO (Lat.; lit., to choose between).—1. Of the senses; to perceive, discern. 2. Of the mind or understanding; to perceive, understand, comprehend. Ger. *Verstehen*; Fr. *Entendre*.

INTENSION (lit., a stretching out), in Logic and Metaphysics, involves the qualities which are necessarily possessed by objects bearing a particular logical name. It is opposed to extension, which includes the objects to which the name may be applied. Metal in intension is defined by the qualities common to all metals. Intension is synonymous with comprehension, connotation, depth. Analysis in intension is syn-

¹ See Mellin's *Wörterb. Verstand*.

thesis in extension. As the intension of a term is increased, the extension is decreased. An *intensive syllogism* is one which involves the qualities of its object. See Hamilton,¹ Jevons,² Spalding,³ Thomson.⁴

INTENT or INTENTION (INTENTIONALITY).—"Sometimes purposes cherished within, but practically inoperative. More frequently, purpose as directing the use of means for the attainment of a selected end." In law and morals, *intention* affects the character of the action following, "and the responsibility of the agent."—C. F. V.

*Intention (Logical). *Intention (First and Second).

INTENTIONAL SPECIES or FORMS, among the Peripatetics of the Middle Ages, intermediate and vicarious objects between the mind itself and the external object of thought. *Intentional* marks the relative and accidental nature of their manifestation.—Hamilton.⁵

INTEREST (Lat.; Ger. *Interesse*), largely used by Kant.⁶—The dependence on the principles of reason, on the part of a contingently determinable will; "that whereby reason becomes practical;" "a stimulus of the will, presented through reason;" "the complacency in association with the mental representation of the existence of an object;" "the association of pleasure with the appetitive faculty, if this linking of the two be, in the judgment of the understanding, valid, in accordance with a general rule—valid for the subject at least."

Interest of Inclination (Hypothetical, Sensuous, Pathological), in Kant,⁷ practical pleasure, in as far as it is united with the appetitive faculty; interest in the object of the action; interest in behalf of inclination.

Interest of a Mental Faculty, in Kant,⁸ a principle which involves the condition on which alone the faculty is exercised.

Interest (Categorical, Moral, Practical), in Kant,⁹ a pure, unsensuous interest of the mere practical reason; an interest in the observance of the moral law; interest in the action; dependence of the will on the principles of reason in itself.

¹ *Lect. on Logic*, Lect. VIII. ² *Lessons in Logic*, Less. V. ³ *Art. Log.* in *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 8th ed. ⁴ *Laws of Thought*, sect. 48-52. ⁵ *Reid's Works*, 952, 953. ⁶ *Grundlegung zur Met. der Sitt.*, 38*, 71, 121 seq. *Crit. d. pract. Vernunft*, 127, 141, 144, 215 seq. *Crit. d. Urtheilskr.*, § 2 seq. *Rechtslehre*, Einl. iii. ⁷ *Rechtslehre*, iv. *Met. der Sitt.*, 38*. ⁸ *Pract. Vern.*, 215 seq. ⁹ *Pract. Vern.*, 141, 142. *Grundl. u. Met. d. Sitt.*, 38*.

INTERMEDIATE LINK or **CAUSE**, a cause between the primary cause and the effect. A is the cause of B, and B is the cause of C: B is the *intermediate link*.

INTERMUNDIA, the metakosmia of Epicurus, the spaces between the bodies of the universe, where the life of the gods was spent, free from all care about the affairs of the creatures.—Cicero,¹ Diogenes Laertius.²

INTERNAL (Lat.), inward, 1. as opposed to the outward; 2. as opposed to the relative, marking what a thing is in itself, apart from comparison—absolute. (Ger. *innerlich*.)—Kant.³ *I. sense*, in the Cartesian school, convertible with *consciousness* in general, and thus came to be frequently applied to denote the source, complement, or revelation of immediate truths.—Hamilton.⁴ *I. senses*, in the Scholastic Philosophy, opposed to the *external senses* (sight, hearing, etc.), were generally accounted four: the common sense; imagination; sensitive judgment; sensitive memory.—Hamilton.⁵

INTERPRETATION (Lat.), explanation, exposition. (Ger. *Auslegung*.)

*Interpretation of Nature.

INTERSTICE, INTERSTITIUM (Lat.), space between. (Ger. *Zwischenraum*.)

INTERVAL (Lat.), space between ramparts and tents; space between, either of locality or time.

INTOLERANCE, in Ethics, want of toleration; unwillingness to yield what is demanded by the right of opinion.

INTRAMUNDANE, opposed to extramundane; within the world; neither without it, nor above it.

INTRINSIC (Lat.), lit. following into the inside; inner; inherent—the opposite of accidental; essential to the nature or character. It is applied to qualities and properties; in Ethics, to equity, evil, goodness, worth; in Logic, to argument.

INTRODUCTION (Ger. *Einleitung*), in Philosophical Literature, the name of a class of books, embracing formal Encyclopædia—the branches of preliminary philosophical knowledge; Propædæutics, Prolegomena: Real-Encyclopædia: sketches of the various departments. There are also special introductions to Logic, Metaphysics, Psychology, Ethics, and other special topics.

¹ *Finib.*, II. 23. ² *X.* 89. ³ *Rein. Vern.*, 361. ⁴ *Reid's Works*, 759. ⁵ *Do.*, 953.

INTROVERSION, the act of turning the mind inward ; applied to the faculties. — Berkeley.¹

INTUITION. — “ Immediate knowledge — direct perceiving or beholding of an object or principle. Leibnitz² distinguished ‘ knowledge ’ (*cognitio*) into intuitive and symbolical.” — C. F. V. “ An *intuition* is any knowledge whatsoever, sensuous or intellectual, which is apprehended *immediately*; a *notion*, on the other hand, a product of the discursive faculty, is any knowledge whatsoever which is apprehended *mediately*.” — De Quincey.³ See *Anschauung*.

*Intuition and Conception.

Intuition, Philosophy of, Intuitionist Philosophy, one which rests on intuition, external and internal perception ; a science of experience. — Krug.

INTUITIVE, the opposite of deductive ; reached by intuition ; direct ; applied to judgment, knowledge, reason ; self-evident truth, perception, vision.

INTUSSUSCEPTION, the reception of other matter into organic bodies.

INUNDERSTANDING, adj., devoid of understanding or of mental faculties ; applied by Pearson⁴ to beasts and plants.

*Invention.

IN VERBIS SIMUS FACILES, MODO CONVENIAMUS IN RE, we need have no difficulty about the phrase, if we agree in the thing. — See *Logomachy*. A serious difference in words usually involves, however, a real disagreement in view, or ignorance of the truth ; and unity in the thing seeks a common formula.

INVERSION (lit., a turning upside down), changing of order ; in Logic, a mere change of the ordinary succession of the parts, the parts themselves remaining what they were ; to be distinguished from *Conversion*, q. v.

INVOLUNTARY, without will ; without the act of the will ; forced.

INVOLUTION, rolling up, infolding ; the opposite of *evolution*, q. v. *The theory of involution in generation*. — See **Evolution, Theory of**. *I. of Concepts, I. of Notions*, relation of containing and contained ; in comprehension, opposed to subordination. — Hamilton.⁵

¹ *Guardian*, No. 89. ² *Opera. Philos.*, Erdmann, p. 79. ³ *Rhetoric*. ⁴ *Exp. of Creed*, Art. xl. ⁵ *Logic*, 155.

IONIAN PHILOSOPHY, SCHOOL OF (IONICS), the earliest of the Greek schools, mainly occupied with physics.—See **Synthetical Tables**.

IPSE DIXIT—he (Pythagoras) has said it—the formula which marks reception on the mere authority of an assertion.

IPSO FACTO—by or in the fact itself—is used where the principle maintained is involved in a fact admitted or proved.

*Irony.

IRRATIONALISM, view or system in conflict with reason.—See **Rationalism**.

IRRELATION, IRRELEVANCY, character of the irrelevant; what is not to the purpose; destitute of logical connection; as, *irrelevant conclusion*, in fallacy.—Jevons.¹

ISAGOGE, in Philosophical Literature, *Introduction*, q. v.

ISODYNAMY, character of the **Isodynamic**, of equal force, *Equipollent*.

ISOLATION (Fr., from Lat.), insulation; separation or shutting up to itself, whether physical, intellectual, or moral.—*I of the Ego* (Ger. *Isolirtheit des Ich*), marks the absolute individuality of the human person. "Between the Ego and the world exterior to it, and especially between the Ego and the Tu, the I and Thou, there lies an impenetrable boundary. The other Egos are utterly inaccessible to our consciousness; our Ego is utterly inaccessible to them. . . . The longing overwhelms us to break through these bounds of individuality which hem us in, so that with immanent consciousness we may permeate the universe."—Steudel.²

ISOSTHENY, in the ancient Sceptic Philosophy, equal force; applied to arguments of equal weight for and against; logical *isodynamy*.—Diogenes Laertius.³

ITALIAN PHILOSOPHY.—See **Synthetical Tables**.

ITALIC SCHOOL.—See **Synthetical Tables**.

JACOBI, F. H. (1743–1819), SYSTEM OF, philosophic belief, faith, immediate assurance of feeling—the supersensuous indemonstrable.⁴

¹ Less. in *Logic*, xxi. ² *Philosophie im Umris*s, II., 60–62. ³ 9, 73. ⁴ Krauth's *Berkeley*, 100, 101.

JUCUNDITY (Lat.), quality of the *jucundum*, agreeableness, pleasantness, to the senses or the mind. (Ger. *Annehmlichkeit*.)—Sir T. Browne,¹ Kant.²

JUDGE, JUDEX (the Court), (Ger. *Richter*), one to whom judicial authority, the right of decision (juridical faculty, Ger. *Befugniss*), belongs.—*J. supreme* (*Judex supremus*, Ger. *Oberste Richter*), is one from whose decision there is no appeal.—Kant.³

Judge, to, in Ethics and Jus., 1. to decide upon a question of morals, or of character; 2. to pronounce a jural decision.

Judge, to, in Logic, is to conjoin, or separate two ideas. We conjoin them when we think that the one agrees with the other; we separate them if we think that the one does not agree with, or is repugnant to, the other.—Baumeister.⁴

***JUDGMENT**, “an exercise of comparison, and also the decision reached.”—C. F. V. In Kant, the judgment is the link between the theoretical and practical reason. He considers it as æsthetic and teleologic, and devotes to it his “Critique of the Judgment.”

Judgment, Faculty of, in Kant, tabular view of:

- I. Æsthetic Faculty of Judgment. 1. Analytics. *a*. The beautiful; *b*. The sublime. 2. Dialectics.
- II. Teleological Faculty of Judgment. 1. Analytics. *a*. External conformity with plan; *b*. Internal conformity with plan. 2. Dialectics.

Judgment.—1. As an act. (Lat. *Judicium*; Fr. *Jugement*; Ger. *Urtheil*.) “An act through which the given mental representations first become cognition of an object;” “the mental representation or expression of the unity of the consciousness of different representations, or the mental representation of their relation, so far as they form one notion;” “the mode of reducing given cognitions to the objective unity of apperception.”—Kant.⁵ 2. As a power or faculty. (Lat. *Judicium, vis judicandi*; Fr. *Jugement*; Ger. *Urtheilskraft, U. vermögen*.) “The second of the three superior or intellectual faculties of cognition—the understanding, the judgment, the reason. It is the faculty of judgments, one of the three functions of

¹ *Vulgar Errors*. L. J. ² *Urtheilskraft*, § 57, 238. ³ *Rechtslehre*, xxix. 169 seq. ⁴ *Institut. Philosoph. Rational.*, § 185. ⁵ *Naturwissenschaft*, xix.; *Logik*, § 17; *Rein. Vern.*, 141; Meiklejohn's Transl., 87.

intellectual power, which is covered by the word 'understanding,' when we take it in its broad, generic sense."¹ *J. pure, J. transcendental*, giving *a priori* the conditions on which alone the special can be subsumed under the general.²

Judgment, Critique of the (*Kritik der Urtheilskraft*), the last of Kant's great critiques (1790).³ After the introduction, the Critique is arranged as follows:—I. Critique of the *Æsthetic* Judgment. i. Analytic of the *æsthetic* judgment: 1. Analytic of the beautiful; 2. Analytic of the sublime; [3.] Deduction of the pure *æsthetic* judgments; [4.] Taste, art, and genius. ii. Dialectic of the *æsthetic* judgment. [iii.] Appendix, methodology of taste. II. Critique of the teleologic judgment. i. Analytic of the teleologic judgment. ii. Dialectic of the teleologic judgment. [iii.] Appendix, methodology of the teleologic judgment.

Judgment, Eclipse of, Lapse of, subsumes the special under the general.—Mellin.⁴

JUDGMENTS, EQUIPOLLENT, those to which the same complex notion corresponds; logical equivalents.—Wolf.⁵

Judgments, *Æsthetic*, in the sphere of taste, pronounce whether an object be beautiful or ugly.—Kant.⁶

Judgments, Affirmative, in which "the subject and predicate are affirmed of each other; in negative judgments, they are denied of each other, and the proposition is called a *negative*."—Hamilton.⁷

*Judgments, Analytic.

Judgments, Categorical.—1. In Aristotle, the term has no reference to his ten *summa genera*, but signifies affirmative judgments. 2. By his disciples it is applied to a judgment in which the predicate is simply affirmed or denied of the subject, and in contradistinction to those propositions which have been called *hypothetical* and *disjunctive*. As now employed, simple or absolute; opposed to *conditional*.—Hamilton.⁸

Judgments, Comprehensive, or Intensive, if the subject or determined notion be viewed as the containing whole.—Hamilton.⁹

¹ *Rein. Vern.*, 169; Meiklejohn's Transl., 103; *Anthropologie*, §§ 31, 32. (40. 41.) ² *Urtheilskraft*, xxvi. ³ *Gesammtausgabe* (Leipzig, 1839), VII., 1-376. Kirchmann, 1860. Beck's *Auszug*, II., 1-382. Opera (Born) III., 169-55. *Critique du Jugement trad. par J. Barwé*, 2 v., Par., 1869. Willich: *Elements of the Critical Philosophy*, Lond., 1798, 103-113. ⁴ *Wörterb. d. Krit. Phil.*, ii. 574. ⁵ *Logic*, § 278. ⁶ *Urtheilskraft*, §§ 9, 16, pp. 29, 40. ⁷ *Logic*, 176. ⁸ *Logic*, 166. ⁹ *Logic*, 163.

Judgments, Conditional, the opposite of categorical, are those in which the relation of determination between the subject and predicate depends upon conditions. As these conditions may lie in the subject or in the predicate, or in both, there arise hypothetical (subject), disjunctive (predicate), hypothetico-disjunctive or dilemmatic (both).—Hamilton.¹

Judgments, Congruent, Consonant, Consentient, where neither contradiction nor contrariety exists.—Hamilton.²

Judgments, Definite, Determinate, of a definite or determinate quantity, as their sphere is circumscribed, comprising the two subordinate classes of General or Universal, and of Singular or Individual propositions.—Hamilton.³

Judgments, Dianoetic.—See **Judgments, Discursive**.

Judgments, Different, Diverse, when the matter and form of two judgments are not the same.

Judgments, Dilemmatic, Hypothetico-disjunctive, are those in which a distinction is found, both in the subject and in the predicate—a combination of an hypothetical form and of a disjunctive form.

Judgments, Discretive, those in which there is a careful and successful distinction of things that differ.

Judgments, Discursive, Dianoetic, are those which are reached by a train of reasoning.—Wolf.

Judgments, Disjunct.—See **Judgments, Disparate**.

Judgments, Disjunctive, “are those in which the condition qualifying the relation between the subject and the predicate lies proximately in the predicate—D is either B, or C, or A—Men are either virtuous or vicious.”—Krug,⁴ Hamilton.⁵

Judgments, Disparate, when relatively identical judgments have a similar subject, their predicates are disparate, if a similar predicate, their subjects are *disjunct*.—Hamilton.⁶

Judgments, Empirical, based upon experience.

Judgments, Extensive, opposed to *comprehensive*, are those in which the predicate or determining notion is viewed as the containing whole.

¹ *Logic*, 165–170. ² *Logic*, 184. ³ *Logic*, 171, 172, 175. ⁴ *Logik oder Denklehre*, § 57, Anm. 3. ⁵ *Logic*, 169. ⁶ *Logic*, 183.

Judgments (*Urtheile*), Forms of, in Kant,¹ Tabular View of
All judgments are

- I. According to Quantity, either 1. Universal; 2. Particular; or 3. Individual.
- II. According to Quality, either 1. Affirmative; 2. Negative; or 3. Infinite (limitative). — See **Judgments, Limitative**.
- III. According to Relation, either 1. Categorical; 2. Hypothetical; or 3. Disjunctive.
- IV. According to Modality, 1. Problematic; 2. Assertory; or 3. Apodictic.

Judgments, Hypothetical, conditional judgments comprise three species, 1. Hypothetical; 2. Disjunctive; 3. Dilemmatic. *ὑποθετικὸς* is commonly rendered by *conditionalis*; Boethius uses them as convertible. Many of the schoolmen used hypothetical to designate the genus, and conditional the species, and so many modern compends, Aldrich, and Whately. But conditional, as the more extensive, should designate the genus. Hypothetical judgments are those in which the condition qualifying the relation between the subject and the predicate lies proximately in the subject. — Hamilton.²

Judgments, Hypothetico-disjunctive. — See **Judgments, Dilemmatic**.

Judgments, Identical, Convertible, Equal, or Equivalent, opposed to different. — See **Judgments, Equipollent**.

Judgments, Indefinite, Indeterminate, 1. In the common doctrine of the Logicians, "those in which the subject is not articulately or overtly declared to be either universal, particular, or individual." 2. In Hamilton, judgments are "of quantity indeterminate or indefinite, according as their sphere is uncircumscribed."³

Judgments, Individual, Singular, Expository, 1. Those in which the subject is a minimum of extension; 2. In Hamilton, judgments of a determinate quantity which are of a unit indivisible.⁴

Judgments, Infinite, in Kant⁵ (*unendliche Urtheile*), the third of the judgments according to quality. — See **Judgments**.

¹ *Rein. Vernunft*, 95; Kirchmann's edit., 112, and his note 27; *Opera* (Born), I. 6. Beck: *Auszug*, I. 23; Translat. Haywood, 72; Meiklejohn, 58. ² *Logic*, 167. ³ *Logic*, 171. ⁴ *Logic*, 171, 172. ⁵ *Rein. Vernunft*, 97, 98.

Forms of, Tabular View. They are judgments in which the copula is affirmative and the predicate negative, as "man is immortal," in which not only is mortality excluded, but a deathless being is asserted. In a negative judgment, as such, something is denied—nothing is affirmed. In an affirmative judgment, as such, something is affirmed—nothing is denied; but in the infinite or *limitative judgment*, q. v., something is affirmed, to wit, by the copula, and something is denied, to wit, by the predicate. It is negative-affirmative.—Krug.¹ Kant's own explanation of infinite judgments is as follows: "In a transcendental logic, *infinite* judgments are to be distinguished from affirmative judgments, although in general logic they are properly classified with the affirmative, and do not form a distinct member in the division. General logic abstracts from all content or matter of the predicate, even though it be negative and has regard only to the question whether the predicate is to be affirmed of the subject, or to be denied of it. Transcendental logic, however, considers also the judgment according to the value or content of this logical affirmation, an affirmation by means of a simple negative predicate, and what this affirmation furnishes us by way of gain in respect to the total cognition. Were I to say of the soul, 'it is not mortal,' I would, by a negative judgment, at least have avoided an error. By the proposition, 'the soul is not mortal,' I have, it is true, so far as logical form is concerned, actually *affirmed*, inasmuch as I put the soul into the unlimited sphere of non-mortal beings. Now, as the *mortal* embraces one part of the whole sphere of possible beings, and as the *non-mortal* embraces the other, nothing more is asserted in my proposition than that the soul is one thing of an *infinite* multitude which still remains when I remove the mortal. But, by this process, the infinite sphere of all the *possible* is only so far limited that the mortal is separated from it and the soul is placed in the compass which remains. This compass, however, after this abstraction, still remains *infinite*, and other parts can be removed without any growth thereby in the conception of the soul, or in the affirmative determination. These infinite judgments, consequently, are,

¹ *Handb. d. Philosophie*, § 160 a.

as regards the logical compass, actually merely limitative as regards the content of cognition in general, and hence, in the transcendental table of all the momenta of thoughts in the judgments, they are not to be passed over, because the function of the understanding exercised by them may, perhaps, be of importance in the field of its *pure, a priori cognition*.”¹ Kirchmann’s note on this passage is as follows: “LOGICAL FUNCTIONS OF THE UNDERSTANDING.—The negative judgments, such as ‘man is not mortal,’ deny the copula, and, therefore, the judgment, as such, which has its essential character in the copula. The *infinite* judgments, as ‘man is non-mortal’ (or immortal), do not deny the copula, and, therefore, do not overthrow the judgment, as such, but the predicate of it is a negative one, and, therefore, according to Kant, *infinite*. This infinity, however, does not exist if the negation is designed not to be *contradictory*, but only *contrary*—as ‘the man is not sick,’ i. e., is well. In which proposition the predicate embraces no infinity.” In his introduction to the study of Philosophy, Kirchmann says, “The *not*, the negation, implies a purely relative thinking, in which no content is positive, but is rather held back in thinking. When we say ‘red is not yellow,’ ‘this man is not seeing (blind),’ ‘this tree is not an oak (no oak),’ the second conception is thereby removed from the first. The word ‘*not*’ needs, in order to its complete application, the determination of two points; thus, ‘red is not yellow,’ is a phrase in which *verbally* the one may be concealed under the other. We have, then, the impression of the *non-yellow*, by which something other than yellow is intended but is not further determined—it may be red, blue, or acid, or hardness; in general, all that exists, with the exception of *yellow*, is the *non-yellow*. In this greatest extension the *non-yellow* prevents the contradictory antithesis of the *yellow*, in the narrower extension, where between what is *not* yellow and what is yellow, there remains something in common; the *non-yellow* forms the contrary antithesis to the *yellow*, for example, red. The *non-yellow* can, however, also mean the pure negation of the *yellow* without thereby having any specific reference. In this third signification the *non-yellow*

¹ *Rein. Vern.* (1799), 97, 98, (Kirchmann) 115.

is not objectively capable of mental representation, but designates only the pure denying of *the yellow*, as involving relative thinking. Which of these three significations the word '*not*' may have in any particular case, is to be determined by circumstances. Very frequent use is made in language of '*not*' with the *existent*, and there are certain syllables that express it, as '*less* and *un*' (e. g., *helpless*, *unpleasant*), and '*in*' and '*im*' (e. g., *indirect*, *immortal*). As a rule, these syllables express the contrary, as *unwell* (= sick), *uneven* (= rough). *Nothing* (as *not anything*), because of the wide compass of *anything*, designates the contradictory of anything. The other is the *not this*."¹—See **Judgments, Limitative**.

Judgments, Intuitive, are those in which we attribute to an entity what we see to be comprehended in the notion of it; as, *rain is moist*.—Wolf.

Judgments, Limitative, in Kant, who, following Boethius and the Schoolmen, "explains infinite judgments as those which do not simply indicate that a subject is not contained under the sphere of a predicate, but that it lies out of its sphere, somewhere in the infinite sphere. He has thus considered them as combining an act of negation and an act of affirmation, inasmuch as one thing is affirmed in them through the negation of another. In consequence of this view, he gave them, after some Wolfians, the name of Limitative . . . a third form of judgments under quality — affirmative, negative, or limitative."—Hamilton.²

Judgments, Logical, "are founded on conceptions formed by abstraction and generalization from the primitive."

Judgments, Logical, the *four of the old logicians*, as to quantity and quality, with their symbols, are:

Universal Affirmative	. . .	A.
Universal Negative	. . .	E.
Particular Affirmative	. . .	I.
Particular Negative	. . .	O.—Atwater.³

Judgments, Modality of.—See **Modality**.

Judgments, Negative.—See **Judgments, Affirmative**.

Judgments, Opposed, Confictive, "when, of two or more judgments, the one affirms the other denies, and when they

¹ *Erläuterungen zur Krit. d. rein. Vern.*, 21.

² *Logic*, 179.

³ *Logic*, 90.

are thus reciprocally different in quality. Their relation in this respect is called *opposition* — either *contradiction*, *repugnance*, or *contrariety*."—Hamilton.¹

Judgments, Particular, when the predicate is affirmed or denied of an indefinite part of the subject, as, "some men are orators."—Atwater.² "Whose subject is a common term, species, or genus, but whose predicate agrees only with certain individuals of the species or genus. Its mark is *some*."—Wolf.³

Judgments, Plurative, "are those in which more than half, but not all, of the subject is taken. Of a similar nature are numerically definite judgments, those in which a definite number or numerical proportion of the subject is taken."—Atwater.⁴

Judgments, Practical, those which bear on action, conduct, the common conditions of life; those which apply principles correctly.

Judgments, Previous, suspended on conditions; *ad interim*; provisional.

Judgments, Primitive, give only the predicate of existence — simply affirm that a phenomenon, external or internal, is. See **Judgments, Logical**.—Atwater.⁵

Judgments, Quality of, has respect to the relation of the predicate to the intension of the subject—affirmative or negative.

Judgments, Quantity of, has reference to the relation of the predicate to the extension of the subject—universal, particular, or singular.

Judgments, Ratiocinating, involving the processes of reasoning; opposed to *judgments, ratiocinated*, or *rationated*, which are the results of reasoning, conclusions from syllogisms of the reason, and having consequently an *a priori* ground.

Judgments, Relation of, has respect to the manner of connecting the predicate with the subject—categorical or hypothetical.

Judgments, Simple, are those in which, in fact as well as in form, there is but one subject and one predicate.

Judgments, Singular, are those in which the predicate is affirmed or denied of individuals; or when the subject is a plurality of individuals taken collectively.

¹ *Logic*, 184. ² *Logic*, 88. ³ *Phil. Rat. sive Logica*, § 243. ⁴ *Logic*, 102. ⁵ *Logic*, 23, 83.

Judgments, Substitutive, are affirmative judgments which have a distributed predicate. They are called substitutive because the predicate may be substituted for the subject, without limiting the quantity either of the judgment or of the predicate substituted. They are either particular or universal. The symbol of the universal substitutive is U, of the particular substitutive Y.—See **Judgments, Logical, the Four**.

***Judgments, Synthetic**, are judgments of extension—opposed to *judgments analytic*, which are judgments of explanation.

***Judgments, Tautologous**.

Judgment, Terms of, the termini, the two notions, one of which is at the beginning, the other at the end of a judgment—the subject and predicate.

Judgments, Universal, are those in which the predicate is affirmed or denied of all the subjects taken distributively. Its affirmative mark is *all*, its negative mark *none*.

Judgments, Vague, in which the notion of the subject does not include what is determined by the predicate. — Wolf.¹

JURIDICAL, JURISTIC (Lat.), 1. Acting in the distribution of justice. “All discipline is not legal, that is to say *juridical*, but some is personal, some economical, and some ecclesiastical.”—Milton.² 2. Relating to jus, or law. “Jurisprudence is a *juridical science*.” *J. Realism, J. Idealism, J. Synthetism*, mark the relations between the metaphysical systems and Jus.

JURISCONSULT (Lat.), one who gives his opinion in cases of law, on the presumption that he is learned in the law. (Ger. *Rechtsgelehrt, Rechtskundig*.)

JURISPERITUS (Lat.), one versed, skilled, experienced in the law. (Ger. *Rechtserfahren*.)

***JURISPRUDENCE**, “rests on the science of the right. For personal rights are based upon what is right in human conduct.”—C. F. V. See Ahrens,³ Audisio,⁴ Kirchmann,⁵ Post,⁶ Stahl,⁷ Trendelenburg,⁸ F. Walter,⁹ Whewell.¹⁰

JUS.—I. prop. (*that which joins or unites together*; [morally] *that*

¹ *Logic*, § 320. ² *Colasterion*. ³ *Droit Naturel*, 6th ed., 1868. ⁴ *Fundamenta*, 4th ed., 1868. ⁵ *Grundbegriffe* (Phil. Bibl.), 1869. ⁶ *Naturgeertz*, 1867. ⁷ *Philos. d. Rechts*, 4th ed., 1870. ⁸ *Naturrecht*, 2d ed., 1868. ⁹ *Naturrecht u. Politik*, 2d ed., 1871. ¹⁰ *Hist. of Moral Philos.*, p. 16.

which is binding in its tendency or character; hence) Law, whether natural, human, or divine; whether written or unwritten; whether in principle or in practice. A. Of Natural Law, *Jus Naturale*, *i. e.*, the law common to all animate creation, whether men or animals: 1. In general; 2. Especially that which in and of itself possesses the principles of law; that which is good, right, proper, fair, just; justness, fairness, equity. B. Of Human Law: 1. Of the law of nations or mankind, the law commonly in force amongst nations or mankind collectively; 2. Of civil law or the law of particular states. II. By Metonymy. A. A right or privilege resulting from law of any kind. B. Permission, liberty, conceded right; power of doing anything founded on another's permission or leave. C. Power, authority, as resulting from law of any kind.—W.-R. Whewell's *Elements of Morality*, including Polity, in Book II., treats of *Jus*. Of Rights and Obligations. Book VI. *International Jus*. Rights and Obligations between States.

Jus is classified or characterized: 1. By adjectives or participles: as, acquired, external, civil, general or strict, connate, inborn, native, natural, internal, contrasted, controverted, cosmopolitan, broad, lax, strict, sovereign, personal, most personal, really personal, positive, real. 2. By the possessive case: of a state, of nations, of exile, of fruition, of usufruct, of using, of punishment, of the sword, of hospitality, of habitation, of protection, of majesty, of nature, of necessity.

JUSJURANDUM (Lat.), an *oath*, *q. v.* (Ger. *Eid*.)

JUST (Lat.).—1. In accordance with the principles of law or justice; upright. 2. Founded or resting on (natural) law; equitable; right; proper. 3. Accordant with divine law; right; what ought to be.

***JUSTICE**, "the equal between man and man, grounded on equal subjection to moral law and equality of rights among men, or founded upon mutual contract or natural relations."—C. F. V. Distributive justice has been divided into: 1. Remunerative; 2. Primitive; 3. Civil.

JUSTIFICATION (Lat.).—1. Properly, the making or representing one as observant of (human) law; hence, by metonymy of effect for cause, of a judge, the absolving,

acquitting, releasing from charge of being unjust; pardoning, forgiving, treating as if just. 2. The doing or acting justly. 3. The rendering just. 4. The declaring, showing, representing, proving as just. 5. Vindicating, excusing, exculpating the unjust as if he were just. (Ger. *Rechtfertigung*.)

JUXTAPOSITION (Lat.), placing together; apposition; antithetical to *opposition*.

***KABALA, CABALA, KABALISM, KABALISTIC PHILOSOPHY.**—See Hosenroth.¹

KANADA, KASYAPA, founder of a system of atomism, which bears in India the name *Veisheshika*.—See *Analytical Tables*.

KANT (Immanuel, 1724–1804), **SYSTEM OF, KANTIAN SYSTEM, KANTIANISM, KANTISM**, the Critical System, Criticism (*Kriticismus*).—It seeks, by an acute examination of the cognitive faculty, to reach what is necessary and of universal validity in our knowledge, over against the merely empirical. Things are known not as they are in themselves, but only in phenomenon; transcendental cognition is unattainable. God, freedom, immortality are postulates of the practical reason; the imperative of the moral law is categorical.²

KANTO-PLATONISM, in France, Platonic and Kantian idealism conjoined. It was attributed to Cousin.—Krug (1833).

KAPILA, CAPILA, a Hindoo philosopher, founder of the Sankhya system.

KARIKA, in Hindoo philosophy, verses which concisely state the principal theories; more especially a statement of the Sankhya doctrine in metrical form.

KINEMATICS, CINEMATICS, KINETICS (Gr.), the science of motions.

***KNOWLEDGE** (see *Cognition*), “is simple or complex, according as it is concerned with a single thing or with rela-

¹ *Kabala Denudata*, in A. J., II. 9. ² *Critique of the Pure Reason*, 1781. *Practical Reason*, 1788. *Judgment*, 1790. *Religion within the Limits of mere Reason*, 1793. *Anthropology*, 1798. *Works*: Hartenstein, 1867–69; Rosenkranz and Schubert, 1838–40; Kirchmann, 1869 seq.

tions. It is immediate or mediate, according as the thing itself is known, or knowledge is acquired through some representation, or through a rationalizing process."—C. F. V.

Knowledge, Knowing, (Cognition, Cognizing,) Character of, as defined in the later schools of philosophy.—Baader: "True cognizing is an interdwelling of the cognizer in the cognized—man has this sort of immanent cognition of God."¹ Chalybäus: "That only can be immediately certain which the subject grasps in itself, what reveals itself in the immediate self-consciousness of the subject."² J. G. Fichte: "*Knowing* lifts itself above itself and the world that is, and not until it is beyond this world is it *knowing*. Knowing is not a mere knowing of one's self, but a knowing of God, but by no means of a being exterior to God. It is expression of God."³ Kant: "Holding for true, or the subjective validity of the judgment, in relation to the conviction (which is at the same time objectively valid), has these three gradations: opinion, belief, and *knowing* (*Wissen*). . . That holding for true which is both subjectively and objectively sufficient is knowing."⁴ Kitz: "Cognizing is nothing but knowing one's self; the human cognizing must be what it cognizes, and cognize what it is."⁵ Lasalle: "If the logical notion (*i. e.*, the subject) be not itself the proper self-positing inner thing of objectivity, this inner will forever remain to it a sealed external."⁶ Michelet: "In that philosophy (Hegel's) is involved the absolute knowing."⁷ Schelling: "Knowing is identical with intellectual intuition;" "it is an imaging of the infinite in the soul; a being of the absolute in knowing, and of knowing in the absolute." "The soul, having intuition of itself under the form of eternity, has intuition of the Essence itself." "A mediated cognition cannot be an adequate one. The soul, therefore, can have no adequate cognition of things or of itself. That only is knowing, when knowing and being are the same thing." "Man, in his intellectual intuition or imagination (which is the understanding in the act of intui-

¹ Quot. in Steudel: *Phil. i. Unriis*, I., 258. ² *Fundamental Philosophie*, 23. ³ *Wissenschaftslehre*, § 32. *Thatsachen d. Bewusstseins*, ch. v. (*Werke*, II., 685). *Wissenschaftslehre in Unriis*, § 12 (*Werke*, II., 705). ⁴ *Rein. Vern.*, 850 (cf. p. 145). Meiklejohn, 493. Haywood, 617. 3d ed. *zu Prunquä*, Tissot, II., 406. ⁵ *Zuschr. v. Fichte*, B. 48, 285. ⁶ *Zuschr.* "Der Gedanke," II., 148. ⁷ *Do.*, II., 267, 268.

tion), has such immanent cognition, and in it an absolute cognition of the eternal."¹ Schopenhauer: "Knowing in general, is to have in the power of our mind, for voluntary reproduction, those judgments which have in anything external to them their sufficient reason. The abstract cognition, grasped in concepts, is consequently alone a *knowing*. This knowing, therefore, is conditioned by reasons, and as the animals lack reason, we cannot, strictly speaking, affirm that they *know* anything, although they have *intuitive* cognition. *Knowing* is related to *intuiting*, as the cognition of the reason to the cognition of the understanding. Knowing is the abstract consciousness, the having fixed in the concepts of the reason, what has been in general cognized in other ways. . . . The *knowing* of the profoundest scholar is only *virtually* existent; *actually*, he is limited to the solitary mental modification of which he is at the moment conscious. There is an amazing contrast between what he knows in *potentia*, and what he knows in *actu*. The former is a boundless, almost chaotic mass, the latter a solitary clear train of thought."² Steudel: "By the actual cognition of an object we mean a cognition which completely penetrates into its object, so that no part and no relation of the object remains unopened to the cognition, none of which it is not master; on the contrary, the object in its total matter and essential character passes into the cognition. Such a cognition is with justice styled *adequate*, because it embraces everything that is in the object itself. Such a cognition we have of our own feelings, sensations, sense-perceptions, thoughts, mere forms, general notions and concepts—in a word, of what passes in ourselves."³

Knowledge, Classified and Characterized. Knowledge, **Absolute**, "carries with itself the perception of its necessary and universal validity."—P. E. Chase.⁴ **K.**, **Acroamatic**, discursive, philosophical, derived from the notions. **K.**, **Actual**, as opposed to habitual, that which is limited to a transient act of cognition. **K.**, **Adventitious**, in Cartesianism, that which comes to the mind in ripening years;

¹ Fern. Darstell. a. d. Syst. d. Philosoph., §§ II., IV. Werke, I., IV. 365, 391; VI. 31, 680; VII. 68. ² Welt als Wille, u. Vorstellung, I., 60, 73 seq.; II., 154. ³ Philosoph. im Umriss, I., 250-259. ⁴ Intellect. Symbolism, § 369.

opposed to *innate* and *factitious*. **K.**, **Analytic**, that which simply unfolds what is embraced in a notion; opposed to knowledge synthetic, *q. v.* **K.**, **a Posteriori**, empirical, mechanical; derived from experience, by perception. **K.**, **a Priori**, independent of all experience and sense-perception. **K.**, **Discursive**, derived from notions, acroamatic. **K.**, **Empirical**, *a posteriori*. **K.**, **Factitious**, that which results from our own mental combinations; opposed to *innate* and *adventitious*. **K.**, **Habitual**, that which is constant, as opposed to the actual. **K.**, **Historical**, objective, *cognitio ex datis*. **K.**, **Hyperphysical**, speculative. **K.**, **Immediate**, that between which and its object there is no other knowledge. **K.**, **Innate**, in the Cartesian system, inborn, originating with the being of the mind, or involved of necessity in its development. **K.**, **Intellectual**, derived from principles, rational. ***K.**, **Intuitive**. **K.**, **Mathematical**, derived from the construction of notions. **K.**, **Mechanical**, *a posteriori*. ***K.**, **Mediate**. **K.**, **Metaphysical**, lying outside of experience, *a priori*. **K.**, **Objective**, historical. **K.**, **Philosophical**, discursive. **K.**, **Practical**, that which has to do with the determining grounds of the will, by which we know duty. ***K.**, **Presentative**. **K.**, **Problematical**, "or belief, covers everything which we believe to be true, but the truth of which depends on circumstances which it is impossible for us to determine with certainty." — P. E. Chase. **K.**, **Pure**, *a priori*, free from the empirical. **K.**, **Quidditative**.—See **Quiddity**. **K.**, **Rational**, intellectual, *cognitio ex principiis*. **K.**, **Real**, "embraces every fact which we are compelled to believe by the constitution of our minds, but of which we do not perceive the entire necessity." — P. E. Chase. ***K.**, **Remote**. ***K.**, **Representative**. **K.**, **Speculative**, hyperphysical, directed to objects of which we can have no experience. ***K.**, **Symbolical**. **K.**, **Synthetic**, links notions which are not contained in each other—opposed to knowledge analytic. **K.**, **Theoretical**, in Kant, "knowledge of that which is, as opposed to practical knowledge, as knowledge of that which ought to be."¹ **K.**, **Transcendental**, in Kant, "that which is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our cognition of these objects, so far as this mode of cognition is possible *a priori*."²

¹ *Crit. d. r. Vern.*, 681; Meiklejohn, 389. ² *Crit. d. rein. Vernunft*, 26; Meiklejohn, 10.

KTISMATOLATRY (Gr.), worship of the creature; generic name for idolatry. — Krug.

KYRIOLEXY, KYRIOLOGY (Gr.), the use of literal expressions, as opposed to figurative; of clear, as opposed to obscure—antithetical to Akry. **Kyriologic**, speaking literally, applied to that kind of hieroglyphics which consists of simple pictures of the things meant; opposed to symbolic.

LABYRINTH, PHILOSOPHICAL, an intricate system. *Bayer's Filum* (Thread of the Labyrinth), 1663, is a Logic.

LAITY, transferred from theology; the body of those whose knowledge is not scientific.

LAMAISM, a form of Buddhism.

LANA CAPRINA (goat's wool), in Logic, insignificant things which give trouble, but do not reward it.

***LANGUAGE**, "expression of thought, feeling, and purpose, whether spoken or written." — C. F. V.

Language, Philosophical, 1. that in which words have an essential significance. — Wolf.¹ 2. The terms and modes of expression actually employed in philosophical writings, which should be free from a false technicality and pedantic obscurity, on the one side, and a show of popularity, inconsistent with thoroughness, on the other. Hegel: "Philosophy is in its very nature something esoteric, neither made for the populace nor capable of being fitted for them; the very thing which constitutes it philosophy, is that it is directly in antithesis to the understanding, and consequently yet more to that plain common sense by which is meant the local and temporary narrowness of a particular generation; in relation to this the world of philosophy is in and of itself a world turned upside down."² "The common way may be pursued in the common coat; but the sublime consciousness of the eternal, holy, infinite, takes to it the apparelling of a high priest."³ "A natural philosophizing, that thinks proper, in place of the rational concept, and in fact because

¹ *Psychol. Emp.*, §§ 303-306. ² *Wesen. d. Philos. ph. Kritik*, Werke, XVI., 45. ³ *Philosophie d. Geistes. Vorr.*, Werke, II., 56.

it is destitute of it, to substitute a vivid, poetical style of thinking, brings to its mart arbitrary combinations of an imagination which has been simply disordered by thought — brings products which are neither fish nor flesh, neither poetry nor philosophy.”¹ Kant: “There is nothing but insipidity in the superfine wisdom of those who take well-established and useful concepts and drop them into their logical crucible, where they sublimate them, and refine them, and subtilize them, till they pass off in vapors and volatile salts.”² Rosenkranz: “Philosophical delineation cannot dispense with the art of diffuseness.”³ Schelling: “The difficulty of understanding philosophy lies in the very nature of the case, and there must forever be in it something unintelligible to the mass of men,” yet “the unintelligibleness in the presentation of it is too often caused by nothing but the want of clearness in the thought.”⁴ Schopenhauer: “A writer who is clear to the bottom, and distinctly understands what he thinks and means, will never write obscurely, will never present vague, ill-defined notions, and search round for hard, complicated terms from other tongues in which to express them.”⁵ “There is a sort of diffuse abstractness which at last suspends all thinking on the part of the reader, for it leaves him nothing to think about — nothing is left but empty pods — to put forth an effort on it creates a sensation like that which follows the attempt to hurl away something excessively light.” “I hear the mill-wheels, but I see no meal.”⁶

Language, Universal, in Wolf, one which all nations could understand. The Chinese and Japanese use a common character for their words, yet cannot understand each other in speaking. The Arabic numerals are the characters of a proximate universality.

LATENT MODIFICATIONS OF MIND. — Sir W. Hamilton recognizes three degrees of mental latency: 1. That which belongs to all the parts of our knowledge which we are not thinking of at the time. I know a language not merely while I make use of it, but inasmuch as I can apply it when

¹ *Werke*, II., 54. ² *Werke*, I., 175. ³ *Psychologie, crit. Aug. Forred.*, xix. ⁴ *Werke*, I., x. 163; II., iii. 18. ⁵ *Welt als Will. u. Vorst.*, 4th ed., 1873, I. 508. ⁶ *Welt als Will.*, II. 69, 90, 159, 160; *Puregu*, I. 149.

and how I will. 2. When the mind contains knowledge or habits of action of which it is wholly unconscious in its ordinary state, but which are revealed to consciousness in certain extraordinary exaltations of its power—memory of languages brought by fever; and, 3. Mental modifications of which we are unconscious, but which manifest their existence by effects of which we are conscious—"When we hear the distant murmur of the sea—this is a sum made up of parts—and if the noise of each wave made no impression on our sense, the noise of the sea, which is the result, would not be realized." In like manner one thought rises after another whose consecution we cannot trace to any law of association with the preceding, but both are associated with an intermediate thought which latent at the time suggests. If a number of balls be placed in a line, and the cue at the end of the line struck, motion will be manifested by the ball at the other end, but not by the intermediate balls. Something like this is the train of thought.¹—F. V. 3.

LATITUDINARIANS, in Ethics, those whose views are loose. The looseness may be practical or theoretical. It is applied, in *Æsthetics*, to those who contend that art may lawfully give pleasure at the expense of moral purity.—Krug.

*Laughter.

***LAW**.—"Law is *physical*, established sequence; *intellectual*, a condition of intellectual action in order that truth may be reached; and *moral*, an *imperative* which determines the right guidance of our higher life."—C. F. V.

*Law and Cause. *Law and Form.

Law and Inclination, in Ethics, the question whether pure morality is conformity with the law, simply because it is the law, or whether it is connected with feeling and moral pleasure—is duty absolutely for duty's sake, or does it include inclination? It is the question raised by Kant's *Categorical Imperative*, q. v., for Kant's view. Beneke: "The moral is grounded entirely in the moral feeling, and all categorical imperatives are nothing more than feelings. Feeling, not reason, is to judge in regard to morality."² J. G. Fichte: "In morals, the feeling decides. This decision indeed rests

¹ *Lectures*, III., p. 355: see Morell's *Introd. to Mental Philos.*, part I., ch. 3. ² *Grundr. d. Physik d. Sitten*, 2, 10, 79, 220, 280: *Schulzsch*, 9.

upon a law grounded in the reason, and disclosed from the transcendental point of view." "All self-crucifixion and mortification is to be rejected—that is to be cast from us, which insures no happiness, in order that we may reach that which gives us boundless happiness." "The only possible confession of faith is: Perform, in every case, what duty enjoins, gladly and without constraint, free from doubts and prudential hesitations about the consequences." "When man's destination rises before him he embraces it with a love unspeakable, with the purest delight. Henceforth he does nothing with dislike. Everything he does, he does with supreme pleasure."¹ I. H. Fichte: "Moral character consists in the unity of the conscience with the idea of the good." "So long as what is natural in us is unconformed to our higher and primal will, duty takes the shape of command. When that conformity is brought about, duty can no longer be styled mere command. It is now the expression of the inmost freedom and inclination of our entire essential character, which has come to harmony with itself and to completeness. The will has now become one with the idea of the good, with the fundamental will. The idea of the *shall* has vanished from duty, and this is the supremest and truest form of the conception of duty."² Frauenstädt: "Every action in accordance with a will presupposes an aim, and the aim presupposes an impulse, an inclination. The original is always the impulse, the inclination. The acting from duty always presupposes therefore an inclination to perform duty. The antithesis, therefore, between duty and inclination is not absolute, but relative. It is not the pleasure which brings a heteronomy into moral action, but pleasure in something beside the moral aim. We must act from pleasure and love, whose object is the good."³ v. Hartsen: "Doing good from a feeling of duty stands no higher than doing good from love."⁴ Hegel: "Morality embraces the proposition: *Contemplate thyself in thine acts as a being of freedom*; or it adds the element of subjectivity to the action, to wit, the subjective as sentiment and purpose corresponds with what the command is in itself, and duty is performed, not

¹ *Werke*, IV., 208, 216; V., 185, 532; VII., 57. ² *System d. Ethik*, II., i. 183, 184, 187, 188, 242-245; ii. 4. ³ *Sittliche Leben*, 77, 163, 165, 284, 285. ⁴ *Ztschr. v. Fichte*, 69, 119.

from inclination, not for any cause extraneous, not with the vanity of being good, but *because it is duty*. The objective law, not the individual persuasion, is to be decisive."¹ Schopenhauer: "Sympathy, fellowship in the needs of others, philanthropy, is the source from which flows everything which Ethics prescribes, under the name of the duties of virtue and love; it is the source of all actions which have moral value, the sole, genuine, moral motive, and the firmest and surest pledge of moral deportment."² Stahl: "He who does good with inclination, and with love to his neighbor, stands on a higher plane than he who is doing it with a constant victory over himself."³ Ulrici: "When benevolence springs only from sympathy, and consequently strives only for our own pleasant feeling in the joy of others, such a willing and acting are in and for themselves as little moral and good as eating and drinking, which are prompted by the pleasant feeling which follows the satisfying of hunger and thirst."⁴

***Law (Empirical).** Law, Ethical, law of virtue, law of the moral, law moral.

Law, External, outward law; a law capable of being imposed and enforced from without, and capable of outward obedience.

Law, Formal, law of the pure practical reason; pure practical law *a priori*, unconditional law, *law moral*, q. v., as, "Thou shalt not lie."

Law, Irremissible, a law which allows of no exceptions.

Law, Material, law of empirical reason; pragmatic, conditioned law.

***Law, Mental.** ***Law, Moral.**

Law, Natural, External, that which is *a priori*, necessary, objective.

Law, Objective, the law of reason, which ought of necessity to determine every will.

Law, Permissive, that which gives permission; the right, but not the obligation, of acting or not acting. — Wolf.⁵

***Law, Physical.** ***Law, Political.**

¹ *Werke*, XVIII., 197, § 189; VIII., 172, 191-195, 201. ² *Grund-Probleme*, 133, 134, 227, 231, 233, 236. ³ *Rechts- und Staats-Lehre*, I. 158. ⁴ *Naturrecht*, 75, 76. ⁵ *Philos. Pract.*, § 165.

Law, Practical, that which relates to the will ; the principle which makes acts a matter of duty ; the objective principle of willing. **L. P. Conditioned**, that whose obligation is not absolute, is hypothetical or prudential.

Law, Pragmatic, a prudential rule or prescription, a maxim of self-love, directed to aims whose objects are in the sphere of the senses ; material law.

Law, Preceptive, affirmative, commanding.

Law, Prohibitive, negative, forbidding.

Law, Statutory, a law to which obedience is due on legal, not on moral, grounds.

Law, Transcendental, transcendental law of nature, a law furnished by the understanding, *a priori*, to which our mental processes are all subjected. — Kant.¹

Law, Unconditioned, formal law, *q. v.*

Law of Antagonism, law of reaction in the changes of matter.

Law of Continuity. — See **Continuity (Law of)**.

Law of God, divine law, the purely moral law, as the will of God.

Law of Nature, a general rule in accordance with which the changes in nature occur. The **Laws of Nature** are partly *a priori*, partly *a posteriori*. The *a priori* laws are those which arise from the cognitive faculty of man, so that the changes in nature, as the phenomena or sense-representations, *which we have*, must be subject to those laws, as otherwise they would not be *our* mental representations, and as such phenomena in nature. The laws *a posteriori* are deduced from observations of nature. — Kant.²

Law of Specification or of Variety, the logical principle that the species of entities are not without necessity *to be diminished* — opposed to the law that entities are not without necessity to be multiplied. — Kant.³

Law of Virtue, law of duty ; ethical law ; moral law.

LEGALITY, conformity to law.

LEGISLATION, in Kant, the influence exercised by one faculty or mental operation on other faculties or other operations. The legislation of the reason is applied to the will and to liberty.

¹ *Urtheilskraft*, xxvi.; *Rein. Vern.*, 17, 165, 263. ² *Rein. Vern.*, 280, 830; Meiklejohn, 170, 486. ³ *Rein. Vern.*, 683; Meiklejohn, 402.

LEGISLATIVE, in Kant, applied to the faculties which impose laws upon the others. Reason is the legislative faculty *a priori*. The judgment is a legislative faculty, determinative or reflecting.

LEIBNITZIANISM (from Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibnitz, 1646–1716), the System of Leibnitz.—1. Sufficient reason. 2. Innate ideas. 3. Identity of indiscernibles. 4. Realities, harmony of. 5. Monads. 6. Pre-established harmony. 7. Time and space. 8. Sensible and intellectual, distinction between. 9. God. 10. Continuity, law of. 11. Theodicy. See all those words, and **Schema**.

Leibnitzo-Wolfian System, Leibnitzianism, as systematized and developed by Wolf.

***Lemma**.

LEMATIC, applied to propositions having the nature of a lemma; preliminary, preparatory.

LEVIATHAN, a monster; in Hobbes, the democracy, the masses of the people.

LEX (Lat.), law, *q. v.*

LEXICON, sometimes applied to the dictionaries of the philosophical sciences, as by Furtmair, Krug, Lossius.

LIBERTARIAN, *adj.*, pertaining to the doctrine of the liberty of the will; opposed to the doctrine of necessity.

***Libertarian**, *n.* — “One who holds that man is capable of rational self-guidance, in the face of desire, affection, and emotion, though he may also allow himself to be swayed by these inclinations of his nature.” — C. F. V.

LIBERTINISM, the system of freedom from moral restraint, of lawless indulgence. It may be practical or theoretical.

***LIBERTY OF THE WILL**, or **LIBERTY OF A MORAL AGENT** (Ger. *Freiheit*). — “Self-determination by the use of our rational powers.” — C. F. V. It has been divided into: I. Internal — the freedom of the will. II. External — personal; legal; social, as domestic, civil or political, ecclesiastical. *Freedom from necessity* is sometimes called, “quite unwarrantably” (C. F. V.), *liberty of indifference*.

Liberty, Human, Definitions of, in Modern Philosophy. — Chalybäus: “At the beginning of life man is determined by his nature. The principle of liberty is not found in a negative antithesis to nature until it persistently wills to abrogate

its connection with nature, because its egoism discerns in that connection a heteronomy. Left entirely to himself, man would be forever at the mercy of a ceaseless play of natural forces, actions, and reactions. Formal freedom, in fact, consists in the ability of putting a stop to this play. This it accomplishes by means of loftier conceptions and ideas. The soul attains positive freedom only at the height of its culture, when it enters creatively into the actual world."¹

J. G. Fichte (with Kant): "Liberty is primary, absolutely incipient—but this it is only when the law of nature does not operate. Liberty is the tearing of ourselves loose from the fetters of mere nature and necessity." "The Ego is only free when it acts; if it be reflective upon this action it ceases to be free and becomes product. I am that which I make myself by liberty. The Ego cannot set itself free by reflection. The will, as absolute creative principle, begets purely of itself a special world, and a sphere of being entirely its own. That only is free, absolutely creative, at the base of whose acts lie only those conceptions which do not rise out of the sphere of given being."² I. H. Fichte: "Liberty, in its highest sense, can be attributed to that only which is through itself everything that it is. There can be nothing freely willed which does not in some degree express the essential nature of him who wills. To be free is to determine ourselves; knowing, feeling, and willing in accordance with our individual nature."³ K. Ph. Fischer: "All actual liberty of the Subject willing, is a making of one's self free, and as the will can be nothing which it is not in itself, this essential liberty must be the presupposition of our becoming subjectively free; and the self-freeing of the Subject willing, is nothing more than making itself that for which it was created."⁴ Flügel: "Man is free when his desires guide themselves by the apperceptive mental conditions. In these conditions the Ego of the man himself has its seat. In them, therefore, the man rules or is Subject. Here self-determination takes place."⁵ Hegel: "Liberty lies in the indetermination of the will; it has in it no determination produced

¹ *Syst. d. Speculat. Ethik*, I. 64, 72, 76, 111, 120, 326, 335, 336. ² *Werke*, I. 371; III. 20; IV. 222, 384–386; VII. 592. ³ *Ontologie*, 351; *Charakter d. neu. Philosophie*, 2d ed., 242; *Ethik*, II., i. 78, 79, 85. ⁴ *Freiheit d. Menschlichen Willens*, ix. 50, 51. ⁵ *Ztschr./f. exact. Philosoph.*, x. 152.

by nature ; it has itself only as object and contents ; it refers itself only to itself ; it is the faculty of reflective self-determination."¹ Kant : " The unavoidable problems of the pure reason itself are God, liberty, and immortality." " We can think of but two kinds of causality with respect to that which happens — causality according to nature, causality derived from liberty. By liberty in the cosmological sense, I understand the faculty of originating of ourselves, a condition ; a faculty whose causality consequently is not in accordance with the laws of nature, subordinated to another cause, which determines it according to the form of time. Liberty in this sense is a purely transcendental idea, which in the first place contains nothing derived from experience ; in the second place, cannot have its object given or determined in any experience, since it is a universal law of experience, involved in fact in the very possibility of the existence of experience, that everything which happens must have a cause — that causality itself must have a cause. . . Reason creates the idea of a spontaneity, which can of itself begin to act, without needing the precedence of any other cause to determine it to action in accordance with the law of causal connection. It is very worthy of remark that on this transcendental idea of *liberty* is grounded the practical notion of it, and that the transcendental creates in the practical that precise element of difficulty which has always surrounded the question whether liberty is possible. Liberty in the practical sense is the independence, on the part of the free-will (*Willkür*), of *necessitation* by the impulses of sensitivity. For an arbitrium is sensuous, in as far as it is affected *pathologically* (through the motive causes of the sensitivity) ; it is called *animal* (*arbitrium brutum*) when it is pathologically necessitated. The human *arbitrium* is indeed *sensitivum* but not *brutum* — it is *liberum*, because sensitivity does not make its action necessary. On the contrary, it dwells in man as a faculty, which determines itself of itself, independently of necessitation through sensuous impulses."² Liebmann : " Liberty is in general the faculty of a being

¹ *Werke*, XVIII. 5, 6, 16, 20, 21, 24 ; VI. 116. ² *Rein. Vern.*, 7, 446, 561-571 ; Meiklejohn, 5, 281, 330, seq. ; Born, 372, seq. ; *Werke* (Rosenkranz), II. 419, 434 ; VIII. 78, 79, 86, 145, 223 ; IX. 12, 28.

to manifest itself as it strives to manifest itself."¹ Michelet: "The absolute alone is free, and the individual is free only so far as, by his own choice, he grasps as his own the true, the good, and the beautiful. This is the freedom of the sons of God. If the will has its root in the sole causality of God, it is fixed by another, and is consequently not free. There is no way of shielding the sacred flame of human liberty but to make it a principle immanent to the soul, to maintain the causality of the absolute, or the absolute causality as the proper essential nature of man. Liberty is the relation of identity and coincidence between subject and object."² Schelling: "Liberty is not a totally fortuitous occurrence of actions, nor are these actions determined by empirical necessity; rather it consists in a loftier necessity, whose spring is in the essential nature of him who acts. That only is free which acts in accordance with the laws of its own essential nature, and is determined by nothing else, either within itself or exterior to itself. Hence the individual act is the result of the free essential nature, and thus results of necessity. It is the faculty of the good and of the evil."³ Schopenhauer: "The conception of liberty is properly negative, as the substance of the conception is nothing more than the denial of the causal necessity." "We think simply of the absence of all that hinders and limits. 1. Physical liberty is the absence of *material* hindrances of every kind. 2. Intellectual liberty. 3. Moral liberty — the *liberum arbitrium*. Its question is, Can I will what I will? If an affirmative reply is given to this question, then it is further queried, Can I will what I will will? and so *ad infinitum*. The question, therefore, at least, reverts to the simple issue, Can I will at all? Here we again come upon the general negative conception of the absence of all necessity. As that is necessary which follows a given sufficient ground, the free must be dependent on no cause whatever, and must consequently be defined as the absolutely fortuitous. A free will would then be one which is not determined by grounds, is consequently determined by nothing whatever, and whose

¹ *Beweis der Freyheit d. Willens*, 34-36. ² *Persönlichkeit d. Absolut.*, 214, 215; "*Der Gedanke*," V. 247, 249. ³ *Untersuchung über d. Wesen d. Menschlichen Freiheit*; *Werke*, VII. 352, 383, 384.

individual acts originate in itself absolutely and in a completely original way. But all clear thinking is quenched by this conception, the conception of the *liberum arbitrium indifferentiae*, and yet this is the only clearly defined, fixed, and decided conception of what is styled liberty of will. To maintain that to a particular man, in a particular set of circumstances, two conflicting modes of acting are possible, is perfectly absurd."¹ Spinoza: "That being alone can be called free which exists solely from the necessity of its nature, and is determined by itself alone to action. That being is necessitated or coerced which is determined by another as to a definite mode of its existence and action."² Ulrici: "Liberty is the consciousness of the ability to decide differently, to act differently. The human will as the power of self-manifestation, self-assertion, and self-determination, is simply the highest grade of that spontaneity which pertains to every living being. In the consciousness of itself it is exalted to the consciousness of liberty. We impute to ourselves in our consciousness liberty of willing. The impulses which operate on our wills present themselves to our consciousness not as coercive causes, but are rendered motives by the soul itself. Thus our willing and acting are to our consciousness free."³ Zeller: "Liberty is self-determination. A will not free would be a self-determining, which, in the very respect in which it determines itself, is not determined by itself. To determine one's self means that we have in our Self, in the Ego, in the personality as such, the ground of the specific activity which is determined."⁴—See Steudel.⁵

Liberty, Acquired, the theory that liberty does not originally belong to man, but is attained by effort. This view is defended by Chalybäus, Drobisch,⁶ K. Ph. Fischer, Frantz,⁷ Hegel, Schaller,⁸ Scholten, Wirth,⁹ and others.—See preceding article, and Steudel.¹⁰

¹ *Welt als Wille*, I. 338; *Grund-Probleme*, 3, 6-9, 46. *Vierfache Wurzel*, 47. ² *Von Gott, Menschen und des. Glück*, Aus dem Holländischen, ins Deutsche übers. von C. Schaarschmidt (Kirchmann's P. B.), ch. iv; *Opera* (Gfroerer), 287, 644. ³ *Ztschr. v. Fichte*, vol. 28, 106; *Naturrecht*, 35-37; *Leib u. Seele*, 600-603. (*Gott u. der Mensch*, I.) ⁴ *Theolog. Jahrbücher*, v. 390, 401-404. ⁵ *Philosophie im Umriß*, II., 1. 8-15. ⁶ *Moralische Statistik*, 74, 92. ⁷ *Naturlehre d. Staaten*, 20. ⁸ *Leib u. Seele*, 47. ⁹ *Syst. d. Speculativ. Ethik*, I. 60, 61. ¹⁰ *Philosophie im Umriß*, Zw. Theil. Erst. Abth., 15, 16.

LIE (Ger. *Lüge*), an act or word of untruth, meant to deceive. Lies are characterized as lies of malevolence, of levity, of inconsiderateness, of necessity, or of benevolence.

***LIFE** (Fr. *Vie*; Ger. *Leben*).—"As to the problem regarding the origin of life, see Huxley,¹ Stirling,² and Bastian."³—C. F. V. For the latest definitions of life, given by philosophical thinkers, see **Vital Force**.

LIGHT (Ger. *Licht*; Fr. *Lumière*), the objective cause of the visibility of bodies. According to the theory of emanation or emission (Newton), it is a subtle, imponderable form of matter, whose parts reciprocally repel each other. According to the theory of undulation or vibration (Euler), now generally received, it is called forth by the undulations of the molecules of an imponderable matter penetrating all bodies, *Æther*.

Light, in the Scholastic Philosophy, is distinguished as four-fold, in accordance with the degrees of the communication of knowledge. 1. Exterior, illumining the mechanic arts. 2. Inferior, producing the knowledge by the senses. 3. Interior, philosophic knowledge. 4. Superior, wrought by grace.—Bonaventura.

Light which shineth in the darkness, in the Hermetic Philosophy, mercury.

LIMITATIVE, restrictive; in Logic, since Kant, applied to the judgments known in the older systems as infinite or indefinite.

LITERATURE, PHILOSOPHICAL, embraces:—1. Works which define or present the essential character of philosophy. 2. Its aim, value, influence, uses. 3. Its method and study. 4. Its defects and controversies. 5. Philosophy, as a whole, systematically handled. 6. Its bibliography and literary history.—Krug.

LOCALITY, existence under the conditions of space; place.—Herbert Spencer.⁴

LOCKE, SYSTEM OF (from John Locke, 1632–1704), denial of innate ideas; the source of our knowledge, the senses, and reflection on our mental states; experience and induction; empirical psychology.

¹ *Lay Sermons*, No. vii. ² *As Regards Protoplasm*. ³ *Evolution and the Origin of Life*, and his *Beginning of Life*. ⁴ *Principles of Psychology*, 226.

LOCOMOTION, spontaneous or voluntary movement from place to place.

LOCOMOTIVE, of or pertaining to locomotion.—“Aristotle, choosing the *locomotive* system as his base, divided his *zootoca* . . . according to their *locomotive* organs.”—Owen.¹

LOCOMOTIVITY, power of locomotion.—“The most superb edifice that ever was conceived or constructed, would not equal the smallest insect, blessed with sight, feeling, and locomotivity.”—Bryan. L. J.

LOCUS TOPICUS.—See **Topics**.

***LOGIC**.—“The name is used in a variety of senses. First, there is the most restricted, known as Formal Logic—the science of the laws of thought as thought.—Hamilton, Mansel, Thomson. Second, the theory of evidence, or philosophy of the whole mental processes by which the mind attains to truth, as developed by Mill. Third, a rationalized theory of all known existence, which is the commonly accepted meaning of the term with German philosophers.”—C. F. V.

Logic, Absolute, apodictic; in the Platonic philosophy, the part of Logic which corresponds with ideas and produces certitude.

Logic, Analytical, as “instituting an analysis of the process of the mind in reasoning.”—Whately. See **Analysis**.

Logic, Apodictic.—See **L. Absolute** and **Apodeictic**.

Logic, Applied, deals with the application of the laws of pure logic to the detection of fallacies, and the development of a proper method for the investigation of truth.—Atwater.²

Logic, Applied, General, in Kant, opposed to **L. pure, general**, “when it is directed to the laws of the use of the understanding, under the subjective empirical conditions which psychology teaches us.”³

Logic, Architectonic, **L. systematic**.

Logic, Artificial, scholastic, scientific, elementary; opposed to **L. natural, popular**.

Logic, Common, **L. elementary**.

Logic, Deductive, reasons from the whole to the parts by syllogism proper; syllogistic.—See **L. Inductive**.

Logic, Dialectical.—See **Dialectics**.

Logic, Elementary, Elemental, **L. general**, **L. universal**,

¹ *Brande & Cox*.

² *Logic*, 36.

³ *Rein. Vernunft*.

formal L.; in Kant,¹ the Logic of the universal use of the understanding, that which embraces the necessary rules of thinking, the rules without which the understanding could not be used. De Morgan: "It includes: 1. The term or name; 2. The copula or relation. 3. The proposition and judgment; 4. The syllogism."²

Logic, Enthymematic, or Imperfect, which remains in the circle of individual objects.

Logic, Epicherematic, or Probable, that which corresponds with notions intermediate between sensations and ideas.

Logic, Formal, "considers the laws of action apart from the matter acted on."—De Morgan.³

Logic, General, Universal, in Kant, "the logic of the general use of the understanding; it embraces the absolutely necessary rules of thought, without which there can be no use of the understanding whatever. It is either pure or applied."⁴

Logic, Imperfect.—See **L. Enthymematic**.

Logic, Inductive, reasons from the parts to the whole.—See **L. Deductive**.

Logic, Modified, induction.

Logic, Natural, Popular, the L. of common sense, properly belonging to anthropology.—Kant.⁵

Logic, Objective, in Hegel.

Logic, Particular, Special, in Kant, "contains the rules which regulate right thinking on a particular class of objects—the organon of this or that particular science."

Logic, Practical, "what has been usually attempted, but miserably executed, under this name," Kant proposes to accomplish by the transcendental doctrine of method.⁶

Logic, Probable, L. epicherematic.

Logic, Pure, "takes no account of the modes in which we collect the materials of thought . . . it only refers them to their proper head or principle . . . it enounces the laws we must observe in thinking."—Thomson.⁷

Logic, Scholastic, Scientific, L. artificial.

Logic, Subjective, in Hegel.

¹ *Rein. Vern.*, viii. seq., 77, 83, 170. ² *Syllabus*, §§ 1-4. ³ *Syllabus*, §§ 1-4. ⁴ *Rein. Vern.*, 76. Meiklejohn, 48, 47. ⁵ *Logik* (Kirchmann), 10. ⁶ *Rein. Vernunft*, 736. Meiklejohn, 431. ⁷ *Necessary Laws of Thought*, §§ 3-5, Introduct.

Logic, Syllogistic, deductive.

Logic, Systematic, L. archetectonic.

Logic, Theoretic, that which involves the principles in the abstract; *L. elementary, L. formal*, as opposed to *L. practical*.

Logic, Transcendental, in Kant, in opposition to the purely formal, the science which determines the origin, compass, and objective validity of the pure cognitions of the understanding and reason, by which we grasp objects entirely *a priori*.¹

Logic, Universal, L. general, L. elementary.

Logic of Cognition, Speculative, of the Speculative Use of Reason, of the Speculative Understanding, of the Universal Use of the Understanding.—1. A Logic in accordance with which the speculative understanding thinks; *Elementary Logic*, q. v. 2. Transcendental Logic, q. v. **L. of Illusion**, see **Dialectics, Illusion**. **L. of Common Sense**, *L. natural*, q. v. **L. of Thinking, Empirical**, *L. of common sense, L. natural*. **L. of Thinking, Pure**, *L. of cognition*. **L. of Truth**, *transcendental analytics*.—Kant.²

Logic, Literature of, may be classified as: 1. Historical (Blakey, 1851). 2. Portions of encyclopædial and introductory works (Beck, Gerlach, Michelet, Oppermann). 3. In collected works, as Kant's, Fichte's, Hegel's, (Wallace,) Schleiermacher's. 4. In works presenting the elementary doctrine in theoretic philosophy (Bardili, Hegel, J. J. Wagner). 5. Works in which both Logic and Metaphysics are treated (Erdmann, Kuno Fischer, Krug, Rosenkranz). 6. Logic alone. Aristotle (*Organon*), Bardili, Drobisch, Hildebrand, v. Hartsen, Herbart, Kant, Krause, Lambert, Lange, Lotze, Schopenhauer, Trendelenburg, Ueberweg, Ulrici. Bain, Bentham, Blakey, Boole, Devey, De Morgan, Fowler, Hamilton, Jevons, Mansel, Mill (Stebbing, 1875), Port Royal (Baynes), Thomson, Whately. Atwater, Bowen, Coppee, C. C. Everett, McCosh, Tappan, Willcox, Wilson. 7. Logic in special applications. Isaac Taylor (Theology), Venn (Chance), Hickok (Reason), Latham (Language).

LOGICAL, of, pertaining to, in accordance with, Logic—as logical antecedent, argument, art, cause, clearness, dispute,

¹ *Rein. Vernunft*, 79–82. Meiklejohn, 49, 50. ² *Logik* (Jäsche-Kirchmann), 1870. *Rein. Vern.*, 74 seq. Meiklejohn's Trans., 45 seq.

method, premise, subtilty, system, truth ; judgment of nature, use of reason.

Logical Abacus, machine, slate, mechanical aids to the method of inference in Boole's System of Logic. — Jevons.¹

Logical Essence, what is embraced in the notion itself, *subiectum quod* ; opposed to real essence, *subiectum quo*, the nature of the thing.

Logical Predicate, that which states the relation of a representation to the understanding, so that it can be thought and cognized through concepts.

LOGISM, in Plato, reasoning ; a reason, argument.²

LOGISTIC, in Plato, applied to the reasoning faculty.³

LOGISTICS, syllogistics.

LOGOMACHY, strife about words merely — though the word is often essential to the thing.

LOGOS (Gr. word), never in the grammatical sense, as the mere name of a thing or act, but rather a word as the thing referred to ; the material, not the formal part ; ratio, the power of the mind which is manifested in speech, reason. Aristotle⁴ distinguishes, 1. The prosphoric, outward Logos of the voice, and 2. The endiathetic, inward Logos of the soul. — See **Apophantic**. — Plato.⁵

***LOVE**. — "Inclination of the nature towards persons regarded as good, involving admiration, and eagerness to help them. In view of the latter characteristic, it is properly named Affection, *ad* and *facio*." — C. F. V. (Ger. *Liebe*.) — Kant.⁶

***Love and Hatred**.

LOWEST SPECIES, *species infima*.

LUNACY (Lat.), moon-madness ; madness in general ; (Ger. *Mondsucht*). — See **Sankey**.⁷

LUXURY (Lat.), excess, extravagance, especially in eating and drinking ; splendor, pomp, magnificence ; redundancy, extravagance. Kant : "The stage in culture at which the propensity to what we do not need begins to do injury to what we do need."⁸

LYCANTHROPY (Gr.), wolf-man-madness ; a form of insanity in which men believed themselves transformed into wolves.

¹ *Element. Lem. in Logic*, 199-201. ² *Tim.*, 34, A. ³ *Rep.*, 439, D. ⁴ *Poster. Analyt.*, I. 10. ⁵ *Theast.*, 206 c.-210. ⁶ *Tugendlehre*, *Einl.* xii. 39, seq. ; *Met. d. Sitten*, I. Abschn. 13 ; *Metaph. of Ethics*, tr. by Sempke (Calderwood), 1869, 115, 116, 207-209, 266-269.

⁷ *Lectures on Mental Diseases*, Lect. xiii. ⁸ *Urtheilskraft*, 393.

LYMPHATIC (Lat.), lit. of a water-nymph; of water; of lymph.—1. Driven out of one's senses; distracted with fear; maddened (by seeing the image of a *Lympha*, a nymph in a fountain, nympholeptic). — Festus.¹ 2. Applied to the temperament, in which the lymphatic element is large. — Dr. Forbes Winslow.²

M, in Logic, marks, 1. The middle term of a categorical syllogism. 2. In certain modes of the figures of syllogism, as for example, *cAmEstrEs* and *dIsAmIs*, it marks a *Metathesis*, transposition of the premises, involved in the vowel (A) before it. — See Atwater,³ Krug.

MACHIAVELIANISM, MACHIAVELISM, system imputed to Machiavelli (1469–1527); despotism of the Prince, sustained by cunning, unrestrained by morals. — Ranke.⁴

MACHINE (Gr., Lat.), instrument; engine; artificial means or contrivance for doing a thing.—“A body (or corpuscle) whose motive force is dependent on its figure.” — Mellin. See **Mechanical**.

Machine, Logical. — See **Logical Abacus**.

MACROBIOTICS, the systematic handling of healthy and happy longevity.

*Macrocosm and Microcosm.

MACROCOSMOLOGY, description of the macrocosm, the universe.

MADNESS, mania.

MAGI, MAGIANS, the priestly caste in ancient Persia; adherents of Magianism; dualism, with star worship.

MAGIANISM, MAGISM, doctrine of the Magi, *q. v.*

*Magic.

MAGISTER ARTIUM LIBERALIUM, Master of the Free Arts is the older title for which Doctor of Philosophy has been substituted.

Magister Sententiarum, Master of Sentences, Decisions: a work by Peter Lombard, designed to systematize and harmonize Scholasticism.

¹ Ed. Müller, 120.

² *Obec. Diseases of the Brain and Mind*, 152.

³ *Logic*, 135.

⁴ *Kritik*, 1824.

MAGISTERIUM PERFECTUM, the perfect mastery; in the Alchemistic Philosophy, the possession of the philosopher's stone.

***Magnanimity**.

MAGNETISM, ANIMAL, Mesmerism, a theory in regard to certain effects produced in men, first in association with the magnet, afterwards without it; now generally referred to the influence of the mind on the body. — C. F. V.

***Magnetism (Animal)**.—By *animal magnetism* we understand those peculiar physical and physiological phenomena which are produced in others principally for the cure of diseases, by a conscious mechanical influence. The mutual impression produced by living beings upon each other is merely a modified universal law of mutual impression, which has been designated *natural magnetism*; for this reason Mesmer, its discoverer, called this artificial method of producing it, by analogous reasoning, *magnetism*. "It is called *animal magnetism* because the animal part of man is the medium, the conducting body, of this penetrating *magnetism*, and is more particularly active in that particular which distinguishes our animal from the vegetable organizations, namely, in the direction of our senses and the higher faculties of man." It has also been called *life magnetism* and *mesmerism*. Kluge and others call it *animal magnetism*, in contradistinction to animal, mineral, and vegetable *magnetism*. — See **Mesmerism**, by J. A. Mesmer, edited by Wolfast. F. V. 3.

MAHÂBHONTA, in Hindoo Philosophy, the condensation of all souls, all subtle elements; one of the two great germs in which the universe at first existed, produced by the union of *Brahm* with *Maya*. — See **Pradjapati**. — C. D. A.

MAJESTATIC (Lat.), pertaining to the supreme authority. *Jus Majestatic* is applied especially to the power of pardon.

MAJOR, greater, in Logic, applied to the premise and term of a syllogism. The major premise contains the major term which forms the predicate of the conclusion. — See **Minor**. Aristotle,¹ Fowler.²

Major, Illicit Process of the, takes place when the term illegitimately distributed in the conclusion is the major term.

¹ *Prior Analytics*, I., iv.

² *Deduct. Log.*, 82, 85, 92, 93, 138.

As Some A is not B,
 All B is C,

∴ Some C is not A. — See **Fallacies, Syllogism.**

MALEBRANCHE, SYSTEM OF; MALEBRANCHISM, idealism, vision in God.

MALEVOLENCE (Fr. *Malveillance*; Ger. *Missgunst*), in Ethics, state of ill-will, habitual feeling of malice.

MALICE (Lat. *Malitia*), bad quality; in Ethics, ill-will, the desire that evil may be inflicted.

MALIGNANCY. — See **Malignity.**

MALIGNITY is a stronger word than Malevolence. — "It is cruel Malevolence, or innate love of harm for the sake of doing it. While Malignity denotes an inherent evil of nature, malignancy denotes its indication in particular instances. . . Malignity always implies evil purpose, while malignancy is said of unpurposed evil." — S. S. D.

MAN (Ger. *Mann, Mensch*), one of the human race; one of this earth who has an animal organism conjoined with a rational soul, so that the two constitute one person; mankind. "That man can conceive of the Ego, of himself as I, exalts him infinitely above all other living beings on earth." — Kant.¹

Man, in Aristotle, animal, rational, mortal — body with rationality, and so Porphyry and the Peripatetics generally.

Man, in Plato, "a rational being (*νοῦς*) who controls the body in which he dwells;"² rationality with body.

MANAS, in Hindoo Philosophy, in the systems of *Nyāya*, q. v., and *Vaiśēṣika*, q. v., is the name of the sensible, the instrument of intelligence, which is distinguished from the soul cognizant and willing which is called *Atma*, q. v. *Gōtama* represents it very much in the manner in which recent European philosophers describe the psychological consciousness. — C. D. A.

MANAVA-DHARMA-CHASTRA, in Hindoo Philosophy, collection of the laws of *Manou*; with the *Vedas* it presents the entire body of the original elements of that philosophy; it is supposed to be older than the conquests of Alexander.

MANIA, excited state of madness. — See **Insanity.** Carpenter,³ Sankey.⁴

¹ *Anthropolog.*, 1. ² *Alcibiades*, I. ³ *Human Physiolog.*, §§ 829, 830. ⁴ *Mental Diseases*, Lect. III.

*Manicheism.

MANIFESTATION, revelation; a showing, exhibition, especially of the hidden, the obscure, the mysterious; claimed by the Hegelian school for their method of philosophizing.

—See **Method**. Krug E. L.

MANIFOLD, MANIFOLDNESS (Ger. *Mannigfaltigkeit*), in Kant¹ and the Critical Philosophy, applied to the number and variety of things, over against the unity of the same things in genera and species.—Lossius.

MANOU (the first), **LAWS OF**, a Hindoo code.—See **Manava-Dharma-Chastra**.

MANNER, in *Æsthetics*, the characteristics of a work derived from the personal elements which distinguish the particular artist.

MANNERISM, excess of manner.

MANTICS, the art of divination; soothsaying. This and its associated words are derived by Plato from *μαίνωμαι*, to be mad, to be inspired with a supernatural frenzy. He distinguishes *μάντις* from *προφήται*, the former being persons who uttered oracles in a state of divine frenzy, the latter the interpreters of these oracles.² Aeromancy is divination by the air; electromancy, by means of a cock; aleuromancy, by meal; enteromancy, by intestines; ornithomancy, by birds; xylomancy, by wood.

MANUAL (Ger. *Hand-buch, Lehr-buch*), in Philosophical Literature, a book for the hand; a compendious yet thorough treatment of some part of philosophy, or of all its parts; compend.

MANY QUESTIONS, FALLACY OF.—See **Fallacy**.

MARRIAGE (Fr.; Lat.; Ger. *Ehe*), legalized union as man and wife. Its forms are monogamy and polygamy. *M. with the left hand*, marriage of one of noble blood with a woman of inferior rank. His left hand is given in the ceremony, and the children do not inherit as in an ordinary marriage.

MASS (Lat.), that which adheres together like dough; "a quantity of matter all whose parts are in operation or motion together."—Mellin.³

MATAEO, MATEO (from the Gr. *ματαιος*, idle,) in various combinations, as **Mateology**, idle discourse; **Mateopoiy**, idle,

¹ *Crit. d. rein. Vern.*, 606-608.

² *Tim.*, 72 B.

³ *Wörterb. d. Kr. Phil.*, *Mass*.

foolish action; **Mateopony**, idle labor; **Mateosophy**, idle wisdom; **Mateotechny**, useless art; art thrown away.

MATERIA.—See **Material**, **Matter**, **Substance**.

MATERIAL, *n.* (Lat. *Materia*,) matter; substance; constituent part or whole; as, "*material* of cognition."—Kant. "*Materials* of all our knowledge."—Locke.

Material, *adj.*, related to matter or to the material. In Logic, it is opposed to the *Formal*, *q. v.* It is applied to *Fallacies*, *q. v.*, law, philosophy (metaphysics), principle, proposition, quality, right, science, thinking (metaphysics), truth.

MATERIALISM.—"The most recent and advanced form of the doctrine is that mind is only a function of the brain. Brain organization, with hereditary transmission, may account for all that distinguishes the intellect of man. 'The brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile.'"—Cabanis.¹ C. F. V.

Materialism has been divided into: 1. The *psychologic*—personality depends on the body; the soul is matter. 2. The *cosmologic*—there is no presence except the local; the soul cannot exist apart from body.—Mellin. A triple division has been proposed: 1. A system which admits the existence of a soul (as Hartley does), but explains its phenomena on principles which seem to imply that they are of material origin. 2. A system which denies the existence of the soul as a separate principle, but does not deny that there is a God and a future state. 3. A system which denies God and a future state of retribution.

Materialism, Literature of, recent.—1. Historical (and critical): Erdmann, F. A. Lange (3d ed., 1876), C. W. Shields.² 2. In Speculative Philosophy: elementary doctrine; empirical psychology, anthropology. 3. Expositions and defences of Materialism: Büchner, Czolbe, L. Feuerbach, Moleschott, Vogt. 4. Arguments against Materialism: Baltzer (1859), Beneke, Böhner, Carnier (1859), Fabri, I. H. Fichte, Frauenstädt, A. v. Gloss (1859), Herbart, Janet, Liebig (1859), F. X. Lierheimer, Lotze, Schaller, Snell, Ulrici,³ R. Wagner (1857), A. Weber (1858), L. Weis (1871).

¹ *Rapport du Physique et du Moral de l'Homme*. ² *Johnson's Cyclopædia*, art. *Materialism*. ³ *Strauss as a Philosophical Thinker*, tr. by O. P. Krauth (1874). In the Prolegomena of the translator will be found notices of recent literature in the controversy on Materialism.

MATERIALISTS, maintainers of Materialism, in some one of its divisions, *q. v.* Among the older materialists were Leucippus, Epicurus, Aristoxenus, Dicaarchus, Strato the Physicist, and the Stoics. Among the modern materialists are Hobbes, Gassendi la Mettrie. — See for the latest materialists, **Materialism**, **Literature of**. Carpenter.¹

MATERIALITY, existence solely as matter — opposed to spirituality.

MATERIALIZÉ, to reduce to matter ; consider as matter ; indulge in a materialistic mode of thought ; to reduce from the ideal to the concrete.

MATHEMA (Gr.), that which is learnt, a lesson ; learning ; in the plural, especially the mathematical sciences, chiefly arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy. — Aristotle,² Plato.³ In Kant, a direct synthetic proposition, reached by construction of concepts — as that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles — opposed to dogma.⁴

MATHEMATICAL, of or pertaining to the mathematics — applied to antinomy, category, certainty, cognition, judgment, principles.

***MATHEMATICS**. — See Bacon.⁵

MATHESIOLOGY, doctrine of sciences ; science of teaching.

MATHESIS (Gr.), learning ; in plural, faculties of learning ; the doctrine of mathematics.

***MATTER**, that which “is extended.” — C. F. V.

Matter, Attempts at a Philosophical Definition of, from Kant to the present time. — Bouillet: “That which constitutes all the bodies of the universe, and produces on our organs the complex of determinate sensations.”⁶ Büchner: “Laws have not been imposed upon matter, but have from eternity been bound up with it.” “Spirit and matter are as inseparable as force and substance, and condition one another with the same necessity. The investigation of nature does not deny spirit, provided the existence of the animal and human spirit be regarded as a natural fact. Substance is not subordinated to spirit, but is its peer.” “What is commonly called spirit is but the product of substance. There is no unsubstantial spirit. The spirit comes and goes with

¹ *Human Physiology*, 795-803. ² *Anal. Post.*, 1, 12, 5; *Metaph.*, 1, 5, 1. ³ *Legg.*, 817, E. ⁴ *Rein. Vern.*, 764. ⁵ *De Aug. Scientiar.*, lib. iii., ch. 6. ⁶ *Dictionnaire*, art. *Matérialisme*.

the substance which has conceived and brought it forth, and in which the spiritual forces dwell. Substance itself neither rises nor passes away ; it is eternal and self-existent." "The supposition of a spirit standing over against substance, independently and controllingly, contradicts all experience."¹ Chalybæus : "Self-extending substance." "Positive spontaneous self-excitation and differentiation do not lie in the conception of matter, but are the distinctive character of spiritual nature."² Cornelius : "The atoms or elements are in and of themselves no forces, but each becomes a force in consequence of its impenetration by another qualitatively opposed element."³ Czolbe : "The canon 'No substance without force,' is an absurdity, for matter is in its concept without force."⁴ D'Ercole (Hegelian) : "Spirit is the active in matter, its inner form, and inert matter does not exist. Cohesion is a phenomenon of spirit."⁵ Drossbach : "The theory of material substance has nothing to justify it ; he who seeks material substance will not find it in the wide world. There is no dead substance ; there is nothing inactive ; there is no matter — all is living, active, immaterial. Force and substance are not different concepts. What we are in the habit of calling matter is nothing opposed to the immaterial, is none other than force. It is the immaterial, vital, potential itself in special conditions. Matter is nothing diverse from the spiritual, no antithesis to the spiritual, but is the spiritual itself. The immaterial, were there such a thing, would be the unspiritual ; an immaterial spirit would be an unspiritual spirit. There is neither spirit without force, nor force without spirit. There is no corporeal principle, and no abstract spiritual principle. The spirit is at once the percipient and that which is capable of being perceived. As the object of perception can be such only to the spiritual, and as the spiritual alone can be percipient, every thing which we perceive through the medium of the senses must be spiritual. The spiritual alone, then, is the essential nature of things. Thus the question how the material comes from the immaterial falls out of sight. The question needs in-

¹ *Natur u. Geist*, 36, 143, 154, 317, 318 ; *Kraft u. Stoff*, ed. 3, Vorw. xxxiv.—xxxvi. 1-4, 10, 70 ; *Aus Natur u. Wissenschaft*, 4, 5. ² *Fundamental Philosophie*, 50, 129. ³ *Bildung d. Materie*, 22. ⁴ *Entsteh. d. Bewusstseyns*, 23. ⁵ "Der Gedanke" (*Zeitschrift*), I. 200.

version, and in reality is this: How, from that which cannot be perceived by the senses, the things of sense-perception can arise?"¹ Fechner: "The physicists understand by matter that which can be felt, the palpable, the most general substratum of the phenomenon of nature,"² "a definition which says nothing of the essential character of matter, but looks simply into the mode of its phenomenon."³ J. G. Fichte: "Substantiality, materiality, are absolutely simple, and hence we cannot say 'diverse substance,' but only 'substance with diverse limitations.'"⁴ I. H. Fichte: "Matter is a Real, filling space."⁵ "Matter is a thoroughly dark concept, one of the most difficult concepts of physics and metaphysics." "The pretended empirical concept of matter is completely illusory; empirically we have furnished to us only a certain number of simple, primary substances." "The antitheses of body or nature, and of spirit, are not furnished in experience, and have, as they are commonly understood, no scientific meaning or utility — they are the dualism of a groundless abstraction."⁶ George: "Matter is to be distinguished from space only by its specific density."⁷ German: "Matter and spirit co-exist in God. Spirit is the life of matter; matter is the life of spirit."⁸ Hegel: "Matter is the self moving." "Time and space are filled with matter — it is the real in them, their truth."⁹ Herbart: "Matter is that which can always be further divided." "To regard it as something merely local, and as yet actual, is thoroughly preposterous, as the predicates derived from mere space amount to nothing." "We never reach that which, in our opinion, matter is." "Matter imagined as a local real, with local forces, belongs neither to the realm of being nor of actual occurrence, but is bare phenomenon."¹⁰ In Kant, matter is defined in these senses: 1. *M. dynamical*, the mobile so far as it fills a space. 2. *M. mechanical*, the mobile so far as it, as such, possesses motive force — the movable, as ca-

¹ *Die Harmonie der Ergebnisse der Naturforschung mit den Forderungen des menschlichen Gemüths*, 14, 19-21, 118, 123, 163. *Ztschr. v. Fichte*, xlv. 51. ² *Physikal. u. philosoph. Atomenlehre*, ed. 2. ³ *Do.*, 108, 109. ⁴ *Grundlage d. gesamm. Wissenschaftslehre*, Werke, I., 307. ⁵ *Zeitschr.*, xxv. 120, xlvii. 24, lv. 240. ⁶ *Anthropologie*, 21, 174, 184. *Psychologie*, Vorr. vii., 34, 85. ⁷ *Ztschr. v. Fichte*, xxix. 132, xxxi. 170. ⁸ *Schöpfergeist u. Weltstoff*, 19 seq. ⁹ *Werke*, VII., 67. ¹⁰ *Werke*, I., 178, 190; II., 190; V. 110.

pable of imparting motion. 3. *M. metaphysical*, every object of sense-perception. 4. *M. phenomenological*, the mobile so far as it can, as such, be an object of experience. 5. *M. phoronomic*, the mobile in space. 6. *M. transcendental*, that in the phenomenon which corresponds with the sensation, or sense-impression; opposed to *form*; the determinable in general.¹ Lotze: "Matter is the phenomenal form under which conjoined pluralities of supersensuous entities present themselves to us, each one of which taken singly is homogeneous with the nature of our soul."² Liebmann: "To the materialists substance is an empty concept—the mere shell of a nut."³ Michelet: "There is nothing absolutely dead; from every death germinates a new life; there is therefore thought in everything existent, and conversely, there is no thought without the existent, the material. Thought is the self-moving being, the active matter. Thus for it the dualism of the material and the immaterial, of thinking and being, of the universal and the individual, has completely vanished."⁴ Planck: "There is but one substance, the extended; for spirit itself is but the perfected, internally self-dependent existence of the extended."⁵ Heinrich Ritter: "Matter or substance is that which can be shaped and limited, that which can be put into form."⁶ Rosenkranz: "The realism of matter lifts itself to the idealism of force as its ground, and the truth of matter is the force immanent in it."⁷ Schaller: "Matter is identified with extension in space." "The universe resolves itself into moved matter—matter whose essential nature we cannot grasp." "If we simply oppose matter to spirit, we dare not embody in the notion of matter the least degree of activity. Activity, Force, would in that opposition be immaterial, the beginning of spirit, of self-consciousness; matter embraces in it no element by which it approximates spirit, or can be compared with it. Hence nothing corporeal is in a condition by which it can set itself in motion."⁸ Schelling: "Matter is the darkest of all things, in some respects darkness itself." "All matter is

¹ *Naturwissenschaft, Werke* (1838), 452-456, 531, 554. *Rein. Vern.*, 31, 322. Meiklejohn, 21, 193. ² *Streitschriften, Heft*, I. 105. ³ *Kant u. die Epigonen*, 34. ⁴ *Zeitschr. "Der Gedanke"*, I. 118. ⁵ *Die Weltalter*, I. 101. ⁶ *Unsterblichkeit*, 236. ⁷ *Meine Reform*, 38. ⁸ *Zeitschr. v. Fichte*, xxi. 43, 44; xxxi. 8, 9; *Leib u. Seele*, 146.

combination, or has risen by combination ; there is no primitive matter, no original substance, out of which everything has come." "Of itself matter is a principle without potency." "When we suppose a cause, we suppose an absolute." "Matter as substance, or matter in as far as it is not mere mass, but has received life into it, has a twofold being, a being in substance and a being in itself. All matter is in itself one. According to substance there are not diverse primal substances or elements, rather is there in all elements one only substance (matter) but posited under diverse exponents. As these exponents are the animating and active principle of matter, the nature of substance may be thus designated : Substance is matter, so far as matter seems completely one with its animating principle. No body is as to substance compound, for substance is one and throughout the same." "The essence of all matter is spiritual in the broad sense of the word, for forces are undeniably something spiritual, and in so far incorporeal—coherence is a purely spiritual connection. If body and soul, matter and form, could be sundered, the phenomenon of the corporeal would cease."¹ Schopenhauer : "Matter is, on the one side, the perceptibility of time and space, or space become perceptible ; on the other, it is causality become objective." "Matter, in the abstract, is to be thought of as without form and property, absolutely inert and passive ; but empirically there is no matter without form and quality."² Schwarz : "Spirit and matter, spirit and nature, are in the end one and the same essence. There is but one substance, the spiritual, which is the primal power of inorganic nature also. There is nothing but spirit, and no individual substance but God." "Matter is spirit benumbed."³ Ulrici : "Matter is identical with the power of resistance, as the inertia of resistance involves extension."⁴ Wirth : "Matter and spirit are really diverse, but not, therefore, dualistically diverse substances ; they are two necessarily diverse forms of one

¹ *Werke*, Abth. I., vii. 43 ; x. 363 ; vi. 259, 549 ; viii. 282 ; x. 355 ; Abth. II., i. 424 ; ii., 266, 277. ² *Vierfache Wurzel*, 123. *Welt als Wille*, I. 582, 589 ; II. 55, 352 ; Z. 25. *Parerga*, II. 9, 89–92 ; *Nachlass*, 226. ³ *Philosoph. d. Gegenwart*, 28, 55 ; *Gott Natur u. Mensch*, 17, 29, 37, 64, 70, 110, 138. ⁴ *Gott u. die Natur*, 351–358. *Zeitschr. v. Fichte*, xxv. 114, 115 ; xxviii. 248 ; xxxiv. 248 ; xlviii. 429.

and the same substantial being, which has in matter its immediate actuality, in spirit its self-mediating actuality."¹

Matter, Logical, the concepts given to constitute a judgment; opposed to *Form*. The logicians formerly called the universal the matter.²

Matter of the Appetitive Faculty, in Kant, an object whose actual possession is desired; that which is related to a subjective, fundamental feeling of pleasure or aversion, so as to determine what we need to be satisfied with our condition; the object of the will.³

Matter of the Practical Law, the object of maxims. **M. of Judgment**, the given concepts. **M. in Space**, reality, real things in space. **M. in Mass**, when all the parts move in one direction to exercise *together* their motive force beyond themselves, as water on a wheel, weights in a scale.—Kant, Mellin.⁴

*Matter and Form. *Maxim.

MAXIMIZE, to increase to the maximum.

MAXIMUM, the greatest quantity or degree; opposed to *minimum*.

MAYA, MAJA, in Hindoo Philosophy (and Mythology), mother of nature and of gods of the second order. According to the Vedas, Maya is matter or illusion, source of all phenomena, and cause of the manifestation of all the individual existences. Maya first existed as liquid, the primeval water. See *Mahābhonta* and *Pradjapati*.—Schopenhauer.⁵

MEAN, MEANS (Lat. *Medium, Medius*).—See *Medium*. "Philosophical doubt is not an end, but a *mean*. We doubt in order that we may believe."—Hamilton.⁶

MEASURE, in Hegel's doctrine of being, proportion; a qualitative quantum; a quantum on which the quality depends.—Schwegler.⁷

MECHANIC, MECHANICAL (Gr.), full of resources; inventive; ingenious; of or belonging to machines; of or belonging to mechanics. It is applied to actions, arts (opposed to liberal), causes, effects, explanation, laws, philosophy, powers,

¹ *Theorie d. Sonnenambulismus*, 60, 66, 175. *Ztschr. v. Fichte*, xxx. 266, xxxi. 308, xlv. 275-283, lli. 47. ² *Rein. Vern.*, 332; Melklejohn, 193. ³ *Pract. Vern.*, 35, 45, 48, §§ 2, 3, 4. ⁴ *Kunstsprache*, 168. ⁵ *Welt als Wille u. Vorstellung*, I. 9, 20, 389, 472; II. 366, 689 *Erlik*, 270. *Willen in d. Natur*, 133. ⁶ *Metaphysica*, Lect. V., 64. ⁷ Stirling's Transl. 325.

principles, properties, solution, theory. Sometimes it is antithetical to rational, that to which reason is requisite, or the conscious, or the deliberate.

MECHANICS, the part of mathematics which involves the laws of motion, equilibrium, and force. It may be analytic, applied or practical, abstract or speculative.

MECHANISM, mechanical contrivance; structure; as, the *mechanism* of the universe, *mechanism* of language.

Mechanism, System of, in Des Cartes, supposes the essence of matter to be extension, and explains all physical phenomena by the mechanical laws of figures and movements. "The mechanical explanation of nature rests on the comparison of nature with a machine—not in all points, but in the main points, if the name is not to be purely arbitrary and devoid of meaning."—Heinrich Ritter.¹

Mechanism of Nature, in Kant, the necessity of an occurrence, in time, in accordance with causality as a law of nature.² This does not imply that the things subject to the law are necessarily material machines.—Mellin.³

MEDIATE, *adj.*, through media or means; opposite of *immediate*; applied to inference, knowledge.

MEDITATIONS, in Philosophical Literature, thoughts upon, contemplations, reflections; reflections, especially of a miscellaneous character.—Des Cartes.⁴

MEDIUM, MEDIUS (Lat.), that which is in the middle, between; the middle; means. In Animal Magnetism and Spiritualism, a person intermediary between the forces and that on which they operate. In Logic, the middle term of the syllogism — *medius terminus*.—See **Terminus**. In Ontology, Wolf defines medium "whatever contains the reason why the end follows the act."

MEGALO (Gr.), great; in composition, as *megalophrosyne*, greatness of mind; pride; arrogance; *megalopsychy*, greatness of soul; arrogance.

MEGARIAN, MEGARIC SCHOOL, school at and of Megara, between Corinth and Athens, founded by Euclid, about 400 B. C. It was a continuation of the Eleatic school, modified by the Socratic influence.

¹ *Encyclopédie*, II., § 108. ² *Fr. Vern., Werke* (1838), iv. 213. ³ *Kunstsprache*, 170.

⁴ *Meditationes*.

MELANCHOLIA, MELANCHOLY (Gr.), black bile; morbid temperament; depression of spirits, without external causes, or out of proportion to them. Maudsley: ¹ "It is usual to make a subdivision of partial insanity into *monomania* and *melancholia*. . . When the patient is depressed, wretched, distrustful, and has corresponding unsound ideas, he is said to labor under *melancholia*. . . The term *monomania*, if used of *melancholia* at all, should be applied to the chronic form of the disease only—to that which Esquirol proposed to distinguish as *lypmania*. . . *Melancholia simplex* is melancholia without delusion."—See Robert Burton,² Dr. W. H. O. Sankey,³ Dr. Forbes Winslow.⁴

MELIUS EST, INJURIAM FERRE, QUAM INFERRE—it is better to bear an injury than to inflict one; denied by the Sophists, maintained by Aristotle.⁵

MEMBRA DIVIDENTIA, the parts into which a class is divided; the constituent species of a genus. — Jevons.

MEMORABILIA, things memorable, worthy of record and of being remembered; the record of these things, as Xenophon's *Memorabilia* of Socrates.

**Memoria Technica*.

***MEMORY**.—"Commonly the power of retaining and reproducing our knowledge. Or, as Hamilton⁶ puts it, it includes a faculty of retention, of reproduction, and of representation."—C. F. V. "For laws of association, see Hamilton,⁷ Mill.⁸"—C. F. V. Kant: "The faculty of the phantasy, by which it retains its intuitions—the faculty of reproducing our spontaneous mental representations." The acts of memory are, 1. Grasping; 2. Retention; 3. Recalling. Memory may be *quick* or *lively* without being *faithful*, or it may be *faithful* without being *quick*. The best memories are both quick and faithful.—Mellin.⁹

Memory, Art of.—See *Mnemonics*.

MENDACITY (Lat.), addictedness to lying; falsehood.

MENS (Lat.), (akin to Sanscrit root *man*, to think, and the Greek *μενος*, might, mind, temper), the mind as thinking,

¹ *Responsibility in Mental Disease* (Intern. Scientif. Series), 1876, 71, 73, 123, 131, 187

² *Anatomy of Melancholy* (1821). ³ *Mental Diseases*, 1866. ⁴ *Obscure Diseases of the Brain and Disorders of the Mind*, 4th ed., 1868. ⁵ *Ethics*, B. V., xi. ⁶ *Lects.*, II. 205.

⁷ *Lects.*, II. 233. ⁸ *Examinat. of Hamilton*, 3d ed., 219. ⁹ *Kunstsprache*, 98.

endowed with the faculties of thought, related to *animus*, the soul, as a part to the whole; the mind, understanding, reason, intellectual powers.

MENTAL, of or pertaining to the *mens*, or mind; applied to faculties, operations, reservation, *q. v.*

***Mental Philosophy**.—"A rational explanation of the facts of consciousness, and of the problems issuing out of these facts. Mental Philosophy has two divisions, Intellectual Philosophy and Moral Philosophy—the philosophy of knowing and the philosophy of right action. To both divisions there belongs a psychology, or science of mental operations; and also a metaphysic, or science of transcendent realities."—C. F. V.

MERIMNOPHRONTIST, MERIMNOSOPHIST (Gr.), "a minute philosopher;" one solicitous about speculative trifles; applied by Aristophanes to Socrates and other philosophers.¹

MERISTICS (Gr.), the art of dividing. — See **Division**.

***MERIT** (Ger. *Verdienst*).—"All right actions are meritorious, that is, they give warrant for self-approbation on the part of the agent, and are, from the very nature of moral law, entitled to the approbation of all moral beings."—C. F. V.

***Merit of Condignity** — *Meritum de Condigno*. — See **Merit**.

Merit of Congruity — *Meritum de Congruo*. — See **Merit**.

MESMERISM (Magnetism, Animal, *q. v.*), from Mesmer: "the voluntary direction of a current of animal magnetism from an operator to a patient. Directed upon the eyes, it induces artificial sleep. It is of interest for purposes of mental philosophy, as affording facilities for studying the question of mental activity during sleep. It may also afford help in reaching some conclusions on the still undecided question as to the rest of the brain in sleep."—C. F. V.

MESSIANISM, PHILOSOPHIC, the disposition to regard a particular thinker, or system, as a finality, establishing the kingdom of pure truth. Carové applies the term to a French system which in 1834 was claiming to have brought religion and philosophy into perfect accord, and to have ushered in an era of the absolute.

META (Gr.), in philosophical composite words; of community or participation; of action in common with another; of suc-

¹ *Nub.*, 102.

cession of time; after, behind; beyond; reversely; change of place, condition, plan. — L. S. L.

METABASIS (Gr.), moving over; passing over; change; transition from one subject to another. In Logic, the fallacy of shifting the subject. — See **Elenchus**.

METABOLA, METABOLE (Gr.), change.

METACOSMIA (Gr.), between worlds; *intermundia*, q. v.

METACRITIC, a critique on a critique, as Herder's *Meta-kritik* on Kant's *Critik* of the pure Reason.

METAGENESIS (Gr.), "the changes of form which the representative of a species undergoes in passing, by a species of successively generated individuals, from the egg to the perfect or imago state. It is contradistinguished from *metamorphosis*, in which those changes are undergone by the same individual." — Owen.¹ It is external when the individuals grow from the outside of the parents; internal when it takes place within. — Herbert Spencer.²

METAGNOSTICS, metaphysics, as going beyond the ordinary knowledge; philosophy in general. — Krug.

METALEPSIS, METALEPSY (Gr.), participation; alternation; assuming one thing for another; one term for another; transsumption. In Aristotle's Logic, the alteration of a term from being the subject of a hypothetical, to being the subject of a categorical proposition.

METAMATHEMATICS, philosophy of mathematics.

METAMORPHOSIS (Gr.), transformation. — See **Morphology**.

Metamorphosis (Gr.), transformation; a materialistic theory in regard to the origin of species. It maintains that each higher species has developed itself out of the species immediately below it, as under specially favorable circumstances the embryo of the lower species develops itself far beyond its specific type, and thus attains the more perfect organization of the species immediately above. — Stöckl.³ — See **Darwinism, Selection Natural, Species**.

***METAPHOR**. — See Krauth on nature and laws of.⁴

*Metaphor and Simile.

METAPHYSICAL, of or pertaining to Metaphysics, q. v. — See **Division**.

¹ In *Brande & Cox*. ² *Principles of Biology*. ³ *Lehrb. d. Philosophie*, § 135, 1.

⁴ *Conservative Reformation*, 701-716.

***METAPHYSICS**, "that department of mental philosophy which is concerned with the speculative or transcendental problems arising out of the facts of consciousness and of the outer world. It was at one time made to include psychology, which was named the lower metaphysics."—C. F. V.

Metaphysics in Fichte, "doctrine of science," or "science of knowing;" the Ego and its immanent activities. **M. in Hegel**, "speculative Logic." **M. in Herbart**, "the science of what is intelligible in experience." **M. in Kant**,¹ the entire philosophical cognition derived from pure reason, without empirical principles, in systematic connection, premised by a critique of the faculty of reason.

Metaphysics, Classification of, in Kant:²

I. Metaphysics of Nature: i. Ontology. ii. Rational Physiology: (a) Immanent Physiology — 1. Rational Physics; 2. Rational Psychology: (b) Transcendent Physiology — 1. Transcendental Cosmology; 2. Transcendental Theology.

II. Metaphysics of Morals.

Metaphysics, Classification of, the Scholastic-Historical, derived from Wolf:

A. General Metaphysics: Philosophia Prima: Ontology: I. The Metaphysical Categories: i. Being, Ens, Sein — opposed to *non-being*. ii. Essence, Essentia, Wesen, Substance — opposed to *attribute*. iii. Operation, Wirken, Cause — opposed to *effect*. II. The Metaphysical Principles: i. The Law of Contradiction, involving: 1. The Law of Identity; 2. The Law of the Excluded Middle. ii. The Law of Causality.

B. Special Metaphysics.—I. Immanent Consideration of the Universe: Cosmology; Philosophy of Nature. i. General Investigation of Empirical Actuality. ii. Rational Cosmology: 1. The Inorganic; 2. The Organic. iii. Rational Anthropology — Man: 1. Body; 2. Soul, Psychology; (a) Essence; (b) Relation to the Body; (c) Origin and Continuance. II. Transcendent Consideration of the World: Natural Theology; Theodicy. i. Existence of God: 1. Negative evidence. 2. Positive evidence. ii. Essence of God, Nature of God: 1. Essentiality of God; 2. Attributes of the

¹ *Rein. Vernunft*, 869; Meiklejohn's Tr., 509. ² *Critik d. reinen Vernunft*, 873 seq.; Meiklejohn's Tr., 512.

Divine Essence. iii. Operation of God: 1. Attributes of Divine Operation; 2. Relation of the Divine Operation to the World; (a) God as Creator; (b) God as Preserver; (c) God as Ruler. See Hagemann.¹

Metaphysics, Literature of, may be thus arranged: I. See **Philosophy, History of**.—II. As part of Encyclopædias and Introductions: J. Beck (12th ed., 1876), Bouvier (14th ed., 1868), Frohschammer (1858), Gerlach (1826–34), Hagemann (3d edit., 1873–1875), Klotz (1875), Liberatore (6th ed., 1875, 1876), Noack (1854), Oppermann (1844), Platner (1793–1800), Pölitz (1807, 1808), Reiff (1840), G. E. Schulze (Grundriss, 1790), Enzyklopædie (3d ed., 1824), Sanseverino (2d ed., 1862–1866), Schwetz (1873), Steudel (1871–1877), Stöckl (4th ed., 1876), Tongiorgi (7th ed., 1875). III. In the miscellanies of various authors; periodicals: Harris (Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 1867–1877), I. H. Fichte (Zeitschrift, 1837–1846), with Ulrici (1847–1877). IV. In collected writings of particular authors: Aristotle, Cartesius, Fichte, Hamilton, Hegel, Herbart, Hume, Jacobi, Kant, Krug, Leibnitz, Locke, Malebranche, Reid, Schelling, Schopenhauer, Spinoza, Wolf. V. In Theoretic Philosophy; elementary doctrine: Beattie, Hartley, Hillebrand, Malebranche, Priestley, Ulrici. VI. In connection with Logic: J. E. Erdmann (4th ed., 1864), K. Fischer (2d ed., 1865), Hamilton, Krug, Rabus (1868), Ritter (1856), Rosenkranz (1858, 1859). VII. Metaphysics, in general, separately: Apelt (1857), Baumgarten, Braniss (1834), K. Ph. Fischer (1834), Fries (1824), George (1844), Hartenstein (1836), Helfferich (1846), Herbart, Kant, Krug, Lotze (1841), John Miller (1875), Reinhold (3d ed., 1854), Suabedessen (1836), Uschold (3d ed., 1857), Weisse (1835). VIII. Special branches of Metaphysics.—See **Cosmology, Natural Philosophy, Natural Theology, Ontology, Physics, Practical Philosophy, Pneumatology, Psychology, Religion**. IX. Bibliography of—1. Büchting (1867–1872), Ersch-Geissler (3d ed., 1850), Gumposch (1851), Lipenius (2 vols., folio, 1682); the annual, semi-annual, quarterly, and monthly catalogues of America, England, France, Germany, and Holland. 2. The best general bibliographies and histories of literature,

¹ *Metaphysik*, 3d ed., 1875.

as Brunet, Graesse. 3. The best special bibliographies and histories of literature, Allibone, Lowndes. 4. The histories of philosophy which have bibliographical notices, as Blakey, Buhle, Ueberweg. 5. The introductions and encyclopædias, as Hagemann, Stöckl. 6. The reviews, special and general. 7. The catalogues of the great publishing houses. 8. Careful inspection of the libraries and of the stock of booksellers. 9. Personal information from scholars, publishers, and booksellers.

Metaphysics, Special Applications of, *M. of Anthropology*, *M. of the Human Understanding*, *M. of Humanity*, of *Man*, *M. of Inner Nature*, *M. of Jus and Law*, and of *Jus Naturale*, *M. of Morals* (Kant), *M. of Pleasure*, *M. of Religion*, *M. of Scripture*.

METAPLASTICS, the art of transformation, as of the figures in syllogism.

METASOMATOSIS, METENSOMATOSIS, the wandering of different souls into the same body; contrasted with *Metempsychosis*, which is the wandering of one soul into various bodies.—Clemens Alexandrinus,¹ Nemesisius,² Gregory Nazianzen.³

METATHESIS (Gr.), transposition, in Logic, of thoughts.—See **Conversion**.

***METEMPSYCHOSIS**.—"The satire of Limonedes on this subject is translated in *The Spectator*, No. 209. See Irhovius (Gu.)"⁴—F. V. 3.

***METHOD**.—"Scientific method is to be distinguished from the order in which things are enumerated."—C. F. V. Methods are designated according to their various aims and modes of procedure; as, acroamatic, analytic, aphoristic, critical, dogmatic, erotematic, mathematical, methodic, mixed, natural, philosophic, popular, progressive, regressive, sceptical, scientific, Socratic, speculative, syllogistic, synthetic, systematic, tabular.

M. in Natural Sciences, M. in Philosophy, M. in the Practical. M. of Philosophizing, M. of Teaching.—See **Systems**.

***METHODODOLOGY** (Gr.), doctrine, discourse, science, system.

¹ 601, 757. ² *N. H.*, 2, 50. ³ *De Hom.*, p. 62. ⁴ *De Palingenesia veterum, seu Metempsychosi Pythagorica*, lib. III., 4to, Amst., 1738.

treatise of method: Bacon,¹ S. T. Coleridge,² Concio,³ Scheidler (1825), Schelling,⁴ Troxler (1835). Hence, *Methodological*.—See *Encyclopædia*, Introduction, Propædæutics.

Methodology (*Methodenlehre*,) doctrine of method; in Kant, 1. *Transcendental*, the second of the two great divisions of the Critique of the Pure Reason.—See **Elementary Doctrine**. He defines it as “the determination of the formal conditions of a complete system of pure reason.”⁵ He divides it into: i. the discipline; ii. the canon; iii. the architectonic; iv. the history—of pure reason.⁶ 2. The Critique of the Pure Practical Reason has the same generic divisions.⁷ He makes the *M. of the pure practical reason* cover “the method in which the *objectively* practical reason can be rendered the *subjectively* practical.” 3. In the Critique of the Judgment, Kant says that taste and the fine arts do not allow of methodology—they have a *modus*, but not a *methodus*. He gives a methodology of the teleologic faculty of judgment.⁸ 4. In Logic, general methodology is defined as occupied with the form of a science, or with the method and manner of linking the manifold parts of cognition into a science.⁹

METHODS, in Logic, are of induction, agreement, difference, joint method, residues, concomitant variations.—See those words.

***METONOMY, METONYMY** (Gr. *μετα*, over, and *ὄνομα*, name), “is a changing of names, as when, because of a recognized relation or dependence between them, we put one word for another. Thus the cause is put for the effect when I say ‘I read Milton,’ that is, his writings; or the effect for the cause, as *pale famine* or *cold death*, because famine occasions *paleness*, and death *coldness*.”—F. V. 3.—See Krauth on Metonymy.¹⁰

METOUSIA, METUSIA (Gr.), participation; communion; possession; enjoyment; means of using; especially of the common possession or participation in *οὐσία*, essence or substance.—See **Consubstantial**.

¹ *Nov. Organ.* (Kirchmann, Phil. Bibl.), 1870. ² *Prelimin. Treat. on Method* (*Encyclop. Metropol.*), 5th ed., 1851. ³ *De Methodo*. Blakey: *Hist. of Philosoph.*, II. 136. ⁴ *Methodes d. akademisch. Studiums*, 1803. *Werke*, I., v. 207. Trad. par Ch. Bénard 1847. ⁵ *Rein. Vern.*, 735; Meiklejohn's Tr., 431. ⁶ *Rein. Vern.* 733-382; Meiklejohn, 431-517. ⁷ *Pract. Vern.* (1788), 31, 269. *Werke* (1838), IV. 111, 272. Kirchmann (1870), 16, 179. Traduit par Barni (1848), 149, 371. ⁸ *Urtheilskraft*, § 60. ⁹ *Do.*, §§ 79-91. *Logik*, § 98. ¹⁰ *Cons. Reformat.*, 701, 702.

METRICS (Gr.), science of measure; in *Æsthetics*, science of poetical measure.

METRIOPATHY (Gr.), the moderation or restraint of the passions; opposed by the ancient sceptics to the Stoic apathy. — Diogenes Laertius.¹

METROLOGY, metrics, *q. v.*

MICRO (Gr.), small; used in a number of compound words, as micrography, micrology, micropsyche — implying either that the object or the subject involved is something small.

***MICROCOSM.** — See **Macrocosm**.

MIDDLE TERM. — See **Term, Middle**.

MIMETICS (Gr., Ger. *Mimik*), in *Æsthetics*, imitation as an art, associated with acting and declamation. — Pölitiz.²

***MIND.** — “Self-conscious intelligence, possessing rational power of self-determination.” — C. F. V.

MINIMUM (Lat.), the least; opposed to *maximum*, *q. v.*

MINOR TERM. — See **Term, Minor**.

***MIRACLE**, “an event which, without being a violation of the laws of Nature, cannot be accounted for by these laws, but implies the operation of causal energy superior to their action. If the progress of science remove from the category of miracles events previously classified as such, it merely fulfils its proper function in so doing. The distinction between the marvellous and the miraculous only thereby becomes more marked.” — C. F. V.

Miracle, Middleton (Conyers),³ Douglas (Bishop),⁴ Farmer,⁵ Boehme (Christian Frederic),⁶ DeQuincey.⁷

MIS, MISO. — 1. (Gr. *μισέειν*, to hate;) in a number of compounds, as misagathy, hatred of the good; misandry and misanthropy, hatred of men; misarety, hatred of virtue; misogyny, misology, misosophy, misotheism. 2. From the Germanic languages, denoting wrong, failure, defect, as misdeed, mistrust, misuse.

MISCELLANY, MISCELLANEOUS WORKS, in Philosophical Literature, applied to writings, either by various authors or from one hand, which treat of a number of philosophical

¹ V. 31. ² *Encyklopädie Philosoph. Wissenschaften*, II. 131–133. ³ *A Free Inquiry into Miraculous Powers*, 1749. ⁴ *The Criterion, or Rules by which True Miracles are Distinguished*, 8vo, Lond., 1754. ⁵ *A Dissertation on Miracles*, 8vo, Lond., 1771. ⁶ *De Miraculis Enchiridion*, 1806. ⁷ *Miracles a Subject of Testimony*, Works, vol. vi., 1858.

topics ; the collected writings, the works of those who have illustrated a number of departments.

MIXTION, mixture. — Sir K. Digby.¹

***MNEMONIC, MNEMONICS, MNEMOTECHNY.**—See *Memoria Technica*, Barbara, Celarent, and the other words of the mnemonic verses.

MOBILITY (Lat.), quality of the mobile; of moving; mental quickness; levity. (Ger. *Beweglichkeit*.)—"That property of an object by which its external relations to a given space can be changed by a force." — Kant.

MODAL, of mode or form; in Logic and Metaphysics, applied to propositions which express limitations or conditions; opposed to *pure*, as *M. abstraction*, *M. propositions*. — Aristotle.² *M.* is also used as a noun. — O. F. Owen.³

***MODALITY**, in Kant,⁴ 1. "The name of those dynamical categories — of the pure understanding involving existence — which express the relations to the faculty of cognition." 2. "That synthetic unity through which the relation of the object to the faculty of cognition is thought." — Mellin.

***MODE**, "the internally fortuitous quality, the contingent determination." — Mellin.

MODIFICATION, process of modifying; result of modifying; mode. — Hamilton.⁵

MODUS (LOGICUS), mode in Logic, mode of conditional arguments, as in the hypothetical syllogism — *M. ponens*, or mode which posits or affirms (constructive hypothetical syllogism); *M. tollens*, which removes the consequent (distinctive hypothetical syllogism); in the disjunctive Syllogism — *M. ponendo tollens*, which by affirming denies; *M. tollendo ponens*, by denying affirms.

MOLECULAR, of the molecule, *q. v.*, as *M. philosophy*, *M. theory*.

***MOLECULE.** — "Atom, corpuscle, individual corpuscle, indivisible body, minimum of body, individual element of body, atomic body, insectile body." — W. A. Miller,⁶ Roscoe,⁷ Herbert Spencer,⁸ Williamson.⁹

¹ *Nature of Bodies*. L. J. ² *On Interpretation*, ch. xii.; *Prior Analytics*, I. iii. ³ *Note on Aristotle, Interp.*, ch. xii. 70. ⁴ *Rein. Vern.*, 266; Meiklejohn, 161. ⁵ *Metaphysics*, 105. ⁶ *Elem. of Chemistry*, 1867, § 13. ⁷ *Elementary Chemistry, Inorgan. and Organic*, 1867, 114, n. ⁸ *Biology*, ch. viii., § 302. ⁹ *Chemistry for Students*, 1865, § 35.

MOMENT, MOMENTUM (*pl. MOMENTA*) (Lat.), the moving thing, movement, motion; the thing moving itself; the affecting or influencing thing; the thing originating, calling forth, producing, causing; element of power; element. In Hegel, all things existent are considered as *moments*, that is, the various movements of the development by which the absolute thought, in producing all things, manifests itself. In Kant, M. expresses the degree of the reality or intensity of the cause of our sensations, or of any phenomenon perceived by our faculties. — D. P. S. "This term was borrowed from Mechanics by Hegel.¹ He employs it to denote the two contending forces which are mutually dependent, and whose contradiction forms an equation. Hence his formula *Esse* = Nothing. Here *Esse* and Nothing are momentums giving birth to *Werden*, i. e., existence. Thus the momentum contributes to the same oneness of operation in contradictory forces that we see in mechanics, amidst contrast and diversity, in weight and distance, in the case of balance." — M. T. M.

***MONADOLOGY.** — Langenbeck (1858), Leibnitz.²

***MONADS**, in Leibnitz and Herbart, "simple substances out of which the compound arise — they are without parts — not to be confounded with the Atoms of Epicurus, but are really unities, indivisible, the ground of all forces, the first absolute principles of all composite substances, including therefore the Atoms — they are like mathematical points, except that they have reality — they are metaphysical points, substantial forms, identical with what Aristotle calls Entelechies. They are without extension or figure. They are directly created, and could only cease by being annihilated. They have qualities; each is diverse from the others, on the principle of the *identity of indiscernibles*, q. v.; they are in a certain sense percipient, dimly (without consciousness), clearly (with it)."—See **Entelechy, Force, Soul, Substance**. Hartenstein (1846), Leibnitz.³

MONANDRY, marriage to one husband. — See **Monogamy**.

MONAS (Gr.), single; a unit-idea (Plato); in the Pythagorean

¹ See his *Wissenschaft der Logik*, vol. III., p. 104, ed. 1841. ² *La Monadologie* (*Principia Philosophica*) *Opera Philosophica* (Erdmann), 705-712. ³ *Nouveaux Essais*, Liv. IV., ch. x.

Philosophy, opposed to the Dyas, as one of the principles of numbers, and of all things as numerable. Monas is used by Leibnitz¹ in his Latin works in the nom. sing. — See **Monads**.

MONISM (Gr.), doctrine of unity; doctrine that there is but one principle of being; doctrine of Monists; opposed to *Dualism*, q. v. Anthropological M. is either materialism or idealism (spiritualism in the exclusive sense). Theological M. is Monotheism. Hegelianism has been styled the Monism of thought.

Monism, Monist (μόνος, one).—"The philosophical Unitarians or *Monists* reject the testimony of consciousness to the ultimate duality of the subject and object in perception, but they arrive at the unity of these in different ways. Some admit the testimony of consciousness to the equipoise of the mental and material phenomena, and do not attempt to reduce either mind to matter or matter to mind. They reject, however, the evidence of consciousness to their antithesis in existence, and maintain that mind and matter are only phenomenal modifications of the same common substance. This is the doctrine of *absolute identity*—a doctrine of which the most illustrious representatives among recent philosophers are Schelling, Hegel, and Cousin. Others again deny the evidence of consciousness to the equipoise of the subject and object as co-ordinate and co-original elements; and as the balance is inclined in favor of the one relative or the other, two opposite schemes of psychology are determined. If the subject be taken as the original and genetic, and the object evolved from it as its product, the theory of Idealism is established. On the other hand, if the object be assumed as the original and genetic, and the subject evolved from it as its product, the theory of Materialism is established." — Sir W. Hamilton.² See **Dualism, Duality of Consciousness**.

MONODYNAMIC (Gr.), having but one power.

***MONOGAMY, MONOGYNY** (Gr.), marriage to one woman only.

MONOGENESIS, derivation of individuals from one original pair.

MONOGENISTS, in Anthropology, those who maintain that

¹ *Opera Philos.* (Erdmann), 740, 742.

² *Metaphysics*, lect. xvi.

mankind consist of one species; opposed to *polygenists*.—Darwin.¹

MONOLEMMATIC (Gr.), pertaining to the monolemma, a syllogism which has but one premise; immediate syllogism; syllogism of the understanding.—See *Enthymeme*.

MONOMANIA (Gr.), insanity determining upon a single point.—Carpenter,² Maudsley,³ Winslow.⁴

MONOMERY (Gr.), unity of parts; having all the parts of one substance; simplicity.

MONOPATHY, separate suffering, whether of one part of the body or one faculty of the soul, apart from the others.

MONOPHYSY (Gr.), singleness; unity of nature.

MONOPSYCHITES (Gr.), single-soul-ists; those who held that there is but a single soul of the world, *Anima Mundi*, and that what are called souls are but part of this.

MONOSCHEMATISM.—See *Schematism*.

MONOSOPHY (Gr.), sole wisdom, applied to God as "the only wise," and by Socrates, who contrasts the M. of God with the philosophy of man.

***MONOTHEISM** (Gr.), doctrine or system of the unity of God; opposed to Polytheism.

MONOTHELESY, MONOTHELETISM, doctrine of the singleness of the will.—See *Monophysy*.

MONSTRATIVE.—1. Demonstrative; 2. Opposed to the demonstrative, which implies argument; applied to the assurance which rests on perception.

***MOOD** (Lat. *Modus, Mode*, q. v.), logical form; manner of being.—"The mood of a syllogism is the relation of its several judgments to each other, with reference to their respective quantity and quality."—Atwater.⁵ The moods may be legitimate or illegitimate. — Fowler.⁶ They are divided into direct and indirect, subaltern.—Fowler.⁷ See *Mode, Figure, Barbara*, and the other mnemonic terms.—Hamilton.⁸ Both mode and mood are used by the English logicians.—Thomson.⁹

***MORAL**, in Ethics, "concerned with the nature of the laws of

¹ *Desc. of Man*, 176. ² *Human Physiology*, § 83. ³ *Responsib. in Mental Disease*, 71, 73, 220. ⁴ *Obscure Mental Diseases*, ch. ix. ⁵ *Logic*, 132. ⁶ *Deduct. Log.*, 87-89. ⁷ *Deduct. Log.*, 91, 101-106. ⁸ *Logic*, Lect. xx., xxi.; *Appendix*, 658-679. ⁹ *Laws of Thought*, §§ 100-103.

right conduct, with the knowledge of them, and with the application of them. In reasoning, *moral* means *probable*, on the basis of the moral order of the universe."—C. F. V. Moral idealism, spiritualism, rigorism, treats man as if he were all spirit; M. realism, materialism, sensualism, treats him as if he were all body; M. synthetism takes the whole man, and puts the two elements of his nature into due relation.—Krug, E. L.

Moral Faculty (see **Conscience**), "the power of the mind by which we obtain our knowledge of moral law."—C. F. V.

Moral Insanity, "a disorder of mind in which, without illusion, delusion, or hallucination, the symptoms are mainly exhibited in a perversion of those mental faculties which are usually called the active and moral powers—the feelings, affections, propensities, temper, habits, and conduct."—Maudsley.¹

Moral Nature, the spiritual nature as involving a consciousness of the character and duty of morality.

***Moral Philosophy**, "is the philosophy of our knowledge of moral law, of the application of such law to human life, and of our relations as moral beings."—C. F. V. See **Ethics**.

Moral Responsibility, accountability for character and acts in the sphere of morality.

Moral Sense (see **Senses, Reflex**).—"Used, 1. To describe the moral faculty, when a transition was occurring from an emotional to an intellectual theory of its nature.—Shaftesbury, Hutcheson. 2. Feeling of reverence toward moral law."—Kant.² C. F. V.

Moral Theology, the portion of systematic theology devoted to the science of ethics; opposed to dogmatic theology.

MORALISTICS, moral philosophy.

***MORALITY**, "every form of action embraced under the application of moral law."—C. F. V.

MORBID (Lat.), diseased; applied to the mind, it expresses disorder which has not reached the degree of insanity. Hence, *Morbidness*.

MORGANATIC (Ger., morning-gift,) "*left-handed marriage*," q. v., in which the woman and any children she may have are excluded from the rank and heirship of the husband.

¹ *Responsibility in Mental Disease*, 170-184. ² *Analyt. der prak. Vernunft; Metaph. of Ethics*, Semple, 2d edit., Calderwood.

***MORPHOLOGY.**—Whewell: "Our *morphology* ought not to prejudice our *teleology*."

***MOTIVE**, "any desire, affection, or other internal force, which impels to action; a mental impulse."—C. F. V. It has been common "improperly" to distinguish motives as *external* or *internal*.—C. F. V. Ger. *Bewegungsgrund (des Wollens)*.—See **Liberty**.

Motive in Volition, recent views of.—See **Liberty**.—Büchner: "Where we believe we are acting freely, one motive has been stronger than another, and has overcome the will."¹ Beneke: "The will of man is nothing more than the sum of his motives, of his desires; these we must follow; in particular cases, we may indeed be able to resist them, but this we can do only by means of another stronger motive." "The volition is always determined by the mental representation of some interest or other; this interest is that which moves the volition."² Drobisch: "There is a relative freedom of the will." "The result of the estimate of that which we are weighing with reference to our acting, determines the will, and the estimate, in the view of the subject-mind, must, if it does not hit the best, at least hit the better."³ Frauenstädt: "Every decision is indeed necessary; it is a decision necessitated by the motive, but this necessity is not in conflict with the self-determination of the will, and does not destroy responsibility, inasmuch as motives do not coerce, but move the will only on the presupposition of its assent. The choice made by the will is a necessary one, but the necessity is not coercion."⁴ J. C. Fischer: "The grounds invested with the stronger charm, the mightier attractiveness, induce the decision in a manner involving natural necessity; the strongest motive always remains victor."⁵ I. H. Fichte: "Liberty is the faculty of following our inclination, or, if the inclinations or influence of motive be conflicting, to follow the stronger, more persistent inclination."⁶ Ludwig Feuerbach: "Nothing is more preposterous than to invent for man a special metaphysical need, distinct from his impulse toward his happiness. Where there is no impulse to happiness,

¹ *Sechs Vorlesungen*, 369. ² *Physik der Sitten*, 75, 89. ³ *Moralische Statistik*, 75, 104.

⁴ *Sittliche Leben*, 232-234, 240, 249, 250. ⁵ *Freiheit des Willens und die Einheit d. Natur-Gesetzes*, ed. 2, 197, 203. ⁶ *Ethik*, B. II., Ab. I., 86, 87.

there is no will. We wish for the end of what is in conflict with us—of pain, of misfortune; we wish for well-being. Willing means well-being, and that, first of all, for ourselves. Will is the desire or longing of a man for what is good or seems to be good; he cannot but will the good. Thus is he of necessity determined or attracted by the objects he regards as useful, and repelled by those he supposes to be injurious. Man strives necessarily after well-being. Willing means to will to be happy.”¹ Herbart: “Actions can be called free, only when they are determined by clear motives.”² Kant: see *Liberty*. Schopenhauer: “All motives are causes, and all causality brings necessity with it. A man can no more rise from his chair, without a motive, than a billiard-ball can roll without receiving a stroke, and his rising on the motive is as necessary and irresistible as the rolling of the billiard-ball on the stroke.” “The necessity with which the motives work is not destitute of something presupposed; its presupposition is the inborn individual character. This character, however, is not a work of art, but of nature, a natural force, and hence every act of a man is the necessary product of his character, and of the motive that has been brought in; if both these be given, the act follows inevitably.” “An act for which there is a sufficient motive cannot be left undone, unless a counter-motive which is stronger necessitates the putting it aside.”³ Spir: “The sole proper aim, the sole proper end of all will, of all effort, is identity with itself, is satisfaction.”⁴ Trendelenburg: “The human will must allow itself to be determined by a rational motive; then only is its freedom restored.”⁵ Ulrici: “The impulses present themselves to our consciousness, not as coercive causes. The freedom of our will shows itself in the very fact that we are able, between two or more given motives, to choose whether we will act upon them at all, or on which of them we will act.”⁶ Carl Werner: “All willing has a pleasure as its presupposition; the soul can will nothing, unless it have a pleasure in it; it has pleasure in that which suits it, and in some sense promises it satisfaction.”⁷ See Steudel.⁸

¹ *Sämmtliche Werke*, x. 62-65. ² *Werke*, IX. 373. ³ *Grund-Probleme*, 35, 36, 44, 53, 56, 205; *Vierfache Wurzel*, 47. ⁴ *Die Wahrheit*, 124. ⁵ *Naturrecht*, ed. 2, 71. ⁶ *Leib u. Seele*, 602; *Ztschr. von Fichte*, XI. 261, 262; *Naturrecht*, 60. ⁷ *Wesen u. Begriff d. Menschen-Seele*, ed. 2, 58. ⁸ *Philosophie im Umriss*, Zw. Theil. Erst. Abth. 50-63.

MULTIFORMITY, diversity of shapes or appearances subsisting in the same thing; character of the multiform.—Herbert Spencer.¹

MUNDANE (Lat.), of or belonging to the world (*mundus*); as, *mundane* soul (Glanville), *M. space* (Bentley).

MUNDUS (Lat.), the world. *M. intelligibilis*, the world as grasped by the understanding; the world of the *noumena*, q. v.; the *entia rationis*, or things in themselves; opposed to *M. sensibilis*, the world as grasped by the senses; the world of phenomena. The genitive of *M.* is used in the combinations *mundi anima*, *spiritus*, soul, spirit of the world; *M. systema*, system of the world.—See **World**.

MUST, marks necessity, whether physical or psychical; opposed to *should*, which marks duty.—See **Freedom, Liberty, Motive, Volition, Will**.

MUTISM.—1. State of muteness; destitution of speech.—Max Müller. 2. Excessive or morbid silence.—K. R. L.

MUTUALISM, system of reciprocal aid.

MUTUATION (Lat.), borrowing.

MYSTAGOGUE (Gr.), an initiator into mysteries; a teacher; a guide.

MYSTERIARCH, MYSTARCH, chief of the mustai, or those "initiated into articles of secret instruction."—C. F. V.

MYSTEROPHY (Gr.), wisdom of the initiated, the mustai; wisdom of the mystics.

MYSTERY (Gr.), secret doctrine; secret; matter of science; that which in its own nature is unknown or incomprehensible.

MYSTIC, *adj.* (Gr.), secret; connected with the mysteries; full of mystery; involving a secret or recondite sense.

Mystic, *n.*, one who holds mystic views.—Delitzsch (1842), R. A. Vaughan (1860).

***MYSTICISM**, "is a term which includes under it all philosophical speculations or transcendent problems which break away from the facts of observation and experience, and which refuse the test presented by such facts."—C. F. V., Krauth.²

***MYTH** (Gr.), "a fictitious or conjectural narrative, presented as historical."—C. F. V. See Baden Powell.³

¹ *Biology*, §§ 61, 311. ² Article *Mysticism*, *Johnson's Cyclopaedia*. ³ *Order of Nature considered in reference to the Claims of Revelation*, 1859, p. 340.

MYTHOLOGUE, myth.

***MYTHOLOGY**, "in the newer sense of the word, philosophical or critical investigation of myths."—L. J.

MYTHOPOEIC, myth-making.—Grote.¹

MYTHOTHEOLOGY, theology as derived from myths, or illustrated by them, or explanatory of them.

NAIVE (Fr.; Lat.), native; unaffected; opposed to the pretentious and conventional; it is opposed also to the sentimental, and is applied to the ancient poetry as more natural and objective than the modern. Hence *Naivete*.—Kant.²

NAME (Lat. *Nomen*; Ger. *Name*), a word or term which represents a person (proper) or thing (common). See **Nominalism**.

NATION (Lat.), "properly signifies a great number of families derived from the same blood, born in the same country, and living under the same government."—Sir W. Temple. "A multitude of human beings allied by physical descent, consequently also by language, manners, character, &c.; a people."—Krug.

***NATURA, N. NATURANS, N. NATURATA**.—See **Nature**.

***NATURAL**, of or pertaining to *Natura, Nature*, q. v.; "belonging to the constitution of things, or to the established order of the Cosmos."—C. F. V.

Natural, of, pertaining to, in harmony with, nature; in classification, based on real and essential distinctions; the opposite of *artificial*. It is applied by Mill to kinds which are distinguished not by a few definite properties, but by an unknown multitude of them. It is applied to causality, concept, condition, faculty, history, necessity, powers, science, state.

***NATURALISM** (Fr.).—1. Conformity to nature, naturalness; 2. The system which attributes everything to Nature as the primary principle, as the *N.* of Strato; 3. *N.* of Schelling, see **Nature, Philosophy of**; 4. A system of natural religion, as opposed to revealed religion.

NATURALIST, an adherent of Naturalism.

¹ *Hist. of Greece*, Pt. I., ch. 16.

² *Urtheilskraft*, § 54.

***NATURE.**—"Philosophy has but two objects, nature and freedom. The Philosophy of Nature is concerned with what is; the Philosophy of Morals with what ought to be."—Kant.

Nature in General, and Laws of Nature, recent attempts at defining.—Büchner: "Nature is a single totality sustained by an internal necessity." "Either the laws of nature rule, or the eternal reason rules; the two would be involved in conflict every moment; the sway of the unchangeable laws of nature, a sway which we cannot call a rule, would allow of no conflicting personal interference."¹ J. G. Fichte: "Nature is not a mere dead material; we must think of her as a Spiritual; she is a formal image of the absolute phenomenon."² I. H. Fichte: "An all-relating unifying power must interpenetrate the real elements; the reciprocal operation among things rests of necessity on an internal relation, a universal *rappor*t between them." "In the laws of nature is revealed the omnipotent sway of the divine wisdom."³ V. Hartsen: "The necessity of the laws of nature, over against the absolute necessity of the mathematical and logical laws, is only *hypothetical*—derived according to their essence from an originally free constitution of them."⁴ Hegel: "Nature is in itself also spirit, which posits itself as its other."⁵ F. W. J. Schelling: "In Nature the eternal things or the ideas come to existence. This takes place not through the intermediacy of a substance or matter, but through the eternal subject-objectivating of the absolute." "Nature is not the mere product of an incomprehensible creation, but this creation itself; not the mere phenomenon and revelation of the Eternal, but rather also this very Eternal itself; and as Spinoza says, the more we discern the individual things, the more we discern God."⁶ K. E. Schelling: "The reciprocal operation of things on one another is mediated through that same substance in which they before were one."⁷ Schulz-Schulzenstein: "In the sciences of inorganic nature there can be no Materialism, for here dead things are correctly explained by dead laws of nature."⁸ Steudel: "It

¹ *Natur u. Geist*, 36, 167; *Kraft u. Stoff*, 40. ² *Nachgelass. Werke*, I. 362. ³ *Zeitschrift*, xxi. 97; xlvii. 21; *Psychologie*, 623. ⁴ *Zeitschr. von Fichte*, lii. 67; see *Steudel*, I. 196. ⁵ *Leben von Rosenkranz*, 103. ⁶ *Werke*, Abth. I., ii. 188, 375; cf. Abth. II., ii. 371. ⁷ *Leben u. Seine Erscheinung*, Vorred. xxiii. ⁸ *Zeitschr. "Der Gedanke"*, I. 148.

is not to be denied that there are laws of nature which have the character of immanent necessity ; but these are the laws to which a strictly mathematical character pertains. This character, however, as Ulrici¹ recognizes, does not pertain to what are properly the laws of nature ; the organization of the universe by no means takes place as Michelet² supposes, according to internal necessity."³

Nature, Conditions of, in Kant,⁴ the causes in the phenomena; opposed to *events in nature*.

Nature, Doctrine of.—See **Physics**.

***Nature, Human.** ***Nature, Plastic.**

***Nature, Law of.**

Nature, Laws of, general rules which define the observed operations in nature.

Nature, Metaphysics of, in Kant.—See **Metaphysics, Tabular View**.

***Nature, Philosophy of**, in Herder and Schelling, a system of cosmogony which holds that nature is the realization of all that is conceivable.—See **Pantheism**. In Kant,⁵ the theoretic, as opposed to the practical.

Nature, Plan of.—See **End**.

***Nature of Things.**—Fleming.⁶

NATURISM, NATURIST.—See **Naturalism, Naturalist**.

NECESSARIANISM, doctrine of the philosophical Necessarians, or Necessitarians.—See **Liberty, Necessity, Will**.

NECESSARY, NECESSITATE, NECESSITATION.—See **Necessity**.

Necessary Matter, in Logic, consists of any subject in which the proposition A may be affirmed; opposed to *contingent and impossible*.

***NECESSITY.**—"The philosophic uses of this term are various: 1. *Physical N.*, according to the laws of nature; invariable sequence. 2. *Intellectual N.*, according to the laws of our intelligence; and 3. *Moral N.*, according to the absolute requirements of moral law. As applied to the question of the philosophy of the human will, N. expresses the doctrine that the will is not free, but that all volitions follow by

¹ *Ztschr. v. Fichte*, iv. 16. ² *Persönlichkeit des Absoluten*, 109. ³ *Philosophie im Umriss*, I. 367-397. ⁴ *Kein. Vern.*, 572. ⁵ *Urtheilskraft*, Einleit. xii. ⁶ *Man. of Mor. Phil.*

invariable sequence from internal motives, as the facts of nature from natural law. The word *Determinism*, q. v., has been proposed by J. S. Mill, as preferable to Necessitarianism."—C. F. V.

***Necessity, Doctrine of** (Ger. *Nothwendigkeit*).

***Necessity, Logical.**

Necessity, as applied to the Notion or Concept of God, in the Ontological argument, urged especially by Leibnitz. Kant: "If any thing exists, there must exist a necessary being, that is, God."¹ Lotze² and Schopenhauer³ maintain that necessity, as applied to the being of God, destroys the conception of His absoluteness and makes Him dependent. Schelling: "If God exist, He must be the necessarily existent. God, therefore, is not merely the necessary Being, but He is *necessarily* the necessary Being."⁴ Steudel: "We stand here in the presence of a mystery which will never be solved to our human cognition. So much we see, that if there be anything at all, there must be a God, in whom it has its ground; and, consequently, as there actually is a world, the world must have God as its ground. As God is the ground of the world, His being is not dependent on the being of the world. On the contrary, the being of the world is conditioned on the being of God. But the perplexing question is: Why is there anything at all — why is there a God and a world? How comes it that there is anything whatsoever? Why is there not nothing? This question is indeed solved by the supposition that the being of God is of itself a necessity. But who can maintain this apart from the world, or how can such a supposition be grounded? The proof of such a notional necessity of the being of God is a failure — the supposition of such a necessity involves a contradiction. Philosophy has here reached a boundary at which she is forced to pause. It is better honestly to confess this than, by artificial and illusory solutions, to mislead ourselves and others."⁵

Necessity, as applied to the Works of God, the theory that God *must manifest* his essential nature; that the world, as it

¹ Steudel, II., 305. ² Mikrokosmos, IV., 551, 552. ³ Parerga, Ed 1, Bd. I., 102, 176.

⁴ Werke, Abth. II., Bd. III., 159-167. ⁵ Philosophie im Umriss, Erst. Theil. Zw. Abth., 306.

is, is a *necessary* result of God's *nature*—Necessity opposed to the received notion of *Liberty*, q. v. Hegel: "In God, liberty and necessity are the same thing." "This necessity in God is in antithesis to the contingency of the world."¹ So Schelling. Franz Hoffmann: "As God is supreme perfection, He can only create and bring into operation the perfect."² Michelet: "For God, everything possible is also actual."³ So Schelling,⁴ Spinoza.⁵ Steudel: "Absolute *liberty* belongs essentially to the notion of the Absolute . . . It is a downright misapprehension to identify this absolute freedom with necessity."⁶

Necessity, as applied to Man.—See **Freedom, Liberty, Volition, Will.** Bergmann: "By liberty need no longer be understood a form of occurrence in conflict with the law of causality, an antithesis to necessity in general. Liberty is a special form of causality; it is a higher form of it. It does not lie upon things as an extraneous coercion, but is the proper form of the things themselves, wherein they can unfold their essential nature, and bring it to adequate manifestation."⁷ Chalibäus: "The concept of necessity is not opposed to freedom, or contradictory to it; but is opposed to arbitrariness. Both are elements subordinate to the concept of liberty, or co-ordinate with it."⁸ Drobisch: "Man, by a moral and firm character, becomes morally free, that is, independent of the coercion of his nature. This freedom, however, is no freedom of the will, but an obligation of it: it forms no antithesis to necessity; on the contrary, we expect, in the case of a person of strictly moral, fixed character, that moral willing and acting have become to him a second nature, and have consequently become necessary."⁹ I. H. Fichte.—See **Liberty.** Frauenstädt: "The moral decision is free from coercion, but not from necessity; a good man acts not under coercion, but from internal necessitation."¹⁰ Hegel: "Every philosophical system is at once a system of liberty and of necessity. Liberty and necessity are ideal

¹ *Werke*, XII., 434, 435, 480. ² *Ztschr. v. Fichte*, xii., 132, 133. ³ *Persönlichkeit des Absoluten*, 30. ⁴ *Werke*, Abth. I., vii. 429, II. 371, I. 323; Abth. II., i. 575 seq. ⁵ *Ed. Gfrörer*, 75. ⁶ *Phil. im Umris*, 311. ⁷ *Ztschr. "Der Gedanke"*, vi. 248, 249. ⁸ *Speculativ. Ethik*, I., 138. ⁹ *Moralische Statistik*, 106. ¹⁰ *Sittliche Leben. Ethische Studien*, 225.

factors, and are consequently not in real opposition. A separated liberty would be a formal liberty, as a separated necessity would be a formal necessity. In the absolute, liberty and necessity are in indifference." "Liberty and necessity, as standing abstractly over against each other, belong to the finite only, and have validity on its basis alone. A liberty which had no necessity in it, and a bare necessity without liberty, would be abstract designations, and consequently untrue ones. Liberty is essentially concrete, determined in itself, in an external mode, and is therefore at the same time necessary. When necessity is spoken of, it is common to embrace in it no more than determination from without. This, however, would be a mere external necessity, not the true internal one, which is liberty itself."¹ Kant: "All the actions of man in phenomenon are determined by his empirical character, and the other causes co-operating after the order of nature. Could we investigate to the bottom all the phenomena of his free-will, there would not be a single human act which we could not predict with certainty, and recognize as necessary from its antecedent conditions. In respect of this empirical character, there is no liberty. But at the same time every act, apart from its phenomenon, is the immediate operation of the intelligible character of the pure Reason, which consequently acts freely without being determined by external or internal grounds in the chain of natural causes."² V. Oettingen: "The difficult problem of the unity of liberty and necessity can never be solved until the individual man is fixed in his determination to become a member of a wisely ordered higher world."³ Rümelin: "Freedom and necessity are not logical opposites. The necessary is opposed to the contingent, freedom is opposed to coercion or external necessity, while the internal necessity is in affinity with freedom, if not identical with it."⁴ Schelling: "Absolute liberty is identical with absolute necessity. In God we can think of no act which does not proceed from the internal necessity of His nature. Such an act is the original one of man's self-consciousness; it is absolutely free, for it is determined by noth-

¹ *Werke*, I., 246, 247, 261, 265, 367, 368; VI., 72, 73, 310, 311; XII., 28; XIII., 39.

² *Werke*, II., 422, 423, 431-437. ³ *Moral-Statistik*, i. 26. ⁴ *Reden u. Aufsätze*, 23.

ing external to the Ego; it is absolutely necessary, for it proceeds from the internal necessity of the nature of this Ego." "That only can be styled a free cause which, in virtue of the necessity of its essential nature, acts apart from all other determination, in accordance with the laws of identity." "True liberty is in unison with a holy necessity—it is itself absolute necessity. For of an act of absolute liberty we can give no further ground; it is so because it is so, that is, it is absolutely, and so far, necessary." "In the soul, as such, there is no freedom, only the divine is truly free, and the essence of the soul is such so far as it is divine." "The action of our soul is not our action, but an action of the Substance. Every truly free act, that is, every divine act, is of itself in harmony with necessity; for the acts of God are at once absolutely free and absolutely necessary. The actions of all men are, relatively to the absolute, neither free nor necessary, but manifestations of the absolute identity of freedom and necessity. The essential character of the soul in knowing and doing is free necessity, and necessary freedom; the particular acts of willing are, however, always determined necessarily." "Even in its finite producing, the soul is merely the instrument of the eternal necessity. In its identity with the infinite, it exalts itself above that necessity which strives against freedom to that necessity which is the absolute freedom itself." "The true good can be wrought only by a divine magic."¹ Schellwien: "If freedom consist in this very agreement with one's self, in this very fact of being one essential nature, and in putting forth this essentiality from within, it is clear that necessity is an indispensable mark of freedom. That is free which has its necessity in itself. Necessity, therefore, is not only in no opposition to freedom, but belongs essentially to it."² Trendelenburg: "It lies in the essential nature of man that his freedom should be determined by grounds of thought, that in this his self-activity should reveal itself. Hence it is no want of freedom, but is the fulfilling of human nature when the thinking man is determined by the idea, that is by the determining divine thought in the ground of things.

¹ *Werke*, Abth. I., iii. 395; vi. 533; vii. 391, 429; vi. 52, 53, 538-569; vii. 391. ² *Kritik des Materialismus* (1858).

Moral freedom becomes confirmed in the good, in such a way that it cannot act otherwise, and is consequently united with necessity.”¹ Zeller: “Freedom and necessity are in one another.” “In the sphere of morals it holds good, without limitation, that everything is free in the measure in which it is necessary; that freedom and necessity, so far from being opposites, are rather each the measure of the other, and are both, jointly, opposed to the contingent, and in this respect to coercion also.” “If the will be subjected to natural necessity in a deterministic manner, there can be no room for a moral order of the world; but if the freedom of choice be exalted to the absolute, with the removal of all necessity, we can again no longer speak of order and conformity to law in action. In the very conception of a moral order of the world is already involved a recognition of the fact, that in willing and doing, freedom and necessity are united.”²

***NEGATION** (Ger. *Verneinung*), “the denial of existence, or the affirmation of absence.”—C. F. V. In Kant, “transcendental sublation, *nihil privativum*, privitive nothing.”³—See **Nothing**. “A concept without any object whatever is empty, a pure negation (*nihil privativum*); it tells what a thing is not, but not what it is.”—Mellin.⁴

Negation, in the Hegelian Method: “Every notion has in itself its own opposite, its own negation, is one-sided, and pushes on into a second, which second, the opposite of the first, is as *per se* equally one-sided with the first. In this way it is seen that both are only moments of a third notion, which, the higher unity of its two predecessors, contains in itself both, but in a higher form that combines them into unity. This new notion, again, once assumed as established, similarly demonstrates itself as but a one-sided moment, that also pushes forward to negation, and through negation to a higher unity, and so on. This self-negation of the notion is to Hegel the genesis of all differences and antitheses, which, for their parts, are never anything fixed or self-subsistent, as the reflecting understanding supposes, but only fluent moments of the immanent movement of the notion. And so it

¹ *Naturrecht auf dem Grunde d. Ethik* (1860), 69, 70. ² *Theolog. Jahrbücher*, v. 390, 438; vi. 85, 191. ³ *Rein. Vern.*, 106, 209, 229, 300, 312, 329, 348. ⁴ *Wörterbuch*, v. 746, 747.

is also with the absolute itself. The universal, which is the ground of everything particular, is such only in this way, that it (the universal), as such, is only something one-sided, and is of itself impelled into negation of its abstract universality by means of concreter particularity (definiteness). The absolute is not a simple one something, but a system of notions which owe their origin just to this self-negation of the original universal. This system of notions is then collectively in itself again an *abstractum*, that is impelled forward into negation of its merely notional (ideal) being, into reality, into the real self-subsistence of the differences (nature).”—Schwegler.¹

NEGATIVE, applied to a judgment, marks that in the determination of it the subject is placed outside of the sphere of the predicate; the negation affects the copula; opposed to *infinite*, q. v.—Kant.²

***Negative Thinking.**—“Sir W. Hamilton³ makes our notion of the infinite ‘a negative notion (the concept of a thing by what it is not).’ See also Mansel.⁴ In opposition to this view, Calderwood,⁵ Young,⁶ Bolton,⁷ Porter.”⁸—C. F. V.

NEGATIVITY, quality of the negative.

NEOPLATONISM, system of the *Neoplatonists* or *New Platonists*, q. v.

NEW PLATONISTS.—1. The ancient Alexandrian philosophers, who united Oriental theosophy with Greek dialectics. 2. Philosophers of a more recent period, who have had more or less Neoplatonic elements, as Fichte and Schelling in their later periods.

NEXUS (Lat.), a joining, binding together; that which joins or binds; connection; dynamical conjunction. (Ger. *Verknüpfung*.) “The synthesis of the manifold, so far as its parts necessarily belong to each other, as of accident and substance, cause and effect; opposed to composition (Ger. *Zusammensetzung*).”—Kant.⁹

Nexus, Analytic, logical nexus, in accordance with the law of identity, as in analytic judgments. **N., Effective**, the causal connection; the connection of operative causes. **N.,**

¹ *Hist. of Philosophy*, Stirling's Translat., 317. ² *Logik*, § 22. ³ *Discussions*, p. 28. Lect. II., 373. The position is vindicated, *Letter to Calderwood*, Lect. II., 534. Am. edit., 684-688. ⁴ *Prolegom. Logica*, and *Limits of Religious Thought*. Lect. III., p. 45. ⁵ *Philosoph. of the Infinite*, 2d and 3d edit., p. 272. ⁶ *Provinces of Reason*, 99. ⁷ *Inquisitio Philosophica*, 182. ⁸ *The Human Intellect*, 531, 652. ⁹ *Rein. Vern.*, 201.

Final, the causal connection of final causes; the harmony of a thing with that character or form of things which is only possible in accord with aims (Ger. *Zweckmässigkeit*). **N.**, **Logical**, the analytical nexus, *q. v.* **N.**, **Metaphysical**, connection in the cognitive faculty *a priori*; opposed to *physical nexus*, *q. v.* **N.**, **Physical**, the connection of phenomena with each other; opposed to *metaphysical nexus*, *q. v.* **N.**, **Real**, **N.**, **Synthetic**, connection in accordance with the laws of causality.—Kant,¹ Mellin.²

NIHIL EST IN INTELLECTU QUOD NON FUERIT IN SENSU (Lat.), "there is nothing in the understanding which was not before in the sense," erroneously ascribed to Aristotle. It is the watchword of the school of Locke. Leibnitz happily compresses the opposite view by adding "*nisi ipse intellectus*," "except the understanding itself."

***NIHIL, NIHILUM**.—See **Nothing, Something**.

*Nihilism, Nihility.

NISUS (Lat.), pressing, pressure; striving, exertion. **N.**, **Formative**, the forming principle (Ger. *Bildungstrieb*; Fr. *Instinct formatrice*): "The faculty of the matter in an organized body to take its determinate form originally, to maintain it through life, and within certain limits to restore it when it has been mutilated."—Blumenbach,³ Kant.⁴

NOMENCLATURE, scientific collection of names; body of the names.

NOMINAL, in Logic, applied to a definition of a word or term, as opposed to a real definition, the definition of a thing.

*Nominalism.

NOMOLOGICAL, of Nomology, *q. v.*

NOMOLOGY ("νόμος, λόγος). If we analyze the mental phenomena with the view of discovering and considering, not contingent appearances, but the *necessary* and *universal* facts, *i. e.*, the laws, by which our faculties are governed, to the end that we may obtain a criterion by which to judge or explain their procedures and manifestations—we have a science which we may call the *Nomology* of mind—Nomological *Psychology*.—Sir W. Hamilton."⁵—C. F. V.

NOMOTHETIC (Gr.), law-giving, law-imposing.

¹ *Rein. Vern.*, 201; *Pract. Vern.*, 199. ² *Wörterbuch*, v. 743-745; vi. 337-348. ³ *Bildungstrieb*, 1781. ⁴ *Urtheilskraft*, § 81. ⁵ *Lect.*, Vol. I., 122.

NON (Lat. *neunum*, not one), not ; in a large number of sentences embodying philosophical principles. **Non bis in idem**, not twice in the same, the proposition of Heraclites. **Non causa pro causa**, in Logic, what is not the cause, assumed to be the cause.— See **Fallacy**. **Non datur tertium**, in Logic, there can be no third.— See **Excluded Middle**.

Non entis nulla sunt prædicata, in Logic and Ontology, what has no being has no marks.

Nonentity, **Nonesse**, **Nonexistence**, the **Nonexistent**, involve the opposite of being ; negation of being or existence.

Non liquet, it is not clear.— See **Skepticism**.

Non multa sed multum, not many but much ; the principle of thorough scholarship.

Non numeranda sed ponderanda argumenta, in Logic, it is not the number of argumenta, but their weight, which counts.

Non quaero intelligere, ut credam, sed credo ut intelligam—I do not seek to understand in order that I may believe, but I believe in order that I may understand ; the roots of our cognitions are our faiths.

Non (Lat. *not*), in many compound words ; represented also by *in* and *un*. Largely used in Logic and Metaphysics.

Non-being, in the Atomistic Philosophy.—Hegel: "In the Eleatic Philosophy, being and non-being are as in mutual contradiction—only being is, non-being is not. In the Heraclitic idea, being and non-being are the same, both together, that is the becoming, are predicate of the existent."¹

Non-being, in the Platonic Philosophy.—Schwegler: "The fundamental thought of the *Sophist*, then, that neither is being without non-being, nor non-being without being, may in modern phraseology be expressed thus: negation is not non-being, but determinateness, and, conversely, all determinateness and concreteness of notions, all affirmativeness, is only through negation, through exclusion, contrariety ; the notion of antithesis is the soul of the philosophical method."²

Non-Contradiction, principle.— See **Contradiction**. Hamilton.³

Non-Ego, all that is not the Ego, the object, the objective, the

¹ Schwegler, ix. 5. ² *History*, Stirling, xiv. 4 c. ³ *Metaphysics*, Am. ed., 526, 680.

object-object, or objective object; opposed to Ego, subject, subjective, subject-object, subjective object. — Hamilton.¹ "Every thing, or any thing in, the whole, or any part of the universe, with the exception of Ego, i. e., the individual who, in thought, is separating the whole world of existences, or entities, into two divisions, he himself forming one of them, everything else the other." — Latham.²

Nonentity (Lat.), destitution of being — opposite of being; not a conceivable thing. Bentley: "Nothing from nothing (is) equivalent to this proposition that nothing can make itself, or, nothing cannot bring its no self out of *nonentity* into something." (Ger. *Nichtsein, Nichts*.) "A nonentity has no predicates." "What in reality has no qualities, has no existence in thought — it is a logical nonentity." — Hamilton.³

Non-Existence (Lat.), destitution of existence — opposite of existence; the non-existent, not an actual thing. — A. Baxter.⁴ (Ger. *Nichtdasein: das nicht Existirende Ding*.) "A non-existent has no rights."

Non-Natural, opposed to the natural; the supernatural, the contranatural, the unnatural. — Kant, Mellin.⁵

Nonplus, *subst.* and *verb*, marks a state of mind in which we can go no further, can say no more. — Bentley, Glanville, Locke, in L. J.

*Non sequitur.

NOOCRATIC (Gr.), applied to the school which considers the pure reason as sovereign, the faculty which directs all the other faculties.

***NOOGONIE**, genesis of the mind. — Kant⁶ applies it to Locke's system, as one which generates the understanding (*Nous*) from the senses, through reflexion and abstraction. But as *Nous*, q. v., has a broader sense, any theory of the generation of concepts may be called a *Noogenie*.

NOOLOGICAL, pertaining to *Noology*, q. v.

NOOLOGIST, in Kant, one who maintains that the pure rational cognitions are independent of experience, and have their sources in the reason, as Plato and Leibnitz; opposed to empirist (Aristotle, Locke).⁷

¹ Reid, Note D., i. § 6. ² Dictionary, s. v. ³ Logic, Lect. V., § 12. ⁴ Nature of the Human Soul, ii. 189. ⁵ Kunstsprache: Nichtnatürlich. ⁶ Rein. Vern., 327. ⁷ Rein. Vern., 882.

***NOOLOGY.**—See Hamilton.¹

***Norm.**

NORMAL, conformable to the norm; expressive of the norm; norm-giving, as *normal* idea: applied by Kant² to the æsthetic idea, the form which fixes the condition of all beauty.

NORMATIVE, directing by the norm; regulative.

NOT, in Logic, the negative element.—See Latham.³

NOTA NOTÆ EST ETIAM NOTA REI IPSIUS, in Logic, the note (mark) of a note is also a note of the thing itself.—See **Inference, Mediate.**—Atwater.⁴

NOTATION, in Logic, a representation to the eye, by figures, of the relation which subsists in thought between conceptions. The most renowned of these are: 1. Euler's, by circles; 2. Hamilton's,⁵ which Thomson says, "is beyond doubt, one of the most important contributions to pure Logic which has ever been made since the science was put forth." It is by letters, lines, numbers, and marks of punctuation; 3. Lambert's, by letters, straight lines, and dots; 4. Maas's, by angles, triangles, and letters.—See Thomson,⁶ Atwater.⁷

NOTE [Lat. *Nota (discrimen, character cognitionis et rei)*; Fr. *Note (caractère de la connoissance et de la chose)*; Ger. *Merkmahl*, a mark], distinctive element of the cognized; in Logic, mark or attribute.—Thomson.⁸ It is distinguished as affirmative or positive; analytic; constitutive or essential in the strictest sense; contingent or extra-essential and variable; coordinate; external; immediate or proximate; mediate or remote, the note of a note; subordinate; synthetic.

NOTHING (Ger. *Nichts*), in Hegel,⁹ pure negation, is identified with the immediate indeterminate notion of being (*Seins*), in the absence of content, and in vacuity.—See **Becoming, Being.**—Porter,¹⁰ Schwegler.¹¹

Nothing.—See **Something.** Kant¹² classifies the concept Nothing thus: 1. Empty concept without object—*ens rationis*. 2. Empty object of a concept—*nihil privativum*. 3. Empty intuition without an object—*ens imaginarium*. 4. Empty object without concept—*nihil negativum*.

¹ *Metaphysics*, Am. ed., 87. ² *Urtheilskr.*, § 17. ³ Excursus under *Not*, in his edition of Johnson's *Dictionary*. ⁴ *Logic*, 139. ⁵ *Logic*, App. XI., 667-679. ⁶ *Laws of Thought*, §§ 101-104. ⁷ *Logic*, 140-143, 232-244. ⁸ *Laws of Thought*, 95. ⁹ *Encyclopædie*, § 87; Wallace, 137. ¹⁰ *Human Intellect*, 529, 532. ¹¹ *Geschichte*, XLV., i. 1, a. ¹² *Rein. Vern.*, 348; Meiklejohn, 208.

***NOTION.**—"Begriff: The form of generalized knowledge, such as that which stands for a genus. We might say a general conception, but for the consideration that 'conception' (*Vorstellung*) is better kept for the mental representation of an individual object. Notion and conception have commonly been used as synonymous."—C. F. V. See Krauth.¹

Notion in Hegel, in the *Science of Logic*, "is that in the other which is identical with itself; it is substantial totality, whose momenta (*individual, special*) are themselves the whole (the *universal*) which just as freely on the one side warrants the distinction, as on the other it comprehends it within itself in unity. The Notion is, 1. Subjective notion. 2. Objectivity. 3. Idea. The subjective notion contains the momenta of *Universality, Particularity, and Individuality. Objectivity* is not being in general, but a being complete in itself, determined by notion. The *Idea* is the highest logical definition of the absolute."—Hegel,² Schwegler.³

Notion in Plato.—Aristotle: "Socrates did not posit the universal notions as distinct individual substances. This was done by Plato, who then named them ideas."⁴ Schwegler: "Plato's ideas are the Socratic universal notions, posited as real individual existences."⁵

Notion in Socrates, The, arose in his method of induction, out of the transformation of a general mental representation into the notion.—"Casting out what was contingent and accidental, he aimed at bringing to consciousness a universal truth, a universal fixing of meaning; in a word, he aimed at forming notions. For example, to find the notion of rectitude, of courage, he advanced from the different individual exemplifications of these virtues, and from these deduced their general nature—their notion. We see from this to what the Socratic induction tended—to *definition* conformed to the notion."—Schwegler.⁶

*Notiones communes.

NOTIONS, CLEAR, CONFUSED, DISTINCT, INDISTINCT, OBSCURE.—See *Notion, § 7.

*Notions, First and Second.

¹ Berkeley's *Principles*, annotated, p. 338. ² *Encyclopædie*, §§ 51, 160-244. ³ *Geschichte*, XLV., i. 3. ⁴ *Metaph.*, xiii. 4. ⁵ *Geschichte*, xii. 6. ⁶ *Geschichte der Philosophie*, xii. 6.

***Notions, Intuitive and Symbolical.**—Leibnitz's application of intuitive to notions "involves a misapplication of the word 'notion.' The term must always indicate representation or mediate knowledge; we may speak of cognitions, intuitive and symbolical, but not of intuitive notions. The passage occurs in the *Meditationes de Cognitione, Veritate et Ideis*,¹ and 'cognitio' is the word first employed by Leibnitz, though he afterwards uses *notio*."—C. F. V.

NOTIORA NATURÆ, in Logic, applied to those things which are more simple or *better known in nature*, as opposed to the *nobis notiora*, things better known to us, or our senses.—Jevons.²

NOTITLÆ COMMUNES, *Notiones communes*, q. v.

***NOUMEN, NOUMENON** (*pl. NOUMENA*), (Gr., a thought-thing; Ger. *Gedankending*, the thing thought). In Kant, negatively, "the thing in itself, the real object to which the qualities recognized by us belong."—C. F. V. In Kant,³ *Noumen* in the positive sense is the supersensuous object, the Supersensuous, *το ὄν κατ' αὐτό, το ὄντως ὄν*. — See **AN SICH**. "*Noumena*, in the negative sense, are things of which the understanding conceives without reference to our mode of sense-perception, consequently not as phenomena, but as manifested through the phenomena." The "intelligible world" is not phenomenon but *noumen*. *Noumen* is *non-phenomenon*.

NOUMENAL, of or pertaining to the *noumen*, q. v.—Stirling.⁴

NOUS, NOOS (Gr.).—1. Mind, as employed in perceiving and thinking; perception; sense. 2. Mind, as employed in feeling and the like; the heart, mood, temper. 3. The mind, as employed in resolving and purposing. In the Attic Philosophy, the perceptive and intelligent faculty, intellect, reason. In Anaxagoras, the principle which acted on the elementary particles of matter, the divine intelligence.—Anaxagoras,⁵ Aristotle,⁶ Grote,⁷ Plato.⁸ In Kant, *Nous* is represented by *Verstand*, the understanding.

***Novelty.**

NOVUM ORGANUM (Lat.), new instrument.—See Bacon.

NULLIBISTS, advocates of nullibity, no-where-ness; applied

¹ *Opera Philosophica*, Erdmann, p. 79. ² *Less. in Logic*, 204. ³ *Rein. Vern.*, 307, 312, 345. ⁴ *Annotations on Schwegler's History*, 375, 418, 457. ⁵ *Fr.*, 2. ⁶ *De Anima*, 1, 2, 5; *Metaph.*, 1, 4. ⁷ *Plato*, I., 56, seq. ⁸ *Phædon*, 97 B. C.

to the Cartesians, who assert that body is somewhere (*alicubi*), spirit is nowhere (*nullibi*).—Krug.

***NUMBER.**—Hegel:¹ "Like the one, number involves two qualitative factors or functions: it is *annumeration* according to the element of discretion; *unity*, according to the element of continuity." Kant:² "A mental representation which comprehends the successive addition of one to one (of things homogeneous.)"—Porter.³

NYÂYA, in Hindoo philosophy, the Sanscrit name for syllogism; the system of Gotâma, who has been compared to Kant; it is a system of ratiocination; a complicated logic of categories and syllogisms, with the element of spiritualism.—See **Categories, Syllogism, Vaiséhica**.

NYMPHOLEPT (Gr.), (hence *Nympholepsy*), nymph-caught; muse-inspired; rapt; entranced. (Lat. *Lymphatus*).—See **Lymphatic**.—Aristotle,⁴ Plato.⁵

O, in Logic, marks a particular negative. — See **A, E, I**.

***OATH** (Ger. *Eid*).

OBJECT (Lat., thrown before, lying before; Fr. *Objet*; Ger. *Gegenstand*).—In Metaphysics, that which is in mental view, that to which the mind is directed, whether in external or internal perception, as objects of sense, sight, hearing; objects of thought, desire, will. It is opposed to the thinking *subject* or *Ego*, as the object of thought, the *Non-Ego*. — See **Objective**. Fichte: "The law of consciousness is, 'No subject, no object; no object, no subject,'"⁶ "The *object* is a non-Ego, which the Ego meets in its going forth from its centre." Hegel: "The objective is identical with material being."⁷ Michelet: "Objectivity is the notion in the form of separation."⁸ Steudel: "Subject is that which takes cognizance of another; object is that which is cognized by another."⁹

Object-Object, the external as mental object, the "objective-object;" opposed to subject-object.

¹ *Encyclopædie*, § 102; Wallace, 163. ² *Rein. Vern.*, 182. ³ *Human Intellect*, 544-554. ⁴ *Eth.*, E. 1, 1, 4. ⁵ *Phædr.*, 238 D. ⁶ *Grundl. d. ges. Wissenschaftslehre*, 1794; *Werke*, I 183, 218. ⁷ *Leben Hegel's*, Rosenkranz, 108. ⁸ *Ueber die Persönlichkeit des Absoluten*, 160. ⁹ *Philos. im Umrisse*, I. 303.

OBJECTIFY, OBJECTIVATE, OBJECTIZE, to render objective, consider or treat as objective. To *objectivate the subject*, to make our own minds the object of study, subject-objects. — Encyclopædia Britannica.¹

***OBJECTIVE**, "what pertains to the object known, in contrast with *subjective*, what pertains to the knowing subject. Hence objective has come to mean that which has independent existence or authority, apart from our experience or thought. Thus moral law is said to have *objective authority*, that is, authority belonging to itself, and not drawn from anything in our nature." — C. F. V.

Objective, Objectivism, Objectivity, in *Æsthetics*, applied to authors and artists whose personality retires into the back-ground or disappears altogether. — Chambers' Encyclopædia.²

OBJECTIVITY, in *Metaphysics*, character of the *object*, q. v., and of the *objective*, q. v.

Objectivity, in *Morals*, applied to good and evil; opposed to subjectivity. Morality strictly pertains to the subject — the moral agent. *Persons* are morally good or morally bad; *things* are not. But in a *secondary* sense, and in this only, the terms morally good or morally bad may be applied to acts which in their true moral connection arise from ethical principle, and in that case participate indirectly in its character, but which may be separated in fact in particular instances from it. Relief of the miserable is in this sense objectively good, though the motive of the person acting may not have been pure. *It* is good, though *he* is not. The killing of a daughter is objectively bad, though the motive of *Virginus* is pure. *It* is bad, *he* is not. — See Steudel.³

***OBLIGATION** (Ger. *Verbindlichkeit*), "Personal subjection to the authority of law, oughtness, duty. 'Bounden duty' is tautological." — C. F. V.

***Obligation, Moral**. — The will of God, "as expressing the absolute perfection of the Divine nature," is the true ground of obligation. "A doctrine of moral obligation presents the great difficulty in the construction of a utilitarian theory of morals in which a deterministic (necessitarian) theory of will is an essential part. How the difficulty has been met may

¹ *Object and Objective.*

² *Object.*

³ *Philosophie im Umriss*, II., i. 538-545.

be seen from Mr. Mill.¹ 'Why am I bound to promote the general happiness? . . . This difficulty will always present itself, until the influences which form moral character have taken the same hold of the principle which they have taken of some of the consequences.' This shuns the difficulty—shifting it from a philosophic to a practical one. The reference here is not to the difficulty in finding a rational explanation of the fact of obligation, but in acting up to admitted obligation. Prof. Bain² makes obligation refer 'to the class of actions enforced by the sanction of punishment.'—C. F. V.

OBSCENITY (Lat., covered over, concealed), in Ethics, filthiness, impurity, unchastity.

OBSCURANT, OBSCURANTISM, OBSCURANTIST, applied to mark the character of opposition to light, truth, and intelligence; the spirit which obscures what should be brought to view.

OBSCURE, in Logic, applied to knowledge which does not enable us to recognize the thing again, and discriminate it from all other things.

***OBSERVATION** (Ger. *Beobachtung*).—"Commonly, attention directed upon external objects. But quite correctly, it is made to include attention directed upon what is within, as well as upon what is without."—C. F. V.

OCCAMISTS, followers of William of Occam (died about the middle of the 14th cent.), violent opponents of the Scotists, Nominalists, *q. v.*

***OCCASION**.—"Opportunity for action, as afforded by the presence of conditions favorable to its performance."—C. F. V. "The proximate cause or last condition which is requisite to bring other causes into action."—Jevons.

OCCASIONAL CAUSES (DOCTRINE OF), OCCASIONALISM.—See *Causes, Occasional (Doctrine of)*. Applied by Kant³ to the theory which supposes God to furnish by direct act the organic character on occasion of each case of generation; opposed to *Præstabilism*.

OCCULT QUALITIES.—See *Quality, Occult*.

OECONOMY (Lat. *Oeconomia*, from the Greek), management of a household; administration (of a state); arrangement; harmonious operation of organization, physical, moral, national,

¹ *Utilitarianism*, p. 40.

² *Emotions and Will*, 3d ed., 264.

³ *Urtheilekr.*, 375.

or social; the animal *oeconomy*, the human *oeconomy*, *oeconomy* of humanity.—Steudel.¹

OMNITUDE (Lat. *Omnitudo*), the totality; the entireness. In Kant, "*das All der Realitat*,"² applied to the transcendental ideal, the idea of an object in which all possible attributes meet.

ONE.—See **Unity**.

ONEIROMANCY.—See **Dreaming**.

ONTOLOGIC, ONTOLOGICAL, ONTOLOGIST, terms derived from *Ontology*, q. v.

Ontological Argument, Proof (of the Existence of God), the attempt to demonstrate that the very idea of God involves His actual being. It is also called the *Anselmian* and *Cartesian* proof.—See Steudel.³

***ONTOLOGY**.—The ancient philosophers were largely occupied with ontological speculations. Plato's *Parmenides* is entirely devoted to ontology. Hegel's philosophy, especially his *Logic*, is in the main nothing but ontology. The mediæval struggle between realism and nominalism is essentially ontological. Kant: "The principles of transcendental analytic are merely principles of the exposition of phenomena; and the proud name of ontology, which involves the claim of presenting synthetical cognitions *a priori* of things in general in a systematic doctrine (as, for example, the principle of causality), must give place to the modest title of a simple analytic of the pure understanding."⁴ "Metaphysic, in the more limited acceptance of the term, consists of *transcendental philosophy* and the *physiology* of pure reason. The former considers only the understanding and the reason in a system of all concepts and principles which relate to objects in general, without embracing objects which are given. It is ontology."⁵ Schopenhauer: "The *philosophia prima*, the investigation of the cognitive faculty, which is divided into the consideration of the primary or intuitional mental representations (*Dianoiology*), and the consideration of the secondary or abstract mental representations (*Logic*). This general part of philosophy, with which every philosophy

¹ *Philosoph. im Umrisz*, II., i. 478–488. ² *Rein. Vernunft*, 656. ³ *Philosophie im Umrisz*, I., ii. 177–183. ⁴ *Rein. Vern.*, 308; *Werke*, II., 713; Meiklejohn, 183. ⁵ *Rein. Vern.*, 873, 874; Meiklejohn, 511, 512.

has to begin, embraces, or rather displaces, what was formerly called ontology. Ontology is the doctrine of the most general and essential attributes of things. That was regarded as the attributes of the things themselves which pertains to them only because of the form and nature of our representative faculty, and a process took place like that of a man who supposes the color of the glass through which he is looking, to be the color of the object at which he looks." "Kant's Critique of the Pure Reason converted ontology into dianoiology."¹ Thilo calls ontology "a little work of art in a snuff-box."² See I. H. Fichte,³ Steudel.⁴ For the divisions of ontology, see **Metaphysics, General**.

ONTOSOPHY, ontology.

ONTOSTATICS, ontology as a theory of the equilibrium of the forces of being.

ONTOTHEOLOGY, theology as derived from or influenced by ontology.—G. E. Schulze.⁵

OPERATION, every activity which produces or influences.

Operation at a Distance (Lat. *Actio in distans*; Ger. *Wirkung in die Ferne*).—The difficult question involved in this term is, Can physical substance operate *immediately* where it is not? It is most commonly discussed in connection with gravitation in its relation to distant bodies. The sun attracts the earth, and the earth attracts the sun. Is there *anything between* the sun and the earth, by *which* they attract each other? Chalybäus: "If there be an attraction through empty space, if there be a universal reciprocal attraction of all bodies, it must originate from a substance continuing to subsist indivisibly even in the differentiation."⁶ The recent atomists are opposed to the doctrine of the (immediate) operation at a distance; as, for example, Cornelius: "That doctrine would imply that there are activities without a something which is active; forces without a substratum, anything real to sustain them. The operations which seem to be of this character are really brought about by a chain of actual essences."⁷ I. H. Fichte: "The theory of an *actio*

¹ *Parerga*, I., 89; II., 19; *Welt als Wille*, II., 200. ² *Zeitschr. f. exakte Phil.*, II., 451.

³ *Ontologie*, 1836. ⁴ *Philosophie im Umriss*, I., 1. 288. ⁵ *Grundriss d. phil. Wissensch.*, II., 164-174. ⁶ *Fundamental Philosophie*, 124. ⁷ *Bildung d. Materie*, 14, 19, 53; *Zeitschr. f. exakte Phil.*, vi. 11-15.

in *distans* involves a conflict with the conditions of clear thinking."¹ Herbart: "The theory is absurd, for it would imply that the force of a thing occupies a far larger space than the thing itself."² Kant: see **Gravitation**. Schelling: "The notion of the *actio in distans* is a simple result of the method of considering things independently of the substance. The substance is omnipresent. Hence, there is no *actio in distans*, for one body does not draw another body to it from a distance, but the universal infinite substance unites them — a substance which is neither far nor near, but at once every thing and each thing. It is that which as one is all, as all is one. It is the identity in the totality, and the totality in the identity."³ "As in the true substance there is no interval, neither nearness nor distance, the operation at a distance is a chimera in nature."⁴—See Steudel.⁵

OPERATIONS, LOGICAL, the three modes of activity in the cognitive faculty: thought (by bare concepts), judgments, and reasoning.

***Operations (of the Mind)**, "the active exercises of the mind, in contrast with its passive experiences."—C. F. V.

OPERATIVE, having the power of operation; effective.

Operative Philosophy, in Bacon,⁶ "Natural prudence, or the part operative of natural philosophy: experimental, philosophical, and magical."

OPHELIOMOLOGY (Gr., useful, doctrine of the), the moral system which is based on self-interest. — See **Deontology**, **Eudæmonism**, **Interest**.

OPINABLE (thinkable), **OPINATION** (act of thinking), **OPINATIVE** (obstinate in opinion), **OPINATOR**, **OPINIASTER**, **OPINIONATED**, all from *opine*, to think, or hold an opinion.

***OPINION** (Ger. *Meinung*), "unverified thought."—C. F. V. Plato: "Just as little as sense-perception, is opinion (mental representation) identical with knowing; incorrect opinion certainly is not, but even correct opinion is not, for it may be produced by the art of discourse, without on that account passing as true knowledge. Correct opinion as materially

¹ *Anthropologie*, 200. ² *Werke*, I., 200; *Einleitung in d. Philosophie*, § 127. ³ *Syst. der gesamt. Philosophie*, 1804; *Werke*, I., vi. 254, 255. ⁴ *Aphorismen über die Naturphilosophie*; *Werke*, I., vii. 230, § 105. ⁵ *Philosophie im Umriss*, I., i. 439–443. ⁶ *Adv. of Learning*, Book II., Works I., 199.

true, formally insufficient, stands rather midway between knowing and not knowing, and has a share in both."¹—Day,² Schwegler.³

OPPONENT, in disputations, one who opposes the theses which the respondent or defendant maintains.

OPPORTUNITY, "occasion favorable for action, both in respect of time and of the conditions requisite."—C. F. V.

***OPPOSED, Opposition.**

OPPOSITES, in Logic, in quantity the extreme terms; not to be confounded with *contradictory*, q. v.

***OPPOSITION**, in Logic, "There is no opposition between contraries; for both may be at once maintained, as both at once must be true if the *some* be a negation of *all*. They cannot, however, both be false. The opposition in this case is only apparent."—Sir W. Hamilton.⁴ O. is distinguished as analytic; logical; contradictory; contrary; subcontrary; dialectic; real—possibly, potentially, actually.

OPPUGNANCE, repugnance.

OPTATION (Lat.), wishing.

***OPTIMISM**.—Its most special antithesis is *Pessimism*, q. v. — Berkeley,⁵ Butler,⁶ Leibnitz,⁷ Schopenhauer,⁸ Steudel,⁹ Ueberweg,¹⁰ Ulrichi.¹¹—See **Order, Moral, and Theodicy**.

***ORDER**, "*Unam posui aliam*."—C. F. V. See Hamilton.¹² In Wolf we have order of the world, of nature, of the school; order mixed, natural.

Order, Moral, of the World (Ger. *Sittliche Welt-Ordnung*; see **Optimism, Pessimism, Theodicy**); in Fichte's *Doctrine of Religion*, is the divine itself: "By right doing, this divine becomes living and actual in us; every one of our actions is performed only on the presupposition of this fact, the presupposition that the moral aim is capable of being carried out through a higher order in the world of sense. The faith in such an order of the world is the complete and perfect faith; for this living and acting moral order is God himself; we need no other God, and can comprehend no other. There lies no

¹ *Theaetetus*. ² *Summary and Analysis of Plato*, Index, Opinion. ³ *Geschichte*, xlv. 4, bb. ⁴ *Lect.*, vol. iii., p. 261. ⁵ *Principles*, § 153. ⁶ *Analogy*, Part I., ch. vii. ⁷ *Theaetetus*, *Opera* (Erdmann), LXIII. ⁸ Quoted in Krauth's *Berkeley*, 118, 119. ⁹ *Philosophie im Umris*, II., 1. 598-603. ¹⁰ *Notes* (116) in Krauth's *Berkeley*. ¹¹ *Stamm*, Krauth's Translat., 107. ¹² *Metaphysics*, Lect. vi.

ground in the reason for going beyond this moral order of the world, and, by drawing an inference, from the thing grounded to the ground, supposing that there is, besides, a special essence as its cause. The notion of God as a special substance is impossible and contradictory. God exists in Himself only as such a moral order of the world. Every faith in a Divine, which embraces more than the notion of the moral order of the world, is to me an abomination, and utterly unworthy of a rational being."¹—Schwegler,² Steudel.³

ORECTIC (Gr. *ορεξίς*, a longing or yearning after, desire), of or for the desires; appetitive. The Orectic, collectively, the desires.—Aristotle,⁴ Monboddo.⁵ See Hamilton.⁶

*Organ.

ORGANIC, ORGANICAL, of or pertaining to an organ, *q. v.*; as, O. pleasure, O. sense-perceptions.—See **Organics**.—Ulrici.⁷

Organic Senses, the senses fixed to specific organs—touch, sight, hearing; taste, smell; opposed to the vague sense.

ORGANICS (Ger. *Organik*), in Hegel's *Science of Nature*, nature advanced to subjectivity. The idea, as life, presents itself in three gradations: 1. As universal image of life, *geological* organism, the *mineral kingdom*. 2. In *vegetable* organism, the *kingdom of plants*. 3. The *animal* organism, the *animal kingdom*.—Schwegler,⁸ Steudel.⁹

ORGANISM, a unity of organs; the being resulting from such a union.—See **Darwinism**, **Evolution**, **Organics**.—Steudel.¹⁰

ORGANIZATION (ORGANIZED BEING), the process of organizing; the organism resultant.—“An *organized* product of nature is that in which all the parts are mutually ends and means.” Kant.—C. F. V. See Porter.¹¹

ORGANOLOGY, the doctrine or science of organic nature.

*Organon, or Organum.

ORGANON, ORGANUM SENSORIUM, in Wolf, organ of sense; as the eye, the nerves.

¹ “Über den Grund unseres Glauben an eine göttliche Weltregierung.” ² *Geschichte*, XLI., i. 2. ³ *Philosophie im Umriss*, II., i. 377–432. ⁴ *Eth. N.*, 6. 2, 5, 1. 13, 18, 3. 3, 19. ⁵ *Anc. Metaphysics*, Book II., ch. 7, 9. ⁶ *Metaphysics*, Am. ed., 128. ⁷ Strauss, Krauth's Translat., 115. ⁸ *Geschichte*, XLV., ii. 3. ⁹ *Philosophie im Umriss*, I., i. 444–464. ¹⁰ *Philosophie im Umriss*, I., i. 470. ¹¹ *Human Intellect*, 29–40; *Literature*, p. 40.

ORGANOSCOPY.—See **Organ**, § 4.

ORGANOZOISM, the form of Hylozoism, *q. v.*, which derives all life from the organism of matter.

ORGANOZOONOMY, a theory of the laws of life in organic nature.—See **Biology**, **Life**.

ORGIES (Gr.), secret rites, secret worship; in the history of Philosophy, applied to the Pythagoreans, who veiled their doctrines and practices in mystery.

ORIENTATION, determining the east point of the compass; attaining or keeping in the mind the points of knowledge, clearly and in their mutual relations; getting “booked up.”

*Origin.

ORIGINAL, as *noun*, origin; archetype; as *adjective*, pertaining to origin; primary; opposed to the trite, feeble, common-place; fresh, suggestive.

Original Sin.—See **Sin**, **Original**.

ORIGINALITY.—See **Genius**.

***ORIGINATE**, **ORIGATION**. Origination in Hegel, “transition from Nothing to Being.”—See P. E. Chase.¹

ORISMOLOGY, **HORISMOLOGY** (Gr.), boundary doctrine; explanation of the technical terms of a science; Terminology.

ORMUZD (*Ehorè-mezdao*, in the Zend, “great Lord”), in the ancient Persian or Zoroastrian doctrine, the good principle, spiritual, and creative word, produced, with *Ahriman*, the evil principle, by the Eternal.

ORNITHOTHEOLOGY (Gr.), bird-theology; physico-theology, as it draws its illustrations from ornithology.

ORTHO (Gr.), right, in compounds, as **ORTHOBIOTICS** (Gr.), the science or art of right living. It is Ethics applied to life. **ORTHOBOULIA**, right counsel, the willing of the good. **ORTHOMORPHY**, right-shaping ethically. **ORTHOPRAXY**, doing right, acting uprightly.

OSCILLATION, swinging backward and forward; applied to vacillation of opinion and character, and to nervous disturbance. “Whose mind is agitated by painful oscillations of the nervous system.”—Berkeley.²

***OSTENSIVE**, opposed to the *Apagoric*.

OUGHT, ***OUGHTNESS**.—See **Duty**. Reid: “When we say a man ought to do such a thing, the *ought* which expresses the

¹ *Intel. Symbolism*, § 331, and note.

² *Siris*, § 104.

moral obligation has a respect, on the one hand, to the person who ought, and on the other, to the action which he ought to do. Those two correlatés are essential to every moral obligation; take away either, and it has no existence."¹

OUSIA (Gr.).—1. That which is one's own; one's substance, property. 2. The being, essence, true nature of a thing; the first of the categories; reality.—Aristotle,² Plato.³ 3. In Stoic Philosophy, hyle, matter.—Ritter.⁴

Ousia, Primary and Secondary, in Aristotle, the individual and the species. "Substance in the concrete and substance in the abstract."—Stöckl.⁵

***OUTNESS**, "Externality."—See Carpenter,⁶ C. M. Ingleby.⁷

OUTWARD (Ger. *Aeußeres*), in Hegel,⁸ the counterpart of the inward; "the existence as the form of the other side of the relation, with the empty characteristic of reflection-into-something-else."

OXY (Gr.), sharp.—In compounds, as, **Oxymoron**, sharp-foolish; equivalent in Logic to paradox; a seeming contradiction in the adjective. **Oxyopia**, **Oxiopy**, sharp-sightedness; mental acuteness. **Oxythymy**, sharp, sudden anger.

P, in Logic, marks the *predicate* of a judgment; the major term; the *conversion per accidens*, q. v.

PACT.—See **Contract**, **Promise**.

PÆDAGOGIK (Ger.), the science of education.

PAIDEUTICS (Gr.), boy-teaching; the science and art of teaching; system of teaching.

PALÆTIOLOGY (Gr.), "while *Palæontology* describes the beings which have lived in former ages without investigating their causes, and *Actiology* treats of causes without distinguishing historical from mechanical causation, *Palætiology* is a combination of the two sciences; exploring, by means of the second,

¹ *Active Powers*, Ess. III., P. iii., ch. vi.; *Works* (Hamilton), 589. ² *Metaph.*, 6. 1, 5; *De Anima*, 2. 1, 3; *Categ.*, 5. ³ *I'had.*, 65 D, cf. 78 C, 92 D; *Theat.*, 185 C. ⁴ *Hist. of Philos.*, iii., 515. ⁵ *Lehrbuch*, ii. 57. ⁶ *Hum. Physiol.*, 1853, § 790. ⁷ *Psychology of the Senses*, 1864, §§ 12, 14; *Introduct. to Metaphysics, Externality*, 1864, b. i., § 12. ⁸ *Encyclopædie*, § 138; Wallace's Translat., *Logic*, 217.

the phenomena presented by the first. All these sciences are connected by this bond—that they all endeavor to ascend to a past state by considering what is the present state of things, and what are the causes of the change.”—Whe-well.¹—F. V. 3.

PALINGENESIA, PALINGENESIS, PALINGENESY (Gr.), again-birth; new birth. — See **Metempsychosis**.

PALLIUM (ET BARBA) PHILOSOPHORUM, the mantle (and beard) of philosophers. The Cynics, and others imitating them, neglected their beards, and wore only the mantle, which became badges of the class.

PAMPSYCHY, PANARCHY, PANANGY.—See **Pancosmism**.

PANCOSMISM (Gr.), formed after the analogy of Pantheism, *q. v.*—1. Doctrine that the Cosmos is the all. Franz Hoffman: “The system (of Pantheism) which sinks its assumed God to a *natura naturans*, without will and consciousness, would be more correctly styled Pancosmism.”² 2. The fourth part of the system of the Neo-Platonist Franciscus Patricius (1529-1597). The parts were, i. Panaugy (All-eye), light comes from God as the primal light. ii. Panarchy (All-rule), God is the supreme principle, controlling all. iii. Pampsy-chy (All-soul), everything is possessed of soul. iv. Pancosmism (All-cosmos), “by light and space, which are incorpo-real substances, everything in the cosmos has unity and connection.”—Krug.

PANLOGISM (Gr.), all-wisdom; Pantheism as it presents God as the all-pervading, vitalizing, and controlling primal reason.

PANNOMY (Gr.), all-law; the law of laws, the law of reason as universal.

PANSOPHY, PANTOSOPHY (Gr.), all-wisdom: 1. Pantheism, see **Panlogism**. 2. The pretence of universal knowledge.

***PANTHEISM.**—The doctrine of Spinoza has been regarded by many as Atheism, “but quite erroneously.”—C. F. V.

Pantheism, Classification of.—Pantheism has different forms: *Material Pantheism*, according to which the mere matter of the universe, with its forces, including life and thought, as the result of organism, constitute the One All, which may be called God.

¹ *Hist. of Scientific Ideas*, II, 258.

² *Ztschr. v. Fichte*, xlviii. 98.

Organic or Vital Pantheism, according to which all nature has life, and an impersonal power is substituted for a personal God.

One Substance Pantheism, according to which there is but one substance. This substance is infinite; a part of it is substance finite, and man is such a part of the divine substance. This is the Pantheism of Spinoza.

Ideal Pantheism, according to which God and the universe are creations of the mind of man. — Schelling and Hegel. "Pantheism is the poetry of Atheism." — F. Newman,¹ C. F. V. See Krauth.²

Pantheism, Ancient.—Aeschylus: "Zeus is earth, air, heaven, and altogether all." Anaxagoras: "The nous is the principle of the all." Parmenides: "The single substance is the one and all." **Pantheism, Mediæval and Early Modern**.—Giordano Bruno, Meister Eckart, Scotus Erigena. **Pantheism, Modern**.—Jacob Boehme, Spinoza. **Pantheism, Recent**.—J. G. Fichte, Hegel, Schelling, Schwarz, Steudel. **Pantheism, Opponents of**.—I. H. Fichte: "The spirit, the consciousness, is that very thing by which the absolute is God — not a bare infinitude, but the eternal person separating itself from it."³ Reichlin-Meldegg, Ulrici. Wirth: "Pantheism has passed its meridian, and has shown most clearly that it is not able to give a completely satisfactory solution of the fundamental questions of philosophy."⁴

PANTHEIST, one who accepts Pantheism.—"One of the first uses of this word is by Toland, in the *Pantheisticon*, 1720, where it has its ancient polytheistic sense. It is a little later that it passes from the idea of the worship of the whole of the gods to the worship of the entire universe, looked at as God. It is now used to denote the disbelief of a personal first-cause; but a distinction ought to be made between the Pantheism like that of Averroes, which regards the world as an emanation and sustained by an *anima mundi*, and that which, like the view of Spinoza, regards the sum total of all things to be deity."—See Farrar.⁵ F. V. 3.

*Parable.

PARADIGMATIC, PARADIGMATICAL (Gr.), presenting a

¹ *Theism*, p. 26. ² Art. *Pantheism*, in *Johnson's Cyclopædia*. ³ *Ontologie*, 373, 396, 502, 503. ⁴ *Ztschr. v. Fichte*, xxxvii. 276. ⁵ *Bampton Lecture*, p. 149.

paradigm, pattern, model, plan, (Lat. *Exemplar*;) an argument, proof from example; showing by example; consisting of examples.

*Paradox.

PARALIPOMENA (Gr.), things omitted; in philosophical literature, a supplement.

*Paralogism, Paralogy.

*Paralogism of Pure Reason.—Kant.¹

PARALOGISTICS, systematic treatment of fallacies; sophistics.

*Parcimony (Law of).

PARENESIS (Gr.), exhortation, address, advice, counsel; hence *Parenetic*, hortatory.

PARERGON, PARERGA, PARERGY (Gr.), subordinate; matter introduced incidentally; appendix.

PARTY, in Logic, when one case has been demonstrated, similar cases can be demonstrated by a like course of reasoning.

PARONYM, *PARONYMOUS (Gr.), of like signification with; formed from a primitive. — See *Conjugate*.

*Part.

PARTHENOGENESIS (Gr.), virgin-production; in Biology, "the successive production of procreating individuals from a single ovum." "Reproduction without immediately antecedent impregnation." — Richard Owen, F. R. S.²

PARTICIPATION (Lat.), partaking, sharing.

PARTICULAR (Lat.), of or concerning a part; in Logic, applied to propositions, in which the subject is taken in a part, indefinitely, of its extension; the judgment of an indeterminate quantity, less than the whole; opposed to indefinite, individual, and universal, *q. v.* — Hamilton.³

PARTITION, division, *q. v.*

PARUSIA, PAROUSIA (Gr.), presence; in Plotinus, a presentiating intuition of the Absolute, or God, bringing man into direct union with Him.

***PASSION**, "highly excited and agitating feeling, violently urging toward a single course of action. Intense emotion, sometimes suffering." — C. F. V.

*Passions (the).

PASSIVE, "A passive state is the state of a thing while it is

¹ *Rein. Vern.*, 398 seq.; *Prolegomena*, § 39; *Logic*, § 90. ² *On Parthenogenesis*, Lond., 1849. ³ *Logic*, 171, 172, 173.

operated upon by some cause. Everything and every being but God is liable to be in this state. He is pure energy — always active but never acted upon, while everything else is liable to suffer change.” — See Harris,¹ F.V. 3.

PASSIVITY, quality of the passive ; opposed to activity ; internal and external sensibility.

PATHOLOGICAL, pertaining to “the element of instinctive feeling, of instinctive sensational motive.” — Stirling.²

PENALTY (Ger. *Strafe*), in Hegel’s Doctrine of the Objective Spirit, the right, restoring itself against the particular will, the negation of the wrong. Theories that found the right of penalty on purposes to prevent, deter, intimidate, or correct, mistake the nature of penalty. Prevention, intimidation, etc., are finite ends, i. e., mere means, and these, too, uncertain means. But an act of justice cannot be degraded into a mere means : justice is not exercised in order that anything but itself be attained and realized. The fulfilment and self-manifestation of justice is an absolute end, an end unto its own self. The special considerations which have been mentioned can come to be discussed only in reference to the modality of the penalty. The penalty which is realized in the person of a criminal is *his* right, *his* reason, *his* law, under which, then, he is justly subsumed. His act falls on his own head. Hegel defends, therefore, even capital punishments, the repeal of which appears to him untimely sentimentality. — Schwegler.³

PER ACCIDENS, in Logic, conversion by which we pass from A to I ; conversion by limitation.

PERCEPT.—See **Perception**.

PERCEPTIBLE, capable of being grasped by perception, *q. v.*

***PERCEPTION**.—Sir W. Hamilton⁴ employs P. to denote the faculty and the perceiving act, and *percept* the object perceived. “A percept may be defined — the cognitive element in an act of sensation.” — Lowndes.⁵ “Descartes, Malebranche, Arnauld, Locke, and philosophers in general before Reid, employed *perception* as co-extensive with consciousness. By Leibnitz, Wolf, and their followers, it was used in a peculiar sense, as equivalent to *representation* or *idea proper*,

¹ *Dialogue concerning Happiness*, p. 86, note. ² *Annotat. on Schwegler*, 402. ³ *History*, tr. by Stirling, 337. ⁴ *Reid’s Works*, 876 a. u. ⁵ *Primary Beliefs*, p. 48.

and as contradistinguished from *apperception* or consciousness. Reid's limitation of the term, though the grounds on which it is defended are not of the strongest, is imminent, and has been very generally admitted." Hamilton.¹—F. V. 3.

Perception, Perceptions, Sense- (Ger. *Wahrnehmung, Sinnes-perceptionen*). — Aristotle: "Sense is not deceitful in what falls within its own province." "Respecting color, it is sight, and not taste, that judges; and respecting juices, it is taste, but not sight; each of which never at the same time affirms about the same thing that simultaneously a thing is so and not so disposed."² "Composition and division are in the intellect, but not in the things themselves."³ Carriere, Drobisch, I. H. Fichte, Liebmann, Lotze, Schellwien, Schopenhauer, Tittmann, Ulrici, and probably the mass of philosophers, hold that the external incentive, and the sense-impressions wrought by it, are something wholly different from the sensations and perceptions they evoke in us, and that the sense-impressions must be permuted into the sensations and perceptions which are different from them. This permutation is not possible without a respondent proper activity on the part of the percipient subject, the soul. The subjective activity, therefore, must be accessory to the sense-impressions, to bring about the perception which shapes itself in us.⁴ Carriere, Drobisch, I. H. Fichte, Ulrici, and the metaphysicians generally, accept the undulatory theory of light, the explanation of color by different degrees of velocity in the undulations permuted into sensation. Ulrici: "It has been firmly established by modern science, that to things in themselves pertains neither color nor sound, neither smell nor taste; on the contrary, what we perceive as color, sound, &c., is physically (in itself) wholly another thing; that is, it must be *thought of* as wholly another thing than that which to us it immediately *appears* to be." "Our sense-perceptions [of this class] do *not* correspond to the in-itself of things." "The same electric stream produces in the eye sensation as a spark, in the ear as a crackling, in the

¹ *Discussions*, p. 75. ² *Metaphysics*, Book iv. (iii.), ch. v.; M'Mahon's Tr., 102, 103.

³ *Do.*, Book vi. (v.), ch. 4; M'Mahon's Tr., 165. ⁴ Steudel: *Philosophie im Umriss*, I, I. 260.

nose as a phosphoric odor, in the tongue as acidity, on the skin as stinging. Which of these diverse perceptions is the true one, corresponding with the objectivity?"¹ In these views, however, is involved only the principle of a particular class of sense-perceptions, nor do they of necessity deny what I. H. Fichte specially maintains, that "the sense-perceptions point to something correspondent in the objective relations of things," and that "the independence on our will of what is contained in this sense-perception necessitates our conceiving that there is a real external world."² J. G. Fichte and all the strict idealists maintain that sense-perceptions are exclusively dependent on our consciousness, and yet "the activity of the Ego, which in itself reaches out into infinity, strikes upon the external limitations of the non-ego."³ I. H. Fichte,⁴ Schopenhauer,⁵ Ulrici,⁶ Wirth, and others explain the reference of the stimulation of the retina to external objects as a reasoning involuntary and unconscious, grounded on the law of causality. Friedrich Fischer: "Perception is given to us immediately as objective, and this objectivity is not brought about by inference: the ego enters the external objects; the consciousness goes forth from the eye to the objects."⁷ Kant: "Perception presents us only the manifold; to bring together this manifold into unities, into indivisible objects, an act of the understanding is necessary. This act rests on the *a priori* unity of consciousness, and this bringing together of what is manifold in perception to the indivisible mental representations, in virtue of this unity of consciousness, is the synthetic transcendental unity of apperception."⁸ Leibnitz and Locke: see *Nihil in Intellectu*. Thilo: "If our sense-perceptions correspond with no external reality, how is it to be explained that in all men the illusion takes the shape of *precisely this* concrete outer world?"⁹ The independence on the will of sense-perception is urged as an argument against idealism. — See Kranth,¹⁰ Steudel,¹¹ Wirth.¹²

¹ *Glauben u. Wissen*, 100, 218, 219; *Ztschr. v. Fichte*, xxv. 99, xxxviii. 31. ² *Psychologie*, I., 291-299, 270, 310. ³ *Werke*, V. 435. ⁴ *Psychologie*, 377, § 174. ⁵ *Vierfache Wurzel*, Ed. 2, 51, 52, 68; *Welt als Wille*, I., 520, 525. ⁶ *Glauben und Wissen* (1858), 12. ⁷ *Begriff d. Philosophie*, 30-32. ⁸ *Rein. Vernunft*, 376; *Logik*, Einl. v. 40 seq. ⁹ *Ztschr. f. exact. Phil.*, iv. 402. ¹⁰ *Prolegomena to Berkeley's Principles*, xiv. ¹¹ *Philosophie im Umriss*, I., i. 266. ¹² *Ztschr. von Fichte*, xli. 191.

Perception of Reason, in Jacobi, implies a "non-explanatory, positively revelatory, unconditionally deciding reason or belief of reason. As there is a perception of sense, so also must there be a perception of reason, against which latter demonstration will as little avail as against the former." — Schwegler.¹

*Perceptions (obscure).

***PERFECT**, in Logic, applied by Aristotle to the first figure, as a peculiarly evident and cogent form of argument.

***PERFECTIBILITY, THE DOCTRINE OF**, is that men are capable, individually and socially, of reaching a state of perfection.

PERFECTIHABIA (barbarous Latin), perfection-having; a scholastic synonym of *entelechy*, *q. v.*

***PERFECTION**, "the full and harmonious development of all our faculties, corporeal and mental, intellectual and moral; by *happiness* is meant the complement of all the pleasures of which we are susceptible. Human perfection and human happiness coincide, and thus constitute in reality but a single end." — Sir W. Hamilton.² F. V. 3.

PERIANTOLOGY (Gr.), talking about one's self excessively; boasting.

PERIODIC, in Quantitative Induction, applied to changes of phenomena, alternately increasing and decreasing.

***PERIPATETIC**, *a.* and *n.* Hence, Peripateticism.

PER SE (Lat.), in itself; used of a concept or thing, regarded apart from its relations to any other concept or thing. — See **Abstraction and Thing in Itself**.

***PERSON**, "contrasted with *thing* and animal, a being capable of exercising understanding and will—a self-determining intelligence." — C. F. V.

Person, in Hegel's doctrine of the objective spirit, "the individual, so far as he is capable of having rights, so far as he has rights and exercises them." — Schwegler.³

Person, in Kant,⁴ 1. A logical subject—substance according to the pure concept—that amid changes is self-conscious of numerical unity. 2. A real subject: abiding substance

¹ *History*, Stirling's Translat., 252. * *Metaph.*, I. 20. * *Geschichte*, XLV., iii. 2 a.

⁴ *Crit. d. rein. Vern.*, I. 408, 412; *Metaph. der Sitten*, 65; *Critik d. pract. Vernunft*, II. 155; *Rechtslehre*, Einl., xxii.

with consciousness of its identity. 3. A rational subject, in as far as it is independent of the mechanism of nature, can propose its own aims, and be its own aim, and is responsible for its acts.

***PERSONALITY.** — I. H. Fichte: "Personality is the fundamental form of the spirit as such, the absolutely equalizing and common, and hence as form, the same in all spirits, up to God himself."¹ Fries: "The essential nature of rational spirit, which has no subordinate value, but an absolute one, exalted above all comparison, the value which we mark by the phrase personal dignity, personal worth."² Kant: "That which involves unity of self-consciousness; real identity of an intellectual substance; moral freedom under moral law; the attribute of a being in virtue of which it can have the Ego in its mental representation."³ Kant distinguishes P. as moral, psychological and transcendental. Maimon: "Unity of consciousness at different times."⁴ Schelling: "Identity exalted to spirituality." "Union of a self-dependent, with a basis independent of it, so that both completely maintain themselves, and are but one being." "We call a being personal in as far as it is free from the universal and is *for itself*, in as far as it pertains to it, to be, apart from reason, in accord with a will of its own."⁵ Wirth: "Individuality knowing itself in distinction from another."⁶ — See Steudel, *On the personality of man as involved in Idealism.*⁷ See Krauth.⁸

Personality as affirmed of God. — The question as between Deism and Theism on the one side and Pantheism, *q. v.*, on the other, as to the proper *personality*, *q. v.*, of God. — See I. Chalybäus,⁹ J. G. Fichte,¹⁰ Hegel¹¹ (claimed both for and against the doctrine that God reaches personality in man), Michelet,¹² Noack,¹³ Schelling,¹⁴ Scotus Erigena.¹⁵ II. I. H.

¹ *Anthropologie*, 573. ² Quoted in *Furtmaier: Real-Lexikon*, s. v. ³ *Anthropologie*, 3. ⁴ *Vers. über die Transcendental Philosophie*, 166. ⁵ *Werke*, I., vii. 370, 394, 395; II., i. 281. ⁶ *Ztschr. v. Pichte*, xxi. 116. ⁷ *Philosophie im Umriß*, I., ii. 114–118. ⁸ *Prolegomena to Berkeley*, 124, 125, 141. ⁹ *Fundamental-Philosophie*, 38. ¹⁰ *Werke*, II. 645, 647; V. 457, 459. ¹¹ *Werke*, II. 19, 27, 317, 319; XI. 90, 93, 200–202; XII. 542, for the personality: II. 16; VII. 22; XI. 90; XII. 210, 218, 219, 226, and many other passages against the proper personality. ¹² *Epiphanie der ewigen Persönlichkeit des Geistes*, 27, 36, 82, 161–180; *Naturrecht*, II. 266; *Ztschr. "Der Gedanke"*, I. 43; II. 263; III. 53. ¹³ *Religiöser Begriff Hegel's*, 38. ¹⁴ *Werke*, I., i. 180, 200; III. 600, 603; vii. 394, 403; viii. 73, 74, 81. ¹⁵ *De divisione Naturæ*, transl. and edited by Noack, in the *Philosophische Bibliothek* (Kirchmann).

Fichte,¹ Franz Hoffmann,² Lotze,³ Rosenkranz,⁴ Schopenhauer ("impersonal God is a contradiction in the adjective"),⁵ Schwarz,⁶ Ulrici,⁷ Wirth.⁸—See Steudel.⁹

PERSONIFY, hypostasize; to invest with the qualities of person, either actually or in thought.

PESSIMISM (Lat.), worst-ism; the doctrine that the world is the worst *possible* (not the worst *imaginable*); opposed to Optimism, *q. v.*—Schopenhauer.¹⁰ See Steudel,¹¹ Ulrici,¹² Hermann.¹³

***PETITIO PRINCIPII.**—See **Fallacy**.

PHANTASM, PHANTOM, FANTASM, FANTOM (Gr.), an appearance, phantom; image; mere image, unreality, distinguished by Plato from *eikōn*. A mental image, given as if by sense-perception, but without an objective external object.

PHANTAST, FANTAST, one who loves and believes in the phantasmal, or chimerical.

PHANTASY, fancy. P. TRANSCENDENTAL, in Kant, imagination, mental copying, the faculty of reducing sensations to phenomenon, of shaping from their order something correspondent with them—like a picture in mosaic.—Mellin.¹⁴

PHASE (Gr.), appearance; changing appearance, aspect, as "the phases of humanity," "the phases of belief," "P. of Philosophy."

PHÆNOMENOLOGY, PHENOMENOLOGY (Gr.), 1. "A science of things as they are recognized by our senses, and of the facts as they appear in our experience."—C. F. V. See **Nature**. 2. In Kant,¹⁵ that part of the metaphysical doctrine of nature which considers the movement or rest of matter merely with reference to modality, that is, as a phenomenon of sense-perception.

Phænomenology of the Spirit, Hegel's (1807), is thus di-

¹ *Idee d. Persönlichkeit*, 73 seq. ² *Ztschr.* "Der Gedanke," III. 58. ³ *Mikrokosmos*, III., 572, 576. ⁴ Schelling u. Hegel, 27, 28; *Meine Reform d. Hegelschen Philosophie*, 18–20. ⁵ *Purerna*, I. 180; *Zureichenl. Grund.*, 13. ⁶ *Forderungen an eine Philosophie der Gegenwart*, 73; *Gott, Natur u. Mensch* (1857), 33–36. ⁷ *Ztschr. v. Fichte*, xxvi. 152; xxvii. 66. *System der Logik*, 253, Anm.: *Gott u. die Natur*, 424. ⁸ *Ztschr. v. Fichte*, xxxvii. 275. ⁹ *Philosoph. d. Umriss*, I., ii. 246–268. ¹⁰ *Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, II. 157 seq., 670–673, 693; *Frauenbildl.; Schopenhauer-Lexicon, Pessimismus*; *Krauth's Prolegomena to Berkeley*, 118, 119. ¹¹ *Philosophie im Umriss*, II., i. 598–602. ¹² *Strauss, Krauth's Translat.*, 106. ¹³ *Gegensatz d. Classischen u. d. romantischen in d. neuer Philosophie* (1877), 180–198. ¹⁴ *Kunstsprache*, s. v. ¹⁵ *Naturwissenschaft*, xxi. 138.

vided: Preface—of scientific cognizing. Introduction—I. Consciousness; II. Self-consciousness; III. Reason; IV. The Spirit; V. Religion; VI. Absolute Knowing.¹—Schwegler.²

PHENOMENAL, of or pertaining to the phenomenon; opposed to the *An sich*, the *per se*, the essential, the *noumen*, the objective, as P. world.

***PHENOMENON**.—"We have 'phenomena of nature' and 'phenomena of mind.'" "P. can be known only along with something else" (that is with self).—C. F. V.

PHIL (Gr.), love; in composite words marking love; friendliness, adherence.

PHILANTHROPISM, a system of education, independent of classic culture, and claiming to be purely human, as directed to things.

***PHILANTHROPY**, practical love to man, love of our neighbor; opposed to *selfishness*.

PHILOSOMATIST (Gr. *φιλος, σωμα*, a lover of the body).—"When you see a man afraid to die, this is evidence that he is not a philosopher, but a lover of bodily enjoyments."—Plato.³ C. F. V.

PHILOSOPHASTER, PHILOSOPHIST, PHILOSOPHISM, used to mark the empty pretence to philosophy.

PHILOSOPHEME (Gr.), a philosophical doctrine, statement, or proposition.

PHILOSOPHER, one who thinks in accordance with philosophical knowledge and judgment.

PHILOSOPHICAL, of, in accord with, Philosophy, as *P. Spirit*.⁴

***PHILOSOPHY**, "is a rational explanation of things existing and of things occurring. Technically, P. is the ultimate rational explanation of things, obtained by discovery of the reason of their existence, or by showing *why* they exist. Science is the rational explanation of external phenomena, by discovery of invariable sequence in their occurrence, and postulating accordingly a 'law of nature,' its object being to show *how* the phenomena exist."—C. F. V. "Philosophy began in wonder."—Aristotle. "From wonder men, both now and at the first, began to philosophize."⁵ "Aristotle's

¹ *Werke*, II. ² *Geschichte*, XLIV. ³ *Memo*. ⁴ See Krauth's *Introduct. to Ulrici's Strauss*, 18; *Prolegomena to Berkeley*, 133, 135. ⁵ *Metaph.*, Book I., ch. ii., 4.

definition of philosophy is 'A knowledge of things by their causes.'¹ "The science of truth, derived from principles."² Crusius: "The complex of those truths of Reason whose object is abiding."³ D'Alembert:⁴ "The application of Reason to the various objects to which it is possible to apply it." Epicurus:⁵ "The effort to attain a happy life" (by examination and on right grounds). J. G. Fichte:⁶ "Doctrine of knowledge, doctrine of science, theory of the sciences." Hegel:⁷ "Grasping, comprehending perception." Kant:⁸ "The system of all rational cognition based on concepts." Schelling:⁹ "Science of the Absolute." Ulrici:¹⁰ "The science of sciences." Wolf:¹¹ "The science of all the actual and possible, as occupied with the question, *How?* and *wherefore?* they are actual and possible." — See Steudel.¹²

Philosophy, Classification of, Divisions of, Parts of.—Krug¹³ classifies thus: General introduction of Philosophy as a whole. I. Fundamental doctrine, elementary principles, and methodology. II. Logic (doctrine of thought), pure and applied. III. Doctrine of cognition, pure and applied. IV. Doctrine of taste, pure (æsthetics) and applied. V. Jus, science of law, pure and applied. VI. Ethics, pure and applied. VII. Doctrine of religion, pure and applied. Kant characterizes P. by the terms analytic, critical, empirical, formal (Logic), material (Metaphysics in general), practical, pure, speculative, theoretic; P. of Nature, P. of Morals.

Philosophy, Divine, First, Human, Natural.—See **Philosophy**, § 1.

PHLEGM (PHLEGMATIC) (Gr.), flame; inflammation; humor in the body; temperament, as supposed to be affected by humor of the blood; state of passiveness in character; frigidness.

PHONOGNOMICS (Gr.), a part of physiognomy, which judges of character by the voice.

PHORONOMIA, PHORONOMICS (Gr.), the theory and science of the forces and laws of motion; cinematics.

¹ *Metaph.*, V., 1. ² *Do.*, II., 1., § 6; *Ethic. ad Nicom.*, vi. 3. ³ *Buhle: Geschichte*, v. 25. ⁴ *Elements de Philosophie*. ⁵ *Buhle: Geschichte*, I., 566. ⁶ *Werke*, II. 34, 35. ⁷ *Werke*, VI., 315. ⁸ *Rein. Vern.*, 885; Meiklejohn, 506, 507. ⁹ *Werke*, Abth. 1., Bd. II., 66. ¹⁰ *Glauben u. Wissen*, 291. ¹¹ *Logica. Disc.*, § 29. ¹² *Philosophie im Umriss*, I., 1. 1-6. ¹³ *Handbuch d. Philosophie*.

PHREN (PHRON) (Gr.), the midriff; the breast; the heart; the mind; in composition, marking relations of the mind or to the mind; as, phrenetic, phrenics, phrenitis, phrenzy.

***PHRENOLOGY** (see **Phren**).—See Chenevix (1838), Cotta (1845), Noel (1839, 1847), Carus (1841, 1845), Engeldue and Elliotson (1846); Sir W. Hamilton¹ (1858).

PHRONTIST (Gr.), a deep, hard thinker; a philosopher; applied derisively to Socrates by Aristophanes.²

PHRONTISTERY (Gr.), a place for meditation; a school, study; "a thinking-shop;" applied to the school of Socrates by Aristophanes.³

PHYS (Gr.), nature; in derivatives and compounds, marking relation to nature; as physianthropy, physicophilosophy, and the words following.

PHYSIATRICS (Gr.), the science of healing in accordance with nature.

PHYSICAL (Gr.), relating to nature, relating to physics; opposed to mental or immaterial; as, *P. causation*, *P. necessity*, *P. possibility*. *P. definition* (see **Definition**).

PHYSICIST, an investigator of physics.—Krauth,⁴ Herbert Spencer.⁵

PHYSICO-THEOLOGY, theology derived from or illustrated by facts in physics; theology resting on the physico-theological proof of the existence and attributes of God. See Derham (1714), Ray, Paley, Brougham (1835), the *Bridge-water Treatises* (1836 seq.).

***PHYSICS**, science of the nature of all the objects of sense. Kant divides physics thus: I. Historical physics, or history of nature; natural history. II. Dogmatic physics, or natural science; physics in the stricter sense: i. Physiography, description of nature; ii. Physiogony, natural history in the strict sense; iii. Pure or rational natural science; iv. Applied or empirical physics.⁶

PHYSIOCRATISM, PHYSIOCRATY, transcendental; in Kant,⁷ the doctrine which makes all causality dependent on nature, and necessarily conditioned by it.

Physiognomica, *Physiognomy.

PHYSIOGONY, in Kant, History of Nature (*Naturgeschichte*), as distinct from the description of nature.—See **Physics**.

¹ *Metaphysica*, 650-658. ² *Nub.*, 267. ³ *Nub.*, 94, 128. ⁴ *Introduction to Ulrici's Strauss*, 22. ⁵ *Biology*. ⁶ *Met. Anf. d. Naturwiss.*, Vorr. IV. seq. ⁷ *Rein. Vern.*, 477 seq.

PHYSIOGRAPHY, in Kant, description of nature (*Naturbeschreibung*), as distinct from *Physiogeny*, q. v.

***PHYSIOLOGY**.—"It is the province of *Physiology*, in dealing with the brain and the whole nervous system, to trace the conditions of our feeling and knowledge from without as far as possible towards the inner circle of experience. It is the province of *Psychology* to trace the conditions of our knowledge and feeling from within as far as possible towards the outer world. As to scientific results in the former department, see Carpenter,¹ Maudsley,"² (C. F. V.), Waitz.³

PHY-TO-THEOLOGY (Gr.), plant-theology — a department of *Physico-theology*, q. v.

***PICTURESQUE**, picturesqueness.

PINEAL (Lat.), like a pine cone; applied to a gland of the brain, the conarion, in which Descartes fixed the seat of the soul, on the ground that it is the only part of the brain which is not double.

PLACE (Fr. *place*, from Lat. *platea*, a street); defined space; space. — Locke,⁴ Whewell.⁵

PLACIT (Lat.), opinion, determination, prescription.

PLAGIARISM (Lat.), kidnapping; in Ethics, literary theft.

PLASMATICAL, having the power of giving form; plastic.

PLASTIC, PLASTICAL, PLASTICS (Gr.), forming, moulding; in *Æsthetics*, applied to statuary and architecture.

Plastic Medium, is one of the hypotheses as to the communication between soul and body. "It is partly material, partly spiritual. As material, it can be acted on by the body; and as spiritual, it can act upon the mind. It is a bridge thrown over the abyss which separates matter from spirit. This hypothesis annihilates itself. Between an extended and unextended substance there can be no middle existence; these being not simply different in degree, but contradictory. If the medium be neither body nor soul, it is a chimera; if it is at once body and soul, it is contradictory; or if to avoid the contradiction, it is said to be, like us, the union of soul and body, it is itself in want of a medium."—Laromiguière,⁶ F. V. 3.

¹ *Mental Physiology*. ² *Physiology and Pathology of Mind*. ³ *Introd. to Anthropology*, transl. by J. F. Collingwood. ⁴ *Hum. Understand.*, Book II., ch. xiii., 6-10. ⁵ *Hist. of Induct. Sciences*, B. I., ch. i. ⁶ *Leçons*, II. 253, 264.

PLATONISM, the system of Plato (see **Synthetical Tables** and **Plato**), in general with its adjectives applied to the purely ideal, intellectual or spiritual, as Platonic love.

PLEASURE, in Ethics. — See **Law** and **Inclination**.

PLENUM (Lat.), filled, full ; opposed to *vacuum*.

PLOTINOS, PLOTINUS (205-270), **SYSTEM OF**, Neoplatonism, *q. v.*

PLURATIVE, in Logic, a name proposed for all propositions which give a distinct idea of the fraction or number of the subject involved.

*Pneumatics. Pneumatism. *Pneumatology.

*Poetry or Poesy.

POINT, in Metaphysics, substance, *q. v.*, with the single attribute of relation.

POLAR, POLARIC, POLARITY (Gr.), axis of a sphere, the sphere which revolves on this axis ; terms which mark the property of things to exhibit their operations in contrasted directions, as the magnet and the world. In Metaphysics, the **Polar System** considers physical and spiritual nature as opposite poles — the real and ideal are considered as the poles in which is revealed the absolute which is in itself indifferent. In Logic, polar marks the completest opposition of extremes.

POLARITY, quality of having poles ; "opposite properties in opposite directions." — Whewell.¹ See Spencer.²

POLEMICS (Gr.), pertaining to warfare ; the science, art, practice, or literary products of antagonistic discussion.

POLITICS (Gr.), relating to citizens ; befitting a statesman ; belonging to the state or its administration ; the science and art of government ; the principles of social relations and duties, as opposed to Ethics, which is the doctrine of individual duties. Beneke (1837, 1841), Bentham, Adam Ferguson (1767), J. G. Fichte (1800), Hobbes (1642), Kant, Paley (1785), Ritter (1837), Spinoza.

POLITY (Gr.), citizenship ; the constitution of a state ; principles and form of government ; the resultant government. — Whewell.³

POLLICITATION. — See **Promise**.

¹ *Philos. of Induc. Sciences*, B. V., ch. 1., § 5. ² *Inductions of Biology*. ³ *Elements of Morality and Polity* (1856).

POLY (Gr.), many, much, as **Polyarchy**, **Polycracy**, rule by many; **Polygamy**, marriage to many wives; **Polylogy**, much talking; **Polygonomy**, multiplicity of names; **Polyzetise**, to put many and useless questions.

POLYARCHIST, **POLYARCHY**, terms relating to the theory opposed to the monarchy of God; "mundane aristocracy, that is, a multiplicity of first principles and independent deities." — Cudworth.¹

POLYCHOERANY, **POLYCOIRANY** (Gr.), rule of many; applied to an "aristocracy of gods." — Cudworth.²

*Polygamy.

POLYHISTOR (Gr.), a universal scholar; a man of large knowledge of the history of the various departments of learning. Such a man was Julius Cæsar Scaliger. — Kant,³ Morhof.⁴

POLYLEMMA, an argument of the same form as a dilemma, but in which there are more than two alternatives. — Jevons.

POLYMATH (Gr.), a man of vast learning. — "Democritus, the younger, was the greatest polymath before Aristotle." "Leibnitz, after Aristotle, is the polymath of the greatest genius that ever lived. He united the greatest, the most penetrating power of intellect with the richest and most extensive erudition." — Schwegler.⁵

POLYSYLLOGISM, **POLYSYLLOGISTIC**, involving several syllogisms in a continuous train of reasoning.

POLYTECHNICS (Gr.), skilled in many arts; a school whose aim is to educate into skill in many branches of art or science.

*Polytheism.

(**POLYTOMOUS**,) **POLYTOMY**, **POLYCHOTOMY** (Gr.), many divisions; classification into many parts, more parts than two; especially opposed to Dichotomy.

POPULARITY (Lat.), the quality or state of the people; effort to please the people; success in pleasing the people; adaptation to their wants, or their preferences.

POPULAR-PHILOSOPHY, in the 18th century, the Wolfian Philosophy rendered shallow, and stated in the tone of conversation; represented by Mendelssohn.

PORISM (Gr.), a deduction from a previous demonstration, a

¹ *Intellectual System*, 403-411. ² *Intellect. Syst.*, 411. ³ *Anthropologie*, 163. ⁴ *Polyhistor Literarium, Philosophicum et Præcticum*, Lubec, 1708. ⁵ *Stirling's Transl.*, 25, 194.

corollary ; " proposition affirming the possibility of finding such conditions as will render a certain problem capable of an indefinite number of solutions." — L. J.

POSIT, in Logic, to lay down as a position or principle.

POSITION-ABSOLUTE, in Herbart, applied to *true being* (reality), which we have not to produce but to recognize. — Schwegler.¹

POSITIVE.—" 1. In its more general acceptance, affirmative. 2. More restrictedly, realistic, in contrast with imaginative and rationalized. 3. Applied to a command, it distinguishes what is the expression of the will of the ruler from moral law, which is essentially right."—C. F. V. See **Moral Term**. As applied to philosophy, see **Positivism**. It is applied by Kant to evil which results from the ground of a direct antagonism to the good. In Hegel, *contrariety* is divided into *positive* and *negative*.

***POSITIVISM (POSITIVISTS)**, " the name given by Comte to his system of philosophy, as professedly based upon facts, and expressly denying the possibility of any knowledge of causes."—C. F. V. Why the history of philosophy ends with Hegel, and not with Comte, is given by Stirling.²

POSOLOGY (Gr.), doctrine of proportions; suggested by Bentham³ as a name for the science of quantity.

***POSSIBLE**.—See Wolf in Schwegler.⁴

POSTERIOR, POSTERIORITY, mark the state of being after, of succession in thought or time; opposed to *priority*, and simultaneousness.

POST-EXISTENCE, after existence, future life.—Addison. L. J.

POST HOC, ERGO PROPTER HOC (Lat.), after this, and therefore in consequence of this.—See **Fallacia a non Causa**.

POSTNATE (Lat.), after-born; subsequent. — Cudworth. L. J.

POSTPRÆDICAMENTA.—See **Præprædicamenta**.

***POSTULATE, POSTULATUM** (pl. *Postulata*), in Kant, " a practical imperative; given *a priori*, capable of no explanation of its possibility, and consequently capable of no proof." It covers, therefore, not things, nor in general the existence of an object, but only maxims or rules for the action of a person.—Mellin.⁵

¹ Stirling's Transl., 280-282. ² *Supplem. Notes to Schwegler*, 446-468. ³ *Essay on Logic*, App. B, sect. ii., iv. ⁴ Stirling's Transl., 204, 206. ⁵ *Kunstsprache*, s. v.

P. of the Pure, Practical Reason, in Kant,¹ a theoretical proposition, not, as such, demonstrable, so far as it is inseparably attached to a practical law of *a priori*, unconditioned validity.

P. of Empirical Thinking in General, in Kant,² the principles of modality; as, for example, "Whatever harmonizes with the formal conditions of experience is possible."—Melin.³

POSTULATED, in Kant,⁴ a condition is said to be (*per thesin*), when what is indubitably certain is yet dependent on a definite condition absolutely necessary to it.

POTENCE, POTENCY, POTENT (from Lat.), power; force.—See **Power**.

***POTENTIAL, *POTENTIALITY**.—See **Capacity**. For Aristotle's views, see Schwegler.⁵

POTENZ (Ger.), potency or degree. Schelling's term for the serial order.

POVERTY (Lat.), smallness of means; need, want, indigence; to be distinguished from pauperism. (Ger. *Armuth*.)—See Krauth.⁶

*Power.

PRACTICAL (Gr.), fit for action.—"Kant's expression for the reason when regarded as the guide of will, in contrast with reason regarded as a purely knowing power."—C. F. V. Kant defines practical as "determining the will directly, serving as motive, effecting a purely moral interest, leading to actions, to the execution of rules, prescriptions, or other things known to us, of which we avail ourselves; what, as cause or effect, is connected with free willing;"⁷ as, the moral interest, the moral law.

Practical for Itself, in Kant,⁸ laying down law unconditionally. Such is the reason, for it lays down laws, whose object is itself only, and which are independent of all condition.

PRACTICALLY GOOD, in Kant, "that which determines the will by means of the representations of the reason; not therefore by

¹ *Praktisch. Vern.*, 220. ² *Rein. Vern.*, 285. ³ *Kunstsprache*, s. v. ⁴ *Rein. Vern.*, 661. ⁵ Stirling's Transl., 101–109, 399, 400. ⁶ *Poverty*, three essays. ⁷ *Metaph. d. Sitten*, 122*, 125; *Praktisch. Vernunft*, 79; *Originalideen ud. empir. Anthropologie*, 16; *Rein. Vern.*, 830. ⁸ *Religion innerhalb*, 19.

subjective influences, but objectively, that is, on grounds which are valid for every rational being as such;¹ as, the will which is determined purely by the moral law.

PRACTICE (Gr.), doing.—See **Praxis**. In Kant,² “that effect of a plan which we regard as the result of certain principles of procedure placed in general before the mind—skilful application of knowledge;” opposed to *theory*, q. v. A physician in his *practice* heals in accordance with his *theory*.

PRÆ.—See **Præ**.

***PRÆDICABLE, PREDICABLE**, in Kant,³ a derivative, pure notion, as force, action, passion.

*Prædicables, Predicables.

*Prædicament, Predicament.

***PRÆDICATE, PREDICATE**.—See R. G. Latham.⁴ In Kant, the mark which, in a judgment, is compared with a thing; as, in the judgment, “all action is finite,” finite is the predicate.

*Præprædicamenta and Postprædicamenta.

PRAGMATIC, PRAGMATISM (Gr.), relating to matter of fact; in German Philosophy, 1. “Peculiarly employed to denote that form of history which, neglecting circumstantial details, is occupied in the scientific evolution of causes and effects.”—Hamilton.⁵ 2. In Kant,⁶ serving to fulfil our aims, promotive of our welfare.

PRAXIS (Gr.), practice; materials for practice.

PRECISIVE (Lat.), cutting off; in Logic, exactly limiting, by cutting off all that is not absolutely relative to the purpose.

PRED, in composition.—See **Præd**.

PREDETERMINISM, PRÆDETERMINISM, in Kant,⁷ the doctrine of the determination of the volition by grounds in antecedent time; time which, with what it involves, is beyond our control.

PREDICATION, affirmation or negation, declaration or denial.—Mill.⁸

PREFORMATION, P., SYSTEM OF, in Kant.—See **Epigenesis**, and **Evolution, Theory of**.

*Prejudice.

Premise, *Premiss.

¹ *Metaph. d. Sitten*, 38. ² *Originalideen üb. d. empir. Anthropologie*, 16. ³ *Rein. Vern.*, 108. ⁴ *Logic in its applic. to Language*, §§ 2, 11, 13. ⁵ *Discuss.*, 1853, Art. iii. ⁶ *Metaph. d. Sitten*, 44. ⁷ *Religion innerhalb*, 85*. ⁸ *Logic*, Pt. V., ch. iii., § 3.

PRENOTION, foreknowledge. — Berkeley.¹

PREPOLLENCE, predominance.

*Prescience.

PRESENTATIVE. — See **Knowledge**.

PRESENTIAL, implying actual presence. — Norris.

PRESENTIATE, to render present; to render as present.

PRESTABILISM (Lat. *Præstabilismus*), in Kant,² the teleological principle in regard to the generation of organic beings, according to which the Supreme First Cause, embodied in the original products of His wisdom, the plan, by means of which an organic being brings forth its like and the species preserves itself, as also the passing away of individuals is provided for by the continual compensation of the very nature which is active in their destruction.

PRESULTOR (Lat.), one who dances before others; applied by the writer De Mundo to the supreme God, "the Coryphæus of the world, or the precentor and *presultor* of it." — Cudworth.³

PRESUPPOSAL, PRESUPPOSITION (Lat.), something assumed as known or admitted; an antecedent.

PRICE (Lat.), that which buys; the equivalent which may be substituted for another thing; relative value. — Kant.⁴

PRIMACY (Lat.), the condition or state of one who is *primus*; the first place or rank; preference; preëminence. In Kant,⁵ "in the case of two or more things conjoined by reason, the preference of one as the primary motive of the union with all the rest."

P., in the Narrower, Practical Sense, in Kant,⁶ the preference of the interest of the one, so far as the interest of another is subordinated to it, it being put second to no other. In this narrower sense, the practical reason has the primacy over the speculative reason — the practical interest is supreme, the speculative is subordinate.

PRIMAL (Lat.), first, the very first, earliest; from or at the beginning; principal; originating, causal; as, *P. matter*. Duns Scotus, "the subtle doctor, created high above all vulgar common matter, a primary *primal*, a secondary *primal*, a tertiary *primal* matter; and yet this matter was one." — Milman.⁷

¹ *Siris*, § 314. ² *Urtheilskraft*, 375. ³ *Intell. System*, 397. ⁴ *Met. d. Sitten*, 77. ⁵ *Praktisch. Vern.*, 215. ⁶ *Praktisch. Vern.*, 215. ⁷ *Latin Christianity*, b. xiv., ch. iii.

***PRIMARY.**—"The most obvious mode of stating the difference of *primary* and *secondary* qualities, appears to be that of Locke, slightly modified. Certain of the qualities of bodies, as their bulk, figure, and motion, are perceived immediately in the bodies themselves. Certain other qualities, as sound, color, heat, are perceived by some medium. Our conviction that this is the case is spontaneous and irresistible; and this difference of qualities, immediately and mediately perceived, is the distinction of primary and secondary qualities."—Whewell.¹ C. F. V.

PRIMIGENIAL, PRIMIGENEOUS (Lat.), first-begotten; first of all; original; primitive.—Glanville.

PRIMOEDIAL (Lat.), first of all; original.—H. Spencer.²

***Principia essendi** or **Principles of Being.**

***PRINCIPLE.**—P. in Anaximander, "The eternal, infinite, indefinite ground, from which, in order of time, all arises, and into which all returns;" "that which comprehends and rules all the spheres of the universe, but which, underlying every individual form of the finite and mutable, is itself infinite and indefinite."—Schwegler.³

Principle, in Kant, as qualified by adjectives: 1. *Absolute P.*, a synthetic cognition drawn from concepts. See **Practical P.**, **Speculative P.** 2. *Comparative P.*, relative; every cognition which can be used as major in a syllogism; every universal proposition; every judgment which renders comprehensible the possibility of another judgment. 3. *External, Foreign P.*, lemma; concept derived from another science; opposed to *internal, native P.* 4. *Formal P.*—See **Formal**. 5. *Material P.*—See **Material**. 6. *Metaphysical P.*, *Transcendental P.*, presents the *a priori* condition, in which alone objects whose concepts must be empirically given can be determined further *a priori*. 7. *Native P.*, internal, within the science; opposed to *External P.* 8. *Practical P.*, involving moral law. It is subdivided in the main: as *a*, apodictic; *b*, assertory; *c*, formal; *d*, material; *e*, problematic. 9. *Regulative P.*, either *a*, of the reason; or *b*, of the understanding.—Mellin.⁴

Principle, in Kant, as qualified by connection with a posses-

¹ *Hist. of Scient. Ideas*, Vol. I., 296. ² *Pr. of Psych.*, ch. xvi., § 73. ³ Stirling's Translat., 10. ⁴ *Wörterbuch*, iv. 703-712.

sive. 1. *P. of Affinity*. — See *P. of Continuity of Forms*. 2. *P. of all Human Cognition*. 3. *P. of all Synthetic Judgments*. 4. *P. of Analogies of Experience*. 5. *P. of Anticipations of Perception*. 6. *P. of Autonomy of the Will*. 7. *P. of the Axioms of Intuition*. 8. *P. of Continuity*. 9. *P. of the Continuity of Forms or of Affinity*, which requires a continuous transition from one variety to another by gradual growth of diversity. 10. *P. of Dynamics*. 11. *P. of the Heteronomy of the Will*. 12. *P. of Homogeneity*. 13. *P. of Reason*. 14. *P. of Self-love*. 15. *P. of Specification*. 16. *P. of Taste*. — Mellin,¹ C. C. E. Schmid.²

Principle, Fundamental, of Philosophy.—Chalybäus: "The concept of Philosophy itself is its real principle — it is to be found in the individual human spirit come to itself."³ J. G. Fichte: "Every science must have a fundamental principle."⁴ Hegel: "Philosophy moves in a circle, at the beginning of which the intermediation swallows up the end," "that with which it begins must at the other end appear as result," "the postulate of a system of philosophy is its result, and where it goes in there it comes out."⁵ Steudel: "In philosophical investigation there is a *guiding* principle, but it contains nothing; it is not a *real* principle, but only a *regulative* one. It is the principle which is valid in every sort of investigation: Philosophy must, at every cost, strive to establish the truth. There is no other fundamental principle in Philosophy — there can be none."⁶

*Principles as Express or as Operative.

***PRINCIPLES OF ACTION**, "either (1) the beginning as to knowledge, that is, the law of right conduct, as the principles of justice; or (2) the beginning as to energy or motive force, as the principle of self-love." — C. F. V.

*Principles of Knowledge.

*Privation.

PRIVATIVE CONCEPTION, IMMEDIATE INFERENCE
BY, in Logic, passes from any affirmative proposition to a negative proposition implied in it, or equivalent to it, or *vice versa*. — Jevons.

¹ *Kunstsprache*, s. v. ² *Wörterbuch*, s. v. ³ *Ztschr. v. Fichte*, xviii. 175; *Fundamental Philosophie*, 5, 48–51. ⁴ *Begriff d. Wissenschaftslehre, Werke*, I. 40, 41. ⁵ *Weiske*, V. 338, 341; VIII. 22; XVI. 98; *Leben von Rosenkranz*, 273, 545. ⁶ *Philosophie im Umriss*, I., i. 30–33.

Privative Terms, in Logic, express that a thing is *deprived* of a quality that it had, or might have had, as *blind*, *dead*.

***PROBABILITY.**—See **Chances**.

***Probable.**

PROBATION (*probo, approbo*, to prove).—To prove is to evince the truth of a proposition not admitted to be true, from other propositions the truth of which is already established. In every *probation* there are three things: 1. The thesis, the proposition to be proved; 2. The grounds or principle of proof; and, 3. The degree of urgency with which the thesis is inferred. The rules of probation are: 1. That no proposition can be employed as a principle of probation which stands itself in need of proof; 2. That nothing else be proved than the proposition for whose proof the probation was instituted.—F. V. 3.

PROBATIVE, furnishing proof.—Mill.¹

***Problem.**

PROCEDURE, mode of proceeding.—Spencer.² See **Method**, **Principle**, **Fundamental**. It may be analytic or synthetic.—Hegel,³ Schopenhauer,⁴ Steudel,⁵ Ulrici.⁶

***PROGRESS.**—See **Perfectibility**.

PROGRESSIONIST, one who maintains the doctrine of progression—1. In organic forms, opposed to Uniformitarian.—Spencer.⁷ 2. In society.

PROGRESSIVENESS, state of advancing.—Mill.⁸

PROLEPTIC, PROLEPTICAL (Gr.), anticipative; in advance of.

PROMANATION (Lat.), flowing forth; emanation.

***PROMISE and POLLICITATION.**—"Promise is a voluntary pledge to do something at a future time."—C. F. V. It is carefully to be distinguished from a simple statement of intention, though the circumstances of such a statement may give it the virtual force of a promise.

***PROOF**, "Evidence confirmatory of a proposition."—C. F. V.

PROPÆDEUTIK (Gr., Ger.), **PROPEDEUTICS**, introductory preparation.—See Jos. Beck (1869, 1876), Hagemann (1873, 1875), Stoy (1870), R. Zimmermann (1867).

¹ *Logic*, pt. v., ch. v. ² *Prin. of Psych.*, P. III., ch. 1., p. 341, ed. 1856. ³ *Werke*, VI. 399, 400; *Encyclopädie*, §§ 227-229. ⁴ *Welt als Wille*, ed. 3d, II., 133. ⁵ *Philosophie im Umriss*, I., 1. 220-222. ⁶ *Ztschr. von Fichte*, xxxv. 280, 281. ⁷ *Biology*, pt. lit., § 140. ⁸ *Logic*, pt. vi., ch. x., § 3.

PROPER, singular.

***PROPERTY**.—"1. That which pertains to a thing; 2. That which is the possession of a person."—C. F. V.

***Property** (Generic). ***Property** (Specific).

***PROPOSITION**.—See De Morgan,¹ Hamilton,² Latham,³ Mill,⁴ Whately.⁵

PROPOSITIONAL, of or pertaining to a proposition.—Watts.

***Propriety**. ***Proprium** (The), or Property.

PROSYLLOGISM.—See Epicheirema, Episylogism.

PROTASIS (Gr.), in Logic, a proposition; premissa. — Aristotle.⁶

PROTOPLASM, PROTOPLASMA (Gr.), primary organic substance. — Carpenter.⁷

PROTOPLAST, original; first individual, or pair of individuals of a species. — R. G. Latham.⁸

PROTOTYPE (Gr.), in the first form, original, primitive; archetype.

PROTOZOA (Gr.), the simplest living organisms.

PROTREPTIC (Gr.), fitted for urging on, hortative. — Plato.⁹

***PROVERB**.—Giuseppe Giuste has a collection of Tuscan proverbs, with notes, Florence, 1858; Trench, proverbs and their lessons. Disraeli, in his *Curiosities of Literature*, has a chapter on the philosophy of proverbs. Baur said: "The genius, wit, and wisdom of a nation are discovered by their proverbs." Scottish proverbs, gathered together by David Ferguson, sometime minister at Dunfermline, and put *ordine alphabetico* when he departed this life, anno 1598, Edin., 1641. A complete collection of Scottish proverbs, by James Kelly, M. A., Lond., 1721. The Proverbs of Scotland, by Alexander Hislop, 12mo, Glasg., 1562.

***Providence**.

PROXIMATE, in Logic, of genus, next higher.

PROXIME, in Logic, next, immediate. — Watts.

***PRUDENCE**, "the habit of acting at all times with deliberation and forethought (in view of the lessons of experience)." — C. F. V.

PSEUDO (Gr.), false.

¹ *Syllab.*, §§ 7, 8, 9, 16, 22, 23. ² *Discuss.*, p. 144. ³ *Logic in Applic. to Language*, ¶¶ 1-3, 17-20. ⁴ *Logic*, pt. I., ch. iv., § 2, ch. vi., § 1. ⁵ *Logic*, b. ii., ch. i., § 1, 2. ⁶ *Anal. Pr.*, l. 1, 2. ⁷ *Physiol., gen. and compar.*, 1851, § 558. ⁸ *List. of the Varieties of Man*. ⁹ *Euthyd.*, 287 c.

PSYCHAGOGIST, PSYCHAGOGUE (Gr.).—1. One who leads souls to the nether world or brings them from it. 2. One who wins souls by persuasion.

PSYCHAGOGY (Gr.).—1. Evocation of souls from the other world. 2. Persuasion.

PSYCHAL, psychical.

PSYCHE (Gr.).—1. Breath (Lat. *anima*), especially as the sign of life; *life* of man and animals. 2. *The soul* or *immortal part of man*, as opposed to his body or perishable part; departed soul, spirit, ghost; the abstract notion of the soul or spirit of man (Lat. *animus*); the seat of thumos, that is, of the will, desires, and passions; the *soul, heart*; especially *sensual desire, propension, appetite*. 3. As the organ of *Nous*, that is, of thought and judgment, the *soul, mind, reason, understanding*.—Plato. For a distinction made by Plato between Psyche and Nous, see Lewes.¹ 4. The vital principle; and generally the *anima mundi*, or *animating spirit* of the universe, supposed, in the Ancient Philosophy, to pervade earth, sea, and heavens. 5. *The butterfly* (*papilio brassicæ*), perhaps as being an emblem of the immortal soul, by reason of its passing through a kind of death in the chrysalis form. 6. As a proper name, *Psyché*, mistress of Eros or Love, emblem of the soul. She is represented in art with butterflies' wings, or as a butterfly.—See Liddell and Scott.²

PSYCHIATER (Gr.), a physician who makes mental disease the subject of his special study and practice. Hence, psychiatria, psychiatry, psychiatric.

PSYCHIC and **PSYCHICAL** (Gr.), of the soul or mind; spiritual; mental; "pertaining to the soul. Applied to force or phenomena distinctive of mind. Used in contrast with *physical*."—C. F. V. See Dr. Forbes Winslow.³

PSYCHICS, psychology.

***PSYCHISM**.—Hence, Psychist.

PSYCHOGNOSY (Gr.), thorough knowledge of the soul. Hence, Psychognostic.

PSYCHOGONY (Gr.), progressive generation, development of the soul. Hence, Psychogonic.

PSYCHOGRAPHY (Gr.), history, description of the soul and its faculties. Hence, Psychographic.

¹ *History* (4th. ed., 1871). I., 266, note. ² *Greek-English Lexicon*, 6th. ed. ³ *Obscure Diseases of the Brain and Mind*, ch. v., viii.

***PSYCHOLOGY**, "that part of philosophy which treats of the soul (*de anima*); the science of those things which are possible through human souls."—Wolf.¹ "A theory of the nature and powers of the mind based upon the analysis and interpretation of the facts of consciousness."—C. F. V., Hamilton.² Hence, Psychologic, applied to analysis, divisions, powers, &c., Psychologist.—See Butler,³ N. Porter.⁴

Psychology, Divisions, Parts of.—P. is divided into empirical P., and metaphysical, transcendental, or rational P.—Wolf.⁵ There are special applications of its principles: comparative, jural, medical, physiological, pragmatic.

Psychology, Empirical, or Experimental, is that whose principles are established by experiment and experience. It follows the introduction to philosophy and is preliminary to Logic.

Psychology, Metaphysical, or Rational, derives *a priori* from the concept of the soul all that observation has deduced *a posteriori*. Its object is the *internal* of which the *external* offers itself to *P. empirical*. It is a part of special metaphysics, and is placed between cosmology and natural theology.—Stöckl.⁶

Psychology, Empirical, is divided into: I. The psychical life in general. II. The psychical life in its special manifestations: i. Faculty of cognition; ii. Faculty of feeling, the emotions; iii. Faculty of appetite, desires, will. III. The psychical life in its progressive conditions and history: i. Periods of life; ii. Waking and sleeping; iii. Special peculiarities, temperaments, character; psychical differences of the sexes, race, and nation; iv. Mental disorders.

Psychology, Rational, is divided into: I. Essential nature and fundamental distinctions in the soul; substantiality; personality; individuality; simplicity; spirituality and incorporation of the soul; materialism. II. Relation of the soul to the body. III. Freedom, destination. IV. Origin and immortality.—Jos. Beck.⁷

Psychology, Literature of.—I. As a part of encyclopædies

¹ *Logic*, § 68, D. ² *Lects. on Metaph.*, I., 135. ³ *Hist. of Anc. Philosophy*, lect. iii.

⁴ *Human Intellect*, 70. ⁵ *Logic*, D, 111, 112. ⁶ *Lehrbuch der Philosophie*, 4th ed., 1876.

⁷ *Grundriss der Empirischen Psychologie*, 12th ed., 1876; *Encyclopædie der Theoretischen Philosophie*, 4th ed., 1869.

and introductions.—Jos. Beck (12th ed., 1876). II. In miscellanies, collected works, periodicals. III. In works on Theoretic Philosophy.—Dressler (2d ed., 1870), Ennemoser (1849). IV. Systems, manuals, compends.—Herbart, Lehrbuch (2d ed., 1834), Principia (1822), Mathematik auf Psychol. (1822), P. als Wissenschaft (1824, 1825), Beneke (1850), Drbal (1868), Drobisch (1842), Carus (1846), Erdmann (4th ed., 1868), I. H. Fichte (1864), Fortlage (1855, 1869), Hagemann (4th ed., 1874), Weisse (1869), Bantain (1853), Prosper Despine (1868), Lotze (1852), Schultz-Schultzenstein (1855), Schnell (1860), Fechner (Nanna, 1848, Zendavesta, 1851, Seelenfrage, 1861), Jessen (1855), George (1854), Ulrici (1866), v. Hartsen (1869), Lindner (3d ed., 1872), Maudsley (1870), Herbert Spencer (1872, 1873), L. P. Hickok (Rational Psychology, 1848, Empirical Psychology, 1854), J. B. Meyer (1869), K. C. Planck (1871), Noah Porter (Human Intellect, 4th ed., 1869). V. Bibliography. — See **Metaphysics**, Literature of.

PSYCHOMACHY (Gr.), soul-battle; conflict of soul and body. It is the title of a poem by Prudentius.

PSYCHOMANCY (Gr.), divination by calling up the souls of the dead.

PSYCHOMETRY (Gr.), measure of the faculties of the soul.

PSYCHONOMY (Gr.), doctrine of the laws and development of the soul.

PSYCHONOSOLAGY (Gr.), doctrine of the diseases of the mind.

***PSYCHOPANNYCHISM**.—Whatever may have been Luther's confusion of views on the world of the dead while he was still under the influence of early education, there is no satisfactory evidence that he ever held that the soul sleeps between death and the resurrection. His mature judgment against it has been expressed most decidedly in his latest and, in many respects, the best of his larger works, his Commentary on Genesis.¹ He says in that: "In the interim (between death and the resurrection), the *soul does not sleep*, but is awake, and enjoys the vision of angels and of God, and has converse with them."

PSYCHOPATHY (Gr.), mental disease.

PSYCHOPHYSICS (Gr.), a special department of Anthropology,

¹ In *Genes.*, xxv. 321, *Interim Anima non dormiat.*

which investigates the relations of the psychical and the physical, in their conjoint operation in man.—G. T. Fechner¹ (who originated the name).

PULLULATION, germination; budding; growing.

PURE, “applied by Kant to an exercise of mind which has no admixture of the results of experience, involving only what the mind itself gives; and also to the power of mind by which such exercise is possible. Thus he uses the ‘pure Idea,’ and ‘pure Reason,’ which is reason in itself alone, without any mixture of sensibility, or play of the sensory. So, also, ‘pure Reverence’ is reverence for moral law, where that is the sole or single motive for action.”—C. F. V. “Pure and applied, as usually employed in opposition in German Philosophy, are not properly relative and correlative to each other; pure and mixed, applied and unapplied, are properly correlative.”—Hamilton.² On pure and modal propositions, see **Judgments**. On pure logic, see **Logic**.

PURISM, in Ethics, extravagance, or affectation of purity.

PYRRHONISM.—See **Scepticism**, **Academics**.

PYTHAGOREAN, pertaining to Pythagoras (540-500 B. C.), his doctrines, his philosophy.—See **Cosmology**, **Metempsychosis**, **Number**.

***QUADRIVIVIUM**.—See **Trivium**.

QUALIFIED, in Kant, marked by a degree of a quality, which shows itself in act, and deserves a name. (Fr. *Qualifié*.) He applies it to envy, ingratitude, and malignant joy.

QUALITATIVE, involving quality—opposed to quantitative; as *Q. correlations*.

*Quality. *Quality (occult).

QUANTIFICATION OF THE PREDICATE.—The quantity of a proposition taken as a whole depends upon the *subject* being universal or particular; but it is equally important to consider the quantity of the *predicate*. In all *affirmative* propositions the predicate must be regarded as *particular*, while in all *negative* propositions it is universal. All that we assert in an affirmative proposition is that the predicate in-

¹ *Elements der Psychophysik*, 1860.

² *Logic*, Am. ed., 44

cludes the subject. Thus in the proposition : All stones are minerals, we only employ the word minerals in so far as it coincides with the word stones ; that is, only in a part of its extension (all stones are some minerals). In a negative proposition, we assert that no part of the subject is contained in any part of the predicate. Thus, when I say : "No stones are metals," I exclude the notion "stones" from the *entire extension* of the word "metals," and consequently use it in its whole generality.—Morell.¹ The quantification of the predicate is much insisted on by Sir W. Hamilton,² Baynes.³ F. V. 3.

QUANTIFY, endue with, mark with the sign of quantity.

QUANTITATIVE, QUANTITIVE, estimable according to quantity.

*Quantity. *Quantity (discrete and continuous).

QUANTUM (Lat.), in Kant, concrete *quantity*, q. v.

QUATERNARY (Lat.), group of four, consisting of four ; regarded with great respect by the Pythagoreans.

QUATERNIO TERMINORUM, in Logic, fallacy of four terms.

***QUIDDITY** or **QUIDITY**, "is the being of a thing considered in order to a definition explaining *what* it is. The being of a thing considered in order to its existence is its *essence* ; in order to its operation, its nature."—Mellin. F. V. 3.

QUINTESSENCE, fifth essence ; distinct from and superior to the four essences or elements (fire, air, earth, water). Applied to the heavens ; pure essence.

QUODLIBET, as many as you please ; in Scholasticism, for miscellaneous writings. Quodlibetary or quodlibetic questions were questions for the exercise of students in philosophy ; point, subtlety. Hence, quodlibetarian, quodlibetical.

QUOTIETY, in Scholasticism, marks the relation of an object to number ; to the question : How many, quot ?

***RACE**.—See *Species*.

RAMEAN TREE.—See *Arbor Porphyriana*.

***RATIO**.—"Proportion. Lat., a reason."—C. F. V.

¹ *Handbook of Logic*, p. 22. ² *Lects. on Logic*, i. ³ *New Analytic of Logical Forms*.

***RATIOCINATION (RATIOCINATE)**, "Reasoning."—C. F. V. In J. S. Mill,¹ syllogism or deduction. Hence, Ratiocinative.

RATIONAL, endowed with ratio, reason; accordant with reason. Hence, Rationality.

***RATIONALE**.—"The rational basis for a system or order of things."—C. F. V.

***RATIONALISM**, in philosophy.

***Rationalism**, in religion, "More restrictedly, the acceptance of the teaching of revelation only in so far as reason can explain its doctrine."—C. F. V. Hence, Rationalize, Rationalizing. See J. H. Newman.²

REACTION, reciprocation of action, of impulse or force.

READVERTENCY, reapplication of mind.—Norris. L. J.

***REAL, THE**.—Hence, Reality. See Whately.³ The real and the ideal, being and thinking.—Steudel.⁴

***REALISM**.—Hence, Realist. See I. Disraeli,⁵ Hallam.⁶

REALITY, Actuality, Determinateness.—Hegel:⁷ "As the object is in intuition or representation, it is only phenomenon; not until it is in thinking, is it in and for itself, that is, objective. It has, therefore, this objectivity in the notion." "This notion posits itself as objectivity by its own activity. This objectivity is simply the reality of the notion. It is the actual and real totality. This totality is the idea. All existent has truth, therefore, only so far as it is an existence of the idea; for the idea alone is the truly actual." "The indefinite being is the first." See Spinoza, below. "The basis of all determinateness is negation; only opinion destitute of thought considers the definite things as positive, and holds fast to them under the form of being." "What is rational is actual, what is actual is rational."⁸ Kapp:⁹ "Reality without determinateness ceases to be." Schelling:¹⁰ "The first step in philosophy, the condition essential even to an entrance on it, is insight into the truth that the absolutely ideal is also the absolutely real; and that, apart from the

¹ *Logic*, pt. II., ch. I., § 3. ² *Developm. of Christ. Doctrine*, ch. I., sect. III. ³ *Logic*, Append. ⁴ *Philosophie im Umris*, I., II. 290-303. ⁵ *Curiosities of Lit., Literary Controvers., Compos. of Words*. ⁶ *Hist. of Literat.*, b. III., § 67. ⁷ *Werke*, V. 16. VI. 168, 180, X. 140. ⁸ *Philosophie des Rechts; Werke*, VIII. 17. He explains and defends his words in his *Encyclopädie*, Einl., § 6; *Werke*, VI. 10, 11; § 142 Do., 281; Wallace, 7, 221. ⁹ *Fr. W. J. v. Schelling*, 360. ¹⁰ *Werke*, I., II. 58.

absolutely ideal in general, reality can only be sensuous and conditioned, never absolute and unconditioned." Spinoza: "Every determination is negation." See Hegel, above. Steudel:¹ "Actual being is reality or actuality. What is real, is exterior to thinking and independent on thinking, or, as Tittmann² says, 'Being actual is antithetical to being thought.' That is ideal which is simply thought, without being exterior to the thinking. This real existing meets us, presents itself to us in sensation and perception. The natural understanding is, therefore, in no doubt that what we perceive as exterior to our thinking, representing mentally, and feeling, is a real and actual existent."

REALIZE, to render real; to render or construe as real to the mind; actualize.

***REASON**.—"This word is used in a variety of senses. 1. A general name for the intellectual nature of man; 2. The faculty of the higher intuitions, or of a *priori* truth. This is Kant's use of the word in contrast with reasoning. 3. The evidence or rational ground upon which a conclusion rests." — C. F. V. Hence, Reasonableness.

*Reason (spontaneity of).

***Reason and Understanding**.—"The perplexity referred to by Whewell may be easily escaped by distinguishing the reasoning power from the reason. The reasoning or discursive process is carried on by the judgment, understanding, or reasoning powers. There is no ambiguity here when, as the result of the reasoning process, we are said to understand the subject. Reason is the faculty perceiving self-evident truth." — C. F. V. J. G. Fichte: "Reason is the absolutely positing faculty in the Ego." "It is the universal thinking, which does not pertain to the individual, but of which the individual may be possessed; the understanding is an intermediate faculty, standing between the reason and the imagination, a faculty in which the mutable element of intuition is fixed and made intelligible. It is a quiescent, inactive faculty of the mind, the mere retainer of what is brought forth by the imagination, and of what is determined or is yet to be determined by the reason, and may be described

¹ *Philosophie im Umriss*, I., i. 298-301.

² *Aphorismen*, 136.

as the imagination fixed by the reason, or as the reason provided with objects by the imagination. In the understanding alone is reality; in it the ideal produced by the imagination is rendered real by conception and comprehension."¹ I. H. Fichte: "The reason is identical with the creative and prescient phantasy — possessed of the faculty of cognising the *An-sich* (the *per se*) of things, by its own activity." "Reflected thinking is but a depotentiated reason." "Reason is an absolutely non-individual thing, or rather it is super-individual; it abrogates everything simply individual in the spirit, and depresses the individual to the recognition of the universal validity of reason itself; it is therefore the unindividualizing in us, because it is in us the cognizing and deciding, eternal, superpersonal reason."² Fries: "The understanding is the superior cognitive faculty, self-cognition. To it is pre-eminently given to lead us to consciousness, which we have in us, not in itself as intuitive cognition; the faculty of this non-intuitive cognition is the pure reason."³ Formstecher: "Reason is the faculty of comparing all phenomena with the primal types, and judging of them in accordance with their truth; as arbitress she is in Art called Taste, in Ethics, Conscience."⁴ Frohschammer: "Reason, in opposition to the understanding, as the faculty of logical activity, is the faculty by which the human spirit is capable of religious faith, and of the immediate *a priori* consciousness of God, as also, in connection with the activity of the understanding, the faculty of the further unfolding of the consciousness, in metaphysical investigation and cognition of the absolute. It is a faculty, furthermore, by which it experiences in conscience the ethical nature of its manifestation of will, and attains to essentially ethical nature." "It is the faculty of the immediate consciousness of the supra-mundane and divine, and manifests itself in our race, as religion and philosophy."⁵ Gleisberg: "Reason is no psychical activity *sui generis*, but is a potentiated understanding; it is in essence the reference of our individual Ego to the

¹ *Grundl. d. ges. Wissenschaftslehre, Werke*, I. 223, 234; *Thatsach. d. Bewusstseins, Werke*, II. 608. ² *Anthropologie*, 566-569; *Psychologie*, I. 462, 463; *Seelenforfdner und die Weltstellung des Menschen*, 134; on the obscurity of the term "Reason," *Do.*, 282. ³ *System der Logik*, 3d ed., 1837, 88. ⁴ *Die Religion d. Geistes*. ⁵ *Althendum*, III. 256-262, 592.

world of ideas, to a higher order of the world; it is the capacity of forming notions, of abstraction, the capacity of determining action in accordance with definite norms, delivered to it or cognized by itself."¹ Harms: "We give to the pre-cognitive power in us the name of reason; it can cognize objects as they are in themselves."² Hegel, in his earlier period: "Reason is only understanding." "Reason is identical with the productive imagination, and thus, so far as it fixes the categories as notions, is understanding."³ Hegel, in his later period: "The understanding is taken as the faculty of determinate notion, which is established for it through the abstraction and form of universality; the inference, however, as the completely established notion, is the rational, and all the rational is an inference."⁴ "Reason is the phenomenon of the absolute, and because the absolute is eternally one and the same, every reason which has been directed upon itself, and has cognized itself, has produced a true philosophy." "Reason is comprehending cognition, and its content is the philosophical idea."⁵ "Reason without understanding is nothing; understanding without reason is still something."⁶ Herbart: "Understanding is the faculty which, in mental representation or thinking, directs itself in accordance with the quality of the thing represented or thought; reason is the faculty of deliberation in accordance with grounds, and of decision." "Deliberation takes place: 1. in connection with the premises of a syllogism; hence, reason is a logical faculty. 2. In the extension of notions to the infinite and unconditioned. 3. In choosing among aims, consequently in the establishment of practical maxims; hence the reason is a moral faculty." "Reason is the faculty of penetrating to the connection of universal truths." "The understanding has reason, and the reason has understanding; they cannot be coördinated, for they do in strictness exclude each other." "One thinker endows reason with his categorical imperative and his transcendental freedom; another endows it with his intellectual intuition of the Ego, or of the absolute; a third, with his marvellous revelation of the reality

¹ *Instinct und freier Wille*, 82. ² *Haller Monatschrift*, Augst, 1852. ³ *Werke*, I. 4, 25.
⁴ *Werke*, V. 116. ⁵ *Werke*, I. 160; VIII. 19. ⁶ *Leben von Rosenkranz*, 546.

of the external world. Thus reason becomes the plaything of systems, and the real facts are darkened."¹ Jacobi: "The impulse to search into his origin, to recognize himself in it, through it, from it—to experience the true in regard to himself—man calls reason. Reason is the eye of the soul itself, as far as it has clear notions. That which in man the Ego clearly expresses, he calls his reason."² Kant.—See ***Reason and Understanding.** Kirchmann denies that there is any difference between the two.³ Lotze: "Understanding and reason are allied in their attempt to reach a comprehension of the manifold; but the leading thought which reason pursues in this effort, the assurance that the sum of actuality can exist only as completed unity and totality, is not the principle in accordance with which the understanding searches only for the form of conjunction between every two members, without deciding in regard to the shape, which must be the result of the union of the whole of them."⁴ Michelet, in accordance with Hegel's doctrine: "There is one only impersonal world-reason; all individual spirits are one spirit only, that impersonal reason; in regard to it, the history of the scattered members shows that this reason only is the absolute actual, and that the subjective is un-reason and evil."⁵ Heinrich Ritter: "Theoretic reason wishes to know the truth, to strip it of all illusion." "The revelations of our reason we receive from God; every revelation must reach us through it; it is the universal medium through which the creature attains the consciousness of God; without reason, there would be nothing to respond to the call of God as Creator, nothing to which His revelation could be opened, nothing by which His work would be understood."⁶ Schelling: "The understanding is an inferior sort of cognition. To its sphere belongs what, with a large part of philosophers, has passed for reason." "Those who, in this sort of cognition, are searching for philosophy, have not yet approached its threshold." "Understanding is fallen reason." "The un-

¹ *Werke*, I., 269, 304; II., 359; VI., 52-58, 152, 163; VIII., 217. ² *Göttlichen Dingen*, 6; *David Hume*, 195. ³ Bergmann, *Philosophische Monatshefte*, I., 455. ⁴ *Mikrokosmos*, I., 257-280. ⁵ *Zeitschr. von Fichte*, xxii. 67, 69; *Zeitschr.* "Der Gedanke," I., 123; II., 264, 265. ⁶ *Philosophische Paradoxa*, 11, 47, 127, 134.

derstanding is also reason, but reason in its non-totality; it has no life of its own; it has life only through reason, not as an intractable, but as a pliant instrument of it. The errors of the understanding spring from a judgment which regards things in their non-totality." "The reason is only in a certain sense higher than the understanding; in the understanding there is something more active, efficient; in the reason, something more passive, self-surrendering. Reason is the understanding in its submission to the higher something, the soul. Reason is but the receiver of truth and the touchstone of it." "Reason is the principle of universal equality; the understanding is the principle of inequality among men. Reason, therefore, is on the side of the people; understanding on the side of the king. The people can largely display reason, but as a people they never display understanding." "No man can describe reason; it must describe itself in every man, and through every man. It bears in itself sense, understanding, and imagination, without itself being any one of these in particular." "It is the mode of cognition in which the finite and infinite is beheld in the Eternal, but not the mode in which the Eternal is beheld in the finite and infinite." "It is that knowing in which the eternal equality of the subject and object cognizes itself." "Philosophy is simply reason conscious of itself or coming to that consciousness." "The real and the ideal all flow together, in reason, into absolute identity. The essential nature of reason, or the essence of the soul, is nothing more than the absolute affirmation of the idea of God." "God is the archetype, reason the ectype—the reflex of deity, reason not as it reveals itself in man merely, but reason as it is the substance of all things, and dwells in the entire universe." "There is no reason which we have, but there is a reason which has us. This reason does not *have* the idea of God, but *is* that idea."¹ Schopenhauer: "Drawing inferences is the proper function of reason." "It has also the capacity for abstract general mental representations and notions. Its content is not material, but formal. Its nature is feminine; it must get before it can give, receive be-

¹ *Werke*, I., iv. 299-301; II. 377; IV. 114-116, 301; V. 270, 331; VI. 43, 495-497, 516, 556, 561; VII. 42, 146, 147, 471, 472; IX. 336; X. 174, 254.

fore it can conceive. Every simpleton has reason. Give him the premises, he can draw the conclusion. The understanding, on the contrary, whose essential nature consists in the consciousness of the law of causality, delivers the primary and intuitive cognition. In this lies the distinction between the two faculties." "Reason is transcendental understanding." "A reason for which is claimed immediate cognition of the supersensuous and absolute, can only be conceived of as like the sixth sense of a bat—it is a purely visionary metaphysical instinct." "The understanding of man differs only in degree from that of the animals."¹ Heinrich Schwarz: "To exalt knowing to actual cognizing is the peculiar feature of the intelligence of the understanding. The understanding abstracts the essential character from the object of perception. But to penetrate thoroughly to the essential character, the interior, belongs not to the intelligence of the understanding, but to that of the reason. The point of view assumed by reason is that of sinking into, penetrating into the primary essence in general. The understanding surmises the actuality and necessity of such principles, but is unable to reach them. It cannot get beyond the antitheses, for which the reason provides unity; it cannot come to repose till it grasps the first principle, the final cause."² Tittmann: "It is best to comprehend in the term understanding the entire faculty of thinking, and to refer the reason to the harmony of the individual intellectual being, in its action, with the universal law. The understanding, in forming notions, judgments, and syllogisms, cognizing the law of the world, and accepting it as cogent, is reason. To observe and follow law is the peculiar characteristic of reason. To the understanding the good and beautiful are simply object, to the reason they are aim."³ Ulrici: "Understanding in general is discriminating activity." "Reason, if we distinguish it from understanding, making it a special mental faculty, is that power and mode of activity of the soul which enable us to bring to consciousness the ethical ideas, to recognize them in their rights and universal validity, and to will and

¹ *Vierfache Wurzel*, ed. 2, 72, 73, 100-109, 116; *Welt als Wille*, ed. 3, I, xxviii, 46, 59, 539, 575, 618; *Grundprobleme*, 147-149; *Nachlass*, 268, 296. ² *Gott, Natur und Mensch*, 1857, 131-133. ³ *Aphorismen*, 102.

act in conformity with them." "Reason is the faculty by which we know the nature of God, and bring into our consciousness the divine ideas of law, order, the end and aim of the world, and in this *implicitly* the ideas of the good, the beautiful, and true. Reason enables us to cultivate these ideas, and in conformity with them to judge and draw inferences, to will and to act."¹ Vischer: "The understanding is a mere *valet-de-chambre*."² Wirth: "The eternal primal feeling of our own essential nature, and mediately of the essential nature of all being; a feeling which the soul bears in it, strives of itself for self-comprehension, and thus takes the name of reason, which is conscious intelligence of the essentiality of being."³—See Steudel.⁴

***Reason (Determining or Sufficient)** (Ger. *Satz des Grundes*, *S. des zureichenden G.*).—I. H. Fichte: "The principle is fundamental, alike for the real ground and the ground of cognition."⁵ Hegel identifies it with the law of causality.⁶ Kant: "It is a very common thing for the juggler in metaphysics to make the pass, and skip from the logical principle of the sufficient reason to the transcendental principle of causality, and assume the latter as involved in the former."⁷ Katzenberger: "The meaning of the law is, that in the formation of our thoughts in accordance with our thinking nature, we are compelled to reflect upon the ground on which we are compelled to think and judge, in this or that way, and in no other." "This logical ground is to be distinguished from the notion of cause. Logic has nothing to do with the real ground."⁸ Leibnitz.—See ***Reason (Determining or Sufficient)**, and ***Sufficient Reason (Doctrine of)**. Schopenhauer distinguishes between the ground of cognition and the real ground, but embraces under the principle of the sufficient reason both the law of causality and the logical law of the ground.⁹ Ulrici combines the two: "The principle is indeed primarily and immediately a law of thought, but we transfer it involuntarily to the real

¹ *Glauben und Wissen*, 203; *Zeitschrift von Fichte*, xxviii. 180. ² *Erhabene und Komische*, 46. ³ *Zeitschrift von Fichte*, xxxvi. 186, 190. ⁴ *Philosophie im Umris*, I., i. 115-185. ⁵ *Zeitschr.*, liii. 212. ⁶ *Werke*, IV. 74, 116. ⁷ In a letter of 1789, *Werke*, XI. 95. Kant has been charged with falling, at an earlier period, into this very mistake. *Werke*, I., 12, 16; II., 170: *Rein. Vern.* (ed. 1794), 246. ⁸ *Grundfragen d. Logik*, 235, 236. ⁹ *Vierfache Wurzel*, ed. 2, 14, 21, 33, 99.

being of things. It is better to call it the law of causality than the law of sufficient reason."¹ Wirth: "It is but a law of thinking; the law, 'Lay down nothing without a ground,' or that, whenever we lay down anything, we must be determined to do so by a process of thinking which affirms the being and excludes its non-being."²—See Steudel.³

Reason, Finite.—See **Reason, Limited.**

***Reason (Impersonal).**—See **Reason and Understanding.**

Reason, Legislative, law-giving; the archetypal, divine reason.

Reason, Limited, finite; in Kant, that which needs for its personal activity the co-operation of the faculties and forces of the senses.

Reason, Perverted, perverse; turned from its proper objects or methods.

Reason, Practical (Ger. *Praktische Vernunft*). In Kant, the reason "in as far as it makes comprehensible to us the sum of all that ought to be and to happen;" "the faculty of all the principles of human cognition which involve the practical;" "the faculty of aims in general."⁴ Kant naturalized the term. Before him, the only terms in this connection were understanding and will.—Mellin.⁵ *Practical and pure*, in Kant, mark one and the same faculty in different relations and activities.—See Steudel.⁶

Reason, Practical (Critique of) (Ger. *Critik der praktischen Vernunft*). The second of Kant's series of critiques of the intellectual powers (1788). See **Critique of Pure Reason, Judgment, Critique of the**. Its divisions are: I. Elementary doctrine of the pure practical reason: i. Analytic of the pure practical reason; ii. The dialectic of the pure practical reason. II. Methodology of the pure practical reason.⁷

Reason, Pure (Ger. *Reine Vernunft*).—See **Critique of Pure Reason.**

Reason, Sufficient.—See **Reason Determining, Sufficient Reason.**

¹ *Glauben und Wissen*, 10, 11, 91; *Zeitschrift von Fichte*, xxiii. 137-193; iv. 201-204; *System der Logik*, 112, 113. ² *Grundfragen der Logik*, 235, 236. ³ *Philosophie im Umrisse*, I., i. 200-203. ⁴ *Originalideen üb. d. empir. Anthropol.*, 17, 142; *Tugendlehre*, 30. ⁵ *Kunstsprache*, s. v. ⁶ *Philosophie im Umrisse*, II., i. 609-612. ⁷ *Werke* (1838), IV., 96-290.

Reason, Theoretic, in Kant,¹ Reason, so far as by theoretic principles it makes comprehensible to us the sum of all that is and takes place. — See **Reason, Practical**.

Reason, Cognition of the, is rational cognition. If it be in accordance with concepts, it is philosophical cognition. It is *formal* or *material*. — See those words.

Reason, Concept of the (Ger. *Vernunftbegriff*), idea; opposed to concept of the sense (Ger. *Sinnlicher Begriff*), and concept of the understanding, or notion (Ger. *Verstandesbegriff*). — See Krauth.²

Reason, Faith of (Ger. *Vernunftglaube*), in Kant,³ rational faith; a faith resting on grounds of reason; a faith which grounds itself on no other data than those furnished in the pure Reason.

***REASONING**, “the application of the reason to determining whether this or that be or be not so.” — Kant. Whately.⁴

REATUS (Lat.), the condition of a *reus*, an accused person, a state of impeachment; the offence charged. — See **Reus**.

RECEPTIBILITY, RECEPTIVITY, capacity of receiving, as R. of impressions.

RECOLLECTION. — See **Remembrance**.

RECREMENTITIOUS (Lat.), abounding in recrement; that which should be sifted away; drossy. — Reid.⁵

RECT (Lat.), in composition, right.

RECTITUDE. — “Rightness; the quality of an action as in accordance with moral law.” — C. F. V.

RECTOR (Lat.). — Ruler, as God is R. of the world.

REDARGUTION, refutation. — Bacon.⁶

REDINTIGATION (*re-inlegro*) (reconstruction), is used by Lord Bacon, in his letter to Sir Geo. Villiers, as synonymous with resuscitation. As used by Sir W. Hamilton, it denotes the fact that the parts of any total thought, when subsequently called into consciousness, are apt to suggest immediately the parts to which they were proximately related, and mediately, the whole of which they were constituent. — Hamilton’s Reid. F. V. 3.

REDISPOSING, adjusting anew. — A. Baxter.⁷

¹ *Originalideen*, 16. ² *Annotata*, Berkeley, 338. ³ *Religion innerhalb*, 247. ⁴ *Logic*, B. IV., ch. ii., § 2. ⁵ *Inq. into Human Mind*. ⁶ *Adv. of Learning*, B. II. ⁷ *On the Soul*, I. 339.

REDUCTIO AD ABSURDUM.—See **Argument**.

*Reduction in Logic.

REDUPLICATIVE, double ; in Logic, the repetition of a phrase so as to exclude all consideration of the object except in one respect—white as white, men as men.

***REFLECTION.**—"Attention directed upon the facts of personal experience. In a wider sense, thought or the reasoning process, whatever be the object on which it is directed."—C. F. V.

REFLEX ACTION, "muscular activity which is the direct result of an impression made upon the sensitive organism. Action of the motor nerves consequent upon a sudden impression upon the nerves of sensation, as in the sudden start on the infliction of pain. Reflex action stands in contrast with voluntary action."—C. F. V.

Reflex Sense.—"Hutcheson's name for a mental power, analogous to the senses, by which we have a perception of truth concerning relations. Its exercise is an act of perception, but it depends upon the understanding for its materials. He regards conscience as a reflex sense."—C. F. V.

REGRESS, the passing back from the conditioned to the conditions. Like progress, it is to the infinite and to the indefinite.

REGRESSIVE, by process of regress, analytical method; a *principiatis ad principia*. R. synthesis involves a series on the side of the conditions; as from the father of a living man to the father of his father, and so on.

REGULA (Lat.), rule.

***REGULATIVE**, "Kant's designation for forms of knowledge which are conditions for the ingathering of knowledge, without affording in themselves a test of objective truth. Regulative stands in contrast with *Constitutive*, q. v. Thus, according to Kant, space and time are only mental forms regulative of the mind in its use of the sensory."—C. F. V. R. is applied by Whewell¹ to the principle of a genus, or of any other natural group.

REGULATOR, one who controls by rule; applied to God.

*Relation. *Relative.

RELATIVITY OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.—"The doc-

¹ *Scientific Ideas*, 1858, vol. II., 120.

trine that the nature and extent of our knowledge is determined by the nature, range, and conditions of our cognitive powers. In knowing, we know not the thing itself, but the thing as related to our faculties and capacities. Carried beyond this, the doctrine leads to sceptical results."—C. F. V. That our knowledge of things is relative or proportioned to our faculties, must be admitted. *Omne quod cognoscitur non secundum sui vim cognoscitur sed secundum cognoscentium potius comprehendata facultatem.*—Boethius. We only know things in so far as our faculties are capable of apprehending them. That external objects have more qualities than our senses make known — and that with more senses we might have known more qualities, if there be more to know, must be admitted; but this does not invalidate the knowledge which we have. So long as we are men, our knowledge must be according to the measure of a man. But this is not the doctrine of the relativity of our knowledge among philosophers. According to some (as Berkeley or Hume), we know nothing of things but the sensations or feelings which they give us. Of the things in themselves we know nothing, and there is no evidence of there being anything corresponding to what we call substance. Others think there is in knowledge a phenomenon and a noumenon — a knowledge of things as they appear to us, and a knowledge of things in themselves. This second form of the doctrine is held under various modifications. According to Kant and others, the mind invests external objects with certain forms, which modify our knowledge. External things exist and have a nature; but we know them only as they appear to us—relative to our faculties of apprehending them; *quiquid recipitur, recipitur in modum recipientium*. "To assert that a representation is *untrue*, because it is relative to the mind of the receiver, is to overlook the fact that truth itself is nothing more than a relation. Truth and falsehood are not properties of things in themselves, but of our conceptions, and are tested not by the comparison of conceptions with things in themselves, but with things as they are given in some other relation. My conception of an object of sense is *true*, when it corresponds to the characteristics of the object as I perceive it; but the perception itself is equally a relation,

and equally implies the co-operation of human faculties. Truth in relation to no intelligence is a contradiction in terms; our highest conception of absolute truth is that of truth in relation to all intelligences. But of the consciousness of intelligences different from our own we have no knowledge, and can make no application. Truth, therefore, in relation to man, admits of no other test than the harmonious consent of all human faculties; and as no such faculty can take cognizance of the *absolute*, it follows that correspondence with the *absolute* can never be required as a test of truth. The utmost deficiency that can be charged against human faculties amounts only to this: that we cannot say that we know God as God knows Himself; that the truths of which our finite minds are susceptible may, for aught we know, be but the passing shadow of some higher reality, which exists only in the Infinite Intelligence."—Mansel.¹ "Everything which man sees, either with the eye of the body or with the eye of the mind, is in some degree an appearance different from the reality; God alone sees the perfect reality of things—God alone knows or can know absolute truth."—Hiller.² F. V. 3. See **Knowledge, Knowing, Character of.**

***RELIGION.**—"Homage to the Deity in all the forms which pertain to the spiritual life, in contrast with Theology, the theory of the Divine nature and government."—C. F. V.

Religion, Definition of, Philosophical, Recent attempts at.—Beneke: "We can form to ourselves an idea of the kingdom of God, but the actualizing of this idea cannot be the aim of our efforts. That would be a fruitless wandering in empty space. Our activity must select an aim more near and well defined."³ Chalybäus: "Morality (*Ethos*) and religion are at the beginning not conflicting, and in the consummation are no longer in antithesis, but brought into unity and harmonized, so that in man the religious principle and the ethical are mutual presuppositions."⁴ Feuerbach: "The good has its ground of sanctification in itself. Where there is morality in earnest, it takes its place as a divine

¹ *Limits of Religious Thought*, p. 149. ² *On Goodness, Wisdom, and Power of God*, p. 258, 12mo, Lond., 1858. ³ *Grundlegung der Physik der Sitten*, 99. ⁴ *System der Speculativen Ethik*, I. 63, 64.

power, in and of itself. If it has no ground in itself, then it has not an internal necessity of its being, and is abandoned to the fathomless arbitrariness of religion. As theology grounds ethics on the will of God, it sets up a principle of ethics which is arbitrary, immoral, annihilating the very basis of ethics, for the good has no other power than its own. There can be no ground of moral obligation to do what is good, beside the conception of the good in and for itself; and it is nothing but refined selfishness to do good not from love to the good but from love to God."¹ J. G. Fichte passed through several gradations of view which may be best understood by taking them in their chronological order. 1. Previous to 1799: "The true faith is a faith in the possibility of realizing the moral law; there is no other faith, and this faith lies in the striving to realize the kingdom of God. Virtue alone leads to true faith, for it alone brings us conviction of God as a moral being. By theoretical arguments we reach not the idea of God as moral, but simply as an Omnipotent Being, the admission of whose existence would be a matter of supreme indifference so far as the morally good is involved. The supreme cause of all moral progress we call God. He who acts morally believes practically in the unconditioned character of the moral, and in the possibility of carrying out the moral law, believes therefore in God. Faith in God cannot be the ground of morality. On the contrary, morality is the principle of faith—Faith comes from it. There is no such thing as virtue for the sake of God. The recognition of the moral law in us precedes faith in God."² 2. In his essay on the "Ground of our Faith in a Divine Government of the World" (1798),³ Fichte advanced views which subjected him to the charge of atheism. His words are cited in the article, **Order, Moral, of the World**. 3. In his "Appeal to the Public" (1799), called forth by this charge, he says: "Morality and religion are absolutely one; both are a grasping of the supersensuous—the first by doing, the second by believing. Religion without morality is superstition, which betrays the victim with a false hope, and makes him incapable of any reformation. What claims to be moral-

¹ *Wesen d. Christenthums*, 366; *Pierre Bayle*, 45, 100, 103, 277, note. ² *Vorlesungen von dem Jahre 1799*; *Zschr. v. Fichte*, xxiii. 214-217. ³ *Werke*, V., 185.

ity, yet is without religion, may indeed lead to an externally decent mode of life, but it is a life in which a man never loves the good and does it for its own sake. Those who say, 'Though a man be in doubt as to whether there be a God and immortality, he must still do his duty,' combine things absolutely incapable of union. Certainly the sense of duty does not rest on faith in God, but, on the contrary, faith in God and immortality rests on the sense of duty."¹ 4. In his "Characteristics of the Present Age," (1804), a modification of his earlier views is manifest: "The fear of God, or of the gods, is superstition, a remnant of heathenism, a superstition which philosophy has to correct. Where there are good morals and virtues, there is still religion, whether men know it or not. Internal, true religiousness does not come forth in phenomenon. It drives a man to nothing whatever which he would not have done without it; but it perfects him internally in himself. His morality obeys the command of duty implicitly, because duty commands, because this obedience is duty, without, however, understanding the command. Religion, however, opens to man the significance of this command as the one eternal law. The religious man grasps this law, and feels it living in himself as the law of the eternal unfolding of the One Life (of God)."² 5. In his "Guide to a Happy Life" (1806), he teaches a self-revealing will of God, and that we should love God. Here God has become to him personal. "It is purely impossible, it is a downright contradiction, that a man should love in two different sorts or have two aims. The love of God blots out absolutely, personal self-love. Only by the annihilation of the second do we come to the first. The love of God endures no other love with it. We must will the Will of God solely for its own sake, and not for the sake of happiness, not even of the happiness which attends it. The expression of the fixed frame of mind of the truly moral and religious man is the prayer: 'Thy will, O Lord, alone be done.' It has no will but that God's will be done. Everything which such a man purposes and steadfastly pursues, has for him value only because it is the direct manifestation of God, which he assumes in him as a distinct individual."³ 6. In his "System of Ethics," 1812, he

¹ *Werke*, V. 209, 210.

² *Werke*, VII. 228-233.

³ *Werke*, V. 519-535.

endeavored to rise from mere Ethics to Theology. "Ethics need know nothing of God, but it is not then Philosophy. A philosophy whose supremest principle is morality only, has not reached an end. Such is Kant's. Theology lying higher than Ethics shows that the conception is the image of God, and absolutely determined by His inward essence."¹ I. H. Fichte: "Religion is the living power of morality, a power which has become conscious of its origin, and which manifests itself ceaselessly in moral achievement. The fact of a power of will making itself known in us, a power which overcomes our self-will and selfishness, cannot be explained entirely by the subjective finiteness and individuality of our nature. We must recognize in it the properly superhuman in man, without which no morality would be possible. A dead, self-manufactured obligation of duty can never free us from the bonds of self, and its shifting, pitiful little aims. Morality without religion is inconceivable. Morality becomes religion; it is, on the side of the moral consciousness, religious, a consciousness of the inward bond with God; it is conscious that its power to work is from God alone. By this consciousness of the inward bond with God, the moral sentiment is exalted to a genuine personal assurance. The practical ideas are eternal, divine ideas. Religion, in its purest expression and in its completeness, is conscious morality, a morality which in virtue of that consciousness is mindful of its origin from God. Morality is perfected only by being interpenetrated with clearness and self-assurance, by reaching the grade of religion. Morality without religion is a mere instinctive insecure thing—an enigma. Religion without morality is a mere external belief—superstition conjoined with confidence in the merit of outward acts. Not until they come together can the moral character be complete. In religion lies the consummation of the moral process."² Frauenstädt: "The assertion of the theologians, that without faith no true virtue is possible, and that the virtues of the atheist are glittering vices, is ridiculous; the very converse is more nearly the truth—the vir-

¹ *Nachgelass. Werke*, III. 4-80. See *Religious Life in Germany*, by William Baur. Transl. by Mrs. Sturge, 2d ed., 1872, ch. viii. ² *Ethik*, I., 23, 51; II., I., ix., 10, 11, 188, 254, 255; II., 435; *Psychologie*, II., 189, 190.

tues of the theist, which are practised for the sake of God, are glittering vices." ¹ v. Hartmann: "When Ethics is separated from Metaphysics, it hovers in the air, and is at best a natural philosophy of human impulses and inclinations with reference to their consequences to society. Ethics in the true sense, as the science of the actuality which is to be corrected, is possible only as the basis of a monistic metaphysics." ² Hegel: "The ideality of morals must obtain an absolute shape, so that, as God of the people, it may be looked at and worshipped. Right and morality have, for the people, their ultimate test only in the form of an actual religion. Only in so far as man knows of God as spirit, and of the determinations of spirit, are these determinations essential, absolute determinations of rationality, of that in general which is duty in him, and immanent in him. In morality, the harmony of religion with actuality, with the world as it is, is brought to existence and perfection." ³ Hülsmann: "The living, felt relation of the soul to God gives a moral sanctity to life." ⁴ Kant: "Religion is the knowledge of all our duties as divine commands." "Moral religion is the religion of a good course of life." "It consists in regarding, in all our duties, God as the law-giver entitled to universal reverence." "Morality is the harmony of the maxims of our action with the law."—See Mellin. ⁵ v. Oettingen: "Without religion, there can be no moral organic shaping of life. All moral norms of life to which we feel ourselves bound, go back to a faith in an absolute will, and an absolute law. The personal relation of sentiment toward God is the principle and basis of morality." "Morality and religion are not to be separated. 'Thou shalt' always points us to an intelligent ordainer of the world." "That is morally good in the objective sense which harmonizes with the will of God, which reveals itself in the world; and morally good, in the subjective sense, is the will in which that divine will has become the motive of internal impulsion." ⁶ O. Pfleiderer: "Moralism without religion

¹ *Sittliche Leben*, 271-273; *Blätter f. litt. Unterh. von 1851*, Nr. 132, 1187. ² *Selbst-Zersetzung des Christenthums*, 84. ³ *Werke*, I., 400; see Krauth's *Berkeley*, 104. ⁴ *Phil. Monatshefte von Bergmann*, II., 88. ⁵ *Kunstsprache*, s. v. ⁶ *Moral-Statistik*, I., 598, 814, 815, 956, 970, 971.

professes to seat the ethical spirit of man in himself; in fact, in so doing, it seats it in the air, withdraws from its feet the firm ground, the establishment in an absolute principle. For wherein are we to suppose that the ground of obligation to the moral law lies? Not in the plurality of individuals; not in society. Moral obligation can lie only in dependence on the absolute will of God. In the struggle of actual life, morality destitute of religion grows lame; it is devoid of the enduring power of patient and hoping persistence; a power which is possessed by religion alone, which exalts man above the world in making him bow before God. Morality destitute of religion is more stubborn, more harsh, more rigorous, in the proportion in which it is more earnest; the autonomic moral person is ordinarily destitute of mildness and love, that love which comes forth only from faith. As, nevertheless, morality is dependent on religion, and must constantly correct itself by it, so does it exercise on religion a reflex influence, in opposition to quietistic mysticism, against a heartless religion of the head, and against an external spurious piety. Virtue is the reception of the will of God into our own will."¹ Plank: "The moral is the purely immanent law of the mind itself, and not a course of conduct toward an objective power, which can only be an object of the moral action, and can never be the ground of the internal determination of the moral itself."² Riehl: "If the moral ideas are to have an influence on life, they must be secularized. Henceforward, men are not going to project their ideal and their moral aims into an imaginary world to come."³ Schelling: "The tendency of the soul to be one with its centre, God, is morality. The soul ought to be wholly one with God, so that it would be impossible for it to act otherwise than in accord with the idea of God. It is no more a question about following God's commands; for the soul which is in identity with God, there is commandment no longer; it acts in conformity with the necessity of its nature. It is false to derive God from morality, because if there were no other reason, no morality is the morality of *man*, there is no morality which the individual as such can give himself. It is an abomina-

¹ *Wesen der Religion*, 119-123, 337. ² *Die Weltalter*, I. 300. ³ *Philosoph. Monatshefte*, VIII. 177, 181.

tion to wish to deduce God from morality, as if God were a family medicine, to be taken as a tonic for morality. It is the deepest perversion to suppose morality first, and to put God after it. Without God, man can be nothing. But that of which God is the spring is not bare morality. It is more than this. It is religion. The first meaning of religion is conscientiousness, the highest unity between what we know and what we do, which makes it impossible that what we do should contradict what we know. The man to whom this is in a divine manner impossible, we call religious, conscientious in the highest sense of the word. To the conscientious man, it is impossible to act otherwise than right. We call those men of God, in whom the knowledge of God passes at once into action. To him who is in identity with God, neither command nor reward is necessary. He acts in conformity with the internal necessity of his nature."¹ Schopenhauer: "Experience has shown that the arrangements of the law and police are not entirely sufficient for the aims of society, and this has suggested the theory that morals are dependent entirely on religion."² D. F. Strauss: "In man's struggle with his sensuality and selfishness his own moral longing is not enough; he wishes for himself a purity and perfection which he knows not how to procure of himself, which he may hope to attain in the blood of the Redeemer, by faith. Yet the moral way seems to be the only true and right way to reach the goal of his wish; the religious way seems to be the way of a pleasing self-delusion."³ Trendelenburg: "Man transmutes the shall into a will, when he wills what he should, when he wills what God wills. The ethical principle is therefore to be apprehended thus: We are to take things and determine them in accordance with the divine determination."⁴ Ulrici: "The ethical feeling stands in original unity with the religious, and is of one and the same origin. In religious feeling the existence and works of God make themselves known, and thus man conceives of the ethical determination of his life, and thus the feeling becomes a feeling of duty. Thus the religious and the ethical feeling reciprocally com-

¹ *Philosophie u. Religion* (1804); *Werke*, I., 1. 55; *System der gesamten Philosophie* (1804), Do., 556-565; *Moralisch. Freiheit* (1809), Do., VII. 392. ² *Grund-Probleme*, 186.

³ *Alle u. neue Glaube*, 134, 135. ⁴ *Naturrecht*, ed. 2; 25, 40.

plete each other. Especially does the feeling of duty involve a feeling of the being and essential attributes of God. The religious and the ethical feeling are not indeed absolutely identical, but they belong directly and inseparably together. In the religious feeling there is an immediate revelation of the metaphysical side of God; in the ethical feeling there is an immediate revelation of his ethical side. Both feelings are, however, but a feeble and tender, though devout affection of the soul." ¹ "On the point of view assumed by science, ethics is the basis of religion, and of the philosophy of religion, not the converse." ² Waitz: "Moral conceptions arise from a totally different source from that of religion. It is a mistake to deduce the two from conscience as a common root." ³—See Riehl, above. Wirth: "Our moral consciousness is the source of our cognition of the divine will, not the converse, that religious faith is the source of morals. When we have once derived our ethical notions from the moral consciousness, we are compelled to find their ultimate verification in the idea of a holy primal will; and philosophical ethics itself, if it is to be thorough, will rise to its pinnacle in the religious moral life; but ethics cannot make its start from the religious principle." ⁴ Zeller: "While theology habitually regards morality, in its ultimate respect, as a relation of man to God, and explains the moral law as a positive divine command, it lies in the essential nature of philosophy to regard moral duty as necessary in and of itself, and moral action as directly demanded by the very conception of man. In man and his own proper nature, we are to seek the root of morality and the ground of the distinction between good and evil." ⁵—See Steudel. ⁶

Religion, Philosophy of, the science of religion; the application of philosophical principles to the discussion of its general character, origin, and claims. It presents: I. Religion in general. II. Revealed religion. III. The Christian religion. IV. The Christian Church.—Stöckl. Apelt (1860), Beneke (1840), Chateaubriand, Denzinger (1857). Fichte, Hegel (*Werke*, XI.), Kant (*Religion innerhalb*, with Kirch-

¹ Leib u. Seele, 719-722. ² Naturrecht, 97, 98. ³ Anthropologie der Natur-Völker, I, 324.

⁴ Ztschr. v. Fichte, xlv. 65. ⁵ Theologische Jahrbücher, vi. 29, 33. ⁶ Philosophie im Umriss, II., i. 324-336.

mann's notes), Krug (1819), Pascal (*Pensées*), Otto Pfeleiderer (1869), Hein. Ritter (1858, 1859), Arnold Ruge (1869), Schleiermacher (*Monologen*), F. X. Schmid (1857), Spinoza.

***REMEMBRANCE, REMINISCENCE, RECOLLECTION**, "recalling of past experience, whether voluntarily or involuntarily."—C. F. V.

*Reminiscence, Reminiscency. *Reminiscence, according to Plato.¹

REMISSION, cessation of intenseness, as of the mind in thinking.—Locke.

REPLETIVE, filling.

REPOSE, in Æsthetics, the character of harmony and proportion in works of art which gives rest to the eye and to the mind; the opposite of glaring, obtrusive, sensational.

REPRESENT (Lat.), to make present, to bring before; to show, exhibit.

REPRESENTATION, in Hamilton,² as re-presentation, second presentation, the faculty or "power the mind has of holding up vividly before itself the thoughts which by the act of reproduction it has recalled into consciousness." In Kant, representation (*Vorstellung*) is the genus which covers every mental determination, every modification of mind, whether accompanied by consciousness or not. For the Kantian and Hamiltonian usage of this term and associated terms, see Krauth.³

REPRESENTATIVE, of or pertaining to representation —It is applied to the *idea* in perception, to *experience*; as opposed to *presentative*, to *knowledge*, to *perception*.

REPRESENTING, Capacity or Faculty of; REPRESENTATION, Capacity or Faculty of, Receptivity of; REPRESENTATIVE POWER—the faculty or possibility possessed by the mind of having *representations*.

REPRODUCE, in the Critical Philosophy, to present again to the mind, through the imagination, the sensations previously experienced.

REPRODUCTION, the capacity, faculty, or act by which the mind reproduces. In Hamilton,⁴ "the process of recovering the absent thought from unconsciousness — not its representation in consciousness."

¹ See *Meno and Phædo*, 72, E. ² *Lect. on Metaph.*, xxxiii., p. 450. ³ *Annoted. to Berkeley's Principles*, 337-340. ⁴ *Lect. on Metaph.*, xx. 275.

Reproduction, Synthesis of, in the Critical Philosophy, an element of empirical intuition furnished by the self-activity of the imagination and understanding. — See **Apprehension** and **Recognition**.

REPRODUCTIVE FACULTY, in Hamilton,¹ the third of the special cognitive faculties; "the faculty of recalling knowledge out of unconsciousness into consciousness — commonly confounded with the conservative, under the name of memory, but most erroneously."

REPUGNANCE, OPPUGNANCE, in the Critical Philosophy, a concept of reflection, in which the determinations of things are in such a relation that their consequences annul each other, if they are united in one subject. I have debts of just three dollars, and have just three dollars to pay my debts. I pay, and the result is, I have no debts and no dollars. — Mellin.

RESEMBLANCE (Fr.), likeness, conformity. — See **Mill**.²

RESENTMENT. — "Antagonism of feeling directed against a person on account of some act done by him in violation of our own rights or the rights of others." — C. F. V.

RESERVATION, MENTAL, in Ethics, the keeping back in the mind; *equivocation*, by phrase which means one thing to the users, and another to those who hear it.

RESIDUAL PHENOMENA, in Logic, **Residues, Method of**, in Induction: "Subduct from any phenomenon such part as is known by previous inductions to be the effect of certain antecedents, and the residue of the phenomenon is the effect of the remaining antecedents." — J. S. Mill,³ Jevons.⁴

RESISTANCE, quality of not yielding to force or external impression, the opposition of "body to the entrance of any other body into the place it possesses." — Locke. Hence, Resistibility.

RESOLUTION (Lat.), untying; in Logic, analysis; solution; explanation; especially of a sophism.

RESPECT (Lat.), looking at, regard; in Logic, relation of concepts, in which one member can be considered as the source of the other. The source is *terminus relationis*; the derivative is *subjectum relationis*. Used in Metaphysics, when two objects, or a mental representation and its object, are in such

¹ *Lect. on Metaph.*, xx. 275. ² *Logic*, Pt. I., b. v., § 6. ³ *Logic*, Book III., ch. 10.

⁴ *Lessons in Logic*, Less. xxix.

relation that the one is in whole or in part the ground of the other.—Mellin.¹

REST (Lat. *Quies*; Fr. *Repos*; Ger. *Ruhe*), "cessation or absence of motion;" "abiding presence in the same place." It may be distinguished as either absolute, complete, perfect; or as relative, respective. The former is ideal. All the rest presented in experience is relative. There is nothing in the universe known to be in absolute rest.—See **Motion**.

RESTAURATION (Lat. *Restauratio*), restoration, renewal.

RESTITUTION (Lat. *Restitutio*), restoring; restoration; giving back; replacing; reinstating.

RESTRAIN, RESTRINGE, RESTRICT (Lat.), to limit; in Kant, applied to the limiting or conditioning of the categories by the Schemata.

RESTRICTION (Lat.), limitation; as, R. of freedom.—See Steudel.² R. mental, mental reservation.

RESTRICTIVE, in Logic, applied to a proposition in which the predicate is limited to a part of the content of the subject-concept, and this part itself is expressed; as, "a king, *as a man*, is the equal of the bondman;" "Man, *as rational*, is superior to the other animals."

RESULTANT, that which comes from, as the result.—"The properties of a compound are *resultants* of the properties of its components."—Spencer.³

RETAIN (Lat.), hold, keep fast; as, the mind retains ideas.—Locke.

RETALIATION (Lat.), return of like for like; in Ethics, return of like evil for evil.

RETENTION.—"The conservative power in our nature by which we keep in possession knowledge received."—C. F. V. See **Conservative Faculty**.

RETENTIVE, having the power of retention; as, R. faculty.—Glanville. Hence, Retentiveness, as R. of memory.—Sir M. Hale.

RÉTINA (Lat.), continuation and expansion of the optic nerve at the back of the transparent parts of the eye, upon which the pictures of external objects fall as objects of vision.—L. J.—Carpenter,⁴ Herbert Spencer,⁵ Ulrici.⁶

¹ Wörterbuch d. Kritisch. Philosophie, art. Beziehung. ² Philos. im Umriss, II., 1. 85.

³ Data of Biology, ch. i., § 1. ⁴ Hum. Physiology, 1864, § 606. ⁵ Princip. of Psychology.

⁶ Leib u. Seele, 2d. ed., 1874, 226-267.

RETORSION, RETORTION, RETORT (Lat.), twisting back; bending back; turning or casting back; driving back; flinging back; as, R. of an argument, turning it against the man who uses it; R. of a charge, making the charge against the bringer of it. In international law, retaliation.

RETRIBUTION (Fr.; Lat.), paying back; applied especially to the rewards and punishments in which God, as a moral judge, marks the character of human actions.

REUS (Lat.), a party to an action (*Res*), either plaintiff or defendant; afterwards restricted to *the party accused*, defendant, prisoner; a party obliged, or under obligation, to do or pay anything; one answerable or responsible for anything; a debtor; one guilty of any crime or condemned to any punishment.

REVERIE, REVERY.—"Castle-building, a kind of waking dream."—Ancillon.¹

REVIVIFICATION, vivid renewal, as of impressions made in early life.

REVOLUTION (Lat.), a rolling back, return to a former place or condition; change. R. is moral, political, social.

REVOLUTIVE, capable of revolving, carefully meditating.—Feltham. L. J.

REVOLVE (Lat.), to turn round in the mind, carefully to weigh and consider.

REWARD.—Recompense for good. It is one part of *Retribution*, q. v.

RHETORIC, PHILOSOPHICAL, the application of philosophical principles to the definition, constituent elements, laws and applications of eloquence and oratory.—Stöckl.²

RHODOSTAUROTIC (Gr.), of the Rosy Cross; used by B. Jonson for *Rosicrucian*, of which it is a Greek equivalent. L. J.

***RIGHT**, "*adj.*", describes the quality of an action as in conformity with moral law; *subst.*, the claim of a person upon others consequent upon the equal subjection of all to moral law."—C. F. V. J. S. Mill:³ "The following ambiguities of the word *right* (in addition to the obvious and familiar one of a *right* and the adjective *right*) are extracted from a

¹ *Ancillon Ess. Phil.*, II. 162; quoted in Hamilton's *Lect. on Metaph.*, 459, and from Hamilton, in Dr. Forbes Winslow, *Obec. Diseases of the Brain and Mind*, ch. xii.

² *Lehrb. d. Philosophie*, I. 10. ³ *Syst. of Logic*, pt. v., ch. vii.

forgotten paper of my own, in a periodical:—‘Speaking morally, you are said to have a *right* to do a thing, if all persons are morally bound not to hinder you from doing it. But, in another sense, to have a *right* to do a thing is the opposite of having no *right* to do it, i. e., of being under a moral obligation to forbear doing it. In this sense, to say that you have a *right* to do a thing, means that you may do it without any breach of duty on your part; that other persons not only ought not to hinder you, but have no cause to think worse of you for doing it. This is a perfectly distinct proposition from the preceding. The *right* which you have by virtue of a duty incumbent upon other persons, is obviously quite a different thing from a *right* consisting in the absence of any duty incumbent upon yourself. Yet the two things are perpetually confounded.’”

Right, *adj.*, and Right, *subst.*—Right, relatively used, refers to a superior end; Right absolutely used; Rights must exist; Rights separately proved; five primary kinds of, are realities; *Rights* and *Right*. *Jus*, the doctrine of rights and obligations.—Whewell.¹ *Jus* of rights and obligations; Rights in general; R. of the person; R. of property; R. of contract; R. of marriage; R. of Government, or States Rights;² international *Jus*, Rights and obligations between States; R. of War; International R. of property; R. of jurisdiction; R. of intercourse.³ For Fichte's and Hegel's theory of right or rights, see Schwegler.⁴ See **Jurisprudence, Jus.**

ROMANTIC.—“The real and proper use of the word *romantic* is simply to characterize an improbable or unaccustomed degree of beauty, sublimity, or virtue. For instance, in matters of history, is not the Retreat of the Ten Thousand *romantic*? Is not the death of Leonidas? of the Horatii? On the other hand, you find nothing romantic, though much that is monstrous, in the excesses of Tiberius or Commodus. So again, the battle of Agincourt is *romantic*, and of Bannockburn, simply because there was an extraordinary display of human virtue in both these battles. . . . So, then, this feeling,—this secret and poetical enthusiasm in all your hearts, which, as practical men, you try to restrain—is, indeed, one

¹ *Elements of Morality and Polity*, 3d ed., 1854, B. I., ch. iv. ² *Do.*, B. IV. ³ *Do.*, B. VI. ⁴ Stirling's Translat., 270-273, 336.

of the holiest parts of your being. It is the instinctive delight in, and admiration for, sublimity, beauty, and virtue, unusually manifested." — Ruskin.¹

Romantic, as marking a classification in Philosophy — opposed to the *Classical*.—"The Romantic represents originally the mode of apprehending and shaping art and the beautiful which sprang forth from the modern Romanic nations. It is identical with the sentiment of the mediæval life in general, or is transferred to us through this life. These two fundamental conceptions, which we are in the habit of taking into consideration in adjusting our view of the relations of the æsthetical in history, have in certain respects a wider signification, and should be employed in part in classifying or distinguishing particular tendencies in philosophy." "Kant was a decidedly classic spirit." "The entire recent speculative idealism of the German Philosophy which followed Kant is of an essentially romantic type. Schelling, Fichte, Hegel, belong in part to this tendency." — C. Hermann.²

***ROSICRUCIANS.**—Robert Fludd.³

RUDIMENTARY, very imperfectly developed; applied by Darwin⁴ to organs or parts "bearing the plain stamp of inutility." It is associated with *Aborted* and *Atrophied*, "arrested in development at a very early stage."

***RULE**, in Hegel. — See Wallace.⁵

***SABAISM, ZABAISM, SABIANISM.** — See Gale,⁶ Gibbon,⁷ Sir W. Jones,⁸ Prideaux,⁹ Sale,¹⁰ Stanley.¹¹ L. J.

SAINT-SIMONISM, a system, philosophical and social, founded

¹ On Sculpture, lect. 2. ² *Der Gegensatz d. Classischen u. d. romantischen in d. neueren Philosophie*, 1817. ³ Fludd wrote *Apologia Opendiaria, fraternitatem de Rosa Crucis suspiciens et infamæ maculis asperam abluta*, 8vo, Leyd., 1616; *Tractatus Apologeticus integritatem Societatis de Rosa Crucis defendens*, 8vo, Leyd., 1617; and under the anagram of Rudolphus Otreb *Tractatus theologi-philosophicus de vita, morte, et resurrectione, fratibus Rosæ Crucis dicatus*, 4to, Oppenheim, 1617. ⁴ *Origin of Species*, 397, and *Glossary*, 430, 431. ⁵ Translat. of Hegel's *Logic*, 173. ⁶ *Chart of the Gentiles*, 1671, pt. ii., b. i., ch. iv., § 6. ⁷ *Roman Empire*, ch. i. ⁸ *Discourse on the Persians*. ⁹ *Old and New Testam.*, connected, pt. i., b. iiii.; *Life of Mahomet*, 1723, p. 73. ¹⁰ Transl. of *Koran*, Prel. Disc., sect. i. ¹¹ *Hist. of Philos.*, 1662, pt. i., sect. i., vol. iv., pp. 81-85.

by Claude Henri, Count de Saint-Simon (1760-1825); Socialism. It involves the abolition of all hereditary privileges, radical modification of the laws of property, the exaltation of labor above capital, equality of the sexes. Bazard and Enfantin were adherents of this system. Fourier and Louis Blanc represent the same general tendency with special modifications.

SALTUS (Lat.), a leap, spring; violent transition; in Logic, a jumping at a conclusion. In Metaphysics, in the principle *in mundo non datur salus*—in the world there is no violent transition. This is the law of continuity, and marks the gradation characteristic of nature in her changes.

*Same. *Sanction.

SANGUINE (Lat.), of blood, blood-colored, abounding in (arterial) blood; one of the four chief temperaments, *q. v.*

*Savage and Barbarous.

*Scepticism, Skepticism.

SCHELLING (F. W. J. von, 1775-1854), **PHILOSOPHY OF, SYSTEM OF, SCHELLINGISM**.—1. Originally, the philosophy of Identity, the doctrine of the absolute identity of the Ideal and the Real, of being and of thinking; pantheistic Philosophy of Nature. 2. Ultimately, a positive and historical Philosophy, divided into: *a.* a purely speculative part, the negative philosophy or "doctrine of potencies;" and *b.* a part applied to history and tradition, the "positive philosophy" as a theory of the divine essence.¹

***SCHEMA** (Gr.), form, shape, figure, conformation; character, characteristic property; sketch, outline, plan, scheme, geometrical form, diagram; in Aristotle's *Organon*, mode of a syllogism.—1. In the Leibnitzian system, the name of a principle essential to each monad, and constituting its proper character, and without which the monads would be indiscernible. 2. In Kant, the purely mental modification which results from the general procedure of the imagination in providing for a Notion its image. When a square, triangle, and circle are drawn in our presence, we say these are figures; that is, in the word figures we give to the three individual intuitions their image, we bring them under their schema. We can draw figures or a figure, but we cannot

¹ *Werke*, 14 vols., 1856-1861. *Life*: Michelet, 1843; Plitt, 1869-1871.

draw figure. To bring under their schema is to determine the class to which they belong, the classes always constituting general notions.—Lossius. It is “a mere skeleton of a concrete thing or group of things—an outline image—an extremely abstracted whole.”—Porter.¹ 3. The schema of an idea, or of a science, is the plan of its parts.—Kant.²

Schema Transcendental, in Kant, the reduction of a pure or *a priori* notion, that is, a category, to the sphere of sense, by connecting it with phenomenon.

SCHEMATISM, the reduction of a Notion to the sphere of sense.—1. To the explication of our cognition—the S. of analogy. 2. To the enlargement of our cognition—the S. of the determining of the object. The *Schematism of pure reason* is the act of the transcendental imagination which produces a schema; the procedure of the understanding with this schema; the mode in which the understanding transfers its unity thought of as general, transfers it to the general form of all intuition; and the mode in which spontaneity and receptivity act in the production of cognition.

SCHEMATISTIC, of the nature of the schema; S. construction. S. hypotyposis.

SCHEMATIZE, in Kant, to render a notion comprehensible by analogy with something sensible.—C. C. E. Schmid.³

SCHEISIS (Gr.), habitude; state of anything with respect to others.—Norris. L. J.

*Scholastic.

***Scholastic Philosophy, Scholasticism**.—According to Cousin,⁴ it has three epochs: 1. From the eleventh century to the thirteenth, and the organization of the university of Paris. This is the infancy of scholasticism. 2. From the thirteenth to the fifteenth century. This is the age of its manhood—when all the great universities of Europe and the great religious orders flourished. 3. From the fifteenth to the close of the sixteenth century. This is the period of its decay. And if from scholasticism you eliminate theology, it will be found, as a philosophy, to be the quarrel between nominalism and realism. This quarrel may also

¹ *Hum. Intellect*, 268. ² *Rein. Vern.*, 861. ³ *Wörterbuch*, s. v. ⁴ *Œuvres inédites d'Abelard*, Introd., p. 45.

be said to have three epochs: 1. Its birth, occasioned by a phrase of Porphyry's. 2. After the struggles of this period succeeded the apparent reign of one of the opinions. 3. The opinion which had been vanquished during the first period, and condemned to silence during the second, revived and triumphed in the third; and its triumph was the time of scholasticism. Of these three periods, the second forms the golden age of the philosophy of the Middle Ages. It is the age of the Dominicans, Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, and Vincent de Beauvais; of the Franciscans, Alexander de Hales, Bonaventura, Duns Scotus, and Roger Bacon.—F. V. 3.

SCHOOL.—1. Particular system of doctrine, with its adherents.
2. Scholastic.

SCHOOLMAN, writer or adept in the scholastic method.

SCHOPENHAUER (Arthur, 1788–1860), **Philosophy of, System of**; see **Pessimism**.—The world is my mental representation; the principle of cognition is the proposition of the ground; the thing in itself is the Will, which comes into phenomenon in things; the intelligible character in man is free, defined by man himself; the empirical character is determined; affirmation and negation of the will to live; asceticism; starvation.¹

***SCIENCE.**—"Rationalized knowledge. It is identical in meaning with philosophy; but, as matter of convenience, the word 'science' has come to be applied to the philosophy of physical existence; the word 'philosophy' to the science of mental existence."—C. F. V. For the different views on the question whether philosophy is entitled to be considered a science, see Steudel.²

***Sciences** (the Occult). ***Scientia** (Media). ***Sciolist**.

***SCIOMACHY.**—"Conflict with imaginary foes."—C. F. V.

SECOND INTENTION.—See **Intention**.

***Secularism**.

SECUNDI ADJACENTIS, of the second adjacent; an expression in incorrect Latin applied to a grammatical sentence or proposition containing only two parts, the subject and verb, without a distinct copula.—Jevons.

***Secundum Quid**.

¹ *Werke*, 6 vols., 1873, 1874. Frauenstädt: & *Lexikon*, 2 vols., 1871. Krauth's *Berkeley, Prolegomena*, 105–122. Harris: *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, I. 61, 232; VIII. 316, et al. ² *Philosophie im Umriss*, I., i. 23–25.

SELECTION NATURAL. — See Darwinism.

SELF "is that conscious, thinking thing, whatever substance made up of (whether spiritual or material, simple or compounded, it matters not), which is sensible or conscious of pleasure and pain, capable of happiness or misery, and so is concerned for itself, as far as that consciousness extends." — Locke.¹ See **Ego**, **Person**.

Self, in its combinations, is very varied. **S. Activity** (Ger. *Selbstthätigkeit*), in Kant,² "absolute freedom, the first in the series of conditions in respect of causes."

S. Approbation, **S. Approval** (Ger. *Selbstbilligung*), in Kant,³ "the subjective operation of the law upon feeling, so far as the pure practical reason is the sole cause."

S. Consciousness, in Kant,⁴ "Apperception, the mental representation of that which is the condition of all unity, yet is itself unconditioned," the Ego. "The knowledge which the mind has of itself in every form of experience." — C. F. V. See Steudel.⁵

S. Contradictory, in Logic, applied to a term which combines contradictory attributes or qualities.

S. Determination, a determination whose motive force lies within the person acting. — See **Liberty Human**, **Necessity**.

SELF-EVIDENT, "carrying the evidence of truth in itself. A self-evident proposition is one whose terms need only to be understood in order that it may be accepted as true." — C. F. V.

***SELF-LOVE**, "a rational regard to one's own good." — C. F. V.

*Selfishness.

*Sematology.

SEMILOGICAL, in Logic, applied to fallacies distinct from the purely logical. They are the first six enumerated under *Fallacy*, q. v.

***SENSATION**, "the feeling which is the result of a single impression on any part of the sensitive organism." — C. F. V.

*Sensation and Perception.

SENSATIONALISM, "the theory which makes sensation the sole origin of human knowledge. Its formula is, *nihil est in*

¹ *Hum. Underst.*, B. II., ch. xxvii., §§ 17-25. ² *Rein. Vern.*, 446. ³ *Practisch. Vern.*, 143. ⁴ *Rein. Vern.*, 139 (401). ⁵ *Philosophie im Umriss*, I., i. 99-106; II. 62-65.

intellectu, nisi prius fuerit in sensu" (C. F. V.),—there is nothing in the understanding which was not previously in the sense.

***SENSE, SENSES.**—Dr. T. Brown,¹ Whewell.²

***Sense and Idea.** ***Senses** (Reflex).

SENSED, perceived by the senses.—Glanville. L. J.

***SENSIBILITY**, "capacity for receiving impressions belonging to the extremity of the nerves of sensation, wherever situated in the body. This stands in contrast with *sensation*."
—C. F. V.

***Sensibles**, Common and Proper.

***SENSISM, SENSUALISM**, or **SENSUISM** (see **Sensationalism**), in Ethics, the regarding of the gratification of the senses as the highest good, and pain as the highest evil.

***SENSITIVITY**, Sensibility, *q. v.*

SENSORIUM, SENSORY.—Hartley,³ Sir I. Newton,⁴ Spencer.⁵

SENSUAL (Lat.).—1. *Metaphysical*, endowed with feeling or sensation; sensitive.—Tertullian.⁶ 2. *Ethical*, devoted to the pleasures of sense.

SENSUALISM.—1. Sensationalism, *q. v.*; opposed to intellectualism. 2. See **Sensual**, 2.

SENSUALITY, character of the *sensual*, *q. v.*, whether metaphysical or moral.

***Sensus Communis.**

SENTENCE, INDICATIVE, in Logic, the grammatical equivalent of a proposition, or of a number of propositions.

SENTIENT, *adj.* and *noun*, mark the power or act of sensation or perception.

***SENTIMENT**, "a form of feeling consequent on a judgment. Moral sentiments are forms of feeling dependent upon judgments as to the moral actions of ourselves and others."—C. F. V.

***Sentiment and Opinion.**

SEPARABLE, is applied to accidents which can be changed; opposed to *inseparable*, which can never be changed. Hence, Separability, Separableness.

SEQUENCE, order of succession.—Mill.⁷

SERIAL, of or pertaining to a series.—Spencer.⁸

¹ *Phil. of Mind*, lect. x. ² *Nor. Org. Res. Aphor.*, b. 1., aph. 1.—v. ³ *On Man*, vol. i., p. 97. ⁴ In L. J. ⁵ *Princ. of Psychol.* ⁶ *Anim.*, 43. ⁷ *Log.*, pt. 1., ch. v., § 6. ⁸ *Biology*, pt. II., ch. x., § 98.

SERIES, sequence, order.—Mill.¹

SEYN (Ger.), translated *Esse*, or Being, and signifying bare, empty existence, admitting of no predicates.—See **Werden**, **Wesen**.

*Sign.

SIGNIFICATES OF A TERM are things denoted or signified by it.

SIMILARS, SUBSTITUTION OF, a principle developed by Jevons (1869), in cases in which one term agrees with another to the extent of being identical with it.

***SIMILE**.—See **Metaphor**.

SIMPLE.—See **Apprehension**, **Conversion**.

SIN.—See **Evil**.

*Sincerity.

SINGULAR.—See **Term**. Applied also to a proposition which has a singular term for its subject.

SOCIAL, relating to society.—Mill.²

***SOCIALISM**, "the theory which advocates community of property, on the ground of the abrogation of personal and individual rights."—C. F. V. See **Saint-Simonism**.

SOCIALIST, adherent to the theory of Socialism.—See **Latham**.³

*Society (Desire of). *Society (Political, Capacity of).

SOCIOLOGY, or **SOCIAL SCIENCE**, "treats of the laws of the social development of the human race."—C. F. V.

SOLIPSISM.—1. In Ethics, egotism; 2. In Metaphysics, egoism, *q. v.*, limiting existence to the single self of the thinker.

***SOMATOLOGY**.—See **Nature**.

SOME, in Logic, sometimes equivalent to all.—De Morgan.⁴

SOMETHING, that which has real existence; an entity; opposed to **nothing**, *q. v.* Kant⁵ classifies the notion of Something, thus: 1. According to Quantity, object with form—*ens phenomenon*. 2. According to Quality, concept with object—*ens reale*. 3. According to Relation, form with object—*ens substantiale*. 4. According to Modality, object with concept—*ens possibile*.

SOMNAMBULISM (*somnus*, sleep; *ambulo*, to walk), sleep-walking.—"The state in which the sleeper prosecutes active exercise, with observation of external objects, and definite

¹ *Log.*, pt. iv., ch. viii., § 4. ² *Logic*, pt. vi., ch. ix., § 3. ³ *Johnson's Dictionary*, s. v.

⁴ *Syllabus*, § 14. ⁵ *Rein. Vernunft*, 348; Metklojohn, 207, 208; Mellin, *Marginalia*, 78.

purpose in his efforts. In this state the eyes are commonly open, but bear no evidence of exercise in perception. Yet external objects are recognized, and are avoided or utilized as occasion requires."—C. F. V. See Carpenter,¹ Horstius,² Richter.³—F. V. 3. Gleisberg⁴ and Perty⁵ both have a story of a fisherman who, finding "that the fish were gone from his live-box, in the morning, set a trap for the supposed thief. He was caught in it himself. He had gone night after night, in a somnambulic condition, and had unlocked the live-box, and let the fishes out." Schopenhauer: "In somnambulism, in its original and proper sense as morbid sleep-walking, there takes place, as in magnetic slumber, a *dreaming of the actual*, which reaches, however, only to what is immediately around, because that is sufficient for the aim of nature in a case of this sort. For a condition of this sort is not like that of magnetic sleep, of spontaneous somnambulism, and of catalepsy; the vital force does not in it, as it does in them, as *vis medicatrix*, suspend the animal life to concentrate its entire strength on the organic life, that it may be able to remove the disorders which are prevailing in that life. On the contrary, in consequence of a morbid state, to which the age of puberty is most subject, it here presents itself as an abnormal superfluity of irritability, which Nature tries to throw off, by the walking and climbing in sleep. At the same time Nature calls forth a guardian of the sleeper in these perilous steps, in the form of a *dreaming of the actual*, which extends in these cases only to what is immediately around, because this is sufficient in these cases to prevent accidents. The dreaming of the actual has therefore, in these cases, only the negative aim of preventing injuries, while clairvoyance has the positive aim of discovering aid from without; in this originates the great difference in the range of vision in the two cases."⁶ "Not always are the objects of our dreams illusory; there is a condition in which we sleep and dream, but we dream what is actually around us. This condition is not as remote from waking as

¹ *Princip. of Human Physiology*, 1853, § 827. ² *De Natura differentiis et causis eorum qui dormientes ambulant*, Lips., 1593. ³ *Dissertatio de statu mixto somni et Vigiliæ, etc.*, Goeth., 1756. ⁴ *Seelenleben d. Thiere u. Menschen* (1861), 166, § 244. ⁵ *Blicke in d. verborg. Leben des Menschengeistes* (1869), 65. ⁶ *Parerga*, 2d ed., I., 277.

the condition of the ordinary dream. In waking from it the change which takes place in us is merely *subjective*; we suddenly perceive a change of the organ of our perception. It is this sort of dreaming which has been called *sleep-waking*; not as if it might be a state between sleeping and waking, but because it may be designated as a being awake in sleep itself. It would be better to call it *Wahrträumen* — dreaming the true.”¹

Somnambulism, as associated with Magnetism, Animal Magnetism, and Clairvoyance, Attempts to Define its Character, on the part of those who accept it as established.—La Saulx: “The soul stands in connection with the soul of the world and with God, and in prophetic moments the individual soul is plunged into the total soul, in the great universal sense of the life of nature, and of the world of man.”² Schelling: “The animals are natural somnambulists, and all nature is in somnambulism.”³ Schopenhauer: “The brain with its consciousness isolates the human individuals; the unconscious portion, on the contrary, the vegetative life with its ganglionic system, is a common life of all, by means of which, in exceptional cases, they are even able to hold communication.”⁴ “Animal magnetism, sympathetic cures, magic, second sight, dreaming the actual, visions of spirits, and visions of every sort, are allied phenomena, branches of one trunk, and give sure and irresistible indications of a nexus of beings which rests upon a wholly different order of things from that of *Nature*, whose basis is the laws of space, time and causality, while this other order lies deeper, is more primal, and more direct. Hence, before it the first and most general laws of nature are invalid, inasmuch as they are purely formal; here, consequently, time and space no longer separate the individuals, and the dissociation and isolation which rest on the purely formal no longer impose inseparable barriers to the communication of thoughts and the immediate influence of the will.”⁵ “In magnetic somnambulism the consciousness is duplicated: two series of cognitions arise, each coherent in itself, but completely distinct from

¹ *Parerga*, 2d ed., I., 254-267. ² *Prophetische Kraft der Menschlichen Seele* (1778, quoted in Stendel, *Phil. im Umriss*, I., li. 172. ³ *Werke*: Abtheilung I., Bd. vii. 251.

⁴ *Welt als Wille*, II., 372. ⁵ *Parerga*, I., 282.

the other; the waking consciousness knows nothing of the somnambule. But the will retains in both the same character, and remains throughout identical, manifesting in both the same inclinations and aversions. For though the function may be duplicated, the essential nature cannot be."¹ Wirth: "The perception of somnambulists is the perception of the Total Life which streams through all things; the somnambulists are immersed into the ganglionic animal life, that life which in itself immediately feels after and feels with the Universal Life."²

*Sophism, Sophister, Sophistical, Sophistry.

*Sorites.

SORTAL, marking sort or species.—Locke. L. J.

*Soul.

SOUL, Attempts in Modern Philosophy to Define.—Baggesen :

"It is not *I* that think, but *it* thinks in me; and it is not *I* that am, but *it* is something in me."³ Carus: "There are three stages of development in the psychic life: unconscious psychic life, consciousness of the world, and self-consciousness, represented by plant, animal, and man; the soul of man passes successively through the three stages, ultimately conserving them by comprehending them into one threefold being in himself."⁴ Chalybäus: "Spirit is a substance, immediately immanent in thinking, or of which thinking is immediately the form of activity; spirit is thinking substance — the soul is dynamically present in the entire organism."⁵ Cornelius (of the School of Herbart): "Beyond doubt the psychical phenomena are the result of a reciprocal action of diverse real essences." (Herbart's "Reals.") "Therefore we are compelled to suppose that there must be a real essence as the substantial bearer of all psychical conditions. This essence is the soul. It must stand with other real essences in causal relation, in order to the generation in it of manifold internal conditions. In brief, the soul needs the body, the body needs the soul."⁶ Drossbach: "In the organism, formed of atoms, which are spiritual essences, one unfolds its spiritual force to the point of self-consciousness; this

¹ *Welt als Wille*, 3d ed., II., 276. ² *Theorie des Somnambulismus*, 222. ³ *Ztschr.* v. Fichte, xxxiv. 153. ⁴ *Vorlesungen über Psychologie*, 133. ⁵ *Ztschr. von Fichte*, xx. 69. ⁶ *Ztschr. für exacte Philosophie*, IV., 99-102.

atom, which as gasiform atom interpenetrates the entire organism, and occupies space as a centre, is the soul. It is invisible, but a local and not unphysical essence. The mass of the brain is an organized state of living essences, which are directed by one of their own number in the midst, as a choir of music by their leader."¹ Erdmann: "When many single constituents give up their separation and individuality in order that an internal aim may hold them together, so that each serves the other and in this serves itself, they form a soul-endowed totality — they have a soul. Soul is in this point of view that by which a composite becomes an actual whole in accordance with an aim immanent in it."² Fechner: "The phenomena of body and soul hang together as internal and external phenomena of the same essence. This primary essence is, however, nothing more than the conjunction of phenomena themselves in the unity of a general consciousness. The soul becomes aware only of its own proper phenomena, the body becomes aware only through that which appears of it to the soul itself. It is a common essence which appears externally as body, internally as soul."³ J. G. Fichte: "The Ego posits itself, that is, itself and its being, by virtue simply of its being. That whose being (essence) simply consists in positing itself as being, is the Ego, as absolute subject. As it *posits* itself, it *is*; and as it *is*, it *posits* itself. The Ego is consequently absolutely and necessarily for the Ego. What is not for itself, that is, is not conscious of itself, is not Ego. The question is sometimes started: *What* was I before I came to self-consciousness? The natural answer to this is: *I* was not at all, for I was not Ego. The Ego is, only in so far as it is conscious of itself.—The possibility of the question involves a confusion between the Ego as *subject*, and the Ego as *object* of the reflection of the absolute subject, and is in itself wholly inadmissible. It is a question which involves the substratum of consciousness. In putting it, we unawares *add*, in thinking, the *absolute subject* as having in its intuition that substratum; that is, in thinking, we add unawares the very thing which we ought to keep abstract, and are

¹ *Harmonie der Ergebnisse d. Naturforschung*, 101–120, 229. ² *Psychologisch. Briefe*, 1851. ³ *Physical. und philosoph. Atomlehre*, ed. 2, 258, 259.

thus involved in self contradiction. We can think nothing without thinking into it our Ego, as conscious of itself; we can never make an abstraction from our self-consciousness; consequently, no questions of the class we are considering can be answered." "In the Ego, being and consciousness coincide, and there can be no existence of the Ego without self-consciousness, and no self-consciousness without an existence of the self." "The substance is the totality of its accidents; nothing more is embraced in it than the accidents; analyze the substance, and nothing is reached but accidents. An enduring substance, or, if you please, a bearer of accidents, is not to be thought of; one accident supports another." "The soul is no more than nature; it is phenomenon of the internal sense. But we must frame a better notion of nature than that it is a dead material thing; we must think of it as spiritual. Nature is a formal image of the absolute, and its supreme point is man."¹ I. H. Fichte: "The fact of self-consciousness can only be explained on the supposition that the soul is a real essence, distinct from the organism, capable of reflection upon itself, that is, of consciousness." "No dualistic theory has the power to establish an objective doctrine concerning man. It can do this neither in its fundamental view, nor in the particular results deduced from it." "We may comprehend the results of our examination in the three propositions which follow: *a.* The spirit of man is individual substance. *b.* The faculty of consciousness ('representation'), which is properly attributed to it, is its original attribute, by no means coming to it simply *per accidens*. *c.* The spirit, finally, is not simply this empty faculty of representation, a mirror which contains nothing, which waits for something from without to fill it (by 'experience'), but it possesses primarily (pre-empirically) certain fundamental tendencies, whose operation emerges in the process of consciousness, in which they come into view." "Soul and body are diverse substances, but in the most intimate union and mutual interpenetration." "The soul, as a complex of conscious activity, requires, of necessity, a real substratum. It is the idea of its body." "Every soul

¹ *Grundlage d. ges. Wissenschaftslehre* (1794, 1802). *Werke*, I., 96, 97, 204-207, 231, 270-246, 460-463; II., 242, 579, 611, 642; V., 264; *Nachgelassene Werke*, I., 85, 271, 362.

acquires for itself an organic body." "The external material body is but the changing image of the internal process of soul and life."¹ Friedrich Fischer: "No soul, no spirit, exists without corporeal basis. The soul does not dwell in the interstices of any organ, as, for example, the brain, but dwells through the entire organ, and pervades it, and is omnipresent within the nervous system. Man takes over into himself the vegetable and the animal to humanize it. Spirit is but a higher-potency, a mere continuation of development of the animal soul, and the animal soul itself is a mere exaltation of the vital force of the plant. These three principles are in man, in virtue of his self-consciousness, comprehended into one and the same Ego."² Fortlage: "We are not spirits in antithesis of the body, but members in the universal spirit, which is the basis of the entire universe."³ Frohschammer: "The soul is a substantial essence. The inmost essence, the Ego, is unattainable to our cognition."⁴ German: "The soul is the principle of the unity of our spiritual bodily organism, the internal central unity of the functions of life. It is related to the body as form to matter. It can as little exist without body as form can exist separate from matter. Nor can the body exist without the soul; both develop and involve each other. The soul permeates the entire body; is omnipresent in every molecule of it. The substratum of the psychical, however, is one which is extended through the entire world, and linked into one system by universal force."⁵ Göschel: "Remembrance is the heart of self-consciousness, and of consciousness, by which the two come to what they embrace; it is the condition of the identity of the Self with itself."⁶ Griesinger: "Soul without respect to the body, and the converse, are not to be thought of; the conception of the unity of the two is to be held fast. The soul of man appears first of all as that unity—which pertains to the animal soul also—which may be compared with accord or harmony. It appears also as a higher and conscious unity, as from the

¹ *Zuschr.*, xii. 246; xxv. 176-178; *Anthropologie*, 90-101, 170, 257, 286; *Seelenfrage*, 23; *Psychologie*, 64; *Seelenfortdauer*, 53, 62, 104, 156-159, 296. ² *Metaphysik*, 36-38; *Sitz der Seele*, 8, 16. ³ *Zuschr. von Fichte*, xxx. 281. ⁴ *Athenäum*, II., 116, 119. ⁵ *Schöpfungsgesetz u. Weltstoff, oder die Welt im Werden*, 66, 123-132. ⁶ *Zuschr. von Fichte*, xxiv. 221.

alternations of the states of the soul, one unity, seemingly abiding, collects itself, the Ego. The brain seems constantly burdened with a multitude of modifications, of which a vast majority abide in dim repose, while only a few intensive ones come forth to the light of consciousness."¹ Hegel: "The pure reference to myself—the reflection in which I no longer refer myself to some other, but refer myself to myself, or am object to myself—this is the Ego, the root of the infinite being itself. It is the complete abstraction from all that is finite. The Ego as such has no contents given by nature or immediate, but has only itself as contents, as it is only by means of abstraction from every other. This pure form is at the same time its contents. At first the Ego is the purely indeterminate. It can, however, by its reflection, pass from indeterminateness to determinateness; for example, to seeing and hearing." "The Ego is thinking; 'I think' is an identical proposition. Ego is perfectly simple. We can, in the sense in which we are Ego, say we think always, for Ego is always the simple identity with itself, and that is thinking." "The body is the same life as the soul, and yet they may be spoken of as lying asunder. A soul without body would be nothing living, and the converse is true. The existence of the notion is its body; the body obeys the soul which has brought it forth. The germs have the tree in them, and embrace its total force, though they are not yet the tree itself. The tree corresponds entirely to the simple image of the germ. A body which did not correspond with the soul would be a pitiful thing." "The soul posits and produces itself; it has a body in itself, not without which it composes one total and actual, and in which it is omnipresent." "The soul generates the unity of the body, and is its permeating vital force."² Herbart: "We have no cognition of what is strictly the essence of our soul—we cannot reach the Ego itself with our consciousness. We can only reach it in the constantly shifting modifications, as it thinks, feels, wills, especially as it possesses the power of representation. The Ego represents itself as self-representing; the Self again is the self-representing, and so on infi-

¹ *Pathologie u. Therapie d. psychisch. Krankheiten.* ² *Werke*, XVIII., 21, 93; XV., 339; V., 16; VIII., 22, 23.

nately. Thus we have a representing without anything represented, which would be a manifest contradiction, a perpetual circle; and we are forced to confess that the Ego is itself unknown, possesses no representation of itself, consequently is no Ego. The Ego is a complexio of purely accidental marks, a complexio which, when all these marks are separated from it, is equivalent to zero. If we remove the individual distinction, nothing is left but an empty place. We should, in this case, have to think of our Ego as a mathematical point in the centre of things. The Ego knows itself only as a limitless train of representations. The question, therefore, What is the Ego? is eternal and unanswerable." "These representations are the self-pervations of the Ego." "The soul is a simple essence without parts, and without plurality in its quality, whose intellectual manifoldness is conditioned by a varied concurrence with other and yet other real essences. In this concurrence the soul remains as a simple subject with manifold modifications working together and counterworking."¹ Horn: "The Ego can as little be demonstrated as the world can. There is no room for more than faith in its reality. If we propose to penetrate to the substance of the soul, we must make an abstraction of it from the accidents, sensations, perceptions, etc. When we do this, however, nothing remains but the pure, empty Ego—an empty notion, a constant echo which can only repeat itself. That the Ego, nevertheless, does not surrender its unity, lies in the continued consciousness which, however, has its ground in feeling only."² Kant: "The Ego, as subject or substratum of all inhering accidents, is substantiality. It is in this case alone we can have direct perception of substance; we have, in fact, derived the notion of substance in general from the Ego. The Ego is an absolute unity, and, as it is no object of outward sense, is immaterial; and though it is present in space, and operates in it, occupies no space, and has no special place in the body." "As simple substance, it does not rise or pass away in accordance with the laws of nature; it is not begotten with the body, nor is it dissolved with it. The body is, rather,

¹ *Werke*, I., 193; IV., 280, 281; V., 109, 267-286, 289; VI., 228-259, 408; XII., 38-61.

² *Zur Philosophie*, 13-17.

but the form of the soul; and birth, life, and death are but the diverse conditions of the soul. Birth is not its beginning; rather, does that which had previously been in a spiritual life, come by birth into a prison, a cave which restrains it in its spiritual life." "The conception of soul can only be reached by deductions. It can be no concept of experience, and we know not how the soul enters into the body." "An immaterial thinking essence, endowed with consciousness, is a spirit. Spiritual essences are essences which are indeed united with a body, but which can continue their modifications, their thinking and willing, though they be separated from the body. If the soul can do this, it is of a spiritual nature. We can only think problematically of immaterial incorporeal spirits as possible; we cannot demonstrate their existence; nor, on the other hand, is it possible to adduce any *a priori* reason against them."¹ Kirchmann: "The existence of the soul consists in feeling and desire."² Kym: "Consciousness comes from the firmly founded relation of the mental modifications, a founding which implies a something, relatively in repose, which transcends in force the single modifications. This thing of relative repose is the Ego."³ Leibnitz: "The senses furnish the material for thinking, without which thinking would be impossible. Created souls and spirits cannot dispense with instruments of sense, and sense modifications. About what could a rational being think, if there were no movement, no matter, no senses? Hence, there is no rational creature without an organic body, no created spirit separated from all matter."⁴ Lichtenberg: "We know nothing in us but the existence of our sensations, mental representations, and thoughts. We ought to say, 'It thinks,' as we say, 'It lightens.' To say '*Cogito*,' is already to say too much, if we translate it '*I think*.'"⁵ Lotze: "The *what* of the soul, its nature, comes as little into view as does the essential nature of things in general; the essential nature of the soul in itself remains unknown to us, before it comes into a situation within which alone its life unfolds itself. Though the coming forth of an

¹ *Vorlesungen über Metaphysik*, 138-254; *Werke*, VII., 60-78. ² *Philosoph. Monatshefte von Bergmann*, I. 437. ³ *Zachr. von Fichte*, xxix. 253. ⁴ *Nouveaux Essais sur l'entendement humain*, 171. ⁵ *Vermischte Schriften* (1844), 70, 99.

intellectual condition cannot be derived from those attributes of matter to which we have respect when we call it matter, yet there is nothing to forbid our supposing that in the corporeal element there is besides those attributes a treasure of inner life, which finds opportunity for manifestation in what we call intellectual life. The visible substance may carry on a double life, externally appearing as matter, internally, on the contrary, moved intellectually. But the fact of the unity of consciousness compels us, in the explanation of the intellectual life, to put in the place of that visible substance a supersensuous essence as supporter of the phenomena,¹ and to suppose that there is a completely indivisible unity in the subject which exercises the comprehending activity of consciousness. Thus we attain a conviction of the supersensuous unity of the soul. The soul is also the focus into which flow together the movements of the bodily life which play hither and thither. The soul neither arises from the body, nor from nothing, but goes forth from the substance of the infinite with the same substantiality which pertains to all the actual in nature, which has sprung from the same infinite source. The soul neither comes fortuitously to this or that particular body, nor does the body create the soul by its organization; rather are souls a creation of the Infinite, who, in this creation, proceeds by a self-given law. Our personality is not, however, compounded of body and soul; rather does our true essence lie exclusively in the soul, and the body is but the most intimately affianced part of the external world, which a higher power has given us as exclusively our own." "The definite seat of the soul is in the brain, in a structureless parenchyma, into which all the nerve-filaments run together." "The spirit is something higher than the soul. In the spirit is the unity of our being, our true Ego. The soul is but an element in its service. At death the soul passes away, the spirit ripens to a new existence."² Maimon: "The soul is a substance; that is, it must be thought of by us as the same Subject in diverse conditions, if its modifications are to be regarded as possessed of objective reality."² Mehring: "The human soul is a self-compre-

¹ *Mikrokosmos*, I., 72, 163-180, 207, 209, 341, 427; II., 135-139, 143; III., 571; *Streitschriften*, I., 138. ² *Vorrede zu Baco's Neues Organon*, 81-83.

hending, personal being, whose essential character is that it becomes itself object and problem of investigation, cognition, and science." "The soul is neither subject nor predicate, but the copula, the movement, the energy, which unites the two." "In the sphere of the inorganic the soul reveals itself as *anima mundi*—soul of the world; but it would be an error to identify this with God. In the elementary, this psychic shows itself as movement; in the crystalline, as formation. In the organic it comes to unity of the material itself, and changes it into its own nature."¹ Planck: "The organizing and spiritual principle is in its origin corporeal, for only the corporeal can work upon the corporeal; spirit, therefore, is only possible as the internal personality of a corporeal being."² Reiff (following J. G. Fichte): "The Ego is the constant process of detaching ourselves from nature, and of being in nature, object to ourselves."³ Rosenkranz: "Spirit is the idea cognizing itself. This definition is sufficiently general to cover both the divine and human spirit."⁴ Schaller: "It is thoroughly wrong to say that the soul is something which has percipience, is a percipient subject, for such language really means that the soul is a lifeless thing which lives, an impercipient thing which has percipency. The soul is rather the act of perception itself, and this process is its substantiality. It is percipient subject, in virtue of the fact that at every moment it exalts the divisible corporeity to an articulate indivisible whole."⁵ Schelling: "My Ego is only so far, and can be thought only so far, as it thinks itself; it is only because it thinks itself, and it thinks itself only because it is. It brings itself forth by its thinking—by absolute causality."⁶ These citations are from Schelling's earlier or Fichtean period. We now give some from his later writings: "The Ego, or human spirit, abstracted from its powers and acts, is nothing. The soul is not something existing in itself, and which could consequently exist if it neither felt, nor thought, nor willed." "The soul, as it exists by relative antithesis to the body,

¹ *Philosophisch-kritisches Grundsätze der Selbsterkenntnis oder Seelenlehre*, I., §§ 1-18: III., §§ 96, 97. ² *Wissenschaft d. Natur*, viii. 270-272. ³ *Wichtige Punkte von d. Philosophie*, 2-6, 53. ⁴ *Epilogomena*, 76; "*Meine Reform*," 17. ⁵ *Leib u. Seele*, 24, 25, 122, 140; *Zschr. v. Fichte*, xxi. 65-67. ⁶ *Werke*, I., i. 96, 97, 167.

consequently not in itself, appears only by this antithesis as determined to existence. It is on the one side, one with the body, and on the other it is the infinite cognizing. To the soul, so far as it is finite, we must ascribe all the relations which are of necessity ascribed to the body. In its infinite cognizing, the infinite thinking has become objective. On this being, at once subjective and objective, infinite and finite, rests the Ego. It is the unity of the subjective and objective." "There is no such thing as a body opposed to the soul." "We give the name of spirit to the power which, in its being exterior to itself, still abides with itself."¹ Schellwien: "The soul, the consciousness *a posteriori*, is nothing but the individual being, so far as it is conscious, and can neither be, nor be thought of, apart from that individual being." "Human monads have existed from eternity; otherwise they could never emerge into phenomenon."² Schopenhauer: "The individual is not thing in itself, but is phenomenon only. It is purely impossible for us to be conscious of ourselves, independently of the objects of knowing and willing. When we enter into ourselves, and begin to reflect on ourselves, we lose ourselves in a fathomless emptiness, in a darkness in which all cognition ceases, and we grasp nothing but an insubstantial spectre. The Ego itself remains after it all a riddle. The soul has no definite seat in the brain. The notion of an immaterial soul dwelling in the brain has nothing to justify it. It is an hypothesis without foundation and without utility, to which nothing has led but timidity in the presence of the question, How the brain can think."³ Schwarz: "The rise of the subjective spirit is a self-lifting of the one profoundest essence presenting itself in the universe. The subjective spirit is at once the consummation of nature, and specifically different from nature. The human soul, which is essential spirit, is energy over the body, and entelechy in itself. The subjective spirit is at once microcosmos, and microtheos. It is microcosmos as the loftiest pinnacle of nature; it is microtheos as the consummation of the self-revelation of God."⁴ Strümpell: "The word Ego implies a very com-

¹ *Werke*, II., 193-195; IV., 283-290; V., 270; II., II., 57. ² *Seyn und Bewusstsein*, 117, 122. ³ *Welt als Wille*, I., 327, Anm. ⁴ *Gott, Natur u. Mensch*, 71-74; *Noack, Jahrbücher*, I., iv. 64-67.

plicated process of thought, dependent on multifarious causal relations."¹ Tittmann: "The soul in its dim unconscious nocturnal life is far more than in its consciousness."² Ulrici: "The Ego in each *individual moment*, in which it knows and speaks of itself, designates no more than the soul in some or other of the definite modifications proper to it—designates it as sentient (feeling), concipient, willing soul over against the individual objects of consciousness. Only in such a determinate modification, which we are to distinguish from the unity of its essence, is the soul in each individual moment of consciousness immanently objective to itself. But to these individual mutable moments are opposed a continuity and steadfastness of self-consciousness, and by the side of the multifarious, variously shifting contents there comes into play at every moment the consciousness of the unity and identity of the Ego; and this consciousness, though it may be dim and undefined, attends every act of our intellectual life. The Ego which now apprehends itself as sentient, or percipient, now as putting forth effort, willing, etc., knows itself at the same time as one and the same, the same abiding self. It is but an expression of this consciousness of unity when we speak of our own soul, and impute to it this or that predicate; that is, when we distinguish our own soul, with its manifold characteristics, from ourselves, and in this act, implicitly contrast ourself as unity with the mutation and manifoldness of our intellectual life; or when we ascribe to our Ego consciousness and self-consciousness, and thus distinguish the Ego from ourselves, the Ego from the Ego." "The Ego is but the one unchanging power and activity of the distinction itself; it is that through which alone consciousness and self-consciousness arise. This power we apprehend as our own inmost self, and distinguish it from the limited Ego of self-consciousness; it lies enduringly as the basis of the unchanging unity of consciousness and self-consciousness, through all the alternation of that which passes through them. Thus the fundamental distinctive character of the soul lies in that one fundamental power of the distinction which is constantly operative in the same way." "The substance of the spirit consists in the

¹ *Ztschr. v. Fichte*, xxvii. 164.

² *Aphorismen*, 84.

activity distinguishing itself in itself, by which the spirit posits itself as the unity of manifold moments."¹ Weisse: "The psychic life is to be regarded, if not as a product of matter, yet as an educt of matter."² Wirth: "The ideal, which exists in all points of the body as the simple unity, and as constantly incorporates itself, as it returns from the outer into itself, is the soul of the body. The spirit is something ideal, which without the body as a substratum, and without the expression through the bodily senses, could not be thought of and could not operate extrinsically. It is but the ideal form of the body, and the body is therefore the necessary organ of its activity. It is the unsensuous power of the body; no power, therefore, and consequently not the soul, can be thought of without such a sensuous substratum. The body, on the other hand, is the ideal form of the soul; that which is originally formed by the soul, or constantly coming into formation." "Spirit, or soul, and body in man are the different life-poles of one and the same human primary essence. The spirit is the primary essence as reflexive unity with itself, as controlling personality, true entelechy, existing for itself, infusing soul into the bodily organism."³ — See Porter,⁴ Steudel.⁵

***Soul of the World.**— Anima mundi, *q. v.*

SOUND, the sense-perception of which the ear is the organ. — See Porter,⁶ Ulrici.⁷

***SPACE.** — See Aristotle,⁸ Sam. Clarke,⁹ Crusius,¹⁰ Des Cartes,¹¹ Epicurus,¹² Hamilton,¹³ Hobbes,¹⁴ Kant,¹⁵ Leibnitz,¹⁶ Locke,¹⁷ Herbert Spencer,¹⁸ Whewell.¹⁹

Space and Time.— See Time and Space.

SPECIALIZATION, the restriction of a name to a narrower

¹ *Glauben und Wissen*, 64–66; *Zeitschr. von Fichte*, xxxvi. 232, 234; *Gott u. die Natur*, 414–417; *System der Logik*, 343, 344. ² *Ztschr. v. Fichte*, xxix. 36–54. ³ *Theorie des Somnambulismus*, 175–191, 202, 203; *Zeitschr. v. Fichte*, xxxiv. 107. ⁴ *Human Intellect*, 6–99, 137, 180. ⁵ *Philosophie im Umriss*, I., il. 3–114. ⁶ *Human Intellect*, 143. ⁷ *Leib u. Seele*, 268–292. ⁸ *Ausc. phys.*, IV., 14, seq.; *Buhle Gesch.*, I., 312; *Lehrb.*, II., § 294. ⁹ A collection of papers, 1717. ¹⁰ *Buhle Gesch.*, V., 29; *Lehrb.*, § 2013. ¹¹ *Princip. Philos. Pars Secund.*, §§ x.–xiv. ¹² *Diogenes Laertius*, I. x., §§ 38–42. ¹³ *Discussions* (Am. ed.), 36, 572; *Logic* (Am. ed.), 73, 74; *Metaphysics* (Am. ed.), 346, 401, 525; *Reid*, 841–847, 861, 878, 882. ¹⁴ *Philos. Prima*, ch. vii. ¹⁵ *Crit. d. rein. Vernunft*, 37–59. ¹⁶ *Opera*, Erdmann, xcix. ¹⁷ *Hum. Understanding*, Book II., ch. xiii. ¹⁸ *Principles of Psychology*. ¹⁹ *Philos. of Inductive Sciences*, pt. i., b. ii., ch. ii., § 1.

class, the extension being decreased and the intension increased — opposed to Generalization.

Specialization, special determination.—Spencer.¹

SPECIALIZE, differentiate or determine in a special manner.—Spencer.²

***SPECIES** (Lat.), a seeing; that which is seen, outward appearance; that which is seen by the mind, idea, notion; the particular thing at which we look, particular sort, kind, or quality (Ger. *Art*).—In the scholastic use a special idea was called a species, a common nature agreeing to several individuals, as horse is species to the name of a particular horse, *e. g.*, Goldsmith Maid. In Logic, genus and difference make the species, as rational and animal constitute man, so that in reality the species contains the genus, that is, implies it. In the philosophy of nature, Whately says, "Species, when applied to organized beings, is always applied, when we are speaking strictly as naturalists, to such individuals as are supposed to be descended from a common stock, or which might have so descended; to wit, which resemble one another, to use Cuvier's expression, as much as those of the same stock do." Prichard says, "the meaning attached to the word species is very definite and intelligible; it includes only the following conditions, namely, separate origin and distinctness of race, evinced by the constant transmission of some characteristic of organization." Dr. Carpenter: "When it can be shown that two races have had a separate origin, they are to be regarded as of different species; and in the absence of proof, this is inferred when we see some peculiarity of organization, characteristic of each, so constantly transmitted from parent to offspring that one cannot be supposed to have lost, or the other to have acquired it through any known operation of physical causes." T. Vernon Wollaston: "While genus is merely suggestive of a particular position which a creature occupies in a systematic scale, species expresses the actual creature itself, belongs to a single race alone, which it therefore exclusively indicates." Darwin: "In considering the origin of species, it is quite conceivable that a naturalist, reflecting on the mutual affinities of organic beings, on their embryological relations, their geo-

¹ *Prin. of Psychology*, p. 607.

² *Induct. of Biology*, pt. II., ch. vii.

graphical distribution, geological succession, and other such facts, might come to the conclusion that each species had not been independently created, but had descended like varieties from other species; but such a conclusion, even if well founded, would be unsatisfactory, until it could be shown how the innumerable species inhabiting this world have been modified so as to acquire that perfection of structure and co-adaptation which most justly excites our admiration." Darwin's answer has stamped his name upon the system. Owen: "One main aim of Cuvier's successors is, and long will be, to determine whether there be any point at which the mutation of a species necessarily stops."—See Carpenter,¹ Darwin,² Owen,³ Prichard,⁴ Whately,⁵ T. Vernon Wollaston.⁶

SPECIES AND ORGANISMS (Rise of).—See **Darwinism**. Steudel.⁷

*Species in Perception.

SPECIFIC, determining species, or determined by species.

SPECIFICATE, mark by notation of specific qualities. Sir M. Hale.—L. J.

*Specification, Specificness (The Principle of). *Specification (Process of).

***SPECULATION**.—The *speculative* part of philosophy is metaphysics; "that which carries us into a region transcending experience, and which has, therefore, been named transcendental."—C. F. V.

SPINOZISM, the **System of Spinoza**, Pantheism—God the one Substance, phenomenal beings its modes.⁸

SPIRIT.—See **Mind**, **Soul**.

Spirit and Ego.—See **Ego**, **Soul**.

Spirit and Matter.—See **Matter**.

SPIRITUALISM.—1. The doctrine of the substantiality of spirit—opposed to Materialism. 2. The doctrine that spirits manifest their presence by rapping and similar manifestations.

SPIRITUALITY, of the nature of spirit, immateriality, as S. of the soul.

¹ *Princip. of Physiology*, 1851, § 737. ² *Origin of Species*, 2. ³ In *Brande and Cox's Dictionary*. ⁴ *Physic. Hist. of Mankind*, b. ii., ch. i., sect. 1. ⁵ *Logic*, b. iv., ch. v., § 1. ⁶ *Variation of Species*, ch. vi. ⁷ *Philosophie im Umriss*, I., i. 407–478. ⁸ See Spinoza, Works in *Philosophische Bibliothek*, with notes by Kirchmann; editions by Gfrürer (1830), Bruder (1843–1846); *Ethics*, Tr. by Willia, 1870, D. D. S., New York (Van Nostrand), 1876.

***SPONTANEITY, SPONTANEOUSNESS**, "the characteristic of an occasional act, springing from the single and immediate operation of the laws of exercise belonging to a mental power. We have examples of spontaneity in the unexpected play of memory, or in the rise of pity at the sight of suffering. Spontaneity thus stands contrasted with the uniform play of fixed law in the physical world, and with mental activity, which is the result of volition."—C. F. V.

*Spontaneous.

***STANDARD OF VIRTUE**, "is, 1. primarily, moral law; 2. proximately, the Divine Will; 3. ultimately, the moral perfection of the Deity. It is the law of God, whether discovered by conscience or presented in Revelation."—C. F. V.

***STATE OF MIND**, "an expression employed to describe each successive form of our experience, however complex."—C. F. V.

*Statistics.

STATUTE (Lat.), a thing laid down or decided; ordinance. Hence **Statutory**, enacted by statute, applied in ethics to morality. —Steudel.¹

***STOICS**.—In morals, their maxim was to live agreeably to nature (*ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν*). —See Diogenes Laertius, *Zeno. Oxford Essays*, 1858.—F. V. 3.

SUBALTERN (Lat.), one under the other: the propositions A I, and E O are called *subalterns*; or we may say more exactly that I and O are respectively the *subalternates* of A and E, each of which is a *subalternans*. I and O are *subcontraries*, each of the other, the name connoting a less degree of contrariety than exists between A and E. *Subaltern* also marks all intermediate genera and species of the chain from *summum genus*, to *infima species*. —Jevons.

***SUBJECT, OBJECT (Subjective, Objective)**.—1. Substance. 2. *Subject*, the mind; *object*, that on which the mind's attention is directed, whether it be something within or something without. *Subjective*, pertaining to the mind, as observant or reflective. *Objective*, pertaining to the thing on which the mind's attention is directed; having validity or reality apart from the mind's contemplation. —C. F. V.

Subject, in Logic, the first term of a proposition, the *underlying*

¹ *Philosophie im Umrisse*, II., i. 206-232.

matter, about which something is asserted—opposed to *predicate*.

Subject-Object, the mind itself as object of its own perception.

SUBJECTIVE (SUBJECTIVELY), of or pertaining to the subject, in Logic, and Metaphysics, applied to the sense of terms. De Morgan:¹ to appearances in motion. Sir I. Herschel:² to vanity and impatience. Schwegeler:³ to principles of thought and sense; the form of knowledge. T. H. Stirling:⁴ to the self-dependent act of thought. Whewell.⁵

Subjective, in *Æsthetics*, to mark art as influenced by the individuality of the artist—as in Rubens and Rembrandt.

***Subjectivism**.

***SUBLIME (THE)**.—See Dr. T. Brown.⁶

SUBORDINATE, in Logic, marks one clause or proposition which forms a part of the subject or predicate of another.

SUBREPTION (Lat.), obtaining by unfairness; fallacy produced by false impressions on the senses; fallacy in Logic, produced by carelessness, wandering of mind, or haste.

***SUBSISTENTIA**, subsistence.

***SUBSTANCE**.—Coleridge,⁷ Ingleby,⁸ Latham,⁹ Mill,¹⁰ Spinoza,¹¹ Whewell.¹²

Substance, Notion of.—See *Ousia*. Aristotle: 1. "The abiding which changes only in its affections." 2. "The indwelling form which unites itself with matter." 3. "The three substances are matter, nature, and the individual, which is the product of both." 4. "Substances are the primary, and were they transitory, everything would be transitory."¹³ Dea Cartes: "A being which so exists as to need for its existence no other being."¹⁴ J. G. Fichte: "The totality which is determinate determinability;" "the members of a relation, singly considered, are accidents; their totality is substance. We are not to think of an enduring substratum, a support of accidents."¹⁵ I. H. Fichte takes in general the view of Herbart. Hegel: "Substance is the absolute;" "the absolute, however, is not to be apprehended simply as

¹ *Syllabus of Proposed Syst. of Log.*, §§ 114–117. ² *Outlines of Astronomy*. ³ *Hist. of Philos.*, Stirling's transl., 1868, p. 438. ⁴ *Secret of Hegel*, Vol. I., 127, 132. ⁵ *Hist. of Scientif. Ideas*, 1858, Vol. I., p. 35. ⁶ *Phil. of Hum. Mind*, Lect. lvii. ⁷ *Aids to Reflection*, p. 6. ⁸ *Intro. to Metaphys.* ⁹ *Logic*. ¹⁰ Vol. I., p. 60, 1866. ¹¹ *Ethics*, Def. Bk. I. ¹² *Philos. of Induct. Sciences*, b. vi., ch. iii., § 2. ¹³ *Metaphysik*, B. I., VII., VIII., XII. ¹⁴ *Hauptschriften* (K. Fischer), 186. ¹⁵ *Werke*, I., 201, 202; II., 563.

substance, but also as subject."¹ Herbart: "The thing in which the marks inhere; none other than the unknown unit, the positing of which represents all those positings which primarily belong to the marks." "The subject which is missed, which is lacking in our cognition, but cannot be lacking in nature." "The supporter of the attributes of a thing, their substratum." "Thus the notion of the thing vanishes, and the notion of substance takes its place. We have believed that we knew the thing—the substance remained unknown. When we note that the things cannot be the sums of qualities, we transmute the things into substances." "The substances are real essences, equivalent to the monads of Leibnitz."² Kant: "The abiding, superior to change." "The subject, as opposed to the predicate." "Anything, especially the Ego, from which the notion of substance is derived." "Matter and body are not substance, but only phenomena of it." "The substantial is the something in general." "The ultimate subject of existence, that which does not pertain as predicate to the existence of another."³ "Schelling, in his Bruno, adhered to the common view of substance, as that which is essential in things, over against the accidental. Subsequently he concurs in the definition by Spinoza, and identifies substance with the absolute, though he considers the individual finite things as substances so far as the absolute substance is presented in them."⁴ Schopenhauer: "The notion of substance is nothing more than a broader abstraction of the notion of matter."⁵ Spinoza: "That, the notion of which needs the notion of nothing else. It is necessarily infinite, and there is no substance but God."⁶ Wirth: "Identical with the notion of the individual essence, and is either fundamental essence or potential essence."⁷ See Hitchcock.⁸

***Substance (The Principle of).**—From Substance, Substantiality.

SUBSTITUTION.—See **Similar.**

SUBSTRATUM, substance.—Locke.⁹

¹ *Werke*, II., 14, 42; V., 6-12. ² *Werke*, II., 245; IV., 103; V., 66; VI., 274. ³ See Stendel, I., 1. 307; Mellin: *Kunstsprache*, s. v. ⁴ *Werke*, I., iv. 244; II., iii. 216; I., II. 199, vi. 254, vii. 189, 203. ⁵ *Welt als Wille*, I., 582. ⁶ *Opera* (Gfrörer), 287-293. ⁷ *Zischr. von Fichte*, B. XXII., XLIV., XLVI. ⁸ *Soul and Substance* (N. A. Review, May-June, 1877). ⁹ *Hum. Underst.*, B. IV., ch. 6.

***SUBSUMPTION**, in Mill,¹ expresses the third mode of explaining a law by showing it to be a particular case of a more general law.

***SUCCESSION, SUCCESSIVENESS**.—See Ingleby,² Locke,³ Mill,⁴ Whewell.⁵

***Sufficient Reason** (Doctrine of).

SUGGESTION (Lat.), a heaping up; adding to; intimation. "Contribution to thought, either spontaneously from within, or by communication from without."—C. F. V.

***SUICIDE**, is more than self-killing, which may be accidental. S. may be either sudden or slow, and takes place even in insanity, where the volition acts, though in a diseased manner. Its moral responsibility is involved where men pursue a course not indeed *for the purpose* of killing themselves, but with a knowledge that it will kill them, as in drunkenness and sensuality. It is not to be confounded with a voluntary surrender of life for those great ends which God has taught us are more sacred even than life, as in martyrdom, service in a just war, rescue of the perishing.

SUICISM, egoism, selfishness. Hence, Suist.

SUI GENERIS (Lat., of its own genus or kind), applied to a thing so peculiar and unlike other things that it cannot easily be brought into one class with them.—Jevons.

SUMMUM.—See **Bonum, Genus**.

SUMPTION (*sumo*, to take), in Hamilton, the major premise of a syllogism.

SUPER (Lat.), above, beyond; in composition, as **Superconsequence**, remote consequence—Sir T. Browne; **Superessential**, Ellis; **Superethical**, Bolingbroke.

SUPERIOR, in Logic, applied to the higher or more comprehensive genus.

SUPERNATURAL.—"That is supernatural, whatever it be, that is either not in the chain of natural cause and effect, or which acts on the chain of cause and effect in nature, from without the chain."—Bushnell.⁶ "We may speak of whatever is supposed to be beyond the natural as *præternatural*. The phrase will apply not only to the divine action, but to

¹ *Logic*, Book III., ch. 12-14. ² *Introd. to Metaph.*, § 120. ³ *Hum. Underst.*, B. II., ch. vii. 9, ch. xiv. 6-12. ⁴ *Logic*, B. III., ch. v., § 1. ⁵ *Hist. of Scientific Ideas*, Vol. I., p. 142.

⁶ *Nature and the Supernatural*.

the agency of such beings as ghosts and demons—to all such operations as witchcraft and necromancy. We may reserve the phrase *supernatural* to the Supreme Being and to the works performed by Him, and to the objects created by Him beyond the natural sphere, such as angels and the world to come. We would confine the word *miracle* to those events which were wrought in our world as a sign or proof of God making a supernatural interposition or a revelation to man. We must not view creation as *supernatural*, but we do look upon it as miraculous.”—McCosh.¹

***Superstition.**

SUPPOSITION (Lat.), a placing under; *Hypothesis*, q. v.

SUPRA-MUNDANE, above, beyond, distinct from the world; applied to God; opposed to intramundane in the Pantheistic sense.

***Supranaturalism.**

SYLLABUS, abstract or compendium.—De Morgan.²

***SYLLOGISM** (see *Induction*), **SYLLOGISTIC**, **SYLLOGIZATION**, **SYLLOGIZE**, **SYLLOGIZER**.—See Bentham,³ Dr. T. Brown,⁴ De Morgan,⁵ Hamilton,⁶ Hegel,⁷ Hobbes,⁸ Locke,⁹ Mill,¹⁰ Stewart,¹¹ Whately.¹²

SYLLOGISTICS, doctrine, theory, science of syllogism.—Lambert,¹³ F. A. Lange,¹⁴ Trendelenburg,¹⁵ Ueberweg.¹⁶

***SYMBOL**.—See **Myth**. In Logic, a substitute, such as a letter of the alphabet, for the thing.—Whately.¹⁷

SYMBOLICAL.—See **Knowledge as . . Symbolical**.

SYMPATHETIC.—1. “Having mutual sensation; being affected either by what happens to the other; feeling in consequence of what another feels.” 2. Involving an occult relation between objects; as, S. cures, S. conveyances, “to confer at the distance of the Indies.”—Glanville. L. J.

***SYMPATHY**, marks an occult relation between objects.—See **Sympathetic**.

¹ *On the Supernatural*, pp. 146, 147. ² *Syllabus of a Proposed System of Logic*.—Pref.

³ *Rationale of Judicial Evidence*, b. iii, ch. x., § 4. ⁴ In L. J. ⁵ *Formal Logic*, ch. v.

⁶ *Discussions*, Art. IV., Append. II.; *Logic*, Lect. XV., XVI.; *Metaph.*, 175. ⁷ *Subjective Logic*, transl. by Bloman & Walton, ch. iii.; *Logic*, transl. by W. Wallace, §§ 181–193.

⁸ *Logica*, ch. 2–6; see Hallam, *Literature*, pt. iii., ch. ii., § 151. ⁹ *Hum. Underst.*, B. IV., ch. xvii. ¹⁰ *Logic*, vol. i., p. 234. ¹¹ *Elem. of Philosoph. of Human Mind*, 1854, p. 301. ¹² *Logic*, ch. iii. ¹³ *Neues Organon*, 1764, I., iv., §§ 229–233. ¹⁴ *Logische Studien*, 1877, 74. ¹⁵ *Log. Unters.*, 3d Aufl., II., 353 seq. ¹⁶ *Logik*, §§ 99 seq. ¹⁷ *Log.*, i., § 4.

***SYNCATEGOREMATIC**.—See **Categorematic**. See Latham.¹

***SYNCRETISM** (Gr.), mixing together, blending; a mixed, blended nature. "*Bruno's syncretism* of the tenet of a pervading spirit, an 'anima mundi.'"—Hallam.²

SYNCRETISTS, in Ethics, the Latitudinarians of *coalition* over against the Latitudinarians of *neutrality*. They maintain that some actions and characters of men are at once good and bad. Both classes of Latitudinarians are opposed to *Rigorists*, q. v.—Kant.³

***Synderesis**.

SYNDROME (Gr.), concurrent action.—Glanville. L. J.

***Syneidesis**. ***Synteresis**.

***SYNTHESIS**.—S. in Fichte:⁴ "If we consider a judgment with reference to its ground of relation, the aim of the reflection is a *synthesis*. The ground of relation is therefore the ground of all synthesis of judgments, that is, the ground of all thinking in general. If the Ego be considered as the ultimate and supreme ground of relation, the principle of all possible synthesis is furnished in it, and without the Ego no further synthesis is possible, because outside of the Ego we can reach no higher ground of relation in which antitheses may be united." S. in Kant: "conjunction of mental representations; the act of uniting various representations to each other, and comprehending their multiplicity in one cognition;" "the mental representation of unity in the manifold." S. **Progressive**, "the S. of a series which advances on the side of the conditioned," "from the immediate consequence to the more remote." S. **Pure**, "that S. which rests upon a ground of synthetic unity *a priori*." "When the manifold in synthesis is given, not empirically, but *a priori*, it is pure," as in numeration; opposed to *S. empirical*. S. **Qualitative**, "the advancing in the series of the subordinate from the condition to the conditioned." S. **Quantitative**, "the advancing in the series of co-ordinates from a given part, through its subordinate parts, to the whole." S. **Regressive**, "the S. of a series on the side of the conditions," "from the nearest conditions to the remot-

¹ *Logic, as Applied to Language*, § 107. ² *Literat.*, 1843, vol. i., p. 13. ³ *Religion innerlich* (Kirchmann), 23. ⁴ *Wissenschaftslehre* (1794), quoted in Buhle: *Geschichte*, vi. 754, 755.

est.¹ The species of *S.* have three varieties: 1. Apprehension, *q. v.*; 2. Reproduction; 3. Recognition.—Mellin,¹ C. E. Schmid,² Willich.³

SYNTHETIC, SYNTHETICAL, in Logic, marks a syllogism in which the conclusion stands last; opposed to *Analytic*, *q. v.* **S. Method** begins with the parts and goes to the whole. See Ingleby,⁴ Kant.⁵

***SYSTEM**.—In Kant: "1. As idea, the unity of manifold cognitions under one idea. 2. As science, any complete sum of homogeneous parts of knowledge, which are linked by the reason;" "a total of cognition arranged in accordance with principles."—Mellin.

*System, Economy, or Constitution.

SYSTEMATIZATION, SYSTEMIZATION, act of reducing to system.

TABLE, TABULAR VIEW, outline of a system, or part of a system, so arranged as to aid the comprehension and the memory by the eye. In this Vocabulary will be found a synthetical table of the entire philosophical sciences, and special tables of the leading topics.—See *Arbor Porphyriana*, *Categories*, *Categories of the Pure Understanding*, *Collision*, *Critique of Pure Reason*, *Fallacy*, *God*, *Attributes of Judgment*, *Judgment*, *Critique of Judgments*, *Forms of Jus*, *Metaphysics*, *Philosophy*, *Theology*, *Vices*, and others.

***TABULA RASA**.—This image is employed by Zeno the Stoic. Perhaps the best physical illustration (they are all defective) of the relation of the mind to the objective image is that of paper prepared for the reception of the photograph—it gives law as well as takes impressions—and its innate conditions need excitation, yet determine, as one essential factor, its results.⁶

TACIT, in Logic, marks a silent or understood premise.

*Tact.

¹ *Kunstsprache*, s. v. ² *Wörterbuch*, s. v. ³ *Elements of the Critical Philosophy*, 180.

⁴ *Introd. to Metaph.*, b. II., div. II., § 135. ⁵ *Rein. Vern.*, 12, 14, 148, 160 s., 194 s., 364, 764; see Haywood's Transl., *Introduct.*, p. iv. ⁶ See Krauth's *Berkeley, Prolegomena*, 124.

TACTILE, TACTION, TACTUAL, mark touch, and susceptibility to it.—See Ingleby,¹ Spencer.²

***TALENT**.—In *genius*, capacity waits on faculty; in *talent*, faculty waits upon capacity.

*Taste.

TAUTOLOGOUS, TAUTOLOGICAL, or TRUISTIC, in Logic, marks propositions which merely affirm the subject of itself, and give no information whatever; as, "Whatever is, is."

TAXONOMY (Gr.), principle of classification.—Whewell.³

TECHNICS (TECHNOLOGY, TECHNICAL) (Gr.), relating to art, skill; method of art; in Aristotle, that part of practical philosophy which relates to the mechanical production of material works in accordance with plan. **T. of Nature**, in Kant, "the procedure, the causality of nature, in reference to those products which reveal an aim, in opposition to the *mechanical*. It is *intentional* where there is conformity with final causes; it is *natural*, when that is really involved in the mechanical causality of nature, which coincides with our notions and rules of art."—Mellin,⁴ Schmid.⁵

***TELEOLOGY (TELEOLOGICAL, TELEOLOGIST)**.—It may be ultimate, reaching to God, or proximate, contemplating the more immediate purpose. Teleology was applied to the deduction of the existence of a Supreme Being by Anaxagoras, by Socrates and his school, and the Stoics. It was criticised by Maupertius and Kant, and is one of the vital questions of our own day.

***TEMPERAMENT**, "prevailing bias of disposition, whether natural or acquired."—C. F. V. See Paulus Cegineta.⁶

*Temperance.

***TENDENCY**, "a cause which will produce an effect unless there be opposite causes, which, in combination with it, counteract and disguise that effect; a cause which may or may not be counteracted."—Jevons.

TENSION, stretching; straining; intensity; as, muscular *tension*, *tension* of thought.—Spencer,⁷ Dr. Forbes Winslow.⁸

***TERM, TERMS**.—*(Absolute),*(Abstract),*(Common),*(Compatible), *(Concrete), *(Consistent), *(Contradictory, Oppo-

¹ *Intr. to Metaph.* ² *Princ. of Psych.*, §§ 53, 62. ³ *Hist. of Scientific Ideas*, 1858, vol. II., 123. ⁴ *Kunstsprach*, s. v. ⁵ *Wörterbuch*, s. v. ⁶ Lib. I., sec. 60, translated by Dr. Adams, vol. I., p. 84. ⁷ *Princ. of Psychol.*, § 55. ⁸ *Obscure Diseases*, ch. iv.

sition of), *(Definite), *(Indefinite), *(Negative), *(Non-relative, Absolute), *(Opposite), *(Privative), *(Relative), *(Simple), *(Singular).

TERMINISM, determinism.

TERMINISTS.—See **Nominalism**.

TERMINOLOGY, a scientific treatment of terms; the definition of the nomenclature; *glossology*, q. v. "Decandolle and others use the term *glossology* instead of *terminology*, to avoid the blemish of a word compounded of two parts taken from different languages. The convenience of treating the termination 'ology' (and a few other parts of compounds) as not restricted to Greek combinations, is so great, that I shall venture, in these cases, to disregard this philological scruple."—Whewell.¹

TERTII ADJACENTIS, of the third adjacent, an expression in incorrect Latin, applied to a grammatical sentence or proposition in which the subject, copula, and predicate are all distinctly stated.—Jevons.

***TESTIMONY**, "is like an arrow shot from a long bow—the force of it depends on the hand that draws it. *Argument* is like an arrow from a cross-bow, which has equal force though shot by a child."—Bacon.

***THEISM**, "the theory of the universe which regards an absolute Being, infinite in intelligence and perfect in moral goodness, as the author of all things." It is not absolutely opposed by its derivation, "though essentially opposed as a theory of the universe," to Pantheism.—C. F. V.

***Theocracy**.

THEOCRASY (Gr.), God-mixture; mingling with God; the intimate union or blending of the soul with God.

***THEODICY**.—Bledsoe,² Chalybäus,³ J. G. Fichte,⁴ I. H. Fichte,⁵ Frauenstädt,⁶ Hegel,⁷ Horn,⁸ O. Pfleiderer,⁹ Schelling,¹⁰ Scholten,¹¹ Steudel,¹² Strauss,¹³ Thilo,¹⁴ Wirth,¹⁵ Zeller.¹⁶

¹ *Hist. of Scientif. Ideas*, Vol. II., p. 109, note, ed. 1858. ² *Theodicy*, 1856. ³ *System der Specul. Ethik*, 30-73, 177, 179. ⁴ *Werke*, V., 184-188, 268, 391, 395; V., 549; *Nachgelassen. Werke*, III, 84, 85. ⁵ *Speculative Theologie*, 1846; *Psychologie*, II., 176; *Theologische Welt-Ansicht*, 109-227; *Characteristik d. neuen Philosophie*, ed. 2, 99. ⁶ *Blicke in die intellectuelle, physische u. moralische Welt* (1869), 65-71. ⁷ *Werke*, I., 152, 153; II., 281-283, 300; VI., 294, 382, 406; XII., 271-281, 533; XV., 684; XVIII., 144, 228, 23, 53. ⁸ *Zur Philosophie*, II. 12. ⁹ *Wesen der Religion*, 300-329. ¹⁰ *Werke*, I., vi. 42-45, 545; vii. 352-408. ¹¹ *Freie Wille*, übers. von Manchot, 219. ¹² *Philosophie im Umriß*, II. i. 377-452. ¹³ *Christliche Glaubenslehre*, II., 369-384. ¹⁴ *Ztschr. f. exacte Phil.*, viii 21-31. ¹⁵ *System der Specul. Ethik*, 19-48, 395. ¹⁶ *Theolog. Jahrbücher*, v., vi.

T. Authentic, in Kant, is that in which we determine the purpose of God, from the principles of practical reason *a priori*. **T. Doctrinal**, is that in which the grounds are derived from the consideration of nature itself *a posteriori*.
— Mellin, Schmid.

*Theogony.

***THEOLOGY**.—Hence, Theological; as, T. Ethics, T. Physics.

*Theology (Natural).

Theology, in Kant, Tabular Classification of.—A. Revealed T. B. Rational T.—I. Transcendental T.: i. Ontotheology; ii. Cosmotheology. II. *Natural T.: i. Physicotheology; ii. Moral Theology.

*Theopathy.

THEOPHANY (Gr.), manifestation of God.

THEOPHILANTHROPY, (THEOPHILANTHROPISTS), a form of deism organized during the French revolution (1796–1801).

THEOREM (Gr.), a speculation, theory; a principle or rule reached by theory; in the plural, the arts and sciences; position laid down as an acknowledged truth; position requiring to be proved; opposed to problem.

***THEORY**, “a rationalized explanation of facts.”—C. F. V.
“Knowledge of principles, as opposed to practice.”—Jevons.
Hence, Theoretical, Theorists.

*Theosophism, Theosophy.

THERAPEUTICS, scientific treatment of disease; applied to the social body by Mill.¹

THESAURUS (Lat.), treasure; storehouse; in philosophical literature, a collection of valuable matter.—Reeb.²

***THESIS** (hence **THETICAL**), laid down; positive.

THEURGY (Gr.), divine work; miracle; magic, sorcery. Hence, Theurgic, Theurgist.

THINGS (Ger. *Dinge*), the individual parts of the objective; the components of the universe. Drossbach: “The atoms are spiritual essences. Everything is an association of atoms, of which, in organic creatures, one supreme atom is always at the head.”³ Du Bois-Reymond says that “the essential nature of things is incomprehensible.”⁴ Fechner:

¹ *Logic*, pt. vi, ch. vi., § 1. ² *Thesaurus Philosophorum* (Cornoldi), 1871. ³ *Harmonie d. Ergebnisse d. Naturforschung*, 109–131. ⁴ *Thierisch Electricität*, Vorred. XLI.

"All concrete being must of necessity come into phenomenon; a concrete thing which does not come into phenomenon is unthinkable."¹ J. G. Fichte: "Things appear absolutely as they are, for they are nothing beside their phenomenon." "The very fact that these things are visible and audible is proof that they do not exist." "The accidents, synthetically united, give the substance; and in the substance no more is embraced than the accidents; and after a perfect analysis of the substance, there is nothing but accidents — things are the totality of their accidents, with no substratum as their base."² I. H. Fichte: "The truth in things is their notion, lying in them, immanent or pre-existent, which the process of human cognition simply detaches from them in investigation, and thus embodies in consciousness."³ George: "The subject of the thing is one fundamental activity, fundamental attribute, to which all its other qualities pertain as predicates."⁴ Hegel: "The thing is the totality, as the development of the determinations of the ground and of existence posited in one — over against indeterminate, abstract matter, it is determinate matter."⁵ Herbart: "The sum of a number of non-existents can only be nothing, can never furnish any real existent. The thing is the *substance*, in which the marks *inhere*."⁶ See **Monads**. Kant: see **An Sich, Noumen**. Leibnitz: see **Monads**. Lotze concurs with Du Bois-Reymond.⁷ Michelet, like Hegel: "It is not our mental representations which harmonize with the objective processes, it is the thought (the Hegelian 'notion'), which does."⁸ Schelling: "The idea of a thing in itself must, according to Kant's own deductions, involve a contradiction. For a thing in itself means nothing more nor less than a thing which is no thing. Where there is sense-intuition, there is the non-ego, and where there is a non-ego, there is sense-intuition. The *intellectual* is no non-ego, but simple ego intuited." "All that is, all things, pertain to the being of the infinite substance, which not only dwells in them, but produces them." "The special things in the infinite real substance have a duplicate life, a life in the substance and a life in themselves, or a special life." "We call that the objec-

¹ *Ztschr. v. Fichte*, xxiii. 84. ² *Werke*, II., 622; V., 466; I., 204. ³ *Ztschr.*, xxiii. 154.

⁴ *Ztschr. v. Fichte*, xxix. 110. ⁵ *Encyclopädie*, §§ 126, 127. ⁶ *Allgemeine Metaphysik*, 2: 215; *Werke*, IV., 106. ⁷ *Mikrokosmos*, III., 233. ⁸ *Ztschr.* "Der Gedanke," III., 290.

tive in anything, whereby it is in the substance considered as its ground; the subjective is that whereby it is in itself." "The more a thing is single, and abides in its singleness, the more does it sunder itself from the eternal Notion of all things—the more does it belong to the primal night, the mother of all things."¹ Schopenhauer concurs with Kant in maintaining that "we do not cognize the essence and the in-itself of things." "The objective world exists only as mental representation, is but a brain-phenomenon. The supposition that things exist also outside of our consciousness, and independent on it, is absurd. The intellect creates the order of things."² Ulrici: "We find that, throughout, it is the *a priori* elements of our thinking, that is, the immanent laws and norms (categories) of our distinguishing, comparing, judging, inferring activity, by which the objectivity of individual sense-perceptions is vouched for. There is an immanent necessity of thought involved."³

THINKING.—See Thought.

Thinking and Being.—See Being, Idea, Ideal, Reality.

See Steudel.⁴

Thinking, Philosophical, Method of.—See Speculation.

Hegel: "Speculation is the activity of the one universal reason directed on itself." "The speculative consists in grasping, cognizing the opposed as unity, and holding fast to contradiction in thinking. It is a mystery to the understanding."⁵ Schelling: "Those systems which forever hover between heaven and earth, and have not the courage to press to the last point of all knowing, are far safer from the most perilous errors, than that system of the greatest thinker whose speculation soars on the boldest wing, who hazards everything on the throw, and who is determined to have the *whole* truth in all its compass or no truth at all. On the other hand, I would have the reader bear in mind that he who is not bold enough to follow truth to her last pinnacle, may indeed now and then touch the hem of her garment, but can never win truth herself. The after-time, more just than the current hour, will place the man who, despising the privilege of tolerable error, had the courage to launch

¹ *Werke*, I., i. 210, vii. 189; II., 199; VI., 218-476. ² *Welt als Wille*, II., 6-14, 311, 323. ³ *Glauben u. Wissen*, 221. ⁴ *Philosophie im Umriss*, I., ii. 290-303. ⁵ *Werke*, I., 71; III., 42; IV., 67, 68; XII., 483; XVII., 347; XVIII., 143, 149.

bravely forth to reach the truth, far above the timorous man, who lay forever at anchor, rather than hazard striking on rocks or sand."¹ Ulrici: "The productive, supplementing, and completing view, by which, from the parts and fragments which lie before us, the totality of a scientific contemplation of the world is, as it were, brought before the gaze, and from the unity (of the idea) thus viewed, the parts furnished are arranged, and the parts wanting are supplied—this is the true nature of that *speculation* which it is the fashion of the day to decry."²

*Thought and Thinking.

Thought, Rules of.—1. The principle of identity or harmony. 2. Of contradiction or non-contradiction, *dictum de omni et nullo*. 3. Excluded middle. 4. Of the ground or sufficient reason. See all those terms.—Steudel.³

***TIME AND SPACE.**—I. *Ænesidemus*: "Time is corporeal, for it is not different from that which is, and from the elementary bodies." Aristotle: "That space (place) exists, is proved even by the local motion of bodies, which, as a fact, confutes all who deny its existence. Space is neither form nor matter; for these cannot be separated from phenomena, while space can be separated from what it contains, as a skin-bottle from the water that is in it. In space, a thing is embraced in the strictest sense." "Whether time be something actual, and what it is, is hard to determine. It seems to be nothing actual, for it allows of no distinction of parts." "Time is the numeration of that which in movement is before and after." Democritus: "Time is the image presented to the mind (*phantasma*) by day and night." Various dogmatists in the ancient world defined time as the movement of heaven, the celestial sphere, as objective; the distinction of the movement of this world, that movement itself, as subjective. Epicurus, as Democritus: "Space is the intangible—an accident of accidents." Heraclitus, as *Ænesidemus*: Leucippus regarded space as it is regarded in the popular view—extended emptiness, objective. Plato distinguishes between pure and empirical time. Pure time is eternal and infinite (*Æon*); in it the things are in them-

¹ *Vom Ich als Princip. d. Philosophie* (1795); *Werke*, I., i. 152. ² *Glauben und Wissen*, 292. ³ *Philosophie im Umriss*, I, i. 187-210.

selves, and *endure*, without change, from moment to moment; it has in it no coming into being, but only essential being. Empirical time is finite, has come into being simultaneously with the rise of the world of phenomena—the mobile image of the Aeon. It is the condition not merely of the existence of phenomena, but of things themselves.” Plotinus embraced space in the notion of form. Sextus Empiricus argued at large against the objectivity of time. The Stoics maintained that time is incorporeal, and a merely intelligible object. Strato the Physicist enlarged Aristotle’s definition, and makes time “the measure of all movement and rest.” Zeno denied the objective reality alike of movement and space.¹ II. Des Cartes considered time a mere mode of thinking. Hobbes: “Space is the mental image (phantasma) of a thing existent as existent, that is, no other accident of that thing being considered, except that it appears exterior to the person having the image.” “The idea of space is not *a priori*, but derived from experience.” “Time is the mental image (phantasma) of movement, so far as we imagine in the movement a before and an after, or a succession.” “It is not *a priori*, but derived from the experience of bodies in motion.”² More: “*Space* is an immovable extended, distinct from *matter*, which is movable. This is not an imaginary something, but is at least real, if it be not divine. But the extended Real, as distinct from matter, can be nothing but deity itself, for it has the attributes of the divine essence. It is infinite, simple, immovable; it is the inmost place of all things—nothing is inside of it (*intra*), and nothing is beyond it; it is eternal, complete, independent; within it, all changes, but it never changes; it is incorruptible, necessary, immense, increate, omnipresent, all-determining, all-impenetrating, all-embracing. It is by *being*, and of itself; while corporeal nature depends upon another being. It is *actual being* (*ens actu*), for it is conceived as existing without cause. It is *pure being* (*purus actu*), because it is necessarily existent of itself, and nothing can affect it, add to it, or take from it.”³ Spinoza, as Des Cartes: “Space is not to be distinguished from extension,

¹ Buhle: *Geschichte*, Vol. I. ² *De Corp.*, P. II.; *Philosoph. Prima*, ch. 7. ³ *Enchirid. Metaphysic.*, ch. 8; *Opera*, I., 165-169.

and no limits are to be put to it, for beyond any limits there must be other spaces."¹ Samuel Clarke: "Space is not a substance, but a property. Space and duration are immediate and necessary consequences of God's existence, and without them his eternity and ubiquity [or omnipresence] would be taken away. Space is in itself essentially one, and absolutely indivisible. Space and time are not the mere order of things, but real quantities. Space is the place of all things and of all ideas; just as duration is the duration of all things and of all ideas."² Leibnitz developed his views of time and space, especially in the controversy with Dr. Clarke. In a letter written by Leibnitz, 1715, he had said: "Sir Isaac Newton says that space is an organ, which God makes use of to perceive things by." Dr. Clarke denies this charge, and says that Newton considers things in the universe "as real things, formed by God himself, and seen by him in all places, wherever they are, without the intervention of any medium at all. And this similitude is all that he means when he supposes infinite space to be (*as it were*) the sensorium of the omnipresent Being." In the later papers which grew out of the controversy opened between these great men, Leibnitz says: "Real absolute space is an idol of some modern Englishmen. They maintain that space is a real absolute being. Some have believed it to be God himself, or his immensity. I hold space to be something merely relative, as time is. It is an order of co-existences, as time is an order of successions."³ Locke: "The consideration of duration, as set out by certain periods, and marked by certain measures or epochs, is time." Locke devotes a chapter to space, but does not define it. He maintains "that the idea of it is derived from sight and touch; that it is not body; that its parts are inseparable; that it is immovable and infinite; that we do not know whether it is substance or accident."⁴ Newton: see Clarke and Leibnitz. The views of Kant are accepted in substance by the great mass of modern thinkers: Time and space are subjective forms and conditions of sense-intuition; not innate *ideas*, but innate

¹ *Opera* (Gfrörer), 51, 58, ch. 4. ² Dr. Clarke's *Fourth Reply to Leibnitz*. ³ A *Collection of Papers which passed between Leibnitz and Clarke*, 1715, 1716. London, 1717. ⁴ *Human Understanding*, *Works*, I., 282-300, 307.

conditions evoked into necessary and invincible activity by sense-perception, and presupposed in the very possibility of experience.

TOPICS (Gr.), concerning τόποι, or common-places; name of a treatise of Aristotle¹ on the method or theory of drawing conclusions in probable matter, the art thereof being the dialectic.

TOPOLOGY.—See **Memoria Technica**.

TOTALITY, in Kant,² plurality considered as unity, as the human race.

TOTUM DIVISUM, a class or notion which is divided into parts by a difference.—Jevons.

*Tradition.

TRADUCE, TRADUCIANISM, relate to the doctrine that the offspring, in both soul and body, is derived from the parents; opposed to *Creationism* and *Pre-existence*.—See Krauth.³

TRADUCTION, in Logic, a process of reasoning in which each conclusion applies to just such an object as each of the premises applies to.—Jevons.

*Train of Thought.

TRANSANIMATION (Lat.), transfer of souls from one body to another, *Metempsychosis*.

***TRANSCENDENT, TRANSCENDENTAL**.—"1. In Kant's sense, transcendental applies to the conditions of our knowledge which transcend experience, which are *a priori*, and not derived from sensitive reflection. 2. The speculative problems which concern supersensible or supernatural being, transcending the range of sense and consciousness." C. F. V. See De Quincey,⁴ Ingleby.⁵

TRANSFER, in Logic, applied to words which have become equivocal by being taken from the thing they originally denoted, and given to some other thing habitually connected with it.—Jevons.

*Transference and Translation.

***TRANSMIGRATION**.—See *Metempsychosis*.

TRANSPOSITION.—See *Conversion*.

TREE OF PORPHYRY.—See *Arbor Porphyriana*.

TRIAS, TRIAD (Gr.), the number three; the three unities; in

¹ *Top.*, i., 1, 1. ² *Rein. Vern.*, 37, 111. ³ *Conservat. Reformation*, 371. ⁴ *Works*, vol. iii., 96. ⁵ *Introd. to Metaph.*, b. i., p. 66.

Neoplatonism, being, intelligence, soul; in Plato, God, the divine understanding, and the *anima mundi* proceeding from God as a plastic power.

TRICHOTOMY (Gr.), division into three parts; opposed especially to *dichotomy*, division into two parts. It is applied to the divisions of man's nature, as body, soul, spirit; and to mental phenomena, as the Platonic T.

TRIFORM (Lat.), having three forms, shapes, or natures; threefold; triple; applied to the *mundus*, as composed of air, earth, and water.—Ovid.¹

TRILEMMA, in Logic, an argument resembling a dilemma, but in which there are three alternatives.—Jevons.

TRILOGY (Gr.), three dramas or dialogues; generally opposed to *tetralogy*, four dramas. Both have been used in arranging the Platonic dialogues.

TRIMORPHIC (Lat., Gr.), presenting three distinct forms; hence, Trimorphism.—Darwin.²

TRIMOURTI, TRIMURTI (Sanskrit, three-form).—In Hindoo Philosophy, the trinity or triad of the Vedas, going forth from the bosom of Brahm. It embraces *Brahma*, the creator, *Vishnu*, the preserver, and *Siva*, the destroyer, by whom the recurrence is made to the unity. They are three forms of manifestation of one impersonal substance.

TRINAL (Lat.), threefold; applied by Spenser to the triplicity, and by Milton to the unity of the Godhead.—L. J. By Chase, to the basis of Comte's Philosophy.³

TRINITY (Lat.), tri-unity, three-one-ness; in the philosophical doctrine of religion, unity of God in triplicity. Boehm connected this "thought of a one that in itself differentiated itself, with the doctrine of the trinity; and the trinitarian schema accordingly, in many an application and illustration, underlies Boehm's conception of the divine life and differentiating process." Hegel "points out that the Trinity is only unintelligible when conceived as three separate numerical units, while speculatively it involves an absolute and divine sense; 'it would be a strange thing if there were no sense in what for two thousand years has been the holiest Christian idea.'" "To Hegel the doctrine of the Trinity was the essential basis of religion."⁴ For the attempts

¹ *Metamorph.*, 15, 839. ² *Orig. of Species*, 35, 252. ³ *Symbolism*, 279. ⁴ Schwegler-Stirling, 155, 355, 422, 425, 426.

of recent speculative philosophy in modifying the church-doctrine of the Trinity, see Peip.¹ The term is sometimes applied to man in *Trichotomy*, q. v.

TRIPARTITE (Lat.), divided or divisible into three parts; threefold.—See *Trichotomy*.

TRIPERSONAL (Lat.), consisting of three persons. Milton: "One tripersonal Godhead."² Hence, *Tripersonality*, tripersonal character.—See *Trinity*.

TRIPLICITY (Lat.), character of the triple; threefoldness; trebleness.—See Chase.³ Similar words are duplicity (logical), quadruplicity.

TRITHEISM (Gr.), a species of Polytheism which embraces three gods only, or three principal gods; opposed to *Monotheism* and *Trinitarianism*.

***TRIVIAM**.—Hence, trivial, relating to the trivium; as, T. schools.

TROPES, the ten sceptical points or arguments; "turns."⁴

TRUE, THE, associated with the beautiful and good, as the object of practical philosophy.—Cousin.

TRUISM, self-evident and undeniable truth. Hence, *Truistic*.—See *Tautologous*.

***TRUTH**.—Hegel: "In common life, the agreement between an object and our conception of the object. In the philosophical sense, the agreement of the subject-matter of thought with itself."⁵

Truth, Criterion of.—Cartesius: "That which we comprehend clearly and plainly is true." Czolbe: "The profoundest riddles of the world have often remained concealed, not because of their great intricacy, but because of their exceeding simplicity."⁶ J. G. Fichte: "The sense of truth is a dim feeling of what is the right." "Faith is an element of all assurance."⁷ Schelling: "Reason is the touchstone of truth," but "the science of reason is not to be removed from the control of experience." "The truth is by no means of such a kind as to be reached only by unnatural straining, and to be expressed only in unnatural words and formulas. Very many spoil themselves at the very entrance on philoso-

¹ Herzog's *Real Encyclopädie*, Art. *Trinität*. ² *Reformation in England*, b. II. ³ *Symbolism*, §§ 305-328. ⁴ Schwegler-Stirling, 135. ⁵ *Logic*, Wallace's Tr., 43. ⁶ *Entstehung des Selbstbewusstseins*, 57. ⁷ *Werke*, I., 73; V., 182.

phy by the unnatural tension of their effort to approach what they consider the right tone of mind. Men judge of the degree of scientific mastery by the degree to which, in the face of nature, a system of philosophy has fallen into distortions and dislocations. We may, however, convince ourselves that the very reverse of this is true, and that what can be expressed in nothing but strained and distorted phrase is shown, by that very fact, not to be the true and right. The true is easy, says one of the ancients; not that we reach it without trouble, for the finding of this easy, simple thing, is the hardest. Most men conceive that the truth must be hard in order to be the truth; but when the truth is found, it always proves to be somewhat like the egg of Columbus."¹ Schopenhauer: "Truth is no harlot, ready to throw herself on the neck of careless passers-by, but a maiden so coy that he who sacrifices all to win her favor is not sure to win it." "Truth enjoys but a short time of triumph between two long eras—in the first of them it is condemned as paradoxical, in the last is despised as trivial."² Ulrici: "Philosophy herself acknowledges that the result of her investigation, despite its scientific character, has not the authority of knowledge, in the strict sense of that term, but only of a scientific faith. The solution of her problems remains but an attempt, which is constantly conditioned by the results and advances of the particular sciences." "When we throw aside everything, for which we have nothing but this scientific faith to plead, the science of philosophy shrivels up into a little remnant of propositions."³—See **Certainty, Error.** See Hamilton.⁴

*Truths, First.

***TYPE.**—See Hamilton,⁵ Mill.⁶ Whewell: "A T. is an example of any class, for instance, a species of a genus, which is considered as eminently possessing the characters of the class."⁷ Kant uses the terms T. of the moral law, T. of the judgment, and T. of an intelligible nature. T. comes into the composition of various philosophical words, as archetype, ectype, prototype, diatyposis, hypotyposis.

¹ *Philosophie der Offenbarung, Werke*, II., II. 18, 19. ² *Welt als Wille*, Vorred. XV., XVIII. ³ *Glauben u. Wissen*, 290; *Gott und die Natur*, 8. ⁴ *Logic*, 376-390. ⁵ *Reid's Works*, 948, 949. ⁶ *Logic*, L. J. ⁷ *Hist. of Scient. Ideas*, 1858, Vol. II., p. 121.

UBICATION (Lat.), in Scholasticism, whereness; local relation.—Glanville, Leibnitz.¹

***UBIETY**, equivalent to Aristotle's *rov*.—See **Categorem**.

UBIQUITY (Lat.), everywhere-ness; omnipresence.

ULTIMATE (Lat. *Ultimum*), the last and highest; applied to good.—See **Bonum Summum**, Good, The Chief. Cicero calls it the *ultimum bonum*.²

ULTRATOTAL, used by Hamilton,³ when, in both the premises together, the quantification of the middle term is more than its quantity as a whole.

ULTRONEOUS, spontaneous; voluntary.—Jeremy Taylor.

UNBELIEF (Ger. *Unglaube*), withholding of due belief; in Kant, the withholding of assent to that which, though objectively insufficient as a ground of cognition, is subjectively sufficient as a ground of faith. *Moral U.* is the rejection of that which, though we cannot *know* it, is yet *morally necessary*, as faith in God, freedom, and immortality. It arises from want of moral interest. It is called *Naturalistic U.*, when it is indifferent or opposed to revelation. The *U.* of reason is the making our reason independent of its own needs—the renunciation of the faith of reason—*Vernunftunglaube* against *Vernunftglaube*.—Mellin.⁴

UNCERTAINTY (Ger. *Ungewissheit*), “A mingled feeling, in which assent and doubt alternate.”—Kant.⁵

***UNCONDITIONED** (Ger. *Unbedingt*), original; originary; absolute; “dependent on no other.”—Kant.⁶ See Porter.⁷

UNCONSCIOUS, THE, PHILOSOPHY OF, a system, developed by Karl Rob. Eduard von Hartmann,⁸ to which Schelling, Hegel, and Schopenhauer are the chief forerunners. It rests upon the principles: I. That the laws of nature control those beings in nature who know nothing of these laws. It rejects materialism, Darwinism, and mechanism; maintains that there is a strict conformity with plan, and maintains with great emphasis a teleology. II. The cause which

¹ *Opera* (Erdmann), 666. ² *De Finib.*, l. iii., c. 7. ³ *Logic*, Append., 584–589. ⁴ *Wörterbuch: Kunstsprache Verstand.* ⁵ *Original Ideen über Anthropol.*, 148. ⁶ *Pract. Vern.*, 138. ⁷ *Human Intellect*, 649. ⁸ *Philosophie des Unbewussten*, Berl., 1869; 3d ed., 1872; 5th ed. (1st stereotyped), 1873; tr. into French by Nolen, 1876. Schelling's *Positive Philosophie als Einheit von Hegel und Schopenhauer*, 1869. *Das Ding an Sich und seine Beschaffenheit*, 1871. *Philosoph. Abhandlung*, 3. *Phil. d. Unbew.* 1872. *Erläuterungen*, 1871. *Darwinism*, 1876 (tr. into French by Guerolt, 1877).

operates in conformity with plan and end is unconscious. The pulsation of the heart, the tone of the arteries, the intestinal movements, the vegetative processes in the body; the animal instincts; the embryonic development, are independent of our consciousness: hence the cause of them operates unconsciously. Von Hartmann also argues to the same conclusion from the phenomena of magnetic somnambulism, *q. v.*, the correct performance of acts without thinking, the thoughts and works of genius, and the origin of language. See Brockhaus,¹ Ebrard,² Kapp,³ Kuhn,⁴ Lange,⁵ Ueberweg,⁶ Ulrici.⁷

***UNDERSTANDING.**—"This term applies properly to the reasoning power, the judgment; the faculty which obtains knowledge by comparison and combination."—C. F. V. See Carlyle.⁸

Understanding and Reason.—See **Reason and Understanding.**

Understanding, Definitions of.—In Kant: 1. "The faculty of concepts." 2. "The faculty which brings forth of itself mental representations, or the spontaneity of cognition." 3. "The faculty of thinking the object of sense-intuitions." 4. "The faculty of cognizing by concepts." 5. "The faculty of judging." 6. "The faculty of uniting *a priori*, and of bringing the manifold of given mental representations under unity of apperception." 7. "The faculty of cognitions." 8. "The faculty of rules." 9. "The faculty of the unity of mental representations by means of rules." 10. "The faculty of mentally representing the particular in the general." 11. "The faculty of thinking." 12. "The faculty of comprehending the manifold in one sensation." 13. "The faculty of the subject to represent mentally to itself everything which, in accordance with its nature, cannot come into the sense." 14. "The superior faculty of cognition (in the widest sense)." 15. "The activity of the mind in uniting or separating mental representations." 16. "The faculty of

¹ *Supplem. u. Elft. Auflage d. Conversations-Lexikon*, 1872, 906. ² E. v. Hartmann's *Philosoph. d. Unbewussten*, 1876. ³ *Philosophy of the Unconscious* in Harris's *Journal*, Jan., 1870. ⁴ *Memorial und Repetit. u. Gesch. d. Philosophie*, 1872, 94, 95. ⁵ *Gesch. d. Materialism u. Kant*, 277-283, 306, 308. ⁶ *Gesch. d. Philosophie*, 4th ed. (Reicke), 1875, 353; tr. by Morris, 1874. ⁷ Strauss, tr. by Krauth, 137. ⁸ *Essays: State of German Literature*.

making mental representations by means of concepts." 17. "The faculty of the cognition of rules in general (by concepts)." 18. "The faculty of mental representation of the general." 19. "The faculty of referring mental representations to an object, that is, by means of that object, to think anything."—Mellin.¹

Understanding, Pure, Principles of, in Kant, "those synthetic judgments which emanate from the pure concepts of the understanding (notions), under the sense-conditions *a priori*, and lie at the base of all other cognitions *a priori*." ²

Understanding, Common, in Kant, "the faculty of cognition and of the use of rules *in concreto*." ³

Understanding, Sound, in Kant, "the common understanding; common sense, so far as it judges correctly." "The understanding as sufficient for everyday affairs, sufficient for the concepts of ordinary knowledge."—Mellin.⁴

Understanding, Speculative, in Kant, "the faculty of the cognition of rules in the abstract." ⁵

Understanding, Concepts of the (Ger. *Verstandesbegriffe*), Notions, *q. v.* ⁶ In Kant, "those are called *pure*, under which all perceptions must be subsumed, that they may serve as empirical judgments. In them the synthetic unity of perceptions is represented as necessary and of absolute validity." ⁷

Understanding, Unity of, in Kant, that which has expression in the category. ⁸

Understanding, Consequence of the (Ger. *Verstandesschluss*), is immediate consequence.

Understanding, World of the, in Kant, "supersensuous nature." ⁹

Understanding, Being of the (Ger. *Verstandeswesen*), intellectual being; in Kant, "Noumena, *q. v.* Objects which are not in the sphere of sense, but are thought of through the understanding merely." ¹⁰

UNDING (Ger.), *nihil negativum*, negative nothing.—See **Nothing**.—Kant.¹¹

UNDULATORY (Lat.), pertaining to little waves; produced by

¹ *Kunstsprache: Verstand.* ² *Rein. Vern.*, 175. ³ *Prolegom.*, 196. ⁴ *Kunstsprache. Prolegomen.*, 197. ⁵ See Krauth's *Berkeley*, 338. ⁶ *Pract. Vern.*, 89. ⁷ *Rein. Vern.*, 383. ⁸ *Pract. Vern.*, 74. ⁹ *Rein. Vern.*, 306. ¹⁰ *Rein. Vern.*, 348.

little waves.—See **Light**. It is applied also to heat and other physical forces.—Chambers.¹

UNICITY (Fr. *Unité*), quality of the unique; principle of unity.
*Unification.

UNIFORMITY OF NATURE, the principle, not without exceptions, that what has been found true of anything will continue to be found true of the same sort of thing.—Jevons.

UNISEXUAL (Fr.), of one sex; applied, in the Societary Philosophy, to friendship, as one of the major passions among the four affective ones.

***UNITARIAN** (A), in Philosophy, a rejector of dualism, and especially of the theory of an evil principle.

UNITARY (Fr.), tending to unity, to synthesis.

UNITÉISME (Fr.), unity-ism; in Fourierism, the need of unity felt by all men.

***UNITY**, or **ONENESS** (Ger. *Einheit*), in Kant,² "that mental representation in the understanding by which the manifold is thought of as linked together."—See **Synthesis**.

Unity, Classification of, in Kant:—I. *Analytic U.* U. of a logical connection; diverse concepts in one judgment, or diverse representations in one concept; as, metal, wood, paper, under the concept of body.

II. *Synthetic U.* U. of intuitions in the concept of an object. i. *Original*, the synthetic U. of apperception, the source of others; transcendental U.; objective U. ii. *Derivative U.*, the uniting of given real intuitions: 1. *Unity of the Understanding*, U. of experience, empirical U., U. of nature, U. of a real linking, subjective U., accidental U. 2. *Unity of the Reason*, systematic U., ideal U.—a. *Speculative U.*, referring to theoretic cognition; b. *Practical U.*, moral U.—Schmid.³

Unity of the Ego.—See **Ego**, **Consciousness**, **Self-Consciousness**, **Soul**.—See Steudel.⁴

Unity of God.—See **God**.

***UNIVERSAL**, in Logic, applied to propositions which affirm the predicate to belong to the whole of the subject, as, "all metals are elements," U. *affirmative*; or which deny the ex-

¹ *Encyclopædia*: Art. *Undulatory Theory of Light*. ² *Rein. Vern.*, 104, 114, 130-132, 282, 462, 610; *Prolegom.*, 199; *Relig. innerh.*, 141. ³ *Wörterbuch*, 4th ed., 1792. *Einheit*

⁴ *Philosophie im Umris*, I., II. 50-56.

istence of any agreement or coincidence between the subject and the predicate, as "no metals are compounds," U. *negative*. Hence, Universality.

***UNIVERSALIA**.—See **Universals**.

***UNIVERSALS**, in Aquinas: 1. *A parte mentis*, or *a parte intellectus*, involve the theory that U. are mental only, subjective. 2. *A parte rei*, involve the theory that U. correspond with objective things.—See **Realism**.

UNIVERSE (Lat.), the collective whole; the totality of being as a unit; the world, in its philosophical or universal sense.—Porter.¹

***Univocal Words**.

UNORGANIZED, applied to beings, in which "the material constituents are combined, according to the ordinary laws of mechanical and chemical union, into homogeneous substances."—Porter.² See **Inorganic, Organism**.

USE (Ger. *Gebrauch*), the application of a conception, or of a faculty of cognition. It may be apodictic, dialectic, empirical, formal, hyperphysical, logical, material, practical or moral, real, speculative, theoretical, transcendental, unlimited.—Mellin.³

USUCAPIO, USUCAPTION (Lat.), in Jus, the acquisition of ownership by long use or possession.

USURPED (Ger. *Usurpirt*), applied by Kant to an arbitrary concept without ground in experience or reason.

***UTILITY**, "adaptation to serve an end generally desired by men." The doctrine of utility in morals is that actions are right because they are useful, "or fitted to gain ends generally desired."—C. F. V. "The creed which accepts, as the foundation of morals, utility, or the greatest happiness principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of pleasure."—J. S. Mill.⁴

UTILIZE, apply to a use; render useful. Hence, Utilization.—Ingleby,⁵ Herbert Spencer.⁶

UTOPIAN (from Sir Thomas More's *Eutopia*), visionary.—Utopia is also used in Rabelais: the kingdom of Gargantua.

¹ *Human Intellect*, 646. ² *Human Intellect*, 28. ³ *Wörterb. d. kritisch. Philosophie*, ii. 737. ⁴ *Utilitarianism*, p. 9. ⁵ *Introduct. to Metaphysic*. ⁶ *Induct. of Biology*, § 43.

VACUUM (Lat.), empty space; either absolute or relative; locality without content.—See **Space**. The intervals in bodies, pores, interstices, considered as empty, are called *V. disseminatum*.

VAISÉCHICA, in Hindoo Philosophy, one of the three semi-orthodox systems. It was founded by Kanada, and is similar to the system of Empedocles. It is the philosophy of individuality, and largely a system of physics. The V. admits the existence of atoms, but of natures as various as the general phenomena of nature. The V. is considered as complementary to the *Nyāya*, q. v., and its six categories are usually added to those of the latter. Both will be found under *Categories, Hindoo*. The third system is the *Sāṅkhya*. See **Yoga-Sontras**.

VALENTINIAN SYSTEM, system of Valentinus, an Alexandrian gnostic of the second century A. D. Gnostic Pantheism: Evil was created by the desire of the Eons to unite with Buthos.

VALUE (Ger. *Werth*), intellectual or moral estimate of worth; and then, by transfer, the thing on which the estimate is put. Intrinsic value of a thing, as absolute, would involve the favorable estimate of every right mind; ordinarily, it is applied to that whose value is relatively fixed. Holiness is intrinsically valuable, absolutely; temporal good, or that which secures it, has a relative value only. *Price* is the public judgment in regard to *value* not intellectual or moral.

VANA ARGUTATIO (Lat.), empty subtlety, quibbling. (Ger. *Spitzfindigkeit, eitele Vernünftelei*.)—Kant.¹

VAPOR, POTENTIAL, OF METAL, in the Hermetic Philosophy, the essence, splendor, soul of metal.

VARIATION (Lat.), alteration; changing; diversification; difference. (Ger. *Veränderung*.) In Kant: 1. "The conjunction, in one and the same subject, of contradictory predicates." 2. "A mode of existence which follows upon another mode of existence of the same object." 3. "The *succession* of opposed determinations." 4. "When something that was not comes into being, or something that was passes out of being—rise and passing away."—Mellin.

VARIATIONS, CONCOMITANT, method of quantitative in-

¹ *Logik*, 80.

duction; in Mill:¹ "Whatever phenomenon varies in any manner whenever another phenomenon varies in some particular manner, is either a cause or an effect of that phenomenon, or is connected with it through some fact of causation."—See **Periodic**.

VARIETY, in *Æsthetics*, that species of manifoldness which is consistent with unity, but prevents it from degenerating into monotonous uniformity.

Variety, Native, in Kant, special variety of the human kind, so remote from another that the offspring of the two is hybrid, with a tendency to die out; as negroes and whites.

VEDA, VEDAS, in Hindoo Philosophy, the name of the most ancient sacred books of the Hindoos. Veda is from the Sanscrit *Vidya*, knowledge, law. The Vedas are in Sanscrit, and contain the primordial views of the Hindoo Philosophy, in regard to God, the creation, the soul, and its relations to God. The collection of them is attributed to *Vyasa*, the compiler. The Vedas are four in number: 1. *Rig-Veda*, hymns and prayers in verse; 2. *Yadjour-Veda*, q. v.; 3. *Sama-Veda*, the *Saman*, prayers to be chanted; 4. *Atharvan, Atharvan-Veda*, which is comparatively modern. The prayers are called *mantras*, the dogmas *brahmanas*. Hence, Vedic.

VEDANTA (called also *Oustara*), in Hindoo Philosophy, literally, "the conclusion of the Veda," name of one of the orthodox expositions of the theologico-philosophical part of the Vedas. It is attributed to *Vyasa* (see **Vedas**). It denies the existence of a material world, and of all individual existence. The other orthodox exposition is the *Purva*. The two systems bear the common name *Mimansa*. Hence, Vedantine, Vedantism, Vedantic.

*Velleity.

VENDIDAD, in the Parsee Philosophy, the twentieth nosk or division of the *Zendavesta*, q. v. It is in the form of a dialogue between Ormuzd and Zoroaster.

*Veracity.

VERB, in Logic, the grammatical predicate.

*Verbal.

VERISIMILITUDE, VERISIMILITY (Lat.), resemblance of truth; probability; likelihood.

¹ *Logic*, book iii., ch. 10.

***VERITAS ENTIS**, transcendental or metaphysical truth.

*Veritas Cognitionis. *Veritas Signi.

VERNUNFT, in Kant, the intuitional faculty or reason, which he divides into theoretical and practical, and which gives birth to ideas (*Ideen*), the highest perceptions of the mind, which are innate, but stimulated into action by experience.—M. T. M.

VERSTAND, in Kant, understanding or intellect; also divided into theoretical and practical; the parent of conceptions or notions (*Begriffe*), which are the generalizations of thought, and mediate representations of things. They are divided into conceptions derived from experience, and conceptions derived from the understanding itself.—M. T. M. See Krauth's *Berkeley*.¹

VESTAL, VESTALATE, used in Fourierism, in connection with a body of unmarried young persons.

VESTIGE (Lat.), tracking; footprint; track; trace; mark; sign; token; in Aquinas, the effect representing the cause, without reproducing its form. Smoke represents fire by *way of image*; but the whole creation represents the Trinity by *way of vestige*.

VIBRATION (Lat.), tremulous, quivering motion; supposed as a necessary condition of the nerve in producing sense-perception.—See Porter.²

VICE (Lat. *Vitium*; Ger. *Laster*), fault; defect; blemish; imperfection; moral fault; failing; error; offence; crime. 1. Subjectively, the propension to an action contrary to the moral law. 2. Objectively, the immoral action itself. It is opposed to *virtue*.

Vices, as in Conflict with the Duties of Virtue, tabular view of, according to Kant: I. Vices in conflict with the duty man owes to himself. i. Of barbarousness of nature: 1. Suicide; 2. Carnalism; 3. Intemperance in eating and drinking. ii. Of culture: 1. Lying; 2. Avarice; 3. False humility.

II. Vices in conflict with the duties man owes to others. i. Misanthropy, hatred of one's kind: 1. Qualified envy; 2. Qualified ingratitude; 3. Qualified malignity.—See **Qualified**. ii. Contempt of one's kind: 1. Pride; 2. Detraction; 3. Scorn.³

¹ *Annotitions* [8]. ² *Human Intellect*, 126. ³ *Relig. innerhalb* (Kirchmann), 27-43; *Tugendlehre*, §§ 7, 36, 41; *Rechtslehre*, § 24.

***VIRTUAL.**—*V. distinction*, admitted by the Thomists, between the essential attributes of a thing. "Between the animality and the rationality of man there is a *V. distinction*." "*V. is less than formal*."

***VIRTUE.**—"1. An act which is in harmony with moral law. 2. A disposition harmonizing with a special form of moral law, and which has the force of fixed habit."—C. F. V.

Virtue (Ger. *Tugend*), in Kant: 1. "The moral strength of the human will in the pursuit of duty." 2. "Readiness, in free moral actions, to determine one's self in conduct by the conception of the law." 3. "Courage in the presence of opposition to our moral sentiments." 4. "Strength of principle in submission to moral duty." 5. "Strength of maxims in pursuit of duty." 6. "The moral faculty of self-control." 7. "The harmony of the will with every duty, a harmony established in a firm moral sentiment." 8. "Moral strength of will." 9. "Firmly grounded sentiment involving the complete fulfilling of duty." 10. "The conformity of sentiment with the law of duty." 11. "The morally good." 12. "The moral sentiment in struggle." 13. "The sentiment conformed to law out of regard to the law."—Mellin.¹

Virtue is distinguished as *noumenon* in its essential character, and *phenomenon* as revealed in external characteristics. It is characterized as *adopted*, when it is prompted by inclination or a native bent of mind; *genuine* and *ethical*, when prompted by principle.

VISHNU, VICHNOU.—See Trimourti.

VISION (Lat.), sight.—1. The act of sense-perception, of which the eye is the organ. See Porter,² Ulrici.³ 2. *V. in God*, the theory of Malebranche, that the sense-perceptions are not really organic, but are made possible by the connection of the soul with God, and of God with the soul. "God has in Himself the idea of all the beings He has created. He sees all these beings by considering the perfections He includes, to which they are related. God is most strictly united to our souls by this presence; so that He may be said to be the place of spirits, as space is the place of bodies. These two things being supposed, it is certain that the mind can see

¹ *Kunst-prache*. ² *Human Intellect*, 152-168, 186-189. ³ *Leib u. Seele*, 2d ed., 1874, 226-268.

what there is in God which represents created beings; that being most spiritual, most intelligible, and most closely present to the mind. And so the mind may see in God all the works of God, supposing God willing to discover to it what He has in Himself that represents them."¹

VISPERED, in the Parsee Philosophy, a book of the Zendavesta.

VITAL FORCE (Ger. *Lebenskraft*).—Czolbe: "The power of organisms cannot be explained by the planless and formless physical and chemical activities." "Nothing is left us but to throw ourselves into the arms of mysticism by accepting a supersensuous vital force, or in acknowledging the eternity of matter, to acknowledge also the eternity of form."² J. G. Fichte: "One of the two, spirit or nature, we must let drop; the actually true and real being is spiritual, and there is no other being."³ I. H. Fichte: "One and the same faculty (the soul) is active in the bodily processes, and in the changes of consciousness, and manifests itself diversely in accordance with the grades of its intensity."⁴ Flentje has shown, from the position of natural science, how untenable is the idea that, in organisms, no other forces are at work than those of inorganic nature, as, specially, of chemistry.⁵ Hegel: "The spiritual is the union of the spiritual and natural, in such way that the natural takes its law and bounds from the spiritual. God is not alongside of things, but actually in them: He is the subsistence of all things." "The consideration of the harmony in the organic brings at once with it the feeling of a higher something which has established this harmony."⁶ Fr. Hoffmann, like Baader, maintains the identity of spirit and nature.⁷ Lotze: "So little do we find in organic bodies that native, self-sufficient vital force, that, on the contrary, we can look upon them only as those places in space in which the materials, the forces, and the movements of the general course of nature interlace in such happy relations, that changeable masses for a long time condense themselves to a shape, though it

¹ *Recherche de la Vérité*, L. III., ch. vi; Buhle: *Geschichte*, III., 444 seq. ² *Entstehung d. Selbstbewusstseins*, 1856, 53, 56. ³ *Nachgelassene Werke*, III. 32. ⁴ *Anthropologie*, 474, 475. ⁵ *Leben u. d. natrl. Natur*, 1866; Büchner's *Kraft u. Stoff . . beleuchtet*, 1876. ⁶ *Werke*, XI. 202, 203. ⁷ *Ztschr. v. Fichte*, XLI. 135.

be ever in transition, and their reciprocal operations can run like melody through the round of bloom and decay.”¹ Mehring² holds the same view as I. H. Fichte. Moleschott opposes the doctrine of vital force, as he defines it — a force without substratum, and yet endowed with personal qualities.³ Planck maintains that the organic originates in influences which animate the surface of the earth from its interior, and pronounces it “nonsense to believe that by the knowledge of the activity of chemical and physical forces in organism we have set aside the notion of vital force as a principle distinct from these forces.”⁴ Schaller directs attention to the distinction between the chemical and the organic; that in the chemical process, after the completion of a single occurrence, the process comes to rest; while in organic nature there is a continuous, self-conserving, living process.⁵ Schelling has the same view.⁶ Schleiden denies the vital force, but lays down an impulse of self-preservation, and a formative impulse as the bases of self-preservation, and of the shaping process in organisms, as a law in accordance with which both are united to each other.⁷ Schopenhauer pronounces the polemic against the supposition of a vital force, stupid. “The denial of the vital force is absurd. Were there not a peculiar force of nature, to which it is as essential to *act in conformity with aim* as it is essential to gravity to draw bodies toward each other; did it not move, guide, regulate the whole complicated mechanism of organism, life would be an illusion, an imposition, and we should have a mere automaton, a plaything of mechanical, physical, and chemical forces. It is not disputed that physical and chemical forces are at work in organism; but that which holds them together and guides them, so that an organism conformed to its purpose comes into being and subsists, that is vital force.” “The vital force certainly uses and brings into its employ the forces of inorganic nature, but by no means consists of them; just as little as a blacksmith consists of his hammer and anvil. Hence, not

¹ *Mikrokosmos*, 2d. ed., 1869, I. 155. ² *Philosoph. kritisch. Grundsätze d. Selbsterkenntnis*, Thl. I. 213-218. ³ *Kreislauf*, 353-356. ⁴ *Wissenschaft der Natur*, 273, 274. ⁵ *Leib u. Seele*, 125. ⁶ *Werke*, I., il. 499; IV. 211. ⁷ Steudel: *Philosophie im Umriss*, I., i. 466.

the very simplest plant-life can be explained by those forces, as, for example, by capillary attraction or by endosmosis, to say nothing of animal life." "A fundamental distinction between the vital force and all the other forces of nature has been found in the fact that, when the vital force once forsakes a body, it never takes it into possession again. Of the forces of inorganic nature, some, for example magnetism and electricity, depart only in exceptional cases from the bodies which they once control; others, as gravity and chemical quality, never depart from a body. But the vital force, after it has once forsaken a body, can never again take it into possession. The ground of this is that it never, like the forces of inorganic nature, cleaves to the mere material, but primarily cleaves to the form. Its activity consists, in fact, in the production and preservation of this form; hence, so soon as it departs from a body, its form is destroyed. But the production of the form has its regular, systematic method, following a distinct line of succession. Hence, the vital force, wherever it enters anew, must begin its texture from the beginning. It must start *ab ovo*." "As regards the vital force, up to thirty-six we live on our interest, after that we begin to draw on our capital."¹ Schwarz² holds the same view as Hoffmann. Spiess³ takes the same view as Schaller. Though he takes ground against vital force, he yet places the essential nature of organism in the fact that in it all the activities are directed to a common aim, and all the individual forces are bound together into a higher unity. Ulrici discusses the vital force under the following heads: I. Relation of the organic and inorganic in a chemical respect. II. Different views entertained on this subject by Regnault, Strecker, Limpricht, Graham-Otto, Kekulé. III. Points of difference between organic and inorganic unions. IV. Can organic substances be produced by artificial methods? V. Answer of Liebig and v. Gorup-Besanez to this question. VI. Difference of the chemical processes in organic and inorganic bodies. VII. The vital force accepted by recent chemistry, rejected by recent physiology. VIII. The opponents of vital force: G. A. Spiess,

¹ *Parerga*, II. 172 seq.; I. 517; *Willen in Natur*, Vorr. VI.; *Welt als Wille*, I. 169.
² *Gott, Natur u. Mensch*, 17; *Zschr. v. Fichte*, XLVII. 235. ³ *Neuen-Physiologie*.

J. W. Schleiden, Du Bois-Reymond, J. M. Schiff, C. Ludwig, A. Fick. IX. Attempts at a reconciliation of views by Claude Bernard and R. Virchow. X. H. Lotze, the leading representative of a tendency to mediation, which yet sets aside vital force. XI. E. Haeckel, the leading representative at present of the materialistic tendency, which denies all distinction between mechanism and organism. XII. Proof that the inorganic forces cannot produce life and its phenomena. XIII. Result: The vital force and the modes of operation distinctive of it are the presupposition of all organization. "So long as we speak of an electrical force, so long, in spite of the variety of its manifestations, we are justified in speaking of a vital force; that is, in using this term to designate the cause of those phenomena by which—in the main in similar ways—organic bodies are distinguished from the inorganic."¹

***VOLITION**, "an exercise of will."—C. F. V. (Ger. *Wollen*.) Bp. Wilkins: "To say that we cannot tell whether we have liberty because we do not understand the manner of *volition*, is all one as to say that we cannot tell whether we see or hear, because we do not understand the manner of sensation."—L. J. Hence, Volitional and Volitive.

VOLUNTAS (Lat.), will, *q. v.* Hence, Voluntary.

VORSTELLUNG (Ger.), in Kant, representation (the Gr. *φαντασία*), applies to intuitional and sensational perceptions, and also to conceptions which are their generalizations.—M. T. M.—See **Verstand**. It is Kant's most general term for mental modifications of every kind. See Krauth's *Berkeley*.² Ulrici³ classifies the conscious soul in its relations to itself under the heads of: I. Life of feeling. II. Life of mental modifications (*Vorstellungsleben*). III. The life of instinct. Under the second he embraces: 1. The faculty of memory; 2. Of the association of ideas; 3. Imagination and memory. Kant applies the adjective "*dunkel*," *obscure*, to those *Vorstellungen*, modifications, of which we are not conscious. It is opposed to *clear*, which marks distinct perception. Complex V. (*gehäuften*) are those in which the main V. are accompanied by other V. springing from subjective grounds, out

¹ *Gott und die Natur*, Dritte, neu bearb. Aufl., 1875, 216–290. ² *Annotations, Tabular View*, p. 338. ³ In the psychological part of *Leib u. Seele*, 2d. ed., 1874, 207–301.

of the situation in which we are or were. They are *pure* when free from everything which pertains to sensation; opposed to *empirical*. Thus, space is a pure V.; body, which fills it, is empirical. They are called *sensible* (*sinnliche*) as aroused by a distinct object and referred to it; as, V. of sound, shape, movements, smell. They are *rational*, as produced by a free operativeness of the mind of man, with the consciousness of an aim. *Vorstellungsfähigkeit*, *Vorstellungskraft*, and *Vorstellungsvermögen*, express the receptivity, capacity, power, faculty of mental representation, the representative power, that on which, in general, rests our power of having mental modifications.—Mellin.¹

VORTEX, (*pl. Vortices*) (Lat.), whirling motion; whirl (Ger. *Wirbel*).—In Des Cartes,² system of matter moving in gyrations (Fr. *Tourbillons*), and carrying the heavenly bodies with it.

WARMTH, "a distinct sensation which, under certain circumstances, is present and comes to our consciousness. Physics has demonstrated that the rise of it is conditioned by distinct movements of the ethereal atoms, and in a certain respect of the ponderable atoms, the 'minutest portions' of a mass; that is, it arises when these movements meet nerves sensible to them, capable of excitation by them."—Ulrici.³

WATCH, as a familiar piece of mechanism, has been largely used in philosophical illustration.—Berkeley.⁴

WATER, in Thales of Miletus (640–550 B. c.), the head of the Ionic physicists: "The principle (the first, the primary cause) of all things: everything is of water, and to water everything reverts."—Schwegler.⁵

WEAK, WEAKNESS, applied in Ethics to human nature, the human heart; infirmity; frailty. (Ger. *Gebrechlichkeit*, *Schwachheit*.—Kant.⁶

WEAKENED CONCLUSION, is applied to the five moods of the syllogism, which, though valid, are of little use, because

¹ *Kunstsprache*, s. v.; *Wörterbuch*, s. v. ² *Princip. Philosoph.*, P. iii. ³ *Strauss, Kranth's Translat.*, 128–130. ⁴ *Principles*, § 62. See Ueberweg's *Notes*, 77, 78, Kranth's Translation. ⁵ *Gesch. d. Philosophie*, 9th ed., 1876. ⁶ *Religion innerhalb*, 21, 22; *Tugendlehre*, 114.

the conclusion is particular when a general one might have been drawn.—Jevons.

WEALTH (Ang. Sax.), that which contributes to *weal*, well-being, welfare; prosperity; riches. (Ger. *Reichthum*.)—H. C. Carey: "W. consists in the power to command the services of the always gratuitous forces of nature. . . The more thoroughly the great natural forces are subjected to human control, and the more numerous these unconsuming slaves—the natural forces—the greater becomes the power of production, and the greater is the tendency towards that accumulation of wealth which manifests itself in the physical, mental, moral, and political improvement of a people."¹ Malthus: "The material objects necessary, useful, or agreeable to man, which have required some portion of human exertion to appropriate or produce."² Wealth comprises "all the articles or products that are necessary, useful, or agreeable to man, and which, at the same time, possess exchangeable value; the power or capacity to exchange for or buy some quantity of labor, or of one or more commodities or products obtainable only by means of labor."—J. R. McCulloch.³ "The annual labor of every nation is the fund which originally supplies it with all the necessities and conveniences of life which it annually consumes, and which consist always either in the immediate produce of that labor, or in what is purchased with that produce from other nations."—Adam Smith.⁴ Whately has grouped and criticised a number of definitions of wealth.⁵

WEIGHT (Ang. Sax.), gravity; measure of gravitation, *q. v.* (Ger. *Schwere*.)

*Well-Being.

WERDEN, DAS (Ger.), in Kant, the *Esse* in a state of action, *i. e.*, active existence; differing from it as dynamical from static electricity.—M. T. M.

WESEN, DAS (Ger.), real concrete existence, or essence manifested in qualified or conditional nature. *W. logisches*, logical essence, "the primary, internal principle of all that per-

¹ *Wealth: Of What does it Consist?* Penn Monthly, October, 1870. ² *Definitions in Political Economy* (Cazenove), 1853, 7, 32, 36. ³ Smith's *Wealth of Nations*, new ed., 1838, 1, note. ⁴ *Wealth of Nations*, Introduct. ⁵ *Logic*, Appendix I. (Sheldon & Co.), 385.

tains to the possibility of a thing ; " " the internal possibility of the concept ; " " the sum of essential parts." Absolutely necessary W. is essence " whose non-being is impossible." Organized W., or being, is that " in which everything is end, and is at the same time reciprocally means." Hence, *Wesentliche*, essential ; as, W. *Stücke*, essential parts.—Mellin.¹

WHEN, marking time, **WHERE**, marking place, in the Aristotelian categories.—See **Category**.

*Whole.

Whole and Parts.—Hegel : " The immediate relation (in which the two sides are quasi-independent) is that of the *whole* and the *parts*. The content is the whole, and consists of the parts : these parts are the form and the reverse of the content. The parts are diverse one from another. It is they that possess independent being. But they are parts only when they are connected with one another as identical, that is, when equated ; or, in so far as they make up the whole when taken together. But this term 'together' is the reverse and negation of the part."²

***WHY?** " for what reason ?"—C. F. V.

***WILL**, " the power by which we determine personal action. Its result is a personal act, mental or bodily, in contrast with a spontaneous act, as involuntary recollection—a reflex act, as shrinking under pain—and the loose sense in which we speak of the action of the laws of nature. On account of its essential connection with intelligence, it is denominated a power of rational self-determination."—C. F. V. See *Des Cartes*.³

Will, Definitions of, arranged in the Classified Alphabetical Order of the Authors of them :

I. Ancient and Mediæval.—Aquinas,⁴ Aristotle,⁴ Augustine,⁵ Epicureans,⁵ Justin,⁵ Neoplatonists,⁵ Pelagius,⁵ Plato,⁵ Plotinus,⁵ Stoics,⁵ Tertullian.⁵

II. Modern, previous to Kant.—Arminius,⁵ Buddeus : " The will is a faculty whereby we first perceive good and evil ; and then desire the good and turn from the evil. Nor does the will seem to differ from the understanding, except in office

¹ *Kunstsprache*, s. v. ² *Encyklopädie* (Rosenkranz), § 135 ; *Logic*, Wallace's Translat. 211. ³ *Principles*, xxxii. ⁴ Quoted in the article *Will*, in Fleming's *Vocabulary*.

⁵ Bain : *History of the Free-Will Controversy : Mental and Moral Science*, 406-428.

and operation. The will sometimes follows the understanding, sometimes precedes it, and determines it to the knowing this or that more accurately. It is customary to call the understanding a *necessary power*, which, when all the requisites of understanding are supposed, cannot but understand, judge, reason. But from the will, it is said, man derives the power of acting *spontaneously*, that is, he is not determined to act by any internal necessity, but is himself the author of his own action; as also the power of acting *freely*, that is, if one object be proposed, he can act or not act in regard to it, can choose it or reject it; or, if a number of objects be proposed, can choose one and reject the others. In the sense here claimed, it seems to me, the will, equally with the understanding, is destitute of all liberty. For as soon as the will perceives anything represented as good, whether by the understanding, the imagination, or the senses themselves, it cannot but love it and desire it; and, on the other hand, the evil, which it perceives as evil, it necessarily shuns and dislikes."¹ Calvin,² Collins,³ Sam. Clarke,⁴ Des Cartes,⁵ Jonathan Edwards,⁶ Gassendi,⁷ Hobbes,⁸ Hooker,⁹ Leibnitz,¹⁰ Locke,¹¹ Price,¹² Priestley.¹³ Regis: "The will is the faculty of affirming or denying, of doing or letting alone, what the understanding presents to it as true or false, good or bad. The ordinary opinion that the soul determines itself, and is a self-active essence, is to be rejected, for the only immediately operative cause is God; all other causes are but mediate instruments, which operate through the Godhead."¹⁴ Reid,¹⁵ South,¹⁶ Spinoza.¹⁷ *Système de la Nature*: "Will, the result of brain-action, is not free; its action is necessitated."¹⁸

III. Modern, subsequent to Kant, to our own day, American and British.—Bain: "The primitive elements of the will are: i., the spontaneity of movement; and, ii., the link between action and feelings, grounded in self-conservation."¹⁹ Carpenter: "A self-determining power within us." Chase:

¹ *Element. Philosoph. Practic.*, Edit. Septima, 1717, 23, 24. ² Bain: *Mental and Moral Science: History*, 406-428. ³ *Physic*, sect. III, lib. x., ch. i.; Opp. II., 409 seq. ⁴ Bain, 411-414. ⁵ Bain, 415, 416. ⁶ Bain, 413. ⁷ Bain, 420. ⁸ Bain, 421. ⁹ *Metaph.*, I. 203. See Buhle: *Geschichte*, III., 413-415. ¹⁰ Bain, 422-425. ¹¹ *Will*, in Fleming's *Vocabulary*. ¹² Bain, 414. ¹³ Buhle, vi. 109. ¹⁴ *Mental and Moral Science*, 1868, book IV., 316-429; *The Emotions and the Will*, 3d edit., 1876.

"The spontaneous form of spontaneity."¹ Coleridge.² Cope: "W. may be considered in two aspects: first, as a control over the origin of mental and bodily movements; and second, as a control over the direction which those movements take." "All actions may be divided into two classes: those which are performed with the design of securing the pleasure of the subject, and those whose motive is to secure pleasure for the object, as distinct from, that is opposed to that of the subject—the *appetent* and the *altruistic*."³ Green,⁴ Hamilton,⁴ Hazard,⁵ Mansel,⁶ Jas. Mill,⁷ J. S. Mill,⁷ Stewart,⁸ Tappan,⁸ Thompson,² Whedon.⁹

IV. Modern, subsequent to Kant, to our own day, Continental.—Bouillet: "Faculty of willing, of self-determining. Sometimes the word is synonymous with activity, and is then divided into *spontaneous W.*, or *instinct*, and *reflective W.*; but, ordinarily, it designates that particular form of activity which succeeds spontaneity, and which supposes reflection. Its determinations take the name of *volitions*. Each of these comprehends the following elements: 1. Self-control, being possessor and master of our faculties. 2. Conception of the idea of an action, the means of accomplishing it, the motives for it or against it (sentiment, interest, duty). 3. Deliberation, judgment of the moral character of an act. 4. Free determination. 5. Execution of the determination. It differs essentially from *desire*, with which Condillac and his school have confounded it, and from the *understanding*, from which the Cartesians have not sufficiently distinguished it; it ought to control the desires and receive illumination from the understanding. It is one of the conditions of *morality* and of *responsibility*, and consequently of *personality*. Maine de Biran, who has laid much stress on the study of the will, has endeavored to explain, by the action of that faculty, many acts or important states of the soul, as attention, sleep, &c."¹⁰ Feuchtersleben.² J. G. Fichte: 1. "What is the meaning of the expression: I find myself *willing*; and

¹ Symbolism, 60. ² Article *Will*, in Fleming's Vocabulary. ³ *The Origin of the Will*, Penn Monthly, June, 1877. Do.: *Consciousness in Evolution*, Penn Monthly, August, 1876. ⁴ *Metaphysics* (Am. ed.), 128; Bain, 425, 426. ⁵ *Freedom of the Mind in Willing; or, Every Being that Wills a Creative First Cause*, 1866. ⁶ Bain, 426. ⁷ Bain, 426-428. ⁸ *Treatise on the Will*, new ed., 1857. ⁹ *The Freedom of the Will*, 1864. ¹⁰ *Dictionnaire Universel*: Art. *Volonte*.

only as willing can I find myself? What it means *to will* is assumed as known. This concept is not capable of a real explanation, and needs none. Every one must be aware, in himself, by intellectual intuition, what it means, and this he can accomplish without the least difficulty."¹ 2. "The will in the phenomenon is never *determining*, but always *determined*: the determining has already taken place; had it not taken place, we should not have it manifested as *will*, but as *inclination*."² I. H. Fichte: 1. "Will is only the becoming real of what is thought, a becoming which has already been controlled by the intelligence. The thinking determines itself immediately to willing, not the converse."³ 2. "The incitant of the will must, first of all, enter into conscious mental representation. This represented something is the starting-point and the first excitant of the act of will, which is produced by feeling. Cognition, feeling, and willing are inwardly inseparable."⁴ 3. "Our willing is co-willing of that which was primarily willed (of God), that which is laid down in the ethical ideas."⁵ V. Hartmann (see Schopenhauer), 1. looks upon the functions of the individual organs of a living body as unconscious acts of will. 2. "A mental representation is the motive and the excitant cause of the will. The will is nothing besides the faculty of willing; it is incapable of all other activity; its essential nature is only the ability of willing."⁶—See **Unconscious, Philosophy of**. Hegel: "The distinction between thinking and willing is merely the distinction between the theoretical and the rational respect. They are not two faculties; the will is a special mode of thinking. The beast acts by instinct."⁷ Helfferich: "Resolution is nothing more than the product of diverse mental representations interlacing or co-working."⁸ Kant.—See special article **Will in Kant**. Liebmann (see v. Hartmann): "W. is the function of the Ego by which it determines itself to action."⁹ Schopenhauer.—See special article **Will, in Schopenhauer**. Ul-

¹ Werke, IV. 10; *System der Sittenlehre*, 1798. ² Werke, VIII., 413; *Recension of Krazer's* *alept. Betracht. üb. d. Freiheit d. Willens*, 1793. ³ *Charakteristik d. neueren Philosophie*, ed. 2, 766, 767. ⁴ *Psychologie*, II. 133. ⁵ Do., 31. ⁶ *Philosoph. d. Erkenntniss*, 2d ed., 213, 217; *Erläuter. z. Metaphys. d. Unbewusst.*, 36. ⁷ Werke, VIII., 34-38; *Philosophie d. Rechts*. ⁸ *Metaphysik*, 235. ⁹ *Beweis d. Freiheit d. Willens*, 11.

rici: "The volition is by no means identical with the mere tendency, not even with conscious tendency and desire. So long as it is impossible to overthrow the fact, to which there is a universal testimony, that the will is able to set itself in opposition to those tendencies which come into our consciousness, to resist the force of the impulse to gratify those tendencies, and to act with that end in view; so long as the will can hem these in and limit them, it is simply impossible (impossible, for it involves a logical contradiction) to identify the will with tendency and desire, or to derive it from the faculty of desire, the appetitive faculty."¹

Will, Willing, in Kant, practical reason (*voluntas, facultas appetitiva superior*).—1. "Everything in nature works according to laws. A rational being alone has the faculty of acting in accordance with conception of laws, principles, that is, has a *will*. As reason is required that we may deduce action from laws, the will is nothing more than practical reason. If the will be in itself in complete conformity with reason, it is the faculty of choosing that only which the reason recognizes as good; in opposition to this, the determination of the will is necessitation." 2. "A perfectly good will cannot be conceived of as *necessitated* to actions in conformity with law. Hence, for the will of God, and for a holy will in general, there can be no imperatives. The *shall* is out of place, the *will* is of itself in necessary harmony with law."² 3. "The will is thought of as a faculty, which determines itself to action in conformity with the conception of certain laws. The objective ground of the self-determination of the will is the *end*; the ground of the possibility of the particular act which accomplishes the end is called the *means*. The subjective ground of desire is incitement; the objective ground of willing is motive."³ 4. In the transition from the metaphysics of morals to the critique of the practical reason, Kant's first proposition is that "the concept of liberty, *q. v.*, is the key to the explanation of the autonomy of the will." "The will is a species of causality pertaining to living beings, in as far as they are rational; and liberty is that attribute of this causality, in virtue of which it is operative inde-

¹ *Gott u. der Mensch, zweiter Theil; I. Das Naturrecht* (1873): *Weisen u. Begriff d. Willens*, 12-35. ² *Grundleg. z. Metaph. d. Sitten*, 36. ³ *Grundl. d. Metaph.*, 63.

pendently of extraneous causes *determining* it. *Necessity of nature* would mark that it is determined to activity by extraneous causes. The freedom of the will is its attribute of being a law to itself, that is *Autonomy*, q. v."¹ 5. "The autonomy of the will is the exclusive principle of all moral law, and of all duties in accord with it. The autonomy is freedom in both the negative and positive sense."² 6. "The will is the faculty of desire, so far as it is capable of determination to act in conformity with the conception of an end. Conformity to an end is applied to a thing only because we can deduce the possibility of it from a will."³ 7. "The faculty of acting in accordance with the conception of the law-principle." 8. "The faculty of determining one's self to action in conformity with the conception of certain laws." 9. "The faculty of determining in regard to certain objects correspondent with conceptions, either to bring them forth, or at least to determine itself to the production of them—whether the physical power to do so be adequate or not—that is to determine its causality."—Mellin.⁴

Will, Willing, in Schopenhauer.—The wide range of topics embraced in Schopenhauer's doctrine of the will may be thus classified:⁵

I. Willing; Wollen; Volition. — i. The subject of the willing. The subject, Ego, is divided into the subject of the *willing* and the subject of the *cognizing*—See **Ego, Subject**. ii. Identity of the subject of the willing and the subject of the cognizing. "The word 'I' designates this identity, and includes both."⁶ iii. Indefinable character of willing: "As the subject of willing is immediately given to self-consciousness, it is impossible to define or describe further what willing is; rather is it the most immediate of all our cognitions; in fact, it is that whose immediateness must at last shed light on all the rest, which are mediate in a high degree."⁷ iv. Wisdom of language in applying the term "willing." "In many, perhaps in all languages, the operation of incognitive, in fact of inanimate bodies, is expressed by 'willing.' A will is consequently presupposed in them,

¹ *Grundl. s. M. d. S.*, 97, 102. ² *Pract. Vern.*, 29, 57, 77. ³ *Urtheilskraft*, § 4-10.

⁴ *Kunstsprache*. ⁵ *Frauenstädt: Schopenhauer-Lexikon*, 1871. ⁶ *Zurich. Grunde*, 3d ed., 143. ⁷ *Zurich. Grunde*, 144; *Handschr. Nachlass*, 161; *Welt als Wille*, 3d ed. 219.

but never a cognition, conception, perception, thinking." ¹

II. Will, Wille.—i. The will, as thing in itself: 1. In what sense the will is to be considered as thing in itself.—See **An Sich, Noumen, Things**. "The perception, in which we cognize the movements and acts of our own will, is far more immediate than any other; it is the point at which the thing in itself comes most immediately into phenomenon, and is illuminated in the closest proximity by the cognizing subject. By every coming forth of an act of will from the dark deep within us into cognizing consciousness, there takes place an immediate transition, into phenomenon, of the thing in itself which lies exterior to time. The act of will is indeed, according to this, no more than the most direct and clear *phenomenon* of the thing in itself; yet it follows that, if all the other phenomena could be cognized by us as immediately and intrinsically, we should feel compelled to claim for them what we claim for the will in us. In this sense, consequently, we must conceive of the internal essence of everything as *will*, and must call the will the thing in itself." ²

2. Antithesis between the will and its phenomenon. "The will as thing in itself is completely diverse from its phenomenon, and completely free from all forms of it, into which it must enter that it may produce phenomenon, forms, therefore, which relate to its *objectivity*, but are extraneous to the will itself. Even the most universal form of all conception, the conception of an object as involved in a subject, does not pertain to it; still less do those subordinate forms which are expressed by the principle of the ground. The will as thing in itself lies outside of the principle of the ground in every shape, is simply without ground, though its phenomena are throughout subjected to the principle of this ground. Further, it is free from all *multiplicity*, though its phenomena in time and space are countless. It is itself one, though never in the sense in which an object is one thing, in antithesis to possible plurality; nor even as a concept is one thing, which has arisen from plurality only by abstraction; but it is one thing as that which, exterior to time and space, imparts to

¹ *Willen in der Natur*, 3d ed., 95-97. ² *Welt als Wille*, 3d edit., II., 221; see Krauth's *Berkeley*, 111-114.

the principle of *Individuation*, q. v., the possibility of multiplicity.”¹ 3. Antithesis between the magical and physical operation of the will. “Magic is an immediate operation of the will itself, freed from the causal conditions of physical operation, consequently of contact in the widest sense of that term.”²—See *Somnambulism*. ii. Objectivation of the will in nature: 1. Objectivation in general. 2. Special grades of objectivation; nature and forces. iii. Exhibition of the grades of will in art: 1. Art as exhibition of ideas or of the grades of will in general; works of art, genius. 2. The special arts as exhibition of special ideas; architecture, gardening, sculpture, painting, poetry. 3. Antithesis between music and the other arts.³ iv. The ethical determinations and manifestations of will; bad, character, conscience, duty, ethics, freedom, good, morals, virtue. v. Affirmation and denial of the will. 1. Significance of this antithesis; quietive and motive. 2. Identity of this antithesis with the Christian antithesis between nature and grace. 3. Antithesis between man and animal in respect to the possibility of deciding to affirm or deny the will. 4. Phenomena of affirmation. 5. Phenomena of negation, asceticism, sanctity. “So far is suicide from being a negation of the will to live, that it is, in fact, a phenomenon of violent affirmation of that will. The self-murderer wishes for life, and is merely dissatisfied with the conditions under which it comes to him. He is like a sick man who interrupts the painful operation which would bring him a complete cure, and keeps his sickness. Instead of making sorrow the quietive of the will, he throws it from him by destroying the body, which is but the phenomenon of the will, destroys it that he may leave the will itself unbroken.”⁴ 6. The two methods of negation of the will to live: through complete resignation or sanctity, through suffering as purely *cognized*, or suffering as actually *felt*. 7. Relation of the moral to this affirmation and negation. 8. The “nothing” which remains after the negation of the will. “What remains after a complete negation of the will would certainly be, in the eyes of all who are yet full of the will, nothing. But the case is reversed to those

¹ *Welt als Wille*, 134, 152. ² *Parerga*, 2d ed., 281 seq. ³ See Krauth's *Berkeley*, 116.

⁴ *Welt als Wille*, I, 471-473.

in whom the will has turned and denied itself. To them this world of ours, so very real, is, with all its stars and its galaxies, nothing."¹

***Will (Freedom of).**—"Will," says Kant, "is that kind of causality attributed to living agents, in so far as they are possessed of reason; and freedom is such a property of that causality as enables them to originate events independently of foreign determining causes."—F. V. 3.—See **Liberty**.

WILLKÜR.—1. Represents the Lat. *Arbitrium*, as *Wille* represents *Voluntas*. W. is absolute will; arbitrariness; free will; free choice; the power and act of capriciousness; with no real reason, no proper motive. 2. It sometimes represents *Voluntas*, *Will*, q. v. According to the character of the influences operative on it, it is called rational or irrational, human or animal, bond or free.

***WISDOM.**—Kant: 1. "The harmony of the will with the final aim of all things, the supreme good." 2. "Reason which teaches us to eradicate what is in conflict with the moral law, and does, in fact, eradicate it." He qualifies it as human, practical, theoretic.—Mellin.²

Wisdom, Doctrine of (Ger. *Weisheitslehre*), philosophy. Kant: "The doctrine which defines the idea of the supreme good practically, that is, so as to make it sufficient for the maxim of our rational conduct. As science, it is philosophy."³

WISE MAN, THE, in Antisthenes, "the man sufficient for himself, independent of all, indifferent to marriage, family, and state, as also to riches, honor, and enjoyment." In the Cynic view: "Master over all his wants and desires, without weakness, free from the fetters of society law and society custom—the peer of the gods." In the Stoic view: "He who actually possesses a true knowledge of divine and human things, as well as the absolute moral perception and strength that flow from it, and who, by consequence, unites in himself every conceivable perfection of humanity."⁴ In Kant: "He who, like a poet, personifies virtue in absolute purity, wholly free from the influence of all extraneous impulses, as a thing solely of duty—as an ideal toward which we must ever be drawing closer."⁵

¹ *Welt als Wille*, I., 485–487. ² *Kunstsprache*. ³ *Pr. Vernunft*, 194. ⁴ Schwegler-Stirling, 54, 55, 129, 130. ⁵ *Tugendlehre*, 9.

WISSEN (Ger.), in Kant, science; sometimes knowledge, but never cognition (*Erkenntniss*, q. v.).—M. T. M.

WISSENSCHAFTSLEHRE (Ger.).—1. "Theory of science (Fr. *Théorie de la Science*);" "science of knowledge;" philosophy considered as a scientific exposition of the essential nature of cognition. 2. The name of the theoretic philosophy of Johann Gottlieb Fichte. "Philosophy is a science (*Wissenschaft*). Science affirms something which it actually *knows* and *can know* (*weiss* and *wissen kann*). How and in what way can a multitude of propositions, very diverse in themselves, become one science, one and the same total? There must be at least one proposition which is certain, which in some way imparts its certainty to the rest, so that, when and in as far as this one is granted as sure, a second one is also sure; and if the second one is sure, a third one, and so on, must be sure. Thus all would have sureness, the same sureness, one sureness in common, and thus become one science. . . How is it possible to reach the content and form of a science in general, that is, how is science itself possible? Anything in which this question would be answered would itself be a science, and in fact the science of science in general. The nation which shall discover this science would be well entitled to give it a name from its own tongue, and might simply call it *science* or the *doctrine of science* (*Wissenschaftslehre*). What has hitherto been styled philosophy would then be the science of science in general."¹

*Wit.

***WIT AND HUMOR**.—Barrow,² Kames,³ *Spectator*,⁴ Sydney Smith,⁵ Thackeray,⁶ Ben Jonson,⁷ S. Bailey.⁸ Sir Henry Bulwer,⁹ has a chapter on wit. According to Sydney Smith, "The feeling of wit is occasioned by those relations of ideas which excite surprise, and surprise alone."

"True wit is nature to advantage dressed;
What oft was thought, but ne'er so well expressed;
Something, whose truth convinced at sight, we find,
That gives us back the language of our mind."—POPE.

¹ *Ueber den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre*, 1794, 1798; *Werke*, I. 27-81. ² Vol. I., sermon 14. ³ *Criticism*, ch. xiii. ⁴ Nos. 58-63. ⁵ *Mor. Phil.* ⁶ *Humorists*. ⁷ *Every Man in his Humor*. ⁸ *Discourses Literary and Philosophical*, 1852. ⁹ *France, Social, Literary and Political*.

Aristotle¹ defines wit as "chastened insolence." And² he says: "The ludicrous consists in a thing being out of place, anomalous, ugly, and faulty, though not in such a way as to cause any sense of apprehension or pain." This definition has been made by Coleridge³ the text for his dissertations on wit and humor.

WOLF (Christian, 1697-1754); **SYSTEM OF**, elaboration and systemization of Leibnitzianism, *q. v.*

WONDER (Ger. *Wunder*).—1. The emotion, the feeling which, "according to circumstances, is denominated *surprise*, *astonishment*, *admiration*, *wonder*; and when blended with" "the intellectual necessity of refunding effects into their causes, and the intellectual necessity of carrying up our knowledge into unity or system," "it obtains the name of *curiosity*. It is a powerful auxiliary to speculation, and adequately explains the preference with which certain parts of philosophy have been cultivated, and the order in which philosophy in general has been developed. Plato, Aristotle, Plutarch, and Bacon, have all concurred in testifying to the influence of this principle."—Hamilton.⁴ 2. Object of the feeling; wonderful thing.

WORD (Ger. *Wort*).—1. An articulate sound which designates or helps to designate a concept or idea; a part of speech; the notation of such a sound by characters. 2. The *Logos*, *q. v.* See Berkeley,⁵ Locke,⁶ Ueberweg.⁷

WORLD, in Philosophy (Gr. *κόσμος* (see compounds of *Cosmo*); Lat. *Mundus*, both implying order and beauty; Fr. *Le Monde*, *l'Univers*; Ger. *Welt*, *Weltall*).—The created universe; never, in its proper philosophical use, applied to our globe simply. "World is the great collective idea of all bodies whatever."—Locke. "It comprehends heaven and earth, all creatures visible and invisible, spiritual and corporeal."—Furtmair. In Kant, we have the world distinguished as metaphysical, intelligible, transcendental, moral.

World, in the History of Philosophy.—I. Ancient.—Anaxagoras: 1. "So far as reason conceives of the world as a system of aims—and that such is the judgment of reason, con-

¹ *Rhet.*, II., xii. 16. ² *Poet.*, v. 2. ³ *Literary Remains*, Vol. I. ⁴ *Metaphysics*, Lect. IV., 54-56. ⁵ *Principles*, §§ 20, 21. ⁶ *Human Understanding*, II., xlii. 18, 28. ⁷ *Notes on Berkeley's Principles* (Krauth's Translat.), [6], [7].

sciousness irresistibly declares—the world cannot be explained mechanically.” 2. “There is a *spirit of the world*, author and governor of the universe, whose nature is reason, and who is the ground and source of all rational being.”—See **Homöomeria**.¹ Aristotle: “There must exist a first, immovable cause of motion, a cause which depends on nothing else, eternal and indestructible, active from eternity, and as everything which is, has its being through movement, is the eternal cause of the eternal world, and preserves it by the constant movement of the heaven in its course.”² Philo: “The Logos, as the first-born Son of God, is God’s instrument in the creation of the world. He is the ideal of the world, after which God gave shape to matter. He is the instrument through which God governs the universe, and preserves it in its course.”³ Plato: “The world is the work of an intelligence shaped in accordance with the highest aims of reason. Its constituent parts are matter and spirit, whose powers and laws are subordinated to the operative force of that intelligence which works in conformity with aims. The world is the sum of all substances in general, its unconditional author, the Godhead, alone excepted.”⁴ Plotinus: “The existence of the world pertains to the essence of the Godhead; the world is consequently from eternity, and can be destroyed by no exterior cause.”⁵ So also Proclus.⁶

II. Mediæval and Modern, before Kant.—Giordano Bruno, Meister Eckart, Scotus Erigena, and Spinoza teach that God is all in all, the alone-existent, the being of the world, and entirely present in it as His creation, in the sense of *Pantheism*, q. v. The great mass, however, of philosophers of this era maintain the proper creation of the universe, its coming into being by the free will of an omnipotent personal creator.

III. Kant to Schopenhauer.—J. G. Fichte denies the real being of the world, and of things, and the substantial being of God. Over against Spinoza, he rejects the being of substance as the bearer of accidents. “Substance is nothing

¹ See sources given in Buhle: *Geschichte*, I. 66. ² *Ausc. phys.*, lib. viii.; Buhle, I. 331. ³ Buhle, I. 623-624. ⁴ *Phædo*, 217; *Philetus*, 244; *Sophista*, 266; *Polit.*, 80; *De rep.*, VI. 121, VII. 158; *Timæus*, 300; Buhle, I. 201. ⁵ Buhle, I. 672-751; Tiedemann: *Geist d. speculativ. Philosophie*, III. ⁶ Buhle, I. 765.

separate and peculiar, but only the accidents themselves under the form of thought. The world of the changeable does not exist; it is pure nothing. The world is not a mirror, an expression, a revelation, a symbol of the eternal, but rather a struggle of being and non-being, the absolute internal contradiction. The concept of being is not of itself, but comes from thinking, and this being is in itself dead. There is no other being than life; the sole life is the life of God, or the absolute; life and absolute are one and the same thing. There is nothing whatever in existence except the immediate and living thinking; not even a thinker, as a dead substance in which the thinking inheres. The real life of this thinking is in its ground, the divine life."¹ Hegel: "God is essential process, and the world a moment in this process. God is the true God only as the living process, to posit his *alter*, the world. The finite, and the infinite also, are but moments of the divine life, or the divine process. The idea is throughout only as the movement. God is this movement in itself, and only thereby living God. Without world, God is not God; it is as moment in Him. God, as spirit, is essential self-revealing, the living process; He did not create the world all at once, but is its eternal creator; this self-revealing, this *actus*, is eternal. This is the concept of Him, this the determination. His reality is revelation. Nature is in itself divine. Nature and the world are incorporations of the divine idea. Nature is the first moment of the self-realizing spirit."² Herbart supposes, as a second material principle beside the absolute, not crude matter, but an infinite sum of uncreated "reals," out of the configuration of which the material world arose. Without the principle of finiteness, no understanding of the world is possible.³ Kant: "The world (metaphysical) is the sum of all phenomena;" W. transcendental; "the total which is not a part of any other total;" "the total to which pertain all substances with their causes;" "the series of all things contingent, whether simultaneous or successive, connected with each other."—Mellin.⁴ Schelling: I. "Creation is nothing

¹ *Werke*, II. 563, 86, 87; *Nachgelassene Werke*, III. 358; *Werke*, V. 445, VI. 361.

² *Werke*, VII. 22, 28; XI. 27, 28, 193, 194, 201; XII. 198, 210, 412; VI. 413; Hegel's *Leben*, 113. ³ Steudel, *Philos. im Umriss*, I., ii. 344; for Herbart's "Reals," see Schwegler-Stirling, 280-283. ⁴ *Kunstsprache*, *Welt*.

but the presentation of the infinite reality of the absolute Ego in the limitations of the finite."¹ 2. "The absolute produces from itself nothing but the absolute, the absolute again. Things are the ideas in the eternal cognitive act of the absolute; they are the essential nature of pure absoluteness, in the form of subject-objectivating. In the world, the eternal things or ideas come into existence. This takes place not by the intervention of substance or matter, but by the subject-objectivating of the absolute."² 3. "Apart from the absolute reason, there is nothing; in it is everything. All that is, is the absolute identity itself. There is no individual being, or individual thing, in itself. The absolute identity is not the cause of the universe, but is the universe itself. What we call matter is not in itself matter, but is the absolute identity itself."³ 4. "The essence of the one is the eternal and invisible Father of all things, who, inasmuch as He never comes forth from His own eternity, grasps infinite and finite in the same act of divine cognition. The universe sleeps in the eternal unity of the infinite; as in an infinitely fruitful germ. The essence of the absolute reflected in being is the infinite body, but reflected in thinking or in activity, as infinite cognizing, it is the infinite soul of the world."⁴ 5. "The sequence of things from God is a self-revelation of God. But God can only be revealed in that which is like Him, in free being, self-acting. To nature belongs a derivative absoluteness, or divinity."⁵ 6. "There is no ground on which the world can be explained except the freedom of God. All true freedom, that is, all absolute freedom, is indeed, in another aspect, absolute necessity."⁶

IV. Schopenhauer divides the world into: I. World as mental representation, world of phenomenon, *Vorstellung*;⁷ and II. World as will, *als Wille* (thing in itself.)⁸

I. World as mental representation. 1. Ideality of the world as mental representation.—See **Externality, Object.** 2. Fundamental form of the world as mental representation. See **Object and Phenomenon.** 3. Physiological condition

¹ *Vom Ich*, Werke, I., i. 149 seq. ² *Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur*, Werke, I., ii. 61, 65. ³ *Darstellung m. Systems der Philosophie*, Werke, I., iv. 114-147. ⁴ Bruno, Werke, I., iv. 252-259, 305. ⁵ *Wesen d. menschlichen Freyheit*, Werke, I., vii. 346, 347. ⁶ *Stuttgart Privat-Vorlesungen*, Werke, I., vii. 429. ⁷ *Welt als Wille u. Vorstellung*, Books I., II.

⁸ Do., Books III., IV.

of the world as mental representation.—See **Brain and Consciousness**. 4. Division of the world as mental representation. "The world, as mental representation, is divided into: *a*, the world of individual things, the world subject to the principle of the ground; and *b*, the world of ideas, which is independent on that principle."—See **Cognition, Object, Phenomenon**. "The world of mental representation subject to the principle of the ground may again be divided into: *i*, the perceptible, and *ii*, the conceptible; or into *i*, the world of the understanding, *ii*, the world of reason."—See **Concept, Intuition, Perception, Reason**. On the world of ideas, see **Idea**.

II. The world as will (thing in itself).—1. Cognizability of the thing in itself, or of the internal essential nature of the world.—See **Ding an Sich**. 2. Relation of this thing in itself to the world of phenomenon. 3. Division of the world as will. "The world, as will, is divided into *a*, the physical, and *b*, the ethical." The former is treated in the second book of the *Welt als Wille*, and in the work *Ueber den Willen in Natur*.—See **Nature**. The second is handled in the fourth book of the *Welt als Wille*, and in *Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik*.—See **Ethics, Morals**. 4. Abrogation of the world of will.—See **Will**.¹

V. Most recent views.—Chalybäus: "Spirit is thinking substance; God is no mere thinking; rather is there in Him a moment of substance. He posits within his own substance relative centres, which arrange themselves to a system of heavenly bodies."² Drossbach's view has been styled "a doctrine of atomic deities." "Every atom fills from its centre the whole infinity of space, through the mutual interpenetration of all atoms."³ I. H. Fichte: 1. "Philosophy cannot, out of the absolute as the abstract in itself, deduce the relative of the finite, not in itself; cannot, out of the one thought, make two. The question why God has created the finite is therefore, for us, destitute of meaning, and falls outside of our point of view, because we can neither put ourselves in God's place, nor make out of him a

¹ Franenstädt: Schopenhauer, *Lexikon*, Art. *Wille*; Krauth's *Berkeley*, 111-115.

² *Ztschr. v. Fichte*, XX. 69-72. ³ Ueberweg: *Gesch. d. Philos. d. Neuzeit*, Vierte Aufl., 1875; Morris's Translat., II. 335.

heuristic principle of deduction.”¹ 2. “The absolute is infinite substantiality, and actualizes itself to the world; the absolute substance determines itself in accordance with its concept, to infinite accidentality, or to the world. The concepts, actuality of the world and actuality of God, run completely into each other, and reciprocally exhaust each other. All concrete determinations are but the accidents of the one absolute substance, which possesses itself, in them, in its totality. Only the absolute substance *is*; the infinite individual is that which is forever rising and vanishing in this unity. The creating of the world is, in its deepest root, no more than the infinite self-preserving and self-creating of the absolute; what God creates is but God himself. The world is the infinite *other* of God. That reciprocal interpenetration of God and the world is only possible in the unifying consciousness of God; it is the ideal existence of the world in His thinking, which comes to be the actual world.”² K. Ph. Fischer coincides in the main with Hegel.³ German: “Spirit is the life of matter, matter the life of spirit. The matter which forms the bodies of the universe is the result of an eternal process, in which the divine distinguishes itself in a visible external element from its internal invisible element. The universe is a creative process of the spirit of God perpetually taking place, a process in which the eternal essentiality of God and the world puts itself into effect. To abrogate the world, God would have to abrogate Himself. It is His eternal work, but on that account no more identical with Him than any other work is identical with its artificer; yet God dwells in it in a manner very different from that in which an artificer dwells in his work. God is, whether within the world or exterior to it, a being who bears the world in Him, as the mother bears her child.”⁴ Franz Hoffmann: “In the higher region of His being God is spirit, in the lower region He is nature.”⁵ Lotze: “All finite things are inwardly-founded parts of the absolute.”⁶ Michelet: “The divine idea has interpreted

¹ *Die Idee der Persönlichkeit*, 1834, 56. ² *Ontologie*, 26, 363-396, 418, 519, 520. ³ *Freiheit d. menschl. Willens*, 12; *Wissenschaft d. Metaphysik*, 100-103. ⁴ *Schöpfungsgeschichte u. Weltstoff, oder die Welt im Werden*, 19-39. ⁵ *Ztschr. v. Fichte*, XLI. 135. ⁶ *Mikrokosmos*, II. 45.

itself in the world; the world is a necessary moment of the divine essence and life, and belongs, as phenomenon, to the actuality of God."¹ "The divine essence is not an abstract substance which dwells beyond the world; it is the essence of things themselves, which lives in the phenomena."² Ulrici, in his discussion of the relation of God and of the world, presents: I. The difficulties involved in the relation of God to the world. "It is universally acknowledged, as the common dogma of religion and philosophy, that the absolute, as such, can be one only, eternal and infinite." It is on the inference that hence "the absolute is of necessity the one and sole being and essence," the struggle arises, the difficulties of a personal theism and of pantheism. II. Discussion of the concepts of eternity and infinity. III. God distinguished from the world in accordance with the logical categories — according to the category of time and space — the category of the whole and the parts — internal and external, essence and phenomenon, substance and modification, ground and sequence, cause and effect, co-working and reciprocal working (preservation and government of the world by God), means and end, concept and idea.³ "In the things lies the norm of their substantial determinateness; but as this norm must be the prius of the existence of things themselves, this norm or law cannot itself have a natural material being; it must, therefore, be an ideal being; nature, therefore, is to be conceived of as grounded in the thought of a thinking being, as established by the author of that law. And as the aims and laws of nature are immanent in things, the author of this conformity with aim and law in nature, cannot merely have elaborated a given material in conformity with aim, but must necessarily, at the same time, be *creator* of the world."⁴ "That power which established the distinction of the atoms must have established the atoms themselves; it could not have derived the atoms *from* itself, as if, so to speak, it had decomposed itself into atoms; it cannot be of one substance and essential nature with the atoms, but it determines them as another thing diverse from its own spiritual essence; in a word, as material. A decom-

¹ *Persönlichkeit d. Absoluten*, 21-23. ² *Ztschr. von Fichte*, XXII. 41. ³ *Gott u. die Natur*, Dritte, neue aufgearb. Aufl., 1876, 648-679. ⁴ *Ztschr. v. Fichte*, XXVIII, 121-123.

position of the spiritual unity of the absolute spirit into what is externally separated is impossible, and, as a contradiction, unthinkable."¹ "God is in one respect immanent, in another, at the same time, transcendent cause of the world. He is *immanent* so far as He is the ground of His own self-determination and self-comprehension, but in this self-comprehension distinguishes Himself *in Himself*, distinguishes His self from His self-activity, and Himself from another which He is not. He is *transcendent* cause so far as He distinguishes the world, which is His creation, not only from Himself, but also from the producing-distinguishing activity of His creative *thinking*, and with this again distinguishes the *thought*, in and with which, and in accordance with which He establishes and determines the world, from this, its *content*, from the world as the *object* in thought."² Wirth: "The world is a real essential counterpart of the Godhead. The other, which God is not, cannot be a second Godhead, but something non-divine. This non-divine is the world. But as the world is established from the divine essence, it must in a certain degree be participant of it. The world, then, as diverse from God, is non-divine, yet as the revelation of the fulness of the divine life, is at the same time divine or in affinity with God."³

World, Philosophical Topics associated with.—1. Beginning of the world. (Lat. *Principium Mundi*; Ger. *Weltanfang*.) 2. Architect of the world; (Ger. *Weltbaumeister*). 3. Concept of the world, cosmological concept, cosmological idea, idea of the world, cosmic concept, cosmic notion; (Ger. *Weltbegriff*). 4. Quantity of the world; (Ger. *Weltgrösse*). 5. Course of the world, course of nature; (Ger. *Weltlaufe*). 6. Author, cause, creator of the world.—See **Cosmotheology, God, Theism**. (Ger. *W. Ursache, W. Schöpfer, W. Urheber*.) 7. Bounds of the world; (Ger. *Weltgrenze*).

World, Soul of the, Spirit of the, anima mundi, q. v.

WORSE RELATION of subject and predicate, in Hamilton,⁴ marks that a negative relation is worse than an affirmative, and a particular than a universal.

¹ *Ztschr. v. Fichte*, XXVIII. 118. ² *Gott u. die Natur*, 672; see also *System d. Logik*, 256 seq., 329; *Compendium d. Logik*, 138 seq., 190; *Ztschr. v. Fichte*, LXIII., 1873, 259 seq. ³ *Ztschr. v. Fichte*, XXXIV. 98, XLVIII. 53. ⁴ *Logic* (Am. ed.), 584.

WRONG, WRONGS, in Jus (Ang. Sax. *Wringan*, to wring or wrest).—"Wrong is merely *wrung* or *wrested* from the right or ordered line of conduct." "The distinction of public *wrongs* from private, of crimes and misdemeanors from civil injuries, seems principally to consist in this: that private *wrongs* or civil injuries are an infringement or privation of the civil rights which belong to individuals, considered merely as individuals; public *wrongs*, or crimes and misdemeanors, are a breach and violation of the public rights and duties due to the whole community, considered as a community, in its social aggregate capacity."—Blackstone.¹

WYASA, in Hindoo Philosophy, probably a generic name of the founders of the *Vedanta*, q. v.

X has been transferred from mathematics to metaphysics as a mark of the unknown. "The thing in itself is *x*."

XANTHOS (Gr.), yellow, auburn, red; in Anthropology, applied to the fair races of men.—Prichard.²

XENO (Gr.), guest-friend; stranger; in composition, as *Xenodochy*, entertainment of a stranger or guest; *Xenomania*, irrational love of the foreign.

XENOPHANES, of Ionia, founder of the Eleatic school, 580–480 B. C. Pantheist: Elements, water and earth. See Brandis (1813), Karsten (1830), Porter.³

XYLO (Gr.), wood; in composition, as *Xylomantics*, divination by wood.

Y, employed, like X, q. v., to designate a second unknown.

YAÇNA (lit., sacrifice), in Parsee Philosophy, a book of the *Zend-Avesta*, q. v.

YADJOUR-VÉDA, second of the *Vedas*, q. v.

YANG, in the Chinese philosophy, one of the two images, generated by *Tai-ki*, or the supreme principle; it is a perfect,

¹ *Commentaries*, b. iv., c. 1. ² *Researches into the Physical History of Mankind*, b. ii., ch. vii., sect. i. ³ *Iam. Intellect*, 532.

subtle, celestial, luminous nature. *Yang* is represented in the *Konas* (the most ancient Chinese writings, the trigrams of Fohi,) by a continuous line.—See **Yn**.

Y-KING, in Chinese Philosophy, "the book of changes," one of the most ancient books of China; a sort of encyclopedia, embracing physics, ethics, and metaphysics.

YN, in Chinese Philosophy, one of the two images generated by *Tai-ki*; it is matter, imperfect, crude, earthly, obscure. It is represented by a broken line.—See **Yang**.

YOGA, in Hindoo Philosophy, doctrine of the eternity of matter and spirit, which are identified with deity, as no more than its modifications. It gives also the means of final emancipation.

YOGA-SASTRA, YOGA-SOUTRA, in Hindoo Philosophy, a book attributed to Patandjali. Its principles accord with the *Sāṅkhya*, q. v.—See **Stöckl**.¹

ZAHAB (Heb.), gold (as a mineral); used by Locke to illustrate, in the case of Adam, the rise of the names of substances.²

ZEAL (Gr.), fervor, passionate ardor; it is good or bad, as it is directed to proper or improper objects, or as it is restrained or unrestrained in due proportion by principle.

ZEND-AVESTA (lit., living word), in the Parsee Philosophy, title of the sacred books which form the most ancient monument of the religion and philosophy of Persia. It is attributed to Zoroaster, q. v. It comprises: 1, the *Vendidad*, q. v.; 2, the *Izeschné* or *Yaçna*, q. v.; 3, the *Vispered*, q. v.; 4, the *Boundehesch*. The first three are written in Zend, the fourth in Pehlvi. See **Maurice**.³

ZENONISM, doctrine, philosophy, system of Zeno.—1. Of the first Zeno, the Eleatic, disciple of Parmenides, in the fifth century B. c.—See **Eleaticism**. See Gerling (1825). 2. Of Zeno of Cittium, 340–260 B. c. **Stoic**, q. v. Hence, *Zenonic*; *Z. points*, indivisible points, from Zeno, the Eleatic; *Zenonist*.

ZERDUSCHT.—See **Zoroastrianism**.

¹ *Lehrb. d. Geschichte d. Philosophie*, §§ 6, 7. ² *Hum. Underst.*, B. II., ch. vi., 46, 47.

³ *Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy*, Part I., ch. v.

ZERO (Arab., Ital., Fr.), nothing; naught; point from which graduation is marked. Hamilton: "Oken, if he adhere to the intuition, intrepidly identifies the deity or absolute with zero."¹

ZETELIC (Gr.), seeking, inquiring; making research.

ZOË (Gr.), life; in the Gnostic Philosophy, name of one of the eons of the Valentinians.

ZOO (Gr.), pertaining to life; animal; in composition, as *Zoogony*, *Zoography* (Boyle, Glanville), *Zoolatry*, *Zoology*.—"Zoology is the noblest part of natural history, as it comprehends all sensitive beings, from reasonable man, through every species of animal life, till it descends to that point where sense is wholly extinct and vegetation commences; and certainly none will deny that life and voluntary motion are superior to a mere vegetating principle, or the more inactive state of the fossil kingdom."—Pennant.²

*Zoonomy.

ZOROASTRIANISM, system of Zoroaster (*Zerduscht*, lit., golden star), probably in the sixth cent. B. C., reformer of the Medo-Persian religion.—See *Zend-Avesta*. See Ed. Rôth (1846). "I am inclined to think that a pantheistic scheme of absorption or nihilism must have preceded Z., which was a speculative advance upon the former system. And Manichæism was only a revived Zoroastrianism; it was just the introduction of the Persian philosophy into Christianity."—Dr. John Duncan.³

¹ *Discussions* (Am. ed.), 28. ² *British Zoology*, Pref. ³ *Colloquia Peripatetica*, 7.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.

(From Tennemann) with a few additions.

B. C.	Rome	Olymp.	
640	114	35,1	Thales born, ac. to Apollodorus.
630	116	35,3	Solon born.
629	125	38	Thales born, ac. to Meiners.
611	143	42,2	Anaximander born.
608	146	43,1	Pythagoras born, ac. to Larcher.
598	156	45,3	Solon published his laws. Pherecydes born about the same time.
597	157	45,4	Thales foretold an eclipse.
584	170	49	Pythagoras born, ac. to Meiners.
561	193	55,1	Solon died.
557	197	56	Anaximenes flourished.
548	206	58,1	Thales died.
547	207	58,2	Anaximander died.
543	211	57,2	Thales died, ac. to some. Pherecydes died.
540	214	60	Pythagoras founded a school at Croto.
536	218	61	Xenophanes settled at Elea.
504	250	69	Pythagoras died. Parmenides flourished, ac. to some.
500	254	70,1	Anaxagoras and Philolaus born. Heraclitus and Leucippus flourished.
			Anaximenes died.
496	258	71,1	Ocellus Lucanus flourished.
494	260	71,3	Democritus born.
490	264	72,3	Battle of Marathon.
489	265	72,4	Pythagoras died, ac. to some.
480	274	75,1	Battle of Salamis.
472	282	77	Diogenes of Apollonia flourished.
470	284	77,8	Democritus born, ac. to Thrasyllus.
469	285	77,4	Socrates born. Parmenides flourished.
460	284	80	Parmenides came from Elea to Athens with Zeno
			Democritus born, ac. to Apollodorus.
			Empedocles flourished, ac. to some.
456	298	81	Anaxagoras repaired to Athens.
450	304	82,3	Xenophon born.
444	310	84	Melissus.
			Gorgias wrote his treatise Περί Φύσεως

B. C.	Rome	Olymp	
442	312	86	Protagoras and Prodicus flourished.
432	322	87,1	Beginning of the Peloponnesian war.
431	323	87,2	Anaxagoras accused.
430	324	87,3	Plato born, ac. to Corsini.
429	325	87,4	Plato born, ac. to Dodwell. Pericles died.
428	326	88,1	Anaxagoras died.
427	327	88,2	Gorgias sent ambassador to Athens. Diagoras fl.
414	340	91,3	Diogenes of Sinope born.
407	347	93,2	Democritus died, ac. to Eusebius.
404	350	94,1	Close of the Peloponnesian war.
400	354	96,1	Socrates died; his disciples retired to Megara.
			Euclid and Archytas flourished.
389	365	97,4	Plato's first voyage to Syracuse.
384	370	99,1	Aristotle born. Pyrrho born.
380	374	100	Antisthenes and Aristippus flourished.
		102	Aristotle repaired to Athens.
			Eudoxus flourished.
364	390	104,1	Plato's second voyage to Syracuse.
361	393	104,4	Plato's third voyage to Syracuse.
360	394	105	Xenophon died.
356	398	106	Alexander born.
348	406	108,1	Plato died; Speusippus succeeded him.
343	411	109,2	Aristotle became preceptor to Alexander.
340	414	110,1	Diogenes and Crates (the Cynics) Pyrrho and Anaxarchus flourished. Zeno of Cittium born.
339	415	110,2	Speusippus died. Xenocrates began to teach.
337	417	110,4	Battle of Cheronæa. Epicurus born.
336	418	111,1	Philip, king of Macedon, died.
335	419	111,2	Aristotle opened his school at the Lycæum.
324	430	114,1	Diogenes the Cynic died.
323	431	114,2	Alexander the Great died. Ptolemy, the son of Lagus, succeeded him in Egypt.
322	432	114,3	Aristotle died; Theophrastus succeeded him.
320	434	115	Demetrius Phalereus, and Dicaearchus of Messana flourished.
316	438	116,1	Arcesilaus born (or later).
314	440	116,3	Xenocrates died; Polemo succeeded him.
313	441	116,4	Theophrastus became celebrated. Crates.
305	449	118,3	Epicurus opened his school at Athens.
300	454	120,1	Stilpo, and Theodorus the Atheist, flourished.
			Zeno founded a school at Athens.
			Diodorus and Philo.
288	466	123,1	Pyrrho died.
286	468	123,3	Theophrastus died. Pyrrho died about the same time; succeeded by Strato.
285	469	123,4	Ptolemy Philadelphus became king of Egypt.
280	474	125,1	Chrysippus born.
272	482	126,4	Timon flourished.

B. C.	Rome	Olymp.	
270	484	127,2	Epicurus died.
269	485	127,3	Strato died: succeeded by Lyco.
264	490	128,3	Zeno, the Stoic, died (or later); succeeded by Cleanthes.
260	494	130	Persæus.—Aristo of Chios.—Herillus flourished.
241	513	134,1	Arcefilaus died (or later).
217	537	141,3	Carneades born.
212	542	143	Zeno of Tarsus flourished.
208	546	144	Chrysippus died, ac. to Menage. Diogenes of Babylon.
185	569	148,4	Panætius born (ac. to some, later).
155	599	156,3	Embassy from the Athenians to Rome. (Critolaus, Carneades the Stoic, and Diogenes of Babylon).
146	608	158,3	Greece and Carthage subjected to Rome. Antipater of Tarsus.
142	612	159,3	Macedon became a Roman province.
135	619	161,2	Posidonius born.
129	625	162,4	Carneades died; succeeded by Clitomachus.
115	639		Panætius accompanied Scipio Africanus to Alexandria.
107 or 106	647	167,2	Cicero born.
		170	Clitomachus died; succeeded by Philo. Posidonius flourished.
84	666	171,1	Sylla took Athens. Philo retired to Rome. Antiochus.
86	667	171,2	Lucretius born (ac. to others, earlier). Posidonius died.
69	685	178	Antiochus died.
63	691	172,2	Judæa became a Roman province.
50		182,2	Posidonius died; succeeded by Jason. Lucretius died.
48		188,1	Cratippus, the Peripatetic, flourished.
44 or 43	711	184,2	Cicero died.
30	724	187,3	Egypt became a Roman province.
27	727	188,2	Augustus became Emperor. Philo the Jew born

A.C.	Roman Emperors.	
1	Augustus.	Birth of Christ.
8		Seneca the philosopher born.
		Sextus the Pythagorean.
		Nicolaus of Damascus, and Xenarchus flourished.
		Athenodorus the Stoic.
14	Tiberius.	
15		Sotion.
33		Crucifixion of Jesus Christ.
34		Philo the Jew flourished.
37	Caligula.	Flavius Josephus born.
41	Claudius.	
50		Plutarch of Chæroneæ born.
54	Nero.	
65		Seneca died.
66		Cornutus and Musonius exiled.
69	Galba, Otho, Vitellius.	
79	Vespasian, Titus.	Apollonius of Tyana flourished.
81		Musonius Rufus recalled from exile.
82	Domitian.	Domitian banished the philosophers and mathematicians from Rome.
89		Justin Martyr born.
		Epictetus flourished.
90		Apollonius of Tyana died.
95		
97	Nerva.	Plutarch flourished.
99	Trajan.	Tacitus.
		Gnostics.
118	Adrian.	Secundus of Athens. Plutarch died.
120		
122		Euphrates the Stoic died.
181		Galen Born. Favorinus. Basilides the Gnostic.
184		Arrian flourished.
188		Akibha the Rabbin died.
139	Antonius Pius.	Calv. Taurus. Apollonius the Stoic.
		Basilides the Stoic.
180		Apuleius.
161	M. Aurelius Antoninus.	Alcinous. Numenius.
165		Peregrinus the Cynic, and Justin Martyr died.
		Lucian.
170		Athenagorus and Tatianus. Atticus the Platonist.
		Bardesanes.
180	Commodus.	Maximus of Tyre. Death of Antoninus.
		Irenæus. Juda the Rabbi. The Talmud.

A.C.	Roman Emperors.	
185		Origen born.
198	Pertinax. Julianus. Sept. Severus.	Ammonius Saccas founded a school. Clemens of Alexandria. Alexander of Aphrodisias. Galen died. Plotinus born. Philostratus.
200		
205		
212	Caracalla.	Clemens of Alexandria died.
218	Macrinus.	Tertullian died.
220	Antoninus Helio- gabalus.	
222	Alex. Severus.	Plotinus became a disciple of Ammonius.
232		Porphyrius born.
233		
235	Maximinus.	
238	Gordian.	Ulpianus.
239	Gordian the son.	
242		Plotinus travelled into Persia.
243		Plotinus came to Rome.
244	Philip.	
246		Amelius became a disciple of Plotinus.
253	Trajanus Decius.	
252	Trebonianus. Gallus and Vi- bius. Hostilianus.	
252		Longinus flourished.
253	Æmilius Valeria- nus.	Origen died.
269	Flavius Claudius.	
270	Aurelian.	Plotinus died.
275		Longinus put to death.
276	Flavius Tacitus.	
277	Aurel. Probus.	The Manichæans.
282	Aurelius Carus.	
284	Diocletian.	Arnobius.
304	Constantine and Maximianus.	Porphyrius died.
306	Constantine the Great.	
321	Constantine con- verted to Chris- tianity.	Iamblichus flourished.
326		Arnobius died.
330		Lactantius died.
333		Iamblichus died. Themistius.
337	Constantius and Censtans.	
340		Enzeb'us bishop of Cæsarea died.

A.C.	Roman Emperors.	
354		Augustine born.
355		Themistius taught at Constantinople.
360	Julian.	Sallustius.
363	Jovianus.	
364	Valentinianus and Valens.	
379	Theodosius the Great.	Eunapius.
380		Nemesius flourished.
384		St. Jerome flourished.
391		Gregorius of Naziansus died.
394		Gregorius of Nyssa.
395	Arcadius and Honorius.	The Roman empire divided.
398		St. Ambrosius died.
400		Nemesius died.
401		Plutarch the son of Nestorius flourished.
	<i>Greek Emperors.</i>	
402	Arcadius.	
408	Theodosius II.	
409		Macrobius. Pelagius.
410		Synesius.
412		Proclus born.
415		Death of Hypatia.
418		Pelagius condemned.
430		St. Augustine, and Plutarch the son of Nestorius, died.
434		Syrianus flourished.
450	Marcianus.	Hierocles and Olympiodorus flourished. Syrianus died.
457	Leo I.	
470		Claudianus Mamertinus flourished. Boethius born.
474	Leo II. Zeno Isauricus.	Marcianus Capella flourished.
476	<i>End of the Western Empire.</i>	
480		Salvanus. Cassiodorus born.
485		Proclus died. Ammonius the son of Hermias. Hierocles.
487		Æneas of Gaza flourished.
490		Marinus died.
491	Anastasius.	Marinus succeeded by Isidorus.
518	Justin I.	
526		Boethius beheaded.
527	Justinian.	
529		The Schools of philosophy closed at Athens
533		Philoponus flourished.

A.C.	Greek Emperors.	
539		Cassiodorus retired to a convent.
549		Damascius and Simplicius flourished.
563	Justinian II.	
575	Tiberius II.	
582	Mauritius.	Cassiodorus died.
602	Phocas.	
604		
610	Heraclius.	Gregory the Great died.
622		Flight of Mahomet.
636		Isidorus of Seville died.
641	Constantine III. and IV.	
	Constans II.	
668	Constantine V.	
673		The venerable Bede born.
685	Justinus II.	
694	Leontius.	
698	Tiberius III.	
711	Philippicus.	
713	Anastasius II.	
716	Theodosius III.	
717	Leo III. Isauricus	
735		Bede died.
736		Alcuin born.
741	Constant. VI.	
753	Almanzour the Khalif.	
754		John of Damascus died.
776		Rhabanus Maurus born.
796	Irene.	
	<i>Emperors of Germany.</i>	
800	Charlemagne.	Haroun al Raschid. Alkendi flourished.
804	Louis the Pious.	Alcuin died.
814	Lothaire.	
840	Louis II.	
855		
856		Rhabanus died.
875	Charles the Bald.	J. Scot Erigena came to France.
877	Louis III.	
879		Alfred the Great.
880	Charles the Fat.	
886		Erigena died.
887	Arnolphe.	
891		Photius died.
899	Louis IV.	
912	Conrad.	

A. C.	German Emperors.	
919	Henry the Fowler.	
987	Otho the Great.	
954		Alfarabi died.
974	Otho II.	
980		Avicenna born.
987	Otho III.	
999		Gerbert, Pope Sylvester II.
1002	Henry II.	
1003		Sylvester II. died.
1020		Mich. Const. Psellus born.
1025	Conrad II.	
1034		Anselm born.
1036		Avicenna died.
1039	Henry III.	
1042		Lanfranc entered the convent of Bec.
1055		Hildebert of Lavardin born.
1056	Henry IV.	
1060		Anselm became prior of Bec.
1072		P. Damianus died. Algazel born.
1079		Abelard born.
1080		Berengarius of Tours died.
1089		Lanfranc, archbishop of Canterbury, died.
1091		Bernard of Clairvaux died.
1092		Roscellin found guilty of heresy at Soissons.
1096		Hugues of St. Victor born.
1100		Psellus died (later, ac. to some).
		Eustrachius of Nicæa.
1107	Henry V.	
1109		Anselm, archbishop of Canterbury, died.
		Alghazali d. at Bagdad (ac. to Hammer).
1114		Alanus of Ryssel born.
1117		Anselm of Laon died.
1118		Abelard taught at Paris.
1120		Abelard became monk of St. Denis.
		William of Champeaux, bishop of Châlons, died.
1126	Lothaire.	
1127		Algazel died at Bagdad.
1134		Hildebert died.
1138		
1139	Conrad III.	Moses Maimonides born.
1140		Hugo of St. Victor died.
1141		Gilbertus Porretanus became bishop of Poitiers.
1142		Abelard died.
1146		Assembly of ecclesiastics at Paris and Rheims to oppose Gilbertus Porretanus.
1150		Lombardus wrote his Sentences.
		Will. of Conches died. Rob. Pulleyn died.

A. C.	German Emperors.	
1153		Bernard of Clairvaux died.
1154	Fred. Barbarossa.	Gilbertus Porretanus died.
1164		Peter Lombardus and Hugo of Amiens died.
1173		Richard of St. Victor and Rotert of Melun died.
1180		John of Salisbury died. Walter of St. Victor.
1190		Thophail died.
1193	Henry VI.	Albert the Great born, according to some.
1198		
1203	Otho IV.	Alanus of Ryssel died.
1205		Moses Maimonides and Peter of Poitiers died.
		Albert the Great born, according to others.
1206		Peter of Poitiers and Averroes died.
1209		David of Dinant. Amalric of Chartres died.
1214		Roger Bacon born.
1217		Averroes died, according to some.
		Michael Scot at Toledo.
1218		
1221	Frederic II.	Bonaventura born.
1224		Thomas Aquinas born.
1234		Raymond Lulli born.
1236		Albert the Great, doctor of theology at Paris.
1245		Alexander of Hales died.
1247		Thomas Aquinas went to Paris. Ægidius Colonna born.
1248		Will. of Auvergne, bishop of Paris, died.
		Thomas Aquinas began to lecture on Lombardus.
1250		Peter of Abano born.
1251	Conrad IV.	
1252		Foundation of the Sorbonne.
1253		Robert Grossetête died.
1254		Niceph. Blemmydes flourished.
1256		Thom. Aquinas became Doctor of Theology
1264		Vincent of Beauvais died.
1273	Rodolphus I.	
1274		Thomas Aquinas died. Bonaventura died.
1275		J. Duns Scotus and Walter Burleigh born.
1277		John XXI. (Petr. Hispanus) died.
1280	Adolphus of Nassau.	Albert the Great died.
1292		
1293	Albert I.	Roger Bacon died, according to Wood.
1294		Henry of Ghent died.
1294		Roger Bacon died, according to some.
1300		Richard of Middleton died.
1308	Henry VII.	J. Duns Scotus died.
1310		Georgius Pachymeres died about this time
1314	Louis V.	

A. C.	German Emperors.	
1815		Raymond Lulli died. Franc. Mayron introduced disputes in the Sorbonne.
1816		Ægidius Colonna died. Peter of Abano died.
1322		Occam resisted the Pope.
1323		Hervé (Hervæus Natalis) died.
1825		Franc. Mayron died.
1830		Occam sought the protection of the emperor Louis.
1832		Will. Durand of Saint Pourçain, died. Theodorus Metochita died.
1337		Walter Burleigh died.
1348		Occam died.
1346	Charles IV.	
1347		Occam died, according to others.
1349		Thomas of Bradwardine and Robert Holcot died.
1350		Peter d'Ailly born.
1357		Thomas of Strasburg died.
1358		J. Buridan still alive. Gregory of Rimini died.
1361		J. Tauler died.
1363		J. Gerson born.
1374		Petrarch died.
1379	Wenceslaus.	
1380		Nic. Oramus, or Oresminius, died.
1382		Thomas à Kempis born.
1395		Bessarion and George of Trebisonde born.
1396		Marsilius of Inghen died.
1397		Henry of Hesse died.
1400	Robert.	
1401		Nicolas Cusanus born.
1408		Laur. Valla died.
1410	Sigismund.	
1415		Matthæus of Cracow died.
1419		Emmanuel Chrysoloras died.
1425		J. Wessel Gansfort born.
1429		Peter D'Ailly died.
1430		J. Gerson died.
1435		Theodorus Gaza arrived in Italy.
1436		Marsilius Ficinus born.
1438	Albert II.	
		Raymond de Sabunde taught at Toulouse. George Gemisthus Pletho and Bessarion repaired to Florence.
1440	Frederic III.	
		Invention of Printing. Foundation of the Platonic Academy at Florence.
1443		Nicolas de Clemange died. Rodolphus Agricola born.

A. C.	German Emperors.	
1453	Taking of Constantinople.	
1455		Nicolas V. died. Reuchlin born.
1457		Laur. Valla died.
1462		P. Pomponatius born.
1463		John Picus of Mirandula born.
1464		Geo. Scholarius Gennadius and Nicolas Cusanus died.
		Cosmo de' Medici and Pius II. died.
1467		Erasmus born.
1471		Thomas à Kempis died.
1472		Bessarion died.
1473		Persecution of the Nominalists at Paris.
		Augustinus Niphus born.
1478		Theodorus Gaza died.
1480		Thomas More born.
1481		Franco. Philadelphus died.
1483		Paulus Jovius born.
1484		Jul. Cæs. Scaliger born.
1485		Rodolphus Agricola died.
1486		J. Argyropulus and George of Trebizond died, ac. to some.
		Agrippa of Nettesheim born.
1489		J. Wessel died.
1492	Maximilian I.	Lorenzo de' Medici died. Louis Vives born.
1493	Discovery of America.	
		Hermolaus Barbarus died. Theophrastus Paracelsus born.
1494		J. Picus of Mirandula and Angelus Politianus died.
1495		Gabr. Biel died.
1497		Melancthon born.
1499		Marcilius Ficinus died.
1500		Dominicus of Flanders died.
1501		Jerome Cardan born.
1508		Bernardinus Telesius born.
1509		Andr. Cæsalpinus born.
1512		Alex. Achillinus died.
1515		Petrus Ramus born. Macchiavelli flourished.
1517	Beginning of the Reformation.	
1520	Charles V.	Fr. Piccolomini born.
1522		J. Reuchlin died.
1525		P. Pomponatius died. Fr. Zorzi flourished.
1527		Nich. Macchiavelli died.
1529		Fr. Patritius born.
1532		Ant. Zimara died. Jac. Zabarella born.
1533		J. Fr. Picus of Mirandula killed.

A. C.	German Emperors.	
1538		Nic. Leonicus died. Val. Weigel and Montaigne born.
1535		H. Cornelius Agrippa died. Sir T. More beheaded.
1536		Erasmus died. Fr. Zorai died.
1537		Jac. Faber died.
1540		Marius Nizolius and L. Vives died. Institution of the Jesuits.
1541		Theophr. Paracelsus died. Charron born.
1542		Gasp. Contarini died.
1543		Copernicus died.
1546		Augustinus Niphus died.
1547		Jac. Sadoletus died. Nic. Taurellus and Justus Lipsius born.
1552		Paulus Jovius died. Cæc. Cremoninus born.
1553		Sim. Porta died.
1555	Ferdinand I.	
1560		Phil. Melancthon died.
1561		Franc. Bacon born.
1562		Ant. Talsæus died. Fr. Sanchez born.
1564	Maximilian II.	
1568		Thomas Campanella born.
1569		
1572		P. Ramus died. Dan. Sennert born. J. Sepulveda died.
1574		Robert Fludd born.
1575		Jac. Böhlm born.
1576	Rodolph II.	Jer. Cardan died.
1577		J. P. Van Helmont born.
1578		Berigard born. Alex. Piccolomini died.
1580		Giordano Bruno quitted Italy.
1581		Lord Herbert of Cherbury born.
1583		Grotius born.
1586		Jac. Schegk died. Luc. Vanini and Le Vayer born.
1588		Bernardus Telesius born. Th. Hobbes born. Val. Weigel died.
1589		Jac. Zabarella died.
1592		Mich. de Montaigne died. Gassendi and Comenius born.
1596		R. Descartes born. J. Bodin died.
1597		Fr. Patritius died.
1600		Giord. Bruno burnt.
1603		P. Charron and And. Cæsalpinus died.
1604		Fr. Piccolomini died.
1606		Nic. Taurellus and Just. Lipsius died.
1614	Matthias.	Mart. Schoock born. Fr. Suarez died. Fr. Merc. Van Helmont born.
1619	Ferdinand II.	L. Vanini burnt.

A. C.	German Emperors.	
1621	Ferdinand III.	J. Barclay died.
1623		Blaise Pascal born.
1624		Jac. Böhme died.
1625		Clauberg, Geulinx, and Wittich born.
1626		Fr. Bacon died.
1628		Rud. Goclenius died.
1630		Huet born. Cæs. Cremoninus died.
1632		Fr. Sanchez died.
		Benedict Spinoza, J. Locke, Silv. Regis, Sam. Puffendorf, and Rich. Cumberland born.
1634		B. Becker born.
1637		Dan. Sennert and Robert Fludd died.
1638		Nic. Malebranche born.
1639		Th. Campanella died.
1642		Galileo died. Newton born
1644		J. Baptiste Van Helmont died.
1645		Grotius died.
1646	Leopold I.	Leibnitz and Poiret born.
1647		Bayle born.
1648		Herbert of Cherbury and Mersenna died.
1649		Scioppius died.
1650		Descartes died.
1651		William of Tschirnhausen born.
1654		J. Selden died.
1655		Gassendi died. Chr. Thomasius born.
1657		
1659		Adr. Heerebord died. Wollaston born.
1662		Blaise Pascal died.
1663		Berigard died.
1665		J. Clauberg and Mart. Schoock died
1666		J. De Silhon died.
1669		Geulinx and J. Coccejus died.
1670		Sorbière died.
1671		Comenius died. Ant. Earl of Shaftesbury b.
1672		Le Vayer died.
1675		Sam. Clarke born.
1676		M. Von Kronland and Voetius died.
1677		Ben. Spinoza died. Th. Gale, Fr. Glisson, and Harrington died.
1679		Chr. Wolf born. Jer. Hirnhaym and Hobbes died.
1680		Jos. Glanville and La Rochefoucauld died.
1684		Berkeley born. Jac. Thomasius died.
1685		Lamb. Velthuysen died.
1687		Henr. More and Wittich died.
1688		Cudworth and Parker died.
1694		Ant. Arnault and Sam. Puffendorf died.
		Fr. Hutcheson and Voltaire born.

A. C.	German Emperors.	
1695	Joseph I.	Nicole died.
1698		Balthasar Becker and J. Pordage died.
1699		Fr. Merc. Van Helmont died.
1704		J. Locke and Bossuet died.
1705		J. Ray died.
1706		Bayle died.
1707		Silv. Regis died.
1708		Tschirnhausen and Jacquelot died.
1711		Hume born.
1712		Crusius and Rousseau born.
1713	Charles VI.	Ant. Earl of Shaftesbury died.
1715		Malebranche died. Condillac and Helvetius born.
		Gellert born.
1716		Leibnitz died.
1718		M. Aug. Fardella died.
1719		J. Poirer and Rich. Cumberland died.
1720		Bonnet born.
1721		Huet died.
1722		Boulainvilliers died.
1723		Adam Smith born.
1724	Charles VII. Frederic II, King of Prussia.	Wollaston died. Kant born.
1727		Newton died.
1728		Chr. Thomasius and Thümmig died.
1729		Sam. Clarke, Collins, Gundling, and Fr. Buddeus died.
		And. Rüdiger died.
1731		J. Priestley born. Mandeville died.
1733		W. Derham died.
1735		Le Clerc died.
1736		
1740		
1742	Francis I.	Garve born.
1743		Jacobi born.
1744		Baptist Vico and Joachim Lange died Platner born.
1745		
1747		Fr. Hutcheson died.
1748		De Crouxaz and Burlamaqui died.
1750		Bilfinger died.
1751		La Mettrie died.
1752		Hansch died.
1754		Berkeley and Christ. Wolf died.
1755		Montesquieu died.
1756		
1757		David Hartley died Gall born.
1758		Ch. Reinhold born.
1759		Maupertuis died.

A. C.	German Emperors.	
1762	Joseph II.	Alex. Baumgarten died. Fichte born.
1765		Herm. Sam. Reimarus died.
1766		Thomas Abbt and Gottsched died.
1769		Gellert died.
1770		Winckler, D'Argens, and Formey died.
1771		Helvetius died.
1772		J. Ulr. Cramer died. Swedenborg died.
1774		Quesnay died.
1775		Crusius and Walch died. Schelling born.
1776		Hume died. Spurzheim born.
1777		Meier and Lambert died.
1778		Voltaire and Rousseau died.
1779		Sulzer died.
1780		Condillac and Batteux died.
1781		Ernesti and Lessing died.
1782		Henry Home and Iselin died.
1783		D'Alembert died.
1784		Diderot died.
1785	French Revolution.	Baumeister and De Mably died.
1786		Mendelssohn died.
1788		Hamann and Filangieri died.
1789		
1790	Leopold II.	A. Smith, F. Hemsterhuys and Basedow d.
1791	Francis II.	Rich. Price, Daries, and Nettelbladt died.
1792		Victor Cousin born.
1798		Bonnet, Moritz, and Beccaria died.
1796		Th. Reid died. Jouffroy born.
1798		Garve died.
1800		Sol. Maimon died.
1801		Heidenreich and Irving died.
1802		Engel died.
1803		J. Beattie and Herder died.
1804		Kant, Jos. Priestley, and Saint-Martin d.
1806		Tiedemann died.
1808		Bardili died.
1809		J. A. Eberhard, Steinbart, and Thos. Payne, died.
1812		K. Chr. E. Schmid died.
1813		J. A. H. Ulrich died.
1814		Fichte died.
1815		Mesmer died.
1816		Ferguson died.
1817		De Dalberg died.
1818		Platner and Campe died.
1819		Jacobi and Solger died.
1820		Wytttenbach and Klein died. Gall d
1821		Feder and Buhle died.
1822		Eschenmayer died.

A. C.	German Emperors.	
1828	Ferdinand IV.	Reinhold and Maass died.
1828		D. Stewart and Bouterwek died.
1829		Frederic Schlegel.
1831		Hegel. Whateley.
1832		Krause. Schulze. Spurzheim died.
1834		Schleiermacher.
1836		Brownson. J. Mill died. Ritter.
1837		Fourier. Whewell.
1838		Schopenhauer died. Day.
1839		Wayland.
1840	Francis.	Krug.
1841		Herbart. Emerson. Upham.
1842		Degerando. Schmucker.
1843		Fries. Fr. Baader. J. S. Mill.
1844		Baynes. Bouvier.
1846		Rauch.
1848		W. A. Butler. Blakey.
1849		Hickok.
1850		Jouffroy. Chalybeus. M'Cosh.
1851	Joseph I.	Oersted.
1852		Diction. des Sciences Philos. completed.
1854		Fortlage. Wight's Transl. of Cousin.
1856		Hamilton's Reid. Schelling died.
1856		Hamilton, Sir Wm., died. Schwegler's Hist
1857		Philos., Transl. by Seelye.
1857		Haven.
1859		Mansell. Jamieson.
1860		Young. Dagg.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

OF THE

History and Literature of the Philosophical Sciences,

FROM 1860 TO 1877.

1860.

F. CHR. BAUER (1792-†Dec. 2, 1860). **HISTORY.** Brandis (Greek and Roman). **JOURNALS.** *Zeitschrift für exacte Philosophie*, organ of the Herbartian School, ed. by Allihn & Ziller. **PSYCHOPHYSICS.** Fechner. **ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER** (Feb. 22, 1788-†Sept. 21, 1860). **G. H. SCHUBERT** (1780-†July 1, 1860).

1861.

K. F. GÖSCHEL (1781-†1861). **H. F. W. HINRICHS** (1794-†1861). **JOURNALS.** *Der Gedanke*, ed. by C. L. Michelet. **PSYCHOLOGY.** Fechner. **F. J. STAHL** (1802-†1861).

1862.

H. M. CHALYBÄUS (1792-†1862). **LIFE.** Moleschott (L., circle of, 2d ed.). **SCHOPENHAUER.** Gwinner.

1863.

COMTE. E. Littré. **HISTORY.** Cousin (5th. ed.). **MAN.** Vogt. **PHILOSOPHY.** Comte (2d ed., Positivist). **PSYCHOLOGY.** Wundt (P., human and animal). **SCHOPENHAUER.** Frauenstädt; Linder. **SOUND-SENSATIONS.** Helmholtz.

1864.

FERRIER, J. F. (1808-†1864). **HISTORY.** K. Schwarz. **HUMANITY.** Jules Michelet. **F. LASSALLE** (1825-†1864, Hegelian). **NATURE.** K. Ch. Planck. **POSITIVISM.** Comte (Cours, 2d ed. fin., Catéchisme, 2d ed.). Taine. **SCHOPENHAUER.** R. Haym.

1865.

COGNITION. Czolbe. **DIALECTICS.** Dühring. **A. GÜNTHER** (1785-†1865). **HEGEL.** J. H. Stirling (Secret of H.). **HERBART.** Leander. **MATERIALISM.** O. Flügel (Atomistic). **PLATO.** Grote. **PROUDHON** (1809-†Jan. 19, 1865). **RATIONALISM.** Lecky.

1866.

CAUSAL PRINCIPLE. Wundt (Relation of axioms of physics to). **COMTE.** J. S. Mill. **HENNING, L. v.** (†Oct. 6). **HISTORY.** Brandis. **J. S. MILL.** J. McCosh. **MORPHOLOGY.** Ernst Hæckel. **SCHOPENHAUER.** Victor Kiy. **I. P. V. TROXLER.**† **WEISSE, C. H.** (1801-†Sept. 19, 1866). **WHEWELL, WM.** (1795-†1866).

1867.

ÆSTHETICS. Lotze. **BRANDIS, C. A.** (1790-†July 24, 1867). **COUSIN** (1792-†1867). **DRESSLER** (†May 18). **HERBART.** Langenbeck. **HISTORY.** Lewes (3d ed.). **MAN.** Lyell. **MILL.** Stebbing (Logic). **PHILOSOPHY.** Trendelenburg (Historical contributions, finished). **UNCONSCIOUS, PHILOSOPHY OF,** written by C. R. E. v. Hartmann.

1868.

COMTE. Œuvres, ed. by Littré. **DIALECTIC.** C. R. E. v. Hartmann (D. method). **HEGEL.** K. Rosenkranz. **JUS NATURALE.** Trendelenburg (J. N., on the basis of ethics, 2d edit.). **PHILOSOPHY.** F. Harms. **ROTHERICH** (1797-†1867). **SCHLEIERMACHER.** P. Schmidt (Spinoza and S.). **UNCONSCIOUS, PHILOSOPHY OF,** by v. Hartmann appears; runs through many editions in the years following.

1869.

F. E. BENEKE. Dressler. **K. G. CARUS** (1789-†July 28, 1869). **HEGEL.** Rosenkranz. **HISTORY.** Erdmann, Dühring, Fischer (modern, 5th vol.), Zeller (Greek). **JUS.** F. v. Holtzendorff. **RELIGION.** Pfleiderer. **BITTER H.**† **SCHELLING.** C. R. E. v. Hartmann.

1870:

BIOLOGY. Hæckel. **GREEK PHILOSOPHY.** Cocker. **HEGEL.** K. Köstlin. **HISTORY.** Stöckl. **LOGIC.** Fowler (Inductive L.), Kant (Kirchmann), Trendelenburg (Logical Investigations, 3d ed.), Ulrici. **PHILOSOPHY.** J. B. Meyer. **PLATO.** Day. **SCHLEIERMACHER.** W. Dilthey (Life). **SCHOPENHAUER.** A. de Balche (Renan et S.).

1871.

ÆSTHETICS. Schasler. **BABBAGE, CHAS.** (1792-†Oct. 20, 1871). **DING AN SICH.** C. R. E. v. Hartmann. **GEORGE GROTE** (1794-†June 18, 1871). **HERBART.** Ziller. **MANSEL, H. L.** (1820-†1871). **NATIONAL ECONOMY.** E. Dühring. **SCHOPENHAUER.** Asher. **UEBERWEG.** (†1871). **UNCONSCIOUS, PHILOSOPHY OF.** Jul. Bahnsen, G. C. Stiebeling.

1872.

ÆSTHETICS. Schasler. **ANTHROPOLOGY.** Lotze (Mikrokosmos, 2d ed., completed); Perty (the mysterious in human nature, 2d ed.). **BIBLIOGRAPHY.** Büchting (Bibliotheca, 1867-1871). **CALOBOTICS.** Bronn (2d edit.). **CHARACTER.** S. Smiles. **DARWINISM.** J. W. Spengel (List of writings on D.). **ENCYCLOPÆDIA.** Bouillet (10th ed.); Meyer (Hand-Lexicon). **FEUERBACH, L. A.** (1804-†Sept. 13). **HISTORY.** Bahnsen; Cousin (9th edit.); K. Fischer; Kuhn: Ueberweg (translated by G. S. Morris, with additions by Noah Porter, Vol. I.). **HUME.** Jodl. **IMMORTALITY.** Luz. **KANT.** Grapengiesser. **LIFE.** Boell. **LOCKE, JOHN.** (Works transl. and annotated by Kirchmann). **LOGIC.** Dittes; Ulrici (Compend., 2d ed.). **LOGOS.** Heinze (L. in Greek Philosophy). **MATERIALISM.** M. Payne (Physiology of Soul and Instinct); Weis. **ORGANON.** Braubach. **PHILOSOPHY.** Riehl. **PLATO.** Burges's transl. completed. **PROPÆDEUTICS.** Beck; K. Hoffmann. **RELIGION.** Pfeiderer (Morals and R.); Seydel; Stöckl. **SCHILLING, G.†** **SCHOPENHAUER.** Asher; Frommann; J. B. Meyer. **SENSE-PERCEPTION.** Böse. **SPINOZA.** Volkelt. **SPIRITUALISM.** W. Crookes. **D. F. STRAUSS.** Der alte u. d. neue Glaube—the old Faith and the new Faith—creates a great sensation, and leads to the publication of a large number of works. **FR. AD. TRENDELENBURG** (1802-†Jan. 24, 1872). **UNCONSCIOUS, PHILOSOPHY OF THE.** J. C. Fischer; v. Hartmann (3d ed.). **WILL.** Wiese. **WORLD.** Boehmer.

1873.

ÆSTHETICS. Werber. **ANIMA MUNDI.** Dieteric. **ART.** Carriere (2d ed.). **BACON, ROGER.** L. Schneider. **BRANISS, J.†** **DARWINISM.** Schleicher. **DYNAMISM.** Chlebk. **EMOTIONS.** Darwin (Expression of E. in man and animals). **ENCYCLOPÆDIA.** Supplement to the eleventh edition of Brockhaus completed. **HEGEL.** Michelet; Schasler. **HISTORY.** Dühring (2d. ed.); Lewes (German, 2d ed.); Maurice (new ed.); Ueberweg (Patristic and Scholastic, Reicke, 4th ed.); Vogel; Weber; Zeller (German Philosophy since Leibnitz). **KANT.** J. K. Abbott (Translat. of Theory of Ethics);

1873—(Continued).

Kirchmann (Annot. of Logic). **LECKY**. Jolowicz (2d ed.). **LOGIC**. T. Fowler (Deductive L., 5th ed.); G. Hagemann (L. and Noetics). **MAN**. Otto Caspari. **MATERIALISM**. Lange (2d ed.); W. Streissguth. **MILL**, J. S. (1806–†1873), (Works translated into German, and annotated by Gomperz). **MIND**. A. Bain (M. and Body, the theories of their relation). **NATURAL RIGHTS**. Ulrici (Naturrecht in Gott u. d. Mensch, II. i.). **NATURE**. Drossbach (Grades of Intelligence and Morality in N.); Langwieser (Du Bois-Reymond). **NOETICS**. G. Hagemann (3d ed., see Logic). **ORGANISMS**. G. T. Fechner. **PHILOSOPHY**. Jacques; Simon; Saisset (Manuel, 7th ed.); W. H. Hill; Schwetz; Spir (Critical P.). **PLATO**. Didot edition, completed. **PSYCHOLOGY**. F. Dittes; Erdmann (5th ed.); I. H. Fichte (2d Part, Thinking and Willing); Schell. **RELIGION**. Zeising (R. and Science). **SCHOPENHAUER**. Venetianer. **SPINOZA**. Wetzell. **STRAUSS**. (Old and New Faith, eds. 4–6, Epilogue as Prologue, eds. 1–4); M. Blind (translator); Frohschammer, Hieronymi, Huber, J. B. Meyer, Nippold, Philippson, Rauwenhoff, Spörri, Ulrici, Weis, Zirngiebl. **SUPERSTITION**. Pfeiderer. **THEISM**. I. H. Fichte. **THINKERS**. J. E. Garretson (T. and Thinking). **UNCONSCIOUS, PHILOSOPHY OF**. E. v. Hartmann (5th ed.).

1874.

ÆSTHETICS. Stöckl (2d ed.). **ANTHROPOLOGY**. Perty. **APOLOGETICS**, Philosophical. J. H. A. Ebrard. **ARISTOTLE**. Works, Didot edition, completed. **BERKELEY**. Principles of Human Knowledge (Ueberweg's notes), ed. by C. P. Krauth; Fraser (Selections). **CHARACTER**. Smiles (2d ed.). **DREAMS**. Strümpell. **EMPIRICISM**. Pfeiderer (E. and Scepticism). **ETHICS**. Seydel. **FETICH**. J. Miller (F. in Theology). **GOD**. Ulrici (G. and Man, 2d ed. I. Body and Soul: i. Physiological part; ii. Psychological part). **HEGEL**. Harris (Journal, viii. 35); Rosenkranz, tr. in Harris's Journal, viii. 1). **HISTORY**. Flint (Philosophy of H. in Europe); Poelter; Schultze (Renaissance); Thilo (Modern); Ueberweg, translated by Geo. S. Morris. **IDEAS**. Vera (Harris's Journal, viii. 107, 228, 289). **IMMORTALITY**. Teichmüller. **KANT**. Edmunds (Harris's Journ., viii. 339); Laurie (Harris's Journal, viii. 305, 339). **LOGIC**. Anderson (Harris's Journal, viii. 85); Drbal; Lotze; Mill (8th ed.); Trendelenburg (Aristotle, 7th ed.); Ueberweg (4th ed.); Vera (Harris's Journal, viii. 13). **MATERIALISM**. Büchner; Dupray; Lange (2d ed.); Tyndall. **METAPHYSICS**. Schlüter (Aristotle's). **MIND**. J. Gaskell. **PANLOGISM**. E. v. Hartmann.

1874—(Continued).

PESSIMISM. Hartsen. **PEDAGOGICS.** Rosenkranz (Harris's Journal, viii. 49). **PROBLEMS.** Lewes (P. of Life and Mind). **PROPEDEUTICS.** Beck. **PSYCHOLOGY.** Drbal; Hagemann (3d. ed.); Harms; Hartsen; Lindner; Ulrici (Gott u. d. Mensch, part I., 2d ed.); Wundt. **SCHOPENHAUER.** Harris; Joséfé (Harris's Journal, viii. 316); Works, ed. by Frauenstädt, iv.—vi. **SCIENCE.** Jevons (Principles of S.). **SOUL.** Bain (S. and Body). **STRAUSS** (†Feb. 9, 1874). Br. Bauer; Reuschle; H. B. Smith; Steutz; Ulrici (transl., with introduction by C. P. Krauth); Zeller; Ziegler. **SUPERNATURAL.** A. R. Wallace (Scientific view of). **WEISSENBOHN, G.** (†June 4th). **WILL.** Kirchner (W., Freedom of).

1875.

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kranz. **PROBLEMS**. Lewes (P. of Life and Mind; Foundations of a Creed). **PROPÆDEUTICS**. E. Klotz. **PSYCHOLOGY**. Bernard; Erdmann (Letters, 5th ed.); Fortlage; Pötter; v. Volkmar. **PSYCHOPHYSICS**. Benedikt (Ethics and Jus). **REALISM**. E. v. Hartmann; Kirchmann. **RELIGION**. C. W. Shields (R. and Science in their relation to Philosophy). **SCHELLING**. Becker. **SCHOPENHAUER**. Klee; Works edited by Frauenstädt. **SCIENCE**. A. P. Peabody; J. T. Seccombe. **SCIENCE, SOCIAL**. R. E. Thompson. **SENSES**. R. S. Wyld. **SOCIALISM**. Martensen. **SOCIOLOGY**. Herbert Spencer. **SOUL**. Cornelius (S. and Body); Lazarus (Life of the S.); Scheide-macher (S. and Brain-activity). **SPENCER**. Synthetic Philosophy. **SPINOZA**. Albert; Busolt; Ginsberg; Turbiglio. **STRAUSS**. Alte u. neue Glaube (8th ed.). **SYNTHETISM**. Richard. **THOUGHT**. T. Hughes. **UNCONSCIOUS, PHILOSOPHY OF**. V. Hartmann (7th ed.); Kluge. **UTILITARIANISM**. Carrau. **VOCABULARY**. Bourdet (Principal Terms in the Positive Philosophy). **WILL**. Hazard (Let-ters to Mill, tr. into German).

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ACTUALITY. Liebmann. **ÆSTHETICS**. Fechner. **ANTHROPOL-
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PHILOSOPHY. F. A. Hartsen; Kirkman (reviewed by Manning; Contemp. Rev., Novemb.); *Liberatore* (6th ed.; Institutiones); Michelet; Steudel (in Outline); Stöckl (Lehrb., 4th ed.). **POSITIVISM.** Pattison (Cont. Rev., March). **PROBLEMS.** Flügel (P. of Philosophy, and Solutions of them). **PSYCHOLOGY.** Brentano; Dilles; Volkmar. **RELIGION.** D. G. Brinton; Fairbarn. **SCHOPENHAUER.** Adamson (Mind, i. 491); Frauenstädt; Gass; v. Hartmann; Helen Zimmern. **SENSES.** Bernstein (Internat. Scientif. Series). **SENSUALISM.** R. L. Dabney. **SOCIOLOGY.** H. Spencer. **SPECULATION.** I. H. Fichte (most recent phases of German). **SPENCER, HERBERT.** Synthetical Philosophy; Principles of Biology. **SPINOZA.** Ethics, translated by D. D. S. **SPIRITUALISM.** W. A. Hammond. **STRAUSS.** Fairbarn (Cont. Rev., May, seq.). **THOUGHT, ENGLISH.** Leslie Stephen (E. T. in XVIIth Century). **UNCONSCIOUS, PHILOSOPHY OF.** Ebrard; Vaihinger. **VOCABULARY.** Third ed. of Fleming's, by H. Calderwood; Classified English V. **ZOOLOGY,** in Relation to Philosophy. Lamarck (Martin-Laug).

1877.

ÆSTHETICS. G. Allen (Physiological A.). **ARISTOTLE.** Kirchmann. **ATHEISM.** Mallock (Contemp. Rev., Jan.). **ALEXANDER BAIN.** (†Jan. 11.) **BUDDHA.** M. Dods. **CAUSES.** Janet (Final C.). **DARWINISM,** still under discussion; new editions of Darwin's works appearing; E. v. Hartmann, translated into French by Gueroult; E. Dreher (Darwinismus—Darwinism and its place in Philosophy); Jos. Kuhl (D. and Philology). **DOUBT.** Pradez. **ECONOMY, POLITICAL.** Bastiat; A. L. Perry; J. L. Shadwell. **EDUCATION.** Kiddle & Schem (Cyclopædia). **ENCYCLOPÆDIAS,** finished or in progress. Britannica (ninth ed., in progress); Brockhaus (Conversat. Lexicon, 12th ed., in progress); Johnson (Department of Philosophy edited by Harris and Krauth), finished. **ETHICS.** Landau; Steudel; Whinfield. **HISTORY.** P. Regnaud (India). **IDEALREALISM.** Weis. **IMMORTALITY.** Goeschel (tr. by Vickroy, Harris's Journal, xi. 65); Theod. Strauss. **JOURNALS, PHILOSOPHICAL,** entire or in large part: *Avenarius* (Göring, Heinze, Wundt): Vierteljahrsschrift (Quarterly for Scientific Philosophy). *Bratuschek* (Ascherson, Bergmann): Monatshefte (Philosophical Monthly). Contemporary Review. *I. H. Fichte* (Ulrici, Wirth). Zeitschrift (Journal of Philosophy and Philosophical Criticism), from 1837. *Harris:* Journal of Speculative Philosophy (from 1867). *M. Lazarus* and *H. Steinthal:* Zeitschrift (Journal of Popular Psychology and Philology) from 1859. *Ribot:* (Revue

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Atheism.

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Reason.

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Cynic. Epicurean. Fate. Idea. Motion. Propriety. Stoics.

ZEVORT. (See PIERRON.)

Contradiction.

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SYNTHETICAL TABLE

OF THE

PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES.¹

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THEORY AND DEFINITIONS.

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The Science of Language
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II. PSYCHOLOGY.

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Interior Perception.
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¹ On the basis of the Table Synthétique of the *Dictionnaire des Sciences Philosophiques*, Deuxième édition, Paris, 1875, pp. 1797–1804.

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Concrete and Abstract.	Contraries (<i>Propositions</i>).
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System.	— Disamis. — Fapesmo. — Felapton. —
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Signs, Language.	Enthymeme.
Proposition.	Antecedent.
Prædicate, Subject.	Consequent.
Prædicament.	Corollary.
Copula.	Conclusion.
Comprehension, Extension	Disjunction.
(Logical).	Disjunctive <i>Argument</i> , or
Affirmation.	Proposition.
Negation.	Dilemma.
	Epicheirema.
	Sorites.
	Argument <i>a fortiori</i> .
	Reduction <i>ad absurdum</i> .

III. LOGIC—(Continued).

Argument.	Error.
Argument <i>a pari</i> , Example.	Antinomy.
See Analogy.	Paralogism.
d. <i>Signs of Error, and its Remedy.</i>	Sophism, Sophistical.
Opinion.	Amphibology.
Hypothesis.	Petito Principii, Fallacy.
Prejudice.	Diallel, Arguing in a circle.

IV. ÆSTHETICS.

Beautiful.	Genius.
Sublime.	Imagination.
Ideal.	Imitation.
Taste.	Arts (The Fine).

V. MORALS, ETHICS.

Goodness.	Apathy.
Honesty.	Justice.
Order.	Penalty.
Law.	Philanthropy.
Autonomy.	Charity.
Perfection.	<i>Self-preservation.</i>
Duty.	Suicide.
Imperative (Categorical, The).	Property.
Jus.	Family.
Right.	Education.
Merit and Demerit.	State.
Virtue.	Society.
Vice.	Socialism.
Cardinal Virtues.	Human Destiny.
Ascetic Virtues, Asceticism.	Humanity.
Abstinence.	Progress.
Stoicism.	Perfectibility.

VI. METAPHYSICS.

Ontology.	Non-Being.
Being.	Nihilum, or Nothing.
Non-Existence.	Privation.

VI. METAPHYSICS—*(Continued.)*

Unity.	Monad.
Essence.	Individuality.
Entity.	Time.
Quiddity.	Space.
Substantial Forms.	Extension.
Archetypes.	Externality, or Outness.
Noumenon.	Motion.
Phenomenon.	Number.
Actual.	Sphere.
Virtual.	Indefinite.
Cause.	Infinite.
Causes (Final).	A parte ante.
Causes (Occasional).	A parte post.
Substance.	Spirit.
Abstract.	Matter.
Accident.	Nature.
Force.	Macrocosm.
Entelechy.	Microcosm.

VII. THEODICY.

Theology.	Prescience.
Theosophy.	Providence.
Teleology.	Evil.
God.	Chance.
Demiurge.	Necessity.
Anima Mundi (Soul of the World).	Destiny.
Emanation.	Predestination.
Creation.	Immortality.
	Eternity.

PART SECOND.

HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL.

FIRST.—PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS.

OF SYSTEMS IN GENERAL.

Dogmatism.	Atheism.
Scepticism.	Theism.
Rationalism.	Deism.
Empiricism.	Anthropomorphism.
Idealism.	Optimism.
Sensualism.	Pessimism.
Nominalism.	Dualism.
Realism.	Pantheism.
Conceptualism.	Fatalism.
Spiritualism.	Metempsychosis.
Animism.	Mysticism.
Materialism.	Quietism.
Hylozoism.	Syncretism.
Dynamism.	Eclecticism.
Atomism.	

SECOND.—PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS.

I. PHILOSOPHY, ORIENTAL.

- | | |
|--|--|
| <p>1. Philosophy of India.
Gymnosophists.—Hylobians.—Sankhya.—Nyaya.—Karikā.—Gotama.—Kapila.—Kanada.—Calana.—Buddhism.</p> <p>2. Philosophy of China.
Lao-tseu.—Confucius (Khoung-fou-tseu).—Mencius (Meng-tseu).—Lie-tseu.—Siun-tseu.</p> <p>3. Philosophy of Egypt.
Hermes Trismegistus.—Hermetic Books, pretended.</p> <p>4. Philosophy of Chaldea.</p> | <p>5. Philosophy of Sabeists.
Sabeism (Sabianism).</p> <p>6. Philosophy of Persians.
Sufi (Sophi).—Sufism.</p> <p>7. Philosophy of Phœnicians.
Sanchoniathon.—Moschus.</p> <p>8. Philosophy of Jews.
Cabala (Kabala).—Aristobulus, the Philosopher.—Philo.—Akiba.—Avicbron.—Maimonides.</p> <p>9. Philosophy of Syrians.</p> |
|--|--|

II. PHILOSOPHY, GREEK.

1. **Mysteries.** Esoteric doctrine.
2. **Hymns of Orpheus.** Orphic Philosophy.
3. **Homeric Philosophy.**
4. **Gnomic Philosophy.**
5. **Sages of Greece.**
Epimenides.—Pherecydes.—Simonides.—Solon.—Bias.—Chilon.—Pittacus.—Cleobulus.—Periander.—Phaleas.
6. **Ionic School.**
Thales.—Hippo.—Anaximenes.—Diogenes of Apollonia.—Heraclitus.—Cratylus.—Anaximander.—Hermotimus.—Anaxagoras.—Archelaus.—Empedocles.
7. **Italic or Pythagorean School.**
Pythagoras.—Charondas.—Lysis.—Abaris.—Theano.—Aristeus.—Alcmeon.—Timæus.—Ocellus.—Eurytus.—Enopides.—Ecphantus.—Hippasus.—Hippodame.—Epicharmus.—Archytas.—Philolaus.—Stesimbrotus.—Echecrates.
8. **Eleatic School.**
Xenophanes.—Parmenides.—Zeno.—Xeniades.—Melissus.
9. **Atomistic School.**
Leucippus.—Democritus.—Bion.—Diomenes.—Anaxarchus.—Metrodorus of Chios.—Nausiphanes.
10. **Sophistic School.**
Gorgias.—Protagoras.—Diagoras.—Euthydemes.—Dionysodores.—Polus.—Critias.—Prodicus.—Callicles.—Hippias.—Thrasymachus.—Alcidamas.
11. **Socratic School.**
Socrates.—Simon.—Socrates the Younger.—Crito.—Simias.—Cebes.—Charmides.—Xenophon.—Aeschines.
12. **Cynic School.**
Antisthenes.—Diogenes the Cynic.—Crates the Cynic.—Hipparchia.—Salust the Cynic.—Echecles.—Metrocles.—Monimus.—Menippus.
13. **Cyrenaic School.**
Aristippus.—Bion of Borysthenes.—Aretas.—Antipater of Cyrene.—Aristippus the Younger.—Eudoxus.—Theodorus of Cyrene.—Evemerus.—Anniceris.—Hegesias.—Dionysius of Heraclea.
14. **Megaric School.**
15. **Eristic School.**
Euclid.—Clinomachus.—Eubulides.—Stilpo.—Apollonius of Cyrene.—Euphantes.—Bryson.—Alexinus.—Diodorus Cronus.—Philo the Megarian.
16. **Elis and Eretria School.**
Phaedon.—Menedemus.—Asclepiades.
17. **Platonic School, Academy.**
Plato.—Speusippus.—Phormio.—Polemo.—Crates the Platonician.—Axiothea.—Xenocrates.—Crantor.
18. **Peripatetic School, Lyceum.**
Aristotle.—Peripatetic Philosophy.—Nichomachus.—Theophrastus.—Eudemus.—Dicaearchus.—Aristoxenus.—Heraclides.—Strato.—Boethius.—Lycón.—Ariston of Iulis.—Critolaus.—Diodorus of Tyre.—Asclepias.—Aspasius.—Aristocles.
19. **Pyrrhonic School, Scepticism.**
Pyrrho.—Timon, author of the Silloi.—Philo the Athenian.—Numenius the Pyrrhonian.—Dioscorides.—Euphranor.
20. **Epicurean School.**
Epicurus.—Aristobolus the Epicurean.—Metrodorus of Lampasa.—Leontium.—Polyen.—Hermachus.—Apollodorus the Epicurean.—Colotes.—Herodotus the Epicurean.—Phaedrus.—Philodemus.—Zeno the Epicurean.
21. **Stoic School.**
Zeno.—Perseus.—Herillus.—Cleanthes.—Ariston of Chios.—Athenodorus of Soli.—Chrysippus.—Antipater of Sidon.—Archidemus.—Panaetius.—Posidonias.—Chaeremon.—Apollonhæa.

II. PHILOSOPHY, GREEK—(*Continued*).

22. New Academy.

Arceasias.—Lacydes.—Calliphon.—Carneades.—Diogenes the Babylonian.—Metrodorus of Stratonica.—Clitomachus.—Charmidas.—Philo of Larissa.—Antiochus of Ascalon.

23. Greek Philosophy among the Romans.

a. *Political Philosophy.*

Polybius.

b. *Roman Jurisconsults.*c. *Roman Epicureans.*

Catius.—Amasianus.—Cassius.—Basilius Aufidius.—Lucretius.

d. *Roman Stoics, Pythagoreans, and Cynics.*

Sextius.—Sotion.—Areus.—Attalus.—Seneca.—Musonius.—Cornutus.—Demetrius.—Epictetus.—Arrianus.—Marcus Aurelius.—Euphrates.—Enomachus.—Demonax.—Crescens.

e. *Roman Practical Eclecticism, New Academy (Cicero).*

24. Decadence of the Greek Philosophy.

a. *New Pythagoreans.*

Euxenus.—Apollonius of Tyana.—Secundus.—Anaxilas.—Moderatus.—Nicomachus of Gerasa.—Nearchus.—Alexander Polyhistor.—Apuleius.

b. *New Platonists; Erudite Platonists.*

Arelus Didymus.—Thrasyllus.—Plutarch.—Alcinous.—Albinus.—Maximus of Tyre.—Taurus Calvisius.—Atticus.—Favorinus.—Theon of Smyrna.—Ptolemaeus.—Calus.—Arria.—Alexan-

der Numenius.—Alexander Peloplaton.—Macrobius.

c. *New Peripatetics.*

Andronicus.—Cratippus.—Xenarchus.—Nicolaus of Damar.—Alexander of Aegæ.—Adrastus of Aphrodisia.—Ammonius the Peripatetic.—Herminius.—Alexander of Aphrodisia.—Galen.—Boethius.—Hieronimus Rhodias.—Hermippus.—Themistius.—Simplicius.

d. *New Sceptics.*

Aenesidemus.—Agrippa.—Menodotus.—Antiochus of Laodicea.—Acron of Agrigentum.—Herodotus of Tarsus.—Sextus Empiricus.—Cythæna.

e. *Sophists, Rhetoricians, Compilers.*

Dion (Dio Chrysostomus).—Lucian.—Diogenes Laertius.—Philostratus.—Eunapius.—Stobæus.—Hesychius.—Fronto.

25. SCHOOL OF ALEXANDRIA.

Numenius of Apamea.—Potamon.—Ammonius Saccas.—Herennius.—Longinus.—Origen the Pagan.—Plotinus.—Amelius.—Lydmachus.—Porphyry.—Jamblichus.—Julian.—Dexippus.—Edesius.—Chrysanthius.—Eustathius.—Eusebius of Myndos.—Sallust the Philosopher.—Plutarch of Athens.—Syrianus.—Asclepiogenia.—Proclus.—Hierocles.—Olympiodorus.—Æneas of Gaza.—Asclepiodotus.—Hermias.—Aedesia.—Priscus.—Ammonius, son of Hermias.—Hypatia.—Marinus.—Isidorus.—Zenodotus.—Damascius.

26. Gnosticism. Gnostic School.

Simon Magus.—Cerinthus.—Saturninus.—Bardesane.—Basilides.—Valentinus.—Carpocrates.—Marcion.—Cerdon.—Manes, *Manichæism*.

III. CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHERS AND CHURCH FATHERS.

a. Greek Church.

Saint Justin.—St. Clemens Alexandrinus.—Aristides.—Tatian.—Athenagoras.—Origen.—Nemesius.—Eusebius.—Synesius.—Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite.—David of Armenia.—Zacharias, Bishop of Mitylene.—Philoponus.—St. John of Damascus.—Pho-

tius.—Psellus.—Johannes Italus.—Aneponymus.—Pachymeres.

b. Latin Church.

Tertullian.—Lactantius.—St. Augustine.—Mameatus Claudianus.—Salvianus.—Martianus Capella.—Boethius.—Cassiodorus.—Bede.

IV. ARABIAN PHILOSOPHY.

Kendi.—Farabi.—Ibn-Sina (Avicenna).—Gazali (Algazel).—Ibn-Badja

(Aven Paclus).—Ibn-Roschd (Averroes).—Tofall.

V. SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY.

1. FIRST EPOCH.—Beginning of IXth to end of XIIth cent.

Alcuin.—Rabanus Maurus.—Scotus Erigena.—Remi of Auxerre.—Gerbert.—Berenger of Tours.—Lanfranc.—Damien.—Roscellinus.—St. Anselm.—Gaunilo.—Anselm of Laon.—Alberic of Reims.—Adelard.—Hildebert.—William of Champeaux.—Abelard.—St. Bernard.—Gilbertus Porretanus (of Poitiers).—Bernard of Chartres.—Peter Beranger.—William of Conches.—Hugo de St. Victor.—Richard de St. Victor.—Hugo of Amiens.—Peter Lombard.—Adam of Petit-Pont.—Adelger.—Alanus ab Insulis (the universal doctor).—John of Salisbury.—Almarich (Amaury) of Chartres.

2. SECOND EPOCH.—XIIIth and XIVth centuries.

Alexander of Hales.—William of Paris.—William of Moerbeke.—John of Rochelle.—Ranulphus Normannus.—Robert Capto (Great Head).—Peter of Spain.—Vincent of Beauvais.—Michael Scotus.—Albertus Magnus.—St. Bonaventura.—St. Thomas Aquinas.—Henry of Ghent (Goethals), (the solemn doctor).—Roger Bacon (the wonderful doctor).—Peter of Auvergne.—

John of London.—Middleton.—Duns Scotus.—Raymond Lully.—Arnold of Villanova.—Kilwardby.—Aegidius Colonna.—Peter of Abano.—Hervaeus Natalis.—Franciscus de Mayronis (master of abstractions and illuminate and acute doctor).—Durand of St. Pourcain (most ready doctor).—Burleigh.—Ockam.—Dante.—Robert Holcot.—Thomas of Strasburg.—Buridan.—John of Mericour.—John of Monteson.—Radulphus Brito (Raoul).—Henry of Langestein.—Oreame.—Paul of Venice.—Marsilius of Inghen.—Heinrich of Hease.

a. Mystics opposed to the Scholastic Philosophy.

Tauler.—Eckart.—Suso.—Gerson.—Petrarch.—Ruysbroek.

3. THIRD EPOCH.—Decline and Fall of the Scholastic Philos.

Peter of Ailly.—Nicholas of Clemen-gis.—Raymond of Sebonde.—Justiniani.—Orbellia.—Paul of Pergola.—Peter of Mantua.—Wessel (Gansfort).—Gabriel Biel.—Dominicus of Flanders.—Cajetan.—John Major (Mair).—Zabarella.—Rhoedus.—Sarnanus.—Lereca.—Suarez.—Zanardi.—Frassen.

VI. PHILOSOPHY OF THE RENAISSANCE.

1. Greek Refugees in Italy.

Bessarion.—Gemistus Pletho.—Genadijus.—Theodorus of Gaza.—George of Trebizond.—Argyropulus.

2. Men of Letters opposed to Scholasticism.

Leonard of Arezzo.—Philelphus.—Laurentius Valla.—Hermolaus Barbarus.—Angelo Policiano.—Rudolph Agricola.—Ulric von Hutten.—Luther.—Melancthon.—Erasmus.—Vives.—Nizolius.—Morel.—Jacobus Faber Stapulensis.—Levoyer (Visorinus).—Sadollet.—Acontius.

3. Peripatetics.

Pomponatius.—Augustinus Niphas.—Contarinus.—Leonicius Thomeus.—Javellus.—Vanius.—Camerarius.—The Conimbricenses of the University of Conimbriga, Coimbra.—Sepulveda.—Govea.—Perlonius.—Charpentier.—Pernumia.—Marta.—Martini.—Pacius.—Cremonini.—Alexander Piccolomini.—Francis Piccolomini.—Achillini.—Cesalpino.—Rorario.—Picart.—Dagella.—Schegk.—Cornelius Martin.—Launoy.—Conring.—Keckermann.

4. Platonicians and Pythagoreans.

Nicholas of Cusa.—Marsilius Ficinus.—Patricius.—Mazzoni.—Jordano Bruno.

5. Stoics.

Justus Lipsius.—Scioptius.—Gataker.—Quevedo.

6. Sceptics.

Sanchez.—Montaigne.—Charron.

7. Mystics.

Reuchlin.—Pico de Mirandula, John.—Pico de Mirandula, Francis.—Cornelius Agrippa.—Ricci.—Zimara.—Zorzi (George of Venice).—Leo Hebraeus.—Paracelsus.—Cardan.—Postel.—Michael Servetus.—Amos Camenius.—Bayer.—Mennens.—Valentine Weigel.—Jacob Boehm.—Robert Fludd.—Por-dage.—Van Helmont, J. B.—Van Helmont, Francis.—Angelus Silesius.—Kronland.

8. Efforts at Reform and Restoration.

Telesio (Telesius).—Juan Huarte.—Taurellus.—Kepler.—Campanella.—Muti.—Ramus.—Casmann.—Gocienius.—Berigard (Beauregard).—Magnen.

9. Moralists and Political Philosophers.

Machiavel.—Languet.—Pibrac.—Jean Bodin.—Estienne de la Boétie.—Pierre de la Place.—Thomas More.—Mariana.—Grotius.—Barbeyrac.—Noodt.

VII. MODERN PHILOSOPHY.—GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS.

(Bacon, Des Cartes.)

A. ENGLISH SCHOOL.

I. Sensualism, School of.

Hobbes.—Welthuyzen (of Utrecht).—Coward.—John Locke.—Mandeville.—Collins.—Dodwell.—Tindal.—Bolling-broke.—S' Gravesande (of Holland).—Hartley.—Priestley.—Abraham Tucker ("Edward Search").—Paley.—Ben-tham.—Mill, James.—Mill, John Stuart.

II. Spiritualism, School of.

1. Naturalists.

Herbert of Cherbury.—Glisson.—Ray.—Newton.

2. Metaphysicians and Theologians.

Milton.—Gale.—Cudworth.—Henry More.—Norris.—Collier.—Berkeley.—

VII. MODERN PHILOSOPHY—(*Continued.*)

Peter Brown.—Lee.—King.—Clarke.—Wollaston.—Shaftesbury.—Palmer.
Derham.—Butler.—Watts.—Stanley.—Price.—Harris.—Burke.
Monboddo.

3. Moralists, Critics.

Barelay.—Harrington.—Cumberland.

III. Scepticism, Scientific School
of.

Glanville.—Craig.—Hume.

B. SCOTCH PHILOSOPHY.

Hutcheson.—Home.—Turnbull.—
Smith.—Reid.—Oswald.—Beattie.—
Ferguson.—Dugald Stewart.—Thomas

Brown.—Bruce.—Mackintosh.—Sir
Wm. Hamilton.

C. FRENCH PHILOSOPHY.

I. Cartesianism, Cartesian School.
Des Cartes. (See above, Modern Phil-
osophy).

1. Disciples of Des Cartes.

Rohault.—De la Forge.—Regis.—
Clauberg.—Cordemoy.—Wittichius.—
Geulincx.—Arnauld.—Nicole.—Male-
branche.—Lamy.—Bossuet.—Fenelon.
—Ruard Andala.—Roel.—Buffier.—Le-
grand.—Pagnac.—Boursier.—Père
André.—Terrasson.—La Morinière.—
Lignac.—Monestrier.—Fontenelle.

2. Friends of Des Cartes and of
Cartesianism.

Clerseller.—Mersenne.—Salabert.—
Cocceius.—Balthazar Bekker.—Silhon.
—Villemandy.—La Placette.—Jaque-
lot.—Nieuwentyt.—Gerdil.—Moly-
neux.

3. Disciples of Des Cartes dissent-
ing from him in part; Spinoz-
ism.

Spinoza.—Cuper.—Cusaeler.—Par-
ker.—Law.—Boulainvilliers.—Des-
champs.—Bredenburg.—Wachter.

4. Adversaries of Des Cartes:
Theologians.

Voetius.—Bourdin.—Schook.—Ra-
pin.—Guérinois.—Père Hardouin.—
Père Daniel.—Lherminier.—Dutertre.

5. Adversaries of Des Cartes:
Philosophical Sensualists and
Sceptics.

Gassendi.—Perrault.—Hobbes (see
above, English Philosophy).—Sorbière.
—Bernier.—La Chambre.—La Mothe le
Vayer.—Pascal.—Foucher.—Nicaise.
—Bayle.—Huet.—Hirnhaim.

II. Sensualistic School of the
XVIIIth Century.

1. Ideologists and Physiologists.

Condillac.—Bonnet.—Bichat.—Ga-
rat.—Volney.—Cabanis.—Delisle de
Sales.—Bonstetten.—Destutt de Tracy.
—Gall.—Broussais.

2. Encyclopedists.

Diderot.—D'Alembert.—Saint-Lam-
bert.—Du Marsais.—Morellet.—D'Hol-
bach.—Toussaint.

3. Epicureans, Atheists.

Levesque de Pouilly.—Deslandes.—
Mirabaud.—Lametrie.—Helvétius.—
D'Argens.—Robinet.—Maréchal.—Nai-
geon.

III. Moralists, Political Philoso-
phers, Economists.

La Rochefoucauld.—La Bruyère.—
Vauvenargues.—Benjamin Franklin.—
Burlamaqui.—Burigny.—Montesquieu.
—Voltaire.—Mably.—Morelli.—J. J.
Rousseau.—Raynal.—Quefnay.—Tur-
got.—Condorcet.—De Welsa.—J. B. Say.
—Azaïs.

VII. MODERN PHILOSOPHY—(*Continued*).

IV. Adversaries of the Sensualistic Philosophy of the XVIIIth Century.

1. Isolated adversaries.

Lignac (see above, Disciples of Des Cartes).—Monestrier.—Jaucourt.—Guénard.—Le Cat.—Garnier.—Needham.—Hemsterhuys.—Mauvertius.—Le Batteux.—Necker.—Portalis.—Madame de Staël.—Madame Necker de Saussure.—Sainclair.—Villers.—Bérard.

2. Mystics and Theologians.

Polret.—Martinez.—Saint-Martin.—Swedenborg.—Lavater.—Bergier.—De Maistre.—De Bonald.—Ballanche.—Bautain.—Buche.—Lamennais.

3. Spiritualists and Eclectics of the XIXth Century.

Massias.—Prévost.—Thurot.—Laromiguière.—De Gérando.—Stapfer.—Bertrand.—Maine de Biran.—Royer-Collard.—Cousin.—Jouffroy.—Dami-ron.—Garnier.—Saisset.—Rémusat.—Maleville.—Matter.—Balmès.—Bordas-Démoulin.—Bouchitté.—Bouillet.—Delondre.—Jacques.—Javary.—Cardallac.—Charma.

V. Positivists and Humanitarians, Philosophers.

Comte.—Leroux.—Reynaud.

D. ITALIAN PHILOSOPHY.

I. Italian Philosophy of the Renaissance. See above, Renaissance.

II. Philosophers of a later period.

Galileo.—Vico.—Fardella.—Bosco-wich.—Muratori.—Stellini.—Gravina.

—Filangieri.—Beccaria.—Verri.—Felli.—Vettori.—Genovesi.—Buonafede (Cromaziano).—Romagnosi.—Gloja.—Pini.—Becchetti.—Galuppi.—Baldinotti.—Rosmini.—Globetti.—Mancino.—Miceli.

E. GERMAN PHILOSOPHY.

First Epoch.—From Leibnitz to Kant.

I. School of Leibnitz and Wolf.

Leibnitz.—Tschirnhausen.—Wolf.—Bilfinger (Bülfinger).—Thummig.—Canz.—Reinbeck.—Jonstius.—Walch.—Reusch.—Riebov.—Baumeister.—Knutzen.—Meier.—Reimarus.—Ploucquet.—Ludovici.—Formey.—Lambert.—Schwab.—Cramer.

II. Adversaries of Leibnitz and Wolf.

Lange.—Crousaz.—Ridiger.—Budde (Buddes).—Gellert.—Crusius.—Hollmann.—Euler.—Nicolai.—Justi.

III. Independent Eclectics, Academicians of Berlin.

La Croze.—Beausobre.—Mérian.—Lhuillier.—Prémontval.—Sulzer.—Men-

delsohn.—Steinbart.—Eberhard.—Eberstein.—Platner.—Meyners.—Lossius.—Plessing.—Selle.—Féder.—Jérusalem.—Brucker.—Zimmerman.—Herberth.—Irwing.—Hennings.—Campe.—Jenisch.—George Socher.—Tiedemann.—Wytenbach.—Abel.—Mauchart.—Gurlitt.—Dalberg.

IV. Moralists, Political Philosophers.

Puffendorf.—Placcius.—Thomasius, Jacob.—Thomasius, Christian.—Heineccius.—Achenwall.—Garve.—Lessing.—De Vattel.—Hoepfner.—Abbt.—Reinhard.—Becker Rudolph Zachar.—Klotzsch.—Basedow.

VII. MODERN PHILOSOPHY—(Continued).*Second Epoch.—From Kant to our own day.***I. School of Kant.**

Kant.—Reinhold.—Mellin.—Schultz.
—Schmid.—Heydenreich.—Beck.—
Ben David.—Dietz.—Mutschelle.—
Snell.—Schaumann.—Schmidt-Phisel-
dek.—Neeb.—Jacob.—Tieftrunk.—
Kiesewetter.—Hoffbauer.—Künhardt.
—Berger, Emmanuel.—Kern.—Boethi-
us.—Kindervater.—Socher, Joseph.—
Fischhaber.—Pöhlitz.—Schwartz.—
Schmalz.—Bergk.—Feuerbach.—Fül-
leborn.—Flugge.—Born.—Kinker.—
Matthiæ.—Wendt.—Stöudlin.—Buhle.
—Tennemann.—Van Hemert.—Schil-
ler.

II. Dissenters of the School of Kant.

Schulze.—Beck.—Berg.—Maimon.—
Bouterweck.—Bardili.—Rückert.—
Krug.

III. School of Fichte.

Fichte.—Forberg.—Niethammer.—
Schad.—Michaelis, C.F.—Reinhold (see

above, School of Kant).—Schelling
(see below).

IV. School of Jacobi.

Jacobi.—Kœppen.—Fries.—Calker.—
Ancillon.—Weiss, C.—Weiller.—Salat.
—Schmid, Theod.

V. School of Schelling and Hegel.

Schelling.—Hegel.—Novalis.—Weber.
—Ast.—Kayssler.—Klein.—Rixner.—
Steffens.—Abicht.—Zimmer.—Stutz-
mann.—Berger, Eric.—Snabedissen.
—Hillebrand.

VI. Mystics and Dissidents.


Hamann.—Baader.—Statler.—Schle-
gel, Frederic.—Welshaupt.—Herder.—
Schleiermacher.—Solger.—Richter,
Jean Paul.—Schneller.—Krause.—
Herbart.—Kayserlinck.—Schopenhau-
er.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL SPIRIT IN THE SCIENCES.


Galileo.—Digby, Kenelm.—Newton.
—Buffon.—Lamarck.—Stahl.—Cuvier,
George.—Cuvier, Fred.—Mairan.—Dar-

win, Erasm.—Saint-Hilaire.—Feuch-
tersleben.—Oken.

THE END.









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